We study the impact of a change in the content of religious practice on fertility decisions. We do so in the context of the Georgian Orthodox Church, where in December 2007, in a move to reverse declining fertility rates, the church’s Patriarch began to personally baptise third- or higher-parity children. At the macro level, using a synthetic control method and interrupted time series analysis, we find suggestive evidence that Georgian fertility rates did rise in response to this intervention. We validate this result using microdata on fertility histories and religion from a representative sample of Georgian women, exploiting variation in religion, ethnicity, marital status, and prior parity to identify women exogenously treated by the patriarch’s campaign. We find that the baptism campaign significantly increased fertility for treated women (i.e. Georgian Orthodox women, especially if married). It also increased marriage and reduced reported abortion. All of these outcomes were desired targets of the intervention. Our results show that even in industrialized, educated, low-fertility societies, traditional authority figures making use of religious discourses may be able to influence fertility patterns. 

with Seung-Hun Chung, Neha Deopa, Kritika Saxena

Submitted for publication

Demographers have long explored theories situating childbearing dispositions as motivations for fertility behaviors (e.g. Theory of Planned Behavior, Traits-Desires-Intentions-Behaviors), based on the observation that stated dispositions towards fertility predict longitudinal behaviors. But many have questioned this interpretation of stated preferences, arguing that survey reports can be unstable and reflect rationalizations. Theories such as the Theory of Conjunctural Action or the “discovery” model suggest that stated fertility preferences may be survey constructions with high degrees of uncertainty, not “motivations.” Survey methodological research could illuminate these theories, yet study of fertility preference survey methods is sparse. If stated fertility preferences are sensitive to contextual priming or question wording, theories postulating that stated preferences are constructions in an epistemically closed context would be supported. In a survey experiment (n=3,000), I find limited evidence for this view; neither abstracted ideals about or desired family size nor intentions to have an additional child are significantly influenced by two different contextual primes, while intended total family size is sensitive to priming. These findings illustrate the importance of carefully distinguishing between the different kinds of questions and concepts often described as fertility preferences.

Accepted for conference presentation at PAA 2023

This study explores the relationship between the diffusion of mobile phones and fertility preferences across low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Theoretically, we build on ideational diffusion theories, world society perspectives, and related extensions. Methodologically, we leverage Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data from 31 countries and conduct analyses exploring a range of non-numeric and numeric fertility preference outcomes. The picture we provide is far more complex and nuanced than the common finding that cell phone diffusion is associated with – or leads to – declines in fertility. First, we find that associations with non-numeric ideals are rather strong and that women owning phones are less likely to report uncertainty, fatalism, or ambiguity about what they would choose, suggesting that cell phones may contribute to help move fertility into the “calculus of conscious choice.” Second, we find that associations with numeric ideals are weaker, suggesting that phones may play a larger role in shaping macro-schemas about choice and agency than child desires per se. Lastly, we document that owning a cell phone is associated with higher intentions to have a child for women with zero or one child, yet lower intentions for women with two or more children. All in all, our findings combined reveal that cell phone ownership is not associated with a monotonic increase in correspondence between intentions and ideals, but a “selective convergence” around the two-child norm – possibly strengthened by the diffusion of more globalized fertility discourses – even for women with stated preferences exceeding such norm.

with Luca Maria Pesando

Submitted for conference presentation at ASA 2023

This project extends the event-study based analyses of motherhood wage penalties pioneered by Henrik Kleven into a novel, low-income context using a new retrospective survey of women's work histories in the Chitwan Valley Family Study based in Nepal. This is an early-stage work in progress, however, preliminary results suggest that motherhood earnings penalties in this low-income context are very similar to penalties measured in higher-income contexts.

with Sarah Brauner-Otto

Work in progress

This project collates school-specific data on curricular characteristics and other school traits for every school which ever existed in the Chitwan Valley, and then identifies individual-level life-course exposure to different school traits for individuals in two longitudinal survey waves. I use this geographically and spatially weighted measure of exposure to school family planning curricula, English-language medium of exposure, and female teachers to assess how school traits influence survey-reported fertility preferences later in life. 

Work in progress

According to recent surveys, the average woman in the United States would be happiest having 2.47 children. Yet, the total fertility rate is 1.69 children. The difference between desired fertility and achieved fertility is called the fertility gap (0.78 children). This paper investigates the determinants of the fertility gap across the U.S. states, focusing on variation in economic freedom. We argue that greater economic freedom empowers women to better achieve their preferred fertility outcome. We test this hypothesis using state-level measures of fertility preference (2020-22) from a nationally representative survey of reproductive-aged women, state-level total fertility rates (2020-22), and economic freedom scores (2000-20) from the Fraser Institute. Even with controls, we find a negative and statistically significant relationship between a state's economic freedom score and its fertility gap. Specifically, a one-point increase in the economic freedom score is associated with a 0.05 decrease in the fertility gap, which amounts to over a 6% reduction in the average fertility gap. 

with Clara Piano

Work in progress