1) A woman whose husband and sister-wife went overseas, and someone came and said that her husband died, she can't remarry or have Yibum until she finds out if her sister-wife is pregnant or not. (However, if witnesses come and say that she's not pregnant, she may have Yibum, and we don't say that we need to worry, perhaps that her husband married a third woman there and impregnated her. Even though most women get impregnated and give birth, so we should rely on the majority of cases that she could marry out; we must say that this Mishna is like R' Meir who is concerned for the minority of cases.

2) If her mother-in-law left to overseas not pregnant, and, at this time, her husband doesn't have any brothers; if her husband dies, she can marry out and she doesn't need to worry that her mother-in-law gave birth to a boy. Although we said that, in a majority of cases, a woman gets pregnant and gives birth; but, even so, only a minority of such pregnancies would obligate her in Yibum. After all, half of all pregnancies result in a female, and you can combine it to the minority of males that will be miscarried. Although R' Meir is concerned about a minority case; still since there's a Chazaka that's she's permitted to marry out, combined to the fact that's it's only a minority of cases that are problematic, it becomes like an exceedingly small minority that even R' Meir is not concerned about. However, in the first case, she has a Chazaka that she needs to fall to Yibum, so you can combine that with the minority of cases where her sister-wife didn't become pregnant to make it like a fifty/fifty chance, and forbid her. [Tosfos adds: and regarding Safeik Tumah in a Reshus Harabim, we'll say it's a complete Safeik and is Tahor.]

3) [Tosfos sets up the Sugya: if she doesn't have a Chazaka that she's permitted to marry out, like] if her mother-in-law leaves overseas while pregnant, and R' Meir holds that you need to worry about the minority of cases that she had a viable boy [Tosfos says: there's no Chazaka here, although she could marry out as is, but the fact she's pregnant puts a damper to the Chazaka and ruins the Chazaka. So, R' Meir doesn't permit in a case where there's a minority of cases to forbid unless a Chazaka supports the majority of cases to permit.] R' Yehoshua, who is not concerned about the minority of cases, permits even if her mother-in-law leaves pregnant since, in most cases, she won't give birth to a viable male.

4) [Tosfos says: the reason why they didn't establish the Mishna like the Rabanan, and we'll say that we can't follow the majority of cases that a woman will get pregnant, since we don't follow majorities that are dependant on a human action; we must say that our Sugya holds like Rava who disagrees with that logic. Alternatively, it's not considered as if it's dependant on an actions ince it's natural for a husband to have relations with his wife.]

5) [Tosfos says: Although we said in the last Perek that a woman is not believed when she went overseas that she had a son there, and the son died after her husband and she should be exempt from Yibum since she has a Chazaka to be permitted to the Yavam, and we don't believe her with a Migo that her son is still living, which would be supported by the majority that most woman get impregnant and give birth; since we refer to a case where we have witnesses that the son died. (See Mahrsha who asks: if we have witnesses about the son, she should have a Chazaka that she could marry out, so why don't we believe her?)]

6) [Tosfos says: the Halacha is not like R' Meir. Although R' Yochanan Paskins like R' Shimon b. Gamliel that, when we see an animal that's giving milk, but we don't know if she gave birth to a child yet, we only exempt the next child from Bechoros if it has a child already following it, since, if it wasn't its child, she wouldn't have mercy on it and treat it like a child. It's not because, without a child, we'll suspect it for being among the minority of animals that gives milk before it gives birth (and we don't take the fact that she gives milk as a proof she already gave birth). Rather, we refer to a case where it's known that this animal gave milk before it ever gave birth, thus, the only proof that she gave birth before is the child tagging along after her. The reason we Paskin like R' Shimon b. Gamliel that we need to worry that a child that was killed within thirty days through a lion or falling off a roof can't be assumed viable even though the majority of children are viable; since we need to worry that there would be rumors that a child the died by just yawning, which we'll need to worry that it died immediately since it wasn't viable. Therefore, they also allowed not to mourn over such a child, and not to allow an animal Shechted within eight days (although rumors don't apply), so not to permit it by a Yavam either. Alternatively, they enacted to forbid a healthy animal Shechted within eight days since you might come to permit unhealthy animals, which are similar to human babies that died after yawning.]

7) [Tosfos says: Although R' Meir permits Damai from the Torah, and doesn't forbid it because of the minority of ignoramuses who don't separate Trumah and Maasar; it fits well if we say that R' Meir is only rabbinically concerned for minority cases. Alternatively, even though we know that some people are wicked not to separate Maasar, but we shouldn't assume that all Jews are wicked. Although R' Meir forbade Kussim because of the minority who were idol worshipping that's because the whole nation is not too particular is keeping Torah.]

8) We said that a woman's husband and sister-wife goes across the sea, and witnesses testify that her husband died; she can't have Yibum or marry out until she finds out if her sister-wife became pregnant. Zeiri explains: according to R' Meir, you can't marry relying that most women become pregnant after time to assume her sister-wife must be pregnant. Rather, she needs Chalitza after nine months (when the pregnancy will be over). Abaya b. Avin and R' Chanina b. Avin explain: that she's even forbidden after nine months since we might eventually find that the sister-wife was pregnant and had a child, and the Chalitza was not necessary, and then we would need to announce to people that she's really permitted to a Kohein (which we would like to avoid, since people might not hear of the announcement and will notice her marrying a Kohein).

9) Although we said in the last Perek that a woman is not believed when she went overseas that she had a son there, and the son died after her husband and she should be exempt from Yibum, but she gets Chalitza, and we're not afraid that witnesses will come and corroborate her position and make the Chalitza unnecessary and we would need to announce that she's permitted to a Kohein; we must say that she was already divorced and is anyhow Pasul to a Kohein and they'll never need to announce her to be Kosher to a Kohein. Alternatively, she claims that they were all hiding in a cave and there were no other witnesses that knew who died first.

10) If the wives of two brothers come from across the seas, and each one testifies that her husband died (and they were the only brothers), they're both forbidden to marry out since they can't rely on their sister-in-law's testimony that their only Yavam is also dead and they can marry out. However, if we have witnesses to one of their husband's death, we can allow the other woman to remarry [Tosfos: and we don't enact to forbid her, for, perhaps, we might come to permit her sister-in-law too.] In the case where there's no witnesses to their death, but they have another brother-in-law and did Yibum to both, and then he died, the Rabanan hold they're still forbidden to remarry out. R' Elazar allows them to marry out. After all, once they were permitted to the Yavam, so the Heter extends to all.

11) There's an inquiry according to R' Elazar why he permitted it. Perhaps, it's because the sister-in-law already got married herself because of her words, so she can rely that she wasn't lying just to get her in trouble. (The Chachumim disagreed since she feels that she would allow herself to suffer to forfeit all her rights as long as her sister-in-law also suffers, as the Pasuk says "let me die along with the Philistines.") Or, perhaps, his reason is, since the woman is believed to permit herself, we may believe her on her sister-in-law (even before she marries herself). [Tosfos says: even though we forbid in the last Perek a woman whose daughter-in-law testified that her husband and son died, even though the statement allows the daughter-in-law to get remarried; but since the part of the statement "my father-in-law died" is only coming to permit her mother-in-law, she's not believed.] Although R' Elazar said "because she did Yibum," that's only to argue with the Rabanan who forbade her even after she did Yibum.

12) Although R' Elazar even allows when her sister-wife came back from overseas and says her husband died (and the Rabanan say that only the sister-wife can marry); and we don't worry that her husband didn't die, but just gave her a Get (and she wouldn't be forbidden even if he returns); we must say it refers to a case where she marries a Kohein (where, she ruins herself if she was really divorced).

13) You can only testify that the husband died if his remains consist of his face with a nose and forehead. This is even true even if you have a Simon with distinct marks on his body or clothes. You can only be believed if you see him within three days of his death. [Tosfos says: since his facial features change after three days. R' Tam explains: this is only if they only found his face, but if he had his whole body, you can be able to tell it's him with the Simanim of his body even without a nose and forehead. Also, perhaps this is only recognizing him with Simanim, but if you actually recognize him, since his body is intact and you can tell who he is with the Simanim over his whole body, even after many days. Also, it seems that this is only when his face is slashed, but you can recognize him after many days if his face isn't slashed. If the face is slashed, but his whole body is complete, you can't testify on him unless it's within three days of his death. However, if you have a Safeik if it's within three days, you can be lenient and testify.]

14) The reason you can't testify on the Simanim alone is because Simanim are not enough a proof from the Torah. Although we can assume that, if you lost a Get and found it, it's the same Get if it's tied to a wallet or a ring, (which would infer that you can rely on Simanim from the Torah); we can still explain it to be only rabbinic. [Tosfos explains: you recognize the wallet or ring, and you're believed that you did since you have a Migo to say it wasn't lost; or that you have witnesses testify that those utensils belong to you, and it's known that you tied the Get there. Alternatively, we consider it an exceedingly distinctive Siman. (See Tosfos Harosh that those utensils have an exceedingly distinctive Siman on them)]

15) Alternatively, we can say that Simanim is enough proof from the Torah, but here we refer to very vague Simanim, like that he's tall, or short. Also, we can't bring a proof from the clothing, since it may have been lent out. [Tosfos explains: the clothing that was tied to the Get, which we allow, is only referring to clothing that's not normal to lend out.] Although we return a donkey to someone when he gives the Simanim of the saddle, and we're not worried that it was just lent out; since people don't lend out saddles since they'll hurt the donkey if it doesn't fit exactly. Also, we don't need to worry here that he lent out the wallet, since it's not a Siman Tov to lend out wallets. He doesn't lend out his ring since people may forge a letter. [Tosfos says: we only worry that it's borrowed when it involves Torah law, but when the rabbis enacted to return objects with Simanim, they weren't worried about borrowing and allowed returning the fruit with the Siman on the bowl. According to the alternative answer, it comes out we're not concerned about borrowing even from the Torah.] Alternatively, we don't return the Get with the Simanim of the clothes it was tied to since we refer to vague indistinctive Simanim like that the clothes were black or white. [Tosfos says: but you can assume it's the Get with a distinctive Siman and we're not worried it's borrowed. Although we say that, if there's a Get found in a briefcase, you need to recognize it before you return it, it's not referring to recognizing the Get, but recognizing the briefcase.]

16) This is not dependant on the argument between the Tanna Kama who holds that you can't allow a woman to remarry with an identifying a wart, and R' Elazar b. Mahvai says that you may testify on it. After all, there, we can say that everyone holds that Simanim are from the Torah, and they argue if the same type of wart is common to someone who has his Mazal. Alternatively, they argue whether the wart changes after death. Alternatively, everyone holds that Simanim, in general, is only rabinically allowed, and they argue whether a wart is an exceedingly distinctive Siman that we allow even from the Torah.

17) (If he found the Get between his utensils, it's Kosher.[Tosfos says: however, just finding it in middle of the floor of a house is not enough since it's common for people to come in and you need to worry that it fell from someone else with your names.])

18) You can't testify on a husband's death if you see him crucified. Tanna Kama says that you can testify on his death if he's chopped up, and R' Eliezer says you can't testify. [Tosfos explains: everyone holds that he'll eventually die since he's cut in a place that will render him a Treifa. R' Eliezer is concerned that he'll live for a short time, and you might permit his wife before he actually dies.] However, R' Eliezer admits that you can testify on him if he also fell into the sea (even if you can't see its shore, so we can't usually permit assuming that he drowned) since the water will worsen the wound and kill him faster.

19) Although Rabbah b. b. Chana saw an Arab merchant cut up a camel, and the camel died immediately and couldn't even finish its scream; Abaya answers: it was a weak camel. Rava answers: our Mishna refers to cutting with a heated knife (which heals the wound somewhat and makes the victim to be able to live longer).

20) You can't testify to a death by seeing an animal eating him unless you see it eating from a place that will kill him.

21) Shmuel says: if you witness him having both his Simanim Shechted, or most of both Simanim, and he runs away, you can testify to his death. Even though we say that he can still show with sign language to write a get for his wife, and the Get will be valid; but he couldn't live too much afterwards, and will die relatively immediately.

22) We don't send someone to Galus for accidentally Shechting most of someone's Simanim. Although we say here that you can testify to his death [Tosfos: even though he must die immediately to obligate Galus, Shmuel holds that he dies immediately]; since we may have concerns that the wind in the house caused his death [Tosfos: by Galus, but he's Chayiv the death penalty for killing purposely in this fashion just like we don't need the victim to die right away when killed purposely, but it's only by Galus where the Torah is less strict, as we also differentiate between killing downwards or upwards.] Alternatively, he could have caused his own death by flipping around. The practical difference between them is if he died in a marble house where the wind doesn't blow, or if we see that he didn't flip, but he was outside.

23) R' Yehuda b. Bava says that waiting three days after the death to see him is not a definite time, but it all depends on the person, location and season. The Gemara has an inquiry whether he's saying a leniency, that sometimes you can permit after three days, or he's saying a stringency, that sometimes you can't permit even within three days.

24) If he fell into water, even the Rabanan permit after many days, since the water seals up his features and doesn't distort them. (It's only if he has wounds does the water bloat the body and distort the features.) However, this is only if he saw him immediately after they recovered the body from the water. However, if it took some time before he can see it, we're afraid that the water will bloat him and distort his features.

25) If he fell into water that doesn't have an end (i.e., that you can't see the shores on all four sides), since he might have survived without you noticing it since he might have been carried by a wave to safety, or he could have found an underground tunnel with air. We shouldn't even permit L'chatchila a rabbi's wife, even though, if he survived, there would be rumors that he emerged. [Tosfos explains: since they only have rumors in most cases, and we don't allow a wife to remarry with a majority of cases. As we don't allow it with testimony that he was a Gosses, dying, even though most Gossess will die.] This is true even if it's a swamp and the water's calm, and he can see all areas where we can expect him to emerge; still, we need to worry that a current will carry him to safety.

26) One can testify on the death of a husband (to allow his wife to remarry), if you saw him fall into a pit of snakes and scorpions, (but not if he fell into a lion's den, since he may not be eaten if the lions weren't hungry); that's only because you're squashing them when you fall (so, they definitely bite). R' Yehuda b. Bava says: you don't say testimony since you're afraid that he works with witchcraft and can trap the snakes and scorpions. However, the Rabanan say that he will be killed on contact because he fell on them, causing immediate retaliation.

27) If he fell into a kiln, you can testify to his death. If he fell inside a vat cooking wine or oil, you can testify to his death [Tosfos: some have the text that you can't testify.] R' Acha says: you can testify by oil, since if it splashes over, it will just excite the flames, but not for wine, since it will put out the flames. However, the Rabanan answer back: even if the wine originally puts out the flame, it will eventually excite the flames. [Tosfos: according to the text that the Tanna Kama holds that you can't testify, this must be a third opinion.]

28) If he fell into water that has an end (and you can see all the shores) R' Meir holds that you still can't allow her to marry. The Rabanan hold that she can remarry if the witness waits for the time that he can still live underwater and doesn't emerge.

29) R' Meir brought a story to support his opinion that someone fell into a big pit and they were able to bring him up alive after many days. The Rabanan say that you can't bring a proof from miracles, since he couldn't survive it naturally since he would need to sleep within three days (and would have drowned). As we see that, if someone swears not to sleep for three days, it's a swearing in vane (since it's impossible to keep) and you give him lashes immediately and put him to sleep. He couldn't have able to cling a little onto the wall since it was lined with the smooth and slippery marble. However, R' Meir held that it's impossible for him not to be able to cling onto it a little bit and sleep momentarily.

30) [Tosfos says: from here it seems that, both R' Meir and the Rabanan hold, you can't count miracles as proof to allow a wife. However, in the Yerushalmi, it says: R' Meir holds that you can't testify if he fell into a lions' den since a miracle could have happened like it happened to Daniel. You can't testify if he fell into a kiln since a miracle might happen to him like it happened to Chananya, Mishael and Azarya. According to that, R' Meir argues on the Halacha that we said earlier that you can testify if he falls into a kiln.]

31) Even if you hear women say that he died, and they didn't intend to say it for testimony. Even if you heard children saying that they were going [Tosfos: back to their houses] from eulogising and burying this man, (but it's not a proof if they said that they're going to the eulogies, since it may come out that he didn't die and no one will eulogise him). Also, only if they say that such and such rabbi eulogised him (or else we need to be concerned that it was only a pet grasshopper or ant that died, and they just named it after this person).

32) A non-Jew is believed when he says that the husband died, as long as he didn't say it to permit his wife. Shmuel explains that she's forbidden if the non-Jew goes into Beis DIn and says "he died and, therefore, we should permit his wife." However, if he just says that he died, he's believed even if his intent was to permit. R' Yochanan says that he's not believed in both cases, and he's only believed if he unwittingly offer the information in a conversation.

33) If she B'dieved got married with a testimony that her husband was drowned in a sea that we couldn't see the shores, she doesn't need to be divorced.

34) There was a non-Jew who tells a Jew that, if you don't uproot unripe grain on Shabbos, I'll kill you the same way I killed Ploni; you can't allow Ploni's wife to get remarried from this, since it was only said to scare him into submission. As we see that we don't believe a non-Jew that his fruits are Arlah, or Klai Kerem or from Azika [Rashi explains: this is a city in Eretz Yisrael, and the non-Jew is from Chutz L'aretz, we don't believe him that it's Chayiv in Trumah and Maasar. Tosfos explains: it was guarded on Shvious, which makes it forbidden. Although we see that they guarded the barley growths on Shvious for the Omer and it didn't forbid it, or else it couldn't be used on the Mizbeach; it wasn't that the guards refrained people from taking, but they just inform them it's for the Omer and they refrain themselves from taking it.] After all, he's only claiming this in order to make his produce sound to be of better quality.

35) He can say testimony on the husband's death even if he saw it by the light of a candle or the moon. Also, according to Beis Hillel we permit a wife through a Bas Kol (a voice without a source) but Beis Shammai argues. There was a story that someone heard a voice that a certain person died, and he looked around and didn't find a person, and they allowed her to remarry. They weren't worried that it was a Sheid, since he noticed that the source of the voice produced a double shadow. [Tosfos says: we only need to worry about a Sheid in the fields or in a pit, but not in the city since they're not commonly found there. When we say not to say Shalom to a friend at night since he might be a Sheid, we must say that it's only if you're in the field. There's an argument in the Yerushalmi if you find a document that says that a person died or was killed, could you marry off his wife.]

36) We aren't concerned that the voice came from a sister-wife who's trying to cause trouble for her. As we see that we're not worried about this in a time of danger, if we hear a voice to write a Get for his wife, even if we don't recognize the voice, we write it so that she shouldn't be left as an Aguna, so too here. After all, if we don't believe the voice, we mighty not find anyone else who knows of his whereabouts, and she'll always remain an Aguna.

37) R' Gamliel and R' Yehuda b. Bava permit the wife through a woman's testimony, and R' Eliezer and R' Yehoshua forbid even to permit through a single witness. R' Akiva permitted through a single Kosher witness, but not through a woman. (However, R' Akiva reversed his opinion when the Chachumim decided to allow like R' Gamliel and R' Yehuda b. Bava.)

38) The Chachumim said to R' Akiva that the previous generation permitted a woman to remarry on the words of a non-Jewish inn keeper. When they came to her, they saw her crying (and that made them consider this as if she just said it during conversation). they asked her where's Ploni who was staying in your inn, and she said he died, and this is his sack, staff and Sefer Torah and grave, and they believed her. R' Akiva answered back: we'll believe all women who act like that. [Rashi says: we only believe her with the articles that were a Siman that what she said was true. Tosfos explains: the Chachumim held this to be a true testimony since she took out his articles to give credibility to her words. Therefore, this is a proof to all women's testimony. R' Akiva says that it's really like unwittingly offering the information during conversation, so there's no proof to allow actual testimony from women.]

39) There's a Tannaic argument whether you need to interrogate the witnesses of a husband's death. The one who says that you don't need to, since there is a Kesuva, we should compare it to monetary testimony. The opinion who says that you need to holds that we should compare it to a capital case (since there's a punishment of Chenek for those who have relations with a married woman.)