Daf 29
74) Rav holds that Chametz on Pesach that mixes into its own type is not Batul at all (since he Paskins like R' Yehuda that something mixed in its own type is never Batul), and it's even forbidden if it's mixed in another type (since they decreed to forbid it when mixed not in its type by a Kareis prohibition since you'll might come to eat it when mixed with its own type, which is forbidden from the Torah). However, after Pesach, it's forbidden when mixed with its own type (since he Paskins like R' Yehuda that Chametz after Pesach is prohibited), but not when mixed in something that's not its type.
75) However, Shmuel holds that, during Pesach, it's only forbidden when mixed in its own type, but not when mixed with other types, and he doesn't enact to forbid when mixed with not its type because you'll might come to permit when mixed with its type. Also, he permits after Pesach even if it's mixed with its type since he holds like R' Shimon that Chametz is permitted after Pesach. R' Yochanan says: if it gets mixed during Pesach, whether it's with its own type or not, it's only forbidden if it gives taste into the food, since he holds like the Rabanan of R' Yehuda that prohibitions are Batul when mixed in its on type. After Pesach, they're all permitted since he holds like R' Shimon.
Daf 30
76) Rava says the Halacha is like Rav that Chametz is not Batul during Pesach whether it's mixed in its own type or not. [Tosfos says: from here, Rashi wants to bring a proof that we Paskin like R' Yehuda who says that it's never Batul when mixed in its own type. However, Tosfos says that we can push the proof off by saying that Rava is Paskining like Rav, but not for his reason (that we Paskin like R' Yehuda), but for another reason, since Chametz is so stringent. R' Tam doesn't have the text that "it's not Batul in the slightest amount." That's also the text in the Bahag and Shiltus. A proof that Rava can't Paskin like R Yehuda, since he says in Chulin that prohibitions are Batul in its own type with a ratio of sixty to one. However, R' Tam wasn't confident to practically Paskin to permit the mixture with sixty.]
Rava also Paskins like R' Shimon that Chametz is permitted after Pesach. Granted, Rava held that R' Shimon fined the one who held Chametz over Pesach that he can't eat it, but that's only when it's intact as is, but not when it's mixed in other food.
77) [Tosfos says: although we say in Mesechta Avodah Zara that wine mixed in other wine is not Batul, it's not because we Paskin like R' Yehuda. Rather, it must refer to Tevel or Yayin Nesech that's anyhow never Batul in its own type. However, this may only be by wine that was actually used as libations before an idol, but for regular non-Jewish wine, it can be Batul in sixty.]
78) Rav held that you need to break the Chametz pots by Pesach. After all, he holds like R' Yehuda that Chametz after Pesach is forbidden, and you can't cook its own type in it after Pesach since it's not Batul. Although the Blios are no longer fresh (after twenty four hours), Rav held that it's still forbidden even if it gives a bad taste. [Tosfos explains: in Mesechta Avoda Zara, Rav held that a mouse that fell into beer forbids the beer. Our Gemara fits in well according to the reason for Rav there: because bad taste still forbids. However, according to the explanation that bad taste doesn't forbid, but a mouse gives good taste in the beer; we must say that it's still forbidden to L'chatchila use bad taste, bur it's only permitted B'dieved after it's mixed. Alternatively, Rav only allows bad taste that are actually bad when they're intact. However, it's forbidden if it was originally good tasting when it was intact, but the absorptions became bad tasting as it stayed in the pot too long.]
79) That, which Rav doesn't hold to leave the pot for after Pesach so that you can cook food that's not the type of the Chametz, which is Batul when it doesn't give taste; we must say that they decreed to forbid it since you'll might come to cook its type in it too. [Tosfos explains why we assume that it would definitely have sixty, since it's uncommon to use a lot of Chametz at once. Tosfos asks: it's forbidden to L'chatchila make prohibitions Batul, even by a rabbinical prohibition, or else it doesn't help to enact it if someone can just add enough permitted food to permit it (unless that rabbinical prohibition is not at all based on any Torah prohibition, like Muktza that we say in Beitza that you can add onto fallen branches on Yom tov so that you may burn it on Yom Tov). Tosfos answers: they were lenient over here since you have two variables to permit, it's a small amount and it gives bad taste (according to the opinion that Rav permits bad tastes). The Ri answers: since it's of earthenware, and if we don't allow it, we would need to break it, it's considered as if it's B'dieved. (Granted we don't allow other rabbinical prohibitions absorbed by earthenware pots, that's because it absorbs a lot of the prohibited food, which is not true by Chametz.)
Tosfos asks on our answer that they forbade not its type since you'll come to permit to cook its type in it, yet, when it came to mixtures after Pesach, Rav doesn't prohibit a mixture not in its type because you'll permit a mixture of its type. Tosfos answers: they didn't need to decree it by mixtures since it's uncommon to fall in a mixture, (but here, you'll be purposely cooking in the pot, so, you need to decree it).]
80) Shmuel permits to keep the pots after Pesach and to cook anything in it, even its own type, since he holds like R' Shimon who permits Chametz after Pesach.
81) You can't knead a dough with milk, and if you do, the bread is forbidden even to eat by itself with salt since you might come to eat it with meat. Also, you can't smear the bottom of an oven with fats, and if you do, the bread is forbidden. [Tosfos says: even though we see that bread baked in the same oven that you're roasting meat can't be eaten with the milky dip Kutach, implying that you can eat it by itself; that's because there it's only forbidden because it absorbs the smell, which doesn't really forbid. This, that we don't allow eating this bread baked with the fats with milk because it's a "Nat bar Nat (second taste)" (since the fats gets absorbed in the floor of the oven, and then it goes into the bread and it's still permitted at that point) like we permit fish that was placed in a meat dish to be eaten with Kutach; it's for the same reason we forbid a radish cut with a meat knife to be eaten with Kutach. As Rashi explains there since there is more taste exiting the knife through cutting the radish than exiting the dish by putting a hot fish on it. So here too, you have more taste coming out by baking in the oven. Therefore, it's also forbidden when you cook fish in a meat pot, and it's only permitted when placing it on a dish. According to Rashi's other explanation, that there is usually some fat on the knife's surface which is actual meat (and not only absorptions), we can say the same here, that we assume there is actual fat still on the oven's floor since it can't get completely wiped up.]
82) However, if you light the oven once, you can bake bread there since it will burn out all the fats. Although Rav forbade all Chametz pots after Pesach and he doesn't allow to just put it in on the fire to Kasher it; we must say that the burning helps only by a metal oven, but not by earthenware. Alternatively, even an earthenware oven can be Kashered with having it fired up since you light it from the inside (where the absorptions are) but a pot has the fire on the outside. It doesn't help to put the coals on the inside since you might come to feel that you need to save the pot from breaking, [Rashi: (and end up not putting coals inside) but rely on the fire on the outside.]
83) Therefore, the heating utensil 'Buchya' (that you bake pancakes on top of the tiles), which the fire is on its outside, can't be Kashered unless you fill the top with coals.
84) If you want to Kasher a knife for Pesach; R' Ashi says you need to put the blade in fire and do Hagala on the handle. However, the Halacha is that both only require Hagala. [Tosfos says: although the Tosefta says that a knife requires fire to Kasher it; R' Tam says that refers to the long knifes used for roasting, and that's why it's listed with a spit. Alternatively, we can be lenient by Pesach since it absorbed when it was permitted (i.e., before Pesach), as R' Ashi himself held in the end of Mesechta Avoda Zara. Although R' Ashi here Kashered it in fire, we must say that he was stringent on himself.]
85) The wooden spoon that you stir a pot needs Hagalah. After all, the same way it absorbs, it will let out the absorptions.
86) A 'Kunya' utensil [Rashi: earthenware that's lead plated] can't be Kashered. Not only the greenish ones that has alum that absorb a lot, but even the black and white ones, even if they're smooth without any cracks. After all, we see that they 'sweat' from the outside when they're cooking, which shows that they absorb, and the Torah testifies that earthenware don't ever leave their non-Kosher state. [Tosfos says: earthenware is permitted when it's returned to the kiln. However, it's never considered as if it leaves its non-Kosher state since, by returning it to the kiln, you're making it into a new utensil. Although, to make an earthenware oven not Tamai, you need to break it in three places, and we don't say that by firing it up, it makes it into a new utensil; since we only say that by a pot which it's not normal to fire up. However, since it's normal to fire up the inside of an oven, it doesn't make it into a new utensil.]
87) The reason they allow a 'Kunya' utensil that absorbed Yayin Nesech, (and you can't say it's because it's only rabbinically forbidden, since they enacted rabbinical prohibitions to parallel Torah prohibitions); since you only use them with cold wine, and not with hot food like here.
88) All utensils that you used for cold Chametz, you may use it for Matza except for where you keep the sourdough, and where you keep a vinegary dip, since their leavening is strong. Not only that, but you can't use a kneading trough for that reason, although it's wide on top and the air inside is well circulated.
89) Abaya held that, when a lender collects his debt, it's considered as if the money was retroactively his from the time of the loan. Rava says that it's only considered his from the time he collected it and on. Everyone holds that if the borrower sold a field between the loan and the collecting, the lender can collect it from the buyer (even if it's not considered his yet), since he has a lien on it. The same applies if the borrower made it Hekdesh, the lender can collect it with just redeeming it with a Dinar. (This redemption is rabbinic so people shouldn't think that Hekdesh can be used without redemption. However, in reality, it's not needed since Hekdesh doesn't stop someone from collecting it when it has a lien unless it was made into a Korban.) The argument is only when the lender makes it Hekdesh before the collection. Abaya says it's considered his retroactively, so, retroactively, when the borrower doesn't pay back by the assigned time, he was Makdish his own item. Rava says: since the borrower has the power to pay money and redeem the field that has the lien, the lender doesn't have possession of the field until he collects it. Therefore, it wasn't his when he made it Hekdesh, so it's not Hekdesh.
Daf 31
90) Reuvein sold a field to Shimon with the responsibility to refund him if creditors collect it from a lien. Shimon didn't pay for the field, but Reuvein accepted the price of the field as a loan to Shimon. Afterwards, Reuvein died, and then one of his creditors came to collect the field because he had a lien on the field from a loan. Shimon paid off the loan so that they shouldn't repossess the field. When Reuvein's orphans come to Shimon to collect the loan he owes for buying the field, they may collect it from him if they don't have any fields from their father. After all, even though their father would need to pay Shimon for paying off the loan (as part of his responsibility to him), but he's not here, and the orphans only need to pay for their father's obligations if he left land to collect. Since he didn't, the orphans are exempt from paying off Shimon, but Shimon still owes money for the loan. [Tosfos says: we don't say that the money Shimon paid to Reuvein's creditors is like payback for the loan for the field. Also, we don't say that the responsibility that Reuvein owes to Shimon says that he's holding the land as collateral (while Reuvein was alive), so he can collect from it if he eventually pays back Reuvein's loan, since it was totally relegated into an unaffiliated loan.]
91) Rava says: if Shimon gives the land as payment for the loan he took for buying the field, he may recollect the land as a payment for the responsibility of Reuvein to refund Shimon for paying back his creditors. After all, the land that orphans collect for the debts to their father, their father's creditors may, in turn, collect from them. (Now, this fits well according to Abaya, since it's as if Reuvein collected it retroactively, and Shimon will now collect land that Reuvein left them. However, according to Rava that it's not collected retroactively, so it should be land that the orphans collected themselves, which the father's creditors can't collect.) We must say that Rava holds like R' Nosson who says that, if Reuvein lends money to Shimon, and Shimon to Levi, Levi equally owes Reuvein as he owes Shimon. Therefore, since this land was owed to Reuvein who owed it back to Shimon, it's as if there is a lien on it to Shimon even if it wasn't in Reuvein's hands at the time. [Tosfos says: this only applies to land that can be used as a lien, so it was considered as it was always in the creditor's possession, since it's designated to collect from. However, moveable items that don't have a lien is not considered in the creditor's possession until it's actually collected. Our Gemara implies that the Halacha is like R' Nosson since Rava holds like him.]
92) Our Mishna says that if a non-Jew lends money to a Jew with the condition to collect his Chametz (if he doesn't pay by a certain day), the Chametz is permitted after Pesach. However, if a Jew lends a non-Jew money with the condition to collect his Chametz (if he doesn't pay by a certain day), the Chametz is forbidden after Pesach.
93) This makes sense according to Abaya since the lender collects it retroactively; however, according to Rava, you need to say that he gave the collateral to the lender to hold (and, at this point, we think that he acquires the collateral).
94) We have a Braisa: if a Jew lend money to a non-Jew on the condition to collect from his Chametz; the Tanna Kama says that he doesn't transgress having Chametz over Pesach, and R' Meir holds that he does transgress it. However, if the non-Jew lends money to a Jew on the condition to collect from his Chametz, everyone agrees that he transgresses the Lav. The Gemara establishes the argument that they both agree that, when he collects, he owns it from this time and on, but not retroactively, and the case is that the Chametz collateral was given over to the lender to hold. Although R' Yitzchok says that the lender acquires the collateral (and that's why it's consider a kindness to return it when the borrower needs it), that was only said when a Jew lends another Jew, but a non-Jew doesn't acquire it from a Jew. Therefore, when the non-Jew lends to the Jew and receives the Chametz of collateral, he doesn't acquire it and the Jew transgresses having Chametz. The Tanna Kama says that the same is true when the Jew lends to the non-Jew, he doesn't acquire the collateral from him. However, R' Meir holds; if the Jew can acquire the collateral from a Jew, of course he should acquire it from a non-Jew and therefore he transgresses having Chametz. Although our Mishna seems to say that the Jew doesn't transgress when he gives the collateral to the non-Jew, we must say the case of the Mishna refers to a case where the Jew tells him that he'll acquire the collateral from the time it's given over to him.
95) [Tosfos explains: even though our Sugya refers to giving the collateral at the time of the loan, and R' Yitzchok says that the lender only acquires the collateral that was given after the loan took place; we must say that the logic is, if you acquire it completely after the loan, you should have somewhat an acquisition at the time of the loan to be considered "found in his hands" to transgress the Lav of having Chametz.]
96) [Rashi says that the lender acquires it enough that he's responsible to anything that happens to it, even if it was beyond his control to stop it (i.e., an Onness). However, Tosfos disagrees. After all, the Gemara in Bava Metzia says that he's not obligated to pay more than a paid watchman. Here, since he does except responsibility for the Chametz like a paid watchman, he transgresses the prohibition of having Chametz even if it belongs to a non-Jew.]
97) [Tosfos explains the Braisa according to Abaya (since the Gemara explains it only according to Rava): it refers to a case where the borrower paid back, so it's not considered as if it's retroactively collected. Therefore, the only reason he'll transgress the Lav is because; having the collateral itself is considered like it's his, as R' Yitzchok said.]
98) If you have a store that, it and its inventory, belongs to a Jew even though its workers are non-Jews, the Chametz found in them after Pesach is forbidden since we assume it belongs to the owner and not the workers. If you have a store that, it and its inventory, belongs to a non-Jew even though its workers are Jews, the Chametz found in them after Pesach is permitted since we assume it belongs to the owner and not the workers.
99) If rubble fell on Chametz, it's considered as if it's destroyed. R' Shimon b. Gamlilel says that it's only if a dog can't dig after it, which you need to have three Tefachim of rubble on top of the Chametz so that the dog can't smell it. However, you still need to Mevatel the Chametz since it might get exposed over Pesach.
100) However, if you're given money to watch, which you would need to keep underground, you don't need it to be three Tefachim deep, since it is not applicable to be worried that someone may smell it. Therefore, it's enough for it to be a Tefach deep.
Daf 32
101) There's an inquiry if a non-Kohein eats Trumah and needs to replace it, does he replace it according to its worth or according to its size. If the amount that he ate was originally worth four Zuzim, and when he's coming to pay back, that size was only worth a Zuz, it's simple you need to pay back four Zuzim worth. After all, it's no worse than a robber who needs to pay according to the worth when he steals it. [R' Akiva Eiger asks; since replacing Trumah is not a payment, as you can't pay money, nor can the replacement be forgiven by a Kohein, so how can you compare it to the payment of stealing?] The inquiry is only if it was originally worth a Zuz, and when you come to replace it, it's worth four Zuzim.
102) We have a Braisa: if someone ate Trumah of dried figs, and he pays back with dates, he gets a blessing. It's not necessarily because dates cost more, and since you replace the same size, you're getting a blessing since you're replacing with a greater worth. Rather, it could be that you're replacing it with a smaller amount of dates that's worth the same as the dried dates that he ate. However, the blessing comes from the fact that he ate something that is not in big demand, and replaced it with fruit with more demand, (and can be sold faster).
103) Therefore, if someone forgetfully ate Trumah Chametz on Pesach, according to the side that you pay according to the size, you can replace it plus a fifth. However, according to the side that you pay according to the worth, since it's worthless, since it's forbidden to have pleasure from it, you pay nothing (unless you hold like R' Yossi Haglili who holds it's permitted to have pleasure from Chametz).
104) According to R' Yossi Haglili, if someone eats Trumah Chametz on purpose (which he's not obligated in an extra fifth or bring an Ashum, but he only pays like a regular robber), if you hold like R' Nechunya b. Hakaneh who says that, if someone does something that's Chayiv Karies, he's exempt if he does another thing at the same time that obligates money (since you can only give the stricter punishment); he doesn't need to replace the Trumah since he gets Kareis for eating Chametz on Pesach.
105) The Gemara concludes that this is a Tannaic argument. R' Akiva and R' Elazar b. Yaakov held that you pay according to the worth, and since Chametz doesn't have worth, you pay nothing. R' Yochanan b. Nuri says that you need to pay, since you pay according to size. R' Elazar b. Chasma holds he needs to pay since he holds like R' Yossi Haglili.
106) The Tanna Kama says that a Yisrael doesn't pay the extra fifth to the principle unless he ate a Kazayis of Trumah, as the Pasuk says "he eats" and eating is not with less than a Kazayis. Abba Shaul says it's with a Pruta's worth, as the Pasuk says "he gives," and giving is not with less than a Prutah [Tosfos explains: when it's coming as a payment like here, and by giving back for stealing. However, by separating Trumah (that a kernal of wheat can exempt a whole pile), or giving a utensil for Chalifin, or giving a Get, it doesn't need to be a Prutah even though the Torah writes 'giving' in those places.]
107) Although it says 'eating' according to Abba Shaul; that just teaches us that it excludes damaging the Trumah, that you only pay when you eat it. Although it also says "giving' to the Tanna Kama, that's only to teach us that you need to give something that could be Kodesh (i.e., Trumah). [Tosfos says: this excludes money and fruit that are not fit to be eaten as Trumah.]
108) According to Abba Shaul, you don't need both variables, that the Trumah is worth a Prutah and is the size of a Kazayis. Although R' Pappa originally held this way, he reversed his position, and we also found a disproof from a Braisa to that effect.
109) We learn from a Drasha that you're exempt from Meila if you purposely had pleasure from Hekdesh. Originally, a Braisa tried to extrapolate from other sins that have the punishment of Kareis, and yet is exempt from a Chatos when done on purpose, so, of course Meila that doesn't have Karies should be exempt when done on purpose. However, the Braisa rejects it since it has the punishment of Misah Biydei Shamayim. The Gemara asks that Misah is less than Karies. The Gemara explains: what we mean is; that it has the punishment of Misah for less than a Kazayis. [Tosfos says: the Gemara could have also reject it by saying that Misah's leniency makes it a reason to pay, since it's not such a bad sin, perhaps we allow him getting an atonement through paying. Also, it could have rejected it since there are four cases where someone brings a Korban for doing a sin purposely.]
The Gemara asks: the opinion that there is Misah by Meila is Rebbi since he learns it from Trumah that's only with a Kazayis [Tosfos: i.e., one only gets Misah for eating a Kazayis of Trumah. Even if you say that when we extrapolate, we extrapolate from one Halacha, and then apply it to the rules of the other Halacha, and since one needs to pay for Meila for a Prutah, you might say that we should say the same for eating. However, since we only know there is Misah by eating is from Trumah, you need a Kazayis for Meila too.] R' Pappa answers: perhaps Rebbi holds like Abba Shaul that eating Trumah is also with a Prutah. This is the proof that R' Pappa reversed his position and holds that Abba Shaul doesn't need a Kazayis along with the Prutah.
Daf 23
110) Mar b. Raveina held that the Braisa's rejection is as follows: for other sins, you're not Chayiv for unintended actions as intended actions. As, if your intentions on Shabbos is to cut a detached vegetable, you're exempt even if it came out that it was attached to the ground [Tosfos points out: this refers to intending to cut one vegetable that you thought was detached, but was really attached. After all, it can't be that you intended to cut one vegetable that was detached and it came out that you ended up cutting another vegetable that was detached, since you would be exempt in that case even if they're both attached.] However, you're Chayiv for Meila if you intended to warm your hand with Chulin wool fleece and it came out that it was Hekdesh fleece.
111) R' Nachman b. Yitzchok explains the Gemara's rejection: for all other sins, you're not Chayiv when you're your not paying attention to what your doing (Misaseik) like you were paying attention. Therefore, if you thought you're lifting a detached vegetable, but you lifted an attached one, and therefore, detached it, you're exempt. However, by Meila, if you stick your hand into a utensil to lift out an item, but there was Hekdesh oil in it and you had pleasure from it, you're Chayiv. [Rashi says: however, he holds that you're Chayiv for Mar b. Raveina's case when you intend to cut it, since you're doing you're intention to cut.]
112) Everyone holds, regarding Trumah Chametz, that if you separate it when it's Chametz, it's not even Trumah. After all, the Torah says "you give him," and not just to give it to his fire. Although we see that you can separate Trumah from Tevel Tamai (as we see that you can't separate Trumah from Tamai Tevel so to permit Tahor produce not to be Tevel, but if you B'dieved do, it's Trumah) even though you can only burn it; that's because there was a time that it was possible that it could be eaten since it was not Tamai at the time of the harvest (like in a case where the harvesters were not Tamai). [Tosfos points out: we only need the Drasha "give to him" and not to his fire according to R' Yossi Haglili who says that you can have pleasure from Chametz on Pesach, but according to the Rabanan, it's covered in the Drasha "to give" that it needs to have the ability to be Kodesh. However, everyone agrees that we need the Drasha "give to him" and not to his fire for Trumah Tamai (when the harvesters were Tamai).] However, here, we refer to wheat that became Chametz when it was still attached to the ground.
113) However, R' Huna b. R' Yehuda says we learn from the Pasuk 'first (i.e., Trumah)' that there must be seconds, i.e., leftovers that become permitted. However, this can't be true by Chametz even according to R' Yossi Haglili, since it wasn't forbidden to have pleasure from it before you separated Trumah, and it's not permitted to eat after the separation. Therefore, there is no produce that becomes anymore permitted after the separation than before the separation. (So, even Chametz that wasn't always Chametz can't be Trumah.) [Tosfos says: although we say by Trumah Tamai that you can't burn it before separating, so separating will give the permission to use it as fuel; but that's only by Tamai Trumah since we have a Drasha that it should be like Tahor, that the permission to consume it only comes after separating, but we don't have a source to forbid it by Chametz.]
114) R' Yochanan held that the juice in the fruit is just contained in the fruit (but is not part of the fruit). Therefore, even if the fruit is Tamai, the juice is not Tamai. Therefore, you can squeeze the fruit less than an egg-size at a time (which is smaller than the Shiur that can make the juice Tamai when it leaves), and the wine is fit for libations on the Mizbeach. Although this should be true by an exact egg-size too, since after you start squeezing, the volume will be less than the size of an egg, but the rabbis forbade to squeeze with an exact egg size since you'll might come to permit with more than an egg size too.
115) However, R' Chisda holds that the liquid is absorbed in the fruit, and is part and partial of the fruit. therefore, if the fruit is Tamai, the juice is also Tamai.
116) According to R' Chisda, that which we have a Braisa that says; if a Tamai person squeeze fruits the size of an egg, the juice is Tahor; it must refer to fruits that wasn't Muchsher yet. It only gets Muchsher after you start squeezing, and at that time it's less than the size of an egg (and it's not susceptible to Tumah). [Tosfos says: from here, it seems that a food can't become Tamai from the Torah unless it's the size of an egg, or else, after you squeezed a little, the fruit will become Tamai which will make the juice absorbed in it Tamai (since we're explaining R' Chisda who holds it's part of the fruit). This is not like how Rashi says that the Shiur of an egg size is only to make other items Tamai, but it can become Tamai even with the smallest amount. However, we can explain our Gemara that the reason the fruit doesn't become Tamai because food can't become Muchsher if it's less than the size of an egg. However, there are many other Gemaras that infer that it can't become Tamai if it's less than the size of an egg, and even Rashi reversed his position.]
117) According to R' Yochanan, that which we forbid Trumah Tamai of grapes and strawberries, and we don't just allow squeezing less than a egg-size at a time because, since it's a long process, it will come to someone stumbling and eat the Tamai Trumah. However we allow to leave bread and oil to use for fuel and we're not worried that someone will eat it; that's because you can throw the bread among your wood, and put the oil in a disgusting utensil, which will discourage eating them.
118) Regarding Tamai wheat kernels; R' Huna says that you can't keep it around to use it as fuel since it's not disgusting, so you might come to stumble to eat it. R' Yochanan permits wheat since they can be cooked and be made disgusting. [Rashi says: however, R' Huna held that you can't rely on that since you might come to eat it before, or at the time of, the cooking. However, R' Tam says that the Gemara's text implies that it's only permitted if it's presently in a state of being cooked and disgusting, but not that you can L'chatchila cook it and make it disgusting (so there is no argument). This would reconcile a contradiction from Mesechta Bechoros and Mesechta Trumos if you need to leave Trumah Tamai to rot, or do you burn it as fuel; that you leave it to rot if it's not disgusting at the moment, but you burn it as fuel if it's already disgusting.]
Daf 34
119) [Tosfos points out: a Yisrael can't have pleasure from Trumah if it gets destroyed in the process, like burning. Otherwise, he may have pleasure from it.]
120) There is a Mishna that says: if you plant Trumah Tamai, the crop is Tahor, but it can't be eaten, and assumingly, it means it's forbidden to a Yisrael. The Gemara asks: what does this mean? After all if it's to teach us that the produce has a status of Trumah, we already know it from another Mishna that says "the produce of Trumah has the status of Trumah.' If you want to say; I might think that's only when the planted item doesn't disintegrate (like planting onions that the original onions stays, but other onions grow out of it) and what originally grows from it, but not what grows from what grows from it wouldn't be Trumah. [Rashi explains: new growths that were never there at the time it was Trumah, like new branches out of a cabbage's stalk, or the widening of the leaves. Tosfos explains: after it grew new produce, you plant the new seeds; and that's also what's brought in the Yerushalmi.] That can't be, since we can learn that out of another Mishna that Tevel planted is only Tevel if the planted item doesn't disintegrate, and in that case, even what grows from what grows from it is Tevel, and of course, the same would apply by Trumah.
121) [Tosfos says: the reason they enacted that what grows from Trumah has the status of Trumah so that the Kohein shouldn't keep it around to plant it, and he'll come to stumble and eat it in the meantime while it's Tamai. Although they didn't forbid it to the Kohein, still, he won't keep it around to plant since he doesn't gain much, since most people can't eat it, so, its value is not worth much. Although the Tosefta in Taharos considers it regular Chulin, that's only regarding Leket Shichicha and Peah (and if a poor Yisroel collects it, he must sell it to a Kohein). After all, since it's Chulin from the Torah, we shouldn't remove these obligations to the poor. Although the Mishna in Bikurim says that it's permitted to non-Koheins, that's only to non-Jews. (Marhrsha- and he still won't keep it around to sell it to non-Jews since there is still not much gain once it's forbidden to all Yisraelim).]
122) R' Sheishes answers (why we need the extra Mishna that planted Trumah is Trumah); it teaches us that it's even forbidden to a Kohein according to Reish Lakish. After all, he says that Kodesh becomes intrinsically Pasul with Hesech Hadaas (when you stop paying attention to it), and you stop paying attention to the Trumah after you planted it. Even if Eliyahu comes and says that it never became Tamai, it's still Pasul. However, according to R' Yochanan who says that it's only Pasul since it might have touched Tumah in the meanwhile, but if Eliyahu came and said it's Tahor it would be Kosher; so, since the planting will make anything Tamai to be Tahor, the Mishna is still difficult.
123) R' Yishmael the son of R' Yochanan b. Broka held that you need Pasul Kodshim to "change its form" (by leaving it overnight) to burn it, and you throw it, in the meanwhile, in a small compartment between the ramp and the Mizbeach. This fits well according to R' Yochanan that you don't burn it after you throw it there, since Eliyahu can always come an say it's Tahor. However, it's difficult to Reish Lakish since the meat's intrinsically Pasul, you should burn it right away. After all, we learn that you burn it right away when the P'sul is in the meat and not in the blood, or that the owner died. [Tosfos explains: even if the P'sul happen through the blood, or that the owner dies (and is not a problem with the meat); once you throw it in the compartment, you have Hesach Hadaas and the meat is Pasul.] We must say that it holds like the Braisa quoted by Rabbah b. Avuha that says that you need to "change its form" for even Pigul, that's intrinsically Pasul, and the same would apply to Hesecha Hadaas.
124) R' Yirmiya answers (why we need the extra Mishna that planted Trumah is Trumah); it teaches us that even Kohanim can't eat it since planting doesn't make Kodshim renewed (and the same applies to Trumah). Therefore, water designated for the libations on the Mizbeach during Sukkos that became Tamai, it only helps to 'plant it' (i.e., to connect it to a Mikvah and momentarily becomes part of the Mikvah and becomes Tahor); that's only before they are Mekadesh the water. However, after he's already Mikadesh it, 'planting' doesn't help since the rabbis gave an extra stringency to Kodshim.
125) The Gemara has an inquiry if these strictnesses were only said when something is made Kodesh in a Kli Shareis, or even if it was made Kodesh with your mouth (i.e., you designate it for Hekdesh, even if it wasn't put in a Kli Shareis). The Gemara wants to bring a proof from what R' Yochanan allows to squeeze Tamai grapes to make Tahor wine (for the Nesachim) since the juice is not part of the fruit, or it would also be Tamai, but just contained within the fruit. However, this is only if it's squeezed before it was Hekdesh, but if you Makdish the grapes before squeezing, they had a strictness by Hekdesh that we consider the juice as it's absorbed in the fruit (and is part of the fruit). This should prove that these strictnesses apply even by designating with your mouth, since you can't Mekadesh it in a Kli Shareis until after it was made into wine. The Gemara rejects this proof. Perhaps the Kodesh here refers to Trumah, and since the optimum Kodesh of it is through your mouth, it's comparable to regular Kodshim that was Mekadesh in a Kli Shareis.
126) He also only allows it if it's squeezed less than a Beitza at a time, or else the wine will become Tamai as it leaves the grapes and touch those Tamai grapes. Also, when you need to squeeze it less than a Beitza is only if the grapes are at least a Sheini, and that will make the wine coming out into a Rishon (like all liquids that touch Tumah). However, if the grapes are a Shlishi, since they can't make Trumah Tamai, it doesn't make the liquid a Rishon.
127) Rava says that we find a Braisa that says; the Pasuk by Para Aduma says "you put the living water in the utensil," which teaches us that the water needs to get its living straight from the river (i.e., you need to draw the water out of the river). Yet, the Pasuk calls it a taking as if its detached from the river. Rather, we must say that it's an extra strictness to take it straight from the river [Rashi says even though it technically should be taken from a bucket of water, so the rabbis put an extra stringency that the water must be drawn straight from the river even if it's only made Kodesh from his mouth], so too, this is an extra strictness [Rashi: that there is no 'planting' water (into a Mikva) by Hekdesh. However, Tosfos held Rashi's explanation to be difficult. Rather, Tosfos explains: although the Torah cares that the water comes straight from a river, the Torah calls it drawing as "putting it in the utensil" as if it's detached. Therefore, the Torah doesn't consider water attached to a Mikvah as part of the Mikvah by Hekdesh. The same applies by Trumah since there is no planting by Hekdesh.]
Daf 35
128) We even see that the Torah makes extra stringencys for Kodshim as it forbids someone with Kodshim even after he went to the Mikvah for a Tumah and after the sunset if he still needs to bring a Korban. We also see that the Torah made wood and frankincense to be susceptible to Tumah by Kodshim, although since they're not food, they're not regularly susceptible to Tumah.
129) If meat become Tamai or Pasul, or if it was carried outside the Mechitzos of the Mikdash; R' Eliezer says that you still should sprinkle the blood on the Mizbeach (since he doesn't require meat to be existent to L'chatchila finish the bringing of the Korban, only blood). R' Yehoshua says that you L'chatchila can't sprinkle (since you also need the meat to be existent), however, if you do sprinkle, the Tzitz makes the meat considered enough fit to make the Korban Kosher even though it's Tamai. [Rashi: explains even if the meat was taken out, since the meat exists, but it's not fit for a technicality (that it was removed), it's Kosher. Tosfos: we must say that he holds like R' Akiva who holds that sprinkling the blood removes the meat from the prohibition of Meila (when it's removed from the Mikdash), so, of course he'll hold that it would make the Korban accepted (by considering the meat existing as Kosher). After all, we see that R' Eliezer says here that the sprinkleing of the blood makes the Korban accepted, but holds that it doesn't take the meat out of Meila. (Maharam explains: it shows it's easier to make a Korban accepted than to take the meat out of the prohibition of Meila.)]
This case that the meat is Pasul (that's not Tamai or was carried out of the Mikdash), according to R' Yochanan, it could mean that it became Pasul by not paying attention to it (since it's only Pasul because it might be Tamai). However, according to Reish Lakish it can't be. After all, he holds that it becomes intrinsically Pasul and the Tzitz won't make it accepted. Rather, it must mean that it was touched by a Tvul Yom.