Brief Bio

Mark Walker was born in a small log cabin built on conceptual foundations of his own design. He is a full-blooded Professor in the Philosophy Department where he occupies the Richard L. Hedden Endowed Chair in Advanced Philosophical Studies. Mark’s PhD is from the Australian National University. He previously taught at McMaster University in the department of philosophy and in the Arts & Science Program. He serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Evolution and Technology and on the board of directors of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. Dr. Walker’s teaching and research interests include ethics, epistemology, philosophy of law, philosophy of religion and philosophy of science. His current primary research interests at present are in epistemology and  in ethical issues arising out of emerging technologies, e.g., genetic engineering, advanced pharmacology, artificial intelligence research, and nanotechnology.

Mark Walker's cv. 

Epistemology Papers 

1. "Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement" forthcoming in Dialogue. Abstract: Epistemic uniqueness is the view that there is at most one maximally rational doxastic response to a given batch of evidence E, while epistemic permissiveness is the denial of epistemic uniqueness. As several authors have noted, one of the attractions of epistemic permissiveness is that it appears to allow us to understand philosophical as rationally faultless, and so permit us to respect the epistemic credentials of all parties to a dispute. I argue that permissiveness is unable to deliver on this claimed benefit.

2. Na-Na, Na-Na, Boo-Boo, the Accuracy of Your Philosophical Beliefs is Doo-Doo, forthcoming in Manuscrito. The paper argues that adopting a form of skepticism, Skeptical-Dogmatism, that recommends disbelieving each philosophical position in many multi-proposition disputes—disputes where there are three or more contrary philosophical views—leads to a higher ratio of true to false beliefs than the ratio of the “average philosopher” (as indicated by survey data). Hence, Skeptical-Dogmatists have more accurate beliefs than the average philosopher. As a corollary, most philosophers would improve the accuracy of their beliefs if they adopted Skeptical-Dogmatism.

3. "Induction Ain't What It Used to Be".  Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies. 2020.  Abstract: We argue that, in all probability, the universe will become less predictable. This assertion means that induction, which some scientists conceive of as a tool for predicting the future, will become less useful. Our argument claims that the universe will increasingly come under intentional control, and objects that are under intentional control are typically less predictable than those that are not. We contrast this form of skepticism about induction, "Skeptical-Dogmatism," with David Hume's Pyrrhonian skepticism about induction. 

4. “Socratic Ignorance, Skeptical-dogmatism, and Self-Refutation”, in forthcoming in Southwest Philosophical Studies.  2018 Presidential Address of the New Mexico Texas Philosophical Society. Abstract: Skeptical dogmatism is the view that we should think that each philosophical view in a multi-proposition--disputes where there are three or more contrary positions--is self-undermining.  I defend skeptical dogmatism against this charge. 

5. "Hinge Propositions, Skeptical Dogmatism, and External World Disjunctivism” in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 9, 2, 2019, 134-167 Abstract: Following Wittgenstein’s lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification (entitlement justification) because of their role in our cognitive lives. Two major criticisms are raised here against the entitlement strategy when used in attempts to justify belief in the external world. First, the hinge strategy is not sufficient to thwart underdetermination skepticism, since underdetermination considerations lead to a much stronger form of skepticism than is commonly realized. Second, the claim that hinge propositions are necessary to trust perception is false. There is an alternative to endorsing a particular hinge proposition about the external world, external world disjunctivism, which permits us to trust perception (to a point), while skirting the difficulties raised by skepticism.

6. "Moore’s proof, theory-ladenness of perception, and many proofs." Philosophical Studies:  (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01304-1  Abstract: I argue that if we allow that Moore’s Method, which involves taking an ordinary knowledge claim to support a substantive metaphysical conclusion, can be used to support Moore’s proof an external world, then we should accept that Moore’s Method can be used to support a variety of incompatible metaphysical conclusions. shall refer to this as ‘‘the problem of many proofs’’. The problem of many proofs, I claim, stems from the theory-ladenness of perception. I shall argue further that this plethora of proofs for incompatible positions leads to a darker form of skepticism, one which maintains that each of the dogmatic views is probably false. We will conclude by considering various ways a Moorean might respond to these difficulties.

7. “Between Gods and Apes: On the Lack of Scientific and Philosophical Progress”, in Philosophy’s Future: The Problem of Philosophical Progress. Edited by Damien Broderick and Russell Blackford, 2017,  Wiley-Blackwell. Abstract: There are reasons to be skeptical of the claim that philosophy and science are making progress toward the complete truth of the universe and our place in it. I discuss two different kinds of skeptical worries about justifying contemporary philosophical and scientific beliefs. Widespread philosophical disagreement leads to a suspicion that most philosophers are probably wrong. In science there is more agreement, but science has not justified some of its basic assumptions including the use of Occam’s Razor for theory selection. Worse, noetic skepticism questions whether humans even have the cognitive capacity for understanding the complete truth. We do not believe that children or apes have that capacity, so the question naturally arises within both philosophy and science as to whether we have reason to believe that adult humans are adequately equipped. Finally, I propose a scientific experiment to put this type of skepticism to the test.

8. “Externalism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism", in the Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 113, 1, pp. 27-57. Abstract: A claimed benefit of epistemic externalism is that it alone can avoid skepticism. Most epistemic externalists, however, allow a residual amount of internalism in terms of a defeasibility condition. The paper argues that this internal condition is sufficient for skeptics to cast doubt on many claims to justified belief about perceptual matters about the world. Furthermore, the internal defeasibility condition also opens the door to a darker form of skepticism; skeptical dogmatism, which maintains that many of our perceptually based beliefs are probably false. Thus, the claimed benefits of externalism in avoiding skepticism are greatly exaggerated.

9. “Occam’s Razor, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism”,  International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 6,1,  2016, pp. 1-29. Abstract: Underdetermination arguments for skepticism maintain that our common sense view of the external world is no better, evidentially speaking, than some skeptical competitors. An important and well-known response by dogmatists, those who believe our commonsense view is justified, appeals to abduction or inference to the best explanation. The predominant version of this strategy, going back at least to Locke, invokes Occam’s razor: dogmatists claim the common sense view is simpler than any of its skeptical alternatives and so has more to recommend it, evidentially speaking. This dispute has overshadowed another possible view: skeptical dogmatism. Skeptical dogmatists hold that we are justified in believing that the common sense view is probably false. I argue that skeptical dogmatism presents some interesting complications to the dialectic between the dogmatist and the skeptic. On the one hand, even if the dogmatist’s use of Occam’s razor is sufficient to rebut skepticism, in itself it is not sufficient to refute skeptical dogmatism. On the other hand, skeptics themselves, ironically, must, given the assumptions of the paper, appeal to something like Occam’s razor in order to avoid capitulating to skeptical dogmatism.

10. Underdetermination Skepticism and Skeptical-Dogmatism International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. 5, 2015, pp. 218-251. Abstract: The paper argues that underdetermination arguments actually permit a much stronger conclusion than the claim we are not justified in our everyday beliefs, rather, we are justified in believing we are probably wrong about most things.

11. “Epistemic Contextualism Versus the Variable Implicit Modal Modifiers Theory”, in Southwest Philosophical Studies, 37, 2016, pp. 75-88.  Abstract: Epistemic contextualist (EC) explains  for the variability in warranted assertability of knowledge claims in terms of the  variability in truth conditions for “knowledge.” I argue for a competing explanation: the embedded propositions in knowledge claims, the “P” in “S knows that P,” is ambiguous. A theory of speakers’ meaning must provide an account of “implicit modal modifiers,” e.g., “certainly,” “highly probable,” “probable,” and so on, and the appropriate implicit modal modifier to attribute to speakers varies with context. This view I call the “variable implicit modal modifier” (VIMM). I offer two independent arguments for VIMM. The first is that considerations of parsimony favor VIMM over EC. The second is that a theory of speakers’ meaning requires, in some cases, attributing implicit modal modifiers to speakers. Once these commitments are made explicit, EC is redundant.   

12. "Naturalism and Skepticism: Can Philosophical Skepticism be Scientifically Tested?"  (Theoria 70.1 , 2004, pp. 62-97).  Abstract: I argue that it is possible to scientifically test philosophical skepticism. The argument develops the naturalistic insight that there may be no particular reason to suppose that nature has selected Homo sapiens’ epistemic capacities such that we are ideally suited to forming a true theory of everything, or indeed, a true theory of much of anything. Just as chimpanzees are cognitively limited - there are many concepts, ideas, and theories beyond their grasp - so too might our conception of the universe seem limited from the point of view of some creature more “evolved” than humans. On the other hand, some physicists (et al.) have argued that humans are on the verge of discovering a “final theory of everything”. Such epistemic “optimism” seems to directly contradict the idea that we might be cognitively limited. To adjudicate between these views I shall suggest the outlines of several “crucial tests” that involve attempting to create creatures who stand to us, with respect to intelligence and wisdom, as we do to apes. A positive result from any of these experiments will indicate that the skeptical view is correct, while failure to create “higher” intelligences lends support to the epistemic optimists’ position.

13. "Prologomena to Any Future Philosophy" (The Journal of Evolution and Technology, 10 , 2002)  Abstract: Since its inception, philosophy has struggled to reconcile the apparent finitude of humans with the traditional telos of philosophy—the attempt to unite thought and Being, to arrive at absolute knowledge, at a final theory of everything. In response, some pragmatists, positivists, and philosophical naturalists have offered a deflationary account of philosophy: the ambitions of philosophy ought to be scaled back to something much more modest. Inflationism is offered as an alternative: it is conjectured that philosophy might make more progress towards the traditional telos if we attempt to create beings (through the application of technology) who are as far removed from us in intelligence as we are from apes. Rather than deflating the ambitions of philosophy we ought to consider inflating the abilities of philosophers. 

14. "On the Fourfold Root of Philosophical Skepticism."  (Sorites, 14, 2002, pp. 85-109). Abstract: This paper provides a definition of ‘knowledge’ in terms of four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: justified, true, gettier, belief. I claim further that we can formulate four specific types of skepticism based on a denial of each of these conditions.

Personal Identity Papers

1.     “Personal Identity and Uploading”, in Journal of Evolution and Technology, volume 22, 1, 2011, pp. 37-52. Abstract: Objections to uploading may be parsed into substrate issues, dealing with the computer platform of upload and personal identity. This paper argues that the personal identity issues of uploading are no more or less challenging than those of bodily transfer often discussed in the philosophical literature. It is argued that what is important in personal identity involves both token and type identity. While uploading does not preserve token identity, it does save type identity; and even qua token, one may have good reason to think that the preservation of the type is worth the cost.

2.   “Personal Identity and Uploading”, in Intelligence Unbound: The Future of Uploaded and Machine Minds, edited by Russell Blackford and Damien Broderick.  2014, Blackwell. This is a slightly edited and abbreviated version of an earlier paper published in the Journal of Evolution and Technology with the same name.

3. “Death, Faster Than Light Travel, and Einstein”, in Death And Anti-Death, Volume 13: Sixty Years After Albert Einstein (1879-1955), edited by Charles Tandy, 2015 Ria Press.  Abstract: This paper describes a thought experiment that shows that people can travel faster than the speed of light. The proposed explanation for why faster-than-light travel is possible for persons, yet consistent with our best physics, is that persons are not wholly physical. The thought experiment also has implications for our understanding of death, specifically, the death of the body may not be the death of the person.  

4.  “Branching is not a Bug; It’s a Feature: Personal Identity and Legal (and Moral) Responsibility, Philosophy and Technology, 2019 doi.org/10.1007/s13347-019-00347-w  Abstract: Prospective developments in computer and nanotechnology suggest that there is some possibility—perhaps as early as this century—that we will have the technological means to attempt to duplicate people. For example, it has been speculated that the psychology of individuals might be emulated on a computer platform to create a personality duplicate—an “upload”. Physical duplicates might be created by advanced nanobots tasked with creating molecule-for-molecule copies of individuals. Such possibilities are discussed in the philosophical literature as (putative) cases of “fission”: one person “splitting” into two. Many philosophers, perhaps most, reject the idea of fission, appealing to some form of a “no-branching” condition to rule out such possibilities. I argue, to the contrary, that there are good moral reasons to think that any account of personal identity that does not permit fission is deeply problematic, especially in connection with theorizing about criminal punishment. I discuss and reject David Lewis’ famous account of personal identity that invokes “multiple occupancy” to allow for branching. In contrast, I offer an account of personal identity that permits branching using the type/token distinction to help with such puzzling cases.

Bioethics Papers

1. Universal Superlongevity: Is it Inevitable and is it good? Early draft of paper Published in Death And Anti-Death, Volume 3: Fifty Years After Einstein, One Hundred Fifty Years After Kierkegaard, 2005, edited by Charles Tandy, Ria University Press. I argue that it is likely in the future that most people will choose to live radically extended lifespans. Fortunately, there are good moral reasons for welcoming this outcome.

2. "Boredom, Experimental Ethics, And Superlongevity "This is the penultimate version of a paper published in Death and Anti-Death, Volume 4: Twenty Years After de Beauvoir, Thirty Years After Heidegger, edited by Charles Tandy, 2006, Ria University Press. I suggest that boredom is probably not a problem for superlongevitists, but we need to run the experiment–live hundreds of years with the help of technology–to find out for sure. The experiment is a good one to run considering the alternative.

3. "Superlongevity and Utilitarianism", in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. vol. 85, 4, December 2007, pp. 581-595. Abstract: I maintain that there are good utilitarian reasons for promoting superlongevity contra Peter Singer.

4. Pro-Social Behavior and Happy-People-Pills  Philosophica 71 (2007): 93-111.  Abstract: I argue that a positive consequence of creating happy-people-pills is that there will be more pro-social behavior (e.g., charity work).

5. ""Designer Babies" and Harm to Supernumerary Embryos", in American Philosophical Quarterly, 45(2), October, 2008, pp. 348-364.  Abstract: I argue that even if we think that embryos are persons, killing some in the process of choosing the most desirable for implantation does not harm them.

6. "The Case for Happy-People-Pills "The Case for Happy Pills", in Free Inquiry, August/September, 29(5), 2009, pp. 33-36. 

7. "Happy-People-Pills for All" in International Journal of Wellbeing 1 (1), 2011. Abstract:   It is argued that we have a moral duty to create, and make available, advanced pharmacological agents to boost the happiness of those in the normal, i.e., the non-depressed, range of happiness. Happiness, conceived as a propensity to positive moods, is a quantitative trait with a sizeable genetic component. One means to boost the happiness of those in the normal range is to test the efficacy of antidepressants for enhancement. A second possibility is to model new pharmacologicals based on the genetics of the happiest amongst us, that is, the hyperthymic. The suggestion, in other words, is to “reverse engineer” the hyperthymic: to investigate what makes the hyperthymic genetically and physiologically different and then put what they have into pill form. To the ‘Brave New World’ objection, that there is more to wellbeing than happiness and that taking happy-people-pills will require the sacrifice of these other aspects of wellbeing, it is countered that contemporary social science research supports the view that happiness promotes achievement in the ‘higher’ endeavors of humanity, including work, love and virtue. In other words, happiness promotes acquisition of traits valued by perfectionists. Those born with genes for hyperthymia, on average, tend to be doubly blessed: they are happier and achieve more than the rest of the population. Happy-people-pills are a means to allow everyone else to share in this good fortune. The paper seeks to rebut two further criticisms: that happy-people-pills will lead to emotional inappropriateness and inauthentic happiness. Finally, it is argued that depending on the view about the role of government in individual welfare, either government has a positive duty to develop happy-people-pills, or government has a duty not to interfere with private companies that seek to develop such pharmacological agents.    

8. "Eugenic Selection Benefits Embryos"  in Bioethics, 28 (5),  2014, 214-224 Abstract: The paper addressed whether pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), used for both negative and positive trait selection, benefits potential supernumerary embryos. The phrase ‘potential supernumerary embryos’ is used to indicate that PGD is typically performed on a set of embryos, only some of which will be implanted. Prior to any testing, each embryo in the set is potentially supernumerary in the sense that it may not be selected for implantation. Those embryos that are not selected, and so destroyed or frozen, are ‘actually supernumerary’. The argument to be advanced is hypothetical: If embryos may be said to benefit or be harmed by our actions, then PGD used to select for an embryo or embryos with the highest expected well-being (EWB) benefits potential supernumerary embryos. The philosophical upshot is that the non-identity objection to the claim that PGD does not benefit embryos is mistaken.

9. "The Case for Happy-People-Pills "The Case for Happy Pills", in Free Inquiry, August/September, 29(5), 2009, pp. 33-36. 

10. Uninsured: Heal Thyself, (Or: why the uninsured ought to be permitted to self-medicate),   Journal of Evolution and Technology, December, 20(2), 2009, pp. 70-79.  Abstract: Approximately one in six persons in the U.S. lack medical insurance. Legislation permits only physicians to prescribe many common medicines. This state of affairs is unjust. A just society cannot have it both ways: legislation cannot say that the expertise of physicians is so precious that only they can prescribe medicine AND not everyone is guaranteed reasonable access to their services. If there is no guarantee of reasonable access then physicians should not have a monopoly on writing prescriptions, and if there is a monopoly on writing prescriptions then people should have reasonable access to their services. To remedy this situation we must ensure that all citizens have reasonable access to medical services, or allow the uninsured to self-medicate.

11. "Cognitive Enhancement and the Identity Objection", in The Journal of Evolution and Technology, 18(1), 2008, pp.108-115.  Abstract:  I argue that the technology to attempt to create posthumans is much closer than many realize and that the right to become posthuman is much more complicated than it might first appear.

Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Science Papers 

1. Is Logic About the World? Answer: Yes. This is a draft of a paper that maintains that logic is about the world.

2. On the Intertranslatability of All Natural Languages This is a draft of a paper under construction. This version is more or less what I read at the 2007 Canadian Philosophical Association meeting. I argue that without what I term the ‘semantic expandability thesis’, languages may evolve to express novel meanings, thoughts and concepts–the intertranslatability of all natural languages is patently false. If we allow an unrestricted version of the expandability thesis then the intertranslatability of all natural languages follows trivially. I suggest, further, that once we become clear about semantic expandability, it may be that there is more common ground among disputants than initial appearances indicate, and expandability introduces a serious challenge to Davidson’s well-known argument for intertranslatability.

3. Swamp Darwin This is a commentary on a paper by Claudine Verheggen read at the 2006 CPA. I hope to make it into a stand-alone paper one day.

4. Astrophysical Fine Tuning, Naturalism, and the Contemporary Design Argument This is the penultimate draft of a paper co-written with my good friend Milan M. Cirkovic (International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 20(3): 285-307). Here’s the abstract: Evidence for instances of astrophysical ‘fine-tuning’ (or coincidences) is thought by some to lend support to the design argument (i.e. the argument that our universe has been designed by some deity). We assess some of the relevant empirical and conceptual issues. We argue that astrophysical fine-tuning calls for some explanation, but this explanation need not appeal to the design argument. A clear and strict separation of the issue of anthropic fine tuning on one hand and any form of Eddingtonian numerology and teleology on the other may help clarify what is arguably the most significant issue in the philosophy of cosmology.

Social and Political Philosophy Papers 

1. Censorship, Logocracy and Democracy  The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (2008), volume 21 , issue 1 , p. 199-238.  Abstract: I will argue that there is a logical contradiction between a certain understanding of the democratic commitment to free and fair elections and certain types of restriction of expression.  

2. The Angelic Hierarchy: Aligning Ethical Push and Pull A complementary “monetary” system is proposed: a computer-based system that allows us to assess the relative pro-community altruism of individuals. Such an arrangement could provide us with an alternate means of seeking social recognition than that offered by capitalism; specifically, it offers the possibility of social recognition based on altruistic contributions to society. It is conjectured that recognition of altruistic efforts will provide the impetus for increased altruistic efforts. This proposal promises several ethical advantages to our present social arrangements. (Here’s a link for the published version: http://www.bepress.com/selt/vol2/iss3/art2)

3. "The Case for Maternity Compensation"   in Journal of Social Theory and Practice, April 35(2), 2009, 279-302.  Abstract:  I offer two arguments for the conclusion that in many instances there is a moral obligation for fathers (or perhaps society at large) to provide pregnant women with monetary compensation. The first raises issues primarily concerned with distributive justice and pregnancy. Pregnancy involves a number of costs, and it is unjust that women should be forced to bear these alone. The second argument uses the generally accepted premise that parents should share the financial burden of raising their offspring. Since the financial onus of raising children begins at conception, so too should paternal financial assistance. 

4. Human Extinction and Farsighted Universal Surveillance Here’s the abstract: This paper attempts to bridge the dilemma created by intrusive surveillance technologies needed to safeguard our security, and the potential negative consequences such technologies might have on individual privacy. I begin with a brief review of the increasing threat to human life posed by emerging technologies, e.g., genetic engineering and nanotechnology. Next, I canvass a potential technological means to mitigate some of this threat, namely, ubiquitous microscopic sensors and then note that a consequence of the deployment of such technology appears to be an erosion of personal privacy on a scale hitherto unimaginable. It is then argued that many details of our private lives are actually irrelevant for security purposes, and that it may be possible to develop technology to mask these details in the data gleaned from surveillance devices. Such a development could meet some, perhaps many, of the concerns about privacy. It is also argued that if it is possible to use technology to mask personal information, this may actually promote the goal of security since it is conjectured that the public is likely to be more willing to accept such invasive technology if it is designed to mask such details. Finally, some applications to our current uses of surveillance technology are drawn.

5. .“Ship of Fools: Why Transhumanism is the Best Bet to Prevent the Extinction of Civilization”, in The Global Spiral, February, 9(9), 2009. (http://www.metanexus.net).  Abstract: Emerging technologies such as genome engineering and nanotechnology present and unprecedented risk to humanity. I argue that our best bet for survival may be to biologically enhance ourselves to be wiser and more virtuous. 

6.  “BIG and Technological Unemployment: Chicken Little Versus the Economists”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, 24(1), pp. 5-25.  Abstract:  The paper rehearses arguments for and against the prediction of massive technological unemployment. The main argument in favor is that robots are entering a large number of industries, making more expensive human labor redundant. The main argument against the prediction is that for two hundred years we have seen a massive increase in productivity with no long term structural unemployment caused by automation. The paper attempts to move past this argumentative impasse by asking what humans contribute to the supply side of the economy. Historically, humans have contributed muscle and brains to production but we are now being outcompeted by machinery, in both areas, in many jobs. It is argued that this supports the conjecture that massive unemployment is a likely result. It is also argued that a basic income guarantee is a minimal remedial measure to mitigate the worst effects of technological unemployment. 

7.   “Technological Unemployment”, encyclopedia entry in The American  Middle Class: An Economic Encyclopedia of Progress and Poverty, edited by Robert Rycroft, Greenwood Press. 

AI Ethics Papers 

1. Mary Poppins 3000s of the World Unite: A Moral Paradox in the Creation of Artificial Intelligence This is the penultimate version of a paper published in Human Implications of Human-Robot Interaction: Papers from the AAAI Workshop, edited by Ted Metzler, 2006, California: AAAI Press, pp.23-28. I argue that the bright future where people no longer have to work will never come about. We may be able to create intelligent machines to do the work of humans, but these machines will be persons, so persons will still have to work.

2. “Artificial Intelligence and the Unintentional Frankenstein”, in Death And Anti-Death, Volume 16: Two Hundred Years After Frankenstein. Edited by Charles Tandy. 

Normative Ethics Papers 

1. A New Puzzle About Non-Identity This is a draft I am working on. The paper argues that there is a latent contradiction in certain Parfitian non-identity cases. In particular, I argue we are sometimes forced into the puzzling situation of describing a policy (or act) as both making and not making things worse for individuals.

2. Genetic Virtue

3. Genetic Virtue: Response to Critics

4. “Consequentialism, Deontology, and Artificial Intelligence Safety”, in Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security, edited by Roman V. Yampolskiy, Taylor and Francis, 411-421. 

Philosophy of Religion Papers

1. The Anthropic Argument Against the Existence of God An argument that God does not exist based on some relatively uncontroversial empirical evidence: humans exist. Forthcoming in Sophia. Published version here.

2. “Genetic Engineering, Virtue-First Enhancement, and Deification in Neo-Irenaean Theodicy”, Theology and Science. 16, 3, 251-272. 

Pedagogy

Free Book by your truly: Critical Thinking By Example

Penultimate draft of paper forthcoming in Teaching Philosophy comparing the Socratic Notes assignment with quizzing: SNT August 19 Chicago.docx

Penultimate draft of The Skills-First vs. Content-First Philosophy Class

Example of a student’s weekly critical response for Turbo Socratic Teaching: barentine weekly critical response student

Example of weekly questions for Turbo Socratic Teaching: Weekly Questions 6 Feldman chapters 8 and 9

Rubric For Dialectical Essay: 3. revised rubric dialectical essay

Example of a student’s peer review: 7. example of a student Essay Assessment #2

Notes Assignment 101 with example

Grading Rubric for Socratic Notes