1) The differences between someone who makes a vow from having pleasure from his friend, and vows that forbid food from him is: taking a shortcut through his property, and, if you can borrow utensils that don't make food that can't be rented for a Prutah {Ran: or else it would help you buy food with the Prutah you saved.} However, they’re both forbidden if the utensil makes food, even if it’s a sieve, sifter, mill and oven {Ran: that it doesn’t directly prepare the food like a pot or spit, so I might think it only “causes the cause” of the food and is not included, so we’re taught otherwise.} This is even when it can't be rented for a Prutah. It also applies to a sack, donkey (that can transport fruit) and even a basket.

2) Even though the owner doesn't care if people take shortcuts through his property, it's like R' Eliezer who forbids using his property even for things that owners automatically allow other people to do. {Ran says: but the Chachumim hold that things that the owner doesn’t care for people to partake is not really considered having pleasure from it. Ramban Paskins like R’ Eliezer since our unnamed Mishna is like him. However, R’ Chananel and R’ Tam Paskin like the Chachumim.}

3) {The Ran quotes the Ramban: he only cares that people make a shortcut to pass through his courtyard, but not to stay there (unless he’s a partner).}

4) If he says “I’m making a Neder from food” he’s only forbidden with food. If he makes a Neder from “the pleasure of the food,” he can’t chew up wheat to place on his wound. If he says “from pleasure that brings to food,” he’s forbidden from anything that can bring him food, like we said earlier. {The Ran says: but it implies that he’s not forbidden in this case to chew up wheat to place on his wound, and not like one who wants to forbid it.}

5) We have an unresolved inquiry if he’s not helping him bring food, but just making him able to travel to the food faster, if it’s forbidden, or it’s permitted since it’s just causing him to have food, but not directly getting him food. {Ran: so we should be stringent.}

6) If someone makes an oath not to have pleasure from his friend, the friend can give his half Shekel for him and can pay his obligation. R’ Hoshia says that it’s like Chanan’s opinion that, if someone goes across the sea, and another person decides to provide the money for his wife to eat; he loses his money. Hence, here also, he didn’t get any pleasure since we don’t consider it anything that he paid up his obligation. {Ran says: it doesn’t even help him to have a portion in the Korbanos, since they take Trumas Halishka for all who will eventually give, so it’s only paying off a regular obligation.} Rava held that it can also be like those who argue, since we refer to a case where they made a condition at the loan that he doesn't need to pay unless he wants to. {Ran says: therefore, if he doesn’t want to pay back, the lender can’t force him, so the one paying for him didn’t help him any.} However, R' Hoshiya held that they should have made a decree not to allow it when he paid on condition that he doesn't need to pay back less he pays when he needs to pay back. {The Ran says that, in Kesuvos, he answers that it’s considered pleasure, not from saving from paying back, since he never has that obligation, but he saves him from the embarrassment whenever he meets the lender.}

7) {The Ran quotes Rashba: this is only if he supports the woman to pay for the husband’s obligation, but usually, when someone supports someone, we don’t say that he’s doing so as a gift, but to get paid back by the one receiving. That’s why one is obligated to pay for one who planted his field. Also, the Yerushalmi says in Bava Metzia: if someone gives a house for someone to stay, it’s assumed that it’s to rent. However, the Ran disagrees since we assume that the person is giving it for the husband, and not for the woman, since he knows that the woman doesn’t have any property.}

8) {The Ran says that the Halacha is like Chanan, and the borrower doesn’t need to pay back if someone pays his obligation, even if his lender is pushy to get it back, and even if he has a collateral, since he can always say that he would convince the lender to return the collateral.}

9) The person can return a lost object to the oath-maker since it's a Mitzvah. If it's in a place where they pay a wage to the one who returns the lost object (for what he lost from his wage that he needed to take off to find the owner), he must give the money to Hekdesh.

10) In the first version: if the pleasure from the person returning the object is forbidden to the object’s owner, he still can return it since the owner is only receiving what’s his. However, if the pleasure from the owner of the object is forbidden on the returner of the object; there’s an argument between R’ Ami and R’ Assi if it can be returned, or not, since he’s getting pleasure from him by being exempt from the Prutah of R’ Yosef {Ran explains: if a poor person comes to collect money, he’s exempt from giving him (since he’s doing one Mitzvah at the time, he’s exempt from other Mitzvos). So, because of the object’s owner, he gains this Prutah, and that’s why R’ Yosef holds that he’s like a paid watchman on the object.} However, the other held this is not considered pleasure since it’s not common to happen {Ran: but since there’s a possibility for it to happen, R’ Yosef holds him to be a paid watchman and is obligated to pay if it’s lost or stolen.} However, they both agree that the statement “in a place where they pay a wage to the one who returns the lost object, he must give the money to Hekdesh” refers to when the pleasure from the person returning the object is forbidden to the object’s owner {Ran: if the returner is too proper and doesn’t want to take it}, but not if the pleasure from the owner of the object is forbidden on the returner of the object {Ran says: although the returner may not receive it, but the owner can keep it for himself and it’s not considered as if he’s taking another person’s money (that he may not want to keep), since he didn’t do much but just returned to him his own object for free. However, the Ran comes out that even the returner may keep the money since he would have had this wage from his work if he didn’t return it. This is similar to buying something from a seller who can’t find someone to buy it off him, that we consider the sale as completely benefiting the seller. The same here, the returner is not gaining by returning the object, but only the owner.}

11) In the second version: everyone agrees if the pleasure from the owner of the object is forbidden on the returner of the object it can be returned since he’s not considered getting pleasure from him by being exempt from the Prutah of R’ Yosef since it’s uncommon. R’ Ami and R’ Assi argue if the pleasure from the person returning the object is forbidden to the object’s owner, which may be forbidden since he’s giving him pleasure by giving him his object {Ran: which he might never get back if this person didn’t return it.} Or do we say that, at the end of the day, the owner is only receiving what’s his. The one who forbade was disproved since the statement “in a place where they pay a wage to the one who returns the lost object, he must give the money to Hekdesh” can’t go when the pleasure from the person returning the object is forbidden to the object’s owner {Ran: like we explained earlier that the returner can keep the wage since only the owner is gaining by him returning it.}

12) {Ran says: regarding the Halacha, we should permit in all cases, even if the pleasure from the owner of the object is forbidden on the returner of the object even though we don’t disprove the one who forbade it in the first version. However, since the opinion to permit both cases are not disproved in either version, and the opinion that forbade was disproved in the second version, we should Paskin that it’s permitted, and that’s also the Rambam’s opinion.}

13) Rava held that, if you have a Hefker bread before you {Ran: in your courtyard or within your four Amos, and you didn’t acquire it yet} and you say that the bread should be Hekdesh {Ran: even though we would say that you acquired it anyhow since your courtyard and four Amos acquire automatically without even saying you want it to acquire; still, here you showed that you didn’t want to acquire it yourself, but for Hekdesh, and since he could acquire it for himself he has the power to acquire for others.} Now, if he takes it to eat, he transgressed Meila on the whole loaf of bread {Ran: since his intent is to completely remove it from Hekdesh’s possession to his own possession. Therefore, the case must have been composed that it was originally Hekdesh’s and was never his. However, if it was his and he made it Hekdesh, since he’s the Hekdesh’s treasurer regarding this bread, and even if he takes it to eat it’s not being taken out of Hekdesh’s possession since you never took it out of the possession of the treasurer.} If you take it in order to have your children inherit it, he only has Meila on the pleasure of gratitude {Ran: that his children will have for him for trying to find objects that he can make them inherit. However, he doesn’t have Meila on the actual bread, so it doesn’t go out to Chulin.}

14) Rava resolves: if someone says that “my bread should be forbidden to you,” and then he directly gives it to him {Ran: without it given to a third person in between, or else it would be permitted since it’s no longer his bread, and also when he says “my bread is forbidden” and not “you’re forbidden to have pleasure from me” since then the actual gift is pleasure}, he can’t have pleasure from the bread since his intent is to forbid it when he gives it to him. After all, while it’s still by him, it’s already forbidden for him to eat it. You can’t say that he’s worried if it stolen from him {Ran: since it doesn’t dawn on people that it might be stolen to make the Neder for it.} Rather, it must be that it’s in order to forbid it after he gives it to him {Ran: and he made the Neder so that the other person shouldn’t overly beg for him to give the bread to him.} However, the Gemara rejects the proof since it might be that he made the Neder to forbid it if he invites him over {Ran: and when he’s invited, the bread is still considered as belonging to the original owner. However, the Ran concludes that we should Paskin like what Rava held simple that the bread is forbidden after it’s given to him, and the Rashba adds that the Halacha is the same if he sold it to him, since it has the same reason.}

15) The very fact that the Mishna says that the pleasure of the returner’s wage falls to Hekdesh {Ran: and not like we usually say that it’s thrown into the dead sea} the Chiddush is that Konams are like Hekdesh that there’s Meila. In truth, it’s an argument between R’ Meir, who holds that there’s Meila and you can redeem it since it’s like Hekdesh (when it’s forbidden on everyone, but not if it’s only forbidden on an individual), and the Rabanan, who hold that there’s no Meila and you can’t redeem it. {The Ran says that the Halacha is like R’ Meir since the unnamed Mishna is like him, and in Mesectha Shvuos, they try to switch their opinions to have the majority hold that it’s Hekdesh. The Ran has a doubt if, according to R’ Meir, if someone does Meila with this item that has the Konam, does that cancel the Konam like Meila makes the item go to Chulin.}

16) If one makes a Konam that his bread should be forbidden to someone else, and he then gives it to the other as a gift; the giver didn’t do Meila since the bread wasn’t forbidden to him {Ran: says that this contradicts the Rambam’s opinion that when the one who made the Neder facilitates pleasure to the one that he forbade to have pleasure, he transgresses “you shall not profane your words.”} The receiver didn’t do Meila since he only wanted to receive Heter and not something prohibited {Ran explains: although all Meila is when the person doing Meila is having pleasure unwittingly, but that’s when they’re the one who takes it out Hekdesh’s possession, but here, he’s not removing it from anyone, but just receiving it. The conclusion is: there’s no Meila until} the receiver spends the money {Ran: by himself, and not receiving it from someone. The Yerushalmi has an inquiry if someone makes a Neder from bread, can he warm his hands with it?}

17) If someone makes a Neder not to have pleasure from a Kohein, the Kohein can bring his (or hers) birds for a Zav, Zavah or to give birth.

18) The Gemara inquires if Kohanim are Hashem's agents in the Avodah or ours? Although the Mishna allows the Kohein to bring the Korbanos of the one who made a Neder on him, so it can’t be his agent, we can reject that it only list the Korbanos to make one Tahor completely since we find a precedent that they can be brought without their consent, as R’ Yochanan Darshens from an extra phrase “Toras Hazav” that you bring the Korbanos of your minor children who need this Tahara. However, other Korbanos that need his consent, perhaps he can’t bring. {Ran says: you can’t bring a proof in the opposite direction that, the Mishna used only cases of people who needed Tahara, implying that the Kohein can’t bring other Korbanos. After all, we can say the Chiddush is that he’s even allowed to bring these Korbanos that the owner gets the added benefit that he can now eat Kodshim since the main agency is for Hashem, but this added benefit is just a side effect.}

19) We Darshen “Toras Hazav” the Korban of minors although you can’t have the same Drasha by “Toras Hayoledes,” since minors can’t give birth, and that’s why R’ Meir holds minors can have relations with a cotton contraceptive to prevent a pregnancy since she might get pregnant and it might kill her. {Ran: although she might not die, but in Yevamos we conclude: that having children are like having pubic hairs (and she becomes an adult by having a child).} We can say that it includes an insane lady who had a child, as R’ Yehuda holds that a husband brings his wife’s Korbanos {Ran: and his Chachumim agree by an insane wife because of this Drasha, and logic dictates that the husband brings it, or who else should be obligated? However, by a minor, it’s logical that her father is obligated to bring her Korbanos.}

20) Although we see that a Kohein who you made a Neder from can bring his Asham and Chatos; it may only be those that a Metzorah brings that’s part of those that are brought to complete his Tahara.

21) Although we see that a Kohein can make something Pigul unwittingly, and if he’s the Jew’s agent, he can say that he only sent him to be an agent to help him out and not to mess him up. {Ran says: but if he did it on purpose, it can, of course, Pasul it without any agency, since we Paskin that someone has the power to forbid someone else’s item through an action. However, when he did it unwittingly, he didn’t do it on his own terms, but just following his agency, and through changing what the owner wants, he cancels the agency. (However, if he’s the agent of Hashem, He makes him an agent under all circumstances.)} The Gemara answers that Pigul is different since the Torah includes it to always Pasul from the term “it shouldn’t be considered” in all cases. {Ran: therefore, the Gemara can’t bring a proof from a Mishna or Braisa, but the Gemara in Kiddushin resolves it from logic that the Kohanim are Hashem's agents in the Avodah, and not ours since, anything that you can't do personally, you can't appoint an agent for, and the Yisrael doesn't have any ability to bring a Korban.}

22) We had the logic; the Korbanos to make one Tahor completely can be brought without his consent since we find a precedent that they can be brought without their consent, that you bring the Korbanos of your minor children who need this Tahara. Although you can’t bring a Chatos for eating forbidden fat for your friend without his consent, although we allow you to bring the Korban of your insane wife; that’s because you can never bring a Chatos for eating the fats for your insane wife (and he can only bring her other Korbanos). After all, if he eats them when she’s insane, she’s exempt, and if she ate it before, then you can’t separate while she’s insane. As R’ Yochanan says that, if one separates a Korban and then goes insane, even after he becomes well again, the Korban is Pasul since, once it was pushed off from bringing, it remains always pushed off.

23) Although you can’t count someone on the Korban Pesach without their consent, but you can count your sons on it; since the concept of "a sheep per household" is not from the Torah {Ran: and minor children don't need to be counted from the Torah, since only those who can have themselves counted needs to be counted.} A proof to it, you can tell your sons that you're Shechting the Pesach for whoever gets to Yerushalayim first; the first one who came gets a share in the Pesach, and he makes all his brothers able to have a share, and if the concept of "a sheep per household" is from the Torah, how does it help for the brothers to be counted? {Ran: after all, even if you hold of Breira, and we say that the one who came up first was always counted on the Korban, how can this brother make all the others have a share if the Pesach was Shechted already,} since it’s now meat and people can only be counted on it before the Shechita. Therefore, although they all don’t need counting, the father only said it in this way to make them zealous to come up fast. (See Bach who asks from Gitten that the Gemara rejects the proof "a sheep per household" is not from the Torah since the father really had them all in mind to be counted, and he only said this to make them zealous to come up fast.)

24) Also, the one who you made a Neder from having pleasure from can separate Trumah for him.

25) We have an inquiry: if you can separate Trumah from your produce to exempt the produce of your friend without his knowledge, or not. Do we say that it’s a benefit for him and you don’t need his consent, or do we say that since it’s his own Mitzvah, he wants to do it himself. That which the one who he made a Neder to have pleasure from can separate Trumah for you, we don’t need to establish in a case where he separates it from his own produce without the owner’s consent (as if it would be with his consent, it would be considered to be his agent and is having pleasure from him to doing your agency). {The Ran quotes the Rashba: this would be permitted only according to Chanan who holds that, if you pay off someone’s loan, the borrower doesn’t owe anything. Therefore, the permission to eat your own produce without removing Trumah is similar to removing a loan. However, the Ran says: it could even be according to the Rabanan, but here, his main intent is to have available Trumah to give to his favorite Kohein, and allowing his produce to be eaten without removing Trumah is just a side effect.} Rather, we can even say that we refer to separating from the owner’s fruit and, although you need to be appointed an agent for that; it’s not like he’s having pleasure from your agency since we refer to a case when he says "anyone who wants to separate Trumah, may separate," which is not appointing anyone specific as an agent. {Ran says: only in this case it’s considered as it’s from the owner’s consent regarding Trumah, but it’s not an agent regarding Neder. However, if he says "all who hear me, separate Trumah," since that implies that you're making him your agent like they forbade when he forbids his wife to have pleasure that saying "all who hear me, feed her." Also, if he says "all who hear me, pay off my loan," needs to repay it even according to Chanan. Also it could be an agent regarding giving a Get. However, saying "anyone who separates won't lose out," is not appointing anyone specific as an agent similar to what we allow saying by the wife you made a Neder on "anyone who feeds her won't lose out." Also, we wouldn’t allow collecting from the borrower with this term according to R’ Meir.}

26) {Ran prefaces: if someone separated a Korban for a friend, but it got a blemish and he wants to redeem it} the owner who needs to add a fifth when he redeems the Hekdesh is the one who bought it, {Ran: since only the owner needs to add a fifth, and the one who made it Kodesh is considered the owner in this aspect. However, regarding Temurah, the one who is atoned is considered the owner}, so he can make the Temurah. Also, if someone takes Trumah from his produce to exempt his friend's produce, he has the pleasure to give it to the Kohein of his choice. {Ran says: the pleasure is that a Yisrael can pay him to give it to his grandson who’s a Kohein, but a Kohein himself can’t pay for the Trumah since this is like the problem of having a Kohein help in the granary for his portion of Trumah.}

27) The person that’s forbidden to have pleasure can teach him Medrish, but not P’sukim, since he didn’t give him pleasure {Ran: since Mitzvos are not given to have pleasure from}. One can’t take pay for teaching Medrish {Ran: unless it’s pay for the amount of work that you canceled from doing in order to teach}. Granted that you also can’t accept payment to teach P’sukim; Rav says that you’re accepting payment for watching the children {Ran says: although the child can have pleasure from the teacher, despite the Neder, since Beis Din is not commanded to prevent a child from doing prohibitions; but since he’s directly teaching them, it’s as if he fed the prohibition directly to the child, which is forbidden.} R’ Yochanan says that he can accept payment on teaching the Trup of the P’sukim {Ran explains: since he holds that the whole Trup is not from the Torah} (Rav doesn’t learn like R’ Yochanan since he holds that Trup is from the Torah. R’ Yochanan didn’t want to learn like Rav {Ran: since he seems that we refer to older people who don’t need to be watched, or it refers to all students, whether boys or girls, and girls don’t need much watching since it’s not normal for them to go outside.}) It’s only forbidden in cities where they take money for teaching P’sukim {Ran: since there are those cities that enacted not to take wages for teaching P’sukim since you might take it also for teaching Medrish. The Yerushalmi says that there’s no prohibition for taking money for teaching P’sukim since it’s only forbidden to take for teaching “precepts and laws.”}

28) {The Ran says that the Halacha is like R’ Yochanan against Rav, and therefore, you could accept wages for teaching Trup even from adults, and the Rambam Paskins the same way.}

29) You can accept wages for Shabbos if it’s absorbed with wages of other times. However, you can’t do it when it’s not absorbed. Therefore, such a watchman for Shabbos, since he can’t take wages, he doesn’t need to pay if it’s lost.

30) A child shouldn’t learn something that he didn’t learn yet on Shabbos, but only reviews what he already learned. It’s either because their fathers are off on Shabbos {Ran: and plays with the kids, and if they’ll learn new items on Shabbos, we’re afraid they’ll stop bringing them} Alternatively, it’s because they eat different foods on Shabbos, which is hard on the intestines, so not to bother them so much to learn new things, which needs them to pay more attention.

31) The one who he made a Neder not to have pleasure from can support his wife and kids, even though the husband is obligated to feed them {Ran: even according to the Rabanan of Chanan since he’s not giving it to fulfill the husband’s obligation, but as a Mitzvah of Tzedaka, and the pleasure that comes to the husband is just a side effect.}

32) The one who made a Neder not to have pleasure from someone can’t marry his Naarah daughter since he’s giving him his daughter as a maid to work for her and he’ll have pleasure from it, but he can marry a Bogeres, which is on her own will. {Ran says: since she’s not under the father’s auspices, he doesn’t hand him the daughter as a maid to work for him, but everything is done because she says so. Alternatively, if the father gives her advice to marry him, we don’t consider it the husband’s having pleasure since it’s all according to her will, and not the groom’s will, I.e., as long as the groom didn’t ask the father to talk to him on his behalf.}

33) If someone made a Neder from having pleasure from his son for Torah {Ran: so that he doesn’t need to stop his Torah learning to help him} he can still fill up a barrel with water, light a candle and to roast a small fish. {Ran says: since he didn’t intend to forbid these small actions. The Yerushalmi says: also, for women and important people who it’s not normal for them to take objects from the marketplace, they may do so (since he didn’t have it in mind to forbid these actions).}

34) The same is true that one who has a Neder on him, he can pass a “peace cup” to the one who can’t have pleasure from him. (Either it’s a cup that they drink by the mourners, or what they drink when exiting a bathhouse.) {Ran says: just like the above Neder for Torah, these small actions are not included in the Neder. It must be that the cups don’t belong to him, or else he had a lot of pleasure from him.}

35) The one who the Neder was made on can’t feed his Kosher animals, nor his non-Kosher animals since he can sell the dead body for more to a non-Jew when it dies if it was fattened. R’ Eliezer allows to feed the non-Kosher animal since he can’t eat it anyhow {Ran: but only the extra that’s more than it needs to live. Otherwise, your feeding allows it to do work for him.} However, everyone agrees that he can feed his slave (what’s not needed to sustain him to work) since you can’t have pleasure from his fattened dead body.

36) If one becomes sick and the other comes to visit him, he can only visit standing, but not sitting. Shmuel establishes the case that the visitor’s property is forbidden to the sick person. Since one is not entitled for wages when he stands, so when the sick doesn’t pay, it’s not like keeping money he owes {Ran: and we can’t forbid the actual visit since the visitor just wants to do the Mitzvah, and the pleasure of the visit comes by itself.} However, he can’t sit down in the places where they accept wages for such visits, since it’s not an obligation to visit that long as to sit with him, it’s forbidden, and in places that they don’t accept wages {Ran: since they enacted not to since you might accept it when you visit standing} we can still say it’s forbidden since we’re worried that you’ll stay for a very long time {Ran: since he can definitely take wages for a very long visit. However, we don’t need to worry that you will stay that long visiting standing, since there’s a distinction not to stay that long by knowing that you can only stand and not sit.}

37) Ulla establishes the case that the property of the sick person is forbidden to the visitor. However, {Ran: even if unspecified in the Neder, we assume} someone doesn’t make a Neder to forbid what he needs to live. Therefore, he never made the Neder to forbid his needs that, if he gets sick, the other can visit him. However, he doesn’t need too much for the visitor to sit, so it’s forbidden. {Ran says: however, Shmuel held that the sick even needs the visitor to sit, so it should be permitted.} However, this is only for his own life, but not for his son’s life. Therefore, the person can’t enter his house to visit the son, but ask about his welfare in the marketplace.

38) {Ran Paskins that the Halacha is like Shmuel, therefore, the visitor may sit with the sick person who made a Neder for him not to have pleasure from him since he didn’t make it when he needs it. However, this doesn’t apply if the visitor made the Neder, since he doesn’t make exceptions for what the other person needs for his life. However, if the sick can’t have pleasure from the visitor, he can’t come to sit to visit even if it’s in a place where they don’t receive wages for it, since he might sit there for a long time. It’s only something like the visit is permitted because his main intent is for the Mitzvah, but you can’t give him items that he needs even if he intends it for the Miztvah. Therefore, we say that, if the one who he makes the Neder on needs food, he can’t directly give it to him, but have him get it from a storekeeper (and you’ll pay for it later), or handing the food to a third party.}

39) There’s no amount given for visiting the sick, and even a great person must visit a lesser person. If someone doesn’t visit, it’s like he spilled blood since he won’t Daven for him to live or die {Ran: i.e., if he’s terminally ill and in great pain, you should Daven for him to die.} You shouldn’t visit in the first three hours of the day {Ran: since he’s extra healthy during that time, so you might not Daven for him since you didn’t see how sick he really is}, nor during the last three hours of the day {Ran: since he’s the weakest then, you might give up on his recovery and won’t Daven.}

40) Rav held that you can tell that it rained in Eretz Yisrael by seeing the river Pras expanded {Ran: and therefore, you need to worry that there’s more rain than its natural running water, and therefore, has a status of Mikvah, which is Pasul since it’s running.} This argues with Shmuel who says that the river gets blessed from its source (and there is always an abundance of spring water).{Ran says: even though it's obvious that the extra water comes from the rain, it's as we say in Taanis that when you have a Tefach of rain, you have two Tefachim coming up from below, from the water tables, so the natural running water is always the majority and is Kosher when running.} Shmuel himself seems to argue on his first statement since he says: rivers don't make people Tahor while it's flowing but during Tishrei. {Ran says: only by rivers like Pras that never run dry, or else we need to worry that there’s no running water at all. Also, only by Tishrei, when it usually doesn’t rain, you can assume that the majority of the water is its natural running water even if you’re not an expert in the size of the river year round. However, if you’re an expert, you can assess if there’s more natural running water than rain water even during the rainy season.} Shmuel's father made Mikvos, (where the water is trapped between four walls), for his daughters during Nissan since he didn't want to rely on them Toiveling in the flowing river (that's only Kosher when the water comes from underground spring water and not from rain water), since the rain water might be more than the natural spring water.

41) {The Ran says: regarding the Halacha, we rely on this opinion of Shmuel that it’s Kosher when it flows, as we see the Rabanan and R’ Meir hold that the reason the river is named 'Pras' since its waters are Paru V'rubu, they grow. (Also, all other rivers come from the Pras, as we say that, if you make a Neder from the Pras, you’re forbidden with all rivers.) It only seems that it’s only when the rivers never run dry. However, the Rif and R’ Chananel Paskin that it’s Pasul. Granted that the Rabanan and R’ Meir Paskin like Shmuel, but Rav wouldn’t argue if he didn’t know that there were Tannaim who argue. Therefore, the Halacha is like Rav when he argues with Shmuel, and there’s even a contradiction to what was Shmuel’s opinion In order to reconcile, we must say that he held that it’s really permitted, but you shouldn’t really rely on it and be stringent, therefore, that should be the way we should be accustomed to do.}

42) {The Raavad held that it’s only Pasul to Toivel in the area where it became wider because of the rain, but you can Toivel in the middle where the river always runs. However, the Rambam Pasuls by a river, and the Heter to Toivel in the “first place” only refers to the pit where the spring emerges from, since that never had more rain water, but you need to worry about the rest of the flowing river.}

43) {Ran also says: we Paskin like R’ Yossi that you can’t close up the flow of a spring to make a Mikvah through items that are susceptible to Tumah, (although R’ Yehuda permits). Also, salty waters and melted snow are permitted when flowing.}

44) If the doctor’s forbidden to the sick person, he can still heal him {Ran: since he intends to do the Mitzvah and the pleasure comes by itself. (We must say that it’s only when he uses the sick person’s herbs, but he can’t give his own medicine since it’s forbidden to actually give items, as we said earlier. However, when the sick one made the Neder, then all is permitted since he didn’t make it on what he needs to live.)} However, he can’t heal his property (I.e., animals) {Ran says: we must say that there’s another doctor, but he may still use him for his own body since not every doctor can heal him. However, if there’s only one doctor, he can also heal the animal since it’s a Mitzvah of returning a lost object. (See R’ Akiva Eiger who asks: it’s not similar to a lost object since the object is healthy, but you just need to save it from a side peril of being lost. However, when the animal is sick, you’re improving the animal so it’s like fattening his animal, which is forbidden.)}

45) The doctor is allowed to say which medicine is beneficial and which medicine is detrimental.

46) R’ Yehuda holds that they can bathe together in a large bath, but not in a small one {Ran: since he gives him pleasure by making the water rise and soaks more of his body, but the water doesn’t rise that much in a large bath to give pleasure to his friend.} However, R’ Meir forbade both since he enacted to forbid a large bath since they might come to permit even a small one.

47) R’ Yehuda holds that they can sleep together in a large bed or, even in a small one in the summer, but not in a small one during the winter (since their bodies will warm each other). However, R’ Meir forbade all of them since he enacted to forbid a large bed since they might come to permit even a small bed. He also enacted to forbid during the summer since they might come to permit even during the winter.

48) They can eat at the same table {Ran: and we don’t worry that he’ll eat from the other one’s food.} However, but not off the same plate {Ran: since he might come to eat from the other one.} However, they could eat from a plate where the leftovers get returned to the host, since, whatever they eat, they’re eating from the host and not from his friend.

49) However, they can’t eat from a trough {Ran: i.e., that the employer places before his employees, since he might eat from what was given for the other. This doesn’t have the above Heter since the leftovers don’t return back to the owner.}

50) The Tanna Kama says that it’s permitted to do work together from a distance {Ran: if they’re digging together, the digging of one won’t help the other at that distance to soften the soil} but not close together. R’ Meir forbids at a distance since they might come to permit even when they’re close to each other.

51) If a person forbids his object on others, he could forbid it even when it leaves his possession. Therefore, if he tells his son that he makes a Konam from him having pleasure from him, if he dies, his son inherits him. However, if he explicitly says “in my lifetime and death,” he can’t inherit his father. This is only if he says “these items of my property,” but if he only says “my property,” it implies that he’s only forbids it while it’s still his property.

52) Thus, if someone forbids someone to have pleasure from his property before Shvious, if he says “these properties,” it remains forbidden even during Shvious (and it’s only permitted if he makes the Neder during Shvious since it no longer belongs to him). However, if he only says “my property,” it’s permitted on Shvious since it’s no longer his, but Hefker, so the Issur goes away.

53) However, it’s only permitted to gather the fruit that’s dangling over the street, but you can’t enter his field to gather them. Although the Torah also made his field Hefker to allow people to go into it to gather; Ulla answers; we refer to a case where he only wants to gather the fruit that are on the border. Since you don’t need to enter the field to gather them, the Torah didn’t make it Hefker for you to enter. R’ Shimon b. Elyakim answers: even though you’re really allowed to enter in order to gather the fruit, but we’re afraid that you might stay there standing there longer than necessary to gather the fruit, which the Torah didn’t make it Hefker for that. {Ran says: although, by visiting the sick, they didn’t enact to forbid standing there more than necessary, (and they only enacted to forbid sitting there since you might sit there longer); that’s because it’s normal to visit by sitting, so, by standing, you have a distinction to remind you not to overstay. However, it’s normal to stand when gathering the fruit, so there’s no distinction, and you might come to stay longer.}

54) If someone makes a Neder from his friend, they can’t lend each other items, they can’t lend each other money, and they can’t sell or buy from each other. Although it seems that only the one who the Neder was made on should be forbidden; R’ Yossi b. Chanina explains: we refer to a case where they both made a Neder on the other. {Ran says: the Chiddush of this statement, according to this, that it’s like R’ Eliezer who forbids pleasure that people just allow out of hand. (We must say that lending items, to fit in this category, are items that people wouldn’t rent.} Abaya answers: they forbid borrowing from the permitted person, since he might lend to him too.{Ran explains: this is only these things that are not very simple that they should be forbidden (since they’re not much of a pleasure) so people will confuse them and think it’s permitted to the one who’s forbidden; but to eat their food, which is a real pleasure, no one would make a mistake, so we say later that the permitted one can eat the food of the forbidden person. Although we permitted earlier for the one who’s permitted to buy from the forbidden one what’s a hot seller, and sell him something that doesn’t have much demand, and we don’t forbid it to both of them like we do over here; the Ramban answers: that’s because there he forbade himself on all the Jews, so they didn’t want to forbid it completely since it’s a great bother to only do business with non-Jews, but here it’s only forbidden to one Jew, we can make the decree to forbid since it’s not much of a bother.}

55) If the cow’s owner doesn’t want to lend his cow out to someone. The potential borrower got mad and made a Neder never to plow with that cow. If he was accustomed to be the one to plow his field, then it’s only forbidden for him to plow his field with the cow, but someone else can do it for him {Ran: since we assume that he only made a Neder for him personally doing the plowing}. However, if he’s not accustomed to plow his own field {Ran: so we should assume his Neder was that no one should plow his field with this cow}, no one can plow for him with this cow.

56) The person who the oath forbids is also permitted to go to a storekeeper ({Ran even to one} who the oath-maker is a steady customer) and tell him that "his customer had made an oath to forbid him from his property, so what can I do?" The storekeeper, knowing that the oath-maker wants him to feed this person, can give him food and then collect the money from the oath-maker, {Ran since the oath-maker didn't make him an agent to feed that person even if he usually buys from him on credit. However, this is only if he wants to repay it, but he can’t force it or else he would have been his agent to feed him. Not only by food, but even} if he needs to build his house or make his fence, he can say this before workers and they go and collect it from the one who made the Neder.

57) If the oath-maker and oath's subject are walking in the desert; the Tanna Kama allows the oath-maker to give a gift to a third party and then that person gives it to the oath's subject. If there is no third party there, then he needs to make it Hefker, and the oath's subject acquires it from Hefker. R' Yossi forbids.

58) R’ Yochanan originally wanted to say the reason for R’ Yossi since Hefker works the same way as a gift, that it doesn’t leave the possession of the first owner until it comes into the possession of the second owner. Thus, when the forbidden one acquires it from Hefker, it’s really acquiring it from his friend who he’s forbidden to have pleasure from. Although we say that the forbidden person may take what the other made Hefker before the Neder, and according to this, it’s really acquiring it from his friend who he’s forbidden to have pleasure from; we must say that the one who made the Neder didn’t have in mind to forbid items that he already made Hefker. However, this was disproved. {Ran’s text: the case is that a deathly ill who gave his property to two of his slaves, he wrote to the first one part of his property, and the second one got all of his property. Therefore, the first one doesn’t get anything since the part that he left out could be the slave himself and can’t acquire anything for himself. However, the second one was given everything, so he acquires himself, and we don’t say that he left out half that he wrote for the first one and we don’t say the logic that he’s not giving over what he already gave to someone else.}

59) Therefore, Rava answers: the reason for R’ Yossi since {Ran: we know for sure as if there are witnesses to the fact he only made it Hefker so that the other could acquire it.} This is like the gift of Beis Charon {Ran: that it was only given to a third party for him to give it to his father who he made a Neder on. However, this is not applicable to items that were made Hefker before the Neder, so that’s why he may take them.}

60) We have a Braisa: if you made your land Hefker, he may renege on it for the first three days. {Ran explains: this is a rabbinical enactment to thwart the tricksters who make it Hefker to acquire it for themselves immediately afterwards in order to exempt it from Trumah and Maasar. So, we’re worried that it wasn’t a true Hefker since it was only done as a trick. Therefore, even if someone else takes it, he can renege. (Although the reason for that enactment is not applicable when someone else takes it; but if he can’t renege then, he won’t consider it not Hefker either when he takes it himself.) However, after three days it leaves his possession and he can’t renege.}

61) However, the end of the Braisa is: if he says that the field should be Hefker for Sunday only, it’s Hefker right away. {Ran says: you don’t need to worry that he’s trying to make a trick and wants to retake it right away, or else why did he made it Hefker for a limited time.} However, until someone takes it, he can renege on the Hefker, which seems like R’ Yossi {Ran says: according to our original explanation, that it doesn’t leave your possession until it’s taken.} However, the first part of the Braisa implies that, once the Hefker takes effect, you can’t renege, which implies like the Rabanan that it does leave your possession.

62) Ulla answers: the whole Braisa is like the Rabanan; but the end case is different since it’s uncommon to make it Hefker for a limited time. {Ran explains: since he shows that he doesn’t really want to make it Hefker that much, so he doesn’t want it to leave his possession until someone else takes it, and even R’ Yossi’s Rabanan agree in this case.}

63) Reish Lakish says that it’s like R’ Yossi, and the reason why, in the first case, that he can’t renege from the Hefker, so people shouldn’t forget about the Halachos of Hefker {Ran: since it doesn’t leave the first owner’s possession until it comes into the other one’s possession, people won’t realize that Hefker exempts from Maasar, and he’ll come to separate from obligated produce (that you didn’t make Hefker) on exempt produce (that you made Hefker). The reason why R’ Yossi, in truth, doesn’t compare it to a gift that’s obligated in Maasar, since anyone can acquire it and the owner doesn’t have a choice, so it’s not like he gave it as a gift to someone, so we consider the acquirer as acquiring from Hefker.} The reason they didn’t enact this from the first day is because the tricksters {Ran: like we explained earlier, who only made it Hefker to exempt from Maasar.}

64) When you separate Maasar from the produce of the Hefker field (of less than three days), you need to separate only from that produce, and not from any other produce, or else we need to worry that he’ll separate from exempt produce on obligated produce. {Ran explains: since the world thinks that it was really Hefker and thus, really exempt from the Torah, and if you use other produce, they’ll separate from produce grown in unperforated flowerpots that’s only obligated rabbinically. (Although the rabbis have a way to make the produce exempt too by making the produce Hefker, since Beis Din has the power to make things Hefker. However, it’s not logical to say that they want to do that since they’re trying to make it stringent that it’s not Hefker.)}

65) Although we have a Braisa that, if someone made his field Hefker and got up early and (reacquires it and ) harvested it, it’s obligated in Peret, Ollilos, Shichicha and Pe’ah {Ran: although they’re all exempt when Hefker, but we have an extra word “leave it over” to obligate if he reacquires it}; but exempt from Maasar (even though it wasn’t three days); we must say that it only means that it’s exempt from the Torah, but, in truth, the rabbis made it still obligated. We can say that even Reish Lakish agrees to this since he only holds that it’s obligated from the Torah according to R’ Yossi, and not according to the Rabanan. {Ran says: even according to R’ Yossi, it’s only obligated from the Torah when he takes it back unqualified, since he holds that it’s a reneging of the Hefker, but is exempt from the Torah if he says explicitly that he’s acquiring it from Hefker.}

66) Alternatively, {Ran prefaces: even R’ Yossi didn’t say that it’s obligated from the Torah} only when he made it Hefker before two people or less. As R’ Yochanan quotes R’ Shimon b. Yehotzadok: Hefker before two people is not Hefker, but it’s Hefker if done before three people. (R’ Yehoshua b. Levi says that, from the Torah, Hefker before one is Hefker, but rabbinically, you need it to be Hefker before three so that one acquires it and two should witness it.) {Ran says: when you make it Hefker before three, they spread rumors to the Hefker, and therefore, it’s Hefker to all. However, when he only makes Hefker before two, it doesn’t cause rumors, so it’s like he made it Hefker to these two people only, so it’s like a gift to one of them, so it doesn’t leave your possession until one takes it.}

67) {The Ran says that the Halacha is like Ulla’s explanation that you’re not allowed to renege (after the Hefker takes effect) except for Hefker for a set amount of time that’s uncommon, like we explained. It’s not like Reish Lakish’s explanation who explains it like R’ Yossi according to the explanation that it doesn’t leave his possession until someone else takes it, since that reason was already disproved. The Halacha is like R’ Yehoshua b. Levi against R’ Yochanan, and the Rambam Paskins the same way.}