Daf 21

1) You're permitted to put your Chametz during the fifth hour before your wild animals and we're not afraid that it should be prohibited since they hide the leftovers. (However, domestic animals don't have this problem since they leave the leftovers where they ate, so the owner can come back to burn it.) [Tosfos says: we must say that he doesn't hold that it hides it so much like a weasel does (in cracks and holes). After all, we see in the first Perek that you need to place the Chametz left for the next day in a place that's not accessable to a weasel so that the weasels don't take it.] You also may feed your domestic animal even though they'll leave the leftovers out in the open and you'll might forget to burn it and it would lead to transgressing Baal Yirah [Tosfos explains; if he didn't make a Bitul. We could have also said that there is a problem, (even with a Bitul), that he might see it and come to eat it.] (However, wild animals don't have this problem since they hide the leftovers, so the owners won't transgress Baal Yirah. [Tosfos adds that they won't either transgress Baal Yatmin, not to hide the Chametz. After all, since you didn't hide it and you don't know where it is, you don't transgress it since it's not "found by you" until you actually find it.])

2) Beis Hillel allows selling Chametz to a non-Jew. Beis Shammai forbids unless you know that it will be eaten before Pesach. R' Yehuda b. Beseira holds that you can't sell the milky dip Kutach unless you sell it thirty days before Pesach. [Rashi says: he holds like Beis Shammai. Therefore, he forbids as long as it's the time of getting rid of the Chametz, which is thirty days before when we start Darshing Hilchos Pesach. R' Tam explains that he can hold like Beis Hillel. However, since people can tell who made the Kutach, so anyone who sees it by the non-Jew will assume that the Jew sold it to the non-Jew on Pesach, either by himself, or through a non-Jewish agent. This would be prohibited even according to R' Tam who holds that you may keep Kutach (that's Chametz Nuksha) through Pesach, but it's forbidden to sell it on Pesach to a non-Jew (Mahrsha- since you're forbidden to have pleasure from it.)]

3) If you scorch it before the time it becomes prohibited, you may keep it even after the time that Chametz became forbidden. [Tosfos says: if the scorching makes it inedible that a dog can't eat it. This is just like the condition that we allow moldy bread.]

4) If the time that the prohibition take effect passes, it's forbidden to partake pleasure from the Chametz. Even if it passes the rabbinical prohibited time, it's prohibited that, if you Mikadesh a woman with it, the Kiddushin doesn't take effect at all. [Tosfos says: it's forbidden to sell it, but if you sell the Chametz, the money you received for it doesn't get the prohibition and you can use the money.]

5) You can't use the Chametz after that time to fuel an oven. This is even true according to R' Yehuda who says that the Mitzvah of ridding yourself from Chametz is through burning, [Tosfos: and all prohibitions that need to be burnt, you can have pleasure from the ashes] so I might think you can also have pleasure through the burning, so we're taught otherwise. [However, the Rabanan who say that it's from the prohibitions that are buried, which if burnt, their ash is still forbidden; of course you can't have pleasure when it burns.]

6) R' Meir learns the Pasuk "to a Ger Toshev give and sell to a non-Jew" that you may sell or give Neveila to a Ger Tosheiv or a regular non-Jew. R' Yehuda learns that it's only as the simple prescription of the Torah; you must give it to a Ger Tosheiv, and you must sell it to a non-Jew. However, everyone holds that, if you have a choice, you must give it to a Ger, who you're obligated to support, before you sell it to a non-Jew, who you're not obligated to support.

Daf 22

7) There is an argument whether Chulin that was Shechted in the Azara of the Mikdash is forbidden from the Torah, or not. [Rashi says: whether it's forbidden to partake pleasure from it or not. Tosfos says: we see from many places that it would even be permitted to eat.]

8) There is an Amaraic argument when the Torah says "don't eat," if it's also saying that it's forbidden to have pleasure from it also (unless the Torah explicitly permits pleasure). We see that it's permitted to partake pleasure from Gid Hanashe, since you can send a complete thigh to a non-Jew. [Tosfos explains: the reason that you don't have a problem with the prohibition to give a gift to a non-Jew, since you're giving it to a neighbor, it's like you sold it to him since it causes good will between you. You may even give it to the non-Jew even according to R' Yehuda who says that the prohibition of Gid Hanashe was given to the children of Noach; it only meant to the children of Yaakov (before Matan Torah). After all, you can't say that originally the prohibition was by non-Jews (and is still prohibited), since it wasn't repeated by Sinai (and the rule is that, any Mitzvah given before Matan Torah, in order that it should apply to non-Jews after Matan Torah, the Torah must repeat it by Sinai.)] The reason it's permitted to have pleasure from it: since, when the Torah permitted to have pleasure from Neveila, it included all of its parts, including the forbidden fats and Gid Hanashe. However, this is only according to those who hold that Gid Hanashe is edible, and it's included in the prohibition of Neveila, but not according to R' Shimon who says that it's not really edible, and the truth is, we see R' Shimon holds that it's forbidden to have pleasure from it. [Tosfos says; according to those who say that the prohibition "don't eat" only means not eating, but you can have pleasure from it, the reason R' Shimon holds Gid is forbidden to partake pleasure from it is from logic. Since it's not really edible, it's not logical that the Torah is only forbidding to eat it, but we should assume that it refers to forbidding pleasure also. Alternatively, that Amorah agrees that R' Shimon disagrees with him, but he's only saying it according to the other opinions.]

9) Even though it says "don't eat blood," everyone agrees it's permitted to have pleasure from it since there's a Hekish from it to water. Just like water is permitted, so too is blood permitted. (According to the opinion that "don't eat" only forbids eating; the reason we need a Hekish to water is to say that only blood that spills on the ground like water is Machsher, but not blood of Kodshim that is caught in a utensil.)

10) The reason that Aiver Min Hachai (i.e.,a limb off a live animal) is permitted to have pleasure from, as we see that the only reason you can't give it to a non-Jew is because it's a stumbling block (since it's forbidden to non-Jews), implying that you may give it to dogs; that's because it has a Hekish to blood. [Tosfos says: if it would be forbidden to partake pleasure from, even if it would be permitted to a non-Jew, you can't even give it to him for free since you're getting good will in return. Tosfos asks: the Gemara in Bava Metzia says that a proof that paining animals is not prohibited from the Torah since we forbid someone to help a collapsing donkey that's carrying Yayin Nesach; implying that if the Torah forbids paining an animal, you would need to help it even though you're getting good will from what's forbidden from the Torah to have pleasure. Tosfos answers: since your intent is to save the animal from pain, it's what we'll permit later, when you don't intend for the sin and it's impossible to do the needed action in another way. Alternatively, we would only allow it if the non-Jew is not there so it wouldn't cause any good will.] According to the opinion that all prohibitions that say "don't eat" doesn't forbid partaking pleasure, the reason we need the Hekish to blood to prohibit blood that comes from a living animal (like when you blood let it).

11) The reason we need a Pasuk to forbid from taking pleasure from a killing ox (that needs to be stoned), although we have a Pasuk that says "don't eat the meat" (even if you Shecht it before it was stoned); it's in order to forbid the skins too (that's not included in not eating the meat).

12) R' Shimon Hamsuni separated himself from Darshening all the times it says 'Es' in the Torah since he didn't want to compare anything to Hashem in the Pasuk "Es Hashem Elokecha Tirah." However, R' Akiva Darshens it to include a Talmid Chachum.

13) It says thrice Arlah in the Pasuk. One to forbid having pleasure from it. One to forbid using it as a dye [Tosfos: and we don't say that it's only for color and it's not considered as if it exists.] One comes to forbid lighting it [Tosfos: and I might thing it would be permitted since it's the way you're supposed to get rid of it, so we're taught otherwise. According to the opinion later that we don't consider the gain of the wood used for fuel as if it's in the bread it baked (and even if the wood is forbidden to have pleasure from, the bread is still permitted); we must say here that 'it is forbidden to have pleasure" refers to oils. That's considered more existing at the time of burning than wood used to bake bread. After all, there, the wood needs to be burned into coals before you bake on it.]

14) The Rabanan say that the word "you plant" by Arlah describes an individual. When the Torah says afterwards "to you' in the plural, it comes to forbid a tree that belongs to the public. R' Yehuda says: they both connote public, and the rule is: two inclusions are not coming to include it, but to exclude it. Therefore, a public tree is exempt from Arlah. [Rashi says that if it grows in the public domain. However Tosfos says: in that case, everyone agrees is exempt, as the Mishna says in Mesechta Arlah. Rather, Tosfos says: R' Yehuda allows it if it was planted in private property for the public to take.]

Daf 22

15) Those who trap animals, and an unkosher animal came into his trap, he may sell it to a non-Jew. However, he can't try to trap unkosher animals in the first place. [Tosfos says: you can raise horses and donkeys to sell since it's only forbidden to trap them for food. This, in Bava Kama, that we need a special curse to forbid people to raise pigs, (and we don't say that it's anyhow forbidden because it's not Kosher), since they wanted to strengthen the prohibition by pigs with a curse. Alternatively, even if you're raising them for their oils (to lubricate, or for a lamp) and for their skins. Alternatively, even if it comes his way without buying them, like if he inherited them, even so, he can't raise them.]

16) This, that we need a Pasuk to permit forbidden fats to do all types of work with it, R' Yossi Haglili says that it comes to permit everyone to use it (and not only for Hashem's use by bringing it on the Mizbeach). However, R' Akiva says that we don't need it to permit to take pleasure from it. Rather, it's needed to say that even the fats of a Neviela is not Tamai and you can use it for all work, even of Hekdesh. You don't need to say that they argue whether a regular "don't eat" is also forbidden in pleasure or not (that R' Yossi Haglili says it does, so you need the Pasuk here to permit, and R' Akiva holds it doesn't so we assume that it's permitted to take pleasure from it). Rather, everyone holds that it's forbidden to take pleasure from it, but R' Akiva holds that we know that fats are permitted to partake pleasure from it from the fact that the Torah permits a Neviela, which includes the forbidden fats and its Gid. However, R' Yossi Haglili doesn't hold of that and, when the Torah permits a Nevila, it doesn't permit the forbidden fats and Gid. [Rashi says: therefore, he holds that you don't need a Pasuk to say that it's not Tamai since it's not part of the Neveila. However, Tosfos says: it's definitely part of the Neveila and you would need a Pasuk to make it Tahor. Rather, he holds that when the Torah permits a Neveila, it's only those parts that the Torah would have permitted if it wasn't a Neveila, but not the fats or Gid.]

17) Therefore, R' Yossi Haglili needs our Pasuk to permit pleasure from fats. Regarding Gid; either he holds that it's permitted to have pleasure from a Kal V'chomer from fats, that are permitted even though it has a punishment of Kareis. [Tosfos says: although there are many prohibitions that are forbidden in partaking pleasure from and don't have Kareis; but we must say that the Kal V'chomer is: just like we see from this Pasuk that fats are included in what we permit by Neviela, so, of course, Gid should be included too.] Alternatively, he holds like R' Shimon that it's forbidden to have pleasure from Gid. He wouldn't hold of the aforementioned Kal V'chomer since Gid is more stringent than fats since it's forbidden even in wild animals. The one who holds of the Kal V'chomer says that the Kal V'chomer is valid to permit the Gid in a domestic animal. [Tosfos explains: if it's not forbidden to have pleasure from a domestic animal, then the prohibition of Gid wasn't said on pleasure, so it would also be permitted by a wild animal.]

18) The practical difference between the opinions if a Lav of "don't eat" includes forbidding partaking pleasure or not is whether Chulin that was Shechted in the Azara is forbidden. After all, the one who says that it includes forbidding pleasure from it, he learns it from the Pasuk by Neveila "this, you should throw to the dogs" implying, but not something else, which he learns to refer to all other prohibitions of "don't eat" from the Torah. However, the one who says it doesn't include forbidding pleasure learns from "this, you throw to the dogs" but not Chulin in the Azara. Therefore, the opinion that it includes forbidding pleasure held that you don't have a Drasha to forbid Chulin that was Shechted in the Azara. [Tosfos asks: why isn't it a practical difference if Chametz Nuksha and a mixture of Chametz is forbidden to have pleasure from. After all, we learn it from an extra "you shall not eat." You can't say that both are forbidden to have pleasure from them according to everyone since the Torah includes them in the regular Halachos of Chametz since, if that would be true, they should have the punishment of Kareis like Chametz.]

Daf 24

19) R' Yochanan (in the first version) says that you're not Chayiv for eating something prohibited unless you eat it in a normal fashion. (However, if it's forbidden to have pleasure from it, it's forbidden even if you take pleasure in a not so normal way.) Therefore, if you eat raw forbidden fats, you're exempt. [Tosfos says; even though someone is Chayiv for Aiver Min Hachai if he eats a live bird (even though you may assume that it's not the regular way to eat it); but, in truth, the small bird is soft and is edible to be eaten raw, so we consider it as normal to eat.] In his second version, R' Yochanan says that you're exempt even if you have pleasure in not a normal way. Therefore, you're exempt if you take fats from a "stoned ox" and smooth it on your wound to heal it).

20) You can't bring a proof that you're exempt from pleasure in a not normal way from the fact that, if you make juice from figs and pomegranates (or all other fruits besides olives and grapes) of Arlah, you're exempt, After all, perhaps the reason is not because it's abnormal to make juice from it. After all, if it wanted to say that you're exempt from abnormal use, it should use a case where he uses the actual fruit in a strange way. Rather, the reason he's exempt since it's only the sweat of the fruit, and not actually the fruit. [Tosfos has an unanswered question: why don't we say here the rule: "the taste is as the Issur's essence." Since the actual fruit gives taste into the liquid, the liquid should be forbidden for having taste of an Issur.]

21) Abaya says: Klai Kerem and meat and milk are forbidden to have pleasure even in an abnormal way according to all, since their prohibitions aren't written by saying "don't eat," (which would teach us that the prohibited pleasure needs to be normal, like eating is a normal pleasure).

Daf 25

22) If grapes are planted together with grain, they immediately become forbidden when they take root. However, if they started growing separately, and then one, that was planted in a perforated flowerpot, was moved next to the other, it's not forbidden until it grows an extra two hundredth in this prohibited spot. [Tosfos says: it seems that the stalks of Klai Kerem is also prohibited. That, which we permitted them in Kesuvos, although we forbid the fruit, that refers to a case where the stalks didn't grow a two hundredth more after they were combined, (but the fruit did grow that amount).]

23) You're allowed to heal yourself with any prohibition if your life is in danger except from wood that was used for an Avoda Zara. [Tosfos explains: only if no other wood would heal him, like it would bring Sheidim to heal, or it will heal in a similar fashion, since it will lead someone to mistakenly accept this idol. The same applies to what we say that you can't be healed by an idol-worshipping doctor, that it's only if he heals you with incantations of his god and it will lead you to follow him in worshipping the idol; however, it's permitted to be healed from him with normal medical practice.] After all, to save a life supersedes all prohibitions except for idolatry, murder, and unlawful relations with a woman.

24) We know from logic that you can't save your life by murdering. After all, who says that "your blood is redder than his" (that you're justified to save your life by taking his life). We know that you can't save your life with unlawful relations since we have a Hekish between that and murder. [Tosfos explains: this only applies to actively having relations with an Ervah, similar to murder, that we only forbid actively murdering someone. However, he wouldn't need to give up his life to passively killing someone, (like allowing himself to be thrown on a baby to kill it), for the logic is the opposite (why is his blood redder than mine that I must give up my life so that he won't be killed). Therefore, we say that a woman forced to have this relations doesn't need to give up her life since she only passively has relations. However, she's not allowed to bring the man to her, since that would be actively having the relations. Also, a man must give up his life even in the case that someone pushes him onto an Ervah, since it's considered as if he's doing an action, since he can only have an erection from his own thoughts.]

25) We also learn from the Hekish: the same way you can save an Ervah from having relations with the life of the pursuer, so too, you can save someone from being killed with the life of his pursuer.

26) Raveina rubbed (the oil) of unriped Arlah olives on his daughter (who had fever). Either he considered the fever to be a danger on her life, or he held that you may have abnormal pleasure from Arlah.

27) If someone gets pleasure (from something that's forbidden to have pleasure from) against his will, (like if he smells Chametz as he walks in the street); Abaya permits, and Rava forbids. In the first version, everyone agrees that R' Yehuda, who forbids unintended prohibitions, would forbid here too. They argue according to R' Shimon who permits unintended prohibitions, and in a case where he was able to avoid it, but he didn't intend to have pleasure. Rava holds that R' Shimon only allows when it's unavoidable and he doesn't intend for it.[Tosfos explains: unavoidable in these cases mean that it's only avoidable with great effort. However, you must say that it's not a P'sik Reisha (i.e., totally unavoidable) since R' Shimon agrees that a P'sik Reisha is forbidden.]

28) A second version; everyone agrees that R' Shimon allows when it's avoidable an unintended. They argue according to R' Yehuda when it's unavoidable, but you intend to have pleasure. After all, R' Shimon holds that, since intention is a factor, it's definitely forbidden to do it with intention. However, according to R' Yehuda, Abaya says intent is not at all a factor, and Rava says that intent is only not a factor when it's a stringency, and not when it's a leniency.

Daf 26

29) R' Yochanan b. Zacai was sitting in the shade of the Heichel and he Darshened to his students the whole day, so they intended to have pleasure, but they couldn't avoid it; so this should prove that it's permitted. The Gemara rejects the proof: since they got the shade from the outside of the Heichel's wall and the wall was made for the inside [Rashi: it's abnormal pleasure from the wall. Tosfos adds: although it doesn't say "don't eat" by Meila (and we said that those prohibitions that don't say "don't eat," you transgress it even with an abnormal pleasure), but we learn it from a Gezeira Shava from Trumah which says "eating."]

30) The reason we lower the craftsman to fix something in the Kodesh Hakedoshim in a box so that he shouldn't have the pleasure of seeing the inside of the Kodesh Hakedoshim even though it's unavoidable [Tosfos: without a great effort of putting him in a box]. However, it's anyhow not a problem with a Torah prohibition, since noise, sight and smells don't have a problem of Meila. [Rashi says; therefore, they didn't enact a rabbinical prohibition when it's unavoidable even with intent. Tosfos asks: we see in Mesechta Shabbos that R' Yehuda forbids dragging heavy furniture, which is rabbinic since it makes a furrow in an abnormal manner, although its unavoidable. Rather, Tosfos says: therefore, in the need to fix the Kodesh Hakedoshim, they shouldn't even extend the rabbinical prohibition to it.] Rather, we must say that the rabbis made a special enactment for the honor of the Kodesh Hakedoshim so that the fixer shouldn't gaze on it.

31) That, which we say that the pleasure of seeing, hearing or smelling Hekdesh is exempt from Meila, which connotes that there is still some prohibition; it's not necessarily referring to those who are in the Mikdash who it's unavoidable not to smell and don't intend for it, but it could refer to those who are out of the Mikdash. [Tosfos says: this only refers to those who intend to draw nearer to the Mikdash in order to smell the incense. However, without any such intent, we say that a bride didn't need to put on perfume in Yerushalayim because of the smell of the incense that came from the Mikdash.]

32) [Tosfos says the Gemara in Sukka is difficult that says that women were able to remove impurities from beans from the light of the flame of the Simchas Beis Hashueiva, since it's a rabbinical prohibition to see from Hekdesh's fire. Also, the Yerushalmi infers from there that there is no Meila by seeing, hearing and smelling.]

33) The Gemara rejects that there is no Meila through smell. As we see that a Braisa says that if you make the recipe of the Mikdash's incense in order to smell yourself, your Chayiv. However, if you only make it to learn how to make it or to hand it over to the Hekdesh to use, he's exempt. If he smells the Mikdash's incense, he's exempt from the prohibition to reproduce the incense, but he transgresses Meila.

34) Therefore, R' Pappa says that only seeing and hearing doesn't have Meila since they have no substance, but smelling has Meila until the smoke rises. However, it does not have Meila afterwards since there is nothing that finished it's Mitzva in the Mikdash that still has Meila except for the scooped up ash from the Mizbeach, the Eglah Arufah ,and the clothing of the Kohein Gadol on Yom Kippur (according to the opinion that a regular Kohein can't use it afterwards).

35) [Rashi explains the following regarding; an Eglah Arufa. Tosfos says really it's a Tosefta about a Parah Aduma.] If you bring a calf to nurse from her mother that's threshing, and it comes out that the calf also threshed a little, she's still Kosher. However, if the owner intends for it to also thresh, she's Pasul although it's unavoidable and he intended; that's because Eglah (or Parah) is different since it says "which hasn't done work," which connotes that even if was done by itself. However, it also needs "which you did to it" yourself, i.e., that you're happy that it was done. Therefore, if a bird flew on it, it's Kosher (since you're not happy that it's carrying the bird), but if a male goes upon her (to mate), he's happy, so she's Pasul.

36) [Tosfos asks: why don't we say that the owner is not happy for the male going upon her since it makes him lose a whole Parah Adumah that's expensive? Tosfos answers: if we would say it's Kosher, then the owner would be happy that the male mated her. Although, in the same way, we don't say that he's happy that the calf helped in the threshing; that's because it would have been threshed anyhow since there as enough cows to finish threshing them without the calf trampling on them. Alternatively, since it's so young, he probably didn't want to bother it with threshing.]

37) [Tosfos says: even though R' Eliezer holds that a pregnant Parah Adumah is Kosher; we must say that our Sugya holds like the Rabanan who argue and say that it's Pasul. Alternatively, it's only Pasul if he's happy when it happens, but not if he's not aware of it until after the male unmounted. This is similar to being happy when a liquid is on a food to make it Muchsher, it's only if he was aware and happy while the liquid is still on it. However, if he was unaware of it until it gets dried, it's not Muchsher.]

38) We see if you found a towel, you must spread it out to preserve it, but you can't spread it before guests even if you're doing it to preserve the towel also, which is unavoidable and intended; that's because you're causing the loss of the towel, since you're setting it up to get an Ayin Hara, or for an evil guest to steal it.

39) Those who sell clothing of Shaatnez can sell them wearing them to show their size as long as they don't intend to have pleasure from them by having those clothes protect him from the rain or sun. However, the Tzadikim used to hold them on a stick behind them. Therefore, we see that even though wearing it is avoidable by carrying it like the Tzadikim, and still it's permitted since it's unintended. This is a disproof to Rava in his first version who holds that if it's avoidable, although it's unintended, it's forbidden.

40) You shouldn't use Chametz (or any other prohibition that you can't have pleasure from, like the peels of Arlah, the stalks of Klai Kerem, and wood from worshipped trees) to fire up an oven. If you do use it to fire the oven for the first time that is the finishing touch of the oven [Tosfos: according to Rebbi who holds that we say that the wood's improvement is noticeable in the bread (and we view as the forbidden fuel is in the item it baked)]; according to R' Eliezer who holds that if two things caused the finishing of a product (one permitted and one forbidden), the item is forbidden, then you can't bake in the oven. Granted that the new wood is permitted, but since it also takes the forbidden walls of the oven to bake, it will forbid the bread. However, according to R' Yehoshua who says if two things caused the finishing of a product (one permitted and one forbidden), the item is permitted, you can bake bread since it will be permitted. [Tosfos says: even though we only allow "two causes" B'dieved, but not L'chatchila, here it's like it's B'dieved since, if you don't allow to bake it, you'll need to break the oven.] However, if it only fueled an old stove, all you need to do is to cool the oven. [Tosfos says: you need to cool down the oven even according to R' Yehoshua that allows two causes (like here where you're baking with forbidden wood and a permitted oven) since you won't be losing but the prohibited fuel, we don't consider it much of a loss and, L'chatchila, you shouldn't rely on "two causes."]

Daf 27

41) R' Eliezer allows to use the bread baked with worshipped wood if you redeem the worth of the pleasure and throw it into the dead sea. The Chachumim say that you can't redeem idolatry items.

42) They also argue with Trumah and regular sourdough that fell into a dough and made it rise. The Chachumim permit as long as there is not enough Trumah sourdough to make it rise itself. [Tosfos says: we only forbid when the forbidden sourdough has enough by itself to make it rise when the permitted sourdough doesn't have enough by itself to make it rise. However, if the permitted sourdough also has enough to make it rise by itself, it's permitted like R' Shimon says in Mesechta Avoda Zara. This, which we forbid in Temurah if a forbidden sourdough makes a dough sour, and then the second dough fell into a third dough, it's forbidden if the first forbidden dough mixed in the second dough could make it rise by itself; that's only if the permitted one can't make it rise by itself.] R' Eliezer doesn't permit it unless the first one, (i.e., the forbidden one), fell in, and you removed it, and then the second one fell in. (Since the forbidden one wasn't around when it became able to rise, he holds that you don't need to be so strict.)

43) Rebbi holds that, if you bake bread with the forbidden fuel, the improvement of the wood is noticeable in the bread (and it's as the prohibition is in the bread) and it's forbidden [Tosfos says: this refers to when the log of wood is on fire like a torch]. However, the Chachumim permit it since we don't view as if the improvement of the wood is noticeable in the bread. [Tosfos says: even with that torch, it only bakes from the burnt part of the wood, which is no longer the original wood that it was, but it's like it turned into coal.] However, everyone agrees that if you cooked something over coals its permitted, [Tosfos says; this is only B'dieved but L'chatchila, the coals are not permitted. Even though you might think that its Mitzvah of burning was fulfilled, but we don't say it's permitted when its burned enough to be coals, but only after it becomes ash.]

44) [Tosfos says: we only say that baking with forbidden fuel is forbidden is by prohibitions that you can't have pleasure from, but not regular prohibitions. This is why, when you bake bread on Shabbos forgetfully, (according to R' Meir) you can eat the bread on Shabbos and we don't say that the Muktza wood that you cooked it with is within the bread.] Shmuel Paskins like Rebbi.

45) Even the rabbis who permit "two causes" would only hold that way by an oven and by a pot that you need to combine a second item (fuel) to benefit from it. However, plates, cups and jugs (that were made with forbidden fuel) are forbidden since you don't need anything else to get pleasure from it. There are those who say that a pot is also forbidden since you can have pleasure with it without anything else. After all, it holds the items that you want to cook before you even light the fire underneath. This is not similar to an oven that you don't have any pleasure until you fire up the oven.

46) There's an argument between Shmuel and R' Yochanan; one held that, when Rebbi permitted coals, he only permitted by dying coals, but not with burning red hot coals. The other held that Rebbi permitted it even with burning red hot coals, and he only forbids when the wood is on fire like a torch. According to him, the Rabanan say that it's always permitted unless it's made into a chair to sit on.

47) [Tosfos asks; according to this that the Rabanan permit a torch since we say it comes from the small part of the stick that was burnt; how can the Gemara in Sukka say that you get pleasure from torches at the time it gets destroyed, since it must burn first before the fire comes out? Tosfos answers: since, regarding Shvious, it only needs to be similar to eating that the pleasure comes at the time of consumption, but it really comes seconds afterwards also, since you're not full until it's deposited in your stomach.

The Gemara there says that most woods have the pleasure after the destruction (since you need to burn it to make coals before baking), and that's why it doesn't have the prohibition of Shvious on them. However, Tosfos asks: according to the opinion who holds that Rebbi forbade even when they're burning red hot coals since it's considered as the prohibition is still around; since most baking is on these red hot coals, why do we consider the wood as destroyed before the pleasure?]

48) The Rabanan agree that bread baked with Hekdesh wood is forbidden since it's not Batul in a thousand, but Arlah is Batul in two hundred. [Tosfos asks: why is this represented as a strictness of Hekdesh, since it's only forbidden since it has a way to make it permitted (by redeeming it), and that would apply to all such types of prohibitions, even by not so strict prohibitions, even by those that are only rabbinical .]

49) The reason we don't say that the Hekdesh wood shouldn't forbid the bread since it becomes Chulin when someone lights it and does Meila: just like we see that R' Yehuda's opinion that if you do Meila on purpose it doesn't become Chulin since there is no Meila, we can say the same here that we refer to wood of Shlomim that there is no Meila [Rashi: since its Kodshim Kalim. Tosfos says that we could say that it was referring to lighting it on purpose knowing that you're using Hekdesh, but that's not so common, so we won't use it as the case.]

50) Although we find that Hekdesh's ash is forbidden (and we don't say that Meila was done); we must say that it refers to a case that it burned by itself without any Meila, or with ash of the Trumas Hadeshen that's forbidden. [Tosfos adds: we could also have answered that it was Shlomim wood.]

51) Also, the ash of a worshipped tree is forbidden. [Tosfos asks: it says in Temurah that this refers to one worshipped by a non-Jew; if so, why don't we consider it as an idol that completely broke by itself and become permitted?]

52) R' Yehuda holds that "destroying Chametz" can only be done through burning. He learns it from a Kal V'chomer from Nosar, although you're not transgressing Baal Yirah, yet you need to destroy it only through burning, of course Chametz that has a prohibition of Baal Yirah, you need to burn it. However, the Rabanan say that you can't make a Kal V'chomer that may lead to a leniency, for if you don't have wood to burn it, you will not be able to destroy it.

53) R' Yehuda says that we can learn it from a Mah Metzeinu from Nossar. After all, we see that Nossar is the example of an item that the Torah says not to leave over, and if you do, you need to burn it, so Chametz also can't be left for Pesach, so you need to get rid of it through burning. [Tosfos says: even though we said before that there is no Baal Yirah by Nossar, yet here the Gemara compares the prohibitions to leave them both over; we must say that Baal Yirah is greater than the prohibition to leave over Kodshim, where you transgress only when it passes the time to eat it, but you transgress Baal Yirah every moment that it still exists.] However, the Rabanan say that we could disprove this from R' Yehuda's own opinion by Asham Taloy that became Pasul, or a bird Chatos brought on a miscarriage that your in doubt if it was a true child that you need to bring a Korban for or not; that you need to bury them and not burn them. (However, the Rabanan hold that they too are burnt.) [Tosfos says: the reason the Rabanan don't agree with this Mah Metzinu according to their own opinion that they all geat burnt; since they learn the Pasuk to be an exclusion that only Nossar gets burnt, implying that all other prohibitions don't get burned.]

54) [Tosfos says that the Halacha is like R' Yehuda since there is an unnamed Mishna like him in Temurah. It's not because of his Kal V'chomer since he makes a similar Kal V'chomer in Sukka (to teach us that you're only Yoitza with Schach of the four types of the Mitzvas Lulav) and we don't Paskin like him there. Rather, it's because of the Mah Metzeinu. Although we disproved R' Yehuda, that's only according to his own opinion, but according to us who Paskin that a Pasul Asham Taloy and the Safeik bird Chatos gets burned., it wasn't disproved.]

Daf 28

55) However, the Chachumim hold that the Chametz doesn't need to be burned, since you can also grind it up and throw it to the wind, or you can throw it into the sea. Rabbah holds that you also need to grind it up before throwing it in the sea if it's not the dead sea (just like when disposing of an idol). R' Yosef holds that you don't need to grind it up in order to throw it in the sea since it absorbs water and gets disgusting even when it's whole. However, he agrees that you can't dispose of Chametz wheat by throwing it in a sack into the sea, but you need to scatter it over the sea so that it can never be gathered again.

56) R' Yossi, by an idol [Tosfos: according to everyone], holds that you need to grind it up and throw it to the wind, and you also need to grind it up before you throw it into a sea that's not the dead sea. [Tosfos explains: what we say that you may grind up Chametz and throw it to the wind is like R' Yossi who allows it by an idol. Alternatively, even the Rabanan only argue by an idol since it's forbidden even with an abnormal pleasure (like to fertilize produce), but will agree by Chametz, which you're allowed to have abnormal pleasure from.]

57) [Tosfos says: even according to the Rabanan who don't allow grinding it up and throwing it to the wind, but requires throwing it in the dead sea, they would agree that you can grind it up and throw it in the wind if you do it in an area that doesn't grow vegetation. After all, you can't always go to the dead sea to dispose of it.]

58) R' Yehuda says that it's forbidden to have pleasure from Chametz from the time it's forbidden to eat, i.e., By noon Erev Pesach. It continues to be forbidden during Pesach and even after Pesach. R' Shimon says that it's only forbidden to have pleasure during Pesach. [Tosfos says; he definitely agrees that you can't eat from noon from a Drasha. The reason that the rabbis required to burn it then, and not to use it as fuel under your pot because you might come to eat it.] R' Yossi Haglili says that it's permitted to have pleasure during Pesach too. [Tosfos says that he only allows to burn it all at once to use as fuel for cooking, and you can't keep it to burn it a little at a time, since you might come to eat it if you leave it around. After all, we should assume that R' Yossi Haglili requires to search your house on the night of the fourteenth (to make sure you don't find Chametz during Pesach and eat it).]

59) Someone's Chayiv even with Chametz that became Chametz through a leavening agent (and not by itself). [Tosfos quotes Riva: we're referring to a leavening agent that's not a dough, like wine sediment. (This is not similar to a dough that was kneaded with fruit juice that there's no Kareis, but just a Lav.) However, if it was made Chametz by sourdough, of course, it makes it more Chametz than when it becomes Chametz by itself.]

60) If someone was Tamai, or was far from the Mikdash, or uncircumcised, or was not religious; although he's exempt from a Pesach, he needs to eat Matzah. [Tosfos explains the irreligious; it refers to someone who was irreligious by the Shechita and became religious at night. Although he was not fit to bring a Pesach, he still needs to eat Matzah.] Also, nowadays, when there is no Beis Hamikdash, we still need to eat Matzah.

61) [Tosfos says: the case of the uncircumcised person (that's not anyhow classified as irreligious) is when he couldn't be circumcised because his brothers died when they were circumcised. Also a Tumtum (who has a membrane covering the private parts and we don't know if the person is a male or a female) can't bring a Pesach from a Safeik that he might be male and he's not circumcised). They're also prohibited in Trumah since we learn a Gezeira Shava from Pesach to Trumah. this is not similar to a seven day old child that we have an unresolved inquiry whether you can smear him with Trumah oil.]

62) We were taught in the Mishna that a Jew's Chametz is forbidden after Pesach, but not Chametz that belonged to a non-Jew. It doesn't seem to be consistent to any of the Tannaim that we brought. After all, R' Yehuda would forbid the Chametz of the non-Jew, and R' Shimon would even permit a Jew's Chametz. R' Yossi Haglili would allow to have pleasure even on Pesach.

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63) R' Acha b. Yaakov answers: it could be R' Yehuda and he learns from a Gezeira Shava from Baal Yirah; just like you can see the Chametz of a non-Jew or Hekdesh, you can eat the Chametz of a non-Jew. [Rashi says; it's permitted from the Torah to eat a non-Jew's Chametz. Tosfos disagrees. After all, you acquire it when you eat it. Either when the non-Jew gives it to you as a gift, or that you stole it and you're responsible to pay for it when it gets destroyed, which is considered as if it's yours regarding Chametz. Rather, we're not exact to say it's permitted to eat, but you may have pleasure from it. Alternatively, you may eat it after Pesach, which is the implication of the whole Sugya.] The truth is, the Mishna could have also differentiate between Chametz of a Jew and a non-Jew regarding eating during Pesach the same way they argue after Pesach.

64) Rava explains: it's like R' Shimon, and the rabbis fined the Jew who kept Chametz over Pesach and transgressed Baal Yirah.

65) They follow their opinions about eating sourdough of a non-Jew after Pesach according to R' Yehuda; Rava says that the eater gets Malkos, and R' Acha says that he doesn't get Malkos.

66) We see that R' Acha b. Yaakov reversed his opinion, as we'll see in the following Sugya: Tanna Kama says that if you eat from Chametz of Hekdesh on Pesach, you're Chayiv for Meila. There are those who argue and say he's not Chayiv for Meila. R' Yochanan explains the second opinion to hold like R' Nechunia b. Hakaneh who holds that Chayiv Kareis is like the Chiyuv of execution in Beis Din that we say that we only give the stronger punishment (so he's only Chayiv for eating Chametz on Pesach, and not Meila). [Tosfos says; although you're only do Meila when it's done forgetfully (and there is no stronger punishment when it's not done on purpose), we must say like the Tanna of the house of Chizkiya that we exempt from payment when doing the sin of the greater punishment forgetfully as when you do it on purpose. Although we never exempt a Korban for a lesser punishment sin just because you also did the harsher punishment sin, (and that's why one needs to bring a Korban for carrying out food forgetfully on Shabbos, although he carried out the vessel it's in on purpose and is Chayiv stoning); still, here we can't say he's Chayiv an Asham for the Meila if he's exempt from paying for the Meila and from the extra fifth.]

67) [Tosfos says: there is an opinion that R' Nechunya b. Hakaneh exempts the lesser punishment when done with Misah Biydai Shamayim, and Rebbi says that Meila gets the punishment of Misah, so you need to bring the payment for Meila even though he's Chayiv Misah; still, that's no proof that you'll be Chayiv Meila by Kareis too, since the Torah only reveals that you need to pay by Misah, and not Kareis. (Alternatively, even if you can' extrapolate Kareis from Misah, we can say our Sugya is like the Rabanan who say that Meila doesn't get Misah.) However, we see that you need to pay for the Trumah Chametz that you eat on Pesach (and we don't say that you're exempt for payment since you get Kareis); since we only say to exempt regular payment, but replacing the Trumah is an atonement. After all, we say that the Kohein cannot forgo and forgive the payment.]

68) R' Yosef says that they argue according to R' Yossi Haglili (that you may have pleasure from Chametz) if you can redeem Hekdesh to feed to a dog. [Tosfos says: the one who forbids, forbids it rabbinically. They enacted to forbid it since you might come to feed it to a dog even if it was originally unblemished and designated for a Korban, and it got a blemish and you redeemed it, (which the Torah forbids feeding to the dogs). Even though you may have pleasure from it from the Torah, it's still considered as not having any use because, practically, you can't have pleasure from it. Although we allow to redeem a mixture of these blemished Korbanos and a Treifa, even though the only thing you can do is throw it to the dogs (since you can't eat it yourself since it might be the Treifa), we must say that the Torah only forbade redeeming Hekdesh that's only fit to throw to the dogs. However, here, if you ever recognize which is the blemished Korban, you could Shecht it and eat it, then it's permitted to even give it to the dogs. After all, R' Akiva allows inviting a non-Jew to eat this blemished Korban with you, but if it was a Treifa, you can't redeem it and even its hide remains forbidden.]

69) [Tosfos says: you can't say that you can have Meila even if it can't be redeemed because you can redeem it after its burnt. Since you can't redeem it as is, there is no Meila. This is also the reason you can't be Mikadesh a woman with something that's prohibited to have pleasure from even though you can have pleasure after it's burnt. Although we're saying you're Chayiv since it will be permitted after Pesach and it will be worth money then, but that's only that you need to wait to have pleasure from it as is, but not if you need to change its form by burning it to ash. Alternatively, we refer to a case where it won't be worth a Prutah after it's burnt. Tosfos concludes: it's difficult according to the first answer; after all, you may have pleasure from these prohibitions as they are if you have abnormal pleasure.]

70) A second version of R' Yosef that everyone agrees that you can't redeem Kodshem to feed to dogs. They argue whether something that causes a loss of money has the status of money. (Therefore, since after Pesach you can redeem it to eat it yourself, so it's worth money to Hekdesh now also.)

71) R' Acha b. Yaakov answers everyone agrees that you can't redeem Kodshim to feed to dogs, and something that causes a loss of money has the status of money. They argue with the argument between R' Yehuda, who says that Chametz is forbidden after Pesach (and no one can ever redeem it), and R' Shimon (that it's permitted after Pesach and it could be redeemed then). Therefore, this is a proof that R' Acha reversed his opinion or else the Chametz of Hekdesh wouldn't be prohibited and would be permitted after Pesach just like the Chametz of a non-Jew. [Tosfos says: although the Gemara in Chulin says that R' Yehuda holds that the Chametz that's owned by a transgressor over Pesach is permitted right away since we can assume that he exchanged it with a non-Jew (since, why eat something that's prohibited if you can eat the same thing that's permitted); they must have held like R' Acha originally held, that R' Yehuda permits Chametz owned by non-Jews on Pesach. Alternatively, it wasn't exact to say that it's permitted right away, but just as soon as the non-Jews can produce Chametz after Pesach.]

72) R' Ashi answers: everyone holds that you can't redeem Kodshim to feed to dogs, and something that causes a loss of money doesn't have the status of money. They argue with the same argument between R' Yossi Haglili and the Chachumim if you can have pleasure from Chametz and if you can redeem the Chametz to use as fuel to cook your pot. [Tosfos explains: however, if you could redeem it for dogs, then a non-Jew may redeem it and there would be Meila. Although, usually, anything that you can't feed to your dog is forbidden to have any other pleasure from it, like to burn it to fuel cooking your pot; however, we already said that it's only rabbinically forbidden to feed it to the dogs, therefore, they only enacted to forbid it to a Non-Jew or dog. The reason we can't allow a non-Jew to redeem it to throw into the fire to fuel cooking his pot in front of us, that's because they forbade doing that since he might end up eating it instead.]

73) [Ri proves from here that you don't transgress Baal Yirah if you keep Chametz around in order to burn it. That's why you can redeem the Chametz according to R' Yossi Haglili and you don't need to worry that you'll transgress Baal Yirah when you redeem it. The explanation is: since the prohibition of Baal Yirah is fixed through the Asei to destroy it, thus, he doesn't transgress when he eventually destroys it.]