I am a postdoctoral researcher at the FutureLab CERES at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Germany, and a guest researcher at the Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC) in Berlin.

My research focuses mostly on Global Public Good Institutions (GPGIs), i.e. international institutions with the mandate to spend their budgets to contribute to particular global public goods. I study both how to optimally design such institutions and how to design mechanisms to increase funding for them.

On the optimal design of GPGIs:

Rewarding countries for taxing fossil fuel combustion: optimal mechanisms under exogenous budgets 

Rewarding countries based on their Global Health Security Index score: optimal mechanisms under exogenous budgets

Rewarding countries for public spending on clean energy research: optimal mechanisms under exogenous budgets 

Curbing fossil fuels through global reward payment funds inducing countries to reduce supply, reduce demand and expand substitutes

Optimally rewarding countries for reducing fossil fuel supply and demand: a time consistency problem

Incentivizing countries to report disease outbreaks by partially compensating them for losses due to trade and travel restrictions 

Incentives for pathogen-agnostic disease surveillance via metagenomic sequencing

Deposit purchase based conservation in the presence of endogenous government tax policy

On mechanisms to increase funding for GPGIs: 

Funding Global Public Good Institutions via carbon pricing for aviation- a comparison of  three proposed mechanisms 

The optimal taxation of air travel under monopolistic dynamic pricing 

Proportionally matching voluntary contributions to Global Public Good Institutions

The strategic benefits of creating separate global funds rewarding countries for reducing supply and demand of coal and oil

On Markov Perfect Equilibria in dynamic public goods games with randomly alternating contribution adjustment moves

Limit Markov Perfect Equilibria in games with randomly alternating adjustment moves for funding global institutions rewarding countries for reducing fossil fuel supply and demand

Proportionally matching voluntary contributions to institutions rewarding countries for reducing the supply and the demand of coal and oil 

Allowing for neutralizing contributions in mechanisms to allocate funding to projects with uncertain impacts: A remedy to the unilateralist curse?

Other work:

The endogenous change in shipping speed when emissions from maritime shipping are taxed 

Optimal subsidies for home delivery in times of COVID-19  , with Richard S. Gray

Optimal subsidies for insulation in multi-flat buildings