1) A single witness is believed that a woman's husband died overseas, even if she's a woman, even if she heard it from a slave.

2) You can't bring a proof that we can believe that single witness from the Torah [Tosfos: and the only reason they put strict repercussions on her if the husband comes at the end, it's not because the witness is not believed from the Torah, but just as a rabbinical strictness to make sure that she will inspect the evidence well before she marries] from the following: a single witness that testifies that someone ate forbidden fats, and he denies it, he's exempt from a Chatos. However, if he doesn't deny it, he brings a Chatos. After all, it's not dependent on how we believe the witness, since the Rabanan say that even two witnesses are not believed to obligate him to bring a Chatos when he denies it despite that they're usually believed. (R' Meir holds that they could obligate a Chatos). This is because the person can claim that he did it purposely, and would be exempt from a Chatos. [Tosfos says: this doesn't depend on whether we believe a Migo against witnesses. Rather, we explain what he says that he didn't do it to mean that he didn't do it unwillingly, but intentionally. Therefore, their testimony is worthless since they can't know his intention when he did it. Thus, we must say the reason why they're believed when he doesn't deny it, whether if it was with two witnesses or with one] because his being quiet is as and admittance that he did it. [Tosfos says: it's not exactly an admittance, since it even applies when the subject of the testimony doesn't know for sure what happened, but his being quiet is, at least, a sign that there is a reason for him to believe it to be true.]

3) [Tosfos is in doubt what would be the Halacha if the person denies the testimony by saying “I didn't eat it, not unintentionally nor intentionally.” On one hand, he's totally contradicting the testimony. On the other hand, when he said I didn't eat unintentionally, we say he's believed, and when he adds “nor intentionally,” it doesn't make a difference.]

4) You can't learn to believe a witness of the husband's death from the fact we believe a single witness by a prohibition, since we only believe him when there's no Chazaka of the Issur,. [Tosfos says: although we learn that from the idea that a Nidda counts the days herself, and she has a Chazaka of being a Niddah; but since she does not have a Chazaka that she'll always emit blood, we don't consider it as a Chazaka on the Issur.] If it has a Chazaka of Issur, we only have a source to believe a single witness if it's in his hands to permit it. [Tosfos says: although we anyhow have a rule that there is no Ervah related thing that's believed with less than two witnesses; but we think at the moment that it may only apply to forbidding her on the husband because of her Z'nus. After all, on that topic it says “a thing of Ervah” that we learn that it needs two witnesses (from a Gezeira Shava).]

5) [Tosfos says: according to the opinion that, when you make a Konem to Hekdesh, you can redeem the Konem; that's only if he makes a Konem on everybody (like Hekdesh), but not on individuals.]

6) [Tosfos says: you may redeem what your friend made Hekdesh without his permission. This is not like Kerem Revai, that only the original owner can give permission to redeem it, even according to the opinion that it's considered as Heaven's property. After all, since Heaven gives you the right to eat it in Yerushalayim, it's enough yours that people can't redeem it without your permission.]

7) Rather, the reason they believe the one witness is since we put such strict repercussions if he comes back, we can assume that she studied the evidence and is convinced that he's dead. The reason we need to make this arrangement. [Tosfos explains: this is not a true strong assumption that she'll check the evidence that it's as if we have witnesses to the death. Rather, the rabbis saw that it's a proper thing to permit her, they decreed that a single witness is believed. This is not considered as uprooting something from the Torah since there is some reason to allow it.]

8) If the husband ever returns: she needs to be divorced by both husbands. Rav says: this is only if she married through a single witness, but if she married through the testimony of two witnesses, then she doesn't leave her present husband. We must say that it's only when we don't recognize the husband, but two witnesses claim that, from the time he left until now, they didn't leave him. The reason you don't recognize him since his face change, similar to what Yosef's brothers didn't recognize him. However, if we recognize him, she must leave her present husband. [Tosfos says: although we have witnesses that he died, and even if you bring all the witnesses in the world against them, they're no better than the first witnesses; but we need to be stringent here since we believe what is obvious to everyone more than two witnesses.]

9) We need to say that she married one of her witnesses, or else the husband who doesn't know any better, would be obligated to bring an Asham Toloy on such a relations where there are two conflicting pairs of witnesses if she's still married to another person. [Tosfos says: this is even according to the opinion that you need to have one piece of definite prohibition that's mixed with a Kosher piece to bring an Asham Taloy, and it's not enough to have one piece that you have a Safeik whether it's Kosher or not, and here there is no definite married lady; still, since, according to the opinion why you need two pieces is to have a piece left over that you might be able to find out if the remaining one is Kosher or not, you also can find out if she's a married lady if disproving witnesses show up and say that the witnesses that testified about his death was really with them someplace else at that time. Also, according to the opinion that you need to have a Chazaka that there was a prohibition that exists here, you have a Chazaka that she was originally a married lady. Although we Paskin that contradicting pairs of witnesses are only a rabbinical Safeik, but from the Torah, we keep it on the Chazaka, the reason why we don't say that she has a Chazaka of being a married lady and should bring a Chatos; since the Chazaka that the wife will examine the evidence well ruins the Chazaka of being a married lady.]

10) R' Menachem b. R' Yossi says: you only don't leave the first husband in this case when she married him first before the second witnesses came, but if she married afterwards, she needs to leave him. The Chachumim say: granted that they shouldn't L'chatchila marry after the contradicting witnesses, but if they marry, she doesn't need to leave.

11) We have a Braisa that Beis Din forces a Kohein to divorce a woman that he can't marry from the Pasuk “you should make him Kodesh.” It can't mean that it refers to a regular case, since it's simple you force it, since it shouldn't be any different than all other prohibitions. Rather, we must refer to a case where I might think it's permitted, like when he was one of the witnesses who said she's fit for a Kohein, and she claims that she knows for sure she's fit (although other witnesses say she's unfit). We don't need to say that it disproves what we permitted this above, since we can say that the Torah is stricter by a Kehuna prohibition. Alternatively, we force people to find any contradicting witnesses before they marry in order to prevent them from marrying. Alternatively, we're referring to a case where the contradicting witnesses came before he's married, and it's authored by R' Menachem b. R' Yossi who says that they must divorce.

12) Shmuel says: the wife only needs to leave a husband when she only was permitted with a single witness if she doesn't contradict the present testimony that the husband didn't die. He can't refer to two witnesses testifying that the husband didn't die, since the wife wouldn't be believed at all against them. It can't be that we refer to one witness who testified that the husband didn't die, since we believe the first witness as if he was two, and this one witness can't contradict the earlier testimony that we count as two witnesses, and we don't need the wife. Rather, his statement was according to R' Nechemia who says that two Pasul witnesses who say he didn't die win out one witness who says he died, and that's why Shmuel needs the wife to help out the one witness. Alternatively, R' Nechemia only says the two Pasul witnesses are only believed against a single Pasul witness, but they're not believed against one regular Kosher man.

13) She needs a Get from both. This is only when she married through a single witness, but if she married through the testimony of two witnesses, then she doesn't need a Get from her second husband, since his Kiddushin didn't take effect. However, we fined her when she married through a single witness, and we don't say people will consider her receiving a mistaken Kiddushin from the second one [Rashi: since they see she didn't received a Get, they'll assume that the Kiddushin was dependent on some condition that wasn't met. Tosfos disagrees since the rabbis required a Get after Nesuin even after Kiddushin was given. Rather, they won't assume that the second one only gave the Kiddushin since he mistakenly thought the first husband died, but then we found out that he was alive.] However, if they didn't have Nesuin, but only Airusin, and didn't have a forbidden relations, they didn't fine her and didn't need a Get from the second husband since people will assume that it was a mistaken Kiddushin. [Tosfos says: but it didn't want to say that people will think it's a mistaken Kiddushin that was given on an unfulfilled condition, and that's why it doesn't help after Nesuin, since it's not common for people to assume that happened.]

14) She doesn't have a Kesuvah from either husband. After all, the whole reason for Kesuva [Tosfos: when it's only rabbinically obligated, like when you marry a widow] is so that it shouldn't be too easy to divorce her; but, here, we want them to divorce her. [Tosfos explains: therefore, even if her Kesuva is Torah obligated, we wave it in order to make it easier to divorce.]

15) She doesn't have her fruit from either husband, or worn out clothing. After all, extra conditions that the rabbis made with the Kesuvah have the same status as the Kesuvah.

16) Even if she grabs these items from either husband, we remove it from her hands.

17) A child from either husband is a Mamzer.

18) You can't separate Trumah from Tamai produce to exempt Tahor produce. [Tosfos says: this is not included in the Drasha “you should give (the Trumah) to him” and not to his fire (that Trumah can't be from Tamai produce that you can only burn) since that only refers to produce that were never Tahor (i.e., was harvested by a Tamai person who has liquid on his hands), but it's Trumah if it was once Tahor, and became Tamai afterwards. Rather, it's like how Rashi explains: we don't want to make the Kohein lose. Alternatively, we forbid even when it was once Tahor because you might be lenient even if it was never Tahor. The Ri also explains: its like separating bad produce to exempt good produce.] If you mistakenly separate it, it's a good Trumah. If you purposely separate it, the Trumah doesn't take effect and it's as if you didn't do anything. [Tosfos says: this even fits into the Ri's explanation, even though, regularly, Trumah separated from bad produce B'dieved takes effect; Tumah is more strict since it can't be eaten at all. This is what we compare it later to separating bitter cucumbers, which is not edible like other bad produce.]

19) R' Chisda explains “the Trumah doesn't take effect” as that it doesn't take any effect, and the separated Trumah turns back into Tevel. This is not similar to what we say by separating cucumbers for Trumah and finding them to have turned bitter, that the Trumah takes effect, but he needs to separate Trumah a second time. As that was separated unintentionally, and our case was done intentionally, and if the original Trumah takes effect, he won't separate it a second time. [Tosfos explains: since he's intentionally doing something wrong, we'll suspect him to continue to do the wrong thing. However, by the cucumbers, where he did it unintentionally, there's no reason to worry that he will do anything wrong in the future and not separate it a second time. However, you can't explain that we fine him more when he does a sin purposely, since it's more of a fine if he needs to separate it a second time.]

20) [Tosfos says: if you plan to separate wine on wine, and you find that the separated wine had turned into vinegar; the Trumah doesn't take effect even according to the Rabanan who argue with Rebbi and holds wine and vinegar are one type of food. This is because, when he separated, he didn't plan to separate vinegar. However, if he purposely separated Trumah from the vinegar; the Tosefta says that even Rebbi holds it to be Trumah. Although regularly, you can't separate Trumah from one type of food to exempt a second type of food, but he only holds that they're only rabbinically considered as two types. This is the implication of the Yerushalmi that says the reason Rebbi holds you can't separate Trumah from wine to exempt vinegar is because he'll might come to do the opposite, separate vinegar on wine and that would be separating bad produce on good produce. (Although we usually don't decree to forbid separating good on bad since you might end up separating bad on good; here is different since wine is not a definite good, since, if you need vinegar, you'll desire it more than wine.)]

21) The reason we're stricter on one who unintentionally separated bitter cucumbers on sweet ones more than on one who unintentionally separated Tamai on Tahor; since it's somewhat more negligent since he should have tasted it before separating. [Tosfos explains: he would need to separate Trumah on a small amount of that cucumbers to allow him to taste a small amount.]

22) That, which we decreed to cancel the status of Trumah if you separated intentionally Tamai on Tahor, but not if you separate Trumah from something grown in a perforated flowerpot on what grew in an unperforated flowerpot, but you just separate a second Trumah from another unperforated flowerpot; since they're grown in two different types of pots, he will understand that the first Trumah might not be a real Trumah, so he'll listen to us to separate a second time. However, by the case of Tahor and Tamai, since they grow in the same type of flowerpot, he won't assume that there's a difference and won't listen to us to separate a second time.

23) R' Nosson b. Oshiya argues with R' Chisdah and explains “the Trumah doesn't take effect” as that it doesn't exempt the rest of the crop (and you need to separate a second Trumah) but the first Trumah remains as Trumah. [Tosfos explains: therefore, it's Trumah Tamai that you can burn, and it's not Tevel Tamai that you can't burn.] This is not similar to separating Trumah from something grown in a perforated flowerpot on what grew in an unperforated flowerpot, that it's Trumah [Tosfos: that is forbidden to non-Kohanim, and not like the Rivan that it's really Chulin, but you just need to give it to a Kohein], but you can't eat the Trumah until you take off Trumah and Maasar for it from other produce [Tosfos: but not from itself, since you might feed what you took off Maasar to a non-Kohein, which he can't eat since it's rabbinically Trumah.] After all, when you separated bad on good, it's really Trumah from the Torah, but not if you separate on what grows in an unperforated flowerpot.

24) According to R' Chisdah who says that they canceled the first Trumah, the Rabanan uprooted something from the Torah, (since, from the Torah, the Trumah is a real Trumah). You can't bring a proof that the rabbis have such a power from our Mishna that they decreed that the child from the first husband is a Mamzer, despite being a Kosher child from the Torah since he's her true husband. After all, Shmuel Paskins that the child is forbidden to marry a Mamzeres. The only reason he's called a Mamzer is to forbid her to a regular Yisraelis.

25) You also can't prove that the rabbis can uproot a Torah law from the fact that a husband inherits his minor wife's property, although the whole Kiddushin is rabbinic. Beis Hillel says that he inherits it after he brings her to Chuppah, and Beis Shammai says that it's only after she “stands high” and is brought to Chuppah. [Rashi: when she grows up and gets two pubic hairs. Tosfos argues, since, if that would be true, it should have said “when she grows up.” Rather, it means when she gets taller and looks somewhat grown and gives the appearance of being a wife. However, if she's very young, the rabbis' decree will look like a joke, since she doesn't appear to be old enough to be a wife.

Tosfos adds: even if she's brought to Chuppah before she “stands high,” it helps too when she reaches this stage of “standing high,” just like Kiddushin beforehand helps for when she reaches this stage.]

R' Eliezer says: she needs to have relations after she grows up (to be Kiddushin), since anything she did while she was a minor is not binding. [Tosfos says: although she didn't have Chuppah yet, but we can consider it living in her husband's house as Chuppah. Alternatively, since he lived with her for a long time, we don't need to worry that she's blemished or she'll give her family to drink Trumah, and the same regarding inheritance, as we'll say later.]

The reason this doesn't prove that the rabbis may uproot Torah law (since they're awarding the money to someone else than who should receive it from the Torah); since we have a rule that Beis Din can make something Hefker. [Tosfos says: you can't say the reason why the Trumah became canceled is because the rabbis made it Hefker when he separated it, so it wasn't his and the Trumah takes effect. After all, since the produce remains his until the end, you can't say that the rabbis made it Hefker for only one moment and then had it revert back to his possession.]

26) We also can't prove it from the Halacha that we allow a Kohein to become Tamai to a minor wife; since he inherits her, and no one else inherits her, we consider her as a Meis Mitzvah that a Kohein can bury. [Tosfos explains: she's really not a true Meis Mitzvah, or else a Kohein Gadol and Nazir should become Tamai to somebody they exclusively inherit. Also, by a regular Meis Mitzvah, if there is a Yisrael around, you don't allow a Kohein to bury it, and here we allow him to become Tamai like a regular husband, even if other people are around. Rather, in such a case, the rabbis can uproot Torah law as long as it's similar to Torah law, like here, where she's somewhat similar to a Meis Mitzvah.]

27) There is no proof that you can uproot a Torah law by the fact that a Kohein's minor wife may eat Trumah, since we may only permit her to eat rabbinical Trumah. [Tosfos says: however, you won't allow Torah Trumah even to a minor, since we may going according to the opinion that Beis Din is required to stop a minor eating Neveila. Alternatively, since, if we allow it, it would imply that she may eat Trumah even after she grew up, but before she has relations with him that makes her married to him from the Torah.]

28) There is also no proof from a non-Kohein who ate Tahor Trumah, and repays it with Tamai Chulin. [Tosfos says: even if you hold that you pay according to the worth (and not volume), and even though this Chulin can only be burnt, you would still need to give as much as the worth of the Trumah you ate; but it's still a downgrade since you're giving something that people don't jump to buy as they did for what you ate.] Sumchos says: if he did it unintentionally, the payment is valid, and if it's done purposely [Tosfos: that you paid the Tamai Chulin], it's not a valid payment. (Therefore, they made it no longer Trumah, and not owned by the Kohein, and if he gives it as Kiddushin, it's not a good Kiddushin, and it uprooted the Kiddushin from the Torah.) [Tosfos says: and we can't say that it's because Beis Din makes it Hefker, since the Kohein didn't do anything wrong that he should have his property taken away from him.]

The reason why we don't say that it's a proof; since Sumchos doesn't hold that they take away the status of Trumah from it, but that he needs to pay it a second time. He only argues with the Chachumim (who says explicitly that you need to pay a second time) that the Rabanan hold you need to pay twice even if he does it unintentionally, since he decrees it then so that you don't neglect paying a second time when done purposely. Sumchos doesn't give this fine when it's done unintentionally just so that they'll keep this fine when done purposely.

29) (However, if he ate Trumah Tamai, and paid back Chulin Tamai, it's very good since he ate something that the Kohein can't eat while he's Tamai and paid back something he could eat when he's Tamai. [Tosfos explains: granted that the Chulin now turns into Trumah and can't be eaten when the Kohein's Tamai; still we're saying that the Yisrael is losing more than he ate.])

30) [Tosfos says: you can't say, according to the opinion that you don't need to pay money you owe when you transgress a sin with the punishment of the Heavenly death penalty (as you only can have one punishment, the harsher one;) that he shouldn't repay Chulin for eating Trumah since he, anyhow, gets the Heavenly death penalty. After all, the Torah says that he must pay, so it's a Gezeiras Hakasuv. Alternatively, the replacement of Chulin is not a payment per se, but an atonement.]

31) Also, there's no proof that the rabbis can uproot Torah law from the fact that the Tzitz appeases to make a Tamai Korban Kosher, even if it was purposely done, and the rabbis enacted that it doesn't appease if it's done purposely [Tosfos: in Pesachim, there's an argument if they fined him when it became Tamai on purpose, or if he sprinkled the blood in Tumah on purpose.] After all, we can say that it only doesn't appease to allow eating the meat. Although they're uprooting the Mitzvah of eating Kodshim, but that's just passively, but they can't uproot them actively.

32) According to this, we can explain why they decreed that if someone converted Erev Pesach, he doesn't bring a Korban Pesach, or the decreed that you can't have Parah Aduma water sprinkled on you on Erev Pesach that falls on Shabbos so that you can bring a Korban Pesach, and you can't bring a knife through roofs, courtyards and Karfifs to make a Bris on Shabbos, you can't wear linen Tzitzis, you can't sprinkle the blood of the sheep that's brought on Shvuos that fell on Shabbos if it was Shechted not L'shma. Also, you can't blow Shofar or take a Luluv on Shabbos. They all are just passively canceling a Mitzvah.

33) [Tosfos says: even though it seems that you're actively canceling Tzitzis since you wrap the Talis around you without Tzitzis, but the real obligation is that, after you put on the Talis, you need to put Tzitzis on its corners. This is not similar to wearing Shatnez, which the Gemara in Brachos considers actively transgressing even while he's already wearing it, since there the main prohibition is to put it on (and this is a continuation of the original wearing). However, the Bracha on Tzitzis is difficult to this, since you say “to wrap yourself in Tzitzis,” implying that the Mitzvah is to wrap yourself in the Talis.]

34) There's no proof to Eliyahu on Mount Karmel who actively sacrificed on a Bamah, since a prophet is allowed to tell us to transgress a Mitzvah temporarily, since he needs it to fix a situation. [Tosfos explains: the rabbis also have this power. After all, the Heter doesn't come from a prophecy that commanded him, since we never listen to a prophet to add something to the Torah. Rather, we must say that it's a general Heter to transgress when you need to fix a situation.]

35) This is not similar to the Halacha of R' Shimon b. Gamliel who holds that a husband, after he sent a Get, can't cancel it, nor can he add onto the conditions that the Get is given with. (Rebbi holds that, even though he's not allowed to, if he B'dieved cancels the Get, it's canceled.) Although its not a good Get from the Torah; but it's different since, when people make Kiddushin, they make it on condition that the Rabanan agree to it, and the Rabanan then can cancel the Kiddushin retroactively. Even if he made the Kiddushin with relations, the rabbis made the relations to be just a promiscuous relations.

36) It's also no proof that Beis Din killed someone in the days of the Greeks for riding a horse on Shabbos, and gave Malkos for someone who had relations with a woman under a fig tree; since they were also to fix a situation.

37) Also, both husbands can't become Tamai to her when she dies, since they can only become Tamai to a wife that's Kosher, but not with one that's Pasul.

38) Neither husband receives what she finds. After all, the original enactment was to prevent animosity between them, but here, where they want them divorced, they want to promote animosity. [Tosfos says: although the Gemara in Kesuvos implies that the find goes to the husband because it's part of her salary; but he gets the salary because he feeds her and they don't want animosity that he feeds her, and she can keep what she makes. However, it's difficult why the Gemara phrases the reason the husband gets what she finds because of animosity, and phrases that her salary is because she's fed? After all, it should have said both was because of animosity, or because of being fed.]

39) Both husbands don't get her salary, since that was enacted because the husband feeds her, and here, she doesn't get support from either husband.

40) Neither husband can't annul her vows. After all, the main reason why he can annul it [Tosfos: when his annulling is not sanctioned from the Torah], when the vow involves something that effects him, so that his wife doesn't get disgusting to him, but here we don't care for her to be disgusting to him. [Tosfos says: this doesn't prove that a Kohein Gadol can't annul vows from his widow wife. After all, perhaps we fine them here more since we make her lose her Kesuva, but not by a widow to a Kohein Gadol where she still has a Kesuva.]

41) If this woman was a Yisrael's daughter married to a Kohein, she can't eat Trumah. If she's married to a Levi, she can't eat Maasar. Granted that, regularly, a Zonah can eat Maasar [Tosfos: even according to R' Meir who holds that Maasar is forbidden to a non-Levi; but not a Zonah, since it's only Pasul from Trumah since the Z'nus Pasuls her from Kehunah, but it doesn't Pasul her to a Levi]; since they fined her. [Tosfos explains: either, this is only according to R' Meir since we can rabbinically view her as a non-Levi to forbid Maasar, but according to the Rabanan who permit it to all people, there's no room to enact to forbid it to her. Alternatively, even according to the Rabanan, we forbid it to be distributed to her, even though she doesn't have a problem eating it.]

42) It also Pasuls a Kohein's daughter from ever eating Trumah, even rabbinical Trumah.

43) Her son doesn't receive her Kesuva (i.e., Kesuvas Binyan Dichrin) after the husband's death (like most sons receive their mother's Kesuva when it's not collected by her, like when she dies before the husband). We don't say that we only fine her who sinned, and not her children.

44) The Tanna Kama says: if the first husband dies, his brother needs to do Chalitza from the Torah, but, rabbinically, can't do Yibum. However, if the second husband dies, his brother does Chalitza and not Yibum, and it's completely a rabbinical enactment.

45) R' Yossi holds that she receives a Kesuvah from her first husband. R' Elazar holds that the first husband receives what she finds. R' Shimon holds that the first husband's brother can do Yibum.

46) R' Huna explains these three Taanaim; that a later one agrees to the Heter of the one before him. Therefore, R' Shimon who holds that the brother can have relations with her, of course he agrees to the find and Kesuva since they're only monetary. [Tosfos says: they didn't fine her. We consider the husband not receiving her find as a fine to her since it would lead to animosity towards her.] R' Elazar holds that he keeps her find despite that it takes place while she's still married to her, and, of course, he'll hold she has her Kesuva that's only applicable after they're no longer married. R' Yossi only holds of giving her a Kesuva since it's only applicable after they're no longer married.

47) R' Yochanan holds the opposite; an earlier Tanna agrees with the Heter of one listed after him, but a later one doesn't agree with an earlier one's Heter. Therefore, if R' Yossi holds that the wife receives her Kesuvah, where she receives the money, of course he keeps her findings, where she loses money. However, R' Elazar says that he only keeps her findings, but she doesn't get her Kesuva from him. [Tosfos says: although we consider the husband not receiving her findings a fine because of animosity, but we still consider it as the husband getting something since most women's salary are more than what they're fed.] R' Shimon doesn't hold of either since they can be applicable when the husband's alive, and only allows Yibum that takes place only after his death. [Tosfos says: we're not worried that they'll say that the first one divorced her and she married the second one, and the first one's brother is now doing Yibum to his brother’s divorcee. After all, when they don't fine them, the didn't enact that people will make such mistakes, but they'll assume that the second one mistakenly married her thinking that the first one died, just like we say this when the second one just gave her Kiddushin without Nissuin.]

48) The Mishna says: if she marries without needing Beis Din's permission, like when she has two witnesses to his death; she may return to her first husband, but she's obligated to bring a Korban Chatos. (We don't consider her an Onness to exempt her from a Korban since she should have waited before marrying to see if her husband will return). However, when she needed Beis Din's Heter, like when she marries with one witness; it's like an individual that does a sin with Beis Din's P'sak and is exempt from a Chatos. Rav Paskins like the Mishna.

49) R' Shimon says: if she marries with Beis Din's permission, i.e., through one witness, when the husband comes back, we consider as if she purposely committed adultery. If she didn't need Beis Din's permission, i.e., with two witnesses, we consider as if she did it unintentionally. R' Ashi explains: he's referring to forbidding her to her husband. Thus, with one witness, it's as if she did it purposely and is forbidden to her husband. However, if she had two witnesses, it's as if she did it unintentionally, and she's permitted to her husband. Raveina explains: it's referring to bringing a Korban. As if it was done with Beis Din's permission, she doesn't bring a Korban [Tosfos: since it's an individual acting through a Beis Din's P'sak, and calling it doing it on purpose is just a sign that she doesn't bring a Korban like those who sin on purpose.] If she married with two witnesses without needing Beis Din's permission, she brings a Korban.

50) Ulla asks on this Heter for the woman to remain with her husband if she got married with two witnesses because it's an Onness, and what could she have done? After all, we see many cases that a Get turns out to be Pasul, and we say that she needs to be divorced from both husbands etc. For example, if the Get was dated to the kingdoms of Madia or Greek. [Tosfos explains: it only Pasuls by a Get that's a very important document that the kingdom cares that it's dated to their kingdom, but other documents are not Pasul by not dating it by their kingdoms.] Another example: like they were in the east, and he writes that they're in the west. [Tosfos explains: this refers to the location of the Sofar. However, (Mahrsha- perhaps) it refers to where the witnesses are, and not exactly where the Sofar is, because, why do we need to know his location? After all, our custom is, if they're not in the same place, the Sofar writes the witnesses' location and send it to them. The only reason that it implies the Sofar's location since, usually, he's in the same place as the witnesses. However, this is only Pasul by a Get, but not by other documents, since they don't need to be fit for Hazama. Even though a Get dated later than it was written is Kosher, we must say that the witnesses were in the location written in the Get on that date.] Another example: when the Sofar mixed up the Get with the receipt on the Kesuva, and handed the Get to the woman, and the receipt to the husband, and the husband hands her what turned out to be the receipt. Another example: when she's given a “Get Mekusher” and there's not as many witnesses as folds. So, we see that they must get a divorce even though they were an Onness since, what should they have done differently?

The Gemara rejects the proof: since she could have done better by reading the Get (before a Chacham). [Tosfos says: even something that wouldn't dawn on her that it would be Pasul, it's still needs to be given to a Chachum to permit her.]

51) If a Yavam does Yibum, or Chalitza, to one of the wives, and the other wife then marries out based on that, and it turns out that the first wife was an Iylanus, she needs to leave her second husband. You can't say that it's an Onness, and what could she do? As, she should hav waited until the other wife grows up to find out if she's an Iylanus.

52) R' Huna b. Dr' Yehoshua says: even though we answered all the Braisos to allow an Onness, but you shouldn't rely on those answers, and you should forbid the woman who married because two witnesses said that her husband died.

53) If, after she married, there are rumors that her first husband is still alive; she doesn't need to leave her second husband since we don't suspect rumors after she's married. [Tosfos says: not only if it's a rumor that the Kiddushin was done improperly, where we can say that she inspected the situation to make sure that the Kiddushin is proper; but we also don't suspect a rumor that she committed adultery after her marriage.] This is even if she needed a Heter from Beis Din.

54) On what the Mishna says that, if someone marries because of Beis Din's P'sak, she's exempt from a Korban; Zeiri says that we don't Paskin like it since a Braisa holds that this is not relying on a mistaken P'sak, but they mistook the facts. This would be like, if Beis Din mistakenly thinks that the sun sat on Moitzie Shabbos, but it really didn't, if anyone did Melacha, they must bring a Korban.

55) R' Nachman says: it must be a P'sak. After all, they're believing a single witness, and we don't believe single witnesses on the facts. So, we only allow because Beis Din Paskins such.

56) Rava proves it's not a P'sak. After all, if Beis Din has a P'sak that something is permitted, then they have a strong reason to forbid, if they then find a weak reason to permit, they wouldn't able to permit. However, here, if one witness says he's dead, then two witnesses say that he's alive, and yet we believe another witness that he died [Rashi: i.e., he died now.]

57) If Beis Din Paskined that she can remarry, and she had a promiscuous relations, she's Chayiv a Chatos if the husband returns since Beis Din only allowed her to remarry. R' Elazar explains it to refer to any out of wedlock relations. R' Yochanan says it's only if she has relations to someone who she's forbidden to marry, like a widow to a Kohein Gadol, but she's exempt from a Chatos by just an out of wedlock relations, since the P'sak makes her a regular unmarried woman.

58) We have a Braisa just like R' Yochanan; that R' Elazar says that, if she marries a Kohein Gadol, they're Chayiv a separate Chatos for each relations. The Chachumim say that he's only Chayiv one Chatos for all relations in one forgetting. However, they admit that he's Chayiv for every different person they have relations with.

59) If a woman's husband and son went overseas, and then it was reported to her that her husband died first, and her son afterwards, and she married a stranger. Or, it was reported that her son died first, and then her husband, and she had Yibum. Then the reports come back that the opposite happened, she needs to leave from her present husband, and her child from him is a Mamzer. This is only according to R' Akiva according to the opinion that he holds that a child from any Lav is a Mamzer, but according to the opinion who says that only Lavim of relatives make a Mamzer, a child of a Yevama who marries a stranger is not a Mamzer.

60) Rav holds that Kiddushin doesn't take effect when a stranger gives it to a Yevama [Tosfos: even according to the Rabanan who argue with R' Akiva and say that the child from a Lav is not a Mamzer]. This is learned from the Pasuk “the wife shouldn't marry a stranger.” Shmuel says it's a Safeik if the Pasuk is coming [Tosfos: only] for a Lav, or to say Kiddushin doesn't take effect [Tosfos: besides coming for a Lav.]

61) Ameimar holds like Shmuel and requires her to receive a Get. Therefore, if they thought he didn't have a brother to do Yibum, and she married a stranger, and then it turned out that there was a brother, if the Yavam is a Yisrael, then we can [Tosfos: force] the husband to divorce her so that the Yevama should do Yibum. However, if the Yavam is a Kohein, even though he can't do Yibum to her anymore (since she's divorced), but the husband still needs to divorce her since we shouldn't allow the sinner to gain. [Tosfos says: this is only if the Yisrael wants to do Yibum, or the Kohein wanted to do Yibum. However, if they wanted to do Chalitza anyhow, we should allow the husband to remain married, since he's not gaining since he would have anyhow married her (and not like the Bahag and R' Chananel). However, this is only if they had Kiddushin, but if she had Nesuin, she's forbidden to both of them etc., as we'll say later.]

62) We have three versions of R' Gidal quoting Rav. The first version: there's no Kiddushin or Nessuin when a Yevama marries a stranger. The second version: there's no Kiddushin, but there is Nesuin; (i.e., since the Kiddushin did not take effect, we're referring to promiscuous relations). This is like R' Hamnuna who says that a Yevama who had promiscuous relations becomes forbidden to the Yavam. The third version: she's only forbidden to the Yevama when she marries like a Nesuah, since people will confuse her with a wife who's husband went overseas, that if she remarries because of reports that he died, and he returns, that the Halacha is that she needs to be divorced by both husbands etc. However, out of wedlock relations is not common, so they didn't decree to forbid her.

63) [Tosfos says: according to this; that, which we said, that only to R' Akiva, a Yevama to a stranger is not a Mamzer, but not according to the Rabanan, we must say that it's only not a Torah Mamzer, but it's a rabbinical Mamzer, as the Gemara says in Gitten; that they must be divorced etc. and the child from both are Mamzerim. This is either because of R' Hamnuna's opinion, or because they'll confuse her with a wife whose husband went overseas. However, the Yerushalmi explains that it's not a Mamzer completely, like the first version of R' Gadil. The Mishna in Gitten is according to R' Akiva, and not like the Sugya there who explains it like the Rabanan. However, the Ri says that we should Paskin like the two later versions of R' Gadil, and like the Sugya in Gitten that it's a rabbinical Mamzer. Even if you want to Paskin like the Yerushalmi, the husband must divorce her even if he had children with her as it's implied in the Yerushalmi, and not like the Bahag. However, there's a version of the text in the Yerushalmi like the Bahag.]

64) R' Yanai says: Kiddushin doesn't take effect by a Yevama to a stranger. R' Yochanan brings a proof from the Mishna that says you can't make Kiddushin with a Yevama so that it takes effect after her Chalitza, implying that he can't have Kiddushin take effect now. We can't say that the author of the Mishna is R' Akiva who, anyhow, holds that Kiddushin doesn't take effect by Lavim, since he would hold that the Kiddushin in this case will take effect, since he holds that you can make an acquisition for something that hadn't yet come into the world. As we see that a woman who tells her husband that the salary that I will make will be prohibited to you (through a Konam); the Tanna Kama says that he doesn't need to annul this vow. [Tosfos explains: we refer to a case where he provides her food and a silver Maah allowance; so the Tanna Kama holds that makes him entitle to everything she makes, even extras.] R' Akiva holds that he needs to annul it. [Tosfos explains: since he holds that the extra she makes when she pushes herself is hers. The reason this is considered as a vow that's applicable to him (to allow him to annul), since it's very hard to estimate what belongs to him and what belongs to her. Alternatively, even if it's hers, he has the right to buy a field with it and eat the produce as long as they're married. Although you may assume that, since the money is obligated to go for his use, that the vow shouldn't take effect; since the rabbis who decreed it didn't decree it so strongly that a vow can't take effect.] However, R' Huna b. R' Yehoshua disproves this proof. Really, it's R' Akiva and he holds that she can't acquire what hadn't come into the world yet. The reason that the Konam takes effect since it's as if she made a Konam on her hands regarding what it makes, and the hands are in this world.

65) However, R' Huna b. R' Yehoshua argues with R' Nachman b. Yitzchok who says that R' Akiva holds that someone may not acquire something that hadn't come into the world yet. As he says that the following all agree that someone may acquire something that hadn't come into the world yet. The first is R' Huna, as he says that, if you sell the future fruit of your date tree, you can only renege on the sale before the fruit grows, but not after it grew. (R' Nachman says that you can renege on the sale after it comes into the world. However, if the buyer takes it, you can't remove it from him.)

66) Also, we see Rav holds of this opinion. As he says; if someone sells a field that he doesn't own yet and says “I sell you this field for when I'll buy it, and it should take effect from now” he acquires it. [Tosfos says: he only needs to say that the acquisition happens now when he's making the acquisition from a Chalifin or a document. As the Chalifin can only take effect right away, since the handkerchief is returned right away, and the document might get ripped in the meantime. However, when the acquisition was done through money, you don't need to say “from now” since the money is always by the seller for the acquisition to take place. After all, it wasn't given as a loan or for her to watch, but for the acquisition. Thus, the money is always considered in the buyer's possession to take effect, even if the money is no longer around. Although Rav was in doubt if someone makes Kiddushin from now until after thirty days; if it's a condition and it takes effect right away, or if he's reversing his first statement that it should take effect right away, and it only takes effect after thirty days; that's only for things that are already in existence. However, in our case, where it's not in existence yet, of course he wants it to take effect now, and he's just mentioning that it takes effect after he buys it since he doesn't own it yet. Alternatively, we can't think it's a reverse in this case, since he says “from now” at the end of his statement.]

67) [Tosfos says: however, we see R' Yochanan disagrees with the case of Kiddushin from now until after thirty days, as the Gemara says in Kiddushin, and says that it starts to take effect right away and it continues until thirty days. This is like how he holds by buying a cow from now until thirty days, that he acquires it by thirty days if it's in a swamp that's fit to make a Meshicha, since he needs that the acquisition to take effect at the end. However, Shmuel holds that it's simple that it's a condition, and, after thirty days, it was retroactively his without any other acquisition needed.]

68) Also, we see R' Yanai and R' Chiya hold of this opinion. As they hold that you may separate Trumah and Maasar Erev Shabbos on produce that you expect to come to you on Shabbos. [Tosfos: that his sharecropper is expected to bring. However, if he owns it outright, everybody allows separating Trumah and Maasar on it even if it's still attached to the ground if it's fit to harvest now. It's not probable to consider it as something that doesn't exist yet just because it's far away. We also allow, for the honor of Shabbos, to separate Trumah and Massar for fruit that's not close to the Trumah and Maasar being separated.]

69) Also, we see Rebbi holds of this opinion. As he says, if you free a slave that you don't own for when you buy him; when you buy him, you can't work him since the freedom document takes effect even though it was given when he didn't exist in his possession.

70) Also, R' Meir holds of this opinion. As he says that you can give Kiddushin to someone who Kiddushin can't take effect now for when it will take effect. Like, giving Kiddushin to a non-Jewess for it to take effect after she converts, or to a married lady for after she gets divorced etc. [Tosfos says: even though, regularly, even if an acquisition can be made on an object that's not in the world yet, they hold that you can't make an acquisition to people who hadn't come into the world (like to the unborn) and these people don't exist yet regarding Kiddushin; we must say that it's different here since the people exist, but they're just not fit yet for Kiddushin. This is also why it's more lenient than other cases of acquiring what's not in the world that they, at least, need to be something expected to come into the world, even though these people need not to be expected to become able to have Kiddushin. Granted, since it's a lenient case, this is no proof that R' Meir held completely that you can regularly acquire something that's not in existence yet; but, since we see he holds like this opinion partially, we can assume he holds it completely.]

71) We see R' Elazar b. Yaakov holds of this opinion. As he says: you can separate Trumah and Maasar on grain that hadn't grown a third yet. Also, we see R' Akiva holds this opinion, as we brought his opinion earlier about the wife making a vow that her husband can't have pleasure from the salary she didn't make yet.

72) The first version of the following Sugya: R' Sheishes was asked if a single witness of her husband's death allows her to have Yibum, or not? Do we say the reason a single witness allows her to remarry since we know that she'll investigate the evidence well, and, perhaps, she won't investigate that well by a Yavam, if she loves him much, so, we shouldn't believe the single witness. Or, do we say the main reason to allow marrying since it's something that will eventually become known [Tosfos: so we don't need her to investigate much, so the limited investigation she'll make by a Yavam is enough.] R' Sheishes answers: he's believed as long as two witnesses don't contradict him. [Tosfos explains: although they didn't impose on her the same strict fines if she's wrong and does Yibum, as we'll say soon; still, since she might get Chalitza, and she'll marry a stranger, and then the strict fines applies, she'll investigate well in the first place. Alternatively, even though there's no reason to investigate here well, but since, regularly, a woman would investigate well to remarry with a single witness; so she'll investigate here too.]

73) The second version of the Sugya: the question wasn't if he's believed to say that the husband died in order to marry the Yavam. After all, she's believed to say that her husband died so that she can marry her Yavam. Rather, we want to know if a single witness is believed to say that her Yavam died, or that her son died after her husband; so that she can marry out. After all, she might hate the brother a lot, and that will cause her not to investigate it well. [Tosfos explains: we could have also asked if the witness is believed to say that the son died first and then her husband, since she's not believed to say her son died first. Alternatively, of course the single witness is believed, since the wife will investigate, and we don't need to worry she'll limit her investigation because she may love the brother. The only reason a wife isn't believed that her son died first since it was only a special decree to believe the wife on her husband's death so that she won't be stuck as a married lady, but we didn't make this decree to believe her on the death of a son to lead her to Yibum. However, a single witness is believed since she'll investigate well. We only have a worry when she's getting out of the Yibum since we're worried that she'll limit her investigation to get away from a brother that she may hate. After all, usually the hate of somebody is greater than the love for somebody. Also, it's more common to hate a broter-in-law than to love him. Also, it's worse to fall to Yibum before someone you hate than it's good to fall to someone you love, since it's much worse for the possibility to be married to someone you hate, than the possibility to have Yibum before someone you love, since you might get Chalitza from him. Also, even if he does Yibum, it's not so great since you could have married someone equal to him, or even better than him.

Also, the woman is believed to say that the son died after her husband, since she didn't have to say anything about the son, and we would assume that he's alive, as that's his Chazaka, so we believe her with a Migo. However, the single witness, if his true intent is to mess her up, he can't just say that the husband died and not to say anything about the child. After all, when they hear afterwards that the child died, they'll investigate if he died before, or after the husband. However, now that the single witness says that he died after the husband, they wouldn't investigate further.]

74) Rava wants to say that it's a Kal V'chomer. After all, we believe a single witness to permit in a case of an Issur Karies [Rashi to permit a married lady to remarry someone else. Tosfos disagrees. After all, you don't have any reason not to believe the single witness since she would definitely investigate well. Rather, we believe him to allow her to the Yavam and we don't say she won't investigate because she loves him.] Therefore, we should definitely believe a single witness for a Lav of allowing a Yevama to marry a stranger. However, one of the rabbis rejected the Kal V'chomer. After all, the woman herself disproves it, since she's believed to marry herself to the Kareis [Tosfos: to marry the Yavam and we don't worry she'll lie because of love], but is not believed to to say that her Yavam died [Tosfos: since we're worried she'll lie because she hates him.]

75) If two witnesses say that her son died before her husband, and she gets Yibum, and then two witnesses come and say it was the opposite; you shouldn't believe the second pair of witnesses more than the first ones. [Tosfos says: we don't say that the two cancel each other out and we should put her on her Chazaka that she's forbidden to the Yavam. After all, since the Yavam and the wife claim that they know for sure the husband died last; we don't say they must divorce. This is similar to what we allow in the beginning of the Perek when she marries one of her witnesses.]

76) A woman is not believed to say that her Yavam died and she can get marry to a stranger, or that her sister died and she's permitted to her husband. Also, a man isn't believed to say that her brother died to do Yibum to his wife, and that his wife died so he can marry her sister. We don't say to believe him since he doesn't want his children to become Mamzeirim, so he definitely won't lie. (This is a Chiddush even to a Yevama marrying a stranger according to R' Akiva who says that the child is a Mamzer.)

77) If someone was told that her husband died, and had Kiddushin from another man, and the husband returns before Nesuin; she may return to him and she doesn't even need a Get from the second husband. Even if she was given a Get, it doesn't forbid her to a Kohein.

78) If someone's wife went overseas and he was informed that she died [Tosfos: from two witnesses, since you can't marry your wife's sister from a testimony of a single witness.] He married her sister, and then the wife returned, the husband may take her back. This is not like the woman remarrying after falsely hearing that her husband died (where she's forbidden to him [Tosfos: according to the opinion even in a case where two witnesses testified that he died]). After all, a married woman is forbidden to her husband if she purposely committed adultery, so we decreed to forbid her in this type of mistaken case. However, since purposely having relations with your wife's sister doesn't forbid the wife to you, so they didn't decree to fine her in this type of mistaken case.

79) If your wife and brother-in-law went overseas, and he was informed that they both died, so he married his wife's sister (since both your wife, and her husband, died); and they returned; he's still permitted to his wife. We don't say that, once the sister is forbidden to her husband [Tosfos: when she was permitted by a single witness, or according to the opinion she's forbidden even if two witnesses testified to his death], we should also forbid his wife too. [Tosfos says: he doesn't even need to give a Get to his wife's sister since everyone knows that it must be a mistaken marriage since his wife returned, and there's no way for him to be able to give Kiddushin to her.] This is even true according to R' Akiva who says that if someone married his brother's wife or wife's sister on the testimony that the other died, and they didn't, you must give her a Get (and then your wife would be forbidden as being the sister of the one who you divorced); but that's only when the wife only received Kiddushin, so we can say that the reason he married her sister since the Kiddushin was mistaken. However, if there was Nesuin, even R' Akiva admits that you don't need to worry that people may assume the Nesuin was mistaken, and the sister doesn't need a Get. [Tosfos says: even according to the opinion that a mistaken Nesuin is dissolved and doesn't need a Get, but it's still very uncommon to happen that someone will allow that his relations to be out of wedlock, so people won't suspect it.]

80) [Tosfos explains: only R' Akiva holds that a wife's sister needs a Get when she's forbidden to her husband. However, it's not applicable to fine anyone because of the prohibition of a wife's sister. After all, we said earlier that we only fine her by a married lady since she's forbidden from the Torah if she purposely committed adultery. Therefore, we don't need to fine them in this case and say that people will assume that it was a mistaken Kiddushin.]

81) [Tosfos says: however, R' Akiva admits that, if you marry your father's wife, or your aunt, she doesn't need a Get. He only requires it by Ervahs that may become permitted since you might be thinking about them, but not Ervahs that are always forbidden.]

82) Even according to Rava who says that the Torah excludes the prohibition of a mother-in-law after his wife's death, it doesn't exclude it completely, but only from the punishment of burning. However, she's still prohibited [Tosfos: and has Kareis].

83) R' Yehuda says: even Beis Hillel forbids your wife if you have relations with her mother, and they only argue with Beis Shammai and permit the wife when you had relations with her sister. However, R' Yossi says that everybody holds that a wife's sister doesn't forbid your wife, and Beis Hillel permits even by a mother-in-law. The Halacha is like R' Yossi.

84) R' Yossi argues with the Tanna Kama and says: “all who become Pasul from others (i.e., a married woman) Pasuls by himself (i.e, his wife's sister). If he doesn't Pasul by others, it doesn't Pasul by himself.” R' Ami explains: the Tanna Kama holds that, when a wife and brother-in-law travel overseas; it doesn't make a difference if two witnesses said that your brother-in-law died and his wife is permitted to him, or if one witness testified, and she's forbidden to him; this first man is still permitted to his wife. However, R' Yossi held that his wife is only permitted when his brother-in-law is permitted to his wife, but not when she's forbidden, since he caused them to be forbidden, he becomes forbidden too.

85) R' Yitzchok Nafcha says that we refer to permitting through a testimony of a single witness, and R' Yossi argues with the Tanna Kama on two fronts. If his brother-in-law and Arusah wife went overseas, where, we can suspect that his Kiddushin with her was mistaken (and that's why he can marry her sister) and perhaps the brother-in-law gave his wife a conditional Get. Therefore, the brother-in-law can't take back his wife, since it looks as if he's taking back his ex-wife after she married someone else, and he's forbidden with his wife because she's the sister of the one he divorced. (However, the Tanna Kama says that we never forbid the wife because of her sister, and we only forbid the brother-in-law with his wife since she's an adulterous married lady.) However, if your wife was a Nesuah when she went overseas with your brother-in-law, then we don't suspect the Nesuin to be mistaken. Therefore, it's obvious the marriage to her sister was a mistake, and she doesn't need a Get, and, therefore, she's permitted to her husband, and he's permitted to his wife (since he didn't need to give a Get to her sister). (However, the Tanna Kama permits him to his wife in all cases, and forbids the brother-in-law to his wife in all cases.)

86) Shmuel Paskins like R' Yossi. R' Yosef asks: it seems to contradict with his opinion regarding a Yevama; that Rav says she's like a married woman, and Shmuel holds that she's not. R' Huna establishes that they argue in a case where an Arusah's husband went overseas, and she was informed that he died, and had Yibum from his brother. Rav holds that she's like a married lady that remarries and is forbidden to her husband, and Shmuel says she's not like a married lady and is permitted to her husband, and we don't say that people will suspect that it was a mistaken Kiddushin. Abaya answers: maybe Shmuel only Paskins like R' Yossi according to R' Ami's interpretation that his wife is forbidden once his brother-in-law's wife is forbidden because of him. Alternatively, even if he has R' Yitzchok's explanation, he only Paskins like R' Yossi regarding permitting her sister if she's a Nesuah, but not forbidding her if she's an Arusah. Alternatively, we'll establish the case where he argues with Rav, not like how R' Huna established it, but they argue about a Yevama that had Z'nus, if she's forbidden to her Yavam just like a married woman is forbidden to her husband, or not. Alternatively, they argue if Kiddushin doesn't take effect on a Yevama like it doesn't on a married lady. Rav and Shmuel are consistent to their opinions if it takes effect, or not.

87) If a minor brother gives Maamar, he Pasuls all his brothers from doing Yibum. However, this is only if he did it before the other brothers, but if his brother first did Maamar,the minor's Maamar is nothing. He only forbids them if he has relations afterwards [Tosfos: but his Chalitza doesn't do anything.]

88) Similarly, Rav holds that a minor can give a Get. [Tosfos says: therefore, since he holds of a Get that's in the place of Chalitza, he, of course, holds that a minor can make a Maamar that's in the place of Yibum. After all, his Yibum is greater than his Chalitza, as we see that his relations (Yibum) forbid her on his brother after the brother gave Maamar, but not the minor's Chalitza.] Shmuel holds that a minor has a Maamar [Tosfos: but disagrees about a Get.]

89) R' Meir holds that the minor has a Get and Maamar, but it's not as powerful as the same thing by an adult. Therefore, according to R' Gamliel that we usually don't say that there's a Maamar after Maamar, and Get after Get, will say that there's a Maamar after a minor's Maamar, and a Get after a minor's Get. Also, according to the Rabanan, who usually say that there's a Maamar after Maamar, and Get after Get, would agree that there's no minor's Maamar after an adult's Maamar, and a minor's Get after an adult's Get.

90) R' Meir holds that a Yibum of a nine year old is like a Maamar, and his Chalitza is like a Get. [Tosfos says: he compares Chalitza to Yibum. However, the Rabanan don't compare them and a minor's Chalitza is nothing. When we said earlier that only a minor's relations forbids her to the brothers, it was like the Rabanan.]

91) If a Yevama has relations with two minor Yavams; the Tanna Kama holds that the second one's relations forbids her on the first brother. The same if he has relations with a Yevama and her sister-wife, the relations with the sister-wife forbids him on the first wife. R' Shimon says they're both Kosher. After all, if the first relations makes an acquisition of some kind, the second relations can't do any more to forbid him; and if the first relations did nothing, then the second one did nothing too. This argues on b. Azai who says that there is only no Maamar after Maamar by one Yavam and two Yevamos, but not by two Yavams to one Yevama. (There are some who have the text the opposite.)

92) If a nine year old had relations with his Yevama, and he dies, another brother does Chalitza, but can't do Yibam. If he married a woman and died, his wife is exempt from Chalitza, since he can't make a Kiddushin. [Tosfos says: however, it's not sinful to live this way, and we don't consider it as promiscuous. Also, we consider it a Mitzvah to marry him off slightly before he becomes an adult.]

93) If a nine year old minor has relations with a Yevama, but never had relations with her after he grew up. However, when he grew up, he married another wife, and then he died. This first wife must receive Chalitza and not Yibum, and the second wife can have Yibum or Chalitza. The first wife doesn't forbid the second wife, although she's forbidden since she's a Yevama from two husbands, and the second wife is her sister-wife, so, she's a sister-wife of someone who's forbidden. The reason she's not forbidden; Rav says since the minor's relations is not like Maamar. Shmuel and R' Yochanan hold that it's like Maamar. However, our Mishna argues with the Mishna in the third Perek that forbids the second wife since we compare her to an Ervah's sister-wife. As our Mishna will hold that we shouldn't forbid her since she's similar to an Ervah's sister-wife. However, R' Shimon holds that you can do Yibum to either wife and Chalitza to the second one since he doesn't hold that a Yevama from two husbands are forbidden.

94) This is the Halacha by a nine year old, but it can also apply to a twenty year old that didn't get his pubic hairs. However, this is only if he doesn't have signs for a Saris. After all, a Saris can't do Yibum or Chalitza.

95) If he doesn't have signs of Saris, we don't consider him a Saris until it passes most of his years (i.e., by thirty five, which is half of seventy) without pubic hairs.

96) If a man is very thin and didn't get pubic hairs, you need to fatten him up, and if he's too fat, you need to make him thinner. After all, sometimes the hairs fall out because he's too fat, or because he's too thin.