1) A Naarah who’s an Arusa {Ran says: this excludes if she’s a Bogeres, but it doesn’t exclude when she’s a eleven year old that we check out if her Nedarim are binding, since this Halacha will still be correct}, where the father and husband jointly annul her vows, even if one of them didn’t annul, the vow is not annulled at all.
2) If one of them annulled it, and then the other one consented to the vow, and then went to a Chachum to undo his consenting; the first one doesn’t count still since their annulling only takes effect when they annul it at the same time {Ran: it’s not exact, but without a break of a consent in between. The Ramban says: the first one can now annul it and this second annulling will combine with the other’s annulling. However, the Rambam says: once his original annulling was canceled with the other one’s consenting, he can no longer make a second annulling.}
3) {Ran quotes Rashba: since the Chachum undoing the consent retroactively makes it as if it doesn’t exist, why does it make a break between the first one’s annulling? As we see in Kesuvos if someone is Mekadesh a woman on condition that she doesn't have any oaths on her, if she goes to a Chachum to get her oath undone, the Kiddushin takes effect by the case of the oaths, since the Chachum retroactively undoes the oath, so it's as if she never had oaths on her by the Kiddushin. However, the Ran answers: it’s only by Kiddushin that’s a complete action. Therefore, as long as the Chachum didn’t permit it, it doesn’t take effect, and after the Chachum permits it, the Kiddushin takes effect retroactively. However, by annulling of one of these men are nothing by themselves, and even with both of them annulling, it doesn’t help as long as they don’t combine, like when one annulled the vow and died before the other one annulled it. Therefore, once there’s a consent in between, it cancels the original annulling that it shouldn’t take effect.}
4) {The Ran brings a Sifri and Yerushalmi that we have a Hekish between the father’s annulling to the husband’s annulling. Just as a husband’s annulling, he can only annul vows that are between him and her and those that are painful to her, so too the father; and not like the Rambam who says that the father can annul all Nedarim.}
5) If the husband dies, his share to annul empties out into the father’s possession. Like in a case where the husband hears and he kept quiet and died, or if he annulled and then died, {Ran: even after that day} the father may annul the husband’s share. {Ran adds: even after the husband heard the vow and it was already in his possession to annul, where we might think that he can no longer give it over to inheritance.} However, if the husband consents to the vow, or if he waited a day quietly, which has the Halacha status as if he consents to it, the father can’t annul it anymore.
6) If her father heard the Neder and annulled his part, but the husband didn’t hear about it until the father died, the father’s share doesn’t empty out into the husband’s possession (to annul his part). {Ran explains: we might have thought that since the husband didn’t hear about it yet and the right to annul didn’t come to his possession yet, that the father’s annulling weakened the Neder so much that there’s not much for the husband to get from the father’s share and could annul that little; so we’re taught not like that.}
7) If the husband heard and annulled his share, and the father didn’t have a chance to hear about the Neder until the husband dies; the husband’s share empties out into the father’s possession and he can annul it. {Ran says: even though the annulling makes the Neder weak since the father didn’t hear about the Neder at the time to annul it, so I might think that the leftover of the Neder is too weak for it to go into the father’s possession, similar to what Beis Hillel holds later; so we’re taught that the husband’s annulment is completely canceled when he dies, so it didn’t weaken at all.}
8) When the husband heard about the Neder and annulled, and the father didn’t have a chance to hear before he died, the husband can’t annul for the remainder of the Neder since he only has the power to annul in partnership {Ran says: even though the father died before he heard about it, so it never was in his possession to annul, and through the annulling of the husband, the Neder weakened so much that only a minute amount of it remained, which may help to just finish off the annulling; still, it’s a definite Halacha that a husband can only annul through a partnership with the father.}
9) If the father heard about the Neder and annulled it, and the husband didn’t hear about it until he died; we learned that the father can annul it {Ran: the husband’s share, but not his own share since that was already annulled.} However, R’ Noson says that it’s only Beis Shammai’s opinion, but Beis Hillel says that he can’t annul it since the original annulling weakens the Neder {Ran: thus, it only remains a small amount that wasn’t annulled, which is too insignificant for the father to inherit.} Beis Shammai says that the original annulling only cuts off half the Neder {Ran: but the second half is still as as strong as ever, so the husband’s share is very significant, so the father can inherit it.}
10) Thus, if she makes a Neder not to eat two Kezaysim of food, and one of them (I.e., father and husband) annulled it, but not the other one, according to Beis Shammai since it cuts the Neder in half, but the second one is still in its full strength (so one of the Kezaysim is still fully forbidden) and if she ate both Kezaysim, she definitely ate one Kazayis that’s forbidden (and gets Malkos). [Ran quotes Rashba: the reason why you need a Kezayis is because, although R’ Pappa says that you get Malkos for Konams with eating the smallest amount; we’re saying it’s a Kezayis to cover all bases since there are those who argue with R’ Pappa. Alternatively, although we called it a Neder, we’re referring to swearing. Alternatively, for transgressing Meila and a Korban.} However, Beis Hillel holds that it weakens the whole Neder, so it’s only a simple prohibition, but she can’t get Malkos.
11) A father or husband can ask a Chachum to undo his consent to a Neder {Ran: since the consent is part of the Neder}, but not to undo an annulling {Ran: even though it’s not applicable to make a Neder, I might think since there’s a Hekish between it and consenting, you can have it undone by a Chachum like by consenting, so we’re taught otherwise.}
12) If you said twice that you consented to the Neder, and you went to a Chachum to undo the first consent, the second consent falls into place {Ran: since it finds a place to take effect, (though, until now, there was no place for it to take effect).}
13) If he says “it should be consented to and annulled, and the consent can’t happen unless the annulling can take effect,” {Ran: he definitely doesn’t want the consent to work, so he made a condition that it should be dependent on the annulling also taking effect. However, we can question his intent, if he wants the annulling to take effect after the consent takes effect, and since the consent can’t take effect, so too the annulling doesn’t take effect, or does he want them both to happen simultaneously, (but since you can’t physically say it at the same time, you needed to say it one after another, so the consent can’t take place, but only the annulling. You can’t say that the rule “whatever can’t take effect one after another, it doesn’t take effect if it’s done simultaneously,” but here, it seems that the husband doesn’t want the consent to block the annulling.} It seems that it’s dependent on the argument between R’ Meir and R’ Yossi. As we see their argument: if someone says on an animal "it should be the Temurah (i.e., exchange) for a Olah and a Temurah for an Shlomim"; R' Meir says that only the first statement takes effect and it’s a Temurah of an Olah, and R' Yossi holds both statements take effect, and when it gets a blemish, you sell it and you buy a Shlomim with half the proceeds, and an Olah with the second half.
14) {Ran says: in Mesechta Temurah, it qualifies that, if he says that it should take effect one after the other, the first one takes effect. If he says Temurah of Shlomim and Olah, everyone agrees that both take effect. The argument is if he says a Temurah of an Olah and Temurah of a Shlomim; that R’ Meir held that, if your intent is for both to take effect at the same time, you wouldn’t place another word “Temurah” between the Shlomim and Olah. However, R’ Yossi held we should assume that he wanted it to take effect together, but he just thinks that it can’t take effect unless he says specifically Temurah by each Korban. Although by consenting and annulling, we don’t have an extra word like they do by Temurah; we only need the extra word by Temurah since they could take effect together, but you can’t have a consent and annulling happen at the same time.}
15) However, we can say that it even meant to take effect together according to R’ Meir since he says explicitly that “the consent can’t happen unless the annulling can take effect,” you show that you want them to take effect together.
16) If you say that the consenting and annulling should take effect at the same time, neither one takes effect since we have the rule “whatever can’t take effect one after another, it doesn’t take effect if it’s done simultaneously.” {Ran: the Chiddush is that we don’t say that, since they can’t take effect together, he wants one to take effect first, and we don’t know which, so we need to be worried that it was the consent that took effect first because of the Safeik, so we’re taught otherwise.}
17) We have some unresolved inquiries: if he says “It should be consented today,” if it implies that it should be annulled tomorrow, or not since he didn’t say explicitly that it should be annulled tomorrow. Even if it does imply that it’s annulled tomorrow, is it annulled the next day, which is inconsequential. Or if it’s like he said it’s annulled today for tomorrow.
18) Also, there’s an inquiry if he says “I consent to it for the moment,” does it imply that it should be annulled after that moment, or it doesn’t since he didn’t say anything explicitly about annulling. Also, even if he said explicitly to be annulled after the moment, we can inquire: do we say that when he said the consent should be momentarily, once it takes effect, it’s considered consented forever, or since the whole day is given to consent and to annul, he can annul after it was consented momentarily.
19) You cannot bring a proof from what a wife says that she’s a Nazir, and the husband says “me too,” that he can’t annul her vow. It’s not necessarily because he consents it momentarily {Ran: since he wants it to take effect momentarily in order for his own Nazir to take effect through it.} As we can say that the implication of saying “me too” is that he wants to consent to it forever. {Ran says: since the Gemara doesn’t resolve the inquiry, we should be stringent and say that it wasn’t annulled.}
20) Just like the death of the father doesn’t empty out his share to the husband, the same if she becomes a Bogeres in between (which also cuts her off from her father) doesn’t empty out his share to the husband for past Nedarim, but only for future ones she made after she turned into a Bogeres.
21) If she made a Neder when she was still an Arusa, and the husband divorces her that day, and she got remarried that day, even if this happened a hundred times, the father and the present Arus husband can jointly annul the Neder. Shmuel explains: even if it was heard by the first husband and it was fit for him to annul it.
22) If her father heard and he annulled the Neder, but the husband didn’t have a chance to hear it before he died, and she remarried that day; even if it happened a hundred times, the father and present husband can annul the Neder {Ran says: according to some Rishonim, this was said according to all opinions, even to Beis Hillel. Even though Beis Hillel holds that the original annulling weakens the Neder that it’s impossible to inherit the rest to others, however, the second Arus is considered to take the place of the first Arus, and you don’t need to come onto an inheritance of the rest, but automatically, it’s in his possession to annul.}
23) If the husband hears the Neder and annulled it, but the father didn’t hear about it until after the husband’s death; Beis Shammai held that, even if she remarries, only the father annuls it, like Shmuel even after the first husband hears about it, the husband’s share empties into the father’s possession since the original annulling cuts it in half. {Ran explains: since the Arus already annulled, it removes his portion completely and there’s only the father’s portion left. Granted, through the Arus’s death, his annulling is canceled, however, it just empties into the father’s possession, but not in the second Arus’s possession despite that it was already in the first husband’s possession, and the second husband is in the first one’s place, since the first one’s share was already canceled and the father was left at that moment without any partner to annul with.} Beis Hillel holds that the father and the present Arus jointly annul since the first husband’s share doesn’t go to the father since it was weakened by the first annulling {Ran: since the father can’t annul only with a combination of the husband’s annulling; therefore, the husband doesn’t remove himself from his share until the father combines with his annulling, so the second husband comes in and takes his place.}
24) {However, Ran quotes Tosfos: really, Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel argue in the first case: they argue when the father annulled and then the husband dies, and she remarries; then Beis Shammai says that both can annul, since the father’s share cuts it in half, then the husband half is fully intact to have the second one inherit it. However, Beis Hillel is consistent to his opinion that it weakens the whole Neder and the husband’s left with an insignificant amount that he can’t inherit to another, not to the father and not to his successor. Also, in this last case, when the husband annuls it and dies, that Beis Shammai holds since it was already by the first husband, it can empty out to the father completely that the second husband doesn’t get it at all, since the second husband needs to be like the first one, that no other husband had the ability to annul it beforehand. However, Beis Hillel doesn’t hold of that logic, so he holds that the father and present husband may annul jointly.}
25) There’s an unresolved inquiry if she made a Neder and he divorced her, and someone else married her, if the second one can annul the Neder, or is the first one’s divorce is like a consent to the Neder {Ran: since he knows that, if he divorces her, he can’t annul anymore.} We can’t bring a proof from the Mishna that he can annul from what we said that the father and the present husband may jointly annul a Neder since we can establish that case as when the husband didn’t hear the Neder. The reason why we need him to remarry that day is because the father heard that day.
26) {Ran quotes the Ramban that the Halacha is that we need to be stringent as if the husband consented since it’s unresolved and it’s a Safeik. However, the Rashba says that, even though we can’t bring a direct proof from the Mishna since we can push off the proof by establishing the case that the husband didn’t hear about it, but since Shmuel established the case as when the husband already heard about it, so we should Paskin like Shmuel, and not like the Gemara’s inquiry. The reason the Gamara didn’t bring a proof from Shmuel since they only wanted to bring a proof from a Mishna or Braisa, as we see this in many other places.}
27) It’s the way of Talmidei Chachumim (when they’re the father and husband), when the husband is about to bring her to Chuppa, the father says that all her Nedarim she made in my house is annulled, and the husband says that all her Nedarim she made before she came into my possession is annulled. {Ran explains: since he can’t annul after Nesuin Nedarim she made before she came into his possession since he’s now annulling her vows by himself.}
28) There’s an inquiry if he can annul without knowing she made a Neder on the Safeik that perhaps she did, or not? (Do we say that the Pasuk saying that “the husband heard” is exact, or not exact?) We can’t prove it from what we said earlier that the father and husband can annul before the Chuppah although they didn’t hear; because we can say that they heard, and it’s the way of Talmidei Chachumim to try to get her to reveal her Nedarim {Ran: to get into an argument with her so that she’ll reveal what she made a Neder so that he can annul it afterwards. However, if he just says “the Nedarim should be annulled when I hear about it” doesn’t help by the father since she won’t be under his auspices when he hears about it, so the annulling won’t take effect. Regarding the husband; some text say that he also needs to find out about the Nedarim since, when he hears about it, it already left his auspices for Nedarim made before Nesuin. Others say that we don’t have the husband in the text, and it does help for him to say when he hears. After all, she’s still in his possession to annul in general, and he started to combine with her father to annul before the Nesuin by saying “it should be annulled when I hear about it,” so he combines with the father to annul the Neder.}
29) This, that we have an argument that R’ Eliezer held that he can make a condition that all Nedarim she makes from now until I get back from a certain place should be annulled, and the Rabanan argue {Ran: and hold you can’t annul a Neder before it’s made.} (However, everyone agrees that you can’t consent to a Neder before it’s made); we can say that he also made a condition that it’s only annulled when he hears about it. The reason that he doesn’t wait to annul it when he hears about it since he’s afraid that he’ll be too busy then and forget to annul it. {Ran quotes Tosfos: it doesn’t mean that you say “it should be annulled” and it becomes automatically annulled when he hears, but he needs to make a condition.}
30) This, that R’ Yonason held that you can appoint an administrator to annul his wife’s Neder until he returns from a certain place, and even R’ Yashiya only argues because of a Gezeiras Hakasuv that “the husband annuls,” but in principle, he wouldn’t disagree although the husband didn’t hear about it yet {Ran quoting R’ Yosef: and the hearing of the administrator doesn’t help since the husband didn’t hear, so he can’t make an agent to do something that he can’t do. Therefore, the Gemara in Nazir establishes the author like R’ Eliezer that you can annul before she made a Neder, or else he can’t make an agent now for something that he can’t do now.} We must also say that he says it’s annulled when it’s heard {Ran: I.e., the administrator told the woman that it’s annulled when the husband hears about it.} The reason that he doesn’t wait to annul it when he hears about it since he’s afraid that he’ll be too busy then and forget to annul it.
31) {Ran says: this, that we establish it like R’ Eliezer that you can annul before she made a Neder, the reason why he doesn’t annul it all himself now; the Gemara in Nazir says: while he’s still there he doesn’t want to give a blank annulment for all Nedarim, since he might hear some Neder that he wants her to keep. The Ran adds: the reason he doesn’t make this blank annulment when he leaves since he wants the choice to stop the annulments by taking away the administrator’s agency.}
32) We have an inquiry on the side that a husband can annul a Neder before he hears it, what would be the Halacha if he’s deaf? Is he no worse than any husband who didn’t hear the Neder, or do we say that it's worse when it's impossible to do (like we say that you don't need to mix the oil into the Mincha, but it needs to have not too much flour that you can still mix it in.) The Gemara resolves it from a Braisa that excludes a deaf man from “the husband hears.” {Ran quotes Ramban: we can’t prove from here that the exclusion is only for a deaf man, but a regular man who didn’t hear the Neder may annul since the Braisa maybe have just used the case of a deaf man as the usual case when the husband didn’t hear. However, since the Gemara asks this second inquiry on the side that the husband can annul without hearing, the Gemara held that to be the Halacha. This is also the simple reading of all the above Mishnayos and Braisos without coming on to pushed explanations. Therefore, the Halacha is that he can annul without hearing, and the Rambam says the same thing.}
33) The Gemara has an inquiry whether he can annul two Nedarim from two wives at the same time? (If the word “annulling her Neder” is exact to be in the singular, or is it not exact?) The Gemara proves it from a Braisa that the Tanna Kama says that you can’t give two Sotahs to drink at the same time since the women’s morale will be boosted from the other {Ran: that if one who is Kosher would insist on drinking, the other woman who might be sinful may also insist and won’t admit, and it will come that Hashem’s name will be erased because of it.} R’ Yehuda says that it’s not because of that, but because the Pasuk says “you give her to drink,” implying by herself. {Ran brings from some who explain: so, it’s an argument between the Rabanan and R’ Yehuda if “her” being in the singular is exact, and we should Paskin like the Chachumim that it’s not exact. This also seems to be the explanation in the Tosefta. However, the Ramban held that they both hold that it’s exact, but the Chachumim just hold like R’ Shimon that you Darshen the reason of the Pasuk. We also see that everyone agrees that you can’t Shecht two Parah Adumos together since the Pasuk says that you Shecht it, and not it and another one. Perhaps the Tosefta’s text is corrupted. The Ran brings another proof: we say later that you need to know who made the Neder (and it doesn’t work if you think it was your wife, but you found out it was your daughter) since it says “her.” Therefore, if the annulling doesn’t work doing it together, consenting to two Nedarim together doesn’t work either since we compare them later, as you also need to know to who’s Neder you’re consenting to.}
34) A Bogeres {Ran: that waited thirty days to get Nesuin, or a Naarah} who waited twelve months, and a widow who waited thirty days {when the new husband is obligated to feed her even if he didn’t bring her to Chuppah yet}; R’ Eliezer holds he can annul the vows {Ran: without the father} since the woman only vows on condition that her husband agrees to it, (and she views him already as her husband after he's feeding her). However, the Chachumim, {Ran: i.e., R’ Yehoshua}, say that he can’t annul her vows until she’s brought into the Chuppah.
35) We don’t need to say that R’ Eliezer held like the original teaching that she may eat Trumah after it becomes time to feed her {Ran says: the reason why she's permitted to eat after the time of marriage came; according to the reason to forbid her since her husband might find her to have some blemish, we don't need to worry about this after he feeds her since he definitely has her inspected for blemishes at that point by his female relatives since he won’t throw out his money to feed her for naught. According to the reason that she might give her siblings to drink Trumah, we don’t need to worry here since the husband is feeding her, he reserves a place for her to eat away from her family so that they won't make him spend extra if she shares with them.} (However, according to the second teaching, she’s forbidden to eat Trumah until she entered Chuppah {Ran: or because he might find a blemish, or she might give her siblings to drink Trumah. (R’ Akiva Eiger asks that everyone agrees by the second teaching the reason is because of a blemish.)})
36) {Ran explains: at this point, we think that, even though, from the Torah, both teachings don’t argue and she’s a wife from the Torah before Chuppah; but, perhaps, since the rabbis removed the status of a wife from her regarding Trumah, they removed it by annulling vows in order to strengthen their enactment.}
37) (However, according to the first teachings, if the husband dies within twelve months, and she falls before her Yavam, she doesn't eat Trumah even after twelve months {Ran: since the Torah says that she eats if she's "his money acquisition," but this woman is the money acquisition of his brother. Therefore, Rashi says: even if she had twelve months before the husband, she can't eat when she falls to Yibum because of the above Drasha. However, R’ Tam disagrees since he held the Pasuk is only an Asmachta, and according to this first teaching, they only forbade when she didn't eat before her husband. However, once she ate before her husband and when the above worries to forbid her don't apply, she could eat when she fell to Yibum. The Yerushalmi says the same thing.}
38) The Gemara answers: perhaps the first teaching only considers her his wife regarding rabbinical Trumah {Ran: and thus only forbidden to the Arusah rabbinically} but not by annulling vows that are from the Torah. Also, perhaps R’ Eliezer only holds her to be his wife by annulling vows, like Rava says he can annul since the woman only vows on condition that her husband agrees to it, (and she views him already as her husband after he's feeding her). {Ran explains: even though she is not his wife from the Torah, she has him in mind. Even the Rabanan would agree to this, and that’s why they agree that a minor who was married off by her mother or brother when she’s close to being an adult, which her Nedarim take effect from the Torah, the husband can annul, but they argue that she doesn’t make her Nedarim on condition that this man consents just because he’s feeding you.} However, regarding Trumah, where we have concerns that it might lead to a sin, he says that the she can’t eat even rabbinical Trumah.
39) {Ran says: there are those who want to say from here that, if someone decides to make a Neder on his friend’s consent, his friend may annul his Neder. However, the Ran disagrees since, if annulling is only a condition in the Neder, we should allow it with any words to disapprove, and later we only permit if he says that it’s annulled. So, we must say it’s only a Gezeiras Hakasuv regarding a wife, and we give a reason for the Pasuk since she only vows on condition that her husband agrees to it. (See Reshas who asks: if so, how can we permit it by a minor, or before the Chuppah when he pays for her food, since she’s not his wife from the Torah, he doesn’t fit the description of the Gezeiras HaKasuv?) It can only work if he made a valid condition that it’s only if the friend wants, and then he can disapprove it in any words he wants to convey his disapproval. Alternatively, the Gezeiras Hakasuv is only that it’s not as if she said “on my husband’s consent,” but we assess her intent that she wants it only on her husband’s consent. However, if someone says he makes a Neder “on Ploni’s thoughts,” it doesn’t necessary that he’s only doing it if Ploni consents to it.}
40) R' Eliezer says that a woman that fell to Yibum, even before two brothers, one Yavam may annul her vows. R' Yehoshua says that only if he fell to one Yavam do we say that he may annul the vow, and R' Akiva says he can't annul it even in that case.
41) R' Yehoshua and R' Akiva argue whether he's connected to her or not. R’ Akiva says she’s not connected, and R’ Yehoshua says she’s connected to him and is like his wife, but he doesn’t hold of Breira. {Ran explains: it needs to be appointed at the time of the annulling who is the Yavam, although we don’t find an opinion who holds that a Yevama connection is considered as if she's already married to the Yavam because of the connection but R' Oshiya according to R' Shimon, and he was disproved; we must say he was only disproved explaining R’ Shimon, but R’ Yehoshua held that he’s considered completely married. Alternatively, he holds she’s only an Arusah and he only means that he can annul it in partnership with her father.}
42) R’ Ami explains R' Eliezer who allows it by two brothers, even though it's not sure that it will fall to the one who annuls it; it is only if he made a Maamar, and like Beis Shammai that he acquires her. (R’ Yehoshua criticized him, even according to your explanation that Maamar acquires, how can we consider him a full husband to annul when he has a brother who can make her forbidden to him by giving a Get or having relations with her.) According to R' Elazar, who says that Beis Shammai only holds that the Maamar only pushes off the sister-wife, but doesn't acquire {Ran: if a brother who married her sister dies after the Maamar was given to this sister, she doesn’t fall to Yibum to the brother with the Maamar because she’s his wife’s sister, but the Maamar doesn’t make her not to need Chalitza and only goes out with a Get}, we can say that it refers to a case where Beis Din already assigned him to give her food (since it passed the time that they assigned him to make Yibum). Therefore, he can annul since the woman only vows on condition that her husband agrees to it, (and she views him already as her husband after he's feeding her).
43) {Ran says: although the Rabanan who argue with R’ Eliezer earlier, assuming it’s R’ Yehoshua, doesn’t hold that feeding a wife makes it your wife to annul the vow; we must say he holds here the Yavam may annul with the father jointly like an Arusah. Alternatively, the Rabanan who argue with R’ Eliezer is not R’ Yehoshua.}
44) R’ Eliezer makes a Kal V’chomer that the Yavam can annul the vow: if a regular wife that wasn’t given to him from Heaven, he can annul her vows, the Yevama who Heaven gave her to him, (even to R’ Ami’s explanation, that Maamar acquires her only through Heaven making her connected to him), of course he could annul her vows. R’ Akiva answered back: we only say this by a wife that, even though he didn’t have any acquisition in her before you marry her, but others also don’t have any acquisition to her. But here, by Yevama, the same way Heaven makes her fall to you, Heaven also made her fall to others (I.e., his brother).
45) R’ Yehoshua said to R’ Akiva: that was a good disproof by a Yevama falling before two brothers, but what could you say when he falls before one brother? He answered: since she’s not similar to a wife in many aspects (like there’s no death penalty if she has outside relations), so she’s not similar regarding vows either.
46) {Ran says: the Ramban Paskins like R’ Akiva since R’ Eliezer and R’ Yehoshua didn’t answer him anything, and Ben Azai praised his opinion. However, the Ran is in doubt that, if the Yavam can’t annul, could the father annul by himself. It makes sense that Nedarim she made in her father’s house or in the possession of an Arus, the father can annul himself since the share of the Arus empties into his possession and doesn’t combine with anyone else unless someone else becomes an Arus, and the Yavam is not like an Arus. Especially how Tosfos explained earlier that, according to Beis Shammai, if it was heard by the first Arus before he dies, the second Arus doesn’t take his place and is nothing, so the Yavam is also like he’s nothing. However, he’s in doubt about Nedarim made while she’s by the Yavam.}
47) We have an inquiry according to Beis Shammai who says Maamar acquires, does it only acquire like an Arusah, or also like a Nesuah? We can’t bring a proof from R’ Ami who explains R' Eliezer (who allows it by two brothers, even though it's not sure that it will fall to the one who annuls it), and we explained the case is if he made a Maamar, and like Beis Shammai that he acquires her, since it may refer that she’s an Arusah, and the Yavam needs to annul jointly with the father {Ran: or by himself if he starts feeding her} and we have a Braisa that implies this.
48) R’ Eliezer says that you could annul your wife’s Neder before she makes it from a Kal V’chomer. After all, if you can annul a Neder after it’s forbidden, you can of course annul it before it forbids. However, you can’t consent to her Neder before he makes it; {Ran says: since you don’t have the Kal V’chomer, but, on the contrary, that you can only consent to it when it’s forbidden.} However, the Rabanan say that you can only annul a Neder after it’s made.
49) There’s an unresolved inquiry whether, according to R’ Eliezer, the Neder doesn’t take effect at all, or it takes effect and is then immediately annulled. The practical difference is if someone hears her becoming a Nazir and he says “me too,” if his Naziris is able to take effect from her Neder. {Ran says: this is not similar to the case of; if you bring meat of Shlomim after the blood sprinkling, and regular meat, and say the regular meat should be like the Shlomim meat; that we say that he intends on its status now, and it’s permitted, so it can’t take effect even if it was once Kodesh; there is different since he wants the Neder to take effect from the object, so we say he wants it as the object is at this moment. However, here, he wants the Neder to take effect on what she’s saying that she’s a Nazir, so he means that it should be like how it was when she said to be a Nazir. Also, it’s not difficult to what we say that if someone made a Neder to be like someone else’s Neder, if a Chachum permits the first Neder, the second Neder is automatically also permitted. After all, there, the Chachum retroactively removes the Neder from ever have taken place, but here, the husband can only cut it off from this time and on, so the Neder always remains that it took place.}
50) The Gemara brings a proof from R’ Eliezer’s proof that you can make such a Kal V’chomer; that we make such a Kal V’chomer by Tumah, if you have a Tamai seed that’s planted, it becomes Tamai, so, of course, while the seed is planted, it can’t become Tamai. So, just like there, the Kal V’chomer tells us that it can’t become Tamai, so too here by annulling, that the Neder can’t take effect at all.
51) Although the Chachumim usually hold of such Kal V’chomers, as there’s no one who holds that you can sell your Naarah daughter for a maid from a Kal V’chomer that she leaves once she gets the pubic hairs of a Naarah; but here is different since we have a Hekish between annulling and consenting a Neder. So, just like you need the consenting to take place after she makes the Neder, so too annulling. {Ran: and we don’t just say that the Kal V’chomer would override the Drasha, since we see from the following that a Drasha overrides a Kal V’chomer.} We want to say; if a human can’t remove Tumah from something, it could protect from it becoming Tamai, a Mikva that can make something Tahor should protect from it becoming Tamai in the first place. {Ran explains: we don’t say from this Kal V’chomer that a human who swallowed a ring and enters a tent with a corpse, that the ring is Tahor even after he regurgitates it, so too a Mikvah should prevent anything to become Tamai while it’s inside it if Tamai touches it; therefore we have a Drasha of “whatever touches the carrion, it becomes Tamai,” which Hillel says that it refers to even when it’s in a Mikva. Therefore, we see that a Drasha overrides a Kal V’chomer.}
52) The Tanna Kama says: if you heard your wife’s Neder, you can only annul it until nightfall. Therefore, if you hear it at night, you have until the next nightfall to annul it, but if you hear it during the day before sunset, you only have until sunset to annul it. However, R’ Yossi b. Yehuda and R’ Elazar b. R’ Shimon say you may annul it for a twenty-four hour period. The Halacha is like the Tanna Kama.
53) You may request from a Chachum to uproot one of your Nedarim (oaths) on Shabbos if it's needed for Shabbos. However, if we say the same by a husband annulling the oaths of his wife, or daughters, on Shabbos depends if you hold like the Tanna Kama who says you can annul oaths until nightfall, {Ran: and since, if you don't do it on Shabbos, you won't be able to annul it ever again, so we can be lenient}, or like R’ Yossi b. Yehuda and R’ Elazar b. Shimon who say that you can annul it for a twenty-four hour period, (and if you don't annul it on Shabbos, there is still time to annul it after Shabbos). {Ran: since we Paskin like the Tanna Kama, he can annul all types of Nedarim on Shabbos.}
54) That, which you may request from a Chachum to permit one of your Nedarim on Shabbos if it's needed for Shabbos, even if you could have requested it on Friday. This is not only when you bring it before an expert Chachum {Ran: which is not similar to a judgment, which is forbidden on Shabbos, like by three people}, but even before three laymen, since it’s not similar to a judgment since you can permit it standing up, at night and with relatives, which are regularly invalid for judgments, you have a distinction that it’s not a true judgment.
55) R’ Nachman held that you may open session on "permitting an oath" by the person regretting he made the oath, so, since he doesn’t need too much concentration he allows permitting the oath while walking, riding or standing up. However, R’ Gamliel held that you can’t open session on "uprooting an oath" by the person regretting he made the oath, so the Chachum needs to be sitting to permit the oath since it takes more to permit it, so it must be taken more serious and not on the run. {Ran quotes Rashba: that, since we Paskin that you can open session on "uprooting an oath" by the person regretting he made the oath; even if he didn’t regret it and needs a true opening, but since they didn’t require the Beis Din to sit at the outset (when they were seeing if he regrets it), he doesn’t need to sit afterwards either. However, the Ran doesn’t understand the logic behind it, so he disagrees.}
56) If someone says to his wife “all the Nedarim you make, I don’t want you to make Nedarim” (or if you say “it’s not a Neder”), it’s not a annulment. {Ran’s first explanation is that we don’t have in the text about saying “it’s not a Neder.” The problem is since you say that you don’t want her to make Nedarim in the future seems to infer that you’re fine with the past Nedarim. However, it’s not a consent to them, so he may annul them afterwards within the same day. The Ran’s second explanation has “it’s not a Neder” in the text. He explains the first statement that he didn’t want her Nedarim in the past (and although the simple way that construction is used for the future tense, but we find it also to mean the past tense). The problem is that he can only annul it by using the word ‘annul.’}
57) However, if he says “it’s good what you did,” “there’s none like you” or “even if you didn’t initiate making the Neder, I would made you make it,” they’re all consents. {Ran says: even if they’re not technically words to make a consent, but since we know he wants it in his heart, and consenting in one’s heart is a consent.}
58) When annulling on Shabbos, he shouldn’t say to his wife, {Ran: like he usually does}, that the Neder is annulled, or is canceled {Ran: since you could annul with a change of words, you should do it with a change of words}. Rather, he should say “go and eat,” or “go and drink,” and the Neder will automatically be canceled. R’ Yochanan says: but you should annul it explicitly in your heart.
59) Beis Shammai says: you can only annul in your heart on Shabbos but you need to explicitly say it during the week, but Beis Hillel allows it even during the week to annul in his heart. {Ran says: with some wording, like “go and eat.” Also, even with some wording that’s not explicitly annulling, it doesn’t help without annulling in ones heart; like we explained earlier when he says “it’s not a Neder.”}
60) If a Chachum uses the term ‘annulling,’ and if a husband uses the term ‘permitting,’ it doesn’t work. {Ran explains: ‘annulling’ implies from this time an on, and ‘permitting’ means retroactively.}
61) You can use three laymen (since we have an exclusion by the Mo’adim that you only need experts by Kiddush Hachodesh, implying, but not by Nedarim), or one expert (since the Pasuk says by Nedarim “the heads of Shvatim.”) {Ran says: it seems that ‘experts’ are defined as those who have Smicha. After all, those are the ones who are needed to make Kiddush Hachodesh, which we exclude Nedarim from. Also, from there, we ask, but it says “the heads of Shvatim,” which we reconcile that one expert can permit the Neder; implying that the expert needs to have Smicha just like by Mo’adim. However, the Rambam Paskins: experts are those who learn the topic and able to apply logic, but the laymen are people who can apply logic (but, if they can’t apply logic, they can’t permit since they don’t understand what they’re permitting). The Gemara wasn’t comparing “the heads of Shvatim” to those with Smicha, but just saying that they’re not true laymen. He wants to bring a proof that Rav permitted a Neder himself although he doesn’t have Smicha. However, that may not be a proof since the Yerushalmi says that Rav received permission from Rebbi to permit Nedarim (that may be considered as receiving Smicha for it). However, it’s not a proof that he had Smicha since you can say that it was only to allow him to permit it alone even if there’s a greater person than him in town. However, we can bring a proof from the Yerushalmi that says that R’ Huna permitted a Neder himself since he was equal to “the head of the Shevatim” (and not because he received permission from the Reish Gelusa). Although R’ Zeira asked because he didn’t have Smicha, but because he held that it’s not enough to have someone who is learned and can apply logic, but one of the greatest experts of the generation, and he wondered if R’ Huna fits that definition, and the answer was that he did.}
62) If the husband keeps quiet {Ran: for that day}, it’s considered as a consent, but not as an annulment. If he consents in his heart, it’s a consent; but annulling in one’s heart is not an annulment. {Ran explains: since we see keeping quiet for a day is a consent without saying anything, so we see that consent in the heart is a consent, and it’s as if he was quiet for a day. (See R’ Akiva Eiger who asks: we usually say that conditions in your heart are not binding unless they’re obvious what your thinking, like a women giving away all her money before her marriage that she’s only trying to hide it from her husband. Therefore, how can you compare being quiet for a day where it’s obvious that he’s consenting to consenting in your heart which is not obvious?)} You may ask a Chachum to permit a consent {Ran: when it’s within a day of hearing it}, but you can’t have him permit an annulment.
63) R’ Chisda says: if you didn’t annul on the day you heard since you wanted to bother {Ran: your wife, but you want to annul it}, you may annul it later, even after ten days. However, he’s disproved from a Braisa that says explicitly he can’t annul it. Also, we see that you can annul a wife’s Neder on Shabbos since he won’t be able to do it after Shabbos {Ran: and if it’s true that you can push it off just to bother your wife, you should also be able to push it off in order to keep the rabbis’ enactment of not annulling unnecessary Nedarim on Shabbos, since it’s no worse of a reason.} Also, we see that R’ Meir and the Rabanan argue if the husband knew of the concept of a husband annulling his wife’s Neder but didn’t know that he could annul this particular one, that R’ Meir says that he can’t, and the Rabanan says he could {Ran: since the day he realizes that he can annul is like the day he heard of the Neder.} (If the husband didn’t even know the concept of annulling his wife’s Neder, everyone holds that he can annul when he finds out that he can annul. {Ran: since the time that he finds out he can annul is like the day he hears the Neder.} {Ran says: if we say that when you didn’t annul since you want to bother your wife, not knowing that you can annul this Neder shouldn’t be any different, so why can’t he annul according to R’ Meir? Even the Rabanan don’t disagree but because he holds the day he finds out he can annul is like the day he hears the Neder, but otherwise he would agree that you can’t annul for some excuse.}