1) Nedarim that involves her suffering, the husband is allowed to annul completely, even what’s not applicable to the couple. However, regarding Nedarim that are between him and her, the husband can only annul parts of the Neder that’s applicable to him, but not what’s applicable to others.

2) The Tanna Kama says that, if she says that she’s not bathing ever if she bathes today, or “I swear I won’t bathe,” it is included in causing her pain. R' Yossi says that oaths that she won't bathe is not classified under oaths that cause her pain.

3) {Ran says: that, which the husband can annul the condition “if I bathe today” even though the Neder didn’t take effect yet, it must be like the Rabanan who argue with R’ Nossan and hold that you can annul a Neder that didn’t take effect yet (and R’ Nosson holds that he can’t). However, this is only if the conditions that the Neder was made on are categorized as her suffering, or things that are between the husband and wife, or that the wife can’t stand to keep them, (which a husband can annul Nedarim that are under these categories). However, if not, then she needs to not fulfill the condition so that the Neder shouldn’t take effect, since he can’t annul at this point.}

4) {Ran also says: it’s only if some condition that’s in the wife’s hand’s to do, but if it’s in the hand’s of the husband to fulfill, like, as we say later, if she says that she’s a Nazir if her husband divorces her, the husband can annul it right away, even before the Neder takes effect.}

5) {Ran says: although we see that people don’t keep the conditions of Nedarim like the Neder itself (and that’s why there’s an opinion that, if someone vows that his eyes won't sleep today if I sleep tomorrow, he can't sleep today since he might sleep tomorrow since people don’t take the condition seriously), we don’t consider it as if he didn’t fulfill the condition and the Neder takes effect so that the husband can annul. However, that’s only if the Neder doesn’t take effect at all until he doesn’t fulfill the condition, but if the condition is that an item is forbidden today if he doesn’t eventually fulfill a condition, then he can annul right away since, if the condition is not fulfilled, the Neder takes effect retroactively, so it’s as if the Neder already took effect.}

6) Although the Rabanan say that not bathing is included in causing her pain, someone doesn’t get Kareis for bathing on Yom Kippur. After all, there you need that the causing pain be something that’s noticeable for that day, and the lack of bathing is not painful that day, only lack of eating and drinking, and it’s not noticeable until after many days. However, by Nedarim, it says “to pain her,” which includes anything that will eventually pain her.

7) Although R' Yossi says that oaths that she won't bathe is not classified under oaths that cause her pain, it’s not a contradiction to his position regarding not having enough in a city’s spring for that city and a neighboring city. That R’ Yossi held that washing their clothing goes before the lives of the neighboring city, that they wash their clothing before allowing the other city to drink. (The Chachumim say that you give the other city to drink before washing your clothes. However, they both agree that you drink before the other city drinks, and your washing of your clothing goes before the other ones, and giving your livestock to drink goes before the other one’s livestock). So, if we see that R’ Yossi held that there’s such a strong pain for clothes washing, we should assume the same for bathing one’s body. However, this is not true, since the lack of clean clothes leads to insanity, while the lack of bathing only leads to blisters and painful scabs (and the lack of washing one’s head can lead to blindness). {Ran explains: insanity is more harsh than the skin ailments since the former can’t be healed, but the latter ones can be healed. So laundering is more needed than bathing.}

8) R' Yossi and the Chachumim also argue regarding applying beauty spices, if it’s classified under oaths that cause her pain, or not. {Ran explains: this is only regarding her upper part of her body, but refraining from the bottom part is not classified as causing her pain, but only oaths that’s between the couple.}

9) R' Yossi says that oaths that she won't bathe or apply beauty spices [Tosfos: even forever] is not classified under oaths that cause her pain, however, R’ Ada b. Ahava says that it’s classified as being an oath between the couple, and R’ Huna says that it’s not even classified as that, since as a parable, a fox never gets hurt entering its hole in the ground, (so, too, the husband won't get damaged with his wife) {Ran: and you don’t need to worry that one of her hairs will get attached to him by relations as a result of not washing there}, and we have a Braisa like R’ Ada b. Ahava.

10) If she makes a Neder not to serve her husband's father or brother, or her father and brother, and if she makes a Neder not to give hay before his animals, he can’t annul it since it’s not between him or her, since she doesn’t owe it to him, (and it’s definitely not something that pains her). However, if she makes a Neder not to fill his cup or to make the beds, it’s canceled without annulling since she owes this to him. {Ran explains: although she also needs to feed his animals, but we refer to a case where he brought her four maids to help her, where she’s exempt from performing chores, but she’s still obligated in chores of endearment, like to fill his cup and to make his bed.}

11) R’ Gamliel says: even when he owes it to her, he needs to annul {Ran: since it’s possible to annul} so that she shouldn’t transgress “don’t profane your words,” {Ran: even though it’s not a real Neder, and it’s only words, you shouldn’t profane it.} Also, things that are really permitted, in a place where they're stringent, you can't be lenient before them to cancel their custom.{Ran: although it’s not a true Neder, but only words, you can’t profane it. Therefore, Ri the Kohein says that, if someone has a custom not to eat meat and drink wine at different times, they can’t just permit it to him without him asking a Chachum to permit it like an oath.}

12) Alternately, the Pasuk of “don’t profane your words” teaches us that a Chachum can’t permit his own oaths. {Ran says that the Ramban Paskins like R’ Yehuda in Mesechta Negayim that he can’t permit his sons or wife’s Nedarim, (which she made concerning others, where he can’t annul it as a husband.)}

13) {The Ran quotes Yerushalmi: if someone makes a Neder that the city inhabitants can’t have pleasure from him, a Chachum of that city can’t permit it. However, if he forbids himself to have pleasure from the people of the city, a Chachum from the city can permit it.}

14) If you make a Konam from relations, according to R’ Yossi, it’s only a Neder between the couple, but not of pain. However, there’s an unresolved inquiry according to the Rabanan if it’s only a Neder between the couple or it’s also of pain.{Ran says: therefore, we need to be strict, and the husband can only annul it regarding himself, but she can’t have relations with others (if she gets divorced).}

15) Shmuel says: according to the Rabanan, if she says that the pleasure from Ploni should be forbidden to her, the husband can annul {Ran: what’s applicable to her pain}, even if you can access those items and pleasures from other people. Granted that the Mishna says that you can’t annul if she makes a Neder from fruit from one country since she could get them from another country, and the same if she makes a Neder from one storekeeper since she could get it from another storekeeper, as long as the second one will give her credit like the first one {Ran says: since she might not have money, and she won’t be able to buy her food, and it will lead to pain. The same by the Neder from fruits of one country, it can’t be of her country that’s she’s in, since it’s not simple that imports will be available, so it’s equal to not having another storekeeper that will give her credit.} However, that could be according to R’ Yossi who has a higher standard to what’s considered being pained and only considers it to be between him and her, but the Rabanan hold that he can annul these Nedarim because it’s classified as causing pain. {Ran says: since we see that Shmuel holds like the Chachumim, that seems to be the Halacha.}

16) If she makes a Neder from two loaves of bread, one is classified as causing her pain if she’s prevented from eating it, and the other one is not {Ran: since it’s coarse}; Shmuel holds that the same way you can annul the part on the one that’s classified as causing pain, you can annul the loaf that’s not classified as causing pain. R’ Yochanan says that you can only annul the bread that would cause pain, but not the one that doesn’t cause it. {Ran explains: they argue regarding this, that you can’t annul part of a Neder. Shmuel held that you either annul the whole Neder, or none of the Neder is annulled. Thus, if he annulled only the white loaf, then he’s still forbidden with it, so, without also annulling the coarse bread, it will cause pain. However, R’ Yochanan holds that you only need to annul the whole Neder that causes pain, since leaving out the part that doesn’t cause pain is not a problem of annulling part of a Neder.}

17) {Ran says: only by Nedarim that are applicable to pain do we say that you need to remove the whole Neder since, if you only remove part, you leave your wife in pain with the other part. However, on Nedarim that are between the couples, since it depends on what the husband cares for, and if he only cares that some of the Neder doesn’t take effect, but he doesn’t care about the other part, even if he annuls part, he’s completely removing the parts that he cares about. Therefore, he can only annul the parts that are applicable to him, and this is even according to Shmuel, since, what others need annulled has nothing to do to what’s applicable to what you need annulled.}

18) If the husband annuls her Naziris, even according to R’ Yochanan, he removes the whole Naziris and she can eat the peels and pits, although refraining from them has no pain, since you can’t have a Naziris half way.

19) If a woman makes a Neder to be a Nazir, and then she became Tamai, and then her husband annuls it, she doesn’t bring a bird Olah (but only a bird Chatos, as we’ll say) {Ran: since there’s no Korbanos for a half of Naziris}. The reason we don’t say according to R’ Yochanan that you should only annul the part that forbids her to drink wine that has pain to refrain from {Ran: even though you can’t have a Naziris half way; we can say that not becoming Tamai is not so connected to Naziris since a Naziris Shimshon is permitted to become Tamai. Alternatively, the Gemara could have gave that as an answer, but there’s a practical difference in the new answer if he says “a Konam on going to a mourner’s house”} since the living should ponder; if one does not participating during the time of mourning for others, nobody will come to eulogize or bury her when she dies, which would cause her pain.

20) The same way that there’s no Naziris for half, you can’t bring its Korbanos for keeping half of the Naziris, (as, when the husband annuls, it cuts it off from this point on, but doesn’t uproot it retroactively). However, if he becomes Tamai, he brings a bird Chatos {Ran: since it’s easy to bring it} as we see that you can bring it on a Safeik {Ran: so you can also bring it for a half of Naziris}.

21) If she says Konam from the Briyos (I.e., people), the husband can’t annul it {Ran: according to R’ Yossi, however, according to the Rabanan who held like Shmuel, as long as there is pain to refrain from some people, he can annul the whole Neder). This infers that she can have pleasure from her husband since he’s not included to be part of the masses included in the term ‘Briyos.’ Also, it’s probable that the husband is not forbidden since, if so, he’s no worse than the only storekeeper that will give her credit that the husband can annul.} However, this is difficult since it ends up saying that she’s permitted to take Leket, Shichicha and Peyah {Ran since the Torah says that the owner leaves it, and not that he gives it. Therefore, she’s not receiving it from the field’s owner. This implies that she’s forbidden to receive from her husband or else she can’t collect these “gifts to the poor” since she’s not poor (since she’s supported by her husband).}

22) Ulla answers: really, the husband is not included in ‘Briyos,’ and she’s permitted to receive from him. This is what the Mishna is saying: also {Ran: even if the husband is poor and can’t support her, he still can’t annul} since she can be supported by collecting Leket, Shichicha and Peyah.

23) Rav answers: really, the husband is included in ‘Briyos,’ and it’s saying that the reason he can’t annul since she’s not in pain since it’s possible to be supported by collecting Leket, Shichicha and Peyah. {Ran explains: he’s not concerned that the terminology of the Mishna is not “because she’s permitted with Leket, Shichicha and Peyah,” you can still read it to say ‘because.’ When we say he can annul a Neder on a storekeeper who will give her credit, it means during the winter when she can’t collect Leket, Shichicha and Peyah.}

24) R’ Nachman answers: really, the husband is not included in ‘Briyos,’ and she’s permitted to receive from him. It’s saying: she can receive support from the husband, and even if he divorces her and he reverts to being part of the Briyos, she’s only can be supported with Leket, Shichicha and Peyah.

25) {The Ran says that the Bavli here seems to disagree with the Yerushalmi that says if someone made a Neder to forbid sea travelers after thirty days, and within the thirty days, a sea traveller retires and becomes a land dweller; if we follow his status at the time the Neder was made, or the time it goes into effect depends on the argument between R’ Akiva and R’ Yishmael at the end of the Mesechta about a woman who made a Neder to take effect after her marriage. R’ Yishmael says that the husband can annul it since we follow the time it takes effect, so the retired seaman is permitted, and R’ Akiva held that he can’t annul it since we follow the time that the Neder was made, so here, the retired seaman is forbidden. However, our Sugya held that we follow what the husband is now, even though he wasn’t considered part of the Briyos when the Neder was made. Rather, the Bavli holds that it doesn’t depend on that argument, but we go according what people are called at the moment, and R’ Akiva only follows when the Neder is made to explain the Drasha of the Pesukim. This is also the implication in Bava Basra that, if you make a Neder from people of a city, you’re forbidden even from people who settled there after the Neder was made. However, the Ramban Paskins like the Yerushalmi, perhaps it’s only to forbid someone who’s included when the Neder was made, even if he’s no longer included when it takes effect, where the Bavli doesn’t explicitly say otherwise, and we don’t just follow the reason that we only follow what he’s called in the present. Alternatively, according to R’ Akiva, you also follow the time when the Neder’s made, and not only when it took effect.}

26) Although if she makes a Konam from relations from Jews, and the husband can only annul it regarding himself, but she can’t have relations with others (if she gets divorced) {Ran: and we don’t say that he doesn’t need to annul at all, since he’s not included in the masses}; that’s only since we have a proof that she means her husband since he’s the only one who she’s permitted to at the moment, we should assume she wants to forbid herself on him. However, generally, when there’s no proof that she means mainly her husband, we say her husband is not included in the general populace.

27) From the Mishna, it seems, that this is only by Leket, Shichicha and Peyah, but not by Maasar Ani since there’s gratitude to the owner since he gives it. However, there’s a Braisa that says that he may receive it; R’ Yosef wanted to make it depend on the following argument. As R’ Eliezer says that you don’t need to take off Maasar Ani from Damai, and the Chacumim say that you need to separate. {Ran explains: anything that is Tevel, you need to have gratitude for receiving it. As the Pasuk says “don’t profane the holy items of the Jews which you separate (I.e., Yarumu, from the word of Trumah).” We learn anything that you can profane (I.e., that it’s Tevel), has a status of Trumah that it says that you give, which implies that the person should need to have gratitude for you giving it to him. Hence, R’ Eliezer held it not to be Tevel since it’s not forbidden for anyone to eat, so he held that logically such an item can’t be Tevel. Thus, there’s no gratitude needed for receiving, so the one who’s forbidden through the Neder may receive it. However, the Chachumim say that it’s Tevel through a Gezeiras Hakasuv, so there’s gratitude needed to the giver, so the forbidden one from the Neder can’t receive it.} Abaya rejects this since we can say that everyone agrees that there’s Tevel by Maasar Ani, and they only argue about Damai, that R’ Eliezer says that the Am Ha’aretz is not suspected not to separate the Maaasar Ani since he may make his property Hefker and keep it for himself, but the Chachumim say that he doesn’t want to do that since someone might acquire his property in the meantime and he’ll be destitute. {Ran says: thus, we can’t reconcile the contradiction between the Mishna and Braisa.}

28) Rava answers: we only say he’s allowed to collect Maasar Ani during the summer where he collects it himself from the fields, but not during the winter where he’s given it from the owner’s house, as it says “you shall give it to the Levi etc.” {Ran explains: either that, originally, it’s left in the granary for the poor to take themselves during the summer, but he gathers the leftovers to his house to distribute during the winter. Alternatively, during winter, he distributes it from his house, but during the next summer, he takes it out to the granary for the poor to take themselves.}

29) If someone steal someone else’s Tevel, Rebbi holds he needs to pay back all that he stole, and R’ Yossi b. Yehuda says only according to the amount that will remain Chulin. It’s not necessarily that they argue whether those items that you have the benefit to give it to whoever you want is considered yours or not, but we can say that {Ran: everyone holds it’s not yours} and they argue whether to fine the robber to pay the whole thing for robbing, or not. Alternatively,{Ran: everyone holds it’s yours}, and they argue whether they fined the owner of the Tevel for not separating it fast enough.

30) We have a contradiction in the Mishna, that, originally, it says that if you make a Neder on Kohanim and Leviyim from having pleasure from you, they may take their gifts against your will {Ran: proving that the benefit to give it to whoever you want is not considered as if it’s yours}, but then it says that if you forbid some of them, the other must receive them {Ran: but not these you made a Neder on; proving that it’s considered as yours to forbid it.} Rav reconciles {Ran: really, it’s considered yours} but since in the first case, you can’t give it to anyone, it’s designated to just rot, so it’s considered like dirt {Ran: that you have no pleasure from, so it’s Hefker, and the Kohein or Levi acquires it from Hefker. Therefore, if someone makes a Neder from having pleasure from his fruit, it seems that it’s Hefker and people may take it. However, the Rashba says: if he asks a Chachum to permit it, it’s uprooted retroactively, so it was never Hefker, so the one who took it needs to pay for it. The reason that the Kohanim and Leviyim may take it and we don’t need to worry that he will ask a Chachum to permit the Neder since it’s uncommon to do so. A proof to that, if someone is Mekadesh a woman on condition that he or her don’t have Nedarim, and they do, she’s not Mekudeshes and she could marry someone else and we don’t need to worry that a Chachum will permit it. It must be since it’s uncommon. The Ran disagrees since it’s very common to ask a Chachum, since it’s the proper thing to do, and that’s why a Neder is considered to be a Davar Sheyeish Lo Matirin. However once it’s Hefker when the Neder is made, it always remains Hefker even after a Chachum was asked to permit it. The case of Kiddushin, we must say that it’s not saying that she can remarry, but it’s saying that, in the meanwhile, we don’t consider them married. Alternatively, we even allow her to get married since she’ll no longer asks a Chachum to permit since it will mess her up. In the case that the condition is on his Neder, the truth is that she can’t remarry, and her marriage status depends if he ever asks a Chachum to permit. However, even he didn’t ask yet, you need to suspect that he may ask and she can’t remarry.}

31) If a woman who tells her husband that the salary that I will make will be prohibited to you (through a Konam); the Tanna Kama says that he doesn't need to annul this vow. {Ran explains: since he’s entitled to everything she makes, even extras she made even when she pushes herself.} R' Akiva holds that he needs to annul it. {Ran explains: since he holds that the extra she makes when she pushes herself is hers.} R' Yochanan b. Nuri says he needs to annul the vow since she may get divorced and he can never take her back.

32) Shmuel Paskins like R' Yochanan b. Nuri, and it can’t be because he holds that someone can forbid even something that hadn't come into the world yet since he holds like R' Yochanan Hasandler who holds that the husband can't be Mekadesh the extra of her salary {Ran: more than the five Slayim that the rabbis required for her food, like we say in Kesuvos, but doesn't give her a silver Maah, so he doesn’t get her extra salary} since he holds someone may not acquire something that hadn't come into the world yet. (However, R' Meir says that the husband can Mekadesh her extra salary; since he holds someone may acquire something that hadn't come into the world yet.)

33) (You can’t say the reason is: since you can forbid other people’s fruits on yourself despite not being yours, he also can make a Neder on something that hadn't come into the world yet; since that’s only {Ran: if he had one variable in his possession, either the fruit or the person to forbid on (I.e., himself). However, if both aren’t in his possession, he can’t forbid on others something that’s not his}; so, the same way he can’t forbid other people’s fruit on their owners, you can’t forbid on them items that hadn't come into the world yet.)

34) Rather, it refers to a case that she made a vow on her hands regarding what they make, and the hands are in this world.

35) However, how can she forbid it, since she owes it to her husband to work with her hands? {Ran explains: at least according to the opinion that someone may acquire something that hadn't come into the world yet, she can say that it should take effect after she’s divorced, but according to those who hold someone may not acquire something that hadn't come into the world yet, how can she make it forbidden then} since it’s something that hadn't come into the world yet?

36) Although, when someone says that the field that I'll be selling to you shall become Hekdesh when I buy it back, it becomes Kodesh; that’s because he can be Mekadesh it this moment, but when a person says "the field I already sold you should be Mekudesh when I buy it back," it's not Mekudesh (like, a woman can only have her salary after she's divorced, but now she’s not under her own auspices.)

37) Although it might not be a complete comparison since, there, it’s totally removed from your possession, {Ran: but a wife is only acquired for her production, but her body is still hers}, it's not similar to a case where he's Mekadesh his field that was given as a collateral {Ran: that also belongs to the borrower, and the lender only gets the produce}, that it takes effect since it's in his hands to redeem it. He can even Mekadesh it even if the condition is that he can't redeem it for ten years, since he can redeem it after ten years. However, a woman can only have her salary after she's divorced, and she doesn't have the ability to force a Get. {Ran says: although a woman can refuse to give her salary by saying that she won't be fed, but there are some chores that she can’t get away from, like grinding flour and baking.}

38) R' Ashi answers: Konams are like Hekdesh that ruins liens, as Rava says: Hekdesh, Chametz and freeing a slave can remove a lien on an object, so it's not something that only works for the future. {Ran quotes Rashi this is only Hekdesh Haguf (a Korban) that can't be rescinded, but a Kedusha for its worth, since it could be redeemed, the lien also prevents it from having it take effect. However, he needs to ‘redeem’ it on a Dinar so it shouldn’t look as if Hekdesh is becoming Chulin without any redemption. However, R’ Tam argues, but this is not the place to explain this at length.}

39) The reason the Konam doesn’t take effect right away {Ran: the rabbis strengthened the power of the husband that the Hekdesh is pushed off that it shouldn't take effect now while he’s married to her. However, since it should take effect right away, we don’t consider it as not being in the world yet. Therefore, when she’s divorced, it’s like it was originally forbidden when she made the Neder.}

40) {The Ran explains the Tanna Kama who says that he doesn’t need to annul because of what will happen after she’s divorced: either he holds that you can’t annul a Neder that can only take effect after the divorce, or he holds that, since the Neder doesn’t take effect right after the Neder was made, it doesn’t take effect when she’s divorced either.}

41) If he thought his wife made the Neder when he annulled, but if was really his daughter, or he thought that the Neder was a Nazir, but it was a Korban, or vice versa; he needs to annul it again, since the Pasuk says that you annul “for her,” that you need to intend for the right female {Ran: and the same by consent, since it says you consent “to her,” you need to intend for her.} The same applies for ripping clothes for a dead relative, if he thought it was his father, and it ended to be his son, he needs to rip again since it says Dovid ripped “on Shaul,” that he needs to intend for that person.

42) However, this is only so if he was told explicitly that it was the wife who made the Neder, but if he was told about an unqualified relative that made a Neder, and he decided it must be his wife, he doesn’t need to annul again. The same with all the other cases. Also, even if he was told it was his wife, but he found out that it was his daughter Toch K’dai Dibor (within the time to say “Shalom, my Rebbi”), he doesn’t need to annul again. It’s also true when one thought a relative died, and he ripped on him, but he was only unconscious, but died within Toch K’dai Dibor of the rip, he doesn't need to rip again.

43) The Halacha is that all that was said Toch K’dai Dibor is considered as part of the original speaking except for blasphemy and worshiping idols {Ran: that he reverses from his curse or saying that an idol is god Toch K’dai Dibor} and by Gitten and Kiddushin. {Ran explains: it seems that other areas are not so serious, it seems that the one who says it doesn’t want it to be final until after Toch K,dai Dibor to give him time to reverse himself. However, these areas are so serious, and he doesn’t say them unless he’s convinced that he wants to say it. However, it’s not like R’ Tam who says that it’s a rabbinical enactment to allow reversing himself for that amount of time, since he might be met by his Rebbi at that moment, which would obligate him to return a Shalom to him, and we want him to be able to reverse it after that. The reason they didn’t make him rip the clothing again Toch K’dai Dibor as not to differentiate between Halachos. However, the Ran disagrees since it doesn’t seem that the Chachumim would have the power to allow actively transgressing a Neder.}

44) If she says that she’s forbidden to these figs and grapes; R’ Yishmael says: if he consents to the figs, it’s as he consented to the grapes too {Ran: since that’s the implication of “consenting to it,” even to part of it.} However, if he annulled about figs, it’s not annulled until he annuls the grapes too {Ran: the Tosefta implies that even the part about figs aren’t annulled yet.} R’ Akiva says: we have a Hekish between consenting to annulling, just like consenting part of it is a consent to all of it, so too annulling part of the Neder, the whole Neder is annulled. The Chachumim say that annulling can’t be done in half, and since we have a Hekish between annulling and consenting, also a consenting to half is nothing.

45) However, if she says that she’s making a Konam to these figs and a Konam to these grapes; they’re considered two different Nedarim, and the consenting or annulling of one doesn’t effect the other. This is like R’ Shimon who says if you swear to five people that you don’t owe them money, you’re only obligated in one Korban since it’s one swearing until you say another swearing for each one. {Ran says: therefore, if he says Konam from tasting figs and grapes, according to R’ Shimon, it’s one Neder, and the Chachumim hold it to be two Nedarim. The Halacha is like R’ Shimon.}

46) If the husband didn’t even know the concept of annulling his wife’s Neder, everyone holds that he can annul when he finds out that he can annul. If the husband knew of the concept of a husband annulling his wife’s Neder but didn’t know that he could annul this particular one, R’ Meir says that he can’t annul anymore, and the Rabanan (R’ Yehuda) says he could. {Ran says in his first explanation: R’ Meir holds that the husband can’t annul not on the day he hears about the Neder or the day he realizes he can annul since they’re both a partial hearing, which is not considered as hearing, so he can’t annul. However, the Rabanan say that the day of hearing about the Neder is considered the day that it became known to him despite being a partial hearing, so he can annul that day, but not the day that he finds out that he can annul it. The second explanation: R’ Meir only considers the day of hearing the day he was informed about the Neder and not the day he’s informed that he can annul, and the Chachumim say it’s the day that he’s informed that he can annul.}

47) The Gemara asks: we say that R’ Yehuda exempts the blind from going into exile from the Pasuk “he didn’t see,” and R’ Meir says he goes into exile. {Ran explains: according to the first explanation: it’s a contradiction in R’ Meir who holds by Nedarim that a partial knowing is not considered as if he knows, and a blind has a partial understanding of a person’s position, as he can sense that he’s close, but doesn’t know exactly where, and yet R’ Meir holds that it’s considered as if he knows that he’s there. Also, it’s a contradiction to R’ Yehuda who holds by Nedarim that a partial knowing is considered knowing, but he doesn’t consider the blind’s partial knowing as knowing and exempts them. According to the second explanation, R’ Yehuda is not difficult since he doesn’t hold that a partial knowing is a knowing, and that’s why he can’t annul until he knows with full knowledge that he can annul. However, it’s difficult to R’ Meir who also holds that you need a complete knowing, but he holds that knowing about the Neder and there’s a concept of annulling is a complete knowledge, and he doesn’t need the knowledge that this Neder is annullable at all. Therefore, why does he hold that the blind’s partial knowledge is anything?

48) The Gemara rejects the proof: {Ran says: and R’ Yehuda and R’ Meir don’t argue with that logic, rather}, the reason for R’ Yehuda: as it says; “if you meet your friend in a forest” which would seem to include a blind person. Then the Torah says “without seeing” (which implies that regularly he sees) to exclude the blind. R’ Meir holds there is another Pasuk that also excludes, “without knowledge.” We have the rule that the Torah doesn’t write two exclusions (for the same object) but (to do the opposite) to include that object.

49) If someone made a Neder that his son-in-law can’t have pleasure from him, and he wants to give to his daughter {Ran: if it’s food, he can give it to her since we said earlier that you can feed a wife of someone who you forbade pleasure from you. Even if the husband gives her the exact food needed to feed her, the father can give her extra food. After all, it doesn’t go to the husband. As we see that he can restrict her eating from what the husband gave her, and the extra she saves that she didn’t eat belongs to her, and of course, she can keep food given to her by someone else.} If he wants to give money, Rav held like R’ Meir that he needs to say “on condition that your husband doesn’t possess it” and add “and it should buy what you’ll put in your mouth.” {Ran: but it’s not enough to say “on condition that your husband doesn’t possess it” since his hand is more powerful in what she gets than her hand. However, when he adds “and it should buy what you’ll put in your mouth,” she doesn’t acquire it until she eats the food and at that time, the husband definitely doesn’t receive it. According to this, it’s only a Heter by food, and not with clothing. Alternatively, it’s also a Heter by clothing, since she doesn’t acquire the money completely, but for what the giver says that it must go for, the husband doesn’t get it.}

50) Shmuel holds like the Rabanan that it helps to say to the woman “that you use the money as you see fit” {Ran: or to say “on condition that your husband doesn’t possess it”}. After all, he holds that the woman’s power in what she acquires is on par to the husband’s power.

51) {Ran prefaces: even R’ Meir only holds this way when others give her a gift, but her husband can give her a gift that she acquires. Thus} if his wife has her own house in the courtyard {Ran that the husband wrote her that he doesn’t have anything to do with it} you can have your wife acquire an Eiruv for others in the courtyard. Although usually the wife's hand is like the husband's, but since he needs to give it to her to acquire for herself so that it would work for her house, once she acquires for herself (since he can give her a gift), she can acquire at the same time for others. However, if she doesn’t have her own house in the courtyard, since the wife's hand is like the husband's and she doesn’t need to receive it to acquire for herself, she can’t acquire for others {Ran: even if the husband is gifting it to her}.

52) {Ran quotes R’ Amram Gaon and Ramban who Paskins like Shmuel since we Paskin like him against Rav in monetary law, and we Paskin like the Chachumim against R’ Meir. We also see many unnamed Gemaras like Shmuel. However, R’ Tam and Raavad Paskin like Rav since they argue here by Nedarim, which is Issur, and the Halacha is like Rav by Issur.}

53) {The Rambam Paskins like Shmuel, but only when he said “that you use the money as you see fit,” but not if he only said “on condition that your husband doesn’t possess it.” It seems his reason is that he doesn’t give it over to the woman completely but just to buy what she wants, and not for anything else.”}

54) When a single woman who made a Neder to become a Nazir after her Nesuin, or a married lady made it to take effect after she’s divorced; R’ Yishmael says that the husband can annul in the first case, but not in the last case since we follow the time it takes effect, and R’ Akiva held that he can’t annul it in the first case, but in the second case since we follow the time that the Neder was made.

55) The Mishna says that, if she makes a Neder to become a Nazir after thirty days, we follow what she was at the time of the Neder, and if she was a single woman, he can’t annul even if she marries within thirty days, and if she was married at the time, he can annul his wife’s Neder even if she’s divorced within thirty days. R’ Chisda says that the author is R’ Akiva who follows her status by the Neder. However, Abaya says that it could fit into R’ Yishmael, since she could remain at the same status when the Neder takes effect as when she made the Neder, everyone follows her status when the Neder was made. {Ran concludes: the Halacha is like R’ Akiva even when the condition that it should take effect after Nesuin, or after divorcing.}

56) If the husband hears about the Neder, divorces her, and marries her back on the same day, he can no longer annul it since she was in her own possession for a moment.

57) When the father’s agents go along with the husband’s agents that came to fetch her, she’s still an Arusa and needs a joint annulment from her father and husband. If they totally hand her over to them, she’s a Nesuah, and the husband annuls her vows alone, and they can’t annul anymore vows she made before this Nesuin.

58) There are three daughters that the father can’t annul her Nedarim; when she’s a Bogeres, an orphan, and an “orphan in her father’s lifetime” {Ran: I.e., that she left his possession once.}

59) If she says that she forbids pleasure from her or his father if she needs to feed her husband, or she’s forbidden to her husband if she feeds one of the fathers, the husband may annul it. {Ran says: granted, that the Neder didn’t take effect yet, even if the condition doesn’t involve her pain or something between them, but since it a condition that’s almost impossible to avoid, it’s as if the Neder took effect.}

60) This is according to the Rabanan who hold that the husband can annul a Neder that didn’t take effect yet {Ran: even if the condition and the Neder aren’t of the same type, like if the Neder is something of pain, and the condition is something between the couple.} However, R’ Nosson says that he can’t annul unless the Neder takes effect {Ran: even if the condition and Neder are the same type, I.e., that they’re both involve her pain or both involved things between the couple, and we don’t consider it as if the Neder started.}

61) R’ Acha b. R’ Huna once trick the person who made the Neder and wanted to permit it to fulfill the condition so that the Neder should take effect so that he can permit it. Rava says: it seems that he holds that the Rabanan and R’ Nosson also argue whether the Neder needs to take effect by a Chachum permitting it like they argue regarding a husband annulling it. R’ Pappi says that they only argue by annulling, since the Rabanan learn from the Pasuk “annulling thoughts,” that you can annul when it’s only thoughts. (While R’ Nosson learns it from the Pasuk “Cheprah Halivana,” which is an acronym of “Hafara is when the Benah (I.e., the Neder) is Chal, I.e., takes effect.) However, regarding a Chachum permitting it, everyone holds that you can’t until the Neder takes effect, as the Pasuk says “you shouldn’t Chal, profane, your words” {Ran: implying that others may profane it (by a Chachum permitting it), and only when it’s Chal, takes effect.}

62) {Ran says: it’s possible that Rava personally held like R’ Pappi, and he still says that the reason for R’ Acha since the Rabanan and R’ Nosson argue, because there’s no proof from waht R’ Acha said that he held more than that the Tannaim argue by Heter, and he wanted it to take effect, and he didn’t want to rely on the Rabanan to permit it right away, since he wanted to avoid getting involved with their argument, and wanted to do like everyone.}

63) Others say that R’ Pappi concluded that everyone agrees that the Neder doesn’t need to take effect for a Chachum to permit it since “don’t profane your words” implies while they’re only words, and not when it takes effect. However, this was disproved from a Braisa that says that if one makes a Neder, and then made a Neder to become a Nazir when he gets his Neder permitted by a Chachum, he first needs to get his Neder permitted by the Chachum, and only then you can get the Naziris permitted by the Chachum.

64) {Ran says: the Halacha is like the Rabanan since they’re the majority against R’ Nosson. Also, we must say that R’ Akiva earlier who says that you can annul a Naziris by a wife that she said to take effect after she’s divorced can only go like the Chachumim. Also, the Sugya in the first Perek about annulling when she says “if I bathe” follows the Chachumim’s opinion. The only reason Rava praised R’ Acha for following R’ Nosson was just to avoid the argument and to do like all opinions, but that doesn’t mean he held it to be the Halacha.}

65) {Ran qualifies: this is only when it’s a condition that’s impossible to keep and will eventually take effect, but if it could be kept, then we say don’t fulfill the condition, and the Neder won’t take effect (so it’s not necessary to annul to avoid pain, or for it to be qualified as “things between the couple”).}

66) {Ran says that there are those who say that it’s only on conditions that may not be met, but if it will definitely be met, like it should take effect after thirty days, the husband can annul right away. However, there’s an opinion that says that, still, since it didn’t take effect at this time, the Chachum can’t permit it yet.}

67) Originally we said that the following women that get divorced receive their Kesuva. If a Kohein's wife says that she was defiled, (but a regular Yisrael’s wife would either be permitted to her husband if she was forced, or, if she did it willfully, she loses her Kesuva). Also, if she says that the heavens separate us {Ran: that he can't shoot his semen like an arrow (but dribbles) and can’t have children. The Gemara in Kesuvos says that she only has a valid claim that she wants to marry and have children so that she'll have someone to lean on in her old age, and someone to bury her when she dies. Otherwise, she's not obligated to have children to complain that she needs children.}] Also, if she says that "she's taken from the Jews" {Ran explains: i.e., relations is painful to her, and, thus, she vowed not having relations from everyone). The very fact that she forbids herself on everyone proves that it’s true that she’s pained by it, so we make him divorce her.}

68) However, afterwards, they suspected them that they only caused the Get to marry someone else, so we don't believe them to get divorce. Therefore, if a Kohein's wife says that she was defiled, she would need to prove it, or else she's not believed. Also, if she says that the heavens separate us, Beis Din should ask of him {Ran: Yerushalmi explains that he should make a party for her to appease her.} Also, if she says that "she's taken from the Jews" (i.e., relations is painful to her, and, thus, she vowed not having relations from everyone); the husband should annul the part that's applicable to him and have relations with her, and if they ever divorce, she's forbidden to have relations from anyone else, since that part of the vow is still intact.

69) {The Ran says: it seems that, intrinsically, he should be forbidden to her when she says that she’s defiled. Some explain that the rabbis have a power to allow actively uprooting a Halacha when they’re trying to uphold something. However, this is difficult since it’s usually said on a temporary injunction and not a permanent one (like we say that the made enactments for the moment, like allowing Eliyahu to bring a Korban on Har Karmel.) Rather, we say; since everyone makes Kiddushin on condition that the rabbis consent to the marriage. So, the rabbis no longer consent to this marriage, so they annul it, so she was never the Kohein’s wife to forbid her on him. However, this would only be permitted if she claims that she was raped by someone who’s relations doesn’t Pasul her to Kehuna. Others say: really intrinsically, someone is not believed to say that she’s forbidden to someone who she’s obligated to, but originally, they thought that since it’s an embarrassment for her to admit this, she didn’t say this to lie; but then they saw that they said it to marry others, so they reverted back to the Halacha as it was intrinsically that she can’t forbid herself to him.}

70) When the Kohein’s wife says that she was defiled: R’ Sheishes says that she must eat Trumah too, or else it would bring rumors out on the children that there mother was really unfit for Kehuna. However, Rava says that she doesn’t eat since she can eat Chulin {Ran: and people will only assume that she doesn’t have Trumah to eat.} However, R’ Sheishes agrees that, after she’s divorced or widowed, she can’t eat Trumah anymore. Since she ate before, and only stopped now, they’ll say that she’s not eating now since she had relations now with someone who is Pasul for Kehuna.

71) We say that the Kohein’s wife that was raped gets her Kesuva, and we don’t say that rape to a Kohein’s wife is the same as willful adultery of a Yisrael’s wife and shouldn’t get a Kesuva, since it’s the husband’s property that gets ruined, so he suffers the loss. {Ran says: since his Mazal of being a Kohein caused her to be Assur.}

72) Although R’ Hamnuna says a woman is believed to say that her husband divorced her (since she wouldn't have the gall to lie like this before him), this is not like the conclusion that a Koheins’ wife is not believed to say to her husband that she’s defiled, since the husband doesn’t know any better, so it’s not gall like by a divorce, where the husband knows if she’s lying or not.

73) Rava says that the woman isn’t believed to say that her husband divorced her, and it’s not like we originally said that a Kohein's wife is believed to say that she was defiled, since it would be an embarrassment to admit that, but it’s not an embarrassment to say she was divorced, so her hate for her husband will make her lie.

74) Also, if she says that the heavens separate us, it’s not difficult to Rava from the original Halacha that she’s believed, that’s because it’s an embarrassment to make such an explicit claim, she wouldn’t lie. The conclusion is not difficult to R’ Hamnuna since we only don’t believe them there since the husband can’t tell if he shoots like an arrow or not, even though he knows that he had relations.

75) {Ran says: the Halacha is like R’ Hamnuna, like it’s brought in many places in Shas. She also takes her Kesuva since we Darshen the Kesuva's wording that it's collected when you can marry someone else. However, perhaps it’s only for the standard one hundred/two hundred, but not for any addition. Also, the Ri says: perhaps only if she comes to Beis Din and claims that her husband divorced her "so I should be able to get married," we allow her to marry and she collects her Kesuva, but not if she claims her husband divorced her "so I should collect the Kesuva," like we say in Kesuvos regarding claiming her husband died.}

76) {Ran says: we only say that she's not believed to say that her husband can't shoot like an arrow because we're worried that she just wants to marry someone else since the husband can't contradict her. However, she's believed to say that he can't even connect to her at all. Since he can contradict her, we have a Chazaka that she won't be brazen to make such a claim before her husband. Therefore, she’s believed even without a valid claim that she wants to marry and have children so that she'll have someone to lean on in her old age, and someone to bury her when she dies. Otherwise, she's not obligated to have children to complain that she needs children. Rather, even because he can’t have relations, just like he needs to divorce and give her a Kesuva if he insists to have relations in their clothing.}

77) {Ran says: although, in Yemavos, it seems the opposite, that if she didn’t have children after ten years of marriage and he claims that it's her fault that we don't have children, and he shouldn't pay a Kesuvah, and she claims that it's his fault since he can't shoot out the semen like an arrow (but only can dribble), she's believed since she's the one who can tell if he shoots out like an arrow or not; implying if he would know, he would be believed; the Ramban answers: she only won’t be brazen to her husband to force a divorce, but in that case, he wants to divorce, so she would be brazen and lie. However, since he doesn’t know if he shoots like an arrow, we shouldn’t make her lose a Kesuva because of a Safeik.}

78) {Ran says: if a Yisrael’s wife had relations with someone else thinking he was her husband, she’s permitted to her husband since this has the status of doing Z’nus unwittingly.}

79) If a husband comes home and found a scoundrel home with his wife, and he runs out, you can assume that they didn’t have yet relations, or else the scoundrel would try to hide {Ran: so that you shouldn’t detect his embarrassment.} Also, if he tells you not to eat from a certain food since a snake ate from it, you can assume they didn’t have relations, for, if they did, he would be happy for the husband to die, and we don’t say that he would rather the husband to live so that “the stolen water makes it sweeter.”

80) {Ran says: granted that, intrinsically, she’s not forbidden anyhow with just seclusion without the husband first warning her not to seclude with him; but still, all decent people worried about their souls should be stringent to satisfy Heaven.}