Learn Tosfos - Kiddushin 1b

159) A non-Jewish slave is acquired with money, documents, Chazaka (by forcing him to work for you), Chalifin or with pulling him.

160) You only acquire him when you physically pull him, but not if you call him and he comes, since he's coming on his account. This is not like pulling an animal that comes when you call it, that it’s acquired since the animal, (which doesn't have thinking capabilities), comes because you called it. A slave child has the same status in this aspect like an animal.

161) If the slave picks up the master, he acquires him through Chazaka, since he's working for him. If the master lifts the slave; the Tanna Kama says that he doesn't acquire, and R' Shimon holds that he acquires since lifting acquires in all instances.

162) You can't acquire a female slave with relations, although she's lifting him, since she's also having pleasure from it. This is even if it's anal relations (where she doesn't really enjoy) since, who says that she doesn't have any enjoyment? Also, there's a Hekish that the Torah says "the layings of women," that we compare regular relations to anal relations.

163) If a convert dies and leaves adult slaves, they go free. The Rabanan say the same applies by minor slaves, and Abba Shaul says that who ever acquires them first keeps them.

164) Mar Zutra made an acquisition on a convert’s slave when the convert died; and you have the slave in his possession when the convert dies so that he shouldn't be without a master even for one moment. Some say that it was adult slaves, and other say that it was minors [Rashi: and not like Abba Shaul, so you needed that the minors shouldn't be left without a master for one moment. Tosfos disagrees since the Halacha is like Aba Shaul. Rather, R' Tam explains: he needed to work him right away at the deaths so no one else could acquire him before he does. Alternatively, R' Tam says: according to the second version that they were minors, it's because it only helps by a minor according to Abba Shaul to acquire them, because an adult, who acquires themselves immediately after death, it doesn't help having them work for you at the time of the death. The Ri says: according to the Rabanan, it's not applicable to acquire them at the time of death since they learn the Gezeira Shava "Lah, Lah" from a woman that the death of the master makes him go out of his possession like the death of a husband releases her from the marriage. However, only according to Abba Shaul who learns that the Gezeira Shava just tells us that it releases the slave from prohibitions (of being forbidden to Jews), but not regarding monetary status (i.e., to release him from the obligation to work for a master); it helps to acquire an adult, since he was working for Mar Zutra at the time of death and didn't want to acquire himself; he has a status of a minor (who doesn't have the ability to acquire himself).]

165) R’ Meir holds that freeing a slave is detrimental to the recipient, so, nobody has a right to acquire his freedom document for him without them appointing him; since someone can't acquire for him without his consent when it's detrimental. However, he can accept the document himself, even though he doesn't have an independent acquisition from his master; since his freedom document and his hand (to acquire for himself) comes simultaneously. However, others can free him by paying for him against the slave’s will the same way that money buys him from the master against the slave's will. Although one can buy the slave with a document against his will (and he can't accept the freedom document to free him against his will) that's because the two documents have different text; they're totally different objects, but the money have the same minting on them. Rava answers: the money has nothing to do with the slave, but that the master is being compensated for the slave, thus you don't need the slave's input. However, by receiving the freedom document, the receiver is representing the slave, so he can't represent him without his consent in something detrimental.

166) The Rabanan hold that he can accept the document himself; since his freedom document and his hand (to acquire for himself) comes simultaneously. Someone else can also accept the document for him without his consent since freeing a slave is beneficial to the recipient, as someone can acquire for his friend without his consent when it's his benefit.

167) R' Shimon b. Elazar says: a slave can't accept the document himself; since he holds that his freedom document and his hand (to acquire for himself) doesn't come simultaneously. After all, he learns a Gezeira Shava "Lah, Lah" from a woman that the Get needs to leave the possession of the master completely.

168) Rabbah has an inquiry according to R' Shimon b. Elazar: can a slave appoint an agent to accept a freedom document for him? [Tosfos says: there are those who explain: he definitely holds that others acquire the freedom document for him, but the question is does it make it worse since the slave made him an agent. Others explain: the question is if the reason why others could acquire for him is because he's his agent, and those who say it's detrimental for him to go free, if you need his consent, or even according to those who say it's generally beneficial, but does it help for him to protest against it if he doesn't personally want to be freed. Or do we say it doesn't work because he was the slave’s agent, and the slave’s protests are nothing.] The Gemara concludes that it's his agent, and it's not similar to R' Huna b. Dr' Yehoshua who says that the Kohanim are Hashem's agents in the Avodah, and not ours. After all, anything that you can't do personally, you can't appoint an agent for. (Therefore, a Kohein who you vowed not to have pleasure from can bring the Korban). After all, the Yisrael doesn't have any ability to bring a Korban, but a slave is theoretically able to accept his document, but he just can't because of a technicality that the document can't leave the possession of the master.

169) Also, they argue: R' Meir holds that a slave can't redeem himself with money, and they Chachumim say that he could. Everyone agrees that you can't give a gift of money to a slave regularly, since his master will acquire it. R' Sheishes says they argue whether he can receive a gift on condition that his master doesn't have any possession on it. [Tosfos: however, if it was given on condition to redeem himself, everyone agrees that he acquires it to redeem himself.] R' Elazar says that everyone agrees that you can't give a gift on condition that his master doesn't have any possession on it, and they argue if he can give it on condition to redeem himself. [Tosfos quotes R' Tam: in Nedarim, it seems from Rav who says, regarding a wife who vowed from pleasure from her husband, that people can give her money on condition to feed herself, but not just by saying on condition that the husband doesn't have any possession on it; that this is the true Halacha. Granted that Shmuel disagrees, but the Halacha is like Rav when they argue about prohibitions. Although there are practical differences regarding monetary laws, where the Halacha is like Shmuel; but all the Sugyos dealing with this question deals with prohibitions. However, the Ri didn't hold it to be a proof from a wife to a slave; since a wife's hand is not as much as her husband's hand as a slave's hand is his master's. After all, the husband can give his wife a gift, and he won't have any possession on it, and gifts from others to a wife, the husband only receives the produce of the gifts. (Even though the husband keeps what her wife finds completely, that's because, as it says in the Yerushalmi, that she shouldn't take gold from her husband and claim that she found it. However, that's not a problem by gifts, since there are rumors to gifts.) However, by a slave, he never keeps anything of those gifts.]

170) Although it seems that their opinions are the opposite in the following case: the Rabanan say that a wife can't redeem Maasar Sheini without adding a fifth, and R' Meir says she can. It's assumed that the only way to establish it if she can own gifted money that was given on condition that her husband doesn't have any possession on it to say that, when she redeems her husband's Maasar Sheini, that she's not using his money. The Gemara answers: really, the case is that it's Maasar Sheini that she inherited from her family. The Rabanan are consistent to their opinion that holds that Maasar Sheini belongs to the owners, so the husband takes it like all items that fall to his wife; and R' Meir holds that Maasar Sheini belongs to Hashem, so they never enacted that it should go to the husband, so the husband's money is redeeming fruits that are not his, so you don't add a fifth.

171) [Tosfos says: a woman doesn't need to add a fifth onto her own Maasar since the Pasuk says 'man' to exclude her, and not like Rashi says. She can't use her money of Nichsei Melug to redeem, since her husband acquires the produce of it, but she could [Mahrsha- use the money her husband gives her as a gift.]]

173) A slave leaves his master by having his tooth or eye knocked out by the master, but not with a baby tooth, since it will grow back. We learn that he leaves with the knocking out of all the other tips of his exposed limbs from a Riboy U'miut. It's even if it doesn't make him lose any function, since we have a extra Pasuk of 'sending' to include it. We only exclude being similar to a tooth or eye if he made his hand shrivel up if it will eventually heal.

174) There's a Tannaic argument, when knocking out a limb, if the slave goes free even without a freedom document. R' Shimon says he needs one since we learna Gezeira Shava "Shiluach, Shiluach" from a wife. R' Meir holds he doesn't need it since it says "he goes free" before it says Shiluach, so it's not affected by the Gezeira Shava. The Chachumim Paskin that he doesn't need a document for eyes and teeth that are written explicitly in the Torah, but you need for other limbs that are only learned from a Drasha. [Tosfos says: granted they make him freed from the Torah like eyes and teeth; R' Tam explains: it's a rabbinical decree so that his master shouldn't see him in the market and claim that he's still his slave. However, he can't claim that by an eye and tooth since they'll just tell him to read the Pasuk. Riva answers: only eyes and teeth that's written before Shiluach is not affected by the Gezeira Shava, but the other limbs that are learned from the extra Shiluch is affected by the Gezeira Shava.]

175) If the master hits his eye, and blinds him, or his ear and deafens him, he goes free. However, if he only hit across from those limbs, he doesn't go free. Granted that damage that came from wind is damage, and that's why you pay if your chicken sticks his mouth in a glass utensil and breaks it by cockadoodledoing inside; but by humans we can say that it wasn't the wind that damaged , but he scares himself. As we have the rule: if you scare your friend and he gets damaged; you're exempt from paying in Beis Din, but he should pay to satisfy Heaven.

176) If you hit his eye and dims his vision, or his tooth and makes it shaky, if he can still use them, he doesn't go free, but if he can't he goes free.

177) Also, if he already has a dim eye and the master blinds him completely, or he had a shaky tooth, and the master knocks it out; he only goes free if the limb was usable beforehand.

178) If you're applying medicine to your slave's eye and it blinds him, or you’re scraping the plaque from around the teeth, and a tooth falls out; the Tanna Kama says that he goes free and R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that he doesn't go free until the master intended to hurt the slave. The Tanna Kama agrees that a child doesn't go out when the master sticks his hand in the mother's womb (to deliver her baby) and knocks out the eye of the child. [Tosfos explains: since there are two positive things going for the master, since he intended to benefit the slave, and he didn't intend to even touch the eye. However, if there's a rock in your lap, and you forgot about it and got up and it fell on your slave and knocked out a limb, he goes free despite the master not intending for his slave, since he didn't intend to help his slave.]

179) If the slave was blind, and you chiseled out the blind eye, he goes free. [Tosfos says: although we say that, if you blind someone who couldn't use his eyes anyhow doesn't go free; but here is worse since you make him missing a limb.]

180) If the master cut off a sixth finger of a slave, he goes free if the extra finger was in the same row as the regular fingers.

181) If you make him impotent by ruining his scrotum, Ben Azai says he doesn't go free, and Rebbi holds that he does. If he cuts off the tip of his tongue; everyone agrees he goes free. This is like what Rebbi holds that, if you sprinkle the Parah Aduma waters on a tongue, it works since the Torah compares it to Tumah, and someone gets Tamai when Tumah touches his tongue. (The Rabanan say it's no good since the Torah compares it to Teveila, that you don't need the water to touch your tongue.) [Tosfos says: even though the slave's going free wasn't compared to Tumah; but we know that it definitely doesn't follow Teveila since the example limbs written in the Pasuk, eyes and teeth, also don't need the water to touch them when entering the Mikvah.]

182) Although the water doesn't need to enter parts of the mouth for Teviela, but it needs to be able to touch all the parts if it would go in, so it's not a good Teveila if there's a Chatzitza in the teeth.

183) Making the scrotum impotent makes her go free is dependent on a Tannaic argument if it's a blemish by Bechor. R' Yehuda holds that, even if its testicles are crushed or extra crushed, detached (completely, but are held up in the outer pocket) and cut off (when it's not completely cut off from the sinew). R' Elazar b. Yaakov says it applies to the member and not to the testicles, and R' Yossi says are crushed or extra crushed (that are more apparent) applies also to the testicles, and detached and cut off only applies to the member.

184) R' Meir and R' Elazar say that a large animal is acquired through handing it over [Rashi says: the owner gives it over to the buyer. Tosfos infers that it's given from hand to hand. However, Rebbi disagrees since it implies from many places that the buyer takes hold of it himself, so we must say it's considered giving over by him taking hold by the command of the owner.] The small animal is acquired through picking it up. The Chachumim of the Mishna says that the small ones are acquired by pulling, and the Chachumim of the Braisa say that both the large and small animals are acquired through pulling. [Rashi says: and of course he acquires by handing it over (which is a stronger acquisition), but the opinion that holds the acquisition is handing it over, it's only acquired by handing it over. R' Tam held the same way. However, Ri brings many proofs that pulling is a better acquisition than handing over. Therefore, the opinion that you make the acquisition by handing over, it means “also handing over,” and of course pulling acquires it. However, when it says pulling acquires it, it means only leading and not handing over.] R' Shimon says that you acquire both types of animals through lifting.

185) Therefore, according to R' Shimon who holds that you acquire large animals by lifting, the way you can acquire an elephant that can't be lifted; you can make Chalifin, or rent the place it standing on. Alternatively, you can bring four utensils for it to stand on. According to the opinion that you can't acquire with the buyer's utensils in the seller's possession [Tosfos: it's either that the seller tells you that your utensils shall acquire, which helps to acquire there. Or] you can acquire it in a public side area. Alternatively, with bundles of vines. [Rashi explains: they're three Tefachim high, so he acquires through lifting, but the original utensils weren't that tall to acquire by lifting, but only as it being your courtyard; or it wasn't a Tefach high according to R' Tam who says you acquire by lifting it a Tefach. However, it's difficult why it frames the case with bundles of vines instead of with rocks. Rather, R' Meshulam explains: these vines are elephant food, and they dangle them above them, which makes them jump to get it, which would be considered as a lifting to acquire.]

186) Land is acquired with money, documents, and Chazaka. In a place where they write documents, you can't acquire unless you gave the money and receive the document, unless you made a condition to acquire with the money alone. Also, one of the parties can make a condition that I'll have the choice whether the money giving acquires (just in case I want to renege on the deal), or the document (so that the other party shouldn't renege).

187) You don't acquire a field with a document alone unless it's a gift, but a sale is not binding without money, unless he sells it for its bad quality, (where the seller agrees to have the document make the transaction).

188) However, the document makes the transaction for a gift even if it says that it's a sale in the document, since that was only written to give the receiver extra power to collect from the giver if his creditor takes the field. [Tosfos explains: we must say that he has a second document written that says it's a gift to push off any people who live on the border who wants to have first dibs to buy the field, since he can't take a gift away, and he's not aware that there's another document that says that the giver has responsibility to replace the field if it's taken away. The Yerushalmi says: that the gift document is necessary to receive generously with the wells that are inside it (since selling is done stingily).]

189) You acquire moveable objects with pulling them; according to Reish Lakish, from the Torah, and according to R' Yochanan, from a rabbinical enactment.

190) You can acquire moveable objects through a transaction made on land, and it doesn't needed to be gathered on the land. However, the giver needs to say "acquire the moveable objects" and "through the land."

191) With the smallest amount of land, you're obligated in Pe'ah [Tosfos quotes the Yerushalmi: that it grows one stalk, and from there, branches out many stalks. After all, you're only obligated in Pe'ah after you start harvesting, so there must be something remaining after the first cut.] Also, you're obligated in Bikkurim [Tosfos: with one wheat stalk, since it's main nourishment is from directly below it. However, a tree gets nourishment from sixteen Amos around it, and if it gets nourished from land you don't own, you're not obligated in Bikkurim.] You also can write a Pruzbal on it. [Tosfos says since it's only common to lend money to someone with land, since it's always available to collect since it can't be lost like other properties. Even if he has the smallest amount of land, he can collect his whole loan since, when the borrower ransoms it, he can collect it again until he pays back his whole loan.]

192) [Tosfos brings R' Shmaya who infers from the case of the Gemara that says that they couldn't do Chalifin since the receiver wasn't there, that you can't have another person represent him to make the Chalifin. However, the Rivan argues since it's a daily occurrence that we allow someone else to represent him, and other proofs. Rather, in the case of the Gemara, the receiver doesn't have any friend here who's willing to give their utensil to make Chalifin for this person, since the giver could keep the utensil.]

193) [Tosfos says: there are those who infer that you can't rent land through Chalifin, but only through money, documents or Chazaka.]

194) You can acquire the moveable objects through an acquisition on land even if the land was sold, and the objects were gifts.

195) If he's giving land to someone, there's an unresolved inquiry if he can acquire moveable objects for someone else through it. It's not similar to what R' Akiva, the caretaker of Tzedaka, acquired the Maasar Ani for the poor by renting land; since the land could have been rented on behalf of the Tzedaka too. Alternatively, since he was the caretaker of the poor, his hands were like their hands.

196) If you didn't pay for all the objects, you don't acquire them when making the acquisition on the land but only for the amount that you paid for.

197) If you sold ten fields in ten different countries, once you made a Chazaka on one of them, you acquire all of them, as long as you paid for all of them, or else you only acquire for how much you paid for. [Tosfos says: the reason that he doesn't acquire them through money, since we refer to a place where they're accustomed not to acquire with money alone. Alternatively, there's a practical difference by a gift. Alternatively, that the money was owed to you by the seller, and you can't used the loan money to make the acquisition since it was given to be spent (and for these individual coins to never to return to him).]

198) If there are ten animals tied together with bits and the seller hands over one of them to the buyer; if he says "acquire this one," he only acquires the first one. However, if he didn't say "this one," he acquires all of them. Anyhow, we can't compare this case to the above case of selling land, not leniently, nor stringently (although other land that doesn't seem to be together with this land seems similar to the animal case). After all, by the animals [Tosfos explains: since you can control all of them with the first bit], they're all connected, and they're all in your hands, but that's no proof to land. Alternatively, land is considered more connected since they're all connected through the earth, they're considered one block of land.

199) Although the Halacha is that you don't swear on land; but you can swear on it with a Gilgul from moveable objects. As we see that you make someone swear with a Gilgul something that you wouldn't swear on by itself by a Sotah that she swears a Gilgul that she didn't have promiscuous relations when she was an Arusa once she needs to swear that she didn't have promiscuous relations when she was a Nesuah [Tosfos: also she swears a Gilgul from other people, even ones that the husband didn't have a jealousy on.] We say that you can make a Gilgul on a claim from a Safeik, even if he claims to swear that he's not your Jewish slave, even though there would be rumors to that effect if it would be true. [Tosfos says: however, it must be something that has some basis to the truth; but he can't make some wild claim, like, swear that you never stole from me in your life.]

200) If someone calls his friend a non-Jewish slave [Tosfos: you must put him in Cherem, since he says on others that he's cursed, we curse him with a Cherem.] If he calls him a Mamzer, we lash him. [Tosfos explains: since he said that others transgressed a Lav, we lash him as if he transgressed a Lav.] If he calls his friend a Rasha, he's allowed to affect his livelihood.

201) There's an argument whether you can do Chalifin with money [Tosfos: and even if the transaction doesn't work as paying for it until you pull the object, perhaps it can acquire by being Chalifin. This is even according to the opinions that say that fruit can't make Chalifin, perhaps coins are better since it's similar to utensils since you can make a necklace for your daughter with it, or you can use it as weights. Alternatively, since it has the functionality that you can buy anything with it, it's similar to a utensil.] However, we Paskin in Bava Metzia that it doesn't make Chalifin.

202) R' Sheishes says that you can do Chalifin with fruit, and R' Nachman says that you don't do Chalifin with fruit. [Rashi explains: he holds that any moveable object that is not a utensil, you can't do Chalifin. Ri and R' Chananel say: it's only by fruit that doesn't have any functionality; but animals that do work do have functionality (by plowing etc.) can make Chalifin. As we see in Bava Metzia that they did Chalifin with a cow for a donkey.]

203) R' Yochanan says: from the Torah, money acquires objects, but the rabbis enacted that you only acquire by pulling. However, if you sold cow meat for money, and with that money, he makes up to buy the buyer's ox, he acquires it with the money since such an acquisition is uncommon, and the rabbis never enacted for uncommon occurrences.

204) [Tosfos says: the reason why they enacted that only pulling acquires, and not requiring both pulling and money (and by that, not canceling the whole concept that money acquires); then, if the buyer brings the items home before paying, if he has a fire, he'll tell the seller that it was his grains that got burnt. The reason why we don't need to worry that, when the seller receives the money and the transaction didn't take effect, that he will tell the buyer that his money got burnt; since the only way to guard money properly is to bury it, and if he didn't and it got burnt, he's negligent in his guarding and he would need to pay anyways.]

205) If Hekdesh buys an animal and gives money for it, it's acquired even if it's on the other side of the world, despite a mortal doesn't acquire until he pulls it. Also, saying something is for Hekdesh is like handing it over by a mortal, so Hekdesh acquires something when the owner says it should be Hekdesh, but a mortal only acquires a gift when he pulls it. If someone pulls an animal of Hekdesh on condition to pay a hundred Zuz, and before he gives the money, it went up in price to two hundred, he needs to pay two hundred since Hekdesh only acquires with money. However, if the animal was two hundred and went down to a hundred after pulling it, the buyer can't renege (even though money acquires by Hekdesh), since Hekdesh can't be worse off than mortals, and just like you can't renege after pulling the fruits when buying from regular people, so you can't renege by Hekdesh. [Tosfos explains: however, you can't say that the reason he can't renege is because saying something is for Hekdesh is like handing it over by a mortal, and pulling is like saying that he'll give two hundred; since it was a mistaken pledge since he didn't know it will go down in price. Although, by the story of Yosef b. Yoezer's son, who was trying to change up a precious coin through Hekdesh, they advised him not to give a price for it, since it might be too small and he can't renege is because saying something is for Hekdesh is like handing it over by a mortal, and we don't say it's not binding since it was a mistaken pledge; since someone accepts on himself an assessment, even if he'll lose if it's too small, but he'll gain if it's larger than it's supposed to be. Alternatively, there, where you're assessing an item that the assessment is not known, we assume that you forgive the extra to the Mikdash, but here you're pulling an animal with a known worth, and he only wants it if it was really worth two hundred when the transaction is binding.]

206) If he gives two hundred to Hekdesh and didn't pull the animal; If it goes down in price, he still owes two hundred. However, if it was a hundred and went up in price to two hundred before pulling; we don't say that Hekdesh can renege since Hekdesh can't be worse off than mortals; since even the mortals who renege need to accept on themselves the curse of "Me Sheparah." [Tosfos says: Although, in Gitten it says that an orphan, who they gave the status like Hekdesh, can renege until the pulling like just like mortals who buy can renege; since orphans, who are actual mortals and should acquire through pulling, but the rabbis enacted to acquire with money, we can say that they can renege without pulling since they shouldn't be like Hekdesh but when it's advantageous, but not to be detrimental. However, by real Hekdesh that never had a Halacha on them to acquire by pulling even rabbinically, and it's only with the logic “since Hekdesh can't be worse off than mortals” that Hekdesh can renege. So as long as mortals can't renege (without a curse), we don't say the logic that Hekdesh can't be worse off than mortals.]

207) The father is obligated to give his son a Mila, but not his mother since the Pasuk says "like Hashem commended him," and not her. [Tosfos says: even though she should be exempt anyhow since it's a time-based positive Mitzvah, but we need it according to the opinion that, after the eighth day, you can do Mila even at night, I might have considered it not a time-based Mitzvah from the eighth day and on.] If the father doesn't give him a Mila, Beis Din needs to. If Beis Din didn't, he's obligated to make sure he has a Mila.

208) The father is obligated to do Pidyan Haben on his son, and not the mother. If the father didn't end up redeeming him, the son would be obligated to redeem himself.

209) If one has an obligation to redeem himself and his son, and he only has five Slayim to redeem, he redeems himself since the Mitzvah on his body is the main obligation. However, if he has five Slayim of unsold land, and five Slayim of land he sold, but it sold after the obligation of your redemption; the Tanna Kama held that obligations written in the Torah is not as if it's written in a document, so it doesn't make a lien, so they can't collect the land to redeem himself, so the one five Slayim that he has unsold is used to redeem himself. However, R' Yehuda holds that obligations written in the Torah is as if it's written in a document, so it makes a lien, so they can collect the land to redeem himself, so the unsold five Slayim of land in his hands can be used to redeem his son. [Tosfos asks: why don't we consider the five Slayim that you have that you can use to redeem yourself as hurting your buyers by not using it for this, which is your first obligation, so that the field should be taken away from them? Also, why can't the buyers tell the Kohein that they left five Slayim unsold land for you to collect from him? Rather, we must say that the grandfather made the sold land as an Apotiki for his son's redemption. However, now since the son grows up and has his own son; the Tanna Kama says that it can't be an Apotiki since it's not like a loan with a document, and R' Yehuda holds that it's like a document, so it's a good Apotiki. Therefore, the buyers can't say that there's five Slayim unsold left in the son's possession since this is coming from the grandfather's obligation, and not from his son's obligation. Therefore, the son's five Slayim is given to redeem his own son.]

210) If you have a first born son to redeem and you need to go up to the Mikdash on the Regel, and you can't afford both; the Tanna Kama says that you first redeem your son since the Pasuk first mentions redeeming your son and then mentions going up for the Regel. However, R' Yehuda says that you first go up for the Regel, since that's a passing Mitzvah (that you won't fulfill if you don't do it now) and the redemption can be done later.

211) If one has five wives, and they all have a first born son, he's obligated to redeem all of them and we don't extrapolate from the first born of inheritance that needs to be the father's first born, since this one is dependent on being the first one passing out of a womb.

212) A father needs to teach his son Torah, and not the mother. However, if his father didn't teach him Torah, he's obligated to teach himself. If there's a choice whether he should learn, or his son, he comes before his son. R' Yehuda says that, if his son has more potential, he comes first.

213) [Rashi's explanation: the people of Bavel who travel to Eretz Yisrael to learn]; they should marry before they learn [since their not around to be busy supporting them, however, the people of Eretz Yisrael], they should learn Torah before they marry [since they learn locally, they have the yoke of support for their families. However, Tosfos asks: how can the people leave their countries without supporting their families? Rather, the people who are in Bavel who leave their countries and are poor need to learn before their married, but the people of Eretz Yisrael who learn locally and are rich, they can marry and then learn Torah.]

214) A twenty year old that had not married yet, his whole life he lives with bad thoughts.

215) When you still have your influence on your children [Rashi: either push them to get married, or discipline them.] Some say that it's between the ages of sixteen to twenty two, others say it's between eighteen and twenty four. [According to the second explanation, if you discipline them afterwards, we're afraid that they may rebel.]

216) You need to teach your son Pesukim, but not Mishna. There's an argument if a paternal grandson is included.

217) Someone should always divide his learning in three parts; a third in Pesukim, a third in Mishna and a third in Gemara. You split it by days [Rashi: you split the week in thirds; Tosfos: you split the day.]

218) When someone asks you something in Torah, don't bumble with it, but you should be able to answer immediately. [Tosfos says: although in Bava Metzia we say that a young scholar should lie about his Mesechta, that's only that he shouldn't take pride over them to say he learned many Mesechtos, but if someone came to ask him a Halacha, or to learn from him, he should be able to answer immediately. Although Chazal says to accustom yourself to say "I don't know;" that's only by other topics. Alternatively, even by Torah so not to be haughty with it.]

219) A father is obligated to marry off his son, and not the mother. He also needs to help his daughter to get married, to clothe her nicely and give a dowry in order that people should jump to marry her.

220) A father needs to teach his child a trade, but not his mother, and some say that he must also teach him to swim since it's included in his obligation to enable him to live (i.e., besides enabling him to make a livelihood).

221) The Tanna Kama says that he doesn't need to actually teach him a trade, but as long as he teaches him how to do business. R' Yehuda requires to only teach him a trade since, if he doesn't have money to do business, what will he do to provide for himself.

222) Both sons and daughters are obligated to honor parents, but the daughter doesn't always have the time to do it since she's obligated to her husband. [Tosfos says: granted that, from the Torah, the wife isn't obligated to work to bring income to her husband, but still, this could be a Drasha since the woman is not always found near her father.] If she's divorced, then she has as much obligation as her brothers.

223) It's forbidden for people to walk four Amos haughtily with a stiff posture, and he shouldn't walk four Amos with an exposed head.

224) If both your father and mother request you to give them a drink, you are first obligated to serve your father, since both your mother and you are obligated to serve your father. However, if they're divorced, they're both even, so you may give it to whoever you want first.

225) You shouldn't awake a parent, even if will lead to a great loss.

226) [Tosfos says: that, which R' Yosef was originally happy if the Halacha was that blind people were exempt from Mitzvos (before they concluded that someone who's commanded to do a Mitzvah is greater than those who are not commanded and still perform the Mitzva {since the one's without a command doesn't have pressure to keep it} seems to imply that he didn't lose making the Brachos on the Mitzvos (or else he wouldn't be so happy). Thus, it would seem, that women can make a Bracha on time-based positive Mitzvos.]

227) Even if your mother rips your clothing and smacks your head and throws your wallet in the sea, you're not allowed to embarrass her.

228) Someone can feed his father delicacies, and not get Olam Habah [Rashi: if he shows that he doesn't really want to give it to him. Tosfos quotes the Yerushalmi about a story where the father asks where he got it, and his son answered him angrily "what difference does it make; just chew it.] Also, he can make him work on the mill, and be brought to Olam Habah [Rashi: when he tells him encouraging words. However, he and Tosfos bring the Yerushalmi, if the son takes over his shift to work for the king, which forces the father to take over his job in the mill (which was the lesser of the two evils.)]

229) Although Avimi had five sons which Smicha, when his father came, he ran to the door to answer it personally, and he would cry out "yes, yes" (to show he's coming) until he opens it.

230) If both of your parents want to give you to drink, accept it from your mother and not your father if he's a Ben Torah since, if you would accept from him, he might feel slighted.

231) The way to honor your father in his lifetime; if you need something, don't order it to be done for yourself, but for your father, so that people will do it for his honor. In his death, you honor him by calling him "my father, my master, may I be an atonement for him" for the first twelve months. After that, you say "he should be remembered for blessing to life in the next world."

232) When a Chachum mentions his father or Rebbi, he shouldn't mention his name, but "my father, my master," or "my Rebbi." However, the announcer should use the father or Rebbi's name.

233) Fearing your parents consist of not standing in their designated place to stand, and not to sitting in their designated seat. You shouldn't contradict them, nor decide between their words and the one who they’re arguing with. Honoring them consists of feeding them and giving them to drink, help them dress and to come in and out.

234) R' Yehuda says that the honoring expenses are paid by the son [Tosfos says: this is only if the father has pleasure from the money. However, when it's a choice to save his money, or his father's, he saves his own since the father doesn't have pleasure by the son's loss.] R' Nosson b. Oshiya says: it's paid by the father. [Tosfos qualifies: it's only when the father has, but if he doesn't, but the son can afford it; we force the son to support the father. Also, the Yerushalmi implies: even if both of them don't have, he must beg for both of them.]

235) Even according to the opinion it belongs to the father; but when your father commands you to do something, you must do it even if it will make you lose money by not doing your work.

236) If there's two brothers, two partners, a father and son, and a student and his Rebbi; they can redeem each other's Maasar Sheini without adding a fifth, and can feed each other from their Maasar Ani. However, we say that there's a curse for someone to feed his father from Maasar Ani. If it's true that the son is obligated to pay for honoring him by feeding him, we must say that this is with the extras, but he can't pay the main feeding, which is his obligation, with Maasar Ani. However, even so, it's a curse to do so since it's still embarrassing to the father.

237) If the parent throws his wallet in the sea, you can't embarrass them. If you're not obligated to give up your money for honoring; it must be that it was the father's wallet, but you're upset because you were destined to inherit it.

238) If you want to inspect if your son has a temper; you can test him by ripping clothing that he's destined to inherit. However, it's only by the seam, or else you'll transgress "don't waste." (We must say that it's in a time when the son is anyhow in a bad mood, or else ripping by the seam won't anger him.) Also, you would need to forgive your honor if he gets upset at you, or else you'll transgress putting a stumbling block before him. [Tosfos says: also, you would need to inform him that you forgive him beforehand, or else he still needs an atonement for wanting to do a sin.]

239) When you see your father do something wrong, you shouldn't tell him bluntly that he's transgressing the Torah, but say it in a round about way, "father, the Torah says this."

240) If there's a choice of doing a Mitzvah or to honor one's parents; you should do the Mitzvah since both you and your parents are obligated in Mitzvos. However, this is only if no one else can do the Mitzvah, but if someone else can do it, let him do the Mitzvah and you go and honor your parents.

241) A father can forgive his honor. However, regarding a Rebbi; R' Chisda says he can't forgive it since the Torah is not his to forgive its honor, and R' Yosef says that he can since it is his Torah, as the Pasuk says "you should say your Torah etc."

242) R' Eliezer says that a Nassi can't forgive his honor, and R' Yehoshua says that he could like we see that Avraham served people. R' Tzadok says that we can learn it from Hashem, as He serves humanity. However, everyone holds that a king can't forgive his honor as the Pasuk says "place a king on you so that his fear should be upon you.”

243) The Pasuk says "you stand before a Seiva, and honor a Zakein." The Tanna Kama says that a Zakein is only a person with wisdom, so you only need to stand before an elderly Chachum, and not before an elder that’s destitute [Rashi: i.e., a wicked one. Tosfos disagrees, since how can Issi b. Yehuda argue to obligate honoring him if your obligated to fight and embarrass him. Rather, it means if he's an ignoramus.] R' Yossi Haglili says that a Zakein is a Chachum, even if he's young. [Tosfos explains: the extra category of Seiva tells us that you honor an elderly Chachum even if he's not amazingly a Chachum, while a young one needs to be amazingly a Chachum.] Issi b. Yehuda held that a Seiva is even if he's destitute. The Halacha is like Issi b. Yehuda.

244) There's no 'honoring' with money, or standing up that stops him from working. Thus, a craftsman does not have permission to stand before a Chachum. [Tosfos explains: i.e., he doesn't need to stand up. Alternatively, he's not allowed to stand up if he's working for another.]

245) However, despite not standing up for the Chachum, they need to stand up for people bringing Bikkurim. Although their honor is not greater than a Talmid Chachum, but we're trying to prevent them from being discouraged and won't bring them the next time.

246) You only need to stand before a Chachum in a place of honor, and not in a bathroom or the inner chamber of a bathhouse. However, you need to stand before him in the outer chamber.

247) It's forbidden to close your eyes before the Chachum comes so not to need to stand up for him when you don't see him enter your four Amos.

248) You shouldn't stand up until the Chachum enters your four Amos, or else it doesn't seem that you're standing up for him. This is only for someone who's not your main Rebbi, but for your main Rebbi, you stand when you see him.

249) A Chachum shouldn't bother people and should try to walk around them avoiding for them to stand up for him. If he does so, he receives long life.

250) You don't need to stand before an elderly non-Jew. R' Yochanan stood anyhow since he must have witnessed many miracles in his life. Rava didn't stand, but he showed honor. Abaya assisted them by giving them his hand to lean on.

251) A Talmid Chachum is not allowed to stand up for his Rebbi but twice a day; once during the day and once at night, so that his honor shouldn't be greater than Hashem, where we only say Shma twice. [Tosfos says: this is only regarding the household of the Rav since people assume they stood up already that day or night and when no one new came in, but if someone new came in, or other people that are not part of the household, they need to stand even a hundred times since the other people may not know that he stood.]

252) There are unresolved inquiries regarding a son who is his father's Rebbi. Does the son need to stand before the father, and does the father need to stand before his son?

253) You should stand before someone who does great deeds.

254) R' Elazar says that you don't need to stand before your Rebbi when you're learning. However, Abaya cursed those who rely on it.

255) A woman is exempt from timed-based positive Mitzvos like Sukka, Luluv, Shofar, Tzitzis and Tefilin. [Tosfos explains: since you're not obligated in Tefilin on Shabbos and Yom Tov. Also, Tzitzis is not obligated at night like R' Shimon's opinion. Although the Yerushalmi implies that you're obligated with a Talis designated to be worn by day, even if worn at night; still it's considered as if it's time based since the designation for day causes the obligation.] However, they're obligated in positive Mitzvos that are not time based like Mezuza, making a fence on a roof, returning a lost object and sending away the mother bird. [Tosfos says: although they're anyhow obligated in constructing the roof's fence from a Lav "don't put something that may cause someone's blood in your house;" but that's only applicable if you build the house on condition that you don't build the fence, but if after you build the house, you change your mind not to put up a fence, or if the fence fell down, it's only an Asei to put it up. Although there's also a Lav for a lost object that "you can't ignore it," that's only if you don't take it, but if you take it to return, but you changed your mind after Yiyush, it's only an Asei. Although there's a Lav by sending away the mother bird" don't take the mother on the children;" but if you picked up the bird to send it away, and then you changed your mind not to send it away, you only transgress the Asei. However, you can't answer that the practical difference by being obligated in all the Asies is that, if you have another Asei that would supersede the Lav, you'll still be obligated for the Asei that's not superseded. After all, if that would be so, then a woman should be able to burn Tamai Trumah on Yom Tov since she's only obligated in the Lav of Yom Tov and not the Asei (since it's time based). Therefore, we must say that when the Lav is given with an Asei, even if one's not personally obligated in the Asei, the Lav is stronger and doesn't get superseded by an Asei.]

256) The exceptions are Matzah and Simchas Yom Tov; that women are obligated even though they're positive time based Mitzvos, and they're exempt from learning Torah, procreating, and redeeming the first born although they're not time-based Mitzvos.

257) [Tosfos says: according to the opinion that a husband is obligated to give Simcha to his wife; Rashi says that he needs to give her linen clothes, and food and drinks. However, Tosfos says that's only these days, but in the days of the Mikdash, he needs to bring her to Yerushalayim and feed her from the Korban Simcha.]

258) Men and women are equal in all Lavs except that women are not obligated not to become Tamai if she's a Kohenes, nor in cutting her Payos and shaving her beard. Issi says they're not obligated in making bald spots (from grief over their lost relatives). They're also both equal by all monetary judgments and Kofar.

259) The beard of a woman and of the Saris [Tosfos: that came after most of his years (i.e., thirty five), or else it's a sign he's not a Saris]; has the status of a beard regarding Tzaras.

260) You're only transgress shaving a beard with a razor, but not with a scissor, even if it cuts very close like a razor, since it's not destroying the root. Also, he doesn't transgress with tweezers or a plane since it's not the normal way of shaving.

261) Someone transgresses making a bald spot for every spot he makes; but it's only if he did it for grief over a dead love one. He transgresses wherever on his head he made it, and it's not exact that he must do it between his eyes.

262) A woman is exempt from Smicha on a Korban. She's also [Tosfos: exempt on the following since they're time based, and besides, it's Pasul if she does it, as we Darshen from Psukim,] from bringing the Mincha to the Mizbeach, and from Kemitza, Melika, Kabala [Holacha] and sprinkling the Parah Aduma waters. Also, sprinkling the blood inside the Heichel on Yom Kippur, and sprinkling bird blood on the Mizbeach [Tosfos: and all other sprinklings]. Also, waving the Korbanos except for the Mincha of a Sotah and Nazir.

263) When you need to wave a Mincha, the hands of the Kohein are 'below' the hands of the owner. [Tosfos says: we don't need to worry about a Chatzitza, (like we do by partners that we say they don't wave for this problem); since we have a Gezeiras Hakasuv to do it this way, which we don't have by partners. Tosfos explains; it doesn't mean that the Kohein's hands are touching the owner's hands from below; but his hands are next to the owner's hand below, i.e., further down the utensil.]

264) All Mitzvos that are dependent on land is only applicable in Eretz Yisrael. (However, if they are not dependent on land, it's applicable both in Eretz Yisrael and Chutz L'aretz). The exceptions are Arlah and Klayim [Tosfos brings the Yerushalmi that says also Chalah, but it wasn't listed since it's not applicable by a non-Jew's produce. This implies that a non-Jew’s produce is applicable to Arlah and Klayim. That, which we're accustomed to eat grapes of non-Jews even though most of they're vines are run into the ground, it's because it never gets cut off from its parent vine. However, you're not obligated in Trumah and Maasar in Chutz L'aretz except for lands that are close to Eretz Yisrael. (They enacted Challah to be obligated in all Chutz L'aretz since it's more similar to something that's not dependent on the land since it's dependent on dough). Alternatively, the Yerushalmi says that they canceled Trumah and Maasar in Chutz L'aretz. Tosfos says: perhaps, since the land is obligated to the king's taxes, it's not considered the Jew’s, and that’s what makes the land not obligated in Trumah and Maasar. However, that won't help in Eretz Yisrael since non-Jew's can't have an acquisition in Eretz Yisrael to exempt it from Trumah and Maasar.] R' Elazar says that you're also obligated in Chadosh. [Tosfos says: therefore, if you know that the barley took root after the sixteenth of Nissan, it's forbidden, but, if you're not sure, we rely that most of them take root before. According to the Yerushalmi who says that Challah is not listed since it's not applicable to non-Jew's produce, since Chadosh is mentioned, it's applicable even by a non-Jew's grains.]

265) The Tanna Kama argues with R' Elazar since he learns "your dwellings" not to mean wherever you live, but rather that it's only obligated after the years of conquering and settling Eretz Yisrael. He holds like R' Yishmael who Darshens a similar word regarding libations [Tosfos: of a personal Korban] that it's only applicable after the years of conquering and settling of Eretz Yisrael, so it wasn't brought in Gilgal. (He couldn't learn that you may bring it on all private alters in Eretz Yisrael, since he Darshens that "I'll give you a place," implying for all of you. Therefore, he Darshens all the places in the Torah that says "your dwellings" for after the years of conquering and settling of Eretz Yisrael.[Tosfos says: however, R' Akiva, who argues with R' Yishmael doesn't Darshen that "I'll give you a place," implying for all of you, so "your dwelling" can be any place that you live, so he holds that you bring libation on private alters.]

266) According to the opinion that Chadosh was applicable before the years of conquering and settling Eretz Yisrael, it makes sense why the Jews who entered Eretz Yisrael didn't eat the grain (even for Matzah) until the sixteenth of Nissan. [Tosfos quotes the Yerushalmi the reason they didn't eat a Kazayis of Matzah Pesach night and have the Asei of Matzah eating supersede the Lav of Chadosh, since an Asei that was given before Matan Torah doesn’t supersede a Lav given at Matan Torah. Alternatively, they decreed not to eat one Kazayis since you might come to eat a second Kazayis.]

267) R' Shimon b. Yachai holds that three Mitzvos were commanded after they entered the land and are also applicable in Chutz L'aretz: Chadosh, and of course, Arlah and Klayim. R' Elazar b. R' Shimon says that the only Mitzvah that was commanded after they entered the land but is also applicable in Chutz L'aretz is "Shmita of money." After all, it's obligated in all places, but it's not applicable anymore when "Shmita of land" is no longer applicable [Rashi explains: i.e., while they're still in the desert, or after they were exiled. R' Tam explains "Shmita of land" is Yovel, where the land reverts back to their original owners, and "Shmita of money" refers to regular Shmita, and is called that because loans are canceled then. Therefore, since Yovel is not applicable these days, since most Jews aren't in Eretz Yisrael, so too, regular Shmita is not obligated (from the Torah).]

268) We have a Mishna that says that, in Chutz L'aretz; Arlah is a Halacha, and Klayim is rabbinical. Shmuel defines 'Halacha' as the laws accustomed in the country (i.e., rabbinical). R' Yochanan says that it's a Halacha L'Moshe Misinai (which is from the Torah). Although Safeik Arlah is permitted there, it's because the Halacha was said that a Safeik is permitted, and only definite Arlah is forbidden.

269) According to R' Yochanan who says that it's a Halacha L'Moshe Misinai; Safeik Arlah in Eretz Yisrael is forbidden, in Surya, it’s permitted, and in Chutz L'aretz, the owner of the field can go down to gather it for you, and it's permitted as long as you didn't see him gather it. [Tosfos says: it's only permitted by a non-Jewish owner, but it's forbidden for a Jewish owner to have pleasure from it if it's from the Torah.] However, Klayim which is only rabbinical, he could see the gathering, as long as he didn't pick it himself (since they only decreed to forbid to plant and gather it). According to Shmuel who says that both Arlah and Klayim are rabbinical, we must say that they have the same Halacha, and either you can't see him gather by both, or you can see him gather by both. Mar b. Raveina taught it leniently, that you can watch the gathering by both.

270) Therefore, there were Amorayim who exchange their Arlah fruits with their friends, since they're Safeik Arlah to their friends.

271) However, it's only Klai Kerem is rabbinically forbidden in Chutz L'aretz, but grafting is forbidden from the Torah since it has a Hekish to mating different species of animals, which is forbidden from the Torah in Chutz L'aretz.

272) [Tosfos says: the Halacha is like R' Yashia that you don't transgress Klai Kerem unless you plant two grains with a grape seed in one hole. However, R' Yashia agrees that you transgress Klai Zerayim when you plant two grains together even without a third grain.]

273) They only enacted to forbid Klai Kerem in Chutz L'aretz, since it's forbidden to have pleasure from it in Eretz Yisrael, but not Klai Zerayim since it's permitted to have pleasure from it in Eretz Yisrael.

274) [Tosfos quotes R' Shmuel from Avira that it's better not to plant Zerayim within three Tefachim from a tree since it looks like you're grafting it to the tree.]

274) Anyone who does one Mitzvah (that pushes you over to have mostly Mitzvos), they do good to him and lengthen his days and he inherits the land, but if he doesn't, it's the opposite. Although we say that there are certain Mitzvos that you eat their fruit in this world, but the principle for them remain in the next (like honoring parents); that's only if you have even Mitzvos and Aveiros, those Mitzvos push you over the top. However, regularly, you need mostly Mitzvos. [Tosfos says: although we say that the Pasuk says “much kindness,” i.e., Hashem tips the scale towards kindness when he has half Mitzvos; but he still has the status of an intermediate person, but these Mitzvos make him into a Tzadik.] However, Chilul Hashem pushes you to the bad side.

275) We have contradicting Braisos whether they do good for Tzadikim, and bad to the Reshayim, or the opposite [Tosfos explains the first answer: that usually Tzadikim have good days, and the Reshayim bad days, but sometimes it's the opposite so that the Tzadik gets his punishment for his sins in this world, and the Rasha gets his payment for his Mitzvos in this world. This is not like R' Yaakov who holds that there is reward in this world, and not like Rashi explains it that it's like R' Yaakov, so the Tzadik doesn't have it good in this world.] Alternatively, they argue whether to hold like R' Yaakov, that there's no reward in this world, or to argue with him and there is reward in this world.

276) Good intentions (that you were an Onness not to bring it to fruition), Hashem considers it as if you did it, but not by bad intentions.[Tosfos says: by non-Jews, it's the opposite, that bad intentions are considered as if he did it, but not good intentions.]

277) If one can't overcome his evil inclination, he should go to a place that doesn't recognize him and wear black and then do what he desires. [Tosfos quotes R' Chananel who explains that he still can't sin, but by these actions, it will help him overcome his evil inclination.]

278) A person, and the world, follow most of its deeds. Thus always view yourself and the world as if they're fifty/fifty, and one Mitzvah pushes them over to mostly Miztvos and to good, and one Aveira will tip it the other way.

279) This is only if you didn't regret doing your earlier Mitzvos, but if you regret them completely, then you lose them.

280) Learning Torah is greater than good deeds, since they lead to having the good deeds.

281) Anyone who learns Psukim and Mishna and in Derech Eretz won't sin so fast. However, if one doesn't have them, he's not civilized and is Pasul to be a witness.

282) Someone who eats in the marketplace is similar to a dog, and some say he's Pasul to be a witness, and that's the Halacha. [Rashi explains: since he doesn't care about his dignity, he's Pasul. Tosfos quotes the Yerushalmi that implies that only a Talmid Chachum doesn't eat there, but others may. Therefore, R' Chananel explains: he grabs produce in the market and eats it, and he's not Pasul simply for being a robber, since it's less than a Prutah's worth. Alternatively, he grabbed something that the owner doesn't care that much about. R' Eliyahu says: he asks for samples from the merchants, but doesn't plan on purchasing. R' Tam explains: our Gemara refers to eating bread, which is even less dignified (but the Yerushalmi refers to small snacking in the street).]