1) If partners vowed from each other, the Tanna Kama says they can’t enter their joint courtyard {Ran says: since he holds that they forbid even what they don’t really care and allow all to do}. R’ Elazar b. Yaakov says that each one can enter their own space in the courtyard. {Ran says: in Bava Kama, the Gemara establishes the argument if they hold of Breira, or not. The Tanna Kama doesn’t hold of Breira, and therefore, we can’t say, when they bought it together, that each one buys it for the time they’re using it. Rather, they own it jointly, but they have an obligation to allow the partner to use his share when he enters. Therefore, the Neder has a power to uproot an obligation. However, R’ Elazar b. Yaakov holds of Breira, so each one acquires the whole courtyard for when they will eventually use it, so they never use the partner’s share, so the partner can’t forbid him. This seems like the Rishonim who say that an owner can forbid his house to his renter even though he’s obligated to allow his renter to be in the house.}

2) The Halacha is like R’ Elazar b. Yaakov. {The Ran asks: but we Paskin in Beitza like R’ Oshiya who says that we only hold of Breira by rabbinical laws, and not by Torah laws. R’ Tam answers: we Paskin like R’ Elazar b. Yaakov, but not for his reason that there’s Breira, but because we Paskin that the Neder doesn’t forbid what the owner would automatically allow people to do. The Ri argues since there are many unnamed Sugyos that holds that it’s forbidden. Rather, he answers: we only Paskin like R’ Oshiya that there’s Briera by rabbinical laws, but we argue with what he says that there’s no Briera by Torah laws. Ran says that this is also problematic since we Paskin like Shmuel that brothers who split an estate are considered as if they bought off their brother’s share, and that they return to the estate every Yovel since there’s no Briera (to say what came to his share was always destined for him to inherit). R’ Moshe answers that each one owns the whole courtyard, so no one uses the other one’s share. However, this is also problematic since this has nothing to do with Breira. Rather, the Ran says that this Breira is different than all other Breiras that it’s a question on the main acquisition, if it will take place, like when you place out an Eiruv on condition if a Chachum comes to that side to Darshen. However, here, the main acquisition took place, that they bought the courtyard, but it’s only a question about the details when you’ll be using it. In this instance, there’s Breira.}

3) They both agree that you can’t place a mill, oven and to raise chickens there {Ran: even though partners don’t care that their partner does this, but since they have a right to protest, it’s forbidden since even things that they regularly automatically allow is forbidden.}

4) If someone makes a Neder not to have pleasure from his partner, we force him to sell his share in the courtyard. {The Ran says: since he sees his friend using the courtyard, and he’ll get jealous and stumble by using the courtyard too. Even according to R’ Elazar b, Yaakov, it will come to stumbling when he gets jealous that the other puts his mill, oven or chickens there. (Although he can prevent the partner from placing it there, but since partners automatically allow it, it’s petty of him to protest, especially since the partner did not cause the Neder, but himself.)}

5) If one of the partners forbade a non-partner to partake pleasure in the courtyard, according to R’ Elazar b. Yaakov, he could enter the courtyard for the second partner, and he’s not forbidden just like he can’t forbid the partner if he makes a Neder on him. {The Ran quotes the Rashba that it’s only if the partner needs him, or he needs to see the partner. Otherwise, the partner doesn’t have the right to have the whole world trample in the courtyard for no good reason. However, the Raah permits it, but the Ran doesn’t agree to him.}

6) There’s an inquiry if the Tanna Kama forbids only when the one who makes the Neder forbids himself from his partner, but not when he forbids his partner to have pleasure from him {Ran explains: this would argue with the Sugya in Bava Kama, and the Tanna Kama would hold of Breira, but if he was the one who caused the prohibition, we fine him}, or do we say that he forbids in both cases {Ran: like the Sugya in Bava Kama.} According to the first side, our Mishna must only refer to a case where the one who makes the Neder forbids himself, and that fits in well since, if he forbade his partner, why do we force him to sell his share if he was an Onness? {Ran says: we can’t say that we fine the one who made the Neder to sell, since there’s no reason since he won’t lead to stumble. This is difficult to the Rambam who says that we always force the one who made the Neder to sell. (Although the Yerushalmi says this, but the Bavli seems to argue.) The Raavad already criticized it. If the one who makes the Neder does it regularly, the Tosefta says that we force him to sell his share. The Yerushalmi explains it that it’s two times.}

7) {The Ran quotes R’ Yona: we can’t bring a proof to this inquiry from a later Mishna: if the person makes a Neder on himself not to have pleasure from his partner, and that the partner can’t have pleasure from him, both can’t enter any public places in the city (since each one has a share in them) so that it’s forbidden in both cases. Rather, it could be only here where both people are forbidden, and if we allow the one who didn’t make the Neder to enter, the one who made the Neder won’t listen to us and will enter too. So they didn’t make any exceptions in that case.}

8) They only argue if the courtyard is too small to split up {Ran: so there’s Breira on the details since the main partnership is guaranteed to stay the same.} However, if there’s enough area to split up, everyone agrees that it’s forbidden to enter. {Ran explains: we can say that each one didn’t acquire the whole courtyard since, eventually, one of them can force the other to split it. The Rashba says that even after they split, it’s forbidden. After all, we said before that the Neder item remains forbidden even if it was given to him, or he bought it, as long as there wasn’t a third party owning it in between. However, the Rambam permits it after the splitting, and it seems the reason is that we know as a fact as if there were witnesses on this, that they bought it in partnership on the condition that one can’t forbid the other one at least after the splitting so not to have the ability to forbid my property on me forever.}

9) If someone made a Neder on his friend not to have pleasure from him, and he rented out bathhouses or presses to other people; the one who is forbidden from his property is only forbidden to patronize those businesses that the owner still has a hand in the profit, but not if he doesn’t have a hand in it. To define having a hand in the profit; R’ Nachman says that he gets a percentage of the profits like a fourth, a third or a half. However, it’s not if he only has the egg concession {Ran: for a percentage, since they used to sell eggs at the bathhouse.} Abaya says that it’s forbidden even if he has profit from the egg concession, but is only permitted if they just pay a tax to him {Ran: i.e., a set amount per year.}

10) {The Ran quotes Rashba: it’s only permitted without the owner having a hand in the profit if it was rented before the Neder, but after the Neder, renting doesn’t uproot the prohibition made by the Neder, but only selling does.}

11) {The Ran says: this is not a contradiction to the Gemara in Erichin that you can uproot a renting of a house by making the house Hekdesh; since that refers that the condition was to rent him a house, and not “this house.” So he’s not under contract to give him this house, but any house. However, it’s difficult why doesn’t the Konam uproot an obligation through the renting? (Although the Ran agrees with Rashi that Hekdesh to Bedek Habayis doesn’t remove the obligation, but just Kedushas Haguf, (and not like R’ Tam), from a Gemara that, if you give a field as a collateral, if you say that I’m making it Kodesh when I redeem it, it takes effect after the redemption; implying that it can’t take effect while it’s obligated to someone else, like by renting; but a Konam is like Kedushas Haguf.) However, we can answer like Tosfos differentiates that someone doesn’t have in mind to forbid properties that are already rented out to others. (Granted that we said earlier that he does have in mind what he already made Hefker; but there it was on something that the Hefker didn’t take effect on and it’s truly completely in his possession, but he doesn’t have in mind to forbid what was truly rented out. Alternatively, we can differentiate like how others say: it’s only permitted if he accepted the rent before the Hekdesh, but if he didn’t accept the rent, then he would need to pay Hekdesh the rent, so the Hekdesh has what to take effect on. Alternatively, it’s like R’ Tam says: only Konam on everyone is like Hekdesh and breaks obligations, but a Konam on an individual is not and doesn’t break obligations. However, according to what we explained in the beginning of the Perek that an individual Konam breaks an obligation, we can only differentiate like Tosfos.}

12) {The Ran continues: others differentiate that here it can’t break the renting since the deal was that they can always have the property as long as they keep on paying the rent. Therefore, it’s more of a buying than renting. However, the Ran personally answers: it only breaks the obligation when the Neder was made against the one renting, but here, he didn’t forbid it on the one renting, but on one of his customers. Therefore, since the obligation stands, he can’t forbid it on those who are coming because of the renter. (Although we said earlier that, when one partner in a courtyard forbids someone with a Neder, he can’t come in with the permission of the second partner since the one who made the Neder not only owns part of the courtyard but also has rights to its use.)}

13) If someone says a Konam: “your house is forbidden for me to enter;” if he sells it or he dies and inherits it to others, it’s permitted since it’s no longer his house. However, if he says “this house,” it’s forbidden even if it’s sold or he dies since it’s still “this house.” {Ran says: if the house collapses and you rebuild it, it’s the opposite, that it’s still his house, but it’s no longer that house. If he says “this one of your houses” has the status as saying “this house” whether it’s a stringency or leniency.}

14) {The Ran prefaces the Gemara: this is not only when someone is forbidding it on himself, since he anyhow has the ability to forbid other people’s properties on himself, but even if the owner forbids it on someone else, it’s still forbidden after it leaves his possession, although you can’t make other people’s properties forbidden on other people.} As we see that, if you tell your son that your property is forbidden to him in your lifetime and after your death, he can’t inherit it. {Ran says that it’s not exact, that it does go to him, but he just can’t have pleasure from it. As it says in the end part of the Braisa that the property goes to his brothers and sons, and if he has someone he owes money to, he collects it. The Ran explains: it’s simple why those who he owes money can collect it since Beis Din collects it against his will, it’s not him giving it over, even though it comes out that he has pleasure as a side effect. However, he can’t give it to his brother or son since he’s getting pleasure that they’ll be grateful to him. Rather, we must say that he tells them that he inherited from his father who made it forbidden for me to have pleasure and I have nothing to do with it, you can take it and do what you want with it. After all, it’s not giving it to them, but like he makes it Hefker to them.}

15) If he makes a Konam on these fruit, he’s forbidden with anything that got exchanged for them or grew from them (if planted). We have an inquiry if an exchanged item is forbidden even when the owner of the fruit forbade it on someone else, or only when the one who made the Neder forbidden it on himself since he can make other people’s property forbidden on himself. However, it’s not forbidden if he makes his object forbidden on someone else, since he can’t make this other item (that at the time of the Neder, it belong to someone else) on a friend. Or do we say that an exchanged item is exactly like a grown item and forbidden no matter who made the Neder.

16) {The Ran says: the inquiry is not exactly on a Neder, but by a prohibition that’s forbidden to have pleasure from. Do we say, even though the money that you sold it for doesn’t get the prohibition from the Torah, and even rabbinically, it’s not forbidden to others; but did the rabbis forbid it on the one who exchanged it? Therefore, the main inquiry is if the reason why it’s forbidden by the Neder is because the one who made the Neder also has in mind to forbid anything that the item was exchanged for, or it’s because they enacted that the exchange of all prohibitions that are forbidden to have pleasure from is also prohibited for the one who exchanged it. (The Gemara could have also inquired regarding the one making the Neder on himself if he made a regular Konam without saying “these fruit” but a regular Konam, if it’s forbidden if others exchanged it, is it forbidden to him. However, in this case of “these fruit,” it’s definitely forbidden to him no matter who made the exchange since we say in a later Perek that it’s like saying it should be like Hekdesh.)}

17) The Gemara wants to bring a proof from the case where someone forbids his wife to have pleasure from him {Ran explains: when she’s still an Arusah, since he’s obligated to her after the Nesuin, so the Neder can’t take effect}, she can borrow from others, and they can collect from the husband {Ran: which is an exchange. This is even to Chanan who says that, if someone pays for the food of a woman, it’s like putting the money on a deer’s horn (that it’s going to be lost and uncollectable from her husband; that’s only if he gave it, but if he lends her money for it, the husband is obligated to pay, as he’s obligated to her from R’ Nosson’s opinion about obligations (that you’re obligated to pay the one who your creditor owes). So, if the exchange is forbidden, how can she borrow when the husband will pay for it? The Ran explains: we should assume that the lender didn’t have in mind to obligate the husband so that the wife shouldn’t do a prohibition through this.}

18) The Gemara rejects this proof: perhaps they only allow exchanges B’dieved, and not L’chatchila. {Ran explains: and this is B’dieved, since the exchange didn’t exist when she borrowed, and when he collects from the husband, when the exchange came into the world, it’s already B’dieved. However, you can’t exchange it L’chatchila, I.e., at the same time.}

19) The Gemara wants to bring a proof from the Halacha that, if someone gives Kiddushin to a woman with what he exchanged with Arlah, the Kiddushin takes effect, (but she’s not Mekudeshes if it’s done with the actual Arlah). The Gemara rejects the proof: perhaps she’s only B’dieved Mekudeshes, but, L’chatchila, not.

20) {The Ran says: it seems that, since the inquiry was not resolved, the Halacha is that we can be lenient since it would only be rabbinically forbidden. However, the Rambam Paskins that it’s prohibited.}

21) If he says “I’m on you a Cherem,” the one he’s making a Neder on is forbidden. If he says “You’re a Cherem on me,” the one who made the Neder is forbidden. If he says “I’m on you, and you’re on me,” they’re both prohibited.

22) However, they are permitted to partake from the (public utilities) {Ran: made Hefker} by those who came up from Bavel {Ran: to all Jews}, like the Har Habayis, the chambers, the courtyards (of the Mikdash) and the well in the middle of the way. However, they’re forbidden with those items of the city (since they both own a share in them) like the streets, the Shul and the bathhouse, the Bima {Ran: that they place the Sefer Torah on to read} and Sefarim. {Ran explains: since it could be sold by the seven community leaders in the midst of the townspeople, we see that the people of the city own it, so it’s a partnership and are forbidden. However, according to what we Paskin like R’ Elazar b. Yaakov that partners may use items that they can’t split, and all of these items can’t be split, so it should be permitted. However, the Rambam is difficult since he Paskins like R’ Elazar b. Yaakov and also Paskins that it’s forbidden here. The Ramban already criticized him.}

23) The way out to allow them to use these communal items is to give over all their shares in this to the Nassi. R’ Yehuda says that you can really give it to anyone but it’s common practice to give it to the Nassi {Ran says: since, by giving it to a friend, you’re running to a problem that he might end up forbidding it to you with a Konam.}

24) The Tanna Kama says that the Nassi doesn’t need to make an acquisition (but he acquires it by just saying that you’re giving it to him), but, if you give it to others, they need an acquisition. The Chachumim say that even the Nassi needs an acquisition. {Ran: the Chiddush of giving to a Nassi is that, since they’re now using the items as usual as they did before the Neder, it might look like a trick and it shouldn’t help, so we’re taught otherwise.}

25) In Galil, everyone is permitted regardless. Since they were all in fights for generations, the forefathers had given all the communal items to the Nassi years ago.

26) If the oath's subject doesn’t have what to eat; the Tanna Kama allows the oath-maker to give a gift to a third party and then that person gives it to the oath's subject. However, this is only if he doesn’t show at the end that it wasn’t a real gift but only a trick, but if he shows at the end that it’s only a trick, like the case of Beis Choron, that the father made a Neder from his son, and his son was making a wedding and he told a third party that he’s giving the courtyard and meal over to him so that his father can come and eat from it. The third party, in turn, made everything Hekdesh, and the son reneged since he only gave it to him for his father to be able to eat. In that case we say that any gift {Ran: that’s only a trick} that he can’t make it Kodesh, it’s not a real gift. {Ran: however, if it’s a real gift, although you can’t make the item Kodesh, like when he gives an Esrog to someone on condition that he returns it; it’s a valid gift.}

27) In the first version of Rava: it’s only if he says “in order that my father should eat,” but if he says “that may father should come and eat,” then it’s not a condition, and it’s saying “with your permission.” {Ran compares this to the Gemara in Beitza if someone commands at his death “Ploni should receive four hundred Zuz and marry my daughter,” he receives the money without marrying the daughter since it’s not a condition.} In the second version: even if he doesn’t say “in order,” it’s not a gift, even though usually such a term is not a condition; here it’s different since the meal proves his intentions. {Ran explains: since we know as if we have witnesses on it that he’s only giving it over so that his father should eat. The Rashba says that this is only if he said about his father eating when he gave over the gift. However, the Rambam Paskins that it’s true even if he said it after the gift.}

28) {Ran prefaces the Gemara: if one has two sons, one’s an upright citizen, and the other a robber, and he wants to give all his property to his upright child, but he says that he’ll give half to the robber’s son if he becomes a rabbi. The question is} could you make an acquisition (with his son) on condition that he should make an acquisition (for the grandson to acquire). {Ran explains: this is not similar to a gift on condition to return it, since it’s his until he gives it back, but here, if the grandson becomes a rabbi, then it was never the son’s}

29) Pumbadeisa says that he can’t acquire it to his nephew {Ran: so the son acquires the whole estate just like it would be without this condition. After all, the father gave it all to him if it doesn’t go to his grandson.} R’ Nachman says that he acquires it just like a Chalipin with a handkerchief that’s only an acquisition to make a different acquisition {Ran: since you only give the handkerchief in order to acquire the object, and not that the receiver should get the handkerchief}.

30) However, R’ Ashi asks on R’ Nachman: the Chalipin is not only an acquisition to make a different acquisition since if the receiver wants to keep the handkerchief, he could and you can’t remove it from him. Even if you consider it only an acquisition to make a different acquisition, it’s still not similar to our case. After all, the Chalipin acquires the other object at this moment, while the grandson will only acquire when he becomes a rabbi, and, at that time, the handkerchief is already returned. {Ran says: although R’ Nachman himself held like this in Kesuvos that, if you sell a cow from now until thirty days; he acquires it if, after thirty days, it's in a swamp, (so, that you can acquire it on day thirty); R’ Nachman holds that here he’s giving it to the grandson today if he eventually becomes a rabbi. Rashba says: he only holds this by pulling, Chalipin or Chazaka that the acquisition doesn’t last long until the time of acquiring. However, here, it’s given as a document, and it’s an acquisition as long as the document exists. However, the Ran disagrees since the acquisition only takes place after the father’s death, and a document can’t acquire after the giver’s death.}

31) According to R’ Nachman, the reason it’s not allowed by Beis Choron by being an acquisition to make a different acquisition {Ran: so that the food had a break of being in someone else’s possession between the son and the father} since the meal proves it {Ran: since he wants his father to eat from his food, since what enjoyment does he have that the father’s eating someone else’s food?} Alternatively, {Ran: that Nedarim are more stringent than other money laws, like} we say that R’ Eliezer forbids even things that usually people don’t care about {Ran: that it’s forbidden to take a shortcut through his property even though, regularly, it’s not stealing by doing so. Therefore, although regularly an acquisition to make a different acquisition is valid, we’re stringent by Nedarim.}

32) {The Ran says: we Paskin like R’ Nachman regarding Chalipin that it’s only an acquisition to make a different acquisition, but he can’t keep it. After all, even R’ Ashi who asks that he can keep it was just rejecting the proof, but we see in KIddushin that he can’t keep it, and that’s why he holds that Chalipin can’t acquire a woman for Kiddushin since she must give back the handkerchief (and they enacted that a gift on condition to return it also can’t make Kiddushin since it’s similar to Chalipin). However, regarding whether the grandchild acquires, perhaps the Halacha is like R’ Ashi that an acquisition to make a different acquisition only works when he acquires it at the moment, and not if he acquires it for later. However, the Rambam Paskins like R’ Nachman even by this, and perhaps he holds that the same way R’ Ashi wasn’t coming to argue with R’ Nachman regarding returning the handkerchief, but just pushing off the proof, he’s not arguing in Halacha with this either and is just pushing off the proof.}