Embedded Files
Once upon a time I dealt with research on Contract Theory and Mechanism Design, with applications into Auctions and Industrial Organization. Most recently, I did that as a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Bonn.
CV: pdf
email: martin.pollrich<at>gmail.com
ANR Grant (French National Agency for Research) "Signaling in Auctions and Mechanisms: Theory and Experimental Evidence"
Volkswagen Stiftung Grant "Market Design for Medical Supplies and Services: Corona and Beyond"
Publications
"Auctions with Signaling Bidders: Optimal Design and Information Disclosure," with Olivier Bos, accepted at Games and Economic Behavior
''The irrelevance of fee structures for certification," with Roland Strausz, American Economic Review: Insights 2024, Vol 6(1), pp 55-72
"Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," with Vitali Gretschko, Management Science 2022, Vol 68(7), pp. 5146-5161
"Information Design in Sequential Procurement," with Nicolas Fugger and Vitali Gretschko, Games and Economic Behavior 2022, Vol 135, pp. 79-85
"Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations", with Colin von Negenborn, Journal of Economic Theory 2020, Vol 189
"Mediated Audits" RAND Journal of Economics 2017, Vol 48(1), pp. 44-68
"Imprecise Information Disclosure and Truthful Certification", with Lilo Wagner, European Economic Review 2016, Vol 89, pp. 345-360.
Working Paper
"The Hold-up Problem with Unobservable Investment and the Value of Simple Contracts"
"Sequential Procurement without Commitment" (with Nicolas Fugger and Vitali Gretschko)
"Unobservable Investment, limited commitment and the curse of firm relocation" with Robert C. Schmidt
"The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment"
Google Sites
Report abuse