Daf 17

1) If a brother (Levi) was born after the first brother (Reuvein) died [Tosfos: even if he was a fetus at his death], it's forbidden for him to do Yibum with his brother's wife (Rochel), and she remains an Ervah. Therefore, if another brother (Shimon) does Yibum even before Levi's birth, and then Shimon dies after his birth, Levi can't do Yibum to Rochel because she's an Ervah, and he can't do Yibum to a second wife (Leah) since she's the sister-wife to an Ervah. If Shimon only gave Maamar (rabbinical Kiddushin for a Yevama) to Rochel, then Levi must do Chalitza to Leah, and not Yibum.

2) R' Yehuda b. Beseira says that if someone makes Kiddushin to a woman whose sister fell to him for Yibum, he needs to wait until his brother does Yibum or Chlitza, and then he can make Nesuin to his wife. [Tosfos says: it's only if he made Kiddushin, since he will be seen as making Nesuin to the sister of who he's connected to. However, if he does Nesuin, he doesn't need to wait anymore since he completely severed any connection to the Yevama. Also it's only if he made Kiddushin after the sister fell to him, but if he did it before, she was never connected to him in the first place. As we see this is the case here, since it says later that, if his wife dies, he's permitted to her sister since she was originally permitted (when she fell to Yibum), became forbidden (when he married her sister), and became permitted again (when his wife dies).] This is because he holds that there is a connection between the brother and the Yevama. (However, the Rabanan say that his wife is permitted immediately, since he doesn't hold that a Yevama has any connection to him to consider even somewhat like his wife.)

3) [Tosfos says: the reason we allow here the brother to keep the sister as a wife, but not by the case of two sisters falling to Yibum together from the death of two brothers, that he must divorce the Yevama he did Yibum to; that's because neither sister was destined to be permitted to him, so we're stricter. However, here, he would have anyhow have been permitted to his wife after his brother did Yibum or Chalitza to her sister, so we don't fine him to divorce her.]

4) [Tosfos says: in Megila, the Gemara considers R' Yehuda b. Beseira as a single opinion, (even though we find many opinions who agree that there's a connection between the Yavam and Yevama. We also see R' Ashi later expressing that an unnamed Mishna held there's a connection). Although we can say that the Sugya there holds that the Rabanan agree to the concept of a connection, but they hold the connection is severed when he gives Kiddushin to the sister, however, our Sugya held that the Rabanan disagree with the whole concept of being connected. Therefore, we must say that R' Yosef who considers R' Yehuda b. Beseira a single opinion holds that everybody else holds that there is no concept of connection, and we find Amaroim who disagree with R' Ashi there to explain that Mishna that there is no connection.]

5) Rav says: if the Yevama dies; he's permitted with her mother since he holds there was never any connection to say that she's like the mother of a somewhat wife. This is even true if he was the only brother, and we can't say that the connection could be deflected to another brother. However, the mother is only permitted after she dies, but not while she's alive since it's forbidden to cancel the Mitzvah of Yibum. [Tosfos says: they didn't want to say that there is a connection, and the reason the mother's permitted after her death is that the death severs the connection; since they don't believe that to be true (that the connection gets completely severed by the death).]

6) [Tosfos says: this is even according to R' Gamliel who says that, in the case that he married the Yevama's minor sister, we don't force her to refuse her husband so not to cancel the Mitzvah of Yibum with her sister; that’s only there when she was already his wife, but not for him to L'chatchila marry a relative.]

7) Shmuel says that he's forbidden with the dead Yevama's mother since there was a connection between him and the Yevama, and it doesn't completely severe after her death.

Daf 18

8) We already said in the Mishna “if Shimon only gave Maamar to Reuvein's wife, Rochel, then Levi (who was born after Reuveins death) must do Chalitza to Leah, Shimon's wife, and not Yibum.” If we hold that they are connected, even without Maamar, he would need to only do Chalitza to Leah (and can't do Yibum since she's somewhat an Ervah's sister-wife since Rochel was connected to Shimon already). The only reason they framed the case that there was Maamar to go against Beis Shammai's opinion who holds that Maamar acquires the Yevama to be his wife completely, and Leah wouldn't even need Chalitza.

9) However, R' Meir held that the Yevama has no connection, so, without the Maamar, Levi can do Yibum to Leah. Although we say that, by four brothers who two of them married two sisters, and those two brothers die; the surviving brothers must do Chalitza and not Yibum to the two sisters; it's not because each one is forbidden to the brothers by being the sister of a woman who he's connected to. Rather, it's a decree not to come to a case where one does Yibum to one woman, and the second brother dies before doing Yibum to the second sister, and it comes out that the Mitzvah of Yibum is canceled for the second sister. [Tosfos says: this is against R' Akiva's opinion that, if you do Chalitza instead of Yibum, you're canceling the Mitzvah of Yibum, since Yibum is the overwhelming L'chatchila.]

[Although, the Rabanan of R' Yehuda don't hold that you need to worry about death (and you don't need to set aside another wife for the Kohein Gadol just in case his first wife might die), and we also see R' Meir is not worried about death, or that a barrel might break; we must say that it's only about a death on one particular day. However, here, it's possible that a long time might pass before the second brother will preform Chalitza to the sister, so we're afraid he might die in the meantime. We can't allow him to do Yibum after his brother does Chalitza to the sister, since we need to worry that he might end up doing the Yibum first. However, we can't answer like the Rivan that they both become forbidden when they fell to Yibum together. After all, we should permit Yibum with the one who fell to Yibum first since she was originally permitted (when she fell to Yibum), became forbidden (when her sister also fell to Yibum), and became permitted again (when his sister gets Chalitza).]

10) R' Meir disagrees with R' Gamliel who says that, in the case of marrying the minor sister that we don't force her to refuse her husband so not to cancel the Mitzvah of Yibum with his sister. (After all, R' Gamliel holds not to worry about definitely canceling the Mitzvah of Yibum, and R' Meir is worried even that you might come to Mevatel it.) Rather, R' Gamliel says: you need to wait until she grows up, and then the other leaves. [Rashi explains that the adult sister who fell to Yibum needs to wait until her sister grows up before she can marry someone else. However, Tosfos asks: how can we use the term “the other one leaves” on the adult sister if we were referring to her all along. Rather, he needs to wait to have relations with his minor wife until she grows up. Granted, it's not technically forbidden since there is no concept of connection; but it's not nice to have relations before it will exempt the sister from Yibum.]

11) If Shimon did Yibum to Rochel before Levi was born, and then dies after Levi was born; the Tanna Kama says: she's forbidden to Levi since he wasn't alive when Rochel's first husband, Reuvein, was still living. R' Shimon holds that Levi's permitted since he found her (when he was born) in a permitted state (i.e., being married to a brother that was living together in the world with him). However, the Rabanan learn it from a Pasuk. After all, one Pasuk says “he takes her as a wife and does Yibum.” This implies that she's still somewhat of a Yevama after the marriage. Yet, it says that “he takes her as a wife,” implying it's completely his wife, and she doesn't need Chalitza to be released, but with a Get like a regular wife, and he may remarry her just like he can remarry any wife. Therefore, we must reconcile that he's only considered as still a Yevama from the first husband regarding another brother that wasn't born in his lifetime since he never had any Heter with her yet, and consider her a complete wife regarding the Yavam since he was already permitted to her.

12) R' Oshiya says: R' Shimon would permit even if Levi was born before Shimon did Yibum. After all, it's considered as if she's already married to Shimon because of the connection. R' Shimon doesn't practically forbid a brother that wasn't in the world only if he's the only brother (and the wife wasn't connected to any brother, or when Shimon is still living, so Levi can't do Yibum to Rochel at that time, only Shimon can. (However, after Shimon dies, Levi can do Yibum since we consider Rochel as Shimon's wife even without Yibum because of the connection.)

Daf 19

13) Although R' Shimon, when Shimon gives a Maamar to Rochel and dies, doesn't allow Levi to make Yibum to one and exempt the other since she's the other one's sister-wife through the Yibum connection; since the rabbi's enacted to forbid for, perhaps, when you have two wives falling from different husbands, you'll come to permit one of the wives with the Yibum or Chalitza of the second wife. [Rashi says: the reason why we don't consider them anyhow from one house, since the first one who fell to Yibum is considered as the wife to the second husband before he died through this connection), we must say that they died simultaneously, and according to R' Yossi Haglili who holds that it's possible to happen simultaneously. Tosfos gives another case: the first woman who fell to Yibum was an Ervah to the second brother who died, so she was never connected to him.]

14) However, R' Pappa says: R' Shimon admits that, if Levi was born before Shimon did Yibum, he's forbidden to do Yibum after Shimon's death. There's a Braisa that supports him, which disproves R' Oshiya.

15) The Tanna Kama holds that there is no concept of a Yibum connection. Therefore, without Shimon giving Maamar to Rochel, Levi can do Yibum to Shimon's wife, Leah, and we don't consider her a sister wife of the Ervah Rochel (who was his brother's wife who wasn't alive when he was born). If Shimon gives a Maamar against Rochel's will depends on the argument between Rebbi and the Rabanan. As Rebbi holds that a forced Maamar takes effect just like a forced Yibum takes effect. As we should extrapolate Maamar from Yibum since it's part of Yibum. The Rabanan hold that the forced Maamar doesn't take effect just like a forced Kiddushin doesn't take effect. After all, we should extrapolate Maamar from Kiddushin since it's similar to Kiddushin. However, if she accepted the Maamar, everyone holds it take effect, and when it takes effect, you need to do Chalitza to Leah, but you can't do Yibum.

16) R' Shimon holds that, if Shimon did a Maamar to Rochel before Levi was born, and then he dies, Levi can do Yibum to Leah and exempt Rochel no matter how we view Maamar. After all, if it acquired Rochel, even though it makes her Shimon's wife before Levi's birth, she's exempt since her sister-wife had Yibum. If it doesn't acquire her, then she's exempt since she's a wife of his brother who died before he was born. [Rashi says: R' Shimon's position is either that Maamar completely acquires, or doesn't acquire at all. Tosfos explains: for, if it would only acquire rabbinically, R' Shimon would forbid Yibum with Leah since she seems like the sister-wife of the Ervah Rochel. However, Tosfos says: even if she's acquired rabbinically, because, in as much she was acquired, she became Shimon's wife before Levi's birth, so Leah should be permitted. However, the Gemara seems to assume that R' Shimon, in truth, held that it either completely acquires, or does not acquire at all.]

Daf 20

17) According to R' Shimon, the reason we permit the brother's wife when Shimon does Yibum before he's born, and yet we don't permit his maternal half-sister that married his paternal half brother before his birth, and dies after his birth (even though he comes in the world while there's an obligation to do Yibum), we don't say that the prohibition of a sister falls off, since they're never permitted. However, we see that, sometimes, we permit the prohibition of a brother’s wife (by Yibum). [Rashi says: that the prohibition of the first brother's wife falls off when Shimon does Yibum to her, so Levi only comes from it being Shimon's complete wife. Tosfos adds: a proof that the first prohibition falls off; that if Shimon divorces her, he may remarry her.]

18) If two sisters fall to Yibum, and one of them is an Ervah to you, then you can do Yibum to the second one (since she's not a sister to someone that has a Yibum connection with you). However, if one sister is only a rabbinical Ervah, since she's connected to you from the Torah, so her sister is considered a sister of someone with a Yibum connection with you, and she's forbidden to you.

19) If a woman who's an Ervah that has a punishment of Kareis falls to Yibum, she doesn't even need Chalitza. However, if she's only forbidden from a Lav, and of course, if she's only rabbinically forbidden (Shniyos), she needs a Chalitza, but you can't do Yibum.

20) Although, you can't do Yibum to both the Ervah and the one forbidden with a Lav [Tosfos: and also has an Asei forbidding her, so that we don't say, from the Torah, the Asei of Yibum can supersede it], but we need to differentiate like this to reconcile two conflicting P'sukim. One implies that, even if you can't do Yibum, you must do Chalitza, and the other implies, if there is no Yibum, there' no Chalitza either. Therefore, we must reconcile that the former is by Lavim that, at least, if you give her Kiddushin, it takes effect. (The latter refers to an Ervah where Kiddushin can't take effect.) Therefore, if you do Chalitza to the Lav, since it's called for, it exempts her sister-wife too. However, if he does Yibum, since it's not called for, he doesn't even acquire her B'dieved, and her sister-wife is not exempt.

21) However, if she's only a Lav to him (without an Asei), you can make Yibum from the Torah since the Asei of Yibum supersedes the Lav. Therefore, we learned that, if B'dieved he does Yibum, he acquires her as a wife. [Tosfos explains: this is even by a virgin widow (who's husband died before Nesuin) to a Kohein Gadol. Although she can't become pregnant from the first relations, and she's forbidden to him for any future relations (since he won't have an Asei anymore to supersede the Lav); still, the Mitzvah of Yibum is not dependent on having children through this relations, but just that the man and the women are able to eventually have children (even if not together). This is the reason that you can do Yibum to a minor even though she can't have children now, and we only exclude an Iylanus, or her male counterpart (Saris) from Yibum.]

22) However, they rabbinically forbade having Yibum with a Lav since they're afraid that, if they allow the first relations, they'll come to have a second relations. [Tosfos adds: it's even forbidden to have a complete penetration during the first relations since he's Yoitza the Mitzvah with the slightest penetration. We can't even permit the widow to the Kohein Gadol because the Yibum was permitted, and now she's his wife, and we say that if they married before he was appointed as Kohein Gadol, they may stay together since they married when it was permitted; but we must say that this marriage wasn't permitted, but it was a forbidden marriage that was superseded by Yibum.]

23) Although we usually say that an Asei doesn't supersede a Lav if there is a way that you can fulfill the Mitzvah without transgressing the Lav, and here you can avoid the Lav by getting a Chalitza; since he holds that, given the choice of doing Yibum, Chalitza is not considered as a Mitzvah, he needs to fulfill the Mitzvah through Yibum.

Daf 21

24) The rabbinical prohibitions are your grandmother, your grandfather's wife, your father's maternal brother's wife, and your mother's paternal bother's wife, and your grandson's wife (whether he's your son's or daughter's son).

25) You're permitted with your father-in-law's wife (even though you're forbidden with his daughter {as being your wife's sister if your wife is still alive}); and you're permitted with your stepson's wife, even though you're forbidden with his daughter (as being your wife's granddaughter). We don't decree to forbid the wife since you might come to permit the daughter too.

26) [Tosfos quotes the Yerushalmi that they forbade marrying your father-in-law's wife because it looks like you're doing something forbidden. R' Tam stopped someone from marrying his father-in-law's wife, and ruined the wedding feast he prepared. Although our Gemara permitted it, perhaps they forbade it afterwards.]

27) [Tosfos also quotes the Yerushalmi that they forbade two step-siblings to marry each other when they grew up together since it looks like they're doing something forbidden. However, our Gemara in Sotah says not to worry about it.]

28) Most of these Shniyos don't have any break through all generations, and we forbid any ascendant and their wives. We have four exceptions, and Rav informed us about three of them; your mother's paternal brother's wife, your father's maternal brother's wife, and your daughter's daughter-in-law. [Rashi: we make a break to lower generations since there is no Torah prohibition in her generation.] Zeiri adds your maternal grandfather's wife. However, Rav held to forbid the above generation since you might confuse them with your paternal grandfather's wife. However, Zeiri held that there is no reason to be confused since people understand the difference between his maternal relatives and paternal relatives since it's more common to be by his paternal relatives than to be by his maternal relatives.

29) We have an inquiry regarding a mother's maternal brother's wife, if we decree her because of the father's paternal brother's wife? Is it a double decree (since we forbid her because of a mother's paternal brother's wife, which is only forbidden because of a father's paternal brother's wife.) Or do we consider it all one decree since she's considered as an aunt in all cases. We resolved it from the rule said in Eretz Yisrael: any female relative that's an Ervah, her male counterpart's wife is a Shniya. Therefore, since a mother's maternal sister is an Ervah, a mother's maternal brother's wife is a Shniya.

30) However, this rule is only if the female Ervah is a blood relative, but if it's only an Ervah through marriage, like by a mother-in-law, your in-law's daughter, your stepdaughter and a stepchild's daughter; the wife of their male counterparts are permitted. Therefore, your father-in-law's wife, your brother-in-law's wife, your stepson's wife and your stepchild's son's wife are permitted.

31) Ameimer says that they didn't enact against marrying a great uncle's wife, or a great aunt (i.e., your father's father's siblings) [Tosfos: the same to your mother's mother's sister] because you might confuse them with the generation below them who are Ervahs. Although we have a note from Mar b. Raveina that forbids it, but R' Ashi says that it wasn't reliable information since Mar b. Raveina didn't sign on it. [Tosfos says: therefore, R' Chananel and Shiltos Paskins like Ameimar. However, the Ri Paskins not like Ameimar since the Sugya in Hacholetz is not like him.]

Daf 22

32) R' Chiya taught a Braisa to add onto the Shniyos list: your great granddaughter, your wife's great granddaughter, your father-in-law's, and your mother-in-law's, grandmother. We have an unresolved inquiry whether these Shniyos extend for all the generations, or not. [Tosfos says: even though your grandson's daughter-in-law is forbidden for all generations, that's because they're more common to live close to you since they're your heirs, so you need to be strict.]

33) They didn't enact Shniyos by converts. After all, even there Ervah relatives (who converted) are only forbidden to them so people shouldn't say that he went down in holiness when converting, since the people forbidden to him when he was a non-Jew is permitted when he's a Jew.

34) R' Nachman says: maternal brothers who convert shouldn't say testimony together (since it looks like relatives testifying together), but if they do, it's valid. If they're only paternal brothers, they can L'chatchila testify together. Ameimar permits even maternal brothers to testify, and it's not similar to enacting to forbid their Ervahs, since marrying is done by the masses, so they'll confuse them with real Ervahs. However, testimony is run by Beis Din and they understand that we consider a convert as if he's a new born child. [Tosfos says: it seems from here, the problem of a convert marrying a relative is that they'll confuse them with Jewish Ervahs. However, earlier we said that the problem is that people will say that they went down in holiness. Tosfos reconciles: we need the reason for confusing them with Jewish Ervahs by maternal relatives, but people understand that the Yichus of a non-Jew doesn't follow his father, so people won't confuse Ervahs with paternal relatives. We need the reason that they shouldn't say that they went down in holiness for paternal relatives that they were forbidden to when they were non-Jews.]

35) There's a Yibum connection to a Mamzer brother, [Tosfos: even if the dead brother wasn't a Mamzer]. (We don't say that we learn from the brothers of Yaakov's sons who were Kosher, that you need a kosher brother.) After all, if they had a Mamzer child, it will exempt her from Yibum, so logic dictates that she also falls to Yibum to a Mamzer brother. The Mamzer also inherits and a Kohein brother may become Tamai to him. This is not similar to a wife who's forbidden to him that the Kohein can't become Tamai to. After all, that wife is supposed to be divorced, but a brother will always remain a brother.

36) As we said, a Mamzer son exempt his mother from Yibum, as the Pasuk says “a son, he doesn't have (Ayn Lo).” We Darshen “Ayin Aluv” check it out to make sure there is no children, even an illegitimate one. The Mamzer child transgresses if he smites his father. Although the father is not considered as “doing the actions of his nation” i.e., keeping Mitzvos, which is a prerequisite for honoring that parent, if he produced a Mamzer; we must say it refers to a case where he repented. Although Teshuva, in this case, doesn't completely help since the damage from his action is still here, since he created a Mamzer, so it's a mistake that he can't fix; still, since he did Teshuva, he's now “doing the actions of his nation.”

37) [Tosfos says: it says in Sanhedrin that Beis Din can make anyone an agent to give Malkus and curse, except his son. We must say that it's also in a case where he did Teshuva. This fits well by Malkus, since he can't become exempt from Malkus by doing Teshuva. However, cursing him is difficult why they're doing it if he repented. We must say that it refers to a case where he said Hashem's name in vane, or he needed to be placed in excommunication, where Teshuva doesn't exempt.]

38) If someone has relations with his sister who is also his father's wife's daughter; the Chachumim say that he's Chayiv two Chatos for both prohibitions. R' Yossi b. Yehuda says: he's only Chayiv for his sister since the Pasuk says “she's his sister,” that's the only prohibition he's doing. The Pasuk that says “the Ervah of the daughter of your father's wife that your father sired, your sister” is only saying that you're only Chayiv when your father has the ability to give Kiddushin to the mother, but not for a daughter born from a non-Jewess who can't be your father's wife, that she's really doesn't have a status of a sister. (However, it can't exclude if she's a daughter of a woman who's forbidden to your father from a Lav, since the Pasuk calls it a child, as it says “ones the son of a beloved, and one is of a hated” i.e., that the marriage is hated. Also, it can't exclude if she's a daughter of a woman who's forbidden to your father with Karies, since it's considered a child as the Pasuk says “if he was born in the house or outside,” i.e., whether you tell the mother to remain, or to go outside {since the marriage is forbidden}.) We learn that she's not a sister if born from a slave since the Pasuk says “the woman and her children belong to the master.

However, the Rabanan learn it from “don't marry them since he'll make your son go astray.” Only a child from a Jewess (from a non-Jew) is considered your child, and not from a non-Jewess (from a Jew). You can't say it only refers to the seven nations that were in Eretz Yisrael since they hold like R' Shimon who Darshens the reason of the Pasuk, and when it says “it will lead astray,” it includes all non-Jews who lead astray. However, R' Yossi b. Yehuda agrees with the Rabanan of R' Shimon, so he can't learn this Drasha for all non-Jews.

Daf 23

39) It's not necessary to say that the Rabanan held that [Tosfos text: since the child is considered as coming from his Jewish mother that he should be a Mamzer]. Rather, he's a Pasul Jew (and forbidden to a Kohein.)

40) [Tosfos says: the Lav of 'Lo Sichaneim' is applicable to all non-Jews (and not only to the seven nations). Regarding the Lav of 'Lo Tischatein' (not to marry), which we explain goes on after the conversion when marriage is applicable, even though it's not applicable to the seven nations more than all other converts since they're not making them go astray after their conversion; it still only applies to the seven nations. After all, once we see that the Torah excludes Amoni, Moavi, Egyptian and Adomi converts to marry Jews, it should imply that other converts are permitted. Also, the Lav of not making treaties are only applicable to the seven nations, since the purpose is to be able to conquer the whole Eretz Yisrael.]

41) If someone gave Kiddushin to one of two sisters, and you don't know to which one, he needs to give a Get to both of them. (According to the opinion that, if a Kiddushin doesn't allow relations with your wife, it's not a Kiddushin, we must say that it was originally known which sister was the wife, but was forgotten afterwards. [Tosfos says: this is only when the Kiddushin made the relations forbidden, but we say that Kiddushin takes effect on women forbidden to him with a Lav despite not being allowed to have relations with her.] If the husband dies, and he has one brother, he must do Chalitza to both of them. However, if he has two brothers, you can have one do Chalitza to one sister, and then the second brother do Yibum on the second sister. However, you can't have it in the reverse order, since he might be marrying the sister who you have a Yibum connection to.

42) However, if he did make Yibum before the Chalitza, we allow him to keep her. [Tosfos says: this is only here where he had relations with a Safeik sister that you have a Yibum connection to, but you won't be able to keep her if it was a definite one, like we say in the case of two sisters falling to Yibum from two brothers. This is also not similar to someone who made Kiddushin to the sister that you have a Yibum connection to, that the Rabanan didn't even need him to wait to take her until after his brother makes a Chalitza to her sister; that's because the marrying didn't come through a forbidden relations, and when he gives money for the Kiddushin, it breaks the connection to him.]

43) If two people give Kiddushin to two sisters, and they don't know which one gave to which sister; both need to give a Get to each sister. If they both died, then, if they both have one brother, they both do Chalitza to both sisters. If one has one brother and the other has two brothers; the single brother does Chalitza to both sisters, and one of the other one's brother does Chalitza to a sister, and the second brother does Yibum to the other sister. We allow this and we don't decree to forbid this lest the single brother will do Yibum to a sister. However, this is only in this order, but he can't do Yibum before the single brother does the Chalitza since he might be marrying someone else's Yevama. However, if he does marry her before, we allow him to keep her.

44) If they both have two brothers, then one of each set of brothers does Chalitza to different sisters. Then the other brother of each set does Yibum to the sister that his brother didn't do Chalitza to. We don't decree to forbid this since they might come to do Yibum before the Chalitza. (However, this decree is not applicable to the first case where there is a single brother, since he will definitely do Chalitza, it will remind the other brothers to make Chalitza.)

45) This is not similar to the case of four brothers (that two married sisters and died) that we say that the other two brothers must do Chalitza to them and not Yibum [Tosfos explains: and here they allow one to do Yibum, and not like Rashi explains that we allow here if he B'dieved does Yibum before the Chalitza.] After all, there, according to the opinion that there is a Yibum connection, they're forbidden because of being connected to their sister. [Tosfos says: this is not like R' Yochanan's opinion that the sister who fell first is permitted after one did Chalitza to her sister since she was originally permitted, became forbidden (when her sister fell to Yibum), and became permitted again (after her sister's Chalitza).] According to the opinion that there is no Yibum connection, still, there's a problem that the Mitzvah will be canceled (if he does Yibum to one, and then his brother dies and her sister is now exempt from Yibum. You can't rectify this by having the other brother do Chalitza first, since you might come to do the Yibum first.) [Tosfos says: however, R' Yochanan allowed Yibum after the brother's Chalitza, and he's not concerned that he'll do Yibum before the Chalitza. Since he holds that there is a connection, so she's actually forbidden before the Chalitza, he'll be more careful to have the Chalitza beforehand. However, according to those that hold there is no connection, so there is no intrinsic prohibition, and they won't be so concerned that the brother may die beforehand and won't be careful to do Yibum after the Chalitza.] However, in our case, where each one can say that, perhaps it's really my Yevama that I'm taking. [Tosfos says: therefore, you don't need to worry that perhaps he might do Yibum before the Chalitza, since he might be doing correct even if he did so, since he may be taking his own Yevama.]

46) Even if the brothers are Kohanim, and two brothers do Yibum after their brothers did Chalitza to the other one; you don't make them divorce since Kohanim can't marry those who had Chalitza. After all, that is only a rabbinical prohibition, and they didn't forbid by a Safeik. [Tosfos says: we say later in the Mesechta that if a Kohein marries a women who's son died within thirty days (and perhaps the child wasn't viable and she should then fall to Yibum since she didn't have a child), we say that the brother shouldn't do Chalitza (and we rely that the child was probably viable). We don't say that he should do Chalitza since a Kohein is allowed to a Safeik Chalutza. After all, since she's already married, people would say that the reason the rabbis required the Chalitza is because they have proof that the child wasn't viable and she needed Chalitza, and people will deduce wrongly that a Chalutza is permitted with a Kohein. However, here, where they marry after the Chalitza, people will assume that the reason he took her is because they found out she wasn't really a Chalutza (since the Chalitza was unnecessary).]

47) It's a Mitzvah for the oldest brother to do Yibum, but if a younger brother preceded him to do Yibum, he acquires her.

48) The one who does Yibum exclusively inherits his brother, and he doesn't split the estate with any of his brothers. However, this has the same law as the double portion of a Bechor; that it only applies to his property that was in his possession at the time of the death, and not what comes to his estate afterwards (like a repayment of a loan). [Tosfos adds: it's also like a Bechor that his inheritance doesn't revert back to the brothers at Yovel.]

49) If someone is suspected to having relations with a slave or a non-Jew, and the slave is freed and the non-Jew converts; he shouldn't marry her. However, if he marries her, he doesn’t need to divorce her.

50) [Tosfos explains: since the implication is that this convert may marry other Jews, it proves] not like R' Nechemia's opinion. As he says that converts for alternative motives (like because of lions, dreams, and from the days of Mordichai and Esther) are not true converts. Anyhow, once she is a convert, the reason why he shouldn't marry her is since it will strengthen the suspicion, and you're obligated to remove suspicion from you. [Tosfos says: however, if the suspicion was that he was having relations with a non-married Jewess, you can marry her and not worrying about the suspicion since you're fulfilling the Mitzvah “that you should take her for a wife.”]

51) The Halacha is that all those who converted for those alternative motives are converts.[Tosfos points out that these converts from lions are not the same as the Kusim, if they're considered converts from lions, which connotes they weren't true converts. After all, they were still worshiping idols when they converted. Those who say that they were true converts is only because they held they converted completely later.]

52) We don't accept converts in the days of Moshiach, nor in the days of Dovid and Shlomo. [Tosfos explains: Iti Hagitti and the daughter of Paroh were able to convert then since they didn't need the King's table (i.e., welfare). Although we find other converts at that time, not that they converted them, but they converted themselves and they were like tag-alongs. Although Hillel converted the one who said that he wanted to convert on condition to become the Kohein Gadol, that was because he was certain that, eventually, he would convert for the sake of Heaven.]

53) If someone is suspected for having relations with a married lady, and the husband divorces her, even if the person marries her, he needs to divorce her. Rav says that it's only if we have witnesses to him defiling her when she was married. Although there's a Braisa that says that the only time he doesn't divorce her unless there are those witnesses if they had children together; we need to say that Rav is also only referring to a case where they had children. Alternatively, that Braisa is Rebbi's opinion that, if things are very suspicious, like a peddler leaving the house when the wife is in panties; or you find spit on the ceiling of the canopy bed; you find turned over shoe marks near your bed (that someone's trying to conceal the fact he was there); they must divorce since it's very suspicious. [Tosfos explains: i.e., the peddler must divorce her if he marries her after she's divorced, but the original husband doesn't need to divorce her only if he warns her to seclude with him and she secludes with him anyhow; or if they're caught under covers acting like adulterers. Also, we say in the Gemara that these suspicious acts are like rumors to adultery, and we don't forbid a husband for rumors that came out while they're married. Although the Gemara in the end of Nedarim says that they need a reason to permit to a husband through suspicious behavior, like, we assume they didn't have relations if the suspected man didn't run from the house, but otherwise she'll be prohibited to his wife; that's because there refers to the case where she claims that she did have relations. (However, we don't forbid her anyway since, with her claim, she made herself to be forbidden to the husband, and everyone must keep what they claim to be forbidden; but we say there that the rabbis realized that most women who claim this lie in order to get out of their marriage since they seen someone who they rather be with.) However, she's never forbidden to her husband if she claims that she was not defiled.]

Daf 25

54) The Halacha is like Rav when rumors stop [Rashi explains: that rumors come against the original rumor to say it was a lie], and the Halacha is like Rebbi (that he must divorce without children) when the rumor didn't stop for a day and a half. However, if it stopped in the middle, it doesn't count. [Tosfos says: however, Rav didn't hold of this differentiation, and permitted even when rumors went on unstopped.]

55) If she married someone else in between and got divorced, and then she married the one who there were rumors against, he may keep her. However, even so, he shouldn't marry her L'chatchila.

56) However, rumors are only effective when he doesn't have any enemies, but, otherwise, we don't worry about the rumors since we assume that they were started by his enemies.

57) If the rumors were stopped because of fear (since the subject of the rumors was very powerful), we don't consider it as if the rumors stopped.

58) This is not like the case where we say that, if a man divorced his wife because she made vows, or because she has a bad reputation (about adultery), although you're not allowed to take her back, if you take her back, you may keep her. [Tosfos explains: this is really not comparable to our case, since the reason there why you can't take her back is different, either as a fine so that she shouldn't be so loose of a character, or because it might make irreparable damage if she'll marry someone else, and you'll claim that it's a mistaken divorce, since you wouldn't have divorced her if you knew that you can null the vows, and that the rumors of her promiscuity was false. However, still, people will assume that you divorced her because of adultery (and her bad reputation was justified), I might say that they would need to be as strict.] After all, when he takes back his wife, that shows that the rumors were false. However, when she marries the one she's suspected that she had adulteress relations with, it strengthens the validity of the rumors.

59) If an agent came from across the sea bringing a Get for a woman, and he needed to say “it was written and signed before me” to validate the Get, or a witness testified to her husband's death; he shouldn't marry the wife. (After all, people might say that he made the whole thing up just to marry her.) However, if he brings it from Eretz Yisrael, where he doesn't need to say “it was written and signed before me,” where we don't need to rely on his words, but on the Get; he can marry her. Although we don't rely on a witness to the husband's death, since we only allow her to remarry because of the Chazaka that she would only marry after she looks into the matter and is convinced he's dead; still, since there is no document there to rely on that it's true, we're stricter. A proof to this; even the women who are not believed to say that a husband dies (since we assume there is animosity between them, and she might be saying it to get the woman in trouble) are believed to bring a Get since the document is a proof to what she's claiming.

60) If the witness says that he killed him, or we killed him; the Tanna Kama says that he's believed for others, but not for himself. R' Yehuda says: he's only believed for others by saying “we killed” but not that “I killed.”

61) R' Yosef says: if someone testified that a person forced a homosexual act on him, he can combine with somebody else to execute that person [Tosfos: and we don't say he's invalid to testify since he must hate that person]. However, he's not believed when he said he did it willfully, since he would be a wicked person, and wicked people are invalid witnesses. [Tosfos says: when the Gemara in Makkos says that the victim of a murder or homosexual act are invalid for being a witness (and the Gemara wanted to say that they should be an invalid witness that would ruin the whole testimony); that's only when the homosexual act was done purposely and he was wicked, and the killed person became a Treifa during the ordeal, and Treifos can't testify.]

62) Rava held that he's believed even when he says that he did it willfully, since we split his words and only believe him regarding the other person, and not regarding himself. [Tosfos says: we don't split someone's words when the witnesses on a document that claim that they were forced to sign falsely because of threat of confiscating their money; that we should believe them that they were forced, but not because of money, but because of threat of death. The reason, according to Rava, that we don't split his words; since we don't split words to invalidate a document since the need to validate it is only rabbinic. After all, from the Torah, we consider the witnesses' signatures on it as if they were already interrogated in Beis Din. Alternatively, since it's not so common for the force be under threat of death, even if they said they were forced, and didn't say because of money, we would assume it wasn't through threat of death unless they explicitly said so.]

63) [Tosfos says: a person is believed to say that he sinned purposely (and we don't say that he's making himself wicked) since he's trying to stop bringing an unnecessary Chatos.]

64) [Tosfos says: the one who did the homosexual act willfully is invalid to be a witness even according to Rava who says that a wicked man needs to be wicked through sins like robbery (who wrongs Hashem and his fellow man), but not one who sins just to anger Hashem since we don't have any proof that he'll wrong his fellow man by testifying falsely. After all, since he did this act for his own pleasure, we suspect that he'll testify falsely for a payment. This is the reason why someone who ate Neveila to satisfy his cravings is invalid to testify according to everyone.]

65) [Tosfos says: although we see one opinion who held that someone suspected on Ervahs is a valid witness; that's only if he's loose and secludes with them, but not if we have proof that he actually had relations with them.]

66) According to R' Yosef; that which a person is believed to say that he killed her husband, we must say that he held that we permit testimony from an invalid source to allow a woman to remarry. According to R' Mensahe, who holds that we don't allow invalid testimony from the Torah to permit a woman to remarry, but only if he's rabbinically invalid; we can say he holds like Rava (that we split his words and only believe him that the husband was killed, but not by him). If R' Menashe holds like R' Yosef; we must say that he Paskins like R' Yehuda that he's not believed to say he killed the husband. [Tosfos says: so we see that R' Yehuda doesn't hold that you split his words. Although we see R' Yehuda holds that a convert who says that he converted by himself (and not in Beis Din) is only believed for himself, but not for his children, it's not because we split his words. Rather, he needs to be stringent on himself not to marry Jewesses since he made himself someone forbidden through his claims.]

67) The difference, according to R' Yehuda, between testifying that “I killed him” and “we killed him;” that when he says “we killed him;” [Tosfos: we interpret it to mean] I was with those who killed him, and thus, not incriminating himself.

68) A woman who made a vow not to have pleasure from her husband, that the husband didn't annul, and they went to a rabbi, and he couldn't find a way to undo the vow, so they divorce; the rabbi shouldn't marry the woman. However, if a rabbi was on a Beis Din to do Chalitza or refusing ceremony; he may marry the woman, since he's part of a Beis Din, so they're above suspicion. Although to permit a vow, you also need a Beis Din of three, that's only when they're laymen, but an expert may permit by himself.

69) Not only are three people are not suspected, but even two people. As we say that someone who signed a sale document for a field, may buy the field off the buyer. Also, the one who signs a Get is permitted to marry the wife. [Tosfos says: even so, a scrupulous person should avoid it, as it says in Chulin: even though the rabbis permit buying it, someone should avoid things that looks bad. Although the Gemara in Gitten says that we don't allow L'chatchila for witnesses to say that the husband ordered that a certain person should write the Get and two others to sign it because of suspicion, that's because his testimony doesn't directly permit the woman, but she's only permitted after the others write it up. It's not compared to here, where the witnesses' testimony makes her permitted.] The only reason we used a case of a Beis Din before is to teach that you need three people to allow a girl's refusal of her husband, and not like the opinion that allows it with two.

70) If the rabbi B'dieved marries the wife, R' Kahana says that he must divorce her, and R' Ashi says that he doesn't need to divorce. R' Zuti taught like R' Ashi. We also see this by the case where one is suspected with a slave, and she's freed, if he marries her, he doesn't need to divorce. Therefore, we see that we don't divorce because of suspicion. [Tosfos explains: this is not similar to somebody who was suspected with a married lady who has to divorce her, since then he would be forbidden to her if it was true. However, here, the rabbi is permitted with this woman (who made the vow) from the Torah.]

71) All who are forbidden to marry a woman because of suspicion (like the above rabbi, the one who brings a Get or testifies on her husband's death); if they has other wives and they died, he may marry these women afterwards (since they definitely didn't intend to marry them at the time). However, it doesn't help if he divorces his wife. However, that’s only when they didn't have marital spats before then (so, we're afraid he's starting fights in order to give an excuse to marry the other lady), but if they had marital spats beforehand, we can say that he wasn't thinking of marrying her at that time. Some say: even if the fights started afterwards, he's permitted if she started the fighting and not him.

Daf 26

72) In all these cases, if the woman marry someone else in the meantime, but was eventually divorced or widowed, he's permitted to marry them.

73) Even though she's forbidden to him, she may marry his son, brother, and of course, his father (since he fears his father, and wouldn't attempt to have relations with her). This is dissimilar to a man who's suspected with a woman, he can't marry her mother, sister or daughter since we're worried that he married her to be close to that woman to have relations. After all, since his wife won't become forbidden through that relations, she won't guard him from having it. However, the men, who's wife will become forbidden to them through relations, will guard them from having this relations. Alternatively, it's common for the women to visit other women, so the suspected woman will be constantly in his house, but it's not common for men to visit men.