1) If a woman went with her husband across the sea, if there was peace between them, and peace in the world, and then she came and said that her husband died, she's believed. However, if there was a war in the world, she's not believed. We need to worry that she saw that he was hit with an arrow or spear and she thinks that he definitely died, and she wouldn't assume that someone might heal him. [Tosfos adds: she's also afraid to remain there until he actually dies since there are arrows flying there, since there's a big war going on.]

2) A hunger is worse than a war, since, at least by a war, she's believed to say that he died from natural causes on his bed, but not by a hunger. After all, we're worried that she'll run away from him with the expectations that he can't possibly survive, but, in truth, he could survive. Therefore, we don't believe her until she claims that he died and we buried him.

3) When a house collapses on him, or when he's caught in a plague of snakes and scorpions, it has the same Halacha as during a war, since she will say that he died with only an assessment of the situation.

4) When there's a pandemic, some say that it has the same Halacha as a war since she'll also might only claim his death through an assessment. Other say that she's believed and she's not afraid to stick around since people say that "you may have a plague in the world for seven years, and yet, a person won't die before his time."

5) If Beis Din wasn't aware that there was war in those parts, and she informs them of it; there's an inquiry if she's believed since, if she wanted to lie, she could have claimed that there was peace. [Tosfos says: this is not a regular Migo, since that only works to remove the concern of lying, and here we don't believe she's lying, but just that she's saying it through an assessment of the situation, and not through seeing it. Rather, the reason would be: since we see that she was so meticulous to testify that there was a war going on, she must have been meticulous enough to make sure that her husband died. However, we won't say a similar Migo even if we know that there is a war in the world, that believe her that he died at war since she could have said that he died naturally in his bed. After all, we don't consider it too meticulous since it's during the war, she thinks that it looks fishy to say that he died naturally, and they'll assume she's lying.

We see a similar Migo that an employer who is not usually believed to say he paid a worker since he's so busy and might have thought he paid, is believed when he hired him without witnesses since he could have claimed that he never had hired him. Although it was never because we were worried that he'll lie, still we consider it somewhat of lying since he said it with such definitiveness. Therefore, when he has a Migo, we consider that he knows what he's saying, and we won't assume it's because he forgot that he didn't pay him.]

Or do we say: since she already told us there's a war, we have a Chazaka of the war, and the Migo can't remove it from its Chazaka. [Tosfos explains: this is not similar to the inquiry in Bava Basra whether a borrower is believed after the loan was due that he paid back before it was due with a Migo that he paid it back when it was due. (Do we say we believe a Migo when it goes against a Chazaka that people don't pay back loans before it's due, or not.) After all, they're not the same Chazaka. As, even if he's believed by the loan, here, we won't believe her since she might just think her husband's dead from an assessment. Also, if we don't believe him with the loan, that's because it goes against human nature to pay back before it's due, but here she might be believed since he could have died in the war.]

6) [Tosfos says: it's also not similar to the argument between Rebbi and R' Nosson in Mesechta Kiddushin regarding a husband who says at the time of Kiddushin that he has a son from a previous marriage and he doesn't have a brother, and he says at the time of his death that he doesn't have a son and he has a brother. Rebbi says he's not believed to forbid her, but is believed to permit her in the opposite case where he said by the Kiddushin he has a brother, but not a son, but at his death he claims to have a son and not a brother, since he has a Migo since he can exempt her from Yibum anyhow by giving her a Get. R' Nosson says he's believed to forbid her at his death. After all, Rebbi only believes a Migo when you don't worry that he thinks that it's true when it isn't, but here we need to worry she was only saying her husband died since she assumes it to be that way. Also, R' Nosson only believes him against a Chazaka at his death, when people are more serious and they won't lie.]

7) We don't believe her when she claimed that they were in a burning house and only she escaped, since she wouldn't realize that, the same way she miraculously escaped, perhaps her husband also miraculously escaped.

8) When she claims that highwaymen or gentiles fell upon them and she survived, but they killed her husband, she's believed. After all, she can remain there to see if he died since "a woman is considered armed" i.e., protected, since she's not a threat to the highwaymen. [Tosfos adds: she can only not remain during a big war where they're shooting arrows and catapulting great stones, which don't discriminate their targets. However, she doesn't need to worry about individual highwaymen.]

9) If a woman claims that she saw a man burning in the fire, and the Chachumim came and found a burned corpse and palms of a hand, Rava says she's believed, and it's not similar to the case of just the husband being trapped in a burning building, since she witnessed the burning, and we found the scorched remains. R' Chiya b. Avin says that we can't allow her to remarry since someone might have rushed in to save her husband, and he got burnt, but the husband escaped, but ran away since the fire deformed him.

10) The Gemara inquires: is a single witness believed about the husband's death in a war, or not. After all, he's believed regularly since it's an item that will eventually become revealed, and it will be revealed in this case too. Or is the main reason is because a woman investigates before she marries, and she doesn't investigate well during a war. [Rashi says that the witness won't investigate either. Tosfos asks: if so, why do we need the reason that the wife won't investigate, since it's enough to say that the witness won't investigate. Rather, Tosfos explains: although the witness will investigate well and will not make assumptions, but the rabbis only permitted because of her investigations, and she won't investigate.]

11) Although we see that a single witness is believed to say that he saw the husband right after he drowned [Tosfos: i.e., right after they recovered him, since, even if he was in the water for a while, his facial features don't change since the water shrinks it to hold together], that's only when he can give a Siman to identify him. [Tosfos explains: this is according to those who say that identifying through Simanim is enough proof from the Torah. According to those who hold it to be a rabbinical invention, we must say it refers to a very individualized Siman, which is a proof from the Torah according to everyone. However, he's not believed through recognizing him since he might say it as an assumption although he might not be completely sure. (However, you can't say the reason is like Rashi, that he might not recognize him because the water changes his appearance, as we said earlier, that, on the contrary, the water shrinks it into place.) The reason we believe a single witness nowadays by someone who drowned in the sea; it's because we explain this Gemara to mean that he was missing some of his face, like when fish ate it, and it only remained the minimum amount left to recognize a face brought in the last Perek.]

12) If someone gives over sesame to his friend to watch [Tosfos: in front of witnesses] and claims it to be a certain measurement, and the watcher claims that he already took his sesame, and these are other sesame; R' Chisda thought to say that it's like the case earlier that we say that, when identifying someone who drown with a Siman, that we don't say that this person left and this is a different person, so too here, we don't assume the sesame pile is a different one. [Tosfos says: however, if it wasn't given over before witnesses, the person holding on to it is believed to say that he bought it. We only believe someone who claims that it's his by giving Simanim is from heirs whose father wasn't wealthy enough to own the object.] However, Rav rejects the proof: it's only there we believe him since there are Simanim, but not here where there is no Siman. [Tosfos explains: since it's a standard size of a sesame pile, but if it's a special size that is not standard for people to store, it is a good Siman as brought in Bava Metzia.]

13) We see that we're worried that something was emptied and replaced from what R' Yossi allows fruit that was found in a barrel that's written a 'Tuf' on it (which stands for Trumah). We can assume that it's from the majority of fruit in the world which is not Trumah, and a Tuf was only written on it from last year.

14) Even the Rabanan who argue with him and say that you need to treat it as Trumah [Tosfos: despite the fact that it's regular to change the contents from year to year, we should also say that the sesame wasn't replaced either despite that the holder is a Muchzik, and where we regularly say that the burden of proof is on the one collecting] would agree here. After all, only by the barrel we don't assume that it was changed since, if he replaced the Trumah with Chulin, he would have erased the Tuf. R' Yossi held that this is no proof since he might have forgotten to erase it. Alternatively, he kept it on so robbers should think it's Trumah and will not steal it.

15) R' Yeimar says that we don't worry that items were replaced, and Raveina says that we are concerned that it was replaced. The Halacha is that we worry that it was replaced.

16) If someone's husband went on a certain way, and we know that someone died on that way, and the people of the city where he died sent a message relating the name of the person who died, and it was her husband's name; Abaya says that we need to worry that someone else had the same name, and it's no proof that her husband died, and Rava isn't concerned for that. [Tosfos says: we can't refer to a case where there's no other person we know who have that name and in a place where caravans are not common, since everyone is not concerned for this. In this case, we say in Bava Metzia, that we return all Beis Din's documents (and we're not worried that it belongs to someone else with that name). It can't be when we know there's another person with that name, since even Rava would be concerned, as we'll say soon. Rather, we must say that we don't know of anyone with that name, but caravans are common in this place. Although Rava could have brought a proof to his opinion from the opinion of Rabbah his Rebbi, as it's brought in Bava Metzia, but he wanted to only bring proofs from earlier Amaroyim.]

17) Abaya brings a proof from Shmuel's father who sent an inquiry to R' Yehuda Nesiah if he found a Get, does he need to search if someone else had the same name, or not, and he was told to search the whole city of Nahrdai. Rava rejected this proof. After all, if he really needs to search if anyone has the same name, he would need to search out the whole world. Rather, he only told Shmuel's father to search for his honor so it shouldn't be as if he asked something that was not needed at all.

18) Rava brought a proof that Rabba b. Avuha collected a loan from a document that there were many people who had the same name as the lender. [Tosfos explains: although it's only a monetary case, which is more lenient, and it's also a case where we know that there are other people with the same name. However, the Gemara compares a monetary case with knowing there are other people with the name to a prohibition case where we don't know of any other person with the same name.]

19) Abaya rejects the proof. After all, we don't need to worry that it fell from one, and the other one found it, since he guards the document well. [Tosfos adds: i.e., we don't need to worry that much that it fell and someone with his name found it. (However, we say in Bava Metzia that someone who is holding his friend's document, he can't claim that he bought it off him, since the owner could have dropped it and he picked it up. That's because this concern could be if it was found by anyone with any name. Although we're afraid when one brother produces a document, that it might be from another brother even though there is a limited amount of people who may pick it up who's a brother; that's only because brothers snatch things from each other, it's comparable to when it could be picked up by anyone.] We don't need to be concerned that he just gave it to him to watch, since he wouldn't be so stupid to give it to someone with his own name to watch. You don't need to worry that he sold it to him with just handing it over (without writing a document on the sale), since he holds that the acquisition of handing the loan document over is binding without writing another document. [Tosfos explains: however, Rava, who brings this as a proof, holds that documents are not acquired by handing it over without writing a document for the sale. Therefore, since the person collecting doesn't have this sale document, it gives a damper into his case. (Although the Gemara in Bava Basra says that Rava held that the buyer of a document doesn't need to bring a proof that he bought it; he only said it according to the opinion that says that you don't need a sale document.) However, Tosfos asks: why does he need a proof that it's his? After all, it shouldn't be any different than any other item that's not meant to borrow or rent that we assume that it belongs to the one who's holding onto it. However, perhaps we can say that the very fact that no distinguishing sign was written in the document to prove that it's his, (since there must be a way to describe him that doesn't apply to the other one with the same name), we need to worry it's the other one's. Even though we see that you could acquire a document through Agav, as a secondary acquisition when acquiring land; we don't assume that he acquired it that way since it's not common. Alternatively, you only can acquire a document for the sale of the land, since it's like you acquired the reigns of the land, but not loan documents.]

20) There was a story that a Get was found and it says that it was written in Surya, and the husband was from Nahrdai; and they searched from Surya to Nahrdai and they only found one person that has the same name as the husband and there was witnesses that he was in Nahrdai the day the Get was written in Surya; Abaya says: that we can return it to the husband who claims it's his even according to those who regularly say that you can't return it. After all, you searched for anyone else, and the one person who fits the description wasn't there at the Get's writing.

21) Rava says: even I (who usually allow returning it) have concerns you can't return it in this case. After all, once we know someone else with this name, we need to worry that he got to Surya that day through flying by pronouncing Hashem's holy name, or by riding a "flying camel." [Tosfos says: even though we don't suspect this movement by disproving witnesses (and we don't say just because they were in a far place that day, they couldn't be in the place they said they testified on that day). After all, if they would claim that after the second witnesses came, it looks as if they're lying. However, in our case where he wants to ruin the other one's wife, he would keep quiet about his flying camel. Alternatively, R' Menachem says: if the witnesses don't claim that they came through a flying camel, it's sort of a proof that it didn't happen, so we don't need to be concerned about it.] Also, we need to worry that this person sent an agent to have a Get written for him. So, although he was in Nahrdai, but it says in the Get that it was written in Surya.

22) If there was fights between them, the woman is not believed to say that her husband died. You don't define it that she said once to her husband to divorce her, since all women say that from time to time. Rather, we refer to a case where she claimed that she was already divorced. Although, generally, we believe her when she claims this since we assume a wife won't be brazen to claim this before her husband [Tosfos: and this is the Halacha, but only that she can marry, but not to collect her Kesuva]; but we must refer to a case where she claims that she was divorced before two certain people, and they were asked if it was true and they denied it.

23) R' Chanina says: the reason we don't believe her by a fight is because she'll purposely lie to make herself forbidden to him. R' Shimi b. Ashi says the reason is because, when he's dying, she'll assume that he's dead and won't wait to confirm it since she hates him so much. The practical difference between them is if he's the one who instigates the fights. [Tosfos explains: she won't lie purposely since she still has fond feelings for him, but she'll still make assumptions of his death because of the fights. Although she lied about being divorced, but we won't have concern that she'll also lie about his death since she'll suffer major fines if he ever returns, that she must leave both husbands etc.]

24) There's an unresolved inquiry if a single witness is believed when there's a fight. After all, it's still something that's truth will be eventually revealed, but she won't investigate well because of the fights.

25) R' Yehuda says that she's only believed if she comes to Beis Din in tears, since that makes the story more believable. However, the Rabanan say: if so, then only the sly ones would be able to marry since they would know to fane crying, but the simple ones won't know to do this, and it would be true that he died, and she cried by the death.

26) Originally, there was a story that happened during the harvesting, that a woman came back and said that her husband died in the field when he was bitten by a snake. They inspected the story and it came out to be true. So, they enacted at that time to believe a wife to say that her husband died. [Tosfos explains: they did this so she won't remain an Aguna, i.e., someone who can't remarry. We can't say we should believe her anyhow since she has a Migo that she could have claimed that he divorced her (according to those who hold that a woman is believed to say that she's divorced even if the husband is not there). After all, it's not a true Migo since the reason we won't believe her if it wouldn't leave her to be an Aguna since she might estimate that her husband is dead, but he may not be. Alternatively, we only believe her that she got divorced in a case where we originally didn't know her to be married, so "the mouth that forbids her could permit her." Since she's the one who told us that she was married, she's believed to say that she was divorced from that marriage. She can get married then even if witnesses came afterwards to testify that she was once married. However, we never straight out believe her that she was divorced unless she said it before her husband.]

27) Beis Hillel originally said not to believe her only in a case similar to the story by the harvesting; i.e., it also needs to be done by a harvesting (when there are dangers) and in the same country, since she may not be as afraid to lie if it happened in another country. Beis Shammai held that it doesn't depend if it's by a harvesting or not, or if it's in the same country or not, since caravans are common, she's still afraid to lie. The rabbis only framed it to work by harvesting since it's the most common case [Tosfos quotes the Yerushalmi: since he might die of heatstroke, or because snakes are common there.] Beis Hillel reversed their decision and held like Beis Shammai.

28) It's not similar to the argument by transporting the Parah Aduma ashes. The Rabanan say: it's forbidden even to throw it from one side to the other, or to swim with it across, or even ride an animal, or being carried on your friend's shoulder, across. You can only carry it with your feet on the ground. (However, you can carry it over a bridge.) It doesn't matter if it's the Jordan or any other river. However, R' Chanina says that they only decreed exactly like it was, that you can't transport it in a boat crossing the Jordan river. (As they found a Kazayis of a corpse in the boat's bottom once when they were transporting the ashes in a boat.) After all, Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel argue if there is fear of lying if they're in another country. The argument between the Rabanan and R' Chanina is how close to the story did they enact. As the Rabanan say that, as long as they didn't touch the ground, it's forbidden, and the specific river is inconsequential. R' Chanina held that it needs to be exactly like the story.

29) Beis Shammai says: once they allow her to remarry, she collects her Kesuva from a Kal V'chomer. After all, if we allow her to marry and we're not worried for the Ervah prohibition, of course we won't worry about monetary prohibitions (of stealing). Beis Hillel says: she can't collect her Kesuva. After all, with her testimony, the orphans can't go down into his fields to inherit it. [Tosfos explains: in order to sell the fields. When we say in Bava Metzia that the orphans take over the field when they hear of the father's death, that's only to eat from the produce. (This refers to hearing from a single witness, for if they heard from two witnesses, they could even sell the fields.) When we contrast there that you can't go into the fields when you didn't have a proper hearing of the death, it's not that he heard it from any witness, but if there are rumors. I.e., you trace it back that one person heard it from another until one heard it from two and they are no longer here, but traveled to another country. Alternatively, when the Gemara there allows going down when you hear of his death, it refers to hearing it from two witnesses, but it's an argument there when you didn't hear it from two, but only from one witness. However, over here we don't even allow it with a single witness according to everyone; we must say it refers to a case where he traveled on his own volition, and since he didn't leave any commands what to do with his property, we don't allow them to go into the property, as we see there in Bava Metzia.]

30) Beis Shammai says: we should Darshen the Kesuva's wording that it's collected when you can marry someone else. [Tosfos says: even though the Gemara in Bava Metzia says that Hillel Darshened the words of a document, as it says that they permit the children of those women who were captured in Alexandra under the Chuppah and was raped since the document says that she'll become his wife when he brings her into the house (so she was unmarried when she's captured); we must say that it was different since they specifically wrote this to make sure the Kiddushin didn't take effect before that since they were aware of the problem of being captured and raped. However, by Kesuva, we should assume that he doesn't want to give her the Kesuva unless she has proof of two witnesses to his death.]

31) At the end, Beis Hillel reversed their decision like Beis Shammai. [Tosfos says: even though we see in Kesuvos that Beis Shammai is the opinion that we Darshin the words of the Kesuva; we need to answer that Beis Hillel only reversed his decision because of the Kal V'chomer, and not from the Drasha of the Kesuva's words. Alternatively, it was only brought as a pushed explanation, and the Gemara's conclusion there is not like this. However, we can't differentiate by saying that Beis Hillel doesn't Darshen the words as much as Beis Shammai does. After all, if the words imply something, why shouldn't Beis Hillel Darshin it? If it doesn't imply it, why should Beis Shammai Darshin it?]

32) Therefore, if we would Darshin the Kesuva to collect it with a single witness, we should of course Darshen the Torah's wording that, if she can get Yibum with this witness, then the brother inherits all of the husband's property.

33) If she comes to Beis Din and claims that her husband died "so I should be able to get married," we allow her to marry and she collects her Kesuva. However, if she claims her husband died "so I should collect the Kesuva," she doesn't collect her Kesuva and she can't marry. (Since she shows she wants to collect money, we think that's her purpose.) There's an inquiry if she mentions both marrying and Kesuva. For, perhaps, since she mentioned Kesuva, she wants money. Or, perhaps, she mainly wants to remarry, but once she's in Beis Din, she'll present all claims that she has. If you want to say that she's believed in this case, what would be in a case where she said that she wants her Kesuva and wants to get married? Do we say that she definitely intended to collect the Kesuva and that's why she mentioned her Kesuva first. Or, do we say that she mentioned Kesuva first since she doesn't know what causes Beis Din to give permission, so she only said Kesuva first since she may have thought that she'll get permission only if she mentioned Kesuva first.

34) Everyone is believed to testify on her except for her mother-in-law and her mother-in-law's daughter, her sister-wife, her husband's daughter and her potential sister-wife (i.e, married to her husband's brother) if she falls to Yibum. [Tosfos says: even to Shmuel who says that a Yevama is not like a married lady, and if the Yavam takes her unlawfully, it doesn't forbid her to him; but she would still accomplish embarrassing her. Alternatively, there's a chance that he'll give Chalitza, and she'll marry out and then become forbidden to her original husband. Even though there's also a chance that her husband may do Yibum and they'll be sister-wives, since she doesn't care too much if she really knows that the husband is really alive and will come back and then she would be ruined.]

35) There's an inquiry if only a mother-in-law's daughter can't testify, since her mother hates her, she hates her too, but a father-in-law's daughter (that's from a different wife) can testify. Or do we say that the reason she hates her sister-in-law because she eats her mother's work (since her husband will eventually collect the Kesuvas Binyan Dichrin), so that would apply to her father-in-law's daughter too, she'll hate her for eating her father's work (when her husband inherits him.).

36) R' Yehuda adds that a father's wife and daughter-in-law can't testify. After all, her father's wife hates her since he tells her father anything that she did to her. Also, her daughter-in-law hates her since she tells her husband everything that she did to her.

37) However, the Rabanan held that you don't need to include them since they're automatically included in a mother-in-law and her husband's daughter. After all,the Torah says "just like the reflections of water, so too is the heart of one man to another." Therefore, if one person hates another, we should assume the hate is reciprocal. However, R' Yehuda held that the Pasuk refers to Torah (i.e., if you toil in it, you'll know Torah. if you don't toil, you won't find Torah).

38) There's an unresolved inquiry regarding a mother-in-law that "came afterwards" (i.e., that she's not the mother of his husband, but is the mother of one of his paternal brothers. therefore, she's not her mother-in-law now, but she might become her mother-in-law if she falls to Yibum).

39) The Gemara wanted to bring a proof: if she says that my husband died, and then said that my father-in-law died, that only she can get remarried, but not her mother-in-law although she's no longer her mother-in-law. You have to worry that neither man died, and she only claimed this in order to ruin her mother-in-law. [Tosfos says: this is even true after the wife gets remarried and we can't say that she said her husband died just to ruin her mother-in-law; still, we need to forbid in order that it shouldn't lead to the mother-in-law marrying first.] (Thus the proof would be that, even though her husband is across the seas, and her mother-in-law is not telling him about what she did to her, but she's afraid what will happen after he comes back, so the potential mother-in-law is also worried about the future.)

40) The Gemara rejects this proof: a present mother-in-law is different since, even if nothing that will cause animosity is happening now, there's a history of much animosity in the past. Therefore, it can't be compared to the potential mother-in-law who was never her mother-in-law yet. [Tosfos says: we could have also differentiate between the case of a daughter-in-law who knows that her husband is coming back, but the potential mother-in-law doesn't really expect that her son's brother will die.]

41) If one witness came and testified that the husband died, and another witness came and said that he didn't die; we don't remove the original Heter that's upon her. [Tosfos explains that, if she got married, she doesn't need to leave her husband, but she shouldn't L'chatchila marry to avoid rumors on her kids, as it says in Kesuvos.] This is like how Ulla said: anytime the Torah believes a single witness, it's as if there is two witnesses testifying. [Tosfos explains: this was said by a Sotah where a single witness is believed that she committed adultery. Although it implies there that he's believed against a contradictory witness even if they come at the same time, and here we only believed him if he came first and established the Heter; that's because there the Torah believes the single witness, and by a dead husband, the rabbis enacted to believe the single witness. Thus we compare a rabbinical believeing that came first to a Torah believing that came together. Alternatively, we can explain the Gemara there to mean that they came one after the other, but not at the same time.]

42) If one witness says that he died, and two said that he didn't die, the woman must leave her second marriage. This is simple if those two were completely valid witnesses, and it wouldn't have been necessary to say. Rather, it's saying that, even if they are Pasul witnesses, and it's like R' Nechemia who says that we follow the majority of witnesses. Another version of R' Nechemia: if the one witness is a Kosher witness, all the women in the world can't contradict his testimony. It's only if the single witness was a woman do we say that two women can contradict her testimony and we would follow the majority.

43) If two witnesses say that he died, and a single witness said that he didn't die, she's allowed to marry L'chatchila. This is true even if the two witnesses are Pasul like the opinion of R' Nechemia that we follow the words of the majority, even when it's a leniency to permit her to marry.

44) [(See Mahrsha) Tosfos quotes Ri: we must say that the Torah believes the single witness here like two. After all, it says here that when the one witness says he died, but two said that he didn't die, she must leave her new husband, but it doesn't say that her children from him is a Mamzer. Therefore, it seems to say that it's only rabbinically required for her to leave him. Another proof; that we say that another single witness contradicts him saying that he didn't die, we only heed him if he came together with the witness, but not if he came afterwards. We must say that we only rabbinically heed him when he comes together since the first one is like two witnesses from the Torah, or else there shouldn't be any difference when he came.]

45) If one wife claims that her husband died (i.e., naturally), and the other wife claims that he was killed; R' Meir says that they both can't remarry since they contradict each other. R' Yehuda and R' Shimon say that they both can remarry since they both agree that he doesn't live anymore.

46) If one wife says that he died and the other claimed that he didn't died, the first one can get remarried and collect her Kesuva [Tosfos: even though they say it together.] The second one can't remarry [Tosfos: since she claims to be forbidden, she makes herself as a forbidden item, even if she gives an excuse why she claimed that way.] We don't say that she only said that he didn't die to forbid her sister-wife from remarrying. Although it would forbid herself, she feels that she would allow herself to suffer as long as her sister-wife also suffers, as the Pasuk says "let me die along with the Philistines."

47) R' Elazar says: the above Halacha was said according to R' Yehuda and R' Shimon, and not like R' Meir. R' Yochanan says that it fits into R' Meir's opinion too, since, by testimony to permit a woman to remarry, we don't consider the contradiction of saying "he didn't die" as anything. [Tosfos qualifies this: only when the wife herself says that he died, but if it's from a single witness, another single witness can contradict him saying he didn't die if he came at the same time as the other witness claiming that he did die.] However, R' Yochanan's position is difficult since we have a Mishna that says that, if two women contradict each other if he died, she can't remarry. [Tosfos explains: we must say like Rashi that the women here refer to the wives, or else why did the Mishna change the terminology from the first case that refer to "two contradictory single witnesses."] (However, R' Elazar would say that it's a Stam Mishna like R' Meir.)

48) [Tosfos says: there are those who want to forbid when a woman contradicts a single valid witness. However, this doesn't fit well into the above quoted Mishna that only contrast two contradicting single witnesses and two contradicting women, and not a woman contradicting a single valid witness. However, the Yerushalmi also forbids, and brings a Braisa as a proof.]

49) If a woman went with her husband overseas and comes back and claims that her husband died, she's permitted to remarry, but not her sister-wife. R' Tarfon says: if the sister-wife is a Yisraelis married to a Kohein, she may continue to eat Trumah [Tosfos says: the Ri had a Safeik if this is only for rabbinical Trumah, or even for Torah Trumah since we can keep her on a Chazaka of being a married lady. Although we allow her sister-wife to get remarried on the assumption that her husband died, but this can be compared to two people walking on two paths, which one of them had definite Tumah, we can say they're both not Tamai since a Safeik Tumah in a public area is Tahor. However, Tosfos concludes: we can't really permit here since we can't learn from Sotah to allow a Safeik unless it's not something where someone is definitely doing a sin, and here one of the wives are definitely sinning.] R' Akiva forbade the wife to eat Trumah since her sister-wife might be saying the truth about her husband's death and she wouldn't being making sure she's not sinning if she eats Trumah. However, the Halacha is like R' Tarfon.

50) There's an argument between R' Akiva and R' Tarfon if you're not sure which woman you gave Kidushin to, and five women claim that it was her. R' Shimon b. Elazar says that they only argue when he made the Kiddushin through relations, then R' Tarfon says that he can just leave the Kesuva among them, and R' Akiva says that he must pay all five women the Kesuva. The same applies to the case where he stole from one person and doesn't remember from who, and five people claim it was him, R' Tarfon says that he can just leave the money among them, and R' Akiva says that he must pay all five men. The reason R' Akiva says that you need to pay all of them since it was done through a forbidden manner. (The Chidush by the case of being Mekadish with relations, that although it's a rabbinical prohibition, R' Akiva fined him, and the Chiddush by stealing, although it's a Torah prohibition, R' Tarfon doesn't fine him.) However, if he made Kiddushin with money, or bought an object, then even R' Akiva held that you can just leave the money between them. However, the Rabanan say that they only argue by giving money for Kiddushin or buying, but if he's Mekadesh through relations or stealing, even R' Tarfon requires him to pay everyone.

51) If she went overseas with a Chazaka that she's exempt from Yibum since she had a son, if she comes back and claims that her son died, and then her husband, she's not believed. However, we need to be concerned about her words and have her have Chalitza, but she can't have Yibum. The same is when she went overseas with a Chazaka that she would need Yibum if her husband dies, and if she comes back and claims that she had a son, and her son died after her husband, she's not believed. However, we need to be concerned about her words and have her have Chalitza, but she can't have Yibum.

52) There's a Safeik if it's a benefit for a woman to be divorced before her husband dies so she won't fall to Yibum. As we said earlier that we might have a worry that she'll lie so that her Yavam will take her since she might like him alot, and we said that we also have a concern she would lie to get out of Yibum since she might hate him much. However, we don't completely assume it's a lie, and we are concerned that perhaps it's true and she needs Chalitza and not Yibum. [Tosfos says: and it's not because she claims to be forbidden to him, so she made herself a forbidden item, but because we genuinely have concern that's she's saying the truth, or else we can't force the Chalitza, but ask the Yavam to do a favor and do Chalitza. Alternatively, she's forbidden even if she gives an excuse why she said it, which would permit a self-proclaimed prohibition.] Therefore, if someone accepts the Get on her behalf without her making him her agent to do so, we are in doubt if the Get takes effect, so she gets Chalitza and not Yibum.

53) If the husband is not dying and someone accepts the Get on a woman's behalf without her making him her agent to do so, it doesn't take effect even if she's having major marital fights. After all, it's better to live with someone else than to sit by oneself.