1) A man can be Mikadesh a woman, him and his agent. However, there is a special Mitzvah for him to do it personally more than his agent. As we see that R’ Safra burned (the hairs) of the head (of the slaughtered animal) and Rava salted the fish (for Shabbos. So, we see they participated personally with the preparation of Shabbos, since the Mitzvah is greater when you do it yourself.) Another version: there is even a prohibition not to make the Kiddushin yourself since it’s forbidden for someone to Mikadesh a woman until he sees her, for perhaps he’ll later find something that he finds disgraceful and she’ll be disgraced in his eyes, and the Torah says that you must love your friend like yourself (and it will end up that you won’t love her). However, a woman receives Kiddushin, her and her agent, but there is a special Mitzvah for her to do it personally more than her agent. However, there is no prohibition for her to send an agent to accept the Kiddushin (although she never met him), since it’s better for her to sit together with someone than to be alone.

2) The man could receive Kiddushin for his daughter when she’s a Naarah; implying but not if she’s a minor since it’s forbidden for someone to receive Kiddushin for his daughter while she’s a minor until she grows up and says that she wants to marry that person. [Tosfos says: although we said earlier that it’s not forbidden for a woman (to accept Kiddushin without meeting the groom) since she would rather be together with someone than to be alone; that's only by an adult that made the decision to make the Kiddushin, so we don’t expect her to regret it. However, a minor whose father decides to marry her off, we must worry that, perhaps, if she was an adult, she would refuse this marriage. Tosfos concludes: nowadays, that we marry off our daughters when they’re minors, that’s because, each day, the exile gets harder, and if today you have enough money to marry off your daughter and give her a dowry, you marry her off right away, for perhaps later you might not have the ability to provide this and she’ll remain unmarried forever.]

3) Someone tells his agent to separate his Trumah, he must separate the percentage that the owner usually separates; if he’s generous a fortieth, or if he’s stingy, a sixtieth, and an average person separates a fiftieth. If he doesn’t know how he usually separates, he separates like the average person, which is a fiftieth. However, if he adds or subtracts ten (to a fortieth or to a sixtieth), his Trumah remains Trumah (and we don’t say that the owner didn’t appoint him to take off that amount). [Tosfos says this is different than when someone tells his agent to separate Trumah, if he does (separate from the produce), then, if the owner returns and said “why don’t you take it from better ones”, if there are no better ones (we assume he said it sarcastically) and it’s not Trumah; that’s because most people don’t take off Trumah from the best produce, but from the average fruit. However, by the amount, there are many people who take off Trumah generously, so the agent can say that he assessed you for such an amount.]

4) You have the power to separate Trumah through thought (and you don’t need to say it explicitly).

5) R’ Yannai taught: the Pasuk says “also you.” (‘Also’ teaches us about the agent, and it’s right next to the word ‘you.’) Just like you are a Jew, so too your agent must be a Jew. Although we should exclude a non-Jew to be an agent for taking off Trumah anyhow since he’s not applicable to the laws of Trumah the same way we say that a slave can’t be an agent to accept a Get on behalf of a woman from her husband, since the slave personally is not applicable to the laws of Gitten and Kiddushin; since a non-Jew has the ability to separate his own Trumah according to the Tanna Kama who says that if a non-Jew or Kusi separates Trumah, it’s a good Trumah. (However, R’ Shimon argues and says that the non-Jew’s are exempt from all Trumah.)

6) [Rashi explains: they argue if a non-Jew can acquire land in Eretz Yisrael so much that it breaks the obligation on the fruits to separate Trumah, or not. Tosfos asks on Rashi’s explanation: whether non-Jews acquire land in Eretz Yisrael to remove the obligation of Trumah or not, the Gemara in Gitten says that it’s an argument between Amorayim; and it's not probable that Tannaim argue with the same argument as Amorayim. Therefore, Ri explains: even if we hold that the non-Jew can acquire land in Eretz Yisrael to remove the obligation of Trumah, we can find a case where his grain is obligated in Trumah, like in the case where it grew a third in the hands of a Jew (and then he sold it to a non-Jew). Even if you say it’s exempt when a non-Jew smooths the pile, we can still say that a Jew smoothed the pile. Although the Torah says “your seeds” which excludes those you bought (and the non-Jew bought the grain), that's only if he bought it after the pile was smoothed. However, we refer to when he bought it before the smoothing, and only afterwards, a Jew smooths it.]

7) We Darshen that only ‘you’ could take off Trumah, and not a sharecropper or a partner or a guardian, i.e., you, and not anyone who doesn’t own the Trumah.

8) When orphans come to divide their father’s estate, Beis Din appoints guardians for them and they pick a good share for them. [R’ Tam explains: it’s exact to say that they ‘come’ to split, but, if one protests splitting the estate now, you can’t appoint a guardian to force the splitting against his will. Although the Gemara in Yevamos says that there’s a case where a Kohain dies and he leaves a pregnant wife and many slaves; we allow the slaves to eat Trumah on account of the male heirs (who are also Kohanim), and you don't need to worry about the share of the fetus, i.e., for, (perhaps it will also be a male and we Paskin only born Kohanim allow their slaves to eat Trumah and not those who are yet to be born), the Rabanan enacted, even if a brother is so young that he doesn’t have the mental capacity to agree to the split; that’s a special enactment for the fetus that his share gains too to have the slaves able to eat Trumah, since Trumah is inexpensive. Also, even if this is a proof that you don’t need the orphans consent, at least it’s not a proof that you split if an orphan protests, and we don’t appoint a guardian to split against his will.] Beis Din appoints guardians for them for their benefit and detriment (even though they might get the type of land that they don’t want). [Tosfos asks: although the Gemara in Gitten says that a guardian is not allowed to be detrimental so that they may be beneficial; that's only in a case where creditors claim money from them, which they might not end up coming to claim it after they grow up (for whatever reason). However, when they claim for the orphans, like here when they want their share of the land, and even when they grow up they would need to split the land, we most certainly set up guardians to be detrimental (to give up some land) so that it will be beneficial (to keep the land that’s in their share).]

9) [Tosfos explains: Ri says that the word “pick (a good share)” infers even without a lottery. Therefore, the guardian picks out what he feels to be beneficial to the orphans the same way the orphans would do so when they grow up and each one will pick what they want and acquire it to be his. The same applies regarding having an object that you can’t split, that you can offer that the brothers’ guardians can buy your orphan out, or you’ll buy them out, just like the orphans can do when they grow up. However, R’ Tam explains: we only allow it to split with lots, and it doesn’t apply to items that you need to buy each other out. Although the Gemara says that they pick out the share, this can apply to lots too since, if you’re splitting three fields (for three brothers), you shouldn’t split each field into three, but rather, each one gets his whole inheritance at once in one field. Also, there are many areas that you need to choose to be in each share, like rights for windows (that the shouldn’t be blocked by walls built in the other’s share) and ladders (that you can place a ladder to your top floor, even if it needs to be placed on the other one’s share).]

10) Shmuel says: an orphan may protest what he received when he grows up. R’ Nachman held that they can’t protest when they grow up or else, then, what kind of power does Beis Din have if their enactment won’t stand? However, we only keep their judgment when they don’t make a mistake, but reverse it when they made a mistake (like assessing wrong). After all, we learned in a Mishna; if Beis Din assessed something, but they were off, either by adding or subtracting a sixth, the Tanna Kama says that the sale is null and void. R’ Shimon b. Gamliel says that the sale is valid, because if we would void it, then what power does Beis Din have? Yet, R’ Nachman says the Halacha is like the Chachumim. Still, even if the guardians didn’t err, Shmuel allow protesting over which side they got (since they might have wanted another side if he inherited from his mother a different field on that second side, and he wants his fields to be together). [Tosfos points out: the Gemara could have differentiated between Beis Din making a mistake of a sixth and making a mistake of less than a sixth (where everyone holds the transaction doesn’t become null).]

11) R’ Nachman says: brothers who split an estate are like buyers. Therefore, if they underassess or overassess a property; if less than a sixth, the acquisition stays as is, if more than a sixth, then the whole transaction is null. If it’s exactly a sixth, then, the transaction stays, but you must return the extra sixth you received.

12) Rava says: we only say that the transaction remains valid is when it’s less than a sixth if he didn’t send an agent to make the transaction, but if he sent an agent, then he can tell the agent “I only sent you to benefit me and not to mess me up.” (Therefore, we consider it as he changed what he was sent for, and therefore, didn’t represent the one who sent him.) [Tosfos asks: in Kesuvos, Rava quotes R’ Nachman that the agent of Beis Din has the status of Beis Din; which infers that if the mistake of the agent was less than a sixth, the sale is valid like by Beis Din. Rashbam answers: in Kesuvos, it was Rava quoting R’ Nachman, but he didn’t hold of it. However, in our Gemara, he’s saying what he personally holds. R’ Tam answers: that Gemara refers to the Beis Din’s agent that the rabbis strengthen his power to be like their own, however, in our Gemara, we refer to an agent that the buyer appointed. Alternatively, although we said there that an agent is just like judges, that’s only that the sale is valid, however, the seller must return everything overcharged even if it’s less than a sixth. This is what it’s meant by “I sent you to benefit me,” so all the overcharge must be returned, and it’s not like other people (who do the transaction themselves), that forgive if it was less than a sixth extra.]

13) [Rashi's text:] Rava says: we only say that, if it’s more than a sixth, the sale is null, if they didn’t say split with Beis Din’s assessment. However, if they made that condition, the sale remains valid. Like we learned: if the Beis Din assesses property and they overassessed or underassessed a sixth, the Tanna Kama says that the sale is null and R’ Shimon b. Gamliel says that the sale remains valid, (and we Paskin like R' Shimon b. Gamliel, and not like R' Nachman who Paskins like the Rabanan). Also, we only say that, if he was a sixth off, the sale is valid but he must return the extra (sixth), by movable objects, but by land, we say that there is no concept of overcharging by land.

14) [Tosfos asks on Rashi’s text: that, according to this text, the Gemara brings a proof from R’ Shimon b. Gamliel that the sale is valid, and Rava must disagree with R’ Nachman earlier who Paskins like the Chachumim. However, how can the Gemara refer to a case where he was overcharged more than a sixth and bring a proof from the Mishna where Beis Din assessed, which only refers to adding or subtracting a sixth (and no more). Also, according to this, Rava disagrees with R’ Nachman, which is very forced, since R’ Nachman was his Rebbi. Another question: our Gemara only mentions by a sixth that there is no Halacha of overcharging by land, implying that if you overcharged more than a sixth, we do apply the prohibition of overcharging. However, in the Gemara in Bava Metzia, R’ Nachman says that even if you sell land worth one hundred Zuz for two hundred Zuz, we don’t apply the Halacha of overcharging.

Therefore, it seems to R’ Tam to have the opposite text, like R’ Chananel: this, what we said that you acquire by an extra sixth, but you must return the extra is only if they didn’t say to assess it like Beis Din, but if he says to assess it like Beis Din, the sale is invalid, and we can bring a proof from the Chachumim (who held that the sale was invalid). This, which we say that the sale is invalid if it’s more than a sixth extra, that’s only by movable objects, but not by land. This fits well that you can have a sale of land worth one hundred for two hundred. The Yerushalmi says: until half, there is a problem of overcharging, but less than an extra half, there is no problem of overcharging. If so, this case that he sold a land worth a hundred for two hundred isn’t exact, but you sold it for a little less than two hundred. However, if the case with two hundred was exact, we must say the Yerushalmi that says half is a problem is not exact, but it means the slightest bit more than a half. ]

15) Even by land, we only say that the sale remains valid if they’re off with the assessment, but if they made a mistake with the measurement, then it’s not valid. As Rabbah says: by being off on measuring, weighing and counting, even if it’s less than a sixth, you need to return what you received extra.

16) You can’t make an agent to do a sin. After all, (the agent shouldn’t follow your instructions), since, when given an order from the master (Hashem) and an opposite order from his student (your friend), who should you listen to? Therefore, if someone sent an animal (to damage) if he sent it in the hands of a normal person, the agent is obligated to pay for the damage. (However, with a deaf, insane or minor, you’re exempt from paying in the human court, but you need to pay to satisfy heaven.) However, we have Drashos for exceptions, like M’eila. [Tosfos explains: we must say that the sender sent him forgetfully, because there is no M’eila when it’s done on purpose. However, the agent can't be forgetful or else we should say he’s a valid agent even for all sins since we can’t say, when it’s between the master’s word and the student’s word, who do you listen to? So, we refer to a case where the agent remembers that the money is Hekdesh before he used it.] Also, you can appoint an agent to misuse the object in your care according to Beis Hillel (and Beis Shammai learns the Drasha that it comes to obligate him even with the thought of misusing it), and by Shechting and selling a stolen animal to obligate four or five times.

17) If someone orders his agent to kill a person, Shammai the Elder quoted Chaggai the Prophet that the sender is obligated. (The Tanna Kama says the murderer is obligated and the sender is exempt.) Either he must not hold of the Drashos to exempt the agent. Alternatively, when he said that the sender is obligated, it means to heaven (for ordering the sin). Although the Tanna Kama who argues can't hold that he’s even exempt from heavenly punishment; but Shammai holds he gets a substantial punishment while the Tanna Kama holds he gets less of a punishment. Alternatively, killing is the exception from a Pasuk.

18) Rava says: (even if Shammai holds you can make an agent for sins), he would admit that, if you tell your agent to have relations with an Ervah or to eat forbidden fats, he’s obligated and the sender is exempt since we never find in the whole Torah that one person has forbidden pleasures and another person is obligated for it. [Tosfos says: although we have M’eila where the Beis Hamikdash’s treasurer told an agent to eat a bread that belonged to Hekdesh, that the sender is obligated even when someone else gets the pleasure; we must say that we don't obligate the sender through the agent receiving pleasure, but when he picks it up and acquires it. However, Ri was in doubt in the case where the sender stuck his hand into a jar of oil, or in a case where he was told to sit on Hekdesh’s skins or get warmed with a Korban Olah’s fleece, do we say that the sender gets the obligation like in other cases of M’eila, or the sender is not obligated since we don’t say that this one has pleasure and the other one is obligated for it.]

19) Rav says that an agent could become a witness to testify on the action since it strengthens the thing (that the one who performs the action testifies about it). However, the Beis Medrish of Shilo says that the agent can’t be a witness, since we say that an agent becomes like yourself, so you’re like the sender (and the sender is invalid to testify for himself). This is also a Tannaic argument. The Halacha is that the agent can become a witness. The same applies by divorcing.

20) However, by money, it depends if you hold that, if you lend someone with witnesses, they must return the money with witnesses, or not. After all, if they need to return it before witnesses, they’re partial to their testimony since, if they say that they didn’t give the money over, then they would need to pay back the sender. [Tosfos says: although, even to this opinion, only a borrower must pay back in front of witnesses, but someone whose entrusted with money in front of witnesses doesn’t need to pay back before witnesses since he’s believed to say he returned it with a Migo he could have claimed that it got lost through an Onness (circumstance beyond his control) and our case refers to those entrusted with money; but since they're not believed unless they swear, and any witness that won’t be believed by himself without having to swear, we don’t believe him.), as we’ll explain a little later.]

21) However, if you hold that, if you borrow in front of witnesses, you don’t need to return it before witnesses since they’re believed to say you returned it to the sender, they’re believed to say that they gave it to the receiver. However, nowadays, when they instituted rabbinic swearings, the witnesses must swear they gave it to the receiver (the original lender) and the lender swears he never received it, and the borrower must pay the lender. [Tosfos says: although they’re no longer partial to their testimony after they swear; but the Pasuk says “through the mouths of the witnesses will we establish the fact,” implying that we believe their testimony by itself, and not if they must swear before they’re believed.]

22) [Tosfos says: we say they’re believed before they enacted swearing since they could have said they returned the money to the borrower. Although we regularly don’t believe two people with a Migo since one witness doesn’t know what’s in the heart of his friend to say that he could have made up the same story that his friend would make up; since it’s a claim that’s coming to exempt themselves, they can be confident that his fellow witness would claim the same. That’s why here they’re believed with a Migo.]

23) If someone gives Kiddushin before two witnesses without saying that they’ll be witnesses, it's a valid Kiddushin. [Tosfos says: you only need to say “you’re my witnesses” when you’re admitting to owing money since, otherwise, he can claim back today or tomorrow “I was joking with you” (and didn’t mean it). However, if he didn’t make this claim, we don’t offer this claim to him (to suggest that perhaps he was joking). However, it’s also usual that someone will not make himself look too rich, so he’ll say that his money is not his. Therefore, if he admits before two people he owes someone without the supposed lender claiming it from him he may claim he only said it so he shouldn’t look too rich, and even if he doesn’t claim it himself, we suggest it to him that perhaps that was his intent.]

24) The Tanna Kama says that a man and his Naarah daughter can accept the Naarah’s Get, and R’ Yehuda says only the father can receive it and not the daughter. Reish Lakish says: the same way they argue regarding Get, they argue regarding Kiddushin. R’ Yochanan says: the argument is only regarding Get, but by Kiddushin, everyone holds that only her father accepts it and not the daughter.

25) The reason for R’ Yochanan: since a Get brings the daughter into his jurisdiction, then, either one can accept it. However, Kiddushin that takes her out of his jurisdiction, then only the father could do that, and not the daughter. Alternatively, since Kiddushin needs his consent, so only the father can accept it and not her. However, by a Get that’s given against his will, it may be accepted by either.

26) However, R’ Yehuda admits that either can accept Maamar for her since she’s already attached to the Yavam (so it doesn’t need much of an acquisition to continue the process).

27) If Maamar is given against her will; Rebbi says it takes effect since we extrapolate it from the relations that acquire by a Yevama that are even if it’s against her will. However, the Rabanan say it doesn’t take effect since we extrapolate it from Kiddushin that you need her consent.

28) If someone says to a woman to be Mikudeshes to me with this date, and to be Mikudeshes to me with this other date etc. it’s only a Kiddushin if one of the dates is worth a Prutah, and you can’t combine them. If he says to be Mikudeshes to me with this date and with this other date; it depends on the following Tannaic argument. R’ Yehuda says; if you say “I swear I don’t owe to you, I don’t owe to you, I don’t owe to you” (without saying ‘and’ in between) you’re obligated a Korban for each one. R’ Shimon says if you swear to five people that you don’t owe them money, you’re only obligated in one Korban since it’s one swearing. [Rashi holds that R' Yehuda only holds by “I swear I don’t owe to you, I don’t owe to you, I don’t owe to you” is considered divided statements, but, if he says “I swear I don’t owe to you and I don’t owe to you” (with an ‘and’ in between), that’s considered as one general statement and is only obligated once. He holds that the ‘Vuv’ (and) is adding onto the first statement (and not making its own statement). R’ Tam has the opposite text. If he said “I swear I don’t owe to you, and I don’t owe to you, and I don’t owe to you” this implies he’s swearing to each one but “I don’t owe to you, I don’t owe to you” (without an ‘and’), you’re not obligated but one Korbon.] R’ Elazar says “to you, to you and to you I swear” (since you said “I swear” at the end) you’re obligated a Korban for each one.]

29) Whoever can’t guard her Get, you can’t divorce her (in the first place). [Rashi explains: she can’t get divorced even if her father accepts it. After all, (since she’s not legally mature of mind, she has the status) of the insane. As we exclude an insane from being divorced from the Pasuk “you send her” that she shouldn’t return, and the insane doesn’t understand that, by receiving her Get, she can’t return to her husband, and the same is true to a minor who doesn’t have the intelligence to guard her Get. However, the Ram explains that a minor could be divorced by her father accepting the Get. After all, the Yerushalmi explains that there’s an argument between the Amoraim the reason why you can’t divorce the insane. One says because low lives will follow her and she shouldn’t be open for anyone to follow her and treat her as Hefker property and the other said the reason: since she can’t guard her Get and she would return to her husband. The Yerushalmi says (as we'll quote later) that, when a minor has a father, you can divorce her, since her father can guard her Get, at least according to the opinion that the problem is that she’ll return. After all, she won’t return since her father will guard her not to return. Even though there may be a problem that people will follow her (to that opinion), but we say that’s only a problem by the insane who’s an adult, therefore, people desire her.]

30) [The Yerushalmi says the practical difference between the two reasons; if he transgresses and divorces her anyhow, if she has a father who can guard her Get and if she’s sometimes insane and sometimes sane. R’ Tam explains: if he transgresses and divorces; according to the one who said the reason because people will follow her, since this prohibition is only rabbinic, she’s divorced if he gave the Get. However, the opinion who holds because she returns, then she’s not divorced even if he gives a Get, since it doesn’t take effect from the Torah. If she has a father who can guard her Get: according to the opinion that she’ll be followed, you can’t divorce her L’chatchila (since this is still a problem that she’ll be followed). However, according to the reason because she’ll return after she’s sent, she can be L’chatchila divorced. After all, she won’t return since her father will guard her from returning. Also, when she’s sometimes insane and sometime sane: according to the opinion that they’ll follow her, it’s forbidden to divorce her (since they’ll follow her when she’s insane). However, you can divorce her when she’s sane to the opinion that she won’t return, since at that time she won’t return.]

31) A Naarah is like her father’s hand, and not like his courtyard, or else she can't acquire the Get unless she's asleep, or else she’s a courtyard that’s guarded not from her father's accord (like we say by a slave, since the conscious slave guards himself on his own accord). Even so, it's not a strong comparison to his hand that she can even make an agent.

32) A minor who received Kiddushin without her father’s knowledge; [Tosfos points out: this is a Chidush even by a Naarah according to Reish Lakish according to R’ Yehuda, and according to R’ Yochanan according to everyone; but a Naarah can’t make a refusal], if they already agreed to marry she needs a Get, since her father may have been happy with the Kiddushin (and thus, it takes effect) and she needs to refuse, for, if only a Get was given and the father didn’t want the Kiddushin and it never took effect, however, people may take the Get as a sign that it took effect and they’ll say if this man gives Kiddushin to her sister), the Kiddushin wouldn’t take effect. (So, she needs to also refuse to show that the Kiddushin hadn’t definitely taken effect).

33) [Tosfos: if they didn't already agreed to marry, and not like Rashi who says this depends on two versions], Ulla says the girl doesn’t even need to refuse him (besides not needing a Get unless she got the status of an ‘orphan’ in her father’s lifetime, (i.e., she was married by him and had Nesuin (and she became a widow or divorcee), so she’s no longer under her father’s jurisdiction just like an orphan).

34) If this man, who gave the daughter money for the Kiddushin without the father’s knowledge, dies and she falls to Yibum before his brother and he gives Maamar, she needs a Get and Chalitza and needs to refuse him. She needs a Get for, perhaps the father wanted the Kiddushin only of the second brother (and not the first, so she’s a regular wife of the second brother). She needs Chalitza for, perhaps the father wanted the first brother’s Kiddushin (and now she’s a Yevama). She needs to refuse him for, perhaps the father didn’t want either brother, and without her refusing him, people might think the second one’s Kiddushin was binding and Kiddushin can’t take effect on the girl’s sister. [Tosfos quotes R’ Shimshon from Coucy: this is even if the father wanted both Kiddushins, they need to worry that people would say that Kiddushin doesn’t take effect on her sister since, when he wants the first one’s Kiddushin, then, the sister of your Chalutza is only rabbinic.]

35) [Tosfos says: it doesn't help without the refusal just because he needs also to do Chalitza, which shows that we worry that he wanted the first one’s Kiddushin and everyone knows that your Chalutza’s sister is only rabbinically forbidden. After all, people will say that the Chalitza doesn’t prove anything, since people naturally think that the father really wanted the second brother and not the first since the first one acted badly by presenting the Kiddushin to the girl without the father’s consent, but, the second one didn’t do such a bad thing since he’s under the impression that he’s attached to her with the Mitzvah of Yibum. Therefore, we can assume he wants the second brother and since he didn’t want the first brother, the second one’s Kiddushin is a true Kiddushin), and the only reason they required him to do Chalitza is just to cover all bases, so that people who don’t think logically and think that he may want the first brother. So, we need this refusal to show that we’re truly in doubt that she’s not the true wife of the second one, and Kiddushin should take effect on her sister.]

36) However, if the brother didn’t give Maamar, she only needs Chalitza since everyone knows that the sister of the one you gave Chalitza to is only rabbinic, (so, even if she’s a true Yevama, we know Kiddushin takes effect by her sister). [Tosfos says: we don't require her to refuse him since people might say that the first brother Kiddushin won’t take effect with his father or nephew since they’ll think that the first brother’s Kiddushin took effect, and she’s his father’s daughter-in-law and his nephew’s aunt; since it’s not common that his father would give her Kiddushin once she had some connection to his son. After all, a man doesn’t get too close to his daughter-in-law to want to give her Kiddushin, since a daughter-in-law remains forbidden to him forever, even after his son’s death, and only by a wife’s sister who’s permitted to him after his wife’s death, and he may think of eventually marrying her, he becomes familiar with her did the rabbis enacted the refusal since it might come out that he’ll give her Kiddushin.]

37) If someone said to his friend, I’m being Mekadesh your daughter for my son, we must worry about the Kiddushin perhaps the son told the father how he would like to marry this girl (which would make it a benefit for him if his father Mikadesh her on his behalf, which we say someone can do without being appointed, even though a son is not brazen enough to explicitly appoint his father as his agent. However, Raveina holds that we never assume that perhaps a son will want the Kiddushin the father made for him since he holds explicitly not like Rav and Shmuel and we never worry that Kiddushin given without consent might be a good Kiddushin. [Tosfos says that the Rif Paskins like Raveina since he's a latter authority.]

38) Even according to Shmuel who is worried that the father would want the Kiddushin, they only hold that when it’s done in a dignified manner like with money and not in the marketplace. However, where it’s done in an undignified manner, we don’t worry that the father wants the Kiddushin like if he’s Mikadesh with money in the marketplace or with a bundle of vegetables in a house.

39) [Tosfos quotes a P’sak of the She’iltes: a minor whose father left to go overseas is allowed to marry by herself like an orphan without a father can, since the Rabanan enacted that she could so she shouldn’t be left Hefker to all. However, R’ Menachem from Yoini doesn’t agree since we’re worried that the father would marry her off to someone else in the area that he’s residing. Therefore, the local groom may transgress having relations with a married woman. We don't need to worry that, if the father dies overseas, the daughter should be forbidden to anyone forever, since the father could have married her off overseas and we don’t know to who since we're only worried that he’ll marry her off in the future, and not that he already married her off. As we see this distinction in Gitten that we’re not worried that someone died, but perhaps he will die. Therefore she’s forbidden to eat Trumah when the Get takes affect a moment before his death.

R’ Tam says: once we get to this point, then she’s permitted to her groom when she’s a minor too. Since we don’t need to worry that she had Kiddushin, she’s always permitted, since every moment we can say he didn’t make Kiddushin yet. This can’t be compared to what we worry about perhaps he’ll die in Gitten since we need to worry every moment that he’ll die the next moment, so she’s always forbidden to eat Trumah. However, here she’s not forbidden until she actually had Kiddushin that her father receives, and we can say every moment that the Kiddushin didn’t happen.]

40) There was a story where the husband and wife argued who's relative they should marry off their daughter to. The wife pressured him to agree to have the daughter marry her relative. While they were eating the meal celebrating making the Kiddushin (right before the Kiddushin was given), one of his relatives gave her Kiddushin in the top floor. Abaya said you don’t need to worry that he would want the Kiddushin since the Pasuk says that “the remainder of Jews won’t perform wrongful acts and won’t lie” (i.e., once he gave his word to marry her to his wife’s relative, he wouldn’t renege). Rava said the reason is; since there is a Chazaka (assumption) that someone wouldn’t bother to prepare this whole meal and ruin it (by ruining the occasion by accepting this other Kiddushin). The practical difference between them, if he wasn’t the one who bothered to prepare the meal.

41) If she received Kiddushin with her father’s consent and then the father went overseas. The groom got up and did Nesuin without her father. Rav says that it’s a good Nesuin that she may eat Trumah if she married a Kohain until her father comes back and only if he protests the Nesuin. R’ Assi says: she doesn’t eat since the father may return and protest and it will come out that a non-Kohain retroactively ate Trumah. [Tosfos explains: a rabbinical non-Kohain (who’s forbidden to eat Trumah) since an Arusah eats from the Torah. Although the reason doesn’t apply why the rabbis decreed her not to eat Trumah, like he might find her to have a hidden blemish (that will make the marriage a mistake and like it never happened) or that she’ll give Trumah to drink to her siblings since he brought her to Chuppah, she has her own place to stay (not by her family) and he already checked her for hidden blemishes; even so, the rabbis didn’t differentiate between two types of women that only had Kiddushin.]

42) Rav was (stringent) because he took into consideration R’ Assi’s opinion. [Tosfos says: this implies that the Halacha is like R’ Assi since Rav retracted his words. However, R’ Tam says the Halacha is like Rav since, R’ Assi was his student, and we always Paskin like the Rebbi over the student by the early Amoraim until the times of Abaya and Rava ,where we Paskin like the later authority since they were more careful than the earlier ones to make sure to get to the truth of the Halacha. Rav didn't retract from his P’sak, but he was just strict on himself.]

43) Rav admits that, if she dies, the husband doesn’t inherit her since we leave the money on its Chazaka (and it was originally in her family’s possession). [Tosfos explains: even if the husband is holding onto her property, we don’t consider it that he has the Chazaka on it, because he took them unlawfully. Although Rav allows her to eat Trumah, that’s because a Yisrael’s daughter who had Kiddushin (from a Kohain) is permitted to eat Trumah from the Torah, like Rashi explains.]

44) If he Mikadesh her with her father’s consent and he did Nesuin without his consent, but he was in town, R’ Huna says that she can’t eat Trumah even according to Rav who said she may eat since the father’s not there, but here, the father is present and the reason why he’s keeping quiet (is not because he consents to it) but because he’s boiling mad. R’ Yirmiya b. Abba says that she eats even according to R’ Assi who said she may not eat in the earlier case since we must worry that the father will return and protest. However, here, where he keeps quiet, it shows that he’s happy that this happened.

45) If she received Kiddushin and then have Nesuin, both without the father’s consent and her father was present, R’ Huna says he can eat and R’ Yirmiyah b. Abba says he can’t eat. Ullah says that the Halacha is like R’ Yirmiyah, since, when the father consented to the Kiddushin and she’s Mikudeshes from the Torah, R’ Huna says she can’t eat. Over here, (where the father wasn’t involved in the Kiddushin), of course she shouldn’t eat. Rava says: R’ Huna’s reason is because since the father ignored the whole situation as if he’s not involved), she becomes an orphan in her father’s lifetime (since the father gave up his position to marry her, or perhaps, it’s a sign he agrees to the marriage).

46) A minor who accepted Kiddushin without her father’s consent, Rav says; both the father and the daughter could refuse the marriage at this point. R’ Assi holds that only the father could refuse it, but not her. [Tosfos points out: although earlier Rav worried that, perhaps, the father, would be happy with the Kiddushin, that’s only when he didn’t do anything but heard about it and kept quiet, but if he protests, he shows that he for sure doesn’t want it. The Gemara tells us, not only when the father protests could the girl refuse to marry him, but even when the father wants it, the girl may refuse. Although, if the father wants, he can marry her off against her will; that’s only if he wants it by the beginning of the Kiddushin. However, when she was Mikudeshes without her father’s knowledge, and only afterwards he consents, and we try to say that she’s Mikudeshes since it’s beneficial for the father for the Kiddushin to take effect (and you can make a beneficial transaction for people without their knowledge) but, now that the daughter refuses the marriage, the father wouldn’t have wanted it if he would know that his daughter refuses it. However, this was never difficult to Rashi who explains: since the father didn’t explicitly want it at the time of Kiddushin, if she wants to renege on her acceptance before the father finds out and agrees to it, the father’s agreement afterwards no longer helps (for the Kiddushin to take effect).]

47) If you tell a woman to be Mekadesh to me with this date and be Mekadesh with another date, only if one of them is worth a Prutah, she’s Mikudeshes and we don’t combine the worth of the dates for a Prutah. If you say Mekadesh with this date and this date and this date, if they’re worth a Prutah combined, she’s Mikudeshes. This is like R’ Shimon who holds (when someone swears falsely to many creditors), he’s only obligated in one Korban (since it’s one swearing) until he says “I’m swearing” to each creditor.

48) If she eats the first ones before the next one is given, then she’s not Mikudeshes until one of them is a Prutah’s worth. Rav and Shmuel explain: we refer to the first case when he said a separate ‘Mekadesh’ for each date and we don't say that, if she eats them immediately, since the pleasure comes right away, perhaps she’ll allow herself to be bought for even less than a Prutah.

49) R’ Ami explains: really, it refers to the latter case where he said one Mikudeshes for all the dates, although the first ones are only a loan, (since it’s not around at the end of the Kiddushin, and you can’t be Mikudeshes with a loan); when we say “as long as one of them is worth a Prutah," it means “until the last one is worth a Prutah.” [Tosfos says: although if you tell a woman to be Mikudeshes to you after thirty days, even if the money was spent (before thirty days), the Kiddushin takes effect; we can differentiate that, later, the case refers to when he finished his proposal before the money was spent, even if it was spent before the Kiddushin takes effect. However, by our case, the Kiddushin proposal wasn’t finished until after the last date was given, and by that time, the first and second dates were eaten, therefore, it’s considered to be a loan by her.]

50) Rava says: from R’ Assi’s explanation we can deduce three Halachos. We can deduce that, if someone makes Kiddushin with a loan, it’s not a good Kiddushin. We can deduce that if someone is Mekadesh with a Prutah together with a loan, we say she wants the Kiddushin from the Prutah (and not the loan, so the Kiddushin takes effect). Also, you learn that, if you give money for Kiddushin, but the Kiddushin doesn’t take effect (for whatever reason), the money is returned to the man. (If not, but the woman can keep it, then we can’t consider it a loan, but it’s always ready to become Kiddushin.) [Tosfos explains: if you never finish making the Kiddushin, the earlier money is a gift to her and she doesn’t need to return it, and it's like the money was destroyed before the Kiddushin takes effect. Tosfos concludes: this may be the argument between Rav and Shmuel (who gave a different answer than R’ Ami), and R’ Ami. Rav and Shmuel held that he gives the money for a gift, and we can’t say that you need the last date to be worth a Prutah, but (even if no date is a Prutah) they all combine to be worth a Prutah. However, R’ Ami holds the money needs to be returned, as we explained.]

51) Someone who is Mekadesh his sister, (which doesn’t take effect); Rav says that she must return the money since everyone knows that Kiddushin doesn’t take effect on his sister, he decides to give it to her to watch the money for him. The reason he doesn't want to tell her straight out to watch the money since, if he would approach her directly), she wouldn’t accept it. Shmuel says the money is a gift since everyone knows that Kiddushin doesn’t take effect on his sister, he decides to give it for a gift. The reason he didn't explicitly say that it’s a gift since she’ll be too embarrassed to accept it.

52) Although, if someone separated Challah from flour, it’s not true Challah, and it’s stealing if the Kohain keeps it and we don't say that everyone knows that you can’t separate Challah while it’s still flour, and he must have given it as a gift; since there might come out a mishap. For, perhaps, the Kohain will have a little less than five quarters of a Kav flour, which is the Shiur to separate Challah from the dough, and he adds this flour to complete the Shiur and, since he’s under the impression that the flour is Challah, so it doesn’t combine with the rest of the flour to separate other Challah and he’ll eat the dough that’s Tevel. Although people know that flour can’t be Challah, but they think the reason it doesn’t become Challah is because the Torah didn’t want the Kohain to have to bother making the dough, and the Kohain forgave the dough’s owner for making him bother. We don't say that it should be Challah and you can’t eat it yet until you separate Challah from another dough like when you separate Trumah from the produce of a perforated flowerpot (which is obligated in Trumah from the Torah) to exempt the produce of a closed flowerpot (that’s only obligated from the Rabanan), the separated produce is Trumah, but a Kohain can’t eat from the Trumah until he removes Trumah and Maasar from other produce to exempt it. After all, there, they’ll listen to you to separate again since they know that there is a difference since they’re two types of utensils. However, here they wouldn’t accept it that it’s not completely fixed once you consider the flour Challah because they’re both come from the same type of utensil and they wouldn’t accept that there is a difference between dough and flour.

53) A second version: really, the Kohain would listen to us (since he’s more astute to Mitzvos). The problem is that the original owner would think that his dough has been already fixed (i.e., Challah was taken off) and he’ll eat Tevel. Although people know that flour can’t be Challah, but they think the reason it doesn’t become Challah is because the Torah didn’t want the Kohain to have to bother making the dough, and the Kohain forgave the dough’s owner for making him bother. We don't say that it should be Challah and you can’t eat it yet until you separate Challah from another dough. like when you separate Trumah from the produce of a perforated flowerpot (which is obligated in Trumah from the Torah) to exempt the produce of a closed flowerpot (that’s only obligated from the Rabanan), the separated produce is Trumah, but a Kohain can’t eat from the Trumah until he removes Trumah and Maasar from other produce to exempt it. After all, there, they’ll listen to you to separate again since they know that there is a difference since they’re two types of utensils. However, here they wouldn’t accept it that it’s not completely fixed once you consider the flour Challah because they’re both come from the same type of utensil and they wouldn’t accept that there is a difference between dough and flour.

54) Although; if you take Trumah off from a cucumber and find it bitter, what he took off was Trumah, but he needs to take off Trumah a second time, and we don't say that he won't listen, that's because no mishap can come out since what you separated is Trumah from the Torah. As the Pasuk says “you shouldn’t carry a sin if you take Trumah from your high-quality produce.” (If what you separated would not be valid Trumah, what sin have you done?) From here we see that, if you separate Trumah from the bad produce on the good produce, the Trumah is a valid Trumah.

[Tosfos says: according to the opinion in Temurah that anything that the Torah says not to do, if you do it, it doesn’t make a transaction, however, here it will work from the Pasuk. This is what the Gemara means, since the Pasuk says that “you separate all the best quality, the best quality grain, wine and oil,” which implies that you must bring from the best, why does the Pasuk need to continue by saying “you shouldn’t carry a sin when you separate the best quality?” To teach us, if you take from the bad produce on good produce, there are two sins here; one, you transgressed what the Torah commanded you to take from the best quality, and the other sin is that you now have bad Trumah.]

55) If he doesn't say “Mekadesh with this and this and this,” but “Mekadesh with these,” even if the first ones were eaten before he gave the latter ones, she’s Mikudeshes. After all, when she eats it, she eats what’s already hers (because of the Kiddushin).

56) Rav says: if someone makes Kiddushin with the money of a loan he once gave her, she’s not Mikudeshes. After all, loans are meant to be spent (and the money belongs to the woman when it’s given, since she’s not expected to return that money).

57) It doesn't depend on the following Tannaic argument: the Tanna Kama says, if you give Kiddushin with a loan, she’s not Mikudeshes, and others say that she’s Mikudeshes. They're not arguing whether we say the money of a loan is meant to spend, or not, as the end of the Braisa; everyone agrees that it can acquire an item that you buy. Rather, they argue in a case that he says to be Mekadesh with a Manah (a hundred Dinarim) and he gives her a Manah less a Dinar. (So, he gives money that the Kiddushin could work, and he’ll owe whatever he promised extra. The question is; does she feel confident that she’ll get what’s owed to her. The Tanna Kama holds she’s not Mikudeshes since she’s embarrassed to ask him for it, and the other opinion holds she’s Mikudeshes since she’s not embarrassed to ask him for it. Only when one says “be Mikudeshes to me with a Manah” and he gives her a Dinar, she’s Mikudeshes, but he needs to pay her the rest of the Manah, according to all. After all, only if he gave the whole Manah but is only missing a Dinar, that’s when the Tanna Kama says that she’ll be embarrassed to ask for it. However, if the Manah he owes is missing ninety-nine Dinarim, she’s not embarrassed to ask for the balance.

58) If someone tells a woman to be Mikudeshes to him with his item that she’s holding onto and guarding, and they went to her home to check on the item and they find it to be lost or stolen. If there remains a Prutah’s worth, then she’s Mikudeshes, otherwise, she’s not Mikudeshes.

59) However, if he Mekadesh her with a loan, the Tanna Kama holds; even if there remains a Prutah’s worth, she’s not Mikudeshes. However, R’ Shimon b. Elazar quotes R’ Meir that a loan has the same Halacha as a watched item. They argue whether the lender can renege on a loan (before the borrower spend any of the money). The Tanna Kama held that a loan is in the possession of the borrower (so the lender can’t renege, and he only owes it when the loan is due). R’ Meir holds it’s still in the lender’s possession (and the borrower is only holding it for him). [Tosfos says: Rav can agree with R’ Shimon b. Elazar’s opinion, since, according to him, Rav only said she’s not Mikudeshes with a loan after the borrower started to spend it.]

60) The rabbis of the Beis Medrish say that, according to R' Shimon b. Elazar, the borrower isn't responsible if it’s lost through an Onness, and Rabbah held that everyone agrees that an Onness is upon the borrower, since they’re no worse than borrowing an object that you need to return the actual item (where the borrower is obligated in an Onness), of course he’s obligated by a loan (where he could spend it). They only argue regarding if the money is still in the lender’s possession to renege on the loan.

61) If so, this, that R’ Huna says; if someone borrows an ax from a friend, if he started chopping with it, he acquires it (for the length of the borrowed time), and the owner can’t renege on the lending. However, if he didn’t start chopping, he doesn’t acquire it yet (and the owner may renege).

62) These Tannaim only argue by a loan that you don’t need to return the exact item you borrowed. However, by borrowing an item that you need to return the actual item, everyone agrees that you only acquire it if you started to chop, but not if you didn’t chop yet with it. [Tosfos explains: this is only regarding if the lender can renege on lending the ax. However, the borrower is obligated to pay for any damage, even through an Onness, without chopping with it.]

63) If someone says “be Mikudeshes with this loan document,” or you had a loan to someone else, and you give it over to the woman; R’ Meir holds she’s Mikudeshes and the Chachumim say she’s not Mikudeshes. We can't say that it’s her own loan document (that she borrowed from the groom), since you can’t be Mekadesh with a loan. Rather, it refers to a loan document from a third party. [Tosfos adds: it must be that the borrower isn't around, or she would acquire the loan according to all because of Maamad Shlashtan. Tosfos explains the difference between the two types of loans: by her loan, which she already acquired the money, she’s not receiving anything new for the Kiddushin, but when he gives her a loan he has on another person, he’s giving her something she didn’t have before, so we say she’s Mikudeshes. Granted that the loan money isn’t around, but she has the right to collect it (eventually), so we view it as if it’s around.] They argue with the same argument between Rebbi and the Chachumim. R' Meir holds like Rebbi who says: you acquire documents with just handing them over. The Rabanan hold like the Chachumim who say you don’t acquire it unless you wrote him a sale document and handed over the loan document. Alternatively, everyone doesn’t hold of Rebbi. [Tosfos says: from here we can glean that the Halacha is not like Rebbi since the Gemara could have easily had said that all agree to Rebbi that you can acquire a document with handing it over.] They argue about R’ Pappa’s statement if someone who sells a document to a friend, he needs to write that he’s selling the document with all the liens that comes along with it. R’ Meir disagrees with R’ Pappa (and she acquires everything without writing this), and the Chachumim agree with R’ Pappa. Alternatively, all agree with R’ Pappa, but they argue whether they agree with Shmuel’s statement if someone sold a loan document to a friend, and then forgave the loan, it’s forgiven (and the buyer can’t collect). Even the seller’s heir (who inherits his loans after he dies) can forgive the loan (that his father sold). [Tosfos brings: there are those who explain the reason why he can forgive the loan (after it’s sold) since it’s only a rabbinic enactment to sell documents, so the sale is not strong enough to uproot the power of the original lender to forgive the loan.] Therefore, the one who holds she’s not Mikudeshes holds of Shmuel’s statement (since, she’s not confident that she’ll collect, for perhaps the husband will forgive the loan). The one who holds she’s Mikudeshes disagrees with Shmuel (that he can’t forgive the loan, and she’ll definitely collect). Alternatively, everyone agrees with Shmuel (and, technically, he can forgive the loan). The one who holds she’s Mikudeshes holds that the woman is confident that she’ll collect, since she feels that her husband wouldn’t leave her stranded and forgive the loan to someone else, and the one who holds she’s not Mikudeshes holds that even a woman is not that confident.

66) They also argue by a verbal loan. They argue about Rav’s statement: if someone has his money in a third party’s hand and he wants to give it to another friend, he can tell the guardian, when all three are standing there, “give the Manah of mine that you’re holding to this friend,” and the friend acquires it (because of a rabbinical enactment). The one who holds she’s not Mikudeshes holds that Rav only said this Halacha by a watched item (which is not spent), but not by a loan. The one who holds she’s Mikudeshes holds that Rav said this whether it’s a watched item or it’s a loan. [Tosfos says: from the fact that we don't say that everyone holds that Rav said his Halacha by a loan and they argue about Shmuel’s Halacha that even an heir could forgive the loan, that Shmuel would agree that you can’t forgive a loan that was given over in front of all three people involved.]

67) If someone says to a woman, be Mekadesh to me with an Eirusin document, R’ Meir says that she’s not Mikudeshes and R’ Elazar says that she’s Mikudeshes. The Chachumim say: you assess the worth of the paper (that the document is written on). If it’s worth a Prutah, she’s Mikudeshes. If not, she’s not Mikudeshes. We refer to a case where she made Kiddushin with a document that doesn’t have witnesses signed on it. R’ Meir is consistent to his opinion that the witnesses that make a document valid are the signing witnesses, and R’ Elazar is also consistent to his opinion that the witnesses that make a document valid are the witnesses who see the handing over of the document, (which this document has, so it’s a valid document). However, the Rabanan are in doubt who to Paskin like (but hold that she also has in mind to be Mikudeshes with the worth of the paper). Therefore, we assess the paper and if it’s worth a Prutah, she’s definitely Mikudeshes. Alternatively, we refer to a case where it’s written without having her in mind (not L’shma) and they argue whether a Kiddushin document needs L’shma since we have a Hekish between Get and Kiddushin, or do we say, since we have a Hekish between all the ways of making Kiddushin, and just as money doesn’t need to be minted L’shma, so too, the documents don’t need to be made L’shma. Alternatively, everyone holds it needs L’shma, but does it need to be written with her knowledge. This is dependent on the argument between Rava and Raveina who say she’s Mikudeshes and R’ Pappa and R’ Shravia who say she’s not Mikudeshes.

68) If she said (to a smith) “make me rings (from my materials) and I’ll be Mikudeshes to you,” R’ Meir says that she’s Mikudeshes once it’s made. The Chachumim says she’s not Mikudeshes until she receives money. Everyone holds you can’t make Kiddushin with a loan, and the argument here is whether you owe a hired hand (during his work) from beginning to end (and when you pay him at the end, it’s a loan); or not (and you only owe him at the end, and when you’re Mekadesh her at the end, it’s not a loan, but through the obligation for that moment). [Tosfos says: we can bring a proof that the Halacha is he’s owed (a little at a time) from the beginning to the end of the job from a Gemara in Avoda Zara that, when you build a bathhouse for non-Jews that will hold an idol, you need to stop building when you get to the dome that they’ll place the idol on, but, R’ Elazar says, if you ended up building it, you’re allowed to keep your wage since, when hiring for a job, he is owed (a little at a time) from the beginning to the end of the job, and the dome becomes prohibited when it’s completed, which is by the last bang of the hammer on it, and that last bang is not worth a Prutah (so he’s not paid at all when it’s prohibited).

However, there is no proof if he reneges on his job in the middle, which Rav says he can renege on the job he was hired for even in the middle of the day, (that I might have said that he doesn’t get paid if you don’t owe him until the end of the job). After all, this would apply (that he’s paid) even according to the one who holds he only gets owed by the end, (since he reneges on the job, that is the end of his job). The only Halacha differences is by Kiddushin, for, if you hold when hiring for a job, he is owed (a little at a time) from the beginning to the end of the job, the wage is a loan and she’s not Mikudeshes. Also, regarding the case by an idol, that it’s permitted to use his wages (for building the bathhouse).] Alternatively, all hold that he owes it (a little at a time) from the beginning to the end of the job and they argue whether a craftsman acquires the improvements he made in the material or not, and when the material’s owner pays him, they’re buying the improvement, so she can be Mikudeshes by receiving the improvement. Alternatively, everyone holds that a craftsman doesn’t acquire his improvement and he’s owed it (a little at a time) from the beginning to the end of the job and they argue in a case where he adds a precious stone from himself. (So, it comes out that he’s giving her this stone and he also forgives the loan she owes him for his work.) One holds, when a man offers a Prutah (money) and a loan for Kiddushin, the woman’s main objective is the Prutah and she’s Mikudeshes and the other holds that the woman’s main objective is the loan and she’s not Mikudeshes.

69) If someone says to a girl; be Mikudeshes to me with this cup (of liquid), one Braisa says that she’s Mikudeshes with the cup and what’s in it, and another Braisa says that she’s Mikudeshes with the cup, but not with the liquid inside, and another says she’s Mikudeshes with the liquid inside and not with the cup. The Gemara reconciles that one refers to the cup filled with water, another when it’s filled with wine and the other when it’s full with ‘Tzir’ (either brine or oil). [Rashi explains: water is not prominent, so, we say that you Mekadesh with the cup and not with the liquid inside. Wine is prominent, so, we say she’s Mekadesh with the liquid inside and not with the cup. However, by ‘Tzir’ which is defined as fish brine, which you use over a long period to dip your food in and you need the cup to keep it in, or, alternatively, it’s defined as oil, which you also need the cup to keep it in for a long period, she’s Mikudeshes with the cup and what’s inside it, (since you need the cup for the liquid). R’ Tam explains: you’re Mikudeshes by water with the cup and what’s inside it, since the water is insignificant to the cup (it’s just dragged along with it). By wine, you’re Mikudeshes with the cup but not the liquid inside since it's significant enough that it doesn’t automatically go with the cup, but not significant enough to say that she assumes he’s giving her the wine instead of the cup. However, you’re Mikudeshes by the brine with the liquid inside and not the cup, since the brine is more significant than the cup. However, it’s not so significant to say that the cup just gets dragged along with it.]

70) If you say “be Mikudeshes to me with this cup of wine” and it turns out to be honey, or the opposite. Or he offered a silver Dinar and it came out to be gold, or the opposite; the Tanna Kama says that she’s not Mikudeshes. R’ Shimon says: if he misled her in a way where the truth was better than offered, then, she’s Mikudeshes.

71) R’ Shimon agrees with the concept that if you sell someone wine, and it came out to be vinegar, or if he sold vinegar and it came out to be wine, both participants can renege from the acquisition (even when he gets wine instead of vinegar). Therefore, the same way we say that there are those who rather have vinegar and others rather have wine, some wants silver and not gold. [Tosfos explains: since she may need silver to finish off some jewelry she’s making.]

72) Therefore, we refer to a case where she told her agent to accept the Kiddushin on her behalf from the one who said he’ll be Mekadesh her with a silver Dinar. The groom gave the agent a golden Dinar. One held she insists that the agent does what she told him (and only wanted silver), and the other held it was only a suggestion. [Tosfos says: however, if the woman accepts the Kiddushin herself, she’s not just suggesting to him silver. Only in this case where she’s making an agent, we can say that she’s just suggesting what the agent should accept.]

73) The argument between R’ Shimon and Rabanan is only when he gives extra money, but in the case (later) where he has more Yichus than he said he had, everyone agrees that she’s not Mikudeshes since she doesn’t want to be looked down at.

74) Also, R’ Shimon b. Gamliel holds of this concept that giving an order to an agent is only suggestive. In a town that everyone makes a straight document and the scribe writes for him a tied document, or where they’re accustomed to write a tied document and the scribe wrote him a straight document, (it’s invalid) since the one who ordered it is particular that it should be written normally. They only argue in a place where they’re accustomed to make both kinds, straight and tied, and the husband said to write a straight document and he wrote a tied one. The Tanna Kama says that he’s particular to only write a straight document and R’ Shimon b. Gamliel says it’s only a suggestion.

75) (A straight document (a regular document) has its witnesses signed on the inside of the document. A tied document has its witnesses signed on the backside. The Tanna Kama holds that, if the witnesses sign a straight document on its back, or signed a tied one inside, the document is invalid. R’ Chanina b. Gamliel says that a tied one that has witnesses signed in the inside is valid, since you can (rip open the stitches) and make the document a straight document. [Rashi says: although when you open it up, there would be spaces in between each line (where they would bend over the written line to sew it up), it is not a problem (since it’s similar to regular documents); since there are many scribes that are poor writers and they leave spaces between lines. Tosfos explains: even if there is an abundant of spaces between the lines, you don’t need to worry that it invalidates the document since a “bald Get” (with a lot of empty space) is Pasul, that’s only by a tied Get. (See Mahrsha)])

76) We learned: if he says “on condition that I’m a ‘Kreina’ (one who reads),” if he read three P’sukim in Shul, he’s Mikudeshes. R’ Yehuda says that he needs to read and translate like our Targum. However, if someone translates a Pasuk in its simple meaning, he’s a liar. If he adds onto it, it’s blasphemy. [Rashi says: translating like its simple meaning is like, by the Pasuk “don’t answer on a fight” he’s lying if he says “you can’t testify by a judgment.” On the contrary, it’s a Mitzvah to help the judgment to be true. Rather, you should translate it “don’t refrain from speaking out when they ask you to judge.” Also, Rashi explains “adding onto the translation” as; if someone thinks that, once we have a right to add onto the translation of the Pasuk, I’ll add onto it at will, this is blasphemy, i.e., that you’re degrading Hashem by changing His words. Although Unkolus added, he didn’t do so at will, but it was given this extra translation at Sinai. However, it was eventually forgotten, and he reestablished it, as it’s brought in Megila. However, R’ Chananel explains: if you translate a Pasuk like it’s simple meaning, like by the Pasuk “he saw the G-d of Yisrael” he translates “He saw Hashem,” he’s a liar. He definitely didn’t see Hashem, since “a person can’t see Him and live.” He explains “adding onto translation” as translating the above Pasuk as “he saw the angels of G-d.” This is blasphemy, since he’s making Hashem’s glory to be defined as an angel. Rather, the real translation should be “he saw the honor of the G-d of Yisrael.”]

77) However, this is only when he says a ‘Kreina,’ but a ‘Korah’ (a reader), then he needs to read all of Torah, Novi and Kesuvim precisely.

78) If he says “on condition that I learned;” R’ Meir holds it’s Halacha L’Moshe M’sinai, and R’ Yehuda says it’s the Medrish of Torah. However, that’s only if he says he’s a Tanina (learned), but if he says “on condition I’m a Tanna (a learner),” she’s not Mikudeshes unless he learned Hilchisa, Safra, Sifri and Tosefta.

79) If he says “on condition that I’m a student,” he doesn’t need to be such a great student like Shimon b. Azai and Shimon b. Zoma, but rather, if you can ask him something he’s learning, even if it’s in Mesechta Kallah (which is not too deep).

80) If he says “on condition that I’m a wise man,” he doesn’t need to be as wise as the rabbis of Yavna and like R’ Akiva and his colleagues, but as long as, when he’s asked a question from anywhere that needs logic, he can answer logically.

81) If he says “on condition that I’m a strong person,” he doesn’t need to be as strong as Avner and Yoav, but as long as his friends fear him because of his strength.

82) If he says “on condition that I’m wealthy,” he doesn’t need to be as wealthy like R’ Elazar b. Charsam and R’ Elazar b. Ezarya, but as long as his townsmen honor him for his wealth.

83) If he says “on condition that I’m a Tzadik,” even if he’s a complete Rasha, she’s Mikudeshes (from a Safeik) for, perhaps he had a thought to repent. “On condition that I’m a Rasha,” she’s Mikudeshes (from a Safeik) even if he’s a complete Tzadik, since, perhaps, he had thoughts to worship idols.

84) If he says “(I’ll be Mikudeshes to you) on condition that I’m a Kohain” and he turned out to be a Levi, or he says “on condition that I’m a Levi” and he turned out to be a Kohain, or anything similar, even if she says that she wanted to marry him even if the conditions were wrong, she’s not Mikudeshes. The same applies if she misleads him in anything.

85) There was once this person who sold his property in order to relocate in Eretz Yisrael, and, when he sold his property, he didn’t say anything (about this being a moving sale). If he never was able to relocate, he can’t renege on the selling saying it was a mistake, as Rava says, this condition for selling was only in his heart and wasn’t verbalized by the sale, and things in one’s heart are not binding. [Tosfos says: but if he would say it explicitly by the sale that he’s only selling it to go to Eretz Yisrael, when he doesn’t go, the sale is null. Although he regularly would need to make a double condition; there are times that you don’t need a double condition, but just showing your interest for such a condition. After all, (it’s so much assumed that you want the condition) it’s as if we have witnesses to it. Also, there are things that don’t even need you to show your intent (but we assume it by ourselves). Like the case where he wrote over all his property to a friend, and then he finds out that he has a child (to leave it to), we say the gift is null. Also, by the case where he wrote all his property to his wife, we assume he only made her the authority to care for the estate, (and not that she owns it all). After all, this is what we assess his intention to be.] We learn this from the following case: if a person tells his agent bring me money from the window or from a box, and he brought it to the person (and it’s money of Hekdesh), the sender does the Me’ila even if he says that he was thinking of other money there. You can't reject the proof that, perhaps he only said this in order to exempt himself from bringing a Korban, so, we don’t believe him that he had this in mind; since he doesn’t need this to exempt himself from a Korban since he could have done so by claiming that, after he sent the agent, he remembered it was Hekdesh. As we learned: if the house owner (sender) remembers that it’s Hekdesh and not the agent, the agent is obligated to bring a Korban for the Me’ila. (This also saves face that he wasn't a Rasha to claim this like if he would have needed to claim he did it on purpose.)

86) However, the Halacha of if one doesn’t want to bring his Korban we force him until he says he wants to bring it is not a proof that what’s in one’s heart is not binding; since we greatly assume as if we have witnesses to this that he’s happy to have an atonement. Also, there's no proof from a similar Halacha by a wife’s Get and freeing of slaves, (when the rabbis require someone to give these, and he refuses), we pressure him until he says he wants to give it. After all, since it’s a Mitzvah to listen to the rabbis (so, at the end of the day, he’ll want to do the Mitzvah).

87) There was a person who sold his property on condition that he’ll ascend to Eretz Yisrael and he ascended there, but couldn’t settle there. The first version of the Gemara says people only ascend there to settle there, and he couldn’t settle there, so, we consider it as if the condition wasn’t met, and he can renege on the sale.) The second versions says: since he sold on condition to ascend, and he did ascend there, (the condition was met and the sale is valid).

88) There was a person who sold his property to go up to Eretz Yisrael and he decided not to go up. The first version of R’ Ashi’s statement: since he could go up if he wanted to, the sale is valid. The second version of R’ Ashi’s statement: what prevented you that you couldn’t go up (to invalidate the sale)? The practical difference between the two versions is if there was some Onness on the way (like there were armed robbers). According to the first version, he could still find caravans to go with and ascend. However, according to the second version, where he asks; did anything prevent you from ascending, implies that any excuse for not going up is good enough to invalidate the sale.

89) If someone says to his agent: “go and Mekadesh for me a certain woman in a certain place,” and he went and Mekadesh her in a different place, she’s not Mikudeshes, and the same is regarding Gitten. As by Kiddushin, he knows that they like him in a certain city and they won’t say anything negative about him to the girl, and they may hate him in another city and they’ll say negative things about him. By Gitten, (since divorce is embarrassing), he would rather be embarrassed in a certain city (where he might not know a lot of people) than others. (R' Elazar says she's married, or divorced, since it's only telling him where she probably is.)

90) If he says “she’s in a certain place,” and he gives the Kiddushin, or the Get, in another place, then she’s Mikudeshes.

91) If you Mekadesh a woman on condition she doesn’t have any vows on her or blemishes, and it comes out she has them, she’s not Mikudeshes. If you brought her in without any condition, you need to divorce her (perhaps it’s a good Kiddushin) without a Kesuva (since it might be a mistaken Kiddushin, so she can’t collect because of a Safeik). All blemishes that invalidate a Kohain from doing service in the Mikdash also invalidate women’s Kiddushin.

92) If you Mekadesh two women with a Prutah worth (between them), or one woman with less than a Prutah, even if he sends her gifts afterwards, she’s not Mikudeshes (and we don’t say the gifts were sent to make the real Kiddushin). since he only sent the gifts under the impression that the original Kiddushin was valid. The same applies when a minor gives a Kiddushin (and then gives a gift after he turned Bar Mitzvah).

93) However, if a Chasson sends a gift to his Kallah, we need to worry that he sent it for Kiddushin, since the Mishna that says there is no Kiddushin even after he sends gifts since he’s sending it under assumption that the original Kiddushin is valid. (However, if he never attempted Kiddushin, you need to worry that he sent the gift for Kiddushin.) [Tosfos quotes Rashi that he proposed to her and she accepted. He then, before Kiddushin, sent the gifts in front of witnesses, we worry that, perhaps, he sent it for Kiddushin. The Ram asks: even if they agree to marry, it wouldn't help the situation since we said earlier that she’ll never know why he’s giving the money, unless they were discussing different topics that has to do with the topic of Kiddushin, as we say earlier in the Mesechta. Therefore, Tosfos explains: that we worry about Kiddushin, i.e., once he sends gifts, we need to worry that he already gave Kiddushin earlier.] Abaya rejects this since perhaps, the Mishna is saying that you don’t need to say when he never gave Kiddushin that he’s not sending the gifts for Kiddushin, since he never tried to give Kiddushin. However, here, where he tried for Kiddushin (and didn’t succeed), maybe he sent the gifts to make Kiddushin, so the Mishna teaches us otherwise. R’ Pappa concludes: in a town where they usually give Kiddushin before the gifts, you need to worry that the gifts were given for Kiddushin (since the Kiddushin should have been done at this point). Even where only the majority of people give Kiddushin before the gifts, but a minority of people give the gifts before Kiddushin. I might say that we should take the minority into account (and not consider it as an implied Kiddushin), so, we’re taught otherwise. However, if they send the gifts first and then give Kiddushin, you don’t need to worry that the gifts were sent for Kiddushin. [However, R’ Chananel has the opposite text. It reads; it’s only needed in the case where the majority of the people give gifts before the Kiddushin, but a minority gives Kiddushin before the gifts. I might say that you don’t need to worry about the minority of cases and she’s not Mikudeshes, so we’re taught otherwise, we worry about the minority of cases and we worry about the Kiddushin because of the great stringency of letting a married woman marry someone else.]

94) If the people at market know of a Kesuva written for the bride: in a town where they write the Kesuva after the Kiddushin, then you need to worry for the Kiddushin even in a town where it’s not common to find scribes and I might think he preempted to write the Kesuva early because a scribe was in town then, so, we’re taught otherwise. However, In a town where they write the Kesuva before the Kiddushin, you don’t need to worry .

95) If someone gives Kiddushin to a woman and her daughter, or a woman and her sister, at the same time, she’s not Mikudeshes. Rava held the reason is because Kiddushin that can’t lead to having relations with your wife can’t take effect. According to Abaya who says it takes effect, the reason is like Rabba’s rule: whatever can’t take effect one after another (like Kiddushin on a woman that can’t take effect after Kiddushin was made to her sister), it doesn’t take effect if it’s done simultaneously (like giving Kiddushin to two sisters simultaneously).

96) Although we see that, if someone separates more than a tenth of Maasar, that the leftover of the produce is no longer Tevel, but the Maasar is ruined (since there is Tevel mixed in with the tenth of Maasar), although you can't separate two Maasars one after the other, the reason why Maasar takes effect when you separate more than a tenth simultaneously; that's because Maasar is done in half. [Rashi explains; since you can separate a half of grain for Maasar, so we can say that Maasar is only on the percentage of each grain separated what's fit for Maasar.]

97) We see by Maasar Beheima that, if the tenth and eleventh animal leave the pen at the same time, that one is Maasar Beheima and the other is a Shlomim. Although, usually, you can't separate one after another, so it shouldn't take effect two together; but we see that one after another can take effect by a mistake. After all, if you call the ninth animal "the tenth." Then you called the tenth "the ninth," and then you called the eleventh one "the tenth," all three animals are Kodesh.

98) If you have a Korban Tamid that is Shechted with eighty loaves (instead of the prescribed forty); if you say that you want forty out of the eighty to become Kodesh, it works. If he says that he doesn't want forty to be Kodesh unless all eighty is Kodesh, it's not a valid Korban. We have an argument if it's brought without any specific instruction. Chizkiya holds it to be Kosher since we assume he means to bring the extra loaves as a replacement for the forty Kodesh ones if anything goes awry with them. R' Yochanan holds that it's an invalid Korban since, we assume, he intends it to be a large Korban.

99) Kiddushin that can’t lead to having relations with your wife, Abaya says that the Kiddushin takes effect and Rava holds that the Kiddushin doesn’t take effect. [Tosfos explains Kiddushin that’s not made for relations: that the prohibition to have relations came through the Kiddushin. However, by Lavim, the prohibition didn’t come from the Kiddushin since she’s prohibited to him before the Kiddushin the same way she’s prohibited to him after the Kiddushin. Therefore, even Rava holds that Kiddushin takes effect.] Rava agrees if they knew who was the wife at the time of Kiddushin, and forgot later. The Gemara disproves Rava from the following Braisa: if one person had five sons and another had five daughters. The father of the sons, (who was appointed by his sons to be their agent), said to the father of the daughters; “one of my sons should be Mikudeshes to one of your daughters.” Each one of the daughters needs five Gitten (one from each brother, so they can get remarried). If one of the brothers dies, each daughter needs four Gitten and one Chalitza from one of them. (So, there’s Kiddushin even if it can’t lead to relations.) [Tosfos says R’ Tam permitted one who gave Kiddushin to a certain rich man, and he said to him “your daughter is Mikudeshes to me” without specifying which daughter. This is not only true when they originally agreed (on paper) for one of the daughters to marry, they mentioned her name, and just afterwards, he made Kiddushin without specifying which one, we know he made Kiddushin for this one. Even if they didn’t specify at the original document agreement, but the father specified when he accepted saying he’ll give over a certain daughter, we must say that he had her in mind by the Kiddushin. After all, we say that Jews won’t deceit or lie. Also, even if he didn’t specify at all with his mouth, we should say that he was Mekadesh the oldest daughter, (as Lavan said), “it’s not what we do in our place, to give the younger daughter before the older daughter.” However, R’ Menachem from Yoni argued since this is a case of being Mekadesh to one out of two sisters. If it would be like R’ Tam that, because of the idea of “it’s not what we do in our place, (to give the younger daughter before the older daughter),” then it wouldn’t fit like neither Abaya and Rava. After all, even according to Abaya who says the Kiddushin takes effect, that’s only to say that she needs a Get (but you can’t pinpoint the sister who’s married). So, in this case, he should also need to give a Get. Even R’ Tam retracted and didn’t allow it.]

100) The Halacha is like Abaya (when arguing with Rava) in the six cases with the acronym of “Yal K’gam” [Yud- Yiyush without his knowledge (i.e., if the owner is not aware of the situation of his object, but if he would have known, he would have Yiyush. We Paskin like Abaya that it’s not Yiyush. Ayin- disproved witnesses, we Paskin like Abaya that they’re Pasul to say another testimony retroactively when they said the false testimony and not only from the time the disproving witnesses testified on them. Lamed- a vertical post (Lechi) in front of an alleyway that wasn’t put there with the intent to permit the alley, we Paskin like Abaya that it permits carrying there on Shabbos. Kuf- our case of Kiddushin that can’t lead to relations. Gimmel- if a husband that sent a Get and he does something that hints that he doesn’t want to give it anymore, we Paskin like Abaya that the Get is valid. Mem- a Mumar who eats Neveila in spite, we Paskin like Abaya that he’s Pasul to give testimony (and we don’t only Pasul a Rasha who sins to personally gain).] [Tosfos quotes Rashi that the Lamid refers to a Lechi (post) that came by itself (i.e., was not put there for a Lechi). R’ Tam explains it refers to a case (where a woman gave birth while being a Zava) that even if she didn’t see blood throughout the days of Tumah after a birth (i.e., seven days for a boy and fourteen days for a girl) we Paskin like Abaya that it can’t be used to count (the seven clean days) that’s needed for a Zava. Bnai Nervona explain: it refers to their argument in Pesachim that, if it’s (almost) impossible (to avoid doing a sin when passing an area, like if you will definitely smell Chametz on Pesach when you walk down a street and have pleasure from it) but you don’t intend to do it, (must you avoid that street). Over there, the Halacha is like Abaya (that it’s permitted).]

101) If someone gives Kiddushin to one of two sisters, he needs to give a Get to both. If he dies and he has a brother, he does Chalitza to both sisters. If he has two brothers, one does Chalitza, and then the other can do Yibum. Chalitza must be done first, and then the Yibum, but he can’t do Yibum before the Chalitza. (Since the other sister may be the one who is connected to them to do Yibum or Chalitza) and he’s now marrying the sister of the one who he’s attached to (which is a rabbinic prohibition).

101a) If someone is Mekadesh one of his daughters without explicitly saying which, his daughters who already reached Bagrus are not included (in the Safeik). This is even if the Bogeres appointed her father as her agent to accept Kiddushin since someone won’t leave something that he has pleasure from (i.e., to accept money for his minor daughter, where he receives the money, and accept money for his Bogeres daughter, which the daughter keeps). This is even where the older daughter gives him permission to keep the money, since a person won’t leave to do a Mitzvah that’s personally upon you to fulfil (like getting your minor daughter married) and to do a mitzvah that’s not personally upon you to fulfill (getting your older daughter married, which is put on her to fulfil it, and her father is only acting as her agent).

102) If you Mekadesh with fruits of Shmita, the Kiddushin is valid. [Tosfos quotes Rashi: the Chiddush is; we don’t say that it’s not his money to Mekadesh a woman (but he’s just allowed to eat it). Alternatively, Tosfos says: the Chiddush is; although it’s forbidden to use it to buy items, that’s only L’chatchila, but if you B’dieved sold it, the sale is valid (and the Kiddushin you made is valid).]

103) If you Mekadesh with a stolen item, even if it was stolen from her (where we might say that she forgave it to him when she accepts it for Kiddushin), she’s not Mikudeshes. As R’ Yochanan said; if someone stole, but the owners didn’t have Yiyush (he didn’t give up on it), both of them can’t make it Hekdesh. After all, (the robber can’t) since it’s not his, (and the owner can’t) since it’s not in his possession. Also, when it's stolen from her, that refers to money stolen from her. She’s not Mikudeshes if they didn’t agree to marry, but she’s Mikudeshes if they already agreed to marry.

104) We don’t need to worry about R’ Shimon’s opinion that we assume there is Yiyush when something is forcefully stolen. (Therefore, it would be a case of a stolen item without Yiyush, which Kiddushin is not valid.)

105) A woman can become an agent for her friend (to accept Kiddushin) even when she’s becoming a sister-wife of hers. [Tosfos explains: although a sister-wife is not believed to say their husband died (to permit her sister-wife to marry) since she might have lied to ruin her sister-wife’s marriage (since she might hate her). However, that’s only by a testimony without an action, but here it’s a testimony with an action, she’s believed. [See R’shash who asks why does Tosfos say that this depends on her believability since she’s not saying any testimony?] Alternatively, the Chidush is that we assume the woman accepted for all of them, even if she accepted it without saying anything (that she’s accepting on account of the other women).]

106) If a sharecropper that Mekadesh with a handful of onions (which he’s only entitled to a percentage of it); she’s not Mekudeshes. After all, the owner of the field didn't forgive his share of those onions. However, this is only when he took a handful (where they can’t really calculate how much he took) but, if he gave over a bundle of onions, he can say to the field’s owner “I took already a bundle, when we split, you’ll take an extra bundle to make up for it."

107) [Tosfos says: when an owner made the beer-maker his agent to Mekadesh the woman.] He was Mekadesh a woman with dregs of the beer (that she can use it to ferment other water and make beer). [Maharsha explains- it must be a case where he could have made Kiddushin with a cheaper product.] The owner of the beer came and said “why don’t you give from the more potent dregs?” She’s not Mikudeshes since we don’t say the concept of “why didn’t you take off from better” (as a consent to his action) but by Trumah. As we learned: if someone [Tosfos: was appointed as an agent] goes into his friend’s field and takes off Trumah and Maasar from the owner’s produce. If he chastised the separator for not taking off better ones, if there are better ones, we assume he’s sincere in his agreement to the Trumah and Maasar that was taken off, but he just wanted him to take off the better ones. However, if these are the best ones, so the owner said it sarcastically and really didn’t want this person to take off Trumah and Maasar in this way. If he gathered more, in any case, it’s Trumah. However, this is only by Trumah (where he probably agrees because of the Mitzvah), but in our case, he might have only said to give from the better ones because he’s embarrassed to protest. Therefore, she’s not Mikudeshes.

108) If someone is Mekadesh from his share he received from a Korban, whether it’s from Kodshei Kodashim or Kodshei Kalim, she’s not Mekudeshes. This is even according to R’ Yossi Haglili who holds that Kodshei Kalim belongs to the owner, but that’s only when the animal is alive, but after bringing it as a Korban, all that he receives is from Hashem’s table.

109) [Tosfos says: although you can Mekadesh a woman by giving her service, like to talk to the Sultan for her, even though he didn’t give her anything of his, but because he gave her pleasure; that’s because he can receive a Prutah for his services. However, over here, it’s not his to take credit for this food, since Hashem gave it to him and forbids him to receive money in lieu of the food.]

110) R’ Yehuda says that she’s Mekudeshes, since his share was given to him for all his needs. R’ Meir and R’ Yossi hold that the share was only given to him to eat. Also, R’ Yehuda eventually reversed his decision and says that she’s not Mekudeshes since we see that he holds that they can’t swap shares, thus, you can’t sell your shares for anything.

111) If someone is Mekadesh with Maasar Sheini; R’ Meir holds that she’s not Mekudeshes since he holds that it’s really owned by Hashem. R’ Yehuda, who holds that it belongs to the produce’s owner, she’s Mekudeshes if it was done on purpose, but not Mekudeshes if it was done accidentally.

112) If someone is Mekadesh with Hekdesh R’ Meir holds she’s Mekudeshes if it was done on purpose, but not Mekudeshes if it was done accidentally. R’ Yehuda held the opposite, she’s not Mekudeshes if it was done on purpose, but she’s Mekudeshes if it was done accidentally.

113) The reason for R’ Yehuda by Maasar Sheini, and R’ Meir by Hekdesh that she’s Mekudeshes if it was done on purpose, but not Mekudeshes if it was done accidentally: since it’s done accidentally, it’s a mistaken sale (i.e., Kiddushin). R’ Yochanan explains; one of the cases it’s a mistaken Kiddushin both from the woman and the man, and one it’s only mistaken only for the woman, but the man wants it.

114) R’ Yirmiya understands that Maasar Sheini is only mistaken to the woman, since now she needs to go to Yerushalayim to eat it, but the man is happy that he acquired a woman easily. However, by Hekdesh, it’s mistaken on both accounts since they’re unhappy that Hekdesh would be used and become Chulin on their account.

115) R’ Yaakov held the opposite; by Maasar Sheini, they’re both unhappy, since the husband is scared if the Maasar Sheini might be lost on the trip. [Tosfos explains: and then the woman will have complaints, but you can’t explain since the Kiddushin doesn’t take effect until it reaches Yerushalayim, and if it gets lost, the Kiddushin is canceled. After all, it seems from many places that the Kiddushin takes effect even before it comes to Yerushalayim. Also, it seems to be that they’re considered the owners even outside Yerushalayim. Although in Sanhedrin it says that it’s not obligated in Challah outside Yerushalayim, that’s only because it’s not fit to eat, but not because it’s not his possession.] However, the husband is happy to have the Kiddushin take effect with Hekdesh. Although he’ll eventually need to pay Hekdesh for it, but, perhaps, he doesn’t have the money now. However, the woman has no gain to be Mekadesh with Hekdesh, so she wants the husband to Mekadesh her with his own money.

116) Similarly, R’ Meir holds that if you buy something with Hekdesh, it’s not a sale [Tosfos says: therefore, R’ Meir only holds that there is only Meila by mistake is by eating it.] Although, we see that R’ Meir held that, if the Mikdash’s treasurer gave money to a storekeeper to watch, which he held that the storekeeper can’t use money that was given to him to watch just like a regular homeowner, if the storekeeper uses it, he did Meila; that’s only him saying it according to R’ Yehuda. Since R’ Yehuda held that the storekeeper was just like a money-changer who could use the money, so the treasurer did Meila by giving over money to use. However, R’ Meir personally holds nobody did Meila since it was spent mistakenly.

117) Rav held that R’ Meir holds that someone can do Meila by spending Hekdesh’s money mistakenly. The only reason he holds that she’s not Mekudeshes by Hekdesh since we refer to a Bigdei Kehuna that’s not worn out, so, since the Torah wasn’t given to angels, the Kohanim can’t immediately take it off after the Avoda, so they don’t need to. Therefore, there original Hekdesh was on condition that, if it’s used mistakenly, it shouldn’t have Meila. [Tosfos says: if so, R’ Yehuda who says she’s Mikudeshes, you must say that it went to Chulin by the Meila. Although it’s a Kli Shareis that doesn’t go to Chulin by Meila, we must say it refers to a new one that wasn’t worn yet, so it didn’t have a Chinuch as a Kli Sharies, so it could go to Chulin since it’s not yet a Kli Shareis.]

118) Although we have many places that R’ Meir held that someone can have Meila with the stones of Yerushalayim, or from the leftover of the Lishka which is destined for going for these stones, despite that people will have pleasure from it from its shade like the Bigdei Kehuna; we have to say that the text was that it was R’ Yehuda and not R’ Meir. Although we see that R’ Yehuda doesn’t hold that Yerushalayim is Kodesh, so when someone makes a vow saying an object is like Yerushalayim, it’s not Hekdesh until he says that “it’s like something that was brought as a Korban in Yerushalayim;” we need to say that it’s a Tannaic argument if R’ Yehuda holds that Yerushalayim is Kodesh, or not.

119) The Halacha is like R’ Meir regarding Maasar Sheini since we have a Mishna in Ediyos like him. As it says that Beis Hillel held that Kerem Revai (that has the status of Massar Sheini from a Gezeira Shava) doesn’t need to be left for the poor what fell off or irregular clusters since it’s not considered his vineyard since it’s considered Hashem’s property like R’ Meir.

120) R’ Meir agrees that, if the fruit is still Tevel, it’s the owners (despite that there’s Maasar Sheini destined to be separated) unless you hold that Trumah that’s destined to be taken off is as if it was already separated. Also, he agrees that Kerem Revai, when the grapes starts to form, is also his property unless you hold like R’ Yossi that it has the status of a fruit as soon as it’s formed.

121) Bar Pada agrees with R’ Yochanan that R’ Meir doesn’t hold of Meila by mistake unless you eat it. [Tosfos adds: or if you use it as fuel, or if you use the coins to weigh something.]

122) The Halacha is like R’ Yehuda by Hekdesh, since an unnamed Mishna is like him, that if you did Meila on purpose, it’s not a Meila, but if done accidentally, it is Meila.

123) If you found an animal from Yerushalayim until Migdal Eider, or its distance in all directions: you need to worry that it’s an escaped Korban. Thus, a male within its first year, you have to worry that it might be an Olah, or a Shlomim or a Todah. However, you don’t need to worry that it’s an Asham since it’s two years old. [Tosfos says: however, if you would need to be concerned and it’s not enough to bring it like a Shlomim on condition that it should be considered an Asham if it’s truly an Asham, although they have the same type of sprinkling blood; since you wouldn’t be able to bring Nesachim that satisfies both. After all we pour Nesachim of the Asham down the basins, and if it would be a Shlomim that doesn’t have Nesachim, so it would be a gifted Nesachim that’s poured on the Mizbeach’s fire.] You don’t need to be concerned that it’s an Asham Metzorah [Tosfos: that you can’t bring with a condition as a Shlomim, since the owner might bring another Asham and it would be Chulin in the Azara, or you can’t place the blood on the thumbs]; nor for an Asham Nazir [Tosfos: that it’s sprinklings aren’t the same as a Shlomim] since they’re very uncommon. You don’t need to have concern that it’s a Pesach, since, at the time of bringing a Pesach, the owner is very careful. When it’s not its time [Tosfos: and the reason he wasn’t careful at the time, since the animal got sick and he needed to bring another one, or the owner became Tamai, or the owner separated a second Pesach just in case something happened to this first one] since it’s anyhow would be a Shlomim. [Tosfos adds: you’ll need to say that this opinion doesn’t hold of the problem that the Korban will have a shorter amount of time to eat it since the Shlomim from a Pesach is only eaten for a day and a night. Also, we don’t need to worry that it was a goat from Rosh Chadesh or Yomim Tovim since Beis Din makes a condition when it becomes Kodesh that it would be Chulin if it gets lost.]

124) [Tosfos says: if you find it in its second year, you need to make it graze until it gets a blemish like an Asham whose owner died.]

125) If it’s a female within its second year, you need to be concerned that it’s a Shlomim or Todah, but not a Chatos since it’s only within its first year. You don’t need to worry that it was lost for a year since it’s uncommon. If you find it within the first year, you must lead it into a small house to have it die like a Chatos whose owner died.

126) Therefore, R’ Oshiya held that, in order to bring it like all the Karbanos that we have a Safeik for, you need to decide to acquire it and owe the money for it, and with the money, bring all the Korbanos. Although they’re unblemished animals that you can’t redeem, however, according to R’ Meir who holds that you can purposely have Meila, you could. [Rashi says that he holds that you can redeem unblemished Korbanos. Tosfos says that we don’t find any opinion that you can. Rather, you decide to acquire it from Hekdesh, which makes the Meila, and then you decide to owe its worth.]

127) Although R’ Yehuda holds that you can’t bring unblemished Korbanos or Kli Shareis to Chulin through mistaken Meila, that’s because you don’t have intent to remove it from Hekdesh, but according to R’ Meir that you do it intentionally to remove it from Hekdesh, it helps. [Tosfos says: other objects, R’ Yehuda agrees goes out to Chulin, but only when you planned to remove it completely from a different person’s possession into your own, but if you just want to borrow it, you only pay Meila according to the use you had (and not the amount of the whole object), and the object doesn’t become Chulin.]

128) Therefore, if it’s a male, you buy three Korbanos; Olah, Shlomim and Todah with Challos, and you need to make a condition that the money is redeemed on the proper one. [Tosfos says: you can’t bring one animal for a Todah and Shlomim, with a condition, since the Challos can only be brought with a Todah, since it can’t be gifted by itself.] When the found animal gets a blemish, it should be eaten like a blemished Bechor and Maasar.

129) If it’s a female, you bring a Shlomim and a Todah with its Challos.

130) R’ Yochanan asks: how can you sin (by doing Meila) so that your friend will gain that his Korban is brought? Rather, you need to wait until it gets a blemish, and then you can redeem it.

131) You can’t buy an animal with Masar Sheini money outside Yerushalayim. [Rashi explains: since you only can redeem the coins outside Yerushalayim with other coins. Tosfos disagrees since we allow it in Bavel, as we’ll say later. Rather, it’s like Rashi’s other explanation: it will lose weight from having to travel all that distance (and will lose from Maasar Sheini). The Ri explains: since we’re afraid that they might leave them around to have children. Therefore, females are forbidden according to everyone, and the Rabanan also forbid males since it might lead to buy females, and R’ Meir allows and doesn’t make that decree. However, in Bavel, where their currency is not traded in Yerushalayim, since it’s impossible in any other way, even the Rabanan allowed it.]

132) If he buys it mistakenly, it’s a mistaken sale [Rashi since it’s easier to bring up the money to Yerushalayim than the animal.] However, if he purposely bought it, he needs to bring up the animal to Yerushalayim and eat it there. [Tosfos says: even the Rabanan who say that you need to return the money even if it was sold, that’s only by blemished animals, but not by unblemished ones that you can bring as a Korban.] R’ Yehuda says: it’s only if you bought it for a Shlomim, but you need to return everything if he wanted to have the Maasar money go to Chulin. [Rashi says: that he wanted for the Kedusha of Maasar Sheini to go on the animal and then eat it out of Yerushalayim against the Halacha. However, Tosfos disagrees, since we’re not referring to wicked people, and other questions. Rather, he doesn’t want to redeem it that the Kedusha of Maasar will fall on the animal, but he wants to exchange that, he’ll gift the Maasar money to the seller, and the seller in exchange will gift him a Chulin animal. This is forbidden to do since the seller will think that the money loses its Maasar status and he’ll eat it out of Yerushalayim. Even though the buyer tells him specifically that it won’t, but we’re afraid that he’ll think that it automatically falls off.]

133) This is not only true for items that you can redeem Maasar Sheini money on, but even if it’s in exchange for items that you can’t redeem Maasar Sheini on, you need to return the money. Although R’ Yehuda says that if you Mekadesh a woman with Maasar Sheini on purpose, it’s a good Kiddushin, and we don’t say that everything is returned; we refer to a learned woman who knows that the Kedusha of Maasar Sheini falls off, so we don’t need to make this decree.

134) If the seller runs away, and you can’t return the sale; the buyer needs to redeem the Maasar Sheini money in the seller’s hand with his own money, and use it to buy food in Yerushalayim. [Tosfos says: although you can’t redeem items that is not in your possession; the Riva says that it’s just a fine to the buyer, but the money is still Kodesh in the hands of the seller. R’ Meir answers: you can’t redeem it only when it’s not a complete benefit for the one who it’s in his possession, but if it’s a complete benefit, like in our case where he doesn’t know to bring it to Yerushalayim, you may redeem it since it’s as if he appointed you his agent. Although we say in Bava Kama that if the poor take fruit of Revei, the field’s owner can’t redeem it for them, that’s because the people who took it don’t have the ability to redeem it, so you can’t be his agent either. As the owner can’t since it’s not in his possession, and the robber can’t since it’s not his.]

135) The reason why we fined the seller to return the money, and not the buyer to redeem the money in the buyer’s hand [Tosfos: and according to Riva, he would need to get the seller’s permission or else it would work. Although, either way, the seller would need to bring Maasar Sheini money up to Yerushalayim, but he probably spent a lot of Maasar money for the animal in order that he can use Maasar Sheini money, so he’ll lose what he paid extra for the animal.] After all, we fine the person, I.e., the seller, who has the forbidden Maasar money by him [Tosfos: so that he shouldn’t sell the money anymore.]

136) If someone is Mekadesh with Arlah, Klai Kerem, Shor Haniskal, Eglah Arufah, the birds of a Metzorah, the hair of a Nazir, the first born donkey, meat and milk, and Chulin that was Shechted in the Mikdash [Tosfos adds: Chametz, Pigul, Nosar and Tamai Korban]; she’s not Mekudeshes since they’re forbidden to have pleasure from. However, if they’re sold, you can have pleasure from the money, so if you give it as Kiddushin, she’s Mekudeshes. [Tosfos says: however, if it’s Shvious after the Biur, or idols, she’s not Mekudeshes even with their exchange money, since the money gets their prohibition.]

137) [Tosfos says: you can't be Mikadesh a woman with something that's prohibited to have pleasure from even though you can have pleasure after it's burnt; we refer to a case where it won't be worth a Prutah after it's burnt. Alternatively, since the woman has in mind to get all pleasures from it, she’s not Mekudeshes just because she can have limited pleasure after it’s burnt.]

138) R' Shimon Hamsuni separated himself from Darshening all the times it says 'Es' in the Torah since he didn't want to compare anything to Hashem in the Pasuk "Es Hashem Elokecha Tirah." However, R' Akiva Darshens it to include a Talmid Chachum.

139) It says thrice Arlah in the Pasuk. One to forbid having pleasure from it. One to forbid using it as a dye [Tosfos: and we don't say that it's only for color and it's not considered as if it exists.] One comes to forbid lighting it [Tosfos: even though you're getting rid of it.]

140) The Metzorah birds [Tosfos explains that it implies that both are forbidden, and we don’t allow the one that was sent away only after it was sent]; Reish Lakish says that they’re forbidden in pleasure from the time they were bought, and R’ Yochanan says: only from the time they were Shechted.@@@@

141) Although we have a Braisa that, if you Shechted it incorrectly, you may have pleasure, it fits well according to R’ Yochanan since an unfit Shechita is not considered a Shechita to forbid it in pleasure, like R’ Shimon who holds this way, but R’ Yaakov would forbid since he considers it to be a Shechita. However, the reason why it’s not forbidden to Reish Lakish from the buying, we need to say that the Shecting was Pasul since it was found to be a Treifa [Tosfos says: like it was missing its liver, where you know it didn’t happen after you bought it.]

142) We have a contradiction of P’sukim whether to permit the bird afterwards, or not. To reconcile, we say that the one left alive is permitted, but the Shechted one remains forbidden. The reason to reconcile it this way; R’ Shimon b. Yachai says that, mostly, live animals aren’t forbidden. R’ Yishmel learns it from a Drasha. Rava says that it’s logical that the Torah wouldn’t say to send it away if the person who finds it will stumble to have pleasure from it when it’s forbidden.

143) The Rabanan held that a first born donkey is forbidden to have pleasure from, and R’ Shimon holds that it’s permitted. However, everyone agrees it’s forbidden after you chopped off its head.

144) [Tosfos says: it seems from our Gemara that, if you hold Chulin that Shechted in the Mikdash is only forbidden rabbinically, the Kiddushin will take effect. Although we say that Kiddushin doesn’t take effect with Chametz that’s rabbinicaly Assur from noon Erev Pesach; that’s because there are some type of Chametz that are prohibited from the Torah, However, that doesn’t apply to Chulin in the Mikdash that’s whole concept is only rabbinical.]

145) When you sell original Shvious fruit, the Kedusha falls on the money, but the original fruit remains with its Kedusha too. However, when you trade something for this item that received Kedushas Shvious from a previous trade, that item becomes Chulin, and what you traded it for takes over the Kedusha of Shvious. The money paid for an idol is also forbidden [Tosfos and it’s an argument if the item exchanged for that money also takes on the prohibition.]

146) Items are not considered yours just because you have the benefit to give it to whoever you want, like by a Yisrael who separated Trumah, so he can’t be Mekadesh a woman with this Trumah so that she can give it to whoever she wants.

147) Although we have a Braisa that you can Mekadesh with Trumah, even if you’re a Yisrael, we need to say that’s Trumah that he inherited from his Kohein maternal grandfather. If we say that Trumah that’s destined to be separated is if it’s already separated, even if he inherited Tevel, it’s as if the grandfather separated the Trumah and acquired it for himself.

148) Although we have an argument if someone stole someone else’s Tevel if he needs to pay back all he stole, or only according to the amount that will remain Chulin, it’s not necessarily that they argue whether those items that you have the benefit to give it to whoever you want is considered yours or not, but we can say that they argue by Tevel he inherited from his Kohein maternal grandfather if we say that Trumah that’s destined to be separated is if it’s already separated, even if he inherited Tevel, it’s as if the grandfather separated the Trumah and acquired it for himself, or not. Alternatively, they argue in Shmuel’s statement, if he can technically exempt the whole pile of grain with one kernel of wheat, or not. Alternatively, they both don’t hold of Shmuel and they argue whether to fine the robber to pay the whole thing for robbing, or not. Alternatively, everyone holds of Shmuel, and they argue whether they fined the owner of the Tevel for not separating it fast enough.

149) You can Mekadesh a woman with the wage he should get for bringing the Parah Aduma waters, or filling water for the Parah ashes, but it’s forbidden to receive money for being Mekadesh the water by putting in the ash or for sprinkling it on someone. Anyone who accepts payment for it, his Parah water is as if it’s cave water. [Tosfos says that it’s an Asmachta that it doesn’t even work B’dieved.]

150) If someone accepts money to judge, his judgment is incorrect, and someone who accepts money to testify, his testimony is canceled.