Top1~50 (1):
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 1
Top51~100 (4):
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION 1,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 1,
THEORY AND DECISION 1,
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN 1
Top101~150 (6):
ECONOMICS LETTERS 1,
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES 1,
B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS 2,
ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN 2
Reference: John C Ham, Julian Wright, Ziqiu Ye, The Dramatic Rise of the New Society Journals in Economics, The Economic Journal, 2025;, ueaf044, https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaf044
"On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: A full characterization" (with Goro Ochiai and Hirofumi Yamamura)
[SSRN]
Implementation in optimin (coming soon, available upon request for a draft) (Sep 15, 2025)
11, Hagiwara, M., (2025), "Behavioral subgame perfect implementation", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 233: 106992.
Earlier version of this paper is in:
[SSRN]
10, Hagiwara, M., (2024), "The focal Luce model with status quo", Economic Theory Bulletin, 12, 107–117.
[Springer]
Note that the "Quo" should be "quo", and the mark for showing the end of proof for Claim 1 (□) is not represented in the paper.
The last sentence before the mark □ is "Since X is finite, U is also finite." (i.e., Since X is finite, U is also finite.□)
In addition, some typos are revised in the published version. Hence, I recommend finding it.
Earlier version of this paper is in:
[SSRN]
9, Hagiwara, M., Yonekura, F., (2024), "King Solomon's dilemma: An experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies", Review of Economic Design, 28: 1–19.
[Springer]
Earlier versions of this paper are in:
[SSRN]
[Discussion paper (RIEB, Kobe Univ.)]
8, Hagiwara, M., (2022), "Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values", The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
*This is a substantially revised version of the discussion paper so that I recommend to find the published version.
Earlier versions of this paper are in:
[SSRN]
[Discussion paper (RIEB, Kobe Univ.)]
7, Hagiwara, M., Hanato, S., (2021), "A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game", Theory and Decision, 90, 233–243.
[Springer]
Earlier versions of this paper are in:
[SSRN] [Working paper (Tokyo Tech.)]
6, Hagiwara, M., (2020), "Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions: Comment", Games and Economic Behavior, 122: 476-480
Latest working paper just before published:
[SSRN]
5, Hagiwara, M., Yamamura, H., (2020), "Upper set rules with binary ranges", Social Choice and Welfare, 54: 657–666.
[Springer]
Latest working paper just before published:
[SSRN] [Working paper (Tokyo Tech.)]
4, Hagiwara, M., (2020), "A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the no-envy solution", The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, vol 20.
Latest working paper just before published:
[SSRN] [Working paper (Tokyo Tech.)]
3, Hagiwara, M., (2019), "Double implementation without no-veto-power", Mathematical Social Sciences, 101: 124-130.
Latest working paper just before published:
[SSRN]
An earlier version of this paper was "Double implementation with partially honest agents", Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics Working Paper No. 2016-7, Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics, School of Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology.
2, Hagiwara, M., (2018), "A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents", Economics Letters, 171: 51-53.
1, Hagiwara, M., Yamamura, H., and Yamato, T., (2018), "Implementation with socially responsible agents", Economic Theory Bulletin, 6: 55-62.
[Springer]
An earlier version of this paper was "An outcome mechanism for partially honest Nash implementation", Discussion Paper No. 2016-9, Department of Social Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology.