1) If someone tells his friend to Mekadesh a woman for him, and he went and Mekadesh her for himself, his Kiddushin is valid [Tosfos says: even if he informed her that he was made an agent by the other person, since he said “you’re Mekudeshes to me,” it should be assumed that he’s saying it for himself. We also need to say that we know that the woman understood that he meant himself.] However, it’s considered trickery for switching it on him, unless the woman anyhow refused to marry him. The same regarding buying.

2) A poor person who was busy getting a piece of dung, and you take it before he does, you’re considered to be a Rasha. [Rashi explains that he’s trying to get it from Hefker. However, Tosfos disagrees and says that there are many places that says that you can take Hefker. Therefore, it’s only referring to buying, where you buy it before he does, which is not necessary since you can buy it someplace else. However, he may take it by Hefker, since you won’t be able to get it from Hefker another place. Although, in Bava Basra, we say that you need to distance your traps from the fish that your friend is trapping; that's when it's his business to catch fish, and your intruding on his livelihood. Alternatively, since he did something to make the fish come, and the other person could also make this trick someplace else. The Mahri says: therefore, it’s forbidden for a Melamed to hire himself as a tutor for someone who already has a tutor. However, the father can hire a Melamed away from a different boy, and the other father can’t claim that he should hire a different Melamed.]

3) If one is Mekadesh "after thirty days," another man's Kiddushin that was given within thirty days takes effect. However, if no one comes to Mekadesh, she’s Mekudeshes to him even if the money was spent, since it wasn’t given as a loan or to be watched, it’s always there for the Kiddushin.

4) If she reneged on the Kiddushin within thirty days; R’ Yochanan says that the Kiddushin is canceled since the words of reneging cancels the words of accepting Kiddushin (since the money didn’t transact yet to say that it’s an action). Reish Lakish says that she can’t renege since he words of reneging can’t cancel the action of accepting money for the Kiddushin.

5) The reason why you can cancel your agent before he separates your Trumah, or before he gives a Get, that’s because no action transpired yet.

6) The thought that designates an item to be a utensil cannot be undone by words itself [Tosfos says: since utensils don’t lose its status without an action to change it. However, we never have a question why separating Trumah with your thoughts can’t be undone with your words, since it doesn’t even help to do an action to undo it.] After all, the Torah considers thoughts as an action regarding Tumah, as we say for food to be susceptible to Tumah, it says “if you put liquids on it,” but it’s read that “if liquid is put on it.” (So, we say that as long as you’re happy that the liquid is on, even if you don’t put it on.) Therefore, the Torah equates his thoughts to an action.

7) Another version: R’ Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue when a woman sends an agent to receive Kiddushin, if she can cancel the agency. [Tosfos explains: not in front of the agent, since it’s simple that she can tell the agent that he’s no longer her agent.] R’ Yochanan says that words can cancel her original words of appointing him an agent. Reish Lakish says that words can’t cancel him, but she needs an action, like accepting Kiddushin from someone else before he receives it on your behalf. Reish Lakish was disproved from the fact that you can cancel your agent by Get. The Halacha is like R’ Yochanan even in the case where the money was given already on condition after thirty days. Although we Paskin that, if you cancel the agent by the Get, you can still use the Get to divorce; that’s because he only canceled his agency, but not the Get. [Tosfos says: in Gitten it says that since the Get was written in a valid manner, you can’t uproot that action that made it into a valid Get with words.]

8) If the man gave the Kiddushin “from now until thirty days,” and she accepted Kiddushin from someone else within thirty days, she’s Mekudeshes, but not Mekudeshes. Rav explains that we have a Safeik if the words ‘until thirty days’ is a condition for it to take effect now, or it’s reversing what he said from now, and only wants it to take effect after thirty days. Shmuel says that we only have a Safeik maybe she’s married to the second person until day thirty, but as soon as it turns day thirty, the second one’s Kiddushin falls off since he holds that it’s definitely a condition.

9) It depends on a Taanaic argument if he says “it should be a Get from now until I die,” Rebbi held that we interpret it to be a condition that the Get takes effect immediately as long as he eventually dies, and the Chachumim say that it’s a Safeik Get.

10) Abaya says: according to Rav, if three people Mekadesh a woman, the first one said “from now until thirty days,” and the second one said “from now until twenty days,” and the third says “from now until ten days,” she only needs a Get from the first and the third. After all, if it implies to be a condition, only the first one has a Kiddushin. If it means he reversed from saying “from now,” only the third’s Kiddushin is valid. We don’t say that we need to have a Safeik if the first one might mean a reversal and the second one meant to make a condition, and the second one made the Kiddushin. Rather, the implication is universal, and if it means a reversal, it would be a reversal for all of them. If it means a condition, it would be a condition to all of them.

11) R’ Yochanan holds that they all have a part of her Kiddushin, like a row of bricks, that one brick leaves place for the other one to be set. [Tosfos says: although we said earlier that, if you Mekadesh a half of woman, it’s not a Kiddushin, but here, the Kiddushin doesn’t stop half way, but it continues to take effect until the whole woman is married.]

12) We have a Braisa that, if you give a Get on condition that “it should be a Get from now until I die,” if the husband dies, since it’s a Safeik Get, she needs a Chalitza from the Yavam, but he can’t do Yibum. Although, according to R’ Yochanan, it shouldn’t be a Get at all since there’s something left [Rashi explains: it doesn’t cut her off completely. Tosfos asks: if it wouldn’t work regarding Gitten, it wouldn’t work either regarding Kiddushin since we have a Hekish from divorcing to marrying. Rather, it’s definitely considered cutting her off, but here, since it doesn’t finish taking effect until after his death, it shouldn’t take effect since Gitten can’t take effect after his death. Therefore, Kiddushin wouldn’t take effect either if it was “it should be from now until I die.” However, our case, where it’s only after thirty days, it takes effect.] However, the reason why she can’t do Yibum is, since; she may do so also if he says “from today if I die” which is a definite condition. The reason they didn’t enact Chalitza when he says “from today if I die” so not to allow her to marry out when he says “from now until I die;” since she might think the reason why she needs Chalitza is because she does fall to Yibum, so she’ll end up having Yibum instead. However, they didn’t have this worry to allow Chalitza by “from now until I die” because she might do Yibum, since there’s nothing really wrong if she does Yibum, since it’s only rabbinically forbidden to do Yibum.

13) If someone says: "this is your Kiddushin on condition you give me two hundred Zuz,” R' Huna says that she's married right away since he holds like Rebbi that, when someone says "on condition," it's like he said that it should take effect right away. R' Yehuda says he's not [Tosfos: definitely] married but only after the money is given, since he holds like Rebbi's Rabanan who [Tosfos: are in doubt if he's saying for it to take effect right away or] if saying on condition is not saying "from now." (However, R’ Huna holds that the Rabanan don’t necessarily argue with Rebbi, as R’ Yochanan says explicitly.) The practical difference is if she accepts Kiddushin from someone else in between. R’ Yehuda is concerned about that second Kiddushin, and R’ Huna is not concerned. [Tosfos says: however, if money was given for the Kiddushin, it takes effect even if it was lost before the money given even if "on condition" doesn't mean from now, since it was lost while it's in her possession.]

14) They also argue regarding Get. If someone says: "this is your Get on condition you give me two hundred Zuz,” she's divorced, as long as she gives it. R' Huna says that she's divorced right away and R' Yehuda says he's not [Tosfos: definitely] divorced but only after the money is given. The practical difference if the Get was ripped between the Get's giving and the giving of the money. [Tosfos says: you can’t say the practical difference is if she accepts Kiddushin from someone else in between, since even R’ Yehuda holds that you need to worry about his Kiddushin since she’s Safeik divorced.]

15) Therefore, according to Rebbi (or according to R’ Huna according to all Tannaim) if he says "this is your Get on condition you give me two hundred Zuz,” and he dies; The Tanna Kama says that it implies that it’s only if she gave him money in his lifetime, but not to his heirs after his death. R’ Shimon b. Gamliel says that it does imply to give it to me, or, if I die, to my heirs.

16) If he said to give it within thirty days, the Get only takes effect if it was given within thirty days, and we don't say he doesn't care that much, and only added it to make her zealous to pay it.

17) If he says “on condition that I have two hundred Zuz,” if he shows the money, she’s definitely Mekudeshes, and if not, she’s a Safeik since we’re concerned that he might have it someplace.

18) If he says “on condition that I show you two hundred Zuz,” he’s only Mekudeshes if he shows it from himself. It doesn’t help if he’s a banker/money changer and has the rights to use the money for business.

19) If he says “on condition that I have a Beis Kur of land,” if he shows the land, she’s definitely Mekudeshes, and if not, she’s a Safeik since we’re concerned that he might have it someplace, and we don’t say that we’re not concerned since it’s hard to keep the land a secret since he can’t hide it like moveable assets.

20) If he says “on condition that I have a Beis Kur of land in this place,” if he shows the land, she’s definitely Mekudeshes, and if not, she’s definitely not Mekudeshes even if he has it someplace else, and we don’t say that he can claim to the woman that it shouldn’t make a difference to her since he’s the one who has the bother to transfer the fruit from that place.

21) If he says “on condition that I have a Beis Kur of land,” if he shows the land, she’s only Mekudeshes if it’s his. This is even true if he’s a sharecropper.

22) If someone is Mekadesh his field [Tosfos: when Yovel was still in effect] he redeems an area that you can plant the measurement of Chomar barley for fifty Shekalim, If there are holes in the ground ten Tefachim deep, or it’s filled with water, or rocks ten Tefachim high; they don’t get measured along with it. [Tosfos says: they’re redeemed by themselves according to their worth. However, they become Kodesh when you Mekudesh the field. Just like we say that other similar items are Mekudesh with it, like a well, vats, dove-coop, of course these that are more part of the field.] However, less than that is secondary to the field and is measured with it. Also, if these mounds and holes are fields (by being able to be planted) in their own right, they are also redeemed the same way as the regular field by themselves (and not counting the slope.) [Tosfos says: however, we can’t say a practical difference if they’re considered as one field or two, since it doesn’t make a difference since you’re allowed to redeem a half of field by itself, like it says in Bava Kama.]

23) However, if he sold a field, and there are these mounds and holes, even if you can plant on them, the sale is canceled, since people don’t want to spend money to buy a field and have it look like it’s a couple of different fields.

24) If he says “on condition that I have a Beis Kur of land,” if he shows the land, she’s Mekudeshes if there are these mounds and holes that you can plant on them since it shouldn’t make a difference to her since he’s the one who has the bother to plant and transfer the fruit from that place.

25) R’ Meir holds that conditions that are not similar to the condition made by the children of Gad and Reuvein are not valid conditions; so the condition is canceled and the action remains. Therefore, he needs to make a "double condition," even though, when we say what he should do, we could figure the flip side. You also need the condition said before the action. Also, the positive needs to be said before the negative [Tosfos: the side that you want is what’s considered the positive, even if it’s framed in the negative “if this doesn’t happen.”] R’ Chanina b. Gamliel argues. [Rashi says only on the double condition, but Tosfos says: in Bava Metzia, it implies that all these conditions are also only according to R' Meir.]

26) If someone is Mekadesh a woman and she thinks that he’s a Kohein, but he’s really not, she’s still Mekudeshes since he didn’t mislead her.

27) You can’t give Kiddushin to someone who Kiddushin can't take effect now for when it will take effect. Like, giving Kiddushin to a non-Jewess for it to take effect after she converts, or to a married lady for after she gets divorced etc.

28) You can’t separate Trumah from detached produce on attached produce [Rashi says: since it says “your Dagen.” Tosfos disagrees since, if that would be the case, you couldn’t separate Trumah until it’s smoothed into a pile. Rather, since the Pasuk says “you take from it,” excluding when it’s attached, as we Darshen in Toras Kohanim.]

29) R’ Yochanan says that, if you separate Trumah from detached fruit on attached fruit, or vice versa, with the condition that it would take effect after you detach it, it works, since you have the ability to detach it, it’s not considered as if it’s missing the action of detaching.

30) This is not similar to the case of giving a Prutah to your wife for her to be Mekudeshes to him when he divorces her that she’s not Mekudeshes. After all, although it’s in his ability to divorce her, it’s not in his ability to make her accept the Kiddushin then. This is extra true by giving a Prutah to your slave for her to be Mekudeshes to him when he frees her that she’s not Mekudeshes. [Tosfos adds: this is even true to the opinion that she just needs Teveila, which she can do herself, and doesn’t need Beis Din.] After all, besides that it’s not in his hands for her to accept Kiddushin then, it’s considered as completely missing an action, since she’s considered somewhat like a Beheima now, and you need her to turn into a person, which there’s no greater “missing an action” than that. It’s extra true by giving a Prutah to a non-Jew for her to be Mekudeshes to him when she coverts that she’s not Mekudeshes since she needs three people to be a Beis Din. [Tosfos says: although she needs three people to be a Beis Din; that's only for the acceptance of the Mitzvos, but B'dieved, the Teveila could be done without anyone. That’s what the Gemara in Yevamos says: If people claim that a converted man didn't complete her conversion since he never Toiveled in the Mikvah, it’s a good conversion since we know he Toivels after he emits semen. Although it also says there that three Talmidei Chachumim stand over him by the Teveila and inform him about some of the strict and lenient Mitzvos, that’s L'chatchila, that she needs to Toivel before three Talmidei Chachumim. Alternatively, you need Beis Din there in order to accept the Mitzvos. You need three people there since it's called “a judgment.” Even according to the opinion that the Torah says that you can judge a loan case by yourself; but we should compare conversion stringently to a robbery and assault judgment that needs three judges according to all. The reason we accept converts these days even though we're not expert judges (who received Smicha in Eretz Yisrael) since we're doing the agency of Beis Din (like the reason we judge any case these days). Alternatively, since the Torah says by converts that it’s for “your generations” implying for all generations, even those who don’t have Smicha.]

31) This is not similar to R’ Oshiya’s unresolved inquiry if you give two Prutos to a woman, one for the Kiddushin to take effect now, and one for after he divorces her, although it’s not in his hand’s to Mekadesh her then, but we have another reason it should work: once the Kiddushin takes effect for now, it will take effect for later too.

32) We see R' Elazar b. Yaakov holds of this opinion that someone can make a transaction for something that didn’t come into the world. As he says: you can separate Trumah and Maasar on grain that hadn't grown a third yet.

33) Rabbah says that it’s only by unripe grain that its existence is more noticeable, and R’ Yosef says that it’s even at the beginning of its growth when it’s very small and soft (that you can bend it over). Another version: they both say that it refers to unripe grain that grew somewhat; but Rabbah held that it’s only in an non-irrigated field that only needs rain that comes by itself, and it will grow without your actions, and R’ Yosef says that even in an irrigated field that you need to physically water.

34) If you tell a man, if your wife gives birth to a girl, I’m giving you Kiddushin for her; she’s not Mekudeshes. R’ Chanina says (according to R' Elazar b. Yaakov) only if his wife is not pregnant, but if she is, she’s Mekudeshes. According to the first version, Rabbah would hold only if the pregnancy is noticeable, and R’ Yosef holds even if it’s not noticeable. According to the second version, everyone agrees it’s only if the pregnancy is noticeable.

35) Also, we see Rebbi holds of this opinion. As he says, if you free a slave that you don't own for when you buy him; when you buy him, you can't work him since the freedom document takes effect even though it was given when he didn't exist in his possession. [Tosfos says: the reason he needs to say “from now,” so that it would take effect afterwards even if it gets ripped in the meantime. Although R' Yochanan says that you only acquire the ox when pulling it when you make a condition that you're acquiring after thirty days if it was in his property on the thirtieth day (so his courtyard can acquire it); that’s R’ Yochanan consistent to his opinion earlier by a man who gave the Kiddushin “from now until thirty days,” and she accepted Kiddushin from someone else within thirty days, they all have a part of her Kiddushin, like a row of bricks, that one brick leaves place for the other one to be set. However, we’re going according to Shmuel who says that, as soon as it turns day thirty, the second one’s Kiddushin falls off since he holds that it’s definitely a condition. If he says “on condition,” thirty days is only a condition, and the transaction doesn’t need to extend to after thirty days.]

36) Also, R' Meir holds of this opinion. As he says that you can give Kiddushin to someone who Kiddushin can't take effect now for when it will take effect. Like, giving Kiddushin to a non-Jewess for it to take effect after she converts, or to a married lady for after she gets divorced etc.

37) [Tosfos says: although we say that R’ Elazar b. Yaakov is a Kav, but clean (I.e., said a small amount of opinions, but they’re very logical), but we Paskin that someone can’t make a transaction for something that didn’t come into the world since R’ Nachman Paskins this way in Bava Metzia.]

38) If someone is Mekadesh through speaking to the sultan on her behalf, or any other service; it depends if you hold that you owe a hired hand (during his work) from beginning to end (and when you pay him at the end, it’s a loan and not a Kiddushin); or not (and you only owe him at the end, and when you’re Mekadesh her at the end, it’s not a loan, but through the obligation for that moment). However, if he says for the wage she owes for what he already spoke to the sultan, or already did some service, everyone agrees that it’s a loan and she’s not Mekudeshes.

39) If someone is Mekadesh a woman on condition that his father would keep quiet about it (and not protest), as soon as he hears about it and keeps quiet, she’s Mekudeshes. Even if he dies before he hears about it, she’s Mekudeshes. [Tosfos says: since we should assess him that he wouldn’t have protested if he would have heard of it. However, if the Kiddushin was on condition that the father would agree to the marriage and he died, she’s not Mekudeshes since he’s missing the action of the father agreeing.]

40) If someone says that he was Mekadesh his daughter, but doesn't remember to who, and a person claims that it was to him, he’s believed. Rav says that he’s only believed to give a Get, since he wouldn’t sin in order for others to gain, but he’s not believed to remain married to her since it could be his Yetzer Harah getting the best of him to claim it, and he’s not afraid that the father will contradict him since he doesn’t recall to whom he accepted Kiddushin from. However, if there are two people claiming to be the husband, then one gives a Get and the other marries her, since we say that he has reasons to be afraid to claim it if it’s not true, since the other man, the real husband, knows he’s lying. [Tosfos says: although one of them is lying, but probably he will be the one who will write the Get and the real husband will take her.] R’ Assi says that even the one claimant can marry her, and even if another man comes and claims to be the real husband, he doesn’t have the ability to forbid her on the first one. We have a Braisa like R’ Assi.

41) R’ Assi agrees that if the woman claims that she accepted Kiddushin, but doesn’t remember from who and a person claims that it was to him, he’s not believed to remain married to her since, even if another will come and claim that he was the real husband, even if the woman will realize then, she will now defend her new husband, so he doesn’t have anything to fear from lying.

42) When a father claims “I accepted Kiddushin for my daughter from this man,” the Torah believes him; Rav says only to forbid her to others, but not to get them stoned if they had relations. R’ Assi says he’s believed even to get others to be stoned. R’ Chisdah says only to forbid her to others, and he’s consistent to his opinion that a father’s believed to say that his son is nine years old, or his daughter is three (and relations is applicable to them), to obligate an Ervah to bring a Korban but not to get punished for it.

43) We have a Braisa just like R’ Chisdah. As a father is believed to say that his son is thirteen, and his daughter is twelve [Rashi: otherwise, even if they would have pubic hairs, it wouldn’t make them adults, since those hairs would not be a sign of puberty, but an unsightly wart.] Therefore, if they made vows, the father’s believed that they take effect to forbid people to partake in it. [Tosfos says: although a single witness is only believed regarding what is in his hands to do, we consider this as in his hands since the child will eventually grow up by himself. However, we only consider it in the father’s hands, since it’s upon him to know their ages to inform us for the public record.] However, he’s not believed regarding punishments. [Tosfos asks: when some girl comes to us to receive Chalitza or to get punished, how do we know that they’re adult age yet? Tosfos answers: if she has a lot of pubic hairs, or, if she’s tall enough to be assumed definitely an adult, or otherwise, you would need testimony to their age. Alternatively, the Ri says, once she has pubic hairs, we can assume her to be an adult, however, our Gemara refers to a case where the father said that, when she made the vow a time ago, she was of age and did have pubic hairs.]

44) If a father claims that he received Kiddushin, and a Get, for his minor daughter, he’s believed. However, he’s not believed to say that she was captured and redeemed since the Torah only believes a father regarding marriage to forbid (“I married off my daughter” and she’s forbidden to all), and to permit (“to this man,” to permit him from all the people he already forbade her to). However, they never believed him regarding a captive.

45) A husband who has a Chazaka that he doesn't have a brother nor a son, and the wife has a Chazaka that she’s permitted to marry out, and he says at the time of his death that he has a brother; he's not believed to forbid her. However, he’s believed to say that he has a son, since it strengthens her Chazaka that she’s permitted to marry out, and even if a brother shows up later, she can assume her Chazaka that she can marry out.

46) However, in the opposite case where he had a Chazaka that he has a brother, but not a son, but at the Kiddushin he claims to have a son and not a brother; he’s believed since he has a Migo since he can exempt her from Yibum anyhow by giving her a Get. [Tosfos Yeshanim says: although he doesn’t want to divorce her now, but to keep her, but he can give a Get now to take effect later before his death. Although it’s an “old Get” (since they seclude their whole life), which you can’t divorce with, but since it’s B’dieved Kosher, we consider it as a Migo.] If he then says at the time of his death that he doesn't have a son and he has a brother; Rebbi says he's not believed to forbid her. R' Nosson says he's believed to forbid her at his death. Rebbi holds that a Migo is like witnesses and it uproots the original Chazaka to forbid her, so now she has a Chazaka of Heter, and R’ Nosson holds that it’s not as strong as witnesses and doesn’t uproot the original Chazaka completely, so when he said by his deathbed that she’s forbidden, he’s not going against the Chazaka.

47) However, if he doesn’t renege his words at his death, R’ Nosson agrees that she can get married on his words. Granted the Migo is not greater than the Chazaka, but he also is extra believable since he won’t sin (to lie) if he doesn’t gain by the sin. [Tosfos says: however, if he didn’t say anything at the Kiddushin, but only says that he has a brother at the death, he’s not believed since he may not have the Migo since he might not have the strength to give a Get at this point.]

48) If someone is Mekadesh one of his two daughters without explicitly saying which, even according to the opinion that a Kiddushin that can’t lead to having relations with your wife doesn’t take effect, his daughter who already reached Bagrus is not included (in the Safeik). This is even if the Bogeres appointed her father as her agent to accept Kiddushin since someone won’t leave something that he has pleasure from (i.e., to accept money for his minor daughter, where he receives the money, and accept money for his Bogeres daughter, which the daughter keeps). This is even where the older daughter gives him permission to keep the money since a person won’t leave to do a Mitzvah that’s personally upon you to fulfil (like getting your minor daughter married) and to do a mitzvah that’s not personally upon you to fulfill (getting your older daughter married, which is her obligation, and her father is only acting as her agent).

49) If he has two groups of daughters from two wives, and each set has an older and younger daughter, and someone gives Kiddushin for the older one without qualifying who; R’ Meir says that someone allows himself to fall into a Safeik, and the Safeik is on the daughters from the older set and the older one of the younger set. However, R’ Yossi holds that someone avoids going into a Safeik, so it can only mean the eldest of the older set. The Halacha is similar if he gave Kiddushin for the younger one.

50) If it’s only one set of girls, if he gives Kiddushin for the older one, it’s the oldest of them, and if he gives Kiddushin for the younger one, it’s only for the youngest of them. As, if he would want any of the middle daughters, he would have named her.

51) This last statement seems to contradict their opinions regarding making vows; like if you vow from something until “P’nai, the face,” of Pesach; R’ Meir says that he’s forbidden with it until the end of Pesach, and R’ Yossi only forbids until you reach Pesach; that R’ Meir is till strict even though it’s parallel to one set of daughters. However, the reason for R’ Meir is not that he’s getting himself into a Safeik since it’s a Safeik if the whole Pesach is “the face” since it’s on the surface of the following day of Pesach, but because he feels that the meaning of P’nai is not face, but Panoi, when Pesach finishes, and R’ Yossi holds it means the face.

52) If he claims to be married to a girl, but she claims that she’s not married to him; he’s forbidden to marry her relatives since he made them to himself as a forbidden piece (by claiming to be married to their relative), but she’s permitted to his relatives. Even if she claims to be married to him (where she would be more careful in her claims since she’s becoming forbidden to everyone through it), but he claims that he’s not married to her; we still say she’s forbidden to marry his relatives, but he’s permitted to her relatives.

53) If a mother claims that her daughter is married, she’s not believed, since the Torah only believes the father, but not the mother, and she’s not even believed rabbinically.

54) When she claims to be married to him, we ask him to please give her a Get since she would be forbidden to everyone otherwise. However, if he gives a Get from his own volition, he needs to give the Kesuva since it’s as if he’s admitting that he was her husband. [Tosfos says: from here’s a proof that an Arusah has a Kesuva even if there’s none written. After all, if we’re referring to a case where there’s a Kesuva, there are witnesses that they were married.]

55) This is only if it’s claimed that they had Kiddushin before witnesses, but they left overseas; but otherwise, Kiddushin doesn’t take effect even before a single witness and even if both parties agree that it took place.

56) If someone divorces his wife and then sleeps with her in a motel, and there are witnesses on their seclusion, but not on the relation. Beis Shammai doesn’t require her to give a second Get, and Beis Hillel says that he needs to give a second Get (since he might have had relations with her for Kiddushin). They both agree that there’s no Kiddushin without witnesses. Beis Shammai don’t say that the witnesses on the seclusion is like having witnesses on the relations, and Beis Hillel say that the witnesses on the seclusion is like having witnesses on the relations, (since we assume so much, if they secluded, they had relations). Therefore, all agree that, if she was an Arusah (when she accepted Kiddushin before the Chuppah), she doesn’t need a second Get since he’s not so comfortable with her (to assume that they had relations), we don’t say witnesses on the seclusion is as if they witnessed the relations.

57) The reason we say that you need two witnesses for Kiddushin since we learn a Gezeira Shava “Davar, Davar” from monetary laws. Although, by monetary laws we say when someone admits to an obligation, it’s like having a hundred witnesses on it, that’s only when it’s detrimental only to you, but here it’s detrimental to all others who would want to marry her.

58) The concept of witnesses was only created to prevent lying. Therefore, if brothers are confident that all of them are honest, they can divide the estate without witnesses. [Tosfos says: it seems from her that a Kinyan doesn’t need witnesses to take effect.]

59) A single witness that testifies that someone ate forbidden fats, if he keeps quiet and doesn't deny it, he brings a Chatos. The same is true if he testified that his Taharos became Tamai, or that his animal was involved with bestiality, and he doesn’t deny it, we believe the testimony. [Tosfos says: because his being quiet is as and admittance that he did it. It’s only if it was not in his hands, but if it was in his hands to make them Tamai, he's believed. If time passed between when it’s in his hands and his claim, Abaya says: he’s not believed since it's not in his hands anymore, and Rava says: he's believed despite that it's no longer in his hands, as it says in Gitten.]

60) [Tosfos says: it’s only if the witness claims that the owner knows about it, but if the owner is not expected to know about it, his silence is not like admitting to it.]

61) [Tosfos says: if this witness was made an agent to watch the fruit, he’s believed since it’s in his hands, plus, with the fact that the owner entrusted it to him, it’s as if he believes him like two witnesses.]

62) If a single witness claims that someone’s wife had an affair, and he’s quiet; Abaya says that he’s believed [Tosfos says: even though Abaya agrees that, if someone receives Kiddushin in front of a single witness, that it’s not a Kiddushin; that’s because the money given could be a gift, but an affair, if true, it forbids the wife. When we say that you can only forbid with a single witness when you have Kinoy and Stira (warning and seclusion) that’s only without the husband keeping quiet.] Rava says that he’s not believed. [Tosfos explains: the reason that keeping quiet is like admitting, and by that, making her like “a forbidden piece” since it’s not a complete admitting, but the single witness is usually believed since the quietness proves that there something to the concern, but it doesn’t reach the level of two witnesses needed for an Ervah.] This is unless the witness is believed by him like two witnesses.

63) A Kohein who they have a Safeik on his mother if she was captured; if they’re conflicting pairs of witnesses to this fact, the child can’t act like a Kohein. [Rashi says: since the son doesn’t have a Chazaka of being a Kosher Kohein to put him on. Tosfos disagrees, since the Chazaka of the mother helps for the child. Rather, we only say that the witnesses cancel each other out and we leave the person on his Chazaka to be a Kohein by rabbinical Trumah, but not by Torah obligated Yuchson.]

64) [Tosfos says: Bigdei Kehuna is not Assur to wear even not at the time of the Avodah because the Torah wasn’t given to angels that can remove it immediately after he performed the Avodah, but that’s only when he dons them to do the Avoda, but he can’t wear it for no reason. This is not like Rashi. However, the Tzitz is the exception, that you can randomly put it on, as the Pasuk says “it shall be on his forehead constantly.”]

65) If there was a Kosher Mikvah that they Toiveled there for Tahros, and then you eventually remeasured it and it came out to be missing. R’ Tarfon says: you keep the Mikvah on its Chazaka of being full and, thus, everything you Toiveled there is Tahor, and R’ Akiva says that you Keep the utensils Toiveled there on their Chazaka of being Tamai. [Tosfos explains: they also have a different argument if a Kohein Toiveled in an assumed Kosher Mikvah and did Avoda, and then witnesses testified that it was truly missing at that time.] R’ Tarfon says that it’s a Kosher Avoda similar to finding out that a Kohein, after doing the Avodah, was a son of a divorcee or a woman who got Chalitza. R’ Akiva says the Avodah is Pasul like finding out that the Kohein was blemished.

66) R’ Akiva says: the case of Mikvah is more similar to a blemished Kohein since a single witness is believed by both of them (according to Rava, with him being quiet, and according to Abaya, even without being quiet), since each one could have been found out at the Avodah, by asking him to undress to see the blemish, or to measure the Mikvah. [Tosfos says: it seems a single witness is believed even when he’s contradicted if you can check it out.] This is not similar to a son of a divorcee or a woman who got Chalitza (that Rava doesn’t believe when he keeps quiet since it involves an Ervah topic, and Abaya, only if he’s denying it; since he can’t be checked out at the moment.)

67) Whenever there’s Kiddushin taking effect and no sin, the Yichus follows the father regarding Kohein, Levi and Yisrael.

68) However, when there’s Kiddushin taking effect, but there is a sin; the Yichus follows the defected Yichus. If Kiddushin doesn’t take effect, the child is a Mamzer. [Tosfos says: this seems to be the Halacha, and not like R’ Akiva who says that the child is a Mamzer even for a Lav.] If it involves a non-Jew or slave, the child has the status of the mother.

69) R’ Yossi says that a Ger can marry a Mamzer, and R’ Yehuda forbids. However, they both agree that the child is a Mamzer.

70) If a Chalal marries a regular Jewess, the Tanna Kama says the child is still a Chalal, and R’ Dustai says that the child is Kosher.

71) Everyone agrees that a regular Yisrael who marries a Chalalah, the child is Kosher.

72) Rabbah b. b. Chana quotes R' Yochanan: the child of Egyptians follow the status of the father, so if a second generation male married a first generation female, the child is considered a third generation and is permitted. [Rashi says: we don't follow the P'sul of either parent but by a forbidden relations, like a Yisrael who marries an Egyptian, but not by two Egyptians who are permitted with each other. Tosfos brings Mahram who says that Amoni and Egyptians follow the more Pasul even though they’re permitted. Rather, it’s because they’re from the same nation.] However, R' Dimi quotes R' Yochanan: the child of such a union is a second generation Egyptian.

73) By the non-Jews, we follow the status of the father. Therefore, if a man from Chutz L'aretz marries a Kanani woman, the child may be bought as a slave since it follows the father and is not part of what the Torah says on the seven nations “you should not let anyone live.” However, if a Kanani man marries a woman from Chutz L'aretz, the child may not be bought as a slave since it follows the father and is part of what the Torah says on the seven nations “you should not let anyone live.”

74) However, when the non-Jews convert, the child follows the more Pasul of the nations. Therefore, if a Amoni marries an Egyptian; if the child's a male, he has the status of an Amoni (who's males are always forbidden), and if the child's a female, she has the status of an Egyptian, since Amoni females are permitted.

75) Everyone agrees that a child from a Niddah, despite being a Kareis, the child is not a Mamzer. Also, R' Akiva admits that a child from a Sotah is not a Mamzer since Kiddushin can take effect on her. [Tosfos explains: if he divorces her and remarries her, the Kiddushin takes effect, and we don’t say that the Kiddushin can’t take effect anymore because he divorced her.]

76) R' Tarfon says, that a Mamzer can marry a slave and, if their child becomes freed, he will be Kosher. R' Eliezer says that a Mamzer can't marry a slave in order to make his children Kosher, since the Pasuk says ‘him,’ to follow the Pasul. However, we also say, if the father is Kosher, that child of a slave follows the mother because the Gezeiras Hakasuv of “the slave and her son belongs to the master.” R’ Tarfon holds that no Mamzeiros can pass to the child, since a fetus in a slave is similar to a fetus in a Beheima.