DPhil in Politics, University of Oxford
Email: marco.apastorm@gmail.com
My research focuses on the evolution of public opinion and political conflict in post-industrial democracies. I hold a DPhil in Politics from the University of Oxford and have worked as a Research Fellow at the University of Barcelona in the Institutions and Political Economy Research Group (IPERG). I am currently an Adjunct Professor at IE University.
Activating self-interest: The role of party polarization in preferences for redistribution
Abstract
Although extensive research has analyzed the factors that moderate economic self-interest—the relationship between individuals’ income position and their preferences for redistribution—there is little crossnational research that analyzes the role of political parties. This article argues that political parties play a considerable moderating role in (de-)activating economic self-interest based on the polarization they display in their economic and cultural positions. By combining the World/European Values Survey, the World Income Inequality Database, and the Comparative Manifesto Project datasets, the analyses estimate the moderating effect of party polarization on economic self-interest. The results suggest that economic polarization enhances self-interest for the poor (respondents below the mean income), even when controlling for income inequality, but not for the rich. Moreover, cultural polarization also appears to reinforce self-interest for the poor, rather than supplanting it. The findings have important implications regarding ability for political parties to activate issues among the public.
Abstract
An increasing literature has studied the recent growth of populist parties and the determinants of their electoral success. This article contributes to this body by addressing the question of whether cordon sanitaires or tainted coalitions are more effective at hindering the electoral success of populist parties. Building on the populist parties and cost of governing literatures, we hypothesize that populist parties suffer considerable loses at the ballot box when they join coalition governments as junior partners. Moreover, we test various mechanisms for this negative effect: poor economic conditions, the existence of parliamentary majorities, ideological extremism and low intra-cabinet conflict. Using data from ParlGov and Klüver and Spoon, we find strong support for the main hypothesis, and additional analyses suggest that when populists join coalitions as junior partners they lose extra electoral support if they are ideological extreme, there is low intra-cabinet conflict, or their coalition has a parliamentary majority.
Technocracy as an Anti-Incumbency Weapon: Partisan Polarization during the COVID shock in Spain, with C. Amat
Absolute Gains, Relative Losses: How the Poor and the Rich View Redistribution Differently
Good Samaritan or Rich Samaritan? The Effect of Inequality, Development and Income on Preferences for Redistribution
