日時:2026年7月2日(木)13:30~15:00
場所:豊中キャンパス OSIPP棟6階 会議室
講師:熊谷 元宏氏 (オーストラリア国立大学)
議題:Keeping Pulses on the Soil: Cultivation Practice and the Early Rise of Political Organization
アブストラクト: Scholars studying the origins of political institutions and long-run growth have long viewed agriculture as central to the emergence of political organization. Yet why did early statehood arise faster in some agricultural regions than in others? We argue that the pace of early political development was shaped by an agricultural innovation: the mixed cropping of pulses and cereals. By reducing soil degradation and extending the productive use of land, this cultivation practice helped communities reach and sustain the population levels necessary for political organization and the transition to statehood. The model highlights the dynamic interaction between cultivation practices and soil quality, as well as the intertemporal investment trade-off embedded in crop choice. These dynamic mechanisms are new in the literature on the origins of early state. We also provide empirical evidence by combining archaeological site-level data on the transition to agriculture with a newly compiled global geospatial dataset on historical political entities.
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Time and Date: 13:30~15:00, Tuesday, July, 02
Seminar Venue: 会議室 6F OSIPP棟, Toyonaka Campus
Presenter: Asst. Prof. Motohiro Kumagai (Australian National University)
Title: Keeping Pulses on the Soil: Cultivation Practice and the Early Rise of Political Organization
Abstract: Scholars studying the origins of political institutions and long-run growth have long viewed agriculture as central to the emergence of political organization. Yet why did early statehood arise faster in some agricultural regions than in others? We argue that the pace of early political development was shaped by an agricultural innovation: the mixed cropping of pulses and cereals. By reducing soil degradation and extending the productive use of land, this cultivation practice helped communities reach and sustain the population levels necessary for political organization and the transition to statehood. The model highlights the dynamic interaction between cultivation practices and soil quality, as well as the intertemporal investment trade-off embedded in crop choice. These dynamic mechanisms are new in the literature on the origins of early state. We also provide empirical evidence by combining archaeological site-level data on the transition to agriculture with a newly compiled global geospatial dataset on historical political entities.
日 時:2026年7月17日(金)13:30~16:40
会 場:豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟2階 講義シアター
講 師:海道 宏明氏(ボストン大学)
余 征飛氏(大阪大学)、松井 宗也氏(大阪大学)、林 真氏(大阪大学)
タイトル:TBA(7月初旬にご案内予定です)
※ UOsaka Econometrics Summer Workshop と共催
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Date and Time: July 17, 2026 (Fri.), 13:30–16:40
Venue: OSIPP Building, 2nd Floor, Room 208 (Lecture Theater), Toyonaka Campus
Speakers: Prof. Hiroaki Kaido (Boston University),
Zhengfei Yu (University of Osaka), Muneya Matsui (University of Osaka), Chen Lin (University of Osaka)
Title: TBA (Further details, including the lecture title, will be provided in early July)
※co-hosted with the UOsaka Econometrics Summer Workshop
日時:2026年7月23日(木)13:30~15:00
会場:豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階 会議室
講師:大越 裕史氏(岡山大学)
タイトル:TBA
日時:2026年9月10日(木)10:30~12:00
会場:豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階 会議室
講師:奥山 陽子氏(ウプサラ大学)
タイトル:TBA
日時:2026年10月22日(木)17:00~18:30
*オンラインセミナー
講師:Lukas Mayr氏(University of Essex)
タイトル:TBA
日時:2026年11月26日(木)13:30~15:00
会場:豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階 会議室
講師:Xinwei Dong氏(Huazhong University of Science and Technology )
タイトル:TBA
日時:2027年3月23日(火)13:30~15:00
会場:豊中キャンパスOSIPP棟6階 会議室
講師:Jason Sockin氏 (Cornell University)
タイトル:TBA
日時:2026年4月8日(水)13:00~15:00(日本時間)☆Zoomでのオンラインミーティングで開催です☆
報告者:Undral Byambadalai 氏 (National University of Mongolia)
議題:Beyond the Average: Distributional Causal Inference under Imperfect Compliance
アブストラクト:We study the estimation of distributional treatment effects in randomized experiments with imperfect compliance. When participants do not adhere to their assigned treatments, we leverage treatment assignment as an instrumental variable to identify the local distributional treatment effect—the difference in outcome distributions between treatment and control groups for the subpopulation of compliers. We propose a regression-adjusted estimator based on a distribution regression framework with Neyman-orthogonal moment conditions, enabling robustness and flexibility with high-dimensional covariates. Our approach accommodates continuous, discrete, and mixed discrete-continuous outcomes, and applies under a broad class of covariate-adaptive randomization schemes, including stratified block designs and simple random sampling. We derive the estimator's asymptotic distribution and show that it achieves the semiparametric efficiency bound. Simulation results demonstrate favorable finite-sample performance, and we demonstrate favorable finite-sample perfomance, and we demonstrate the method's practical relevance in an appication to the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment.
日時:2026年4月16日(木)15:10~16:40
場所:豊中キャンパス 法経研究棟7階 小会議室
講師:森田 公之氏(専修大学経済学部)
タイトル:The Allocation of Decision Authority in Three-Stage Decision Processes with Applications to Artificial Intelligence in Organizations
アブストラクト:We study a three-stage decision process that consists of information acquisition,
project choice, and execution of the selected project. A principal wants to choose and implement a proactive project, and hires an agent who chooses a costly effort at the information acquisition stage as well as a costly effort at the execution stage. What the principal can do at the beginning is the allocation of the formal decision authority over project choice, either to herself or the agent. We show that the principal may choose to delegate decision authority to the agent, however unlikely the interest of the agent is to be congruent with her interest, or however competent and experienced she is. We provide several testable predictions. (i) Delegation is more likely as the manager has discretion over both information acquisition and implementation. (ii) Delegation is less likely as opportunities for compromising improve. (iii) Whether or not the parties agree about the status quo matters: In particular, if their preferences about the default decisions differ, the organization is more likely to be decentralized for new project development as their interests are less likely to be congruent. We further discuss the extent to which our results on optimal delegation survive when artificial intelligence (AI) is deployed, distinguishing autonomous and nonautonomous AI. If AI can fully automate information acquisition or execution, delegation cannot be optimal, but it
can be optimal if the agent remains responsible for execution. If AI instead supports execution by lowering its cost, delegation can survive.
日時:2026年4月23日(木)13:30~15:00
場所:豊中キャンパス OSIPP棟6階 会議室
講師: Alan Spearot氏( University of California, Santa Cruz)
タイトル:"Predicting Welfare Effects of Trade Shocks using Equity Markets: Theory and Evidence from Liberation Day"
日時:2026年5月28日(木)13:30~15:00
場所:豊中キャンパス OSIPP棟6階 会議室
講師:白糸 裕輝氏(University of Michigan)
論題:"Paragraph-Citation Topic Models for Semantically Interpreting Citations in Document Networks"
要旨: Social scientists analyze citation networks to study how documents influence subsequent work across various domains
such as judicial politics and international relations. However, conventional approaches that summarize document attributes
in citation networks often overlook the diverse semantic contexts in which citations occur.
This paper develops the paragraph-citation topic model (PCTM), which analyzes citation networks and document texts jointly.
The PCTM extends conventional topic models by assigning topics to paragraphs of citing documents, allowing citations to share
topics with their embedding paragraphs. Our empirical analysis of U.S. Supreme Court opinions in the privacy issue domain, which includes
cases on reproductive rights, demonstrates that citations within individual documents frequently span multiple substantive areas, and
citations to individual documents show considerable topical diversity.
日時:2026年6月4日(木)15:00~16:30
場所:豊中キャンパス OSIPP棟6階 会議室
講師:柳本 和春氏( 神戸大学)
論題:"Computing Alone: Leisure Technology Growth and Marriage Decline”
要旨:Over the past two decades, the leisure of single adults has migrated from socializing with others to computing alone: streaming, video games, and social media. This paper formalizes that migration as a technological transformation of leisure and proposes it as the principal driver of the concurrent decline in marriage. The model embeds recreational technology into a continuous-time marriage search framework: as recreational technology improves, the opportunity cost of search rises and singles endogenously substitute leisure for partner search. The technology shifter is recovered from leisure Engel curves, which separate the technology component from contemporaneous income growth. Calibrated to time-use data, the model accounts for 91 percent of the observed decline in the share married, and the mechanism operates through reduced marriage entry rather than rising divorce.
※本セミナーは以下の科学研究費助成事業による共催で開催。
基盤研究(A) 課題番号:26H01962
「出生時格差:『親ガチャ』が人生を制限しない社会を目指して」
(研究代表者:丸山 士行 教授)
日時:2026年6月25日(木)13:30~15:00
場所:豊中キャンパス OSIPP棟6階 会議室
講師:Jonathan Smith 氏(Georgia State University )
タイトル:"Which Colleges Increase Voting Rates?"
アブストラクト: Using millions of SAT takers linked to college enrollment and voting records, we document wide variation in voter participation across otherwise similar colleges. We estimate over 2,600 colleges' value-added to the likelihood of voting and find that 30 percent of the observed variation across colleges is attributable to the colleges themselves. The standard deviation of these estimates ranges from 3 to 5 percentage points (6–10 percent), with almost all students in our sample attending colleges that increase their entrants’ probability of voting. These effects appear soon after enrollment, persist beyond college, and are driven by colleges creating new voters.