1) All the nicknames of vows are like vows, the same by Cherem and Nezeris and swearing. {Ran explains: this is even without mentioning Hashem’s name, since, if you do mention Hashem’s name without saying you’re swearing or an equivalent nickname, it would still be swearing as it implies in many places. Although it says in Mesechta Shvuos that, when Beis DIn makes him swear, he needs to add Hashem’s name; it’s not like R’ Tam says that you need the name of Hashem to be a Shvuah when others are saying the swearing on it. After all, when you respond ‘Amein,’ it’s as if you said it yourself. Also, we see Gemaras that you can say the Shvuah for others without saying Hashem’s name. Rather, the Mishna there is like R’ Chanina b. Idi who says that a Shvuah must consist of Hashem’s name or nickname, but we’re saying like the Rabanan who don’t require Hashem’s name at all. The Raavad differentiates: you only get Malkos when swearing with Hashem’s name falsely, but it’s forbidden even without Hashem’s name.}

2) The same by all ‘handles’ of vows are like vows (like when you’re missing a word to the vow, we assume that you wanted to say that word to make it a valid vow.)

3) The difference between vows and swearing: the vow forbids the object on the person,and swearing forbids the person on the object. {Therefore, the Ran says: if you say “I vow not to eat food” or “I swear to make this object forbidden to him,” it’s not valid and doesn’t take effect. R’ Chananel, Ri Migash and Rashba Paskins the same way. Although we find Gemaras that form vows and swearings in the opposite way, we must say they weren’t being exact in the way it was said. However, Ramban reconciles that, though they’re not valid ways of saying it, but they’re no worse than a ‘handle,’ so they take effect.}

4) We have a Hekish between vows and Nazir. Juts like the father/ husband can annul vows, they can annul Neziros too (and we don’t say that, since it only lasts for thirty days, it’s not necessary to annul it). Also, just like vows you can transgress “don’t profane your words” or “don’t push it off,” so too by Nezeiros. Although there are other Lavim applicable for when the Nazir profanes his words, like “don’t eat from the grape,” and “don’t drink from the wine,” but they can transgress a second Lav of “don’t profane your words.” {Ran says: after all, when you can’t make any other Drasha from the Lav, it’s obvious that it’s coming for a second Lav.}

5) The case where you transgress “don’t push it off” by Nazir cannot be where he says “I shall be a Nazir” since it takes effect right away. {Ran explains: as there’s nothing to push off, like by a Korban that you push off separating it or bringing it as a Korban.} You can’t say it’s when he says “I’m a Nazir when I want to be {Ran: since it’s only on condition if he wants, and he didn’t want it yet.} Rather, Rava answers: it’s when he says “I shouldn’t depart from this world before I become a Nazir.” We see similarly that, if a Kohein gives a Get on condition that it should take effect a minute before death, she can't eat Trumah since we're worried that he'll die a moment later, so the Nazir also needs to worry that he might die soon. {Ran explains: since he needs to worry that he might die, so he needs to accept his Nezirus right away since he may die before he becomes a Nazir. Thus, he’s pushing it off just like making a Korban to bring immediately, that he transgresses pushing it off as long as he doesn’t bring it.}

6) R’ Acha b. Yaakov answers: we refer to someone who makes himself a Nazir in a cemetery. Even according to the opinion that it takes effect in the cemetery {Ran: which is an argument between R’ Yochanan and Reish Lakish in the third Perek of Nazir} and even according to Mar b. R’ Ashi who says everyone holds that it takes effect right away, and they only argue whether he gets Malkos or not {Ran: if he eats grapes in the cemetery} he still transgresses Baal T’achar because he’s pushing off his Neziris in Tahara when he remains in the cemetery. (Therefore, when a Nazir becomes Tamai, he gets Malkos for Baal T’acher since he’s pushing off his Neziris in Tahara {Ran: besides the Malkos for the regular two Lavim for a Nazir not to become Tamai.})

7) R’ Acha b. Ika answers: the Bal T’achar of Nazir is pushing off his haircut. Although it doesn’t prevent his Korbanos from permitting him, but it’s still a Mitzvah to do.

8) Mar Zutra b. R’ Mari answers: the Bal T’achar of Nazir is pushing off bringing his Korbanos, which is a bigger Chiddush than other Korbanos since it doesn’t come to atone, or to permit a Mitzvah, like those that are brought for Tumah that permits him to eat Korbanos {Ran: but it doesn’t make a difference that it permits him to drink wine}.

9) “Handles of vows” are like “I vow from you” and “I separate from you” and “I distance myself from you” “that I ate from you” or “that I tasted from you.” Shmuel explains that the last two cases of “that I ate” or “that I tasted” was said after either of the first three statements, since the first statements from themselves is uncompelling what they’re referring to, which he holds not to be a proper handle. After all, “I vow from you” might mean that I won’t talk with you, and “I separate from you” might mean from doing any business with you, and “I distance myself from you” might mean from standing within your four Amos. {The Ran says: since it doesn’t imply forbidden to have pleasure more than the other explanations, so no prohibition takes effect since you didn’t vow in a way that has any compelling meaning.} It’s also inferred since it says “that I ate from you,” and not just “that I ate” {Ran: since that might mean that you’re doing it on condition if you eat, so, since it’s not compelling what it means unless you say from you, you need to say “that I eat from you” to be compelling that it’s forbidding pleasure.}

10) This is like R’ Yehuda who says that you need to write in a Get that “you’re getting divorce from me from this Get,” {Ran: or else we don’t assume it's from you but from someone else, or we wouldn’t know you’re getting divorce from the Get, but from your words, since it’s uncompelling.}

11) {Ran says: it seems from here, and other places, that Shmuel held that uncompelling terms are not real handles. Although Shmuel agrees that the main part of a Get is writing, “you are permitted to marry to all," and you don't need to add like R’ Yehuda “this (Get) is from me,” since it’s a strong implication that the husband is giving it, since people do not divorce other people’s wives, like Rava says later. Alternatively, he really holds like R’ Yehuda by Gitten, but he didn’t want to get involved in the argument between the Rabanan and R’ Yehuda, so he took the term that needs to be left out (before the husband’s command), according to everyone.}

12) {Ran concludes: we Paskin like Shmuel that you need compelling ‘handles,’ as this is Rava’s opinion later. The Ramban also Paskins this way.}

13) If one says “I vow to you,” they’re both forbidden to have pleasure from each other {Ran: since it’s like he’s saying that I and my property won’t have what to do with you.”} However, if he said “I vow from you,” only he’s forbidden in his friend’s property, but the friend is permitted with his property {Ran qualifies: it’s only if he concludes “that I’ll eat from you,” or else, as we said, it’s an uncompelling handle and doesn’t take effect.}

14) Abaya held that uncompelling handles are valid handles, and Rava held they’re not since the Torah says by Nazir that it needs to be definite. {The Ran explains: as we see that R’ Tarfon held that if someone says that he’ll be a Nazir if a certain person is a Nazir, and the other says that he’ll be a Nazir only if the other is not a Nazir, neither is a Nazir since it’s not a definite Naziris. Even the rabbis who disagree held that the Pasuk saying it’s definite is coming to tell us that you need a compelling handle for it to take effect.}

15) We must say that Abaya held like the Rabanan by Gitten that you don’t need to say that that you’re the one divorcing, and you can’t say that he can hold like R’ Yehuda and a Get is different since it needs to cut off completely, since we find a Braisa that says that uncompelling handles are not handles not by Get, nor by dedicating a Chatos and Asham, and the dedication doesn’t take effect when you say “this is a Chatos, or an Asham,” even if you’re obligated to bring one, unless you say “this is my Chatos” and “this is my Asham.” According to Abaya, we need to say that it’s authored by R’ Yehuda.

16) However, Rava can hold like the Rabanan, and the Rabanan only say that you don’t need to say that the divorce is from the husband since it’s so simple since people don’t divorce other people’s wives. {Rashba explains it to be a compelling handle, and the Ran adds, even if the language is not compelling, but the context is compelling. According to this, they argue whether you need to say "from me," but in Gitten, it seems that they argue "from this Get," where I might think without this that you're divorcing through your words, and the document is only proof to your divorce. In truth, they argue in both aspects. However, even though we Paskin like Rava, you may not have to write “from me,” since Rava agrees to this, as we say here. (However, he would need to write “from this Get,” since it’s an unresolved inquiry in Gitten whether you need it.) However, some say that the same way we don’t Paskin like the Rabanan regarding “through this Get” we don’t Paskin like them regarding writing “from me” either since it may depend on the regular question whether uncompelling handles are handles or not.}

17) There are many unresolved inquiries: if there’s a ‘handle’ for Kiddushin {Ran explains: since we may not extrapolate it from vows that are only words since it also involves an action of giving Kiddushin.} If he tells a girl “you’re Mekudeshes to me” and to another one “you too,” it’s ,definitely a Kiddushin, but the question is if he only said to the second one “and you,” {Ran: and gives two Prutos to the first one, and the question if she’s also an agent for the second one. After all, if he gave a Prutah to the second one, it definitely means to Mekadesh her like we say that there’s a handle to Gitten, and a Get’s no worse than Kiddushin, so the difference is because you gave her a Get.} Is it like he’s saying “and you too,” or if he’s saying “and you watch.” {Ran explains: granted it’s not implied that way at all, and therefore it will be considered as a compelling handle. However, if handles don’t work by Kiddushin, she can’t be Mekudesh until you spell out “and you too.”}

18) {Ran prefaces the next Gemara: if you want to say that there’s no handle to Kiddushin} we can inquire whether there’s a handle to Pe’ah, as if you say “this row should be Pe’ah, and this one?” (However, if he says “this one too,” it’s Pe’ah.) After all, it may have a handle since there’s a Hekish between it and Korbanos, or do we say there’s no handle since the Hekish is only regarding to obligate it in Baal Tachar. {Ran says: but you can’t apply here the rule that there’s no Hekish that’s halfway, since the Pasuk doesn’t say Pe’ah explicitly, but it’s learned that it’s there from a Drasha.}

19) {The Ran prefaces: it must be that the first row was enough for the Shiur of Pe’ah, or else it’s obvious that he means “also for Pe’ah.”} Therefore, it’s a proof that you can separate Pe’ah from the whole field since it says “Pe’ah of your field” {Ran: and it doesn’t say “from your field.”}

20) We can also inquire whether there’s a handle to Tzedaka, since there’s a Hekish between it and Korbanos, or do we say there’s no handle since the Hekish is only regarding to obligate it in Baal Tachar. It’s only if you say “this money should be Tzedaka, and this one,” which we can say that it’s a start of a new sentence that he never completed. However, if he says “this one too,” it’s Tzedaka.

21) If you say that there’s a handle to Tzedaka, what would be by Hefker? Is it the same, or Hefker is different since it’s applicable to be taken by the rich along with the poor, but Tzedaka is only for the poor.

22) There’s an inquiry on the side that preparing a place for a bathroom makes it forbidden to say Torah or Daven there, if there’s a handle to it (when you say “this will be a bathroom, and this,” since “and this” may be for a different use.)

23) {The Ran concludes the Halacha: by Kiddushin, we must be strict since it’s a question of a Torah law. Regarding Tzedaka and Pe’ah; the Ramban and Rashba both say to be stringent since it’s a Safeik Issur. However, the Ran says that it implies in many places in Shas that we’re lenient by a Safeik “gifts to the poor,” since it has the status of a monetary case, and not of Issur. (However, by Tzedaka, since we say “If you want to say that there’s a handle by Tzedaka,” which the Rambam always Paskin like the side that it picks to ask the next inquiry, we should Paskin that there’s a handle.) Regarding Hefker, we definitely say that Safeik of monetary laws are lenient, and since dedicating a bathroom is also only a rabbinical law, we can be lenient too.}

24) R’ Pappa says: if someone says I’m “Nadina” from you, he’s forbidden {Ran: if he adds “that I eat from you” or else it would be an uncompelling handle,} since everyone defines it to means to distance from you. If he says “Mishamet” from you, it’s not a vow, since it’s only a term for excommunication. If he says “Menuda from you;” R’ Akiva says that the vow takes effect since it means to be distanced, and the Rabanan say that it doesn’t take effect since it’s only a term for excommunication. However, R’ Chisda says that they argue with ‘Meshamet’ too {Ran: since you need to distance yourself from the excommunicated} but concludes that you don’t need to worry about his position. {Ran says that the Ramban Paskins like the Chachumim, (and, anyhow, the Halacha is never like R’ Akiva when his colleagues argue with him.) The Yerushalmi implies that Mishamet is forbidden since it’s similar to Cherem that forbids his property from partaking pleasure, but our Gemara implies not like that, since it permits Shamta. R’ Barch b. Shmuel wants to bring a proof that the property of an excommunicated person from Beis Din is forbidden to have pleasure from (and only if an individual excommunicated him are they permitted). However, the Ran concludes that we find that you’re allowed to rent from him. Thus, we must say, from his proof, that it’s only if he was excommunicated by the great Beis Din is his property forbidden, but not from a regular Beis Din.}

25) If you excommunicate someone before him, you cannot permit it if he’s not there {Ran explains: since he sees someone who is not acting with him according to the excommunication, he’ll suspect that this person is transgressing the excommunication. This is like we say you don't annul a vow if the one you made it before is not there. The Yerushalmi says that some say it's because he'll suspect you that you're transgressing your vow if he didn't witness the annulling. However, it's only L'chatchila, but B'dieved, it's annulled.} However, if he was excommunicated not in front of him, he can be permitted even if he’s not there {Ran: he won’t suspect him since he’ll reason, the same way that he was excommunicated when he wasn’t present, so too the permission happened without him present.}

26) If you hear someone say Hashem’s name for no reason, you need to excommunicate him, and if you don’t, he needs to be placed in excommunication {Ran: someone else should excommunicate him, since the punishment is great}. After all, it brings on poverty, which is terrible as it’s compared to death. {Ran quotes Tosfos: although you excommunicate for all sins, but this one we even excommunicate for not excommunicating the sinner since it’s so strict.}

27) R’ Huna heard a woman say Hashem’s name in vein and excommunicated her, and released her from the excommunication immediately. We learn from here that you don’t need any time waiting between placing a person in excommunication, and releasing him. {Ran quotes Tosfos who asks: the Gemara in Moed Katan says that you can’t release from an excommunication unless it was because of monetary infractions, but not because of Issurim. He answers: R’ Huna didn’t put her in excommunication completely, but just to scare her not to do it again. However, the Rif and Rambam pushes off the Gemara in Moed Katan because of our Gemnara (since they held that they’re arguing).}

28) A Talmid Chachum who puts himself into excommunication can release himself from it, and we don’t say the logic that someone locked in jail can’t free himself. This is like Mar Zutra Chasida who, when he needed to put a budding scholar in excommunication, first put himself in excommunication, and then the budding Talmid Chachum. When he got home, he first released himself from excommunication, and then the budding Talmid Chachum. {The Ran quotes the Rashba: it’s only in a case like here, where he’s not really obligated in excommunication, but put himself in it for the honor of the budding scholar. However, if he’s really obligated in excommunication, he has no power to release himself. However, our Gemara doesn’t imply this, but in all cases, you can release yourself, and this is the Rambam’s opinion too. However, there is a text in our Gemara that supports the Rashba.}

29) {The Ran says: the reason he needed to release himself from excommunication before he entered his house since his family would need to heed the excommunication. However, the Raavad says that he’s permitted to be with his wife since she’s like his own body. After all, the Gemara has an inquiry if he’s permitted to have relations. However, the Ran concludes that it may not be a proof, since it might only be in a case where she’s excommunicated for a different city, which we say does not need to be observed by the people of his city.}

30) R’ Gidal quotes Rav: you can swear to make sure you fulfill a Mitzvah {Ran: even though you’re not obligated in a Korban if you transgress} since you’re already swore to keep it at Sinai {Ran and you can’t fulfill the condition of the Torah “to do bad or good” (since you don’t have a right not to do it), which is written by bringing a Korban, but it’s simple that you still have the Lav of “not profaning your word.”} As it’s permitted to be made in order to make yourself zealous to fulfill it {Ran: although we usually avoid swearing.}

31) R’ Gidal quotes Rav: if one says: I’ll get up early and learn a Perek, it’s a great vow for Hashem, although he already swore for it at Sinai and one swearing doesn’t take effect on another swearing; but you can exempt your obligation {Ran: from what’s said explicitly in the Pasuk, when you go to sleep and get up} with saying Sh’ma by night and day, so the swearing on more than that takes effect {since it can take effect on Mitzvos that we only know from Drashos, even though we hold that it’s an obligation to learn until the Torah is on the tip of your tongue.}

32) R’ Gidal quotes Rav: if one says “Let us get up early and learn this Perek,” they must get up early. {The Ran explains: there are two Chiddushim here. First, that you don’t need to say the term of a ‘vow’ or ‘swearing’ to make the vow binding when accepting to do a Mitzvah similar to accepting on yourself to give Tzedaka. Secondly, that even your friend needs to get up early like Hashem did in the Pasuk brought in the Gemara.}

33) If you’re excommunicated in a dream, you need to have it undone before ten people {Ran: the first version of the text “who teach others.” The second version “who learn Gemara.”} If those people aren’t available, {Ran: you do it before ten who learn themselves, and to the second version, before those who learn Mishnayos.} If this isn’t available, you go to an intersection and you say Shalom to ten travelers {Ran: and since they respond to you Shalom, it will protect you until} you’re able to get it permitted by ten who learn Halachos.

34) If you know the identity of the one who put you in excommunication in the dream, you can’t go to him to have it permitted since he might have been made an agent from Heaven to excommunicate you, but not to permit you. Even if they ended up permitting you in the dream itself, you can’t rely on it since it might be the part of the dream that’s just wrong, and in truth, it didn’t happen. {The Ran was in doubt whether people need to treat him as if he’s excommunicated. Also, it’s not a proof that, if someone vows in a dream, that he needs to have it annulled by a Chachum. After all, excommunication is different since it might have been sent from Heaven. However, the Rashba in Teshuva says that you should get it annulled.}

35) A husband can be an agent for his wife when she has regret on a vow to go in front of a Beis Din, but only if they were already gathered to permit it, but not if he needs to gather them to form the Beis Din. {The Ran quotes the Rambam: this is only by a husband who’s like the body of his wife, but other people must be personally present at the annulling. This is implied in the Yerushalmi that an interpreter can relate the regret to the Beis Din as long as the one who made the vow is present, but not if he’s not there. Even by a wife, it’s only permitted B’dieved once they’re gathered, but not L’chatchila to gather them to annul it. However, Tosfos explains the opposite. Only by a husband, who is very bothered by the vow, and if he needs to bother to gather the Beis Din, he’ll forget the exact regret of his wife, and he might embellish it on his own, but we’re not worried by other people that they’ll add onto the regret. Also, they imply that, if the one who made the vow wrote down his regret and threw it into Beis Din, they can annul the vow, since they know that he regrets it, and he doesn’t need to be present, just like the wife doesn’t need to be present when the husband relates her regret.}

36) We see that Raveina went to R’ Ashi to annul her wife’s vow, so, the fact he didn’t do it himself proves that a person can’t permit vows when he’s in his Rebbi’s town. {Ran explains: although one can’t permit the vows of relatives; that’s only by himself, but he can combine with two others to permit it. Alternatively, he didn’t need to go to his Rebbi, since he can go to one of his students to permit it.}

37) However, you can excommunicate in your Rebbi’s town, and an individual expert judge can permit it by himself. {The Ran says: it seems that he doesn’t need to have Smicha, but as long as he’s an expert in the laws of vows and excommunication, he may do so. This is apparent from many places in Shas. It also seems, if there’s no experts, you can permit the excommunication with three laymen just like you can do by annulling vows. This is also the Rambam’s view.}

38) {Ran prefaces: it’s forbidden to vow, so it’s considered as “the action of the wicked.”} If someone says “like the vows of the wicked, Hareini, I will be” and a Nazir passes him (or else it would be an uncompelling ‘handle’ since it could have meant to be fasting), or he finishes “it should be upon me”{Ran: and there was an animal before him} or he finishes “I shall not eat from it {Ran: and there was a loaf of bread before you} they all take effect even though you didn’t use the term of “vow or swearing” since they’re all ‘handles’ of vows and swearings. However, if you say “like the vows of Kosher people,” they don’t take effect {Ran: since Kosher people don’t vow, so you’re saying that you don’t want it to be a vow.}

39) {The Ran quotes his Rebbis: you need to preface of “like the vows of the wicked” and it’s not enough to say ‘Hareini,’ like it’s enough to say “ ‘A’hei,’ I shall be” when a Nazir walks by, since Hareini is not so strong and it can’t take effect without the preface of “like the vows of the wicked.” However, the Ran doesn’t agree with this, but holds the preface of “like the vows of the wicked” doesn’t help or hinder. The only Chiddush is saying “like the vows of Kosher people,” that it doesn’t take effect at all.}

40) However, if he says like the Nedavos, gifts, {Ran explains: of the Kosher people, it takes effect. However, if you say of the wicked, it doesn’t take effect, as it implies in the Tosefta. After all, if it’s allowed to be done, then it’s not the action of the wicked. Although there’s no difference in the term of Neder or Nedava but by a Korban, but not by other vows. Rather, it seems that a Neder is not done with full will, and that’s why he doesn’t separate the Korban immediately, since he’s procrastinating. However, a Nedava that he separates immediately shows that he’s doing it with his complete will, and therefore, any vow that’s done completely with his will to serve Heaven, it’s permitted.}

41) The Gemara was perplexed who was the opinion who differentiated between a Neder and a Nedava. After all, R’ Meir says that it’s better not to make a Neder at all than to make it and fulfill it. {The Ran says: it would seem that it’s better than a Nedava from the fact he didn’t say it’s better to make a Nedava than a Neder.} R’ Yehuda says that it’s better to make a Neder and fulfill it. The Gemara concludes that it could be like R’ Meir, and he’s just not referring to Nedavos at all, only Neders. Granted that the same way that you have problems of transgressing by Neder, since you might not come to separate the Korban, there’s also a problem by a Nedava {Ran: that you might leave it around for more than three Regalim and come to transgress Baal Tachar.} We must answer that you do it like Hillel's opinion that they don't Makdish the animal until they reach the Azarah to make sure that they don't end up accidentally doing Meila before that. {Ran says: it must mean right before the Azarah, or else it's a problem of bringing Chulin to the Azarah.}

42) The case of a Nedava by a Nazir like the case of Shimon Hatzadik who never ate from a Tamai Nazir’s Asham since the days of Naziris might become too long for him, and he’ll regret the Naziris, and it will be a problem of Chulin brought to the Azarah. {Ran explains: it’s not exact, since, as long as a rabbi didn’t annul his vow to be a Nazir, he’s obligated to bring these Korbanos. However, since it’s not with his upmost will, it's like bringing Chulin to the Azarah.} (However, this is not a problem for a Tahor Nazir, since he assessed that he could keep the days that he vowed to be a Nazir, you don’t need to worry about regret. However, the exception was this one person who made his Neziris to conquer his evil inclination so to eventually shave off his beautiful hair so he shouldn’t go out to transgress sins. {Ran explains: it’s as if we can testify that he’ll never have regret from making this Naziris since he originally really wanted to do it.}

43) {The Ran says: but you’ll never find a swearing that’s considered as a Nedava since it’s so much for Heaven sake; since a swearing to fulfill a Mitzva can’t be classified as a Nedava, a gift, since he’s obligated to do it.}

44) Another version, it could be like R’ Yehuda, and he holds that only Nedavas are better than not swearing, but not Neders that you keep since a Nedava won’t lead to any stumbling. After all, he holds they only Mekadesh it in the Azarah, and only by Tzadikim who make themselves a Nazir because they want the opportunity to bring a Chatos, (since they’re very careful from doing sins, they never have the opportunity to bring a Chatos otherwise).

45) However, R’ Shimon holds that you’re not allowed to make yourself into a Nazir, and you’re considered as a sinner if you do. We see the same from R’ Elazar Hakofer that he’s considered a sinner since he pained himself by refraining from wine, and of course someone’s considered a sinner if he pains himself by refraining from many items.

46) If someone says “Konam, Koneach, Kones,” they’re nicknames for a Korban, “Cherek, Cherech, and Cheref” are nicknames fro Cherem. “Nazik, Nazich and Pazich” are nicknames for Nazir. “Shevusa, Shekuka and Noder B’mumsa D’mohei” {Ran: the swearing that Moshe did (to Yisro)} are all nicknames for swearing.

47) R’ Yochanan explains: these nicknames are what the non-Jews call them. {Ran explains: since you can make vows in all languages. The reason they picked the above terms, although the same applies to any language, since you might think they’re not really other languages, but a mangled Hebrew, so it doesn’t take effect, so we’re taught otherwise.} Reish Lakish says that there words that the rabbis made up {Ran explains: this is also from the Torah, since these made up names are no worse than other languages since it applies to all words that people agree to their meaning.} After all, they wanted people to avoid saying it in Lashon Kodesh, since, if they say “Korban LaHashem,” they’ll end up saying “LaHashem Korban,” where he might just stop at the first word and not finish and end up saying Hashem’s name in vein.

48) It’s not dependent on the argument that Beis Shammai forbids when they say the nickname of the nicknames, i.e., words that are similar to the above nicknames, and Beis Hillel permits (since Beis Shammai holds that they’re non-Jewish languages, so the nickname of the nicknames are also part of the language of the non-Jews, but Beis Hillel holds that their words that were made up by the Chachumim, but they didn’t make up the nickname of the nicknames.) After all, you can say that all hold they are from non-Jewish languages, and Beis Shammai says that the non-Jews’ language consist of nickname of the nicknames, and Beis Hillel says that they don’t {Ran: but just some people mangle the words that way.} Alternatively, the reason for Beis Shammai is that they decreed to forbid nickname of the nicknames so not to be lenient by nicknames, and Beis Hillel didn’t decree it.

49) If he says: ‘Lachulin,’ ‘Lo Kosher,’ ‘Lo Dechi’ and ‘LaTahor,’ he’s forbidden. {Ran says that a Lamed with a Patach under it means ‘no’ like ‘Lo Chulin.’ Therefore, any word that has the connotation that it’s permitted (like Chulin) you need a Lamed with a Patach before it to forbid it to say that it’s not permitted.} This is like R’ Yehuda who holds that you don’t need a Tannai Kafol (a double condition, to speak out the flip side), but it’s not like R’ Meir who requires a Tannai Kafol since we can’t infer the negative side from the positive side. So we don’t say that “not Chulin” infers it’s a Korban. {The Ran says: although R’ Meir agrees that we could make such inferences by Issurim, but vows are also monetary since it involves forbidding property. Although the words “Lo Kosher” means any Issur and might mean one that doesn’t come through a vow, which comparing the item to them doesn’t make it forbidden through a vow, but since it could also mean an Issur through a vow, we need to be stringent, since we always follow the stringent side by a vow.}

50) If one says “Chulin, Hachulin or Kachulin” whether what you’ll eat, or what you won’t eat, it’s permitted. {Ran: even though the latter infers that only what you don’t eat is Chulin, but what you eat is not Chulin,} it’s like R’ Meir who doesn’t make inferences to the flip side. (However, if he says “Lachulin what I eat,” it’s forbidden {Ran says that some don’t have this text since we already said it’s like R’ Meir, and we already said that R’ Meir permits “Lachulin.” However, Raavad changes the text to “L’Chalin,” like the Chalos of a Korban Todah}, but not if he says “L’chulin what I don’t eat” {Ran: and according to the text about Chalin, it’s as if you said it’s not Challa what I don’t eat.}

51) The Gemara asks: if it’s like R’ Meir, if so, we should forbid when he says “L’chulin what I don’t eat” since he holds that it’s like he’s says it’s not Chulin, so I won’t eat; the same way he forbids when he says “L’Korban I won’t eat from you.” {Ran prefaces: although it should imply it’s not a Korban what I won’t eat, inferring what I eat is a Korban; but R’ Meir doesn’t agree to make inferences.} Therefore, we must explain it to mean: it’s a Korban, so I won’t eat it {Ran: since Lamed with a Patach can mean both Lo, not a Koraban, or ‘Li, for a Korban,’ and as we said earlier, we follow the more stringent explanation.}

52) {Ran says: according to the text that it’s like Chalos, the question was: the same way as “LaKorban” is explained as ‘it should be like a Korban,’ so too “LaChalin” should be explained it should be like Challos.”}

53) The Gemara answers: this Tanna partly holds like R’ Meir, as he doesn’t hold that “L’Korban I won’t eat from you” means that it’s a Korban, so I won’t eat it; but he agrees with R’ Meir that you can’t infer the flip side.

54) R’ Ashi answers: we refer to say ‘LiChulin’ {Ran: with a Shva under the Lamed, so it doesn’t mean “it’s not Chulin.” Even if you explain it “It’s Chulin what I don’t eat,” inferring it’s like a Korban what I will eat; still, R’ Meir holds that you can’t infer the flip side. Therefore, it can’t be compared to the case of “L’Korban I won’t eat from you” meaning it’s a Korban, so I won’t eat it unless you say “LaChulin” with a Patach under the Lamed.}

55) {The Ran explains the answer according to the text of “Chalin”: only if you say LiChalin with a Shva under the Lamed does it mean “it should be like Chalos” like “L’Korban” means it’s a Korban. However, with a Patach under the Lamed, it means “It’s not Chalos.” So, when we say “Lichalin what I eat is Assur, it’s only with a Shva under the Lamed.}

56) {The Ran says that the Halacha is like R’ Yehuda that you can infer the flip side, and the Rif and Ramban Paskin the same way. Although the Gemara in Gitten says that Shmuel enacted to write a Tannai Kafol in a critically ill person’s Get; that’s because he was concerned for a Beis Din who will mistakenly think that the Halacha is like R’ Meir and permit her to remarry even though the condition wasn’t fulfilled.}

57) If he says it’s “Tamai, Nosar or Pigel,” it’s forbidden. {The Ran says: we don’t need to say that it doesn’t need a Lamed before them, since that could be read “Lo Tamai” etc. However, you don’t even need a Kaf that’s a prefix of comparison, to say it’s like Tamai. This is different than names of the Korbanos that R’ Yehuda says that the vow only takes effect if you say “it’s like a certain Korban” since, otherwise, I might think to say that you should do service to it like a Korban, but that’s not applicable to these prohibitions. Alternatively, by the Korbanos, if you don’t say “it’s like that Korban,” I might say that you’re trying to swear by the life of the Korban, but not to make the item as a Korban, but that’s not applicable to these prohibitions. Although Tamai is not necessarily referring to a Korban, since it could refer to Trumah, which is not something that’s vowed, and a vow comparing an object to it doesn’t take effect; but since it’s a question which one it’s referring to, we say that you assume it to be stringent by vows.}

58) The Gemara brings an inquiry: if you bring meat of Shlomim after the blood sprinkling, and regular meat, and say the regular meat should be like the Shlomim meat; if it becomes forbidden. After all, do we say that he intends on its status now, and it’s permitted, or on it’s original status which is forbidden. (However, it’s simple that, if he said “let this meat be like Shlomim after it’s sprinkled,” his intent is on the present and it doesn’t take effect.) The Gemara wants to prove it from the case of saying It’s Nossar, that’s by definition after sprinkling, so he must intend to the Korban’s original status. {The Ran says: you can’t reject the proof saying that the vow is on the prohibition of Nossar, since you can only make a Neder when comparing with something vowed, which is not applicable with Issur. After all, after the sprinkling, the vow falls off, but the Issur is just regular meat that the Torah placed a prohibition on.} The Gemara rejects the proof: we refer to Nossar of an Olah that’s forbidden even after sprinkling. The reason it doesn’t say simply like the meat of Olah since it’s a Chiddush to say Nossar since I might think he’s trying to compare it to the prohibition, and not because of the vowed Korban; so we’re taught otherwise. {The Ran adds: it’s also a Chiddush that you don’t need to say the Kaf of comparison, to say “it’s like Nossar,” but “it’s Nossar.”}

59) The Gemara wants to bring a proof from the Braisa that says: if someone vows not to eat meat or drink wine like the day that his father or Rebbi died, or like the day that Gedalia b. Achikam died. {The Ran explains: we refer to a case where the father died the first Sunday in Nissan, and after many years you say “I vow for it to be like the first day of Nisan,” he’s forbidden despite that there were many years in between that the day wasn’t forbidden. Therefore, we follow the original Issur.} However, the Gemara rejects this: we refer to a case where he vowed to fast every year, so even if we follow what it’s presently, it was most recently forbidden. {The Ran says: the Chiddush is that the vow takes effect on the day that Gedalya was killed even though it’s forbidden rabbinically without any vow. Alternatively, the Chiddush is that even if you didn’t compare it to a Korban that’s forbidden to everyone, but only to a fast that forbids an individual, the vow takes effect.}

60) The Gemara wants to bring another proof from the Braisa that says: if someone says that it should be like the Challah of Ahron and his Trumah {Ran: implying Trumah Gedolah or Trumah Maasar} it’s permitted {since it’s only comparing it to prohibitions, and not with a vow}. This implies if it’s the Trumah of the Todah loaves that’s {Ran: usually} permitted after sprinkling, yet it’s still forbidden since we follow its original status. The Gemara rejects the proof: the Trumah of the Todah loaves is included in what the Braisa allows Ahron’s Trumah {Ran: since they’re also forbidden to a non-Kohein}. The Braisa only comes to exclude the Trumah of the Lishka.

61) Alternatively, we refer to separating the Todah’s loaf and it was done before sprinkling the Todah’s blood, by the kneading. As Shmuel says that you only need four loaves for a Todah, and having forty loaves is only a Mitzvah, but the Korban is valid without it. We must say that you made the ten loaves from the dough of each type, take off one for Trumah, and then mush the remaining dough together and bake it as one loaf. However, you can’t take one type Trumah on the other loaves since the Pasuk says “from all the Korban,” that you need Trumah from each type, and not from one type on the other type. Also, you can’t originally make it into one loaf and break off a piece for Trumah since the Pasuk says “one from every Korban” and not part of one loaf. {The Ran says: we could have also answered that they separated the Trumah after they were baked before sprinkling, since it needs to be bread before the sprinkling, as we say that it needs to be baked enough to form a crust before the Shechita. However, we explained it that it was separated during the kneading to explain Shmuel.}

62) You can’t say it depends on the argument whether comparing it to a Bechor, that R’ Yaakov says that it takes effect, and R’ Yossi says that it doesn’t take effect (to say that they argue if you bring a piece of Bechor after sprinkling and a piece of meat, and say the meat is like a Bechor, if he meant like it was originally or how it is now). After all, we can say that they argue even before sprinkling, and R’ Yossi holds that it doesn’t take effect since you don’t make a vow to make it Kodesh like other Korbanos, since it’s automatically Kodesh. This is not similar to a Chatos or Asham, although you’re obligated in them without a vow, but you need to vow to make an animal Kodesh to designate it for the Korban. However, R’ Yaakov held, since there’s a Mitzvah to dedicate the Bechor for Hekdish, it something that’s made a vow on. However, R’ Yossi held that this is not considered making a vow to make it Kodesh, since it’s B’dieved Kodesh without making this dedication. {The Ran says that the Ramban Paskins that we don’t follow what it was originally. Although our Sugya has the question unresolved, but the Sugya in Nazir says that we follow the later status, and not the original, whether it’s stringent or lenient.}

63) R’ Yehuda says: if someone says “like a sheep, like an animal pen, like wood, like what’s brought to fire, like the Mizbeach or like the Heichel” it all takes effect and makes it forbidden. (However, without the Kaf of comparison, without saying ‘like,’ it doesn’t take effect.) However, the Rabanan say that, even without the Kaf of comparison, it takes effect.

64) According to R’ Yehuda, if he says “like Yerushalayim,” there’s an argument if it’s forbidden, or permitted {Ran: since it’s like saying “like the stones of Yerushalim”} until he says explicitly, like something sacrificed in Yerushalayim.

65) Even R’ Meir who says that, by just saying it’s Korban (without saying the Kaf of comparison), it’s forbidden, would agree that saying “Hai Korban” doesn’t forbid since it sounds like you’re just swearing in the life of the Korban.

66) If someone tells his friend that he’s Konam his mouth from speaking to you, his hand from doing work with you, his feet from walking with you, they’re all forbidden. Although regularly we say that a Neder only takes effect on an object, but not on actions, like talking and walking {Ran: even though it takes effect rabbinically, but we’re saying that, in truth, it takes effect from the Torah}, since it’s like forbidding the mouth, hand and feet from doing these actions, which are objects. {Ran says: even though it may also mean he’s forbidding the activities, still, we always say that we follow the stringent explanation by vows.}