Daf 2

1) There are fifteen women that are Ervahs to someone, if she married his brother who dies without children; he can't do Yibum to her (and she doesn't even need Chalitza). Neither can he do Yibum to the Ervah's Tzara. If another brother does Yibum to the Tzara, and he also has another wife, and he dies, the first brother cannot do Yibum, and doesn't need Chalitza, to his Ervah's Tzarah's Tzarah. This can go on indefinitely.

2) One of the fifteen Ervah's is a women who was originally the wife of his brother from his mother (and then married the brother from his father) [Tosfos asks: we see in Toras Kohanim and in the Yerushalmi that there's a Drasha to exempt a wife of a maternal brother, (since the Torah compares a brother's wife to a Nidah, that she needs to possibly become permitted to him just like a Nidah will be permitted. So only a paternal brother could be permitted through Yibum, but not a maternal brother. Tosfos answers: according to the Riva, we can say that it only exempts from Ariri (losing children), but he's not completely exempt from Karies. However, according to Rashi that all Kareis has Ariri, and this is what separates Kareis from heavenly Misah, this answer doesn't fit well. According to the Riva, the difference between Kareis and Misah is like the Yerushalmi says, Karies is by fifty years and Misah is by sixty years. However, the Bavli says that Kareis is by sixty years, so Misah must be at some time after that.]

3) Included in the fifteen women is a wife's sister. [Tosfos says: even though she might become permitted to him eventually since his wife might die. Although we see that a Nidda is obligated to have Yibum or Chalitza despite that she's forbidden at the time of the brother's death; that's because the Nidda is not forbidden to the brother more than any other person, so this is not a special prohibition to him. Alternatively, a wife's sister doesn't have to wait until she becomes permitted since it's not “the pleasant way of the Torah” to hold her indefinitely until that time. However, by Nidda, since she doesn't need to wait but the amount for her to become Tahor, which any husband would anyhow need to wait, it's considered “the pleasant way of the Torah.”]

4) If any of these Ervah's had refused her husband (if she was married off by her brother or mother as a child), or she was divorced, or found to be an Iylanis; you may do Yibum to the other wife. [Tosfos says: from this, it would seem that an Iylanis doesn't need a Get, and we consider it a definite mistaken marriage, otherwise, the other wife should be considered only a questionable Ervah's Tzarah and should only get Chalitza. This is even according to the opinion that says that if you make a Kiddushin on condition of not having a blemish, that, when you have relations with her, you forgive the condition and you have relations to make a complete Kiddushin; that's only on other blemishes, but an Iylanis is so uncommon, it never dawns on him to make a new Kiddushin for, perhaps, she's an Iylanis. However, this is only by a definite Iylanis, but if you only suspect she's an Iylanis, she needs a Get to be released.]

Daf 4

5) An Asei supersedes a regular Lav [Tosfos: even if the essence of the Mitzvah doesn't mean the pushing off of the Lav like by Yibum, where the Mitzvah is to marry the usually forbidden brother's wife.] We learn this through the Smichos (juxtaposition) of Tzitzis to Shatnez; that you can wear Tzitzis with Shatnez. Even according to those who don't learn Smichos regularly agree here since, either, because it's obvious to make the Drasha, since the Pasuk wasn't written in the Parsha of Tziztis, or, since they're extra words.

6) [Tosfos says: we see in Menachos that the Gemara says that everybody is obligated in Tzitzes, even Kohanim. I might say that since they're not obligated in Shatnez since they did the Avodah with Shatnez they're not obligated in Tziztis ; but since they're obligated outside of the Avodah in Shatnez, they're obligated in Tziztis. This, that women aren't obligated in Tzitzis despite that they're obligated in Shatnez; that's because the Drasha to exempt them from time-based Mitzvos, which is the Hekish with Tefilin, is stronger than a Smuchos (since it's written together in the same Pasuk). Although we should say, since they're exempt from Tzitzis, they should also be exempt from Shatnez, and we know they're obligated since the Gemara in Beitza says that Shatnez should not have any use on Yom Tov and it doesn't say it's used by women; but there must be some (unknown to us) Drasha to obligate them.]

7) You're obligated in not wearing Shatnez even if it's not worn per se, but if it's juts laying on top of you. However, it needs to be like wearing Shatnez that you have pleasure having it on you, but not like having it on you while selling your wares to show the length.

8) R' Yishmael held that, when the Torah mentions 'clothes,' it only refers to wool and linen. Therefore, you're only obligated in Tzitzis from the Torah of wool and linen. The Chachumim say that all clothes are obligated in Tzitzis. Rava explains: but threads of wool and linen can be Tzitzis for any clothes, and other materials can only be Tzitzes to clothes of their own material.

9) In order to transgress Shatnez, you need it to have a double attachment.

Daf 5

10) In order to transgress Shatnez from the Torah, they need to be carded, spun and 'Noz.' [Tosfos says that the wool and linen threads need to have these by themselves before attaching them to each other, not like the Rivan who says that you need to spin the wool and linen together. After all, then Tzitzis doesn't need to be Shatnez since the wool Techeiles threads are not spun with linene. Rashi explains 'Noz' as weaving them together. Tosfos disagrees since it should be similar to the other conditions, carding and spinning, that it's each material by itself before combining them. Rather, Tosfos says: it means to twist threads together (to make them thicker).]

11) [Tosfos says: you can't say that you can't learn that an Asei supersede all Lavs from Tzitzis superseding Shatnez since we see that it's a weak Lav since it's permitted by Bigdei Kehuna; since it's not permitted per se, but it also only supersedes Shatnez. We can't learn from the fact that the Mitzvah of burning Nossar doesn't supersede Yom Tov that Aseis don't supersede Lavs, since it wouldn't cancel the Mitzvah if it wasn't done on Yom Tov since you can easily wait until the next day to burn them.]

12) [Tosfos says: once you're putting wool Techeiles on the linen garment, you can even have the white strings made from wool, even though it's possible to have it made from linen. Also, once we see that wool white strings can be used on a linen Talis, you can use white linen strings on a wool Talis. However, this is only when there is Techeiles, but if they're all white strings, you can't have Shatnez. As we see that they forbid Tzitzis in linen because the Techiles might be forged and is really Kala Ilan (a plant based substitute).]

13) Although we allow a Metzorah Kohein to shave his beard [Tosfos: which would be transgressing a Lav and Asei, proving that an Asei supersedes a Lav and Asei; that's only since it's a weak Lav since it's not prohibited to all (since women may shave). Although a Kohein Gadol can't make Yibum to a widow since there's a Lav and Asei, even though it's not prohibited to all; that's because it's considered applicable to everybody since the women are prohibited to him, and it's not only him prohibited to the women. There are those who explain that only a Metzorah can supersede a Lav and Asei that's not applicable to all, and not all Aseis, since it has an added factor that it produces marital harmony (according to the opinion that he's forbidden to his wife even when he's a definite Metzorah, and the Tahara process starts the process to bring him back to his wife.)]

14) The Asei of Metzorah supersedes the Asei and Lav of not shaving a Nazir. That's because Nazir is a weak Lav since it could be permitted by a Chachum, but it's no proof to other Lav and Aseis.

15) If a Yevama falls before someone disgusting, or has a certain skin disease, we don't force her to have Yibum with him. We learn this from the Smichos to “do not muzzle when its threshing,” that we don't muzzle the Yevama either.

16) When the Pasuk says “not to reveal the corner of your father,” R' Yehuda says that it refers to a woman your father raped (i.e., had non-marital relations with), since it's written near the Parsha of rape. However, the Rabanan say that there is a break between the two passages. Therefore, it's only coming to forbid a woman that fell to your father for Yibum (and to transgress two prohibitions. After all, she would also be your aunt, since she was originally married to your father's brother.) [Tosfos has two ways of learning if R' Yehuda agrees that it forbids the Yevama that fell to your father besides forbidding the one who the father raped, or that he disagrees completely.]

17) This is only by a regular Lav that it's superseded by an Asei, but not by a Lav that has a punishment of Karies. We don't say that the same way that it supersedes a regular Lav despite that transgressing the Lav is harsher than not keeping the Asei, so it should even supersede a much harsher punishment of a Lav with Kareis.

18) That, which we need a Pasuk to teach us that you can't do Yibum with an Ervah, (since we should assume that the Asei can't supersede an Ervah that has Kareis); since I might think that the same way it permits the Ervah of a brother's wife, it would permit other Ervah's too. This could be compared to a Metzorah that his eighth day fell on Erev Pesach, and he emitted semen that day and went to the Mikvah. We allow him to go to the Mikdash to bring his Korbanos for Metzorah so that he'll be fit to bring a Korban Pesach later. This is despite the fact someone who is a T'vul Yom of a Keri is forbidden to enter the Levi's camp [Rashi says: the case that he emitted semen, and not any other cases of Tumah, since they're not allowed in the Levite’s camp. However, Tosfos says that the Ri rejects this. After all, the Gemara concludes with R’ Yochanan that we allow this non-Kareis prohibition to come into the Levite’s camp, is because it’s only a rabbinic prohibition. As we see the Mishna in Keilim says the woman’s courtyard was even holier (than the Chayil) since people who were T’vul Yom can’t enter, assuming all T’vul Yom, even of emitting semen, since we already referred to this Tumah earlier in those Mishnayos. Thus, we see that he's not forbidden in all of the Levite's camp like before the Teveila. Rather, the Ri explains: that the Chidush of using the case of emitting semen, since without T’vila you need to send him from two camps (the Shchina’s camp (the Mikdash) and the Levite’s camp).] Although the Chachumim don’t allow other people who are T’vul Yom from semen inside [Tosfos: at least rabbinically. Although we say that a Tvul Yom of a Zav is like a Zav, that's only regarding eating a Korbon Pesach that’s brought when most people are Tamai. As we say that a Zav and Zava and Niddos and women who gave birth can’t eat from the Pesach. (Only those that were Tamai from a corpse (or a similar Tumah) may eat.) However, regarding going into holy places, he doesn’t have the status of a Zav.] However, this one needs to go to Niknar's gate in order to have the blood and oil placed on his thumb and big toe. [Tosfos says: although they could have easily made it holy and have the Metzorah stand in the woman’s area and stick his thumb under Niknor’s gate (which we’ll consider sticking it into the Mikdash); the Rivan explains: since it’s not in the courtyard proper, we wouldn’t consider it as the Torah prescribed, to put the blood “before Hashem.” However, Tosfos rejects this. If Niknor’s gate was holy, then it would be considered to be “before Hashem.” Rather, R’ Tam answers: they did this to help the Metzorah, so they can stand under the gate and be protected from the elements (from the sun if it’s sunny, and from rain if it’s rainy).] The reason we allow this T’vul Yom to enter; since it’s better for an Asei with Kareis (the Korbon Pesach) to supersede an Asei without Kareis (a T’vul Yom entering the Levite’s camp). [Tosfos: i.e., a rabbinical Asei. Although this is not a definitive rule since, in many cases, the rabbis insisted that people keep their enactments even when preventing doing a Mitzvah with Kareis, as we see in Pesachim. However, in our case, the rabbis didn’t see fit to be so stringent with their enactment.]

19) Ulla says: the reason (that we allow him to stick his thumb into the Mikdash if he’s a T’vul Yom) even though (Ullah holds) that we consider a partial entering (his thumb) as transgressing entering the Mikdash Tamai, but once the Torah permits him to stick his thumb into the Mikdash although he didn’t yet become Tahor from being a Metzorah, they permit it even if he has another Tumah on him, like for emitting semen. (So too, once the Torah allows the brother to do Yibum with the Ervah of a brother’s wife, they allow him even if she’s also a different Ervah.) [Tosfos explains: although, once we consider a partial entering as if he entered and we permit it since there is no other way to do it, we don't permit him to enter the Mikdash completely since the Torah explicitly forbids it, as it says, “he shall not come into the Mikdash.” However, partial entering is not written explicitly in the Torah, rather we learn it from a Hekish to touching Kodshim (i.e., just like it’s forbidden to touch Kodshim with even part of your Tamai body, so too is entering the Mikdash forbidden with only part of your body). Therefore, we consider a prohibition from a Drasha weaker than a prohibition from an explicit Pasuk. Alternatively, since it’s possible to do it with only entering partially, if you completely come in you would transgress coming into the Mikdash Tamai and must bring a Korbon. As we see that, even if you have a reason to be Tamai in the Mikdash, if you stay more than necessary, you need to bring a Korbon. Like, if someone became Tamai while he’s standing in the Mikdash, if he could leave immediately through a shorter distance, but rather takes the longer way out.]

20) However, this is only if the Metzorah would emit semen on the eighth day when he already had permission to stick his thumb into the Mikdash, but if he emitted on the eighth night (the night before he’s eligible to bring his Korbon), that he wouldn’t stick his thumb in the next day, since he emitted it before he was fit to bring a Korbon. Therefore, we only need the Drasha to tell us that you can’t do Yibum to a wife’s sister in a case where the dead husband married and died, and then his brother married her sister when he once was permitted to marry the Yibum. However, it's simple that he can't do Yibum if he married the sister before the brother dies.

21) Another reason why we need the Drasha to prohibit Yibum to a wife’s sister, since I might think it’s permissible to do Yibum from the Hekish of R’ Yona that the Torah combines all Ervos in the following rule “anyone who does any of these abominations will get Kareis.” So, maybe, we’ll compare all Ervos to a brother’s wife. And just as it’s permitted to do Yibum to a brother’s wife, it’s permitted to all other Ervos. Therefore, the Torah has a Drasha by a wife’s sister to teach us otherwise, and we'll learn from it all other Ervos because of the above Hekish. We say to choose the Hekish from all Ervos to a wife’s sister to forbid, than the Hekish to a brother’s wife to permit since we always chose to make a Hekish to a stringency than to a leniency. Alternatively, all other Ervos by definition will have two prohibitions on her, i.e., besides being the other Ervah, she’s also a brother’s wife. So we would rather learn their Halacha from a wife’s sister that also has two prohibitions (a wife’s sister and a brother’s wife) and not to learn them from a brother’s wife, which only has one prohibition.

22) Rava answers: we don’t need the Drasha to prohibit the Ervah herself, since we would never have assumed that she’s permitted since we don’t say that an Asei supersedes a Lav with Kareis.[Tosfos explains why he disagrees with Ulla’s logic that we would think the Ervah is permitted if he married the sister after his brother’s death, and we don’t say once the Torah permits the prohibition, it permits in all cases, even by those that have other prohibitions, like by Metzorah: since Rava disagrees with Ulla, since he doesn’t consider a partial entering of the Mikdash as transgressing the prohibition of entering while he’s Tamai. Alternatively, the Ri answers: only by Metzorah that’s a T’vul Yom we say once the Torah permitted a Metzorah they extended the permission by the same prohibition of a Tamai person entering the Mikdash. However, by Yibum, you can’t say once we permitted for the prohibition of a brother’s wife we would extend it to a different prohibition (a wife’s sister) as well. Also, Rava doesn't assume that you can do Yibum because of R’ Yona’s Hekish since he holds that the Hekish was only given to learn from each other stringencys and not leniencys.] Rather, Rava says: we also don't need the Pasuk to forbid the Ervah's sister-wife since we have another Pasuk of “to be sister wives” to forbid the sister-wife. Rather this Drasha teaches us that the sister-wife is only forbidden where there is Yibum, but not in a non-Yibum situation, when the Ervah doesn't marry a brother.

23) That, which we need the Drasha that honoring one’s parents doesn't supersede Shabbos; it's not because we regularly say that an Asei supersedes a Lav with Karies, but we refer to a case where you lead your animal doing a Melacha, which is a regular Lav, and even so, the Asei of honoring parents doesn’t supersede it. We don’t extrapolate from here that an Asei doesn’t supersede a regular Lav since preparation for the Mitzvah is different. [Tosfos explains: since the part of honoring parents that involves the Issur, like leading your animal to carry something, are only preparatory for the Mitzvah of feeding and clothing your father. However, regularly, when you do the actual Mitzvah, then it supersedes the Lav, since we can extrapolate it from Shatnez in Tzitzis. Even if you have a case where the actual honoring is in conflict with a Lav, we don’t say that honoring supersedes the Lav, since the Torah gives a blanket command not to listen to the parent, implying in all cases. The reason it doesn’t supersede since in most cases the honoring is only preparatory.

However, Rashi explains that the Drasha is to forbid real Melachos like Shechting and cooking, and thus implies that other Aseis similar to honoring parents supersedes Lavim with Kareis. However, this is only because honoring parents are different, since it’s preparatory for the Mitzvah, since you can’t keep the Mitzvah without transgressing Shabbos. However, we would never extrapolate from here that one could do Yibum with his wife’s sister since there is no need to transgress marrying your wife’s sister for the Mitzvah, since you can always do Chalitza. Tosfos rejects this explanation since you can’t get out of the Mitzvah by doing Chalitza if it’s prohibited to do Yibum because of Kareis since there is no Chalitza if you can’t do Yibum. Also, we don’t consider Chalitza a Mitzvah if it’s possible to do Yibum. Also, the Gemara’s conclusion seems to be that an Asei doesn’t supersede a Lav with Kareis, (but according to Rashi’s explanation, we’ll conclude it does supersede).]

24) You can't think, that when the Torah says to fear the Beis Hamikdash, it means that you’ll need to fear the actual building (like you fear a deity), but the One who commanded building it. Rather, the fear that one should have of the Mikdash is that he shouldn’t ascend the temple mount with his staff, his shoes, his money belt, and with dust on his feet. He shouldn’t use it as a shortcut, and, for sure, he can’t spit there, even after its destruction. [Tosfos says: we need a Drasha by fearing parents that we shouldn’t actually fear them like a deity since we would never have thought that one should bow to parents like bowing to a deity. We would only have such an assumption by the Mikdash that’s a holy place. Alternatively, we understand the concept of fearing parents (without it being fear for a deity) by not angering them. However, we cannot find the concept of fearing a building (so I thought it would be like fearing a deity, however, as they concluded) they found a pushed explanation to fearing the Mikdash (not to use it as a shortcut etc.)]

25) The reason we need the Pasuk to forbid Beis Din to execute on Shabbos, although an Asei doesn't supersede a Lav with Kareis because we would have thought that you may execute on Shabbos from a Kal V’chomer. We see that the Avodah in the Bais Hamikdash is so stringent that it supersedes Shabbos, yet we see that executing supersedes the Avodah, as we say to remove him from the Mizbeach to execute him. [Tosfos explains: implying in every case, even if there is no other Kohein available. We can't say the reason is because he’s unfit, like, the Gemara in Brachos says that a Kohein who killed cannot “lift his hands” (to say Birchos Kohanim), and of course they can’t do (the more stringent) service in the Mikdash. After all, he’s fit to perform the service since we Darshin that we take him away from the Mizbeiach, but not if he’s already on top of the Mizbeiach (performing the service). It’s only a stringency (that the Rabanan gave) not to say Birchos Kohanim. Alternatively, we’re only concerned for him to “lift his hands” in Birchas Kohanim, since he killed with those hands and we say “a prosecutor cannot turn around and become a defense attorney.”] So, I might say that executing supersedes Shabbos [Tosfos: and we don’t say that it’s ‘enough’ for the Kal V’chomer to teach us that execution only supersedes Shabbos like it supersedes the Avodah, i.e., only passively (so you can't actively execute on Shabbos); it's according to R’ Tarfon who holds that, if the Kal V’chomer becomes undone, we don’t say it’s ‘enough’ (and we learn the next step beyond that point). Alternatively, the Kal V’chomer works as follows: if the weaker Mitzvah, Avodah in the Bais Hamikdash, (actively) supersedes Shabbos, of course executing, which is a stronger Mitzva, can (actively) supersede Shabbos.] So, the Drasha teaches us otherwise.

26) If someone made Chalitza and then gave her Kiddushin, Reish Lakish says she is no longer Kareis to him, but she is Kareis to his brothers. Furthermore, her sister-wives are Kareis to all, both to the one who made Chalitza and to his brothers. It only says the Lav that “you shall no longer build the house” on the brother who does the Chalitza, but the other brothers remain with the same Kareis that they had before she fell to Yibum, (like any other brother’s wife). Also, only the wife that received the Chalitza has the new Lav of not building the house, but all the other wives remain with their original Kareis of being their brother’s wife. R’ Yochanan says that there is no Kareis, not to the one who did Chalitza and not to his brothers. Neither is there Kareis for the wife that he did Chalitza to, and not to any of her sister-wives. After all, since, originally, any brother can do Chalitza to any sister-wife (where they would knock off the Kareis), and now since one brother does it to one wife, all the rest of them have Kareis? So we must say that the brother that performs Chalitza performs it on behalf of all the brothers, and the sister-wife that receives Chalitza receives it on behalf of all the sister-wives. (Therefore, the Torah refers to all of them when giving them the Lav “not to build,” which knocks off the original Kareis.)

27) If someone made Chalitza to his brother’s wife and then gave her Kiddushin. If he dies, Reish Lakish holds that she doesn't need Chalitza from his brothers since she's an Ervah to them. R' Yochanan holds she needs Chalitza from his brothers since she’s only a Lav to them.

28) Even according to Reish Lakish, according to R’ Shimon (who allows brothers born after the first Yibum to make Yibum after the second brother dies), if he has a brother born after the second marriage, he needs to do Chalitza (since he was never forbidden from the first Chalitza). [Tosfos explains why he can't do Yibum: since we have a rule; the Yavam can’t do Yibum if his brother was forbidden to his wife. After all, if she’s forbidden to her husband that she’s usually permitted to, of course she’ll be forbidden to her husband’s brother who she’s usually forbidden to.]

29) If one brother made Yibum with one wife, and a second brother has relations with a sister-wife, there is an argument between R’ Acha and Ravina whether he gets Kareis or it’s only an Asei (the Torah says that only one of the houses gets built, not two). The one who says that he gets Kareis holds like Reish Lakish. The one that says he transgresses an Asei holds like R’ Yochanan (that the new prohibition that knocks off the Kareis applies to all the brothers). [Tosfos explains that the above is Rashi’s text of the Gemara. However, Tosfos says it can't be since we need the Pasuk to teach us not to take two sister-wives for Yibum, so it can't also come to switch the Kareis with an Asei. Rather, R’ Tam and R’ Chananel’s text is that; one holds he transgresses a Lav. When he does Yibum to one wife, the Pasuk of “you shall not build” applies to the sister-wife. Once you didn’t do Yibum to her (but to a different wife), you can no longer take her. Therefore, R’ Yochanan transfers this Lav to the brothers too. Therefore the text could read “if he, or one of his brothers, has relations with the sister-wife, there is a Lav” (since Reish Lakish would say that the sister-wife is still Kareis to the one who did Yibum or Chalitza). However, to Rashi, they could only argue over the brothers (whether they receive Kareis), but everyone agrees the Yavam gets only an Asei (since the Asei explicitly refers to the Yavam taking the sister-wife).]

30) Rav says that a Sotah’s sister-wife is forbidden to the Yavam. Although a Sotah is only a Lav and not an Ervah, the Pasuk calls her Tamai just like it calls an Ervah. So she has the same status as an Ervah regarding Yibum. [Tosfos adds but she doesn’t need Chalitza either, as Rashi says. We only refer to a definite Sotah (that we have witnesses that she committed adultery), but, a woman who we suspect might be a Sotah (since she secluded herself after the husband warned her not to, but we have no definitive proof to it), must receive Chalitza. After all, the Pasuk says that “she secluded herself and became Tamai” refers to a definite Sotah. However it never says Tumah by a suspected Sotah. Although we say that if she secludes herself with the suspected adulterer she becomes forbidden to her husband, to the suspected adulterer and to eat Trumah from the three times it says Tumah by Sotah; one time to forbid the husband, one time to forbid the suspected adulterer, and one time for Trumah; that's because of the chance that she’s truly a Sotah and is considered Tamai. Although the Torah made a woman who we suspect to be a Sotah to have the status as a definite Sotah; it's only regarding stringencys, but not regarding leniencys.]

31) Rav refers to a Torah prescribed Sotah, but a rabbinical Sotah, like when a woman’s husband travels across the sea, and one witness testifies that he died there and she remarries on his word and eventually the husband returns, if the first husband afterwards dies, R’ Shimon says if his brother makes Yibum or Chalitza to her, it exempts her sister-wives from Yibum. [Tosfos says: however, according to his Tanna Kama who says that the brother needs to make Chalitza is anyhow simple since she’s not a Sotah from the Torah, she definitely requires Chalitza, and can't be removed without anything. The Chidush is like R' Shimon that allows Yibum.]

32) [Ri explains: R' Shimon must permit Yibum L’Chatchila, since it’s logical to say that the Tanna Kama agrees that, B’dieved, it’s a good Yibum. The Gemara assumed according to Rav who exempts a definite Sotah even from Chalitza, then we should forbid a rabbinic Sotah from Yibum. However, if you would be able to do Yibum to a Sotah from the Torah, then it's not a question why you can do Yibum L'chatchila to a rabbinical Sotah. Alternatively, Ri explains R’ Shimon permits only B’dieved. The Gemara originally assumed that, if a real Sotah is an Ervah and doesn’t even require Yibum or Chalitza, a rabbinic Sotah's Chalitza should be considered weak enough not to exempt his sister-wife.]

33) [Tosfos says: perhaps, the Torah only makes her like an Ervah to the husband, but not to the adulterer (and he would need to give Chalitza if she marries his brother).]

34) Regarding remarrying someone you divorced that married someone else in between; R’ Yossi b. Kipar said in the name of R’ Eliezer that someone only transgresses this prohibition if she had Nesuin with the second husband and not if she just received Kiddushin. As the Torah says she can’t return to the original husband “after she became Tamai” (marrying someone else, and Tamai connotes having relations with the new husband.) However the Rabanan say that she’s forbidden whether she had Nesuin or Kiddushin. [Tosfos explains: they felt it wasn’t appropriate that the word Tamai should refer to marrying someone else in between, since she was permitted to get married to him.] Once we don’t say the words “after you become Tamai” to refer to marrying someone else, it tells us that there is a prohibition for a Sotah that was known to had have relations. [Tosfos explains: the reason that a Safeik Sota gets Malkos, since the Torah gives a Safeik Sotah the status of a definite Sota when it’s a stringency.]

35) If someone remarries his ex-wife after she married someone else and dies; there's an inquiry if a brother can do Yibum or Chalitza to her sister-wife. Some say that it's simple to R’ Yossi b. Kipar that she doesn't need anything since it says that the remarried ex-wife is Tamai like an Ervah, and the inquiry is only according to the Rabanan. [Tosfos explains: of course they'll need Chalitza since the 'Tamai' in the Pasuk doesn't refer to remarrying an ex-wife.] Do we say that, even when making a Drasha, we can't take P'sukim completely out of their simple meaning [Tosfos: and thus, you shouldn't do Yibum since there is somewhat Tumah by it], or do we say that, once the connotation of Tumah doesn't apply to it, it's completely uprooted from explaining the remarried ex-wife [Tosfos: so you may even do Yibum.] Others explains it: its simple to the Rabanan that once the connotation of Tumah doesn't apply to it, it's completely uprooted. The only inquiry is according to R’ Yossi b. Kipar. Even though it's called Tumah, but perhaps her sister-wife is permitted since there is an exclusion of “she's an abomination,” implying that only her, but not her sister-wife. Or do we say that the exclusion is only to say that her children are not an abomination (and could marry Kohanim), but the sister-wife is an abomination [Tosfos: and is exempt from Chalitza like all Ervahs' sister-wife.]

36) However, according to all, you definitely can't do Yibum to the ex-wife with a Kal V'chomer. After all, since she's forbidden to her husband, who is usually permitted, of course she's forbidden to her husband’s brother, who is usually anyhow forbidden. [Tosfos says: therefore R’ Yossi b. Kipar will hold that she doesn't even need Chalitza, and the Rabanan hold that she needs Chalitza, but can't have Yibum.]

37) R' Nachman b. Yitzchok explains the above inquiry: that Kal V'chomer is not strong enough to affect the sister-wife from having Yibum, but the only inquiry is on the ex-wife. Do we say this Kal V'chomer is strong enough to push the ex-wife from the Mitzvah of Yibum, or not.

Daf 12

38) According to the Rabanan, if he needs to do only Chalitza and not Yibum, he may do Chalitza to either wife, even to the ex-wife. [Tosfos says: even though usually a Chalitza that's Pasul (i.e., that you don't have an option of Yibum), doesn't exempt her sister-wife; that's only ones that are missing in the strength of the connection between her and the Yavam, like if two sisters fall to Yibum, or if she received a Get from the Yavam. However, this ex-wife has a complete connection to her Yavam, so her Chalitza exempts her sister-wife.]

39) If you have two wives to choose to do the Chalitza to, one is already unfit to marry a Kohein, and the other one is fit to marry a Kohein; do Chalitza to the one that's unfit. This is like we say that you shouldn't pour out the water that you got from your well if you don't need it anymore if others can use it.

40) Shmuel holds that the sister-wife of the minor wife who refused her marriage is prohibited just like the minor wife. This is only if she refused one of the Yavam brothers, but if she refused her husband, then her Kiddushin retroactively becomes null, so her sister-wife is permitted to a Yavam. Also, even if she refuses a Yavam, she's permitted to the other brothers, and of course, her sister-wife is permitted to them.

41) The Gemara asks: the reason she's permitted to the other brothers since no action was done between her and them; why doesn't that reason permit the sister-wife to the brother that was refused, since the sister-wife didn't do an action (of refusal) to that brother? [Tosfos asks on this premise. After all, if the wife that refused this brother now becomes like an Ervah, so her sister-wife is forbidden to that brother too like all Ervah's sister-wives.] The Gemara answers: it's a decree not to permit the situation when one of the wives was his daughter who refused her husband. (The only way that she has a rabbinical marriage and can refuse while her father is alive is when his father already married her off earlier, and she was divorced, the Torah doesn't give him permission to marry her a second time.) Although, usually, when someone refuses her husband, her marriage is totally uprooted retroactively that she's permitted to her husband’s father, but here where the refusal of her marriage was after her husband’s death and already fell to Yibum, it looks like she's your brother's wife, and that's why she needs to refuse him. Therefore, her sister-wife has the status of your daughter's sister-wife. This is similar to what we say that if she refuses a Yavum, she's forbidden to their father, since at the husband’s death, she looks like his son's wife, so she's forbidden like a daughter-in-law.

42) R' Assi holds that the sister-wife of an Iylanis is exempt from Yibum. After all, since the Iylanis is his brother's wife that doesn't fall to Yibum, she's an Ervah, and the other wife is an Ervah's sister-wife. This is only when the husband knew about her condition before the marriage and excepted it. However, if he was unaware of her condition, then it was a mistaken marriage, so the sister-wife is permitted to the brothers. [Tosfos says: this isn't similar to the minor refusing her marriage after her husband’s death, since she still needed to do the action of refusing after his death, but the Iylanis's marriage is automatically uprooted. Alternatively, there's not much rumors about a refusal, so people will assume that she's still his daughter's sister-wife, but there are strong rumors of finding her to be an Iylanis, so people know that she's not an Ervah's sister-wife.]

43) Rava says that the Halacha is that they may do Yibum to the Iylanis's sister-wife even if it was known and accepted by her husband. As an Ervah only exempts her sister-wife if she's the type of Ervah that's only forbidden to this brother, but there are people who she may have Yibum with. However, an Iylanis is not similar to them since she's forbidden in all cases to have Yibum. Therefore, we can't extrapolate that her sister-wife is also exempt.)

44) R' Yochanan says that the Halacha is: a sister-wife of a minor wife that refuses, or of an Iylanis, or of an ex-wife that was remarried is permitted for Yibum.

45) R' Meir holds that three women can have relations with cotton to prevent pregnancies. [Rashi explains: they place the cotton in their orifice when they have relations. Tosfos adds: but other women are forbidden to do so because they're destroying seed. They're commanded not to destroy seed despite not being commanded to have children. A proof to this is that we say that they can check themselves many times (by their organ) since it can't let off seed (like when men touch their organ). This implies, that if it would let off seed, it would be forbidden to them. (However, we can reject this proof saying that the Gemara is not saying that they can't let off seed, but just that they're not commanded to let off seed.

However, R' Tam explains: it's forbidden to have relations with the cotton in that place since it's comparable to spilling your seed on wood. Rather, it means that, after relations these women may stick cotton in their orifice to absorb the seed, and it's permitted since he had regular relations even if it can't lead to pregnancy, just like it's permitted to have relations with a minor or with an Iylanis. She doesn't have the prohibition of spilling seed since she's not obligated to have children. Although all women are allowed to do this, but only these women are obligated.] One of them is a pregnant woman since it might make her fetus a 'Sandel' [Rashi explains: if she gets pregnant a second time, it might knock off the original fetus. Tosfos explains: if she's pregnant with twins, perhaps the semen will pass between them and squash one of them.] The second one is a nursing woman, since she might need to wean her baby too early if she gets pregnant and the baby might die. The third is a minor, since she might get pregnant and it might kill her. This refers to a girl from eleven years old until twelve. The Chachumim say that they all should have regular relations and Hashem will have mercy on them, as it says “Hashem guards the fools.”

46) From the above statement, it seems that minors can give birth (since it says that she might die, but she might be able to bring it to birth). However, the Mishna says that you'll never have a mother-in-law that refused her husband, since the fact she has a child shows that she's an adult. As Rabbah b. Levi says that before eleven, she won't become pregnant, but from eleven until when she becomes an adult (assuming at twelve), she'll become pregnant, and she and the child will die. From twelve and on, they'll both live. R' Safra answers: that having children are like having pubic hairs (and she becomes an adult by having a child), [Tosfos says: Rabbah b. Levi is only saying that she'll die if she's not an adult, and that depends on if she gives birth to a viable child. Therefore, it saying that two years before she will eventually become an adult, she won't become pregnant. A year before, she would die in her pregnancy. When she's an adult (i.e., when she's pregnant with a fetus that will eventually live) she'll live through the pregnancy.]

47) Some say that having a child is even greater than begetting pubic hair. After all, R' Yehuda says that she can refuse her husband when she gets pubic hair until the hair gets 'blacker than the white,' agrees that she can't refuse her husband after she gives birth. [Tosfos says: even though there's enough time when she gets pregnant for pubic hairs to turn black before she gives birth, so at the time of birth she wouldn't be able to refuse anyhow; but that's not really true. After all, it's not a time amount, but you actually need for the hair to darken. This would be true if the hairs fell out, she can refuse until she gets the pubic hairs again and have them 'darken'.]

Daf 13

48) R' Zvid answers: we assume that she became an adult when she gave birth (and we assume she had the pubic hairs) so she can't refuse. [Tosfos explains: since it's not common to give birth without them. Granted, usually, we say that pubic hairs before she's twelve is nothing but a wart, but with the combination with giving birth makes her an adult the same way R' Safra holds it makes her an adult before she's twelve even without any hairs. This is not like Rashi who says that R' Zvid holds that hairs make puberty before she's twelve, which is not like we hold as the Halacha. (All Rabbah b. Levi was saying that, if she's a minor, she would probably die in her pregnancy but not that she can't live.)] We can't say to check for pubic hairs, since we're worried that they fell out. Even to those who aren't regularly worried they fell out, would agree here that it might fall out from the birthing pangs. [Tosfos says: you can't even check here before she gives birth since it could have fell out from the pangs of pregnancy.]

49) If the Ervah died or got divorced before the husband’s death, the brother may do Yibum to her sister-wife. Our Mishna implies that this is even if he married the sister-wife before the Ervah died. However, a further Mishna implies that it's only if the Ervah dies before the sister-wife was married. R' Yirmiya says that they argue whether the death of the husband makes them fall to Yibum, and you can do Yibum to the sister-wife if the Ervah wasn't married at that time; or does the marriage make them fall to Yibum, and you can only do Yibum to the sister-wife if the Ervah wasn't sill married to the husband when she got married. Rava explains: they both hold that the death makes the Yibum and don't argue at all. The form of the Mishna is to start with the bigger Chidush, and finish with the smaller Chidush like saying, “and I don't even need to tell you this smaller Chidush.”

50) The Mishna says: all Ervahs that could have refused her husband before her death, but didn't, her sister-wife needs Chalitza, but doesn't get Yibum. This is either like R' Oshiya says, after death, you can only refuse a Maamar (that she received rabbinical Kiddushin from a Yavam), but not to refuse her connection to the Yavam. It could also be like Rami b. Yechezkal that she can't have Yibum because, at the time of his death, she looks like a sister-wife of an Ervah [Tosfos says: but if she refuses her connection to the Yavam, she can marry others without needing Chalitza, but she just can't marry her husband's relatives.]

51) Beis Shammai says that you can do Yibum to an Ervah's sister-wife. It's only Beis Hillel who forbids.

52) R' Shimon b. Pazi says: the reason for Beis Shammai is from the Pasuk of “you shouldn't allow the wife out to a strange man.” He reads it like the 'outer wife' to imply that there is an “inner wife” of an Ervah relative, and yet it says that the outer one can't marry a strange man. (However, Beis Hillel learns that the outer one refers to an Arusa that didn't have Nissuin, and yet she needs Yibum.)

53) Rava says the reason for Beis Shammai: since they hold that one prohibition can't take effect on an item that already has a prohibition on it. Therefore, if the brother that died married his wife first, and at that time she becomes an Ervah for being his brother's wife, and then the live one married her sister, the prohibition of being his wife's sister can't take effect on a woman who's anyhow forbidden to him because of being his brother's wife. Therefore, her sister-wife is not a sister-wife of the Ervah of a wife's sister, so she needs Yibum. [Tosfos says: but you can't say that he can do Yibum to the Ervah; since, if the prohibition of a brother's wife falls off for Yibum, then the prohibition of being a wife's sister will automatically take effect. Therefore, the prohibition of a brother's wife never falls off.]

54) Even if the live brother married his wife first, and her sister is forbidden because she's your sister's wife, even when your brother marries her, she doesn't become forbidden for being your brother's wife. Therefore, since she doesn't have a status of being a brother's wife, she never falls to Yibum to you. Therefore, her sister-wife is considered as a sister-wife of an Ervah not in a situation of Yibum, so she's permitted.

55) Therefore, if you do Chalitza to an Ervah's sister-wife; according to Beis Shammai, she's forbidden to marry a Kohein, and, according to Beis Hillel, she's permitted, since she wasn't even rabbinically obligated in Chalitza. (This is not like R' Yochanan b. Nuri who wanted to enact to do Chalitza to them (so that you'll fulfill both opinions), so Beis Shammai won't consider her as a Yavam marrying out before Chalitza, and Beis Hillel won't consider it as marrying an Ervah.)

56) We learn from the Lav of “Lo Sisgodidu” that you can't wound yourself in anguish over a dead person. [Tosfos says: although, in Sanhedrin, it says that R' Akiva banged himself over the death of R' Eliezer until blood came out; we must differentiate that the Torah only forbids when he cuts himself. Alternatively, he didn't do it in anguish over his death, but on his Torah that's now not here.] We also learn from it that you can't have people making individual groups that practice Halacha differently since it will make it look like two Torahs.

57) However, this seems difficult since we say that the Megila was read on the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth of Adar. Also, R' Yochanan and Shmuel say that Beis Shammai practice like their P'sak (and Rav and Reish Lakish say they didn't). Abaya answered why this is not a problem of “Lo Sisgodidu,” since it's only a problem in the same city, (even if there are two Beis Dins there), but it's not a problem in two cities. [Tosfos says: according to this, the villager can only read early in the village and not in the city. A proof to this is the Yerushalmi that says that you can only have a villager be Moitzie another villager, but a city person can't be Moitzie him since he's not considered obligated at this time. Therefore, since the villagers were experts to read the Megila, they definitely read in the village itself and didn't go into the city to hear all Torah readings.] Rava says that this doesn't answer why Beis Shammai did like themselves since they were a second Beis Din in the same city. Therefore, it's only a problem of “Lo Sisgodidu” if you have one Beis Din in a city, half Paskins like Beis Shammai and half like Beis Hillel. However, if you have two Beis Dins in one place, it's not a problem of “Lo Sisgodidu.”

Daf 14

58) This argument whether Beis Shammai practically did like their opinion can be explained for the time before the Bas Kol that said the Halacha is like Beis Hillel, and even after the Bas Kol. After all, before the Bas Kol, still, perhaps Beis Shammai didn't do like their opinions since Beis Hillel was the majority; or they did like their opinions since they were sharper, which may over-weigh the fact that Beis Hillel was the majority. They can argue after the Bas Kol, if you heed a Bas Kol, or not. [Tosfos explains: the reason we Paskin like the Bas Kol of Beis Hillel and not the Bas Kol of R' Eliezer; either since the Bas Kol of R' Eliezer only came to protect his honor, or since the Bas Kol of Beis Hillel supports the majority (that we shouldn't take in to account the factor that Beis Shammai was sharper), and the Bas Kol of R' Eliezer was against the majority.]

59) According to the Gemara's conclusion, we see that Beis Shammai followed their own opinion.

60) If it's not obvious that someone is doing an action that's arguing with Beis Din, but he may be doing it for a different reason, it's not a problem of “Lo Sisgodidu.”

61) Even though each faction followed their own Halachos, they didn't refrain from marrying into the others; since Beis Shammai informed Beis Hillel which children where a product of an Ervah's sister-wife that had Yibum, and Beis Hillel informed them of the sister-wives themselves who never received Chalitza; and they could avoid marrying them.

62) This is also true in other arguments between them. Like regarding two sisters who married two brothers who died together, if you could do Yibum; or regarding an old Get (that they secluded after the giving and before the Get takes effect). Also, regarding a Safeik married woman [Rashi's first explanation: a minor, which is a Safeik if she'll refuse her husband and retroactively wouldn't be a married woman; in which Beis Shammai holds that she can't refuse him after Nesuin, and Beis Hillel permits. The second explanation: if someone gives a Get on condition, which there's an argument between those who hold she's considers Safeik married between the Get and the fulfillment of the condition, if you need to worry that, if they're secluded, if the witnesses of the seclusion is tantamount to witnesses on having relations and you need to worry that they got remarried. Tosfos doesn't agree with this last explanation, since this Braisa also brings the argument if seclusion after a Get is a Kiddushin.] Also, regarding if they divorce and they eventually occupied the same room in an inn, if we need to worry about a Kiddushin. Also, regarding the amount of money needed for a money Kiddushin (Beis Hillel says a Prutah, and Beis Hillel says a Dinar). They married the other group relying on the fact that they'll inform them if the person had a question in any of these areas. They even married them without asking, since they would offer the information if it was problematic to the other.

63) Also, regarding utensils, Beis Shammai never refrained borrowing from Beis Hillel. [Tosfos says: since they're usually stricter, the Gemara only said it in this way, and not about Beis Hillel borrowing from them. Tosfos points out that this wouldn't be a problem of “Lo Sisgodidu” even if they wouldn't follow their own opinion. since they could refrain from borrowing since it may be that they didn't want to borrow that utensil since they don't need it.] After all, if it was Tamai according to them, Beis Hillel would inform them.

64) R' Yochanan b. Nuri wanted to enact to do Chalitza to them (so that you'll fulfill both opinions, or else Beis Hillel won't consider the children from the Yibum of Beis Shammai Mamzeirm, and Beis Shammai won't consider the children as unfit for Kehuna. [Tosfos says: as we seen soon that they learn it from a Kal V'chomer from a widow to a Kohein Gadol, and doesn't hold of R' Yehoshua's disproof. Alternatively, since we have a Drasha by marrying an ex-wife (who married someone else in between) that she's an abomination, which implies but not her children, contrasting it to a Yavama marrying out before Chalitza that even her children are abominations.] However, R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that it's not a good enactment. After all, then all the children that Beis Shammai allowed Yibum until now will be considered as Mamzeirim, and those sister-wives of Beis Hillel that remarried will now need Chalitza to continue their marriage, which will repulse them to their husbands; and we shouldn't do it since the Torah says that its path is a nice one.

65) R' Yehoshua says that the children of the Yavama marrying out before Chalitza are fit for Kohanim. We don't say the Kal V'chomer from a widow to a Kohein Gadol, that despite that Lav doesn't forbid her to everybody (but just to one person), her daughters are unfit to marry Kohanim, of course by this Yavama. After all, we can disprove it since the widow herself is more strict since she becomes unfit for a Kohein too. [Tosfos says that you can't add this to the Kal V'chomer, that we should say the Yavama is also forbidden to a Kohein, since that only applies to those Kohanic prohibitions (unless there is a Pasuk to forbid them, like having relations to a Ger who's not allowed in the Kahal {Amon, Moav, Egyptian and Adomi}. Also a Kusi, a Challal, a Nisin and a Mamzer.)]

66) Beis Hillel says that we consider an opening in a wall to combine any water to be part of a Mikvah when they're connected by an opening the size of a pipe.[Tosfos says: even without a hole between walls, you only need the water to be the size of a garlic peel above the wall for the width of the size of a pipe (i.e., two finger's width). Although the Gemara in the beginning of Gitten says that a waterfall can't combine regarding Taharah, and the same by a damp area unless it can make another thing wet; it's not to combine to a Mikvah, but just to make the water on the other side Tahor. Alternatively, it's according to R' Yehuda who holds that we view it as the water goes down, so it follows down this damp area down to the Mikvah. However, if it would be level ground, he would agree that it doesn't combine unless the water is the size of a garlic peel for the width of the size of a pipe.] However, Beis Shammai says that the water doesn't combine until most of the wall is broken.

67) If you have a barrel of olives that are letting off their liquid; Beis Hillel says that you need to make a hole in the barrel to drain them so not to Machshir the olives since this initial liquid is Machshir. (However, if it later gets plugged up with sediment, you don't need to worry that the trapped liquid will Machshir.) [Tosfos says: you need to say that this liquid is as thick as what comes out when it gets warm when gathered in a barrel, or that’s squeezed in a container at the press, because R' Shimon holds that anything less than that, like liquid that comes out by the harvest, is not Machshir.] However, Beis Shammai doesn't require to make a hole since it's not Machshir.

68) They didn't sanctify the land of Amon and Moav of the Transjordan (to be part of Eretz Yisrael) when they came up the second time around (to build the second Beis Hamikdash) so that the poor should be able to have support during Shvious. Therefore, (since they decreed to take off Trumah and Maasar there), they need to separate Maasar Ani for that year. This is like we learned that the people going up from Bavel didn't sanctify many cities that those who came up from Egypt sanctified in order for the poor to be supported during Shvious. [Rashi says that this was what Og and Sichon conquered. Tosfos says: although we see that Transjordan needs to keep Shvious; we can say (to answer the first question) that, when we say that Transjordan keeps Shvious, it only refers to the original lands of Sichon, and not what Sichon captured from Amon and Moav, although the Jews sanctify those lands when they came up from Egypt. Alternatively, R' Tam explains: we can refer to the land of Amon and Moav that Sichon never took over and was never incorporated into Eretz Yisrael.]

Daf 16

69) There is an argument if a slave or non-Jew has relations with a Jewish woman, if the child is a Mamzer, or not. [Tosfos says: the main opinion is that he's Kosher. After all, there's an unnamed Mishna in Kiddushin that holds that way. Also, the opinion that considers him a Mamzer is R' Akiva who says that, if you have relations with a woman who is prohibited to you from a regular Lav, the child's a Mamzer. This makes sense by a slave, since they have a Lav. However, this fits well also by a non-Jew. Granted that there is no prohibition from the Torah when done privately; still, since Kiddushin doesn't take effect, the child is a Mamzer. Alternatively, since he's rabbinically prohibited, then the child is a rabbinical Mamzer.]

70) R' Assi holds: if a non-Jew gives Kiddushin to a Jewess these days, you need to suspect that the Kiddushin may be valid since he might have been from the ten lost Shevatim. Although we usually say that anything that separates from its area has the status of the majority, so this person who came to give Kiddushin should have the status of the majority of the world, which is non-Jews; we must refer to a case where he was in an established place. [Rashi explains: and anything that doesn't separate from his area, but remains in that established area, is considered as a fifty/fifty chance. Tosfos disagrees since the simple case is that he went to her to give Kidushin. Rather, it's in an established place where most of the people are from the ten Shevatim.] Shmuel says: you don't need to worry at all about the Kiddushin since all their daughters (of the generation that was exiled) had a hole in their wombs and couldn't give birth. Thus, any child from them was born from a non-Jewess, and the child gets her status of being a non-Jew. Alternatively, they didn't move before they enacted for them to be true non-Jews. [Tosfos explains: however, R' Assi held that the generation's daughters' wombs didn't get punctured, so they're Jews. However, Rashi explains: he holds that when a Jew has relations with a non-Jewess, the child is a Mamzer. Therefore, the child is Jewish. When it says that the child is a non-Jew, that opinion holds that, when a non-Jew has relations with a Jewess, the child is not a Mamzer. [See R' Akiva Eiger who asks that a Mishna in Daf 69b says that the child is a Mamzer, and yet also says that if the mother is a non-Jewess, the child is a non-Jew.]]