Lucas Barros

I am a fourth year PhD student at the MIT Department of Economics.

My interests lie mostly in mechanism design, information design, strategic communication, as well as language.

Here's my CV.

Email me at lgbarros [at] mit [dot] edu

Research

This paper examines a Sender who commits to acquiring information in a certain way and then cheap talks with a Receiver. I call this framework Acquisition Design. I present a belief-based characterization of communication equilibria that makes it particularly tractable to study changes in the Sender's information acquisition. The main results in this paper show necessary and sufficient conditions for (i) classical Cheap Talk, and (ii) Acquisition Design to be each equivalent to Bayesian Persuasion. These conditions coincide, suggesting that acquisition is for no Sender-Receiver game the essential component of the persuasion literature.

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