1) There are four Nedarim that the rabbis permitted. One of them is the “zealous Neder.” Like in the case where the seller vows that the money should be forbidden to him if he receives less than a Selah (four Dinrim) for the object, and the buyer vows that the object should be forbidden to him if he needs to give more than a Shekel (two Dinrim) for it; we say that they both want to get a compromised three Dinrim. {The Ran says: he never vowed in order for it to take effect, but only for the other one to be zealous to move from his position. Since this is a normal procedure, it’s not considered as “something that’s only in one’s heart” that’s not considered anything. The Yerushalmi says that it’s only if he didn’t keep to his position, but if he did and said that he really meant to make it if he needed to give an inch, the vow takes effect. Also, it’s not exact to say if it’s exactly the mean between the two amounts, for three Dinrim, but as long as it’s more than a Shekel and less than a Selah. However, you can’t sell for an exact Selah or Shekel, since they swore for it not to be those amounts. Others say that the vow doesn’t take effect at all, even for those amounts. The Tosefta says that it’s forbidden to make such vows in the first place since it’s included in the prohibition of “don’t profane your words,” and the Rambam Paskins like that.}

2) This is not only like R’ Tarfon who held that Naziris takes effect only when he knew it will definitely take effect. Therefore, if someone says that he’ll be a Nazir if a certain person is a Nazir, and the other says that he’ll be a Nazir only if the other is not a Nazir, neither is a Nazir since it’s not a definite Naziris {Ran: and we have a Hekish from Nazir to Nedarim}. Therefore, this Neder that’s made through a condition is not definite and shouldn’t take effect. However, it’s even according to the Rabanan, since he only made the vow to make the other one zealous to change his position. {The Ran explains why, in the Gemara’s original thought, it might be R’ Tarfon, although the reason that’s given is because they both want three Dinrin (and not because it’s not a definite vow); since R’ Tarfon may only hold that it doesn’t take effect when they both can’t be Nazirs, but here both of them can take effect when it’s between a Shekel and Selah, and they want it to go to three Dinrim, so it’s assumed that it will lead to both vows to take effect and it’s considered as a definite vow, so we’re taught not like that.}

3) There’s an unresolved inquiry {Ran: and, thus, we should be strict} if he says that it should be more than a Selah, or less than a Shekel, if it takes effect. {The Ran’s first explanation, if you said a very small amount more, or less, like a Pruta’s amount. Since he was so exact in the amount, he means to make the vow. The second explanation: the seller says five Dinrim, and the buyer said one Dinar, since they’re so far apart, they meant to swear.}

4) There’s no proof that, in a case where someone was trying to convince another to eat a meal by him, and the other vows that he won’t come into his house and drink cold water; he may drink the water since he only intended to forbid a large eating and drinking {Ran: and it’s comparable to the other case since he was so exact and also he made a large distance between the offer and the vow, and we still say that it’s not his intent.} After all, over there, a Tzadik says little and does much {Ran: and he’s afraid if he’ll agree to take a drink of water, he’ll give him a full meal.} However, here, he might have been exact when he made the vow.

5) The rabbis made these Nedarim permitted by themselves without asking a Chachum to permit it.

6) R’ Assi says that a Chachum can only permit a Neder that’s similar to the four Nedarim {Ran: that it’s not just permitted through regret without some opening why he wouldn’t have made the vow if he knew then what he knows now.} However, R’ Huna did allow an opening of regret, asking if he regrets his action. {The Ran explains: it must be that he regretted making the vow in the first place. However, if he was fine with making the Neder originally, but he only regrets that it’s still upon him, then it doesn’t help. After all, why does he need to give an opening if we know that he regrets it at the moment since he’s coming to get it permitted.}

7) Rabbah b. R’ Huna permitted a Neder with an opening “if ten people would have tried to appease you at the time, would you have vowed?” {The Ran explains: this is worse than a regular opening where the reason actually existed, even if it was unknown to you, but here it didn’t exist since there weren’t ten people trying to appease, so you didn’t make a mistake what really happened. However, it’s better than just regret, since it’s a factor that you might not have vowed in the first place because of it.}

8) R’ Yochanan permitted a vow a mother made on her daughter “would you have vowed if people would now suspect your daughter for doing unbecoming things since, otherwise, why would a mother make a vow against her?” {Ran brings the Yerushalmi that R’ Simai permitted a vow with the opening “would you have vowed if you would have known that you will have a reputation that you are one who makes vows and people will distance themselves from you?”}

9) R’ Yanai permitted with an opening “would you have vowed if you would have realized that Heaven will think of you as someone trying to portray himself as extra pious that you won’t stumble to transgress your vow, and they’ll be looking at your actions more closely.”

10) However,we shouldn’t make openings like those of R’ Yannai, and not like R’ Gamleil who opened by saying “would you vow if you would realize that all who vows are fit to be stabbed with a spear?” {The Ran explains: since he sinned by vowing, he’s embarrassed to say that he doesn’t regret it, so he’ll lie saying that he really regrets it.} Nor with an opening that “all who vow is as if he constructed a Bama, and if he fulfills it {Ran: and doesn’t ask a Chachum to permit it} it’s as if he brought a Korban on it.” {The Ran explains: even though one might think that bringing a Korban on a Bama is a Mitzvah, but in truth, the Torah forbids it and Hashem doesn’t want it; and the same is true that you shouldn’t make more things forbidden with vows (and it’s enough what the Torah forbade) and Hashem doesn’t want it}. Some say that the first part, that it’s as if you built a Bamah, you can use as an opening {Ran: since it’s not much of a sin, so you won’t be embarrassed to say that you don’t regret it}, but in the second case, that it’s like you brought a Korban, Abaya held it’s a valid opening, and Rava held it to be invalid. Others say that you can’t open with that last statement, and Abaya and Rava argue with the first statement.

11) You also can’t open like Shmuel that, even if you keep your vow, you’re considered to be a Rasha.

12) R’ Assi held that a Chachum can’t permit a swearing in the name of Hashem. {Ran says: although this seems to be an argument between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel, where Beis Hillel allows, and you can’t say that they only argue whether you can permit it from the Torah, but they both agree you can’t from the Rabanan, since Beis Shammai only forbids from the Rabanan. We must say that R’ Assi didn’t held the way we established the argument that it’s regarding swearing. Alternatively, they argue whether, if, B’dieved, a Chachum permit it, if it’s permitted (and Beis Shammai held it remains forbidden). However, all agree that the Chachum can’t L’chatchila permit it.} The exception is when he made a Neder on his wife because she steals money from his wallet, or hit his children, and finds out that it wasn’t true. {The Ran explains: we must say that he validates the swearing that he would have swore anyhow, even if it wasn’t true, or else it would be a mistaken swearing that it doesn’t even need to be permitted by a Chachum. Also, it’s only permitted here with a combination that it’s leading to marital harmony and it’s similar to a mistaken swearing. This is not like the Rashba who says that it’s only because of marital harmony and he can permit it even if it’s true that the wife steals or beats the kids (and the Gemara only used it since it’s the language of the Mishna).} Therefore, if he swear with ‘Mohi’ (that’s a nickname for a swearing), the Chachum can’t permit, and of course, he can’t permit when he swears in the name of Hashem. {Ran brings the text that they can permit by ‘Mohi,’ and only forbids when swearing in the name of Hashem.}

13) However, Rava quotes R’ Nachman that you can open with just asking if he regrets it, and you can permit swearing in the name of Hashem. {The Ran says: even if he held a holy object when he swore. After all, the swearing is only done by his words, and the holy object was only to put fear in him, and not like one Goan held. However, R’ Hai Goan held not to open with just regret, but only with a real good open, and not like the weak one that we say later “if you knew that you would bother the Chachamim to try to find an opening for you.” The Rav and prince of Albargiloni held that a Chachum can only permit a Neder for a Mitzvah, (but we don’t care how a husband annuls his wife’s vows).}

14) {The Ran says: if he makes a vow to fast many fasts, and he needs to get it permitted, you should only do it with an opening, so that he doesn’t need to regret his original vow to fast and lose the reward for the other ones.}

15) There were Tannaim and Amaraim who allowed with an opening “if you would have known that you would bother the Chachamim to try to find an opening for you, would you have vowed?” {The Ran says: this is not considered an opening for something that didn’t happen yet at the time of the vow since it’s very common for it to happen.}

16) If he made a vow on his wife if she marries their daughter off to her relatives, (since he wants her to marry his relatives), and she didn’t listen and married her off to her relatives, we can permit it with an opening that he wouldn’t have vowed if he knew his wife would transgress his words. {The Ran says that this needs an opening and it’s not automatically doesn’t take effect like all “zealous vows.” After all, there, he doesn’t want it to be exactly a Selah, but he’s fine with receiving less, but here he wants her not to marry the daughter off to her relatives, and he cares very much that she shouldn’t. (However, if he doesn’t care that much, like he wants to force his wife to eat with him, we can say that it’s only a “zealous vow” and doesn’t need to be permitted by a Chachum, as we’ll say later.)}

17) {The Ran says: we know that the Chachum permitting can be a individual expert or three laymen. The Ramban held from the Sugya in Bechoros that R’ Yehuda held that one of the three laymen must be a Chachum. R’ Nachman qualifies; like himself who’s learned and can analyze logically. This implies that the individual expert must be greater than that, so he must also have Smicha. Therefore, we can deduce from R’ Yehuda’s opinion what the Rabanan held; that the individual expert must have Smicha. Also, according to R’ Yehuda, the other two laymen must be able to analyze even though they’re not learned, that the Rabanan held that all three laymen must be that way and not complete Am Ha’aratzim. However, the Rambam held that an individual expert doesn’t need Smicha, therefore, he must have learned R’ Nachman explaining the individual expert according to the Rabanan, and not R’ Yehuda’s Chachum of the three laymen.}

18) If someone wants his Nedarim not to be binding all year round, he should make a condition on Rosh Hashana that all Neders made will be canceled, and it helps as long as he doesn’t remember the condition when he’s making the Neder {Ran: or else, why is he making the Neder if he realizes it won’t be anything. Although it seems that, if you make a Neder right after you made the condition “if you don’t eat from me” (if it’s not only a “zealous vow), that the Neder is canceled, although he definitely remember the condition, and we don’t say that making the Neder cancels his original cancellation; since it was made right after the cancellation, he definitely didn’t make the cancellation in order to cancel it right away. Alternatively, in this case, he didn’t make the Neder in vain since it was made to make his friend zealous to eat with him (even if we don’t say it would be automatically canceled without making the condition beforehand for being a “zealous vow). However, Nedarim that are made that are only applicable to himself, he definitely made it to cancel his condition, or else there’s no reason to make it. This is not like the Rashba who wants to differentiate between a Talmid Chachum and Am Ha’aretz making the Nedarim.}

19) Rava held: if you made a condition on Rosh Hashana to cancel a certain Neder, but all other Nedarim will take effect, and you remembered the condition, but you forgot on which Neder the condition was on; if you say explicitly that you’re making the Neder on your original condition, and if it came out that this was the certain Neder that you canceled, then it’s canceled. However, without saying it, the condition is canceled completely and the Neder takes effect in all cases. {Ran says: this is the Halacha and the Rambam Paskins the same way.}

20) However, you shouldn’t Darshen this Halacha that a condition can cancel a Neder to the masses in order that they shouldn’t take Nedarim lightly. {The Ran says: the ‘Kol Nidrei’ we say Yom Kippur night seems to be enacted to cancel future Nedarim, but the language seems to infer to permit past Nedarim. R’ Tam fixed the text to imply future Nedarim, but the Ran concludes not to say it, like we say here, in order not to have the masses make light of Nedarim.}

21) {The Ran brings that the Rambam quotes an argument between the Gaonim if this condition helps for swearing, or just for vows. Tosfos says that it helps only for vows he made by himself, but if he accepts upon himself a vow that someone places on him, the condition doesn’t help since you’re not vowing on your own terms, but on the terms of the one placing it upon you.}

22) R’ Elazar b. Yaakov held: if someone makes a vow from his friend if he doesn’t eat with him, it doesn’t take effect since it’s a “zealous vow” and was only made to threaten the friend to eat by him. There’s an inquiry if the Rabanan argue with him {Ran: since a “zealous vow” may be only in the case where the one who makes the vow doesn’t necessarily want it to be the outcome, like when he vows if he gets less than a Selah, he’s really satisfied by getting three Dinrim, but here, the one who makes the vow didn’t get what he wanted, I.e., that the friend eats with him.} Also, if they argue, they have an inquiry who to Paskin like.

23) There’s no proof from a Braisa where someone said that “Konam to have pleasure from you if you don’t take a Kur of grain and two barrels of wine,” that the Neder can be permitted without a Chachum by having the receiver say “you only made a Neder to honor me (with this gift) and my honor is my will not to accept the gift.” {Ran: that you wanted to give me, and I don’t want to accept. However, R’ Meir held that he’s still forbidden. The Yerushalmi explains it: if he says that it’s for the receiver’s honor, everyone agrees that he can decline it, and if he says it’s for his own honor for his friend to accept the gift, it’s definitely forbidden. They only argue when he makes the Neder unqualified. R’ Meir assumes it’s for the giver’s honor, and the Rabanan assumes it’s for the receiver’s honor.} This implies that, if it wasn’t for the fact that it was done for the receiver’s honor, the Neder takes effect and it’s not only a “zealous vow.” However, we can reject it since, in that case, he doesn’t want to feel like a dog that only takes from his friend and doesn’t give. {Ran explains: but this is not applicable in a regular case of your friend not eating from you, since you vow that he can’t have pleasure anymore from you just like he’s not taking pleasure from me now, and not like here when he saying that he won’t take anymore pleasure from him so it wouldn’t be a one sided relationship. Others explain: this is only applicable by a big gift since he wouldn’t give it unless he got from him the past. However people will invite people to eat with him without getting anything in the past, so he won’t be a dog if the friend doesn’t accept.}

24) There’s also no proof from the following: if he makes a Konam that his friend can’t have pleasure from him if he doesn’t give a gift to my son,” the Neder can be permitted without a Chachum by having the one who made the vow say “it’s as if I accepted it.” (However, R’ Meir forbids it.) {The Ran explains: this is only if the son is being supported by him, so then he can say that it’s as if he accepted it, since he’s the one who will need to provide this part of the support to the son if he didn’t get it from the friend. However, if he’s not supported by the father, then it’s not on the father to say that it’s like he accepted it, since he’s not the one to lose by it, but only the son.} This implies without saying “it’s as if I accepted it,” it takes effect and it’s not only a “zealous vow.” After all, that’s different since he doesn’t want to be like a king that always gives and never receives. {The Rashba says that he can only say “it’s as if I accepted it” by here in place of doing an action, since, even if he gave the gift, the receiver can give it back. However, this wouldn’t work if he says “unless you don’t walk to a certain place,” if he says “I consider it as if you didn’t walk there.” There are those who argue since he could say that he only made the vow so that you do my will, and since I don’t care about it anymore, you have fulfilled my will.}

25) There’s also no proof from the Braisa that, if he vowed pleasure if he doesn’t come to eat, and some Onness happened that he couldn’t come, like he became sick, it doesn’t take effect, implying it takes effect without an Onness and we don’t say it’s only a “zealous vow.” After all, we can establish the case that the friend was begging to eat by him and he made him make the vow, and the homeowner accepted the vow {Ran: since the friend made him make the vow to get invited, he didn’t make it to encourage him to come.}

26) However, we find a Braisa that R’ Elazar b. Yaakov says: more than this, if he says “a Konam that I won’t have pleasure from you if you don’t be a guest by me and eat hot bread and drink a warm drink;” it’s only a “zealous vow”, but the Chachumim don’t agree. This proves that the Chachumim argue. {The Ran explains why this is “more than” our Mishna. According to the explanation earlier the difference between when it takes effect and when it doesn’t, that it only doesn’t take effect when he says you won’t have pleasure from me, but when he says that I won’t have pleasure from you, it takes effect since I don’t want to be like a dog and only take; here we’re retracting that and saying that, even in this case where the person says “I won’t have pleasure from you,” he’s not forbidden since it’s a “zealous vow” and we don’t say it does take effect so that he won’t be a dog. However, according to the differentiation that it takes effect for big gifts, but not for small eatings; here too it’s a small gift of a meal, and if it’s a big gift, we won’t retract from saying it takes effect because he wants not to be like a dog. The reason this case is greater than the other one since he mentions the bread and warm drink, I might say that he’s being exact and wants it to take effect; so we’re taught otherwise.}

27) {The Ran says that some text say that this is a proof that the Rabanan argue completely, and some text say that it’s no proof since the Rabanan may only argue in this case in the Braisa, which is more of a reason to forbid than the Mishna’s case.}

28) Also, a proof is from what R’ Huna Paskins like R’ Elazar b. Yaakov, so we must say that the Rabanan argue. {Ran quotes his Rebbis: we assume he’s referring to the Mishna, since it wouldn’t be a proof if he said it on the Braisa. The Ran explains: our whole question is, maybe that we shouldn’t Paskin like R’ Elazar b. Yaakov if the Rabanan, who are the majority, argues with him. However, once we say that the Halacha is like him, even if they only argue with the Braisa, we know that the Halacha is like him in all aspects. Also, we should assume he also Paskins like him in the Mishna, since he said it unqualified.}

29) {The Ran says: according to this, according to the explanation that he reversed from what he held that it takes effect when he doesn’t want to be like a dog; we say the Halacha that it’s still a “zealous vow” that doesn’t take effect even in a case where we could say that he doesn’t want to be like a dog. (However, we can still say that it takes effect in a case where he doesn’t want to be like a king, since we can say that R’ Elazar b. Yaakov agrees to it.) However, according to the explanation that they never reversed that idea, it takes effect when he doesn’t want to be like a dog. The Ramban also Paskins that way, and it makes sense since it’s the Halacha in an unnamed Mishna.}

30) “Nonsense vows” don’t take effect. This is like if someone makes a Neder if I hadn’t seen the amount of people like those who left Egypt at the Exodus on this path. {Ran explains: although it definitely couldn’t have happened, but we can explain his words to be an exaggeration, that he saw masses pass here, and since people speak in exaggerated terms, so it’s not like the condition wasn’t met for the prohibition to take effect.} Or if he said: if I haven’t seen a snake like a press house (that there’s grooves on his back like grooves on the press {Ran: and snakes never have grooves on its back, but only on its front by its neck. Although this is a complete lie, and it’s not even an exaggeration since no snake has anything near this feature; still, we only say that he just added it to say some nonsense, and not to say it in a way for the Neder to take effect, or else he shouldn’t have mentioned any condition and just make the Neder outright.}

31) {This is the Ran’s text} the same applies to “nonsense swearing” that he swears off fruit if he didn’t see the amount of people like those who left Egypt at the Exodus on this path, or if he haven’t seen a snake like a press house. {Ran says: the Chiddush is by saying if I haven’t seen a snake like a press house, since it can’t be true, and I might say that he wants the swearing to take effect or else he’ll transgressed swearing for naught, (but it wouldn’t be a problem by a Neder, since there is no sin to make a Neder for naught), so we’re taught otherwise that he definitely doesn’t want the swearing to take place or else he should have swore outright without such conditions.}

32) However, if he swore falsely, like that not too many people went on that way that you can consider it an exaggeration to be like the people who left Egypt, we can’t say that it’s still was fulfilled since he considered an army of ants to be “the ones who left Egypt.” After all, people don’t make Nedarim by making up definitions that are so outlandishly different. However, if it could be considered somewhat true in his words, like when he’s swearing that he gave back a loan, and he gave his reed to his litigant to hold while he swears that had the money concealed in it; they must tell him explicitly to swear on our terms, and not on your own terms.

33) We see from this example that the beams of a press have grooves on its back, and the practical difference is regarding selling, that it’s not a valid sale if the beams don’t have these grooves.

34) “Unwitting Nedarim” don’t need to be permitted (since they don’t take effect). This includes when he swears on condition that he didn’t eat yet today, and he forgot that he ate {Ran: since he was unwitting when he made the Neder} and also if he makes a condition not to eat today, and he forgot about the Neder and ate {Ran: since this action makes the Neder take effect, and he unwittingly did this action.} The same applies to “unwitting swearing” {Ran: like in similar cases or} like the case when R’ Kahana and R’ Assi, when they argued what Rav said, each one swore that Rav said like him, and one was false {Ran: and we don’t say that the fact that his friend told him that he was wrong, and it still didn’t stop him from swearing, that we can’t consider it ‘unwittingly.’}

35) It’s also when he made a Neder on his wife because she steals money from his wallet, or hit her children, and finds out that it wasn’t true, it’s an unwitting Neder. {Ran explains: and it’s completely canceled. However, this is only if he explicitly says the reason of the Neder is because she steals money from his wallet or hit her children, but if he didn’t say it, even if it was his intent, it’s not considered as if he was unwittingly in the terminology of the Neder.}

36) If one says to people at a party that “you’re all forbidden to me,” and then he realizes that his father was among them, it’s definitely a mistaken Neder on your father. Regarding the other members of the party: Beis Shammai says they’re forbidden, and Beis Hillel holds they’re permitted since a Neder that’s partially permitted becomes completely permitted.

37) The same we see regarding a Konam from meat and wine the whole year, you can open it to be permitted since Shabbos and Yom Tov were included. {The Ran says: would you have made the Neder if you would know that it’s forbidden to fast on those days. However, it’s not an “unwitting vow” that’s canceled automatically, since he definitely knows that there’s Shabbos and Yom Tov within the Neder, and it’s not similar to the case of the party where he’s not aware that his father was there.} The Chachumim say that the rest of the days are forbidden, and R’ Akiva holds they’re permitted since a Neder that’s partially permitted becomes completely permitted.

38) Rabbah held: everyone agrees that, if originally he said “all of you are forbidden” and now that he realized that his father was there, he says that he would still say “all of you are forbidden,” but would conclude “except for my father,” that all the other people are forbidden. {Ran: since he doesn’t regret the actual term of the Neder of “all of you are forbidden,” which is the main part of the Neder, so he’s sticking with the original Neder.} They only argue if he would say that he wouldn’t use that term, but say “I forbid Ploni and Ploni” {Ran: since he doesn’t want to use the term “all of you are forbidden” since it would seem that he’s including his father until he says except his father.} Then, R’ Akiva says that the whole Neder is canceled {Ran: besides that the Neder was made unwittingly, the term of the Neder was unwittingly, so, in combination, it makes the Neder canceled.}

39) {Ran says: the same would apply in the opposite case. If he started singling out the people, and then realize that he mentioned his father among them, and if he says that if he would have realized his father was there, he would have said “all of you are forbidden except my father” so that nobody would think when I’m singling out people that I might eventually include my father; then the whole Neder is canceled according to R’ Akiva. However, if he says that he would still single people out, but he would just not mention his father, then everyone agrees that the other members of the party will be permitted.}

40) Rava says: everyone agrees that if he said if that he wouldn’t use that term that they’re all forbidden, but say “I forbid Ploni and Ploni” that, once some of the Neder is canceled, it’s all canceled. They only argue in a case where he says that he would still say “all of you are forbidden,” but would conclude “except for my father.” Beis Shammai holds like R’ Meir who says that only the first statement takes effect, (if someone says on an animal "it should be the Temura (i.e., exchange) for an Olah and a Temura for a Shlomim," it’s an Olah; so saying in our case “all of you are forbidden,” the first, and main, part of the statement, is still standing and is not a mistake. Beis Hillel holds like R' Yossi who holds the last statement takes effect. {Ran: therefore, since the main part is the ending, and that’s changed by saying “except my father,” it’s an uprooting of a main part of the Neder, which uproots the whole Neder.}

41) {Ran says that the Halacha is like R’ Akiva that, if some of the Neder is uprooted, the whole Neder is uprooted. The only question is if we should Paskin like Rabbah since he’s the Rebbi of Rava, or to Paskin like Rava, since he’s the later authority. Therefore, we should be stringent by this Safeik, and the Ramban says the same.}

42) {Ran says: there are those who say that, only by a mistake we say, that if he wants to keep the main part of the Neder, it remains since the part that you made a mistake was retroactively not part of the Neder. However, if part of the Neder is permitted by a Chachum, in all cases, the whole Neder is permitted since the part uprooted was always a part of the Neder. However, the Ramban argues. The Ran concludes that this is the implication of our Sugya that we compare the argument between R’ Akiva and the Chachumim about permitting a Neder to the argument between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel about a mistaken Neder.}

43) {The Ramban says: we only say the concept of a Neder that’s partially permitted becomes completely permitted by a mistaken way that he said the Neder since it’s like a mistaken Neder, and since part of it was mistaken, it uproots the Neder totally. However, when it’s being undone through a regret, it’s only permitted the part that he regretted. However, Tosfos held that since regretting uproots the Neder retroactively, since part of it was uprooted, the whole thing is considered uprooted. However, by permitting an excommunication that doesn’t retroactively uproot the excommunication, if you only permit some of the people, the rest remain in excommunication. The same by when a husband annuls his wife’s Neder, it only permits the parts he annuls since we Paskin that the husband only erases the Neder from this time on, but not retroactively.}

44) {Ran says: they’re all considered one Neder if it was said in a way to combine all the parts into one Neder, like when you say you’re forbidden to Ploni and Ploni, but without saying ‘and’ in between, but only to Ploni, Ploni, where there’s an opinion in Kiddushin that you’re Chayiv for transgressing each one separately since they’re separate vows; if you uproot one of them, the rest is not uprooted.}

45) “Onness vows,” like if he vowed pleasure if he doesn’t come to eat, and some Onness happened that he couldn’t come, like he became sick, or his son became sick or a river overflowed and blocked his path; it doesn’t take effect. {Ran explains: he doesn’t intend that the Neder to come into effect by him not coming if it was beyond his control from coming.}

46) If one litigant gives over all his proofs to Beis Din to go out to compile more proofs to his case within the next thirty days {Ran says: which is the time slotted by Beis Din to give time for litigants to come, and Beis Din takes these proofs as a collateral to make sure he’ll come back and not just slip away.} If he says that, if he doesn’t come back by thirty days, I cancel all my proofs, and an Onness prevented him from returning; R’ Huna says that his proofs are all canceled and can’t be used in Beis Din. Rava says that they’re not canceled since the Torah exempts people because of an Onness even in cases where it doesn’t involve the death penalty, as we see they permit “Onness vows.” {However, the Ran says: R’ Huna held that it’s no proof since the one who made the vow doesn’t care that much if his friend becomes forbidden to have pleasure from him, so we don’t expect him to make sure to make a condition to exempt Onness, but the litigant is very interested to make sure his proofs aren’t canceled, so he should have made a condition that an Onness didn’t count.}

47) It’s not a proof against Rava the case where someone gave a Get on condition that he doesn’t return home within twelve months, if he dies within that time, the Get never becomes valid. Although it’s an Onness, it takes effect since we know he wants his wife not to fall to Yibum. Although the case when someone makes a condition that the Get will take effect if he doesn’t return to town within thirty days. Then, he returns on the thirtieth day and finds that the ferry is on the other side of the river (by the town) and he cannot pass it, it’s a valid Get although it’s an Onness. After all, that’s an Onness that is such a common occurrence, which should have dawned on him to make an explicit condition to exclude it. {The Ran says: they could have also answer that the rabbis decreed that the Get takes effect, so that there wouldn’t come out complications from the extremely modest women (i.e., very religiously sincere), who won’t remarry after twelve months perhaps an Onness prevented their husbands from returning, and also, for the truly immodest women (i.e., religiously insincere) who would remarry by claiming that there was no Onness, as it says in the first Perek of Kesuvos.}

48) R’ Huna held that his proofs are canceled, despite it being an Asmachta (that he only offers this for us to rely on him, but he really doesn’t want to give it over), and we Paskin that you don’t acquire with an Asmachta even if he gives over the items like R’ Yehuda. As he says that if the borrower pays back part of the loan and the lender gives the loan document to a third party and the borrower says that, if he doesn’t completely pay up at a certain time, he should return the document to the lender to collect the full amount again; that the lender doesn’t acquire the extra money because it’s an Asmachta. (However, R’ Yossi says that he acquires it since he holds that you acquire by an Asmachta.) The reason why he says it acquires here since he says to cancel his proofs. {The Ran brings the Rambam’s explanation: since he acquires it right away when he forgoes it, it’s not like an Asmachta. However, Rashi in Bava Metzia considers forgiving to also be an Asmachta, since he says that if he gives a down payment for items, and he says that, if I renege on the deal, you can keep the deposit, it doesn’t acquire since it’s an Asmachta. Rather, we must say that the litigant is saying that if he didn’t come within thirty days, he’s admitting that his proofs are lies.}

49) The Halacha is that an Asmachta acquires if its fulfillment wasn’t caused through an Onness {Ran: therefore, his proofs are not canceled if he had some amount of Onness that he couldn’t come back to Beis Din}, however, it’s only if he made the acquisition for the Asmachta in an important Beis Din {Ran: who have the power to remove people’s money, like the Beis Din of R’ Ami and R’ Assi, and not like the Rambam who says that it needs to be judges with Smicha, since then it would be called “an expert Beis Din.”}

50) {Ran says: we need to figure out why the acquisition for the Asmachta needs to be made in an important Beis Din. After all, in Bava Metzia we say that anytime the acquisition is made for now, it’s not an Asmachta, and since you’re making the acquisition with the exchange of a handkerchief, it only works to be made for that moment, since the handkerchief is returned right away, it can’t take effect afterwards. R’ Tam answers: he only acquires by an Asmachta when it’s made for now when the item was given over to the acquirer. However, this doesn’t fit well according to the Gaonim who say that we only refer here to a case where the proofs were given over.}

51) {The Ran quotes the Rif to answer: it’s different here since he’s not making the condition by himself, but Beis Din forced him; so you need an important Beis Din to force it. However, you only need it to have a Beis Din with the power to remove money since the acquisition would seem to be made after thirty days when he doesn’t come back, so when doing in such a Beis Din that has the power to remove money, we consider it as if he made the condition that it should take effect right away.}

52) {However, the Ran rejects that you need an important Beis Din for their power to remove money, since we wouldn’t need an acquisition. Rather, his not returning is an admittance that the proofs are lies, like we said earlier, but it’s not a complete admittance since there’s a condition to the admittance. So, even with the acquisition, we can’t assume he wants it to take effect right away since he doesn’t want the whole acquisition. However, since he makes the acquisition in an important Beis Din, it’s as if he says that the acquisition is from now, since he’s not playing around in an important Beis Din, so, he definitely wants to make the acquisition now.}

53) You can make a false Neder to killers gangsters and tax collectors (if they just appointed themselves without any governmental authority, or that they don’t take just their allotted amount, but otherwise, you’re obligated to pay taxes because of the laws of the kingdom, so you’re not in an Onness situation.) Therefore, you can make a Neder that certain fruit are Trumah, or belongs to the government, and if not, I won’t eat fruits. The reason that the Neder doesn’t take effect since you have in mind that it should be only forbidden that day. Although we say conditions made in your heart is nothing, but by an Onness situation is different. {The Ran explains: since you didn’t explicitly say forever, (or else what you thought in your mind can’t cancel it), we can say that the meaning of the Neder is only for that day. Although we assume when making such a Neder unqualified that it means forever, but since the situation is one of an Onness, we can assess the situation that he doesn’t want it forever, and when he tells us afterwards that he had in mind one day, it shows what the Neder was made for.}

54) {The Ran says: however, if someone wanted to say a Neder to forbid wheat bread, and he didn’t get out the word ‘wheat’ but says an unqualified ‘bread,’ he’s not forbidden to eat all breads. After all, since he only wanted to say the wheat ones, his heart and mouth wasn’t on the same page and the Neder is not binding.}

55) {Laws of the kingdom are only applicable to non-Jewish kings in Chutz L’aretz since they have the right to throw you off their land. However, it doesn’t apply to Jewish kings in Eretz Yisrael. The practical difference to this: if a Jew buys the taxes, you can’t avoid paying him. Also, you can’t make a false Neder for it.}

56) Beis Shammai says that they only allowed making a Neder, but not swearing falsely. Also, only if the gangster makes you make the Neder, but not if you offered to make one. Also, only what the gangster told you to make a Neder on, but not on what you decided to add to forbid yourself. However, Beis Hillel says that you can swear, and you can offer to swear, and of course you can add onto what the gangster demanded you to swear on.

57) If someone makes a Neder that these saplings should be Hekdesh if they don’t break off today, or a Talis should be Hekdesh if it doesn’t get burnt today, they’re Hekdesh if the sapling didn’t break off or the Talis wasn’t burned. This is even if the case where the wind was blowing heavily, and where the house where the Talis was in was on fire, and he claims that he thought the sapling will definitely break and the Talis will definitely be burnt; still, the Neder takes effect.

58) If someone says that these saplings should be a Korban; I.e., Kodesh until they break off, or this Talis should be Hekdesh until it gets burned; they can’t be redeemed.

59) Ben Pada explains: whenever the sapling’s redeemed before it breaks off; the Kedusha immediately reverts back to it until it breaks off, and then it can leave Hekdesh if redeemed. However, Ulla says: once it breaks off, it’s not Hekdesh and doesn’t need a redemption. {Ran says: some explain we’re talking about actual Hekdesh, and others say that it’s a Konam that forbids on everyone, which R’ Meir holds that it helps to redeem it. Although, regularly, Konam falls off by itself, but if it’s on everyone, R’ Meir holds that they can’t.}

60) {Ran quotes Rashba that Ulla only argues with Ben Pada after the breaking off, but he agrees that, before it’s broken off, it reverts back to Hekdesh after it’s redeemed. Therefore, in a similar monetary case, when one says that he sells a field until I get to Yerushalayim, that before he gets to Yerushalayim, if the seller buys it back, it reverts back to the buyer. When he gets to Yerushalayim, Ben Pada says that the seller can buy it back and it won’t revert back to the buyer, and Ulla holds that it automatically reverts back to the seller without buying it back. However, this is only if he bought it with money, since, even if he uses it, the acquisition can happen through it since it wasn’t given as a loan or to watch, but for the acquisition to take effect, so your obligation that you owe the money so that the acquisition to take effect remains forever. However, if he made an acquisition with a Chazaka or Chalipin, since at the time of the acquisition the Chazaka action is not around, and he gave back the handkerchief of the Chalipin, there’s nothing to remake the acquisition at the time, unless you said that the acquisition should take place now (when he’s doing the Chazaka or Chalipin.) However, Rashba was not sure about this since the money was already used for the first acquisition, since it worked for it, it’s not in your possession completely and is not staying around to make another acquisition. This is not similar to Hekdesh that you don’t need an acquisition action, since saying you’re giving it to Hekdesh is like handing it over by a mortal (and the same regarding Tzedaka to the poor).}

61) {However, the Ran brings from the Ram from Kartivi who says that only Bar Pada says that the Kedusha reverts back onto it when it’s redeemed. This is since, even after the sapling breaks off, it needs to be redeemed since Hekdesh doesn’t come off by itself with no redemption, so it must be what you mean when you said it’s Kodesh before it breaks off is that the Kedusha reverts to be on it. However, Ulla held that Kedusha can fall off it after it breaks off by itself without redemption, so we can say that he means that it should be Kodesh before it breaks off without redeeming it. Also, even if the Halacha would be like Bar Pada, that’s only regarding Hekdesh that can’t fall off by itself, but by monetary cases that can fall off by itself, as we say that if someone gives a gift to someone that should go to another person after the first one’s death, it goes directly to the second one. Therefore, everyone agrees that, when he arrives in Yerushalayim, the original sale falls off, and if the seller buys it back beforehand, he can keep it since he only means it sold to the buyer until he reaches Yerushalayim without the seller buying it back.}

62) This, that Ulla says that Kedusha can fall off by itself, it’s even though you can’t tell a woman that today you’re my wife, and tomorrow, you’re not my wife, and she doesn’t leave him without a Get. You can’t say that he makes Rava’s differentiation between Kedusha of the body (like a Korban) and the Kedusha on money, since we see Kedusha on the body of a Korban falls off by itself. After all, we have a Braisa that if you say that an ox should be an Olah for thirty days and then becomes a Shlomim, the first thirty days it’s an Olah, and afterwards, it’s a Shlomim. Even if you want to say that it only refers to a Kedusha of money to buy these Korbanos {Ran: and we must say that this ox is blemished, for if it would be unblemished, even though it’s made Kodesh for its worth, it’s still needs to be personally brought on the Mizbeach}, but we’ll have a proof from the second part of the Braisa. If he says that, after thirty days, it should be an Olah, but now it’s a Shlomim; after thirty days it changes from a Shlomim to an Olah. Now, if it switches in the first case when it’s going from a higher Kedusha to a lower Kedusha, of course it should switch in the second case. The only reason why the Tanna teaches this second case as a Chiddush that even if it has Kedusha of the body, it can fall off automatically. {Ran says: therefore, we need to differentiate between Hekdesh, once it can fall off for monetary Hekdesh, it can fall off for Korbanos too. However, this is not applicable to Kiddushin since it can’t be performed half way or for monetary, but only to Mekadesh her body completely.}

63) According to Bar Pada, who holds that Kedusha can’t fall off by itself; we must explain the last case of the above Braisa that, if he didn’t end up saying, “but now it’s a Shlomim,” then the Hekdesh of Olah takes effect after thirty days. However, if he says “but now it’s a Shlomim,” {Ran: within the amount of time to say Shalom to your Rebbi; and it’s even when he says it after saying that “after thirty days, it should be an Olah,”} it can’t become an Olah anymore since the Kedusha of Shlomim can’t fall off without anything.

64) This, that saying “after thirty days, it should be an Olah,” that it becomes an Olah after thirty days since it’s similar to being Mekadesh a woman saying that it should take effect after thirty days, that it takes effect then even if the Kiddushin money was spent. {Ran says: although you don’t have the obligation caused by giving the money that we say that the acquisition can happen through it if it doesn’t exist anymore since it wasn’t given as a loan or to watch, but for the acquisition to take effect, so your obligation that you owe the money so that the acquisition to take effect remains forever; this is because saying you’re giving it to Hekdesh is like handing it over by a mortal.} You can’t even renege on the Hekdesh within thirty days, even according to the opinion that you can renege on the Kiddushin within thirty days, since giving it to Hekdesh is like handing it over by a mortal. {Ran explains: therefore, its acquisitions are stronger than those done by mortals. Therefore, even though you didn’t say that it should take effect from now until thirty days, it’s as if you said it.}

65) {The Ran quotes the Rashba that this is only according to Bar Pada, but according to Ulla and Rava, we can learn the above Braisa like it simply states. (Even though Rava held that Kedushas Haguf can’t fall off by itself, we can avoid the above proof that it does (why it needs to say the second case if the first case was already stated), since it was taught in a “this, and we don’t need to say this” format.) Therefore, we don’t need to say that giving it to Hekdesh is stronger than giving it to a mortal, but that they’re comparable.}

66) From this Halacha of Bar Pada, we can’t resolve the inquiry of R’ Hoshiya: if you give two Prutos to a woman, one for the Kiddushin to take effect now, and one for after he divorces her. After all, we see R’ Yochanan differentiates whether you redeem the item, or if someone else does. {Ran explains: as if there’s a break in the ownership in between, when someone else redeems it from Hekdesh, even if he sells it afterwards to Hekdesh, it breaks the first one’s Hekdesh and it could never be Mekadesh again after redemption based on the original Hekdesh. The same here by Kiddushin, even though the woman goes directly back to herself, we don’t say that she’s Mekadesh herself to the husband since she can’t be Mekadesh herself, but just allows the husband to do Kiddushin to her by making herself Hefker for such an acquisition. However, by Hekdesh, as soon as he redeems it, he has the ability to make it Hekdesh again. However, you can’t resolve it the other way too, that it’s like others who redeem it in between, since the woman is not totally passive in the Kiddushin, but partially brings herself into his possession.}

67) {The Ran brings the Rashba and Rambam who wants to resolve the inquiry from a Gemara in Kesuvos that when one says that the field that I'll be selling to you shall become Hekdesh when I buy it back, it becomes Kodesh. (Our Gemara doesn’t prove it from there since they didn’t hear of that statement.) However, the Ran doesn’t hold them to be comparable. After all, there’s no Hekdish at the time, so that Hekdish could take effect now. However, the woman is being Mekudeshes at the moment, so the second Kiddushin can’t take effect; it may be considered as impossible to take effect at the moment, so it can’t take effect later either.}

68) If someone makes a Neder from “those who went down to the sea;” he’s permitted with land dwellers. However, if he says that he’s forbidden to land dwellers, he’s forbidden to those who depart to the seas since they also make there way to land.

69) The definition is not those who travel to Akko to Jaffa (who don’t have a long journey by sea), but those who travel constantly at sea. R’ Pappa and R’ Ada b. R’ Ahava argue. One says that this qualification is on the first part of the Mishna that we only consider the constant sea travelers as those who go to sea, and not those that take short trips. The other says that it qualifies the end case, that, not only do we consider the people who take short trips as land dwellers, but even those who are constantly at sea {Ran: but, according to this, those who go from Akko to Jaffa is still considered as sea travelers to be forbidden in the first case. Therefore, we should Paskin stringently like the second explanation. However, the Rashba held logically that we can’t classify someone who just went once traveling on the sea as a sea traveller. Alternatively, even if he did it once, it takes effect if he was at sea at the time of the Neder.}

70) {The Ran brings a Yerushalmi that inquires: if someone made a Neder to forbid sea travelers after thirty days, and within the thirty days, a sea traveller retires and becomes a land dweller; do we follow his status at the time the Neder was made, or the time it goes into effect? They resolved it saying that it depends on the argument between R’ Akiva and R’ Yishmael at the end of the Mesechta about a woman who made a Neder to take effect after her marriage. R’ Yishmael says that the husband can annul it since we follow the time it takes effect, and R’ Akiva held that he can’t annul it since we follow the time that the Neder was made. The Halacha is like R’ Akiva. Therefore, the same will be true if the opposite happens (that someone within thirty days becomes a sailor). However, the Ran doesn’t agree and says that he’ll explain it at the end of the Mesechta.}

71) {Ran also says that there’s an unresolved inquiry in the Yerushalmi: if he travels in the sea for touring, if he’s considered someone “going down to the seas?”}

72) If someone makes a Neder from “those who see the sun,” he’s forbidden to blind people too. After all, if he wanted only to forbid himself to those who can see, he just should have said “on those who can see” {Ran: since all who see, see the sun.} Rather, he means to forbid all who the sun sees them, which only excludes fish and fetuses.

73) If someone makes a Neder to forbid from “the black heads,” he’s forbidden to the bald and elders since he didn’t say “from those who have hair.” Rather, he intends to include all men {Ran: who have the title of “black heads.} However, they’re permitted with women who’s hair is always covered {Ran: so they’re more aptly titled as “the covered heads.”} also, they’re permitted with minors, who’s head is always exposed {Ran: so they more aptly titled as “uncovered heads.”} Rather, it refers to men who’s heads are sometimes covered and sometimes exposed, {Ran: so it can only get a title as the “black heads.”}

74) If you make a Neder from ‘Yeludim,’ you’re permitted with those who are born afterwards, but if you make a Neder from ‘Noldim,’ it includes those who were born and those who will be eventually born. R’ Meir says that it only includes those that are not yet born, but will be born. {Ran sets up the next piece: although we find P’sukim that use both terms for both types of people, those already born, and those who will be born} but we follow by Nedarim how people talk {Ran: and R’ Meir holds that people only use the term ‘Noldim’ on those who will be born, and the Rabanan say that even people call those who are already born ‘Noldim,’ and it only excludes} fish and birds {Ran: that they don’t give birth from their wombs, but lay eggs.}

75) If someone makes a Neder from those who keep Shabbos, or eat garlic (on Shabbos eve because of Ezra’s enactment) or from those who go to Yerushalayim for the Regel; we say that he intends for those who are commanded and who keep those commandments. This excludes a non-Jew who keeps Shabbos since he’s not commanded, and it excludes a Kusi by the Regel since they don’t keep it, although they’re commanded. However, they keep Shabbos and eat garlic, so they are included in those Nedarim since they’re commanded and they keep it.

76) If someone makes a Neder from a Ben Noach; he’s permitted to a Jew. Although he’s also a descendant of Noach, but since Avraham came along and got a greater Kedusha, we call them by his name {Ran: and not as being a Ben Noach.}

77) If you make a Konam not to have pleasure from the “children of Avraham,” he’s allowed to have pleasure from a Yishmaelite since the Torah says that “I will call Yitzchok his descendants.” It also doesn’t include Edomites, as it says that “I will call within Yitzchok his descendants,” and not all of Yitzchok.

78) If you say that you won’t have pleasure from Jews; you can buy and sell from them, as long as you overpay, and sell for less so that you don’t have pleasure on the sale {Ran explains: the object is not forbidden to have pleasure from since you didn’t make a Neder from having pleasure from his property, but from him personally.} If he says that Jews can’t have pleasure from him, he can sell to them overpriced, and he needs to buy from them underpriced. {Ran says: this applies even to properties that weren’t in their possessions at the time of the Neder, since he made the Neder on the person. If he gets an even deal with him, he’s having pleasure from him both in the selling and buying.} However, this refers to an average selling item (that’s not too hot of an item, but there are plenty of people interested in buying it) so both the buyer and seller gain with a fair deal. However, if it’s a hot item, only the buyer gains (unless he overpays for it). If it has very little demand, the seller always gains unless he sells it very cheap.

79) Shmuel holds: if you take a utensil from a craftsman to inspect it {Ran: and if it has a set price, as it says in Bava Metzia} and it broke through an Onness while it’s in your hands; you must pay for it {Ran:since he has the status of a borrower since he has all the gains of this sale just like the borrower has all the gain in the loan.} We must say that it refers to a hot object, or else the gain is not totally the buyers, but also to the seller. We have a Braisa like Shmuel: if a groom buys utensils from a merchant to send to his future father in law’s house to see if they want it for their house, and says “if they don’t, I’ll pay you for the amount I had gained for having this choice;” if it’s destroyed through an Onness when it’s on the way, he needs to pay for it {Ran: since he’s like a borrower}, but exempt from paying if it’s being returned since he’s like a paid watchman {Ran: so he’s obligated to pay if it got stolen or lost like all borrowers when they bring it back after the borrowing period. After all, they had a lot of pleasure from the borrowing, and it was all his gain; he wants to give some pleasure to the owner to accept on himself to pay at this point like a paid watchman.}

80) However, by a middleman {Ran: who takes animals from a seller to sell the animals to others in a different place} is obligated to pay for an Onness on his return too since he can sell it during his return, even if he’s by the owner’s door.

81) If he says that he won’t have pleasure from Jews, and they can’t have from him, he needs to do business exclusively with non-Jews. {Ran quotes Raah: and the Chiddush is that we don’t consider this to be a Neder that’s impossible to keep, that doesn’t take effect.}

82) If someone vows from having pleasure from the “uncircumcised,” he's permitted to have pleasure from an uncircumcised Jew, and is forbidden with a circumcised Arab. If he vows from having pleasure from the “circumcised,” he's forbidden to have pleasure from an uncircumcised Jew, an is permitted with a circumcised Arab. After all, a non-Jew is always considered to be “uncircumcised” and a Jew is always considered “circumcised.”