1) The rabbis used the term Kiddushin since the woman is forbidden to all other people like Hekdesh [Tosfos explains the marriage expression of “you are Mekudeshes to me” according to the above definition of the term Kiddushin. (After all, the expression of “to me” doesn’t fit into being forbidden to others.) He explains: she is forbidden to others for my sake, which is similar to the expression “what my hands make is Mikudesh to heaven,” meaning that it’s forbidden to all for heaven’s sake. A more simple explanation to “you are Mikudeshes to me,” that Mikudesh means “set aside or prepared” for me. (Although this definition literally may apply also to other purchases), yet it wouldn’t work to buy a Talis with “this Talis should be Mikudeshes to me” because “Mikudeshes” connotes an exclusive right to what he buys. This would only apply to a woman where you can’t share her with anyone, but not to a loaf of bread or a Talis where you may share it with others.]

2) There are seven ways a Zav checks himself to see if something caused the Ziva. However, only a man needs to check himself if something caused the Ziva, because then he’ll be Tahor. However, a Zava is Tamai regardless how the Ziva comes.

3) The Esrog tree is similar to all other trees in three ways; regarding Arlah, Revai and Shmita, that the fruit has the status of the year it takes form. [Tosfos says: even to those who hold that Revai only applies to vines agrees that Tanaim argue whether Revai only applies to vines or also to all other trees. Alternatively, even those that hold that Revai only applies to vines, that's only according to Torah law, but they agree that the rabbis decreed Revai on other trees too. The practical difference between the two answers: whether there is Revai in Chutz L’aretz. As, if there is an argument whether there is Revai all together by other trees, then the rule is that we follow the more lenient opinion in Chutz L’aretz. However, if all agree that Revai applies to all trees, albeit rabbinically, then we must keep it in Chutz L’Aretz.

Rashi says that Esrog is similar to other trees by Shmita that it follows the year it formed and not when you harvest it like vegetables. Tosfos argues and says that to say vegetables follow the year they’re harvest by Shvious is not accurate since we see this in the contradiction between the two Mishnayos whether we permit all vegetable growths on Shmita besides the cabbage, or the opposite, that the only vegetable that we permit is the cabbage. So R’ Nissim reconciles that the Mishna that says it's a problem only by cabbage refers to those that started growing in the sixth year and finished in the seventh where usually vegetables mostly grow during the first year, so they have the Halacha of sixth-year produce, but cabbage grows many stalks near each other, and some may have grown their leaves on Shvious, therefore they have the prohibition of a Shvious produce. However, the Mishna that allows only cabbage refers to those that begin to grow on the seventh year and finishes in the eighth. It holds like R’ Akiva that vegetables and grain that grow by themselves on Shvious are completely Assur, therefore other vegetables are Assur, even if mostly grown during the eighth year, since you may confuse them with what grew mostly in the seventh year. Therefore, you must wait until you harvest the eighth-year crop to eat them. However, cabbage that grows fast, we don’t have to worry, since the main part of the cabbage is prohibited since it grew on Shvious, and the stalks that grow afterwards are recognizable that they grew in the eighth year. So, we see that we don’t follow the year that you harvest the vegetables, but rather when they mostly grew.] The Esrog is similar to vegetables in one way that the year follows when you harvest it by Maasar. Since it’s the way of an Esrog to grow on irrigation (along with rain water) like vegetables. [Tosfos explains: since the examples the Torah gave for Maasar are grains and grapes, so we say only those produce that are similar to them (that rely solely on rain water) has the same Halacha as them and follow the first year, but not vegetables that are dissimilar since they need also irrigation, their Halacha is to follow the second year, (which you harvest them). Although Maasar on vegetables is only rabbinic, and they can't have a Drasha to say how to take off Maasar; Rashi answers: it’s not a real Drasha, but just an Asmachta. Ri answers: we can say it’s a real Drasha, but since we don’t need it for Maasar where the Torah wrote this Pasuk, we apply it to Shmita. Although an Esrog, which needs irrigation, follow the first year (when it forms) like all fruits by Shmita; they made a stringency to follow both years. So, although they follow the second year when you harvest them on Shmita, like the Drasha, they were stringent to Assur it if it formed on Shmita too, so it shouldn’t be different than other trees. Alternatively, logically, we should say that the Torah did not differentiate the Halacha of Esrog from other trees, just like it didn’t differentiate between them by Arlah and Revai. Therefore we can assume that the Torah only meant the Drasha to differentiate between fruits and vegetables. However, by Maasar, since it’s only rabbinic regarding Esrog, so the Rabanan can enact that it follows the year you harvest them since they’re like vegetables. ] R' Eliezer says that an Esrog is similar to trees in all aspects.

5) A Koy, which is questionable if it’s a domestic or wild animal, needs to take on the stringencies of both. Therefore it is similar in a way to a domestic animal (that its fats are forbidden) and similar in a way to a wild animal (you need to cover its blood) and similar in a way to both (that it needs Shechita) and is similar in a way to neither [Rashi- that you may not mate it with either type of animal. Tosfos asks: even if we know which category of animal it is, you can’t mate it on another specie. You can’t mate two types of wild animals, like a gazelle and deer. Tosfos answers: this Mishna holds that a Koy is a mixed specie. Its father was a goat and mother was a deer. Therefore, if we consider that an animal follows only its mother specie, then we can mate it with a deer. However, the Tanna holds that you need to consider also the father’s specie; therefore it would be Assur to either specie, since it’s partially the other specie.]

6) The woman can be acquired as a wife in three ways, by giving her money or a document or by relations, but not Chuppah (since it only makes Nesuin). R’ Huna holds that Chuppah also makes Kiddushin, but not Chalipin (exchange). Since Chalipin works with something worth less than a Pruta, and a woman would never allow herself to be acquired with less than a Pruta. [Rashi explains: since it’s derogatory for women to be Mekadish for less, so this disqualifies Chalipin as a form of Kiddushin even when using a utensil that is worth more than a Pruta. R’ Tam disagrees since, if she purposely accepts it as Kiddushin, she should be Mikudeshes, (and we know that Kiddushin can never take effect in any case less than a Pruta.) Also, if someone cannot be Mikudeshes with what they consider a derogatory amount, then aristocrats (like the daughters of Rabbi Yanai) shouldn’t be Mikudeshes with receiving less then a bowl (which holds three-Kav) full of coins. So, R’ Tam explains: it has nothing to do with what she feels to be derogatory. Rather, since we learn that money makes Kiddushin from the buying of Efron’s field, that they used money, we might assume that you may use other acquisitions that are like money, like Chalipin. However, the Gemara concludes that, since you can do Chalipin with a utensil worth less than a Pruta, and we define money as something more than a Pruta, proves that Chalipin is not just a different form of acquiring through money, but an entirely different type of Kinyan.]

7) [Tosfos continues: Chalipin takes effect by non-Jews. Although the Gemara in Bechoros that says that a non-Jew has only one type of Kinyan (just as a Jew has a different type of Kinyan, so a non-Jew has different Kinyanim than a Jew); it means that each one has a different new type of Kinyan that’s not by the other by some other Kinyanim besides Chalipin, since Chalipin applies to both. It must only refer to Jews exclusively acquire with pulling and non-Jews exclusively acquire with money, or vise versa. Therefore, R’ Tam held that he can give his loans over to a non-Jew to collect them and used Chalipin to seal that transaction. However, he needs to be careful not to write in the document that someone else made the Kinyan representing the non-Jew, since the Torah doesn’t let a non-Jew have a Shliach (an agent) but needs to do his own Kinyanim. So one must write that the non-Jew himself made the Kinyan.]

8) She acquires herself back by receiving a Get or by the husband dying, but not Chalitza; since the Pasuk says that a Get cuts her off, which connotes only a Get and nothing else.

9) A father can make his daughter Mikudeshes with money, documents or relations; [Tosfos quotes the Yerushalmi that explains: he can receive payment from the groom for the permission to do Kiddushin through relations.]

10) A Jewish Amah leaves her master when she becomes a Naarah or Bogeres (when she's an Iylanus that goes straight from being a Ketana to being a Bogeres, or else you won't have someone go out by Bagrus since she already went out by Naaros). We don't say that you can only sell those girls that will eventually reach Naaros, but not those that can’t. [Tosfos says: although you sell her when she’s a Ketana, and we won't know that she would be one of those that won’t produce the Simanai Naarah at least until she turns twenty and still doesn’t have the Simanim; but this is practical when she gets older and we can tell she’s an Iylanus, that we shouldn't consider the sale retroactively not valid, and the father would need to return the money he received for her sale and the master must return the wages she should have received for her work, and if the master took her for a wife (through Yiyud) we’ll say she’s retroactively not married.]

11) A Kohain’s daughter that married a Yisrael and becomes a widow; she may once again eat Trumah, as long as she doesn’t have surviving children from him, and even illegitimate children stop her from eating Trumah. [Tosfos points out: we must refer to an illegitimate grandchild, because an illegitimate child means she had an illegitimate relations, which would anyhow Pasul her from eating Trumah.] Grandchildren have the same status as children.

12) A Get needs to cut the husband off totally from his wife. If the husband makes a condition that the Get is only valid if she’ll never drink wine or return to her father’s house, she’s not divorced. [Tosfos says: even after the father dies, as long as it’s in the hands of his children, we still consider it her father’s house.] However, if the condition is only for thirty days, the Get is valid, since they will eventually get cut off completely.

13) R’ Huna holds that Chuppah also makes Kiddushin from a Kal V’chomer; If money cannot finish off the marriage (and you need Chuppah), yet it makes the initial Kiddushin; of course, Chuppah that finishes off the marriage should also make the initial Kiddushin. [Tosfos says: why don’t we say Dayo (enough). It’s enough to learn it to be as strong as from where you learn it, and just like the Chuppah that finishes the marriage only takes effect after giving money, so too, we should say that Chuppah only takes effect for Kiddushin after one gives money; we must say that he holds like R’ Tarfon that we don’t say Dayo when we won’t have anything to learn from the Kal V’chomer.] You can't ask any questions from any form of Kiddushin, since we learn it from the common denominator of all three types of Kiddushin. Rava objects to R’ Huna. First, our Mishna says that you can only acquire a woman three ways, and not four ways. Second, we only learn the Kal V’chomer from Chuppah after money was given. So, how can we learn what Chuppah can do by itself without any other previous acquisition? However, Abaya answers on behalf of R’ Huna. The reason the Mishna only lists three because they only list acquisitions that we learn straight from the Torah and not from a Kal V’chomer. Also, we can put it all in the Kal V’chomer. If money, even after an original giving of money, doesn’t make Nesuin, yet makes Kiddushin, all the more so Chuppah, which at least makes Nesuin after an original giving of money, should make Kiddushin.

14) [Tosfos says: according to Rava that Chuppah doesn’t make Kiddushin, we can't learn a Kal V’chomer in the opposite direction; if Chuppah finishes off the marriage, though it can’t make Kiddushin, so, of course, money that makes Kiddushin should be able to finish off the marriage in the place of Chuppah; since we would say one would need to give that money after giving money for Kiddushin, just like you have Chuppah after giving money. It’s logical that the second giving of money can’t do more than the original money, since you’re not adding anything that you didn’t do before.]

15) If the man gives the Kiddushin and tells her that through this she’s Mikudeshes (or his betrothed or his wife), she’s Mikudeshis. If she gives the money and says that through this she’s Mikudeshes to him, she’s not Mikudeshes. According to the Gemara's first answer; if he gives the money and she says it’s for Kiddushin, it’s as if she does both the giving and the saying, and she’s not Mikudeshes. Alternatively, the Rabanan are concerned perhaps she is married (and if another man gives her Kiddushin, both would be Safeik married to her, and she would need a Get from both of them to marry someone else.)

16) [Tosfos points out: if she gives the money while he says that it’s for Kiddushin depends if the man is an important person, where we consider his receiving her gift as if she received pleasure and is Mikudeshes.]

17) Shmuel says that if a man says to a woman “you’ll be married” or “be a wife” she’s not Mikudeshes since he didn't say it was to him. As Shmuel holds a vague terminology that infers one way; we can't assume he meant it that way. So, since he didn’t explicitly say that she'll be married to himself, we can't infer that he probably meant to himself like by the case of a person saying, “I shall be” and doesn’t explain what he’ll be, he’s a Nazir, and not to be in a fast; and Shmuel qualifies it that only if a Nazir passes by at the time, and he doesn't assume the probable inference, without a Nazir passing by at the time. [Tosfos explains after all, it’s more probable to mean Nazir than fasting, since “I’ll be” connotes that it will start immediately and, many times, this won’t apply to fasting, since he may have already eaten and cannot start the fast until the next day. However, one may start his Niziros immediately, therefore we must say that it’s more probable to mean a Nazir.

However we say by vows: if someone says “I make an oath from you” that Shmuel personally validates vague terms and can assume it means not to eat from him, and not only not to speak with him. Also, Shmuel agrees that the main part of a Get is writing, “you are permitted to marry all," and you don't need to add like R’ Yehuda “this (Get) is from me.” Tosfos explains: it all depends how strong the implications of the vague term is. In our Gemara, since there are those that give Kiddushin on behalf of a friend, if he doesn’t say “to me,” it’s not such a great indication that he truly meant himself. However, in Nedarim, the Gemara strongly implies that he means not to eat from them even if he doesn’t explicitly say so. Also, when writing the main part of a Get, it’s strongly assumed the husband is giving it, since people do not divorce other people’s wives. However, in Mesechta Nazir, there are two versions of texts that explain Shmuel’s position, and in one version it explains, if a Nazir doesn’t pass, then the words are so vague that it doesn’t mean Nazir more than Taanis. (So, this is no proof to a vague term that implies one way more than the other.)]

18) However, if he says that “he’ll be her husband” it is nothing. As the Pasuk says that the man needs to take a wife, and not take himself to be her husband. Also, by divorce, If a man says to his wife “I’m no longer your husband” she’s not divorced. As the Pasuk says he needs to send away his wife and not send himself away.

19) However, if the man says to a woman “you’ll be my wife” or “you’ll be my Arusa” or “you’ll be acquired by me,” or “you’ll be mine” or “you’ll be in my possession” or “you’ll be connected to me,” she’s Mikudeshes.

20) We have many inquiries: what if he says, “you’ll be singled out to me” or “you’ll be ‘Miyuad’ to me?” (I.e., the term used by a master marrying his Amah.) What if he says, “you’ll be my helper” or “be my ‘opposite’?” (Based on the Pasuk, when Hashem created Chava, He said, “I’ll make a helper opposite to him”) What if he said, “you’ll be my Atzurah?” What if he says, “you’ll be my rib (or side)” or “my closing” or “my underneath?” (These are based on the Pasuk, that to make Chava, Hashem removed the rib and closed the hole underneath where He took it.) What if he said, “you’ll be my grabbing?”

The Gemara qualifies: if out of the blue he pops this question, although they may technically mean Kiddushin, since she has no frame of reference what he’s saying, the woman doesn't realize that he refers to marriage. Rather, they were discussing marriage when he popped the question. Shmuel Paskins like R’ Yossi that no further statement is anyhow necessary, since they’re in the middle of talking about marriage, it’s obvious he’s giving money to marry her, (and not like R’ Yehudah that holds that just speaking about marriage is not good enough, and you’ll need to say explicitly that the money is for Kiddushin), and if he didn’t say anything else and gave the money, she assumes it’s for Kiddushin. However, if he injects one of those statements, and if they don’t mean Kiddushin, she may assume that he’s changing the subject and doesn’t want to marry just yet, and he’s only offering her employment.

21) If he says “you’ll be my taking," she’s Mikudeshes, based on the Pasuk “when a man takes a wife.”

22) If someone says to a woman “you’ll be my ‘Charufa’ ” [Tosfos says: if the Torah by Shifacha Charufa refers to a half freed maid-slave, and she can accept Kiddushin from the Jewish slave (according to the opinion in Gitten that Kiddushin can take effect on the free half of the woman); she's definitely Mekudeshes. However, according to the opinion that the Pasuk refers to a full maid-slave that cannot accept Kiddushin at all (and it only means that she’s designated for him)]; only those who use the term in Judea can Mikadesh with it, because they refer to Charufa as marriage. However, all other locales cannot use that term for Kiddushin.

23) Regarding the argument between R’ Yossi and R’ Yehuda that R’ Yossi held that no further statement is anyhow necessary, since they’re in the middle of talking about marriage, it’s obvious he’s giving money to marry her, and R’ Yehudah holds that just speaking about marriage is not good enough, and you’ll need to say explicitly that the money is for Kiddushin; Shmuel and R’ Oshia qualify R’ Yossi’s opinion that only if they spoke about marriage (the whole time up to the giving). The argument among the Tanaim that Rebbi says that they need to be speaking in that topic, and R’ Elazar B. R’ Shimon disagrees; it only means they broke from the actual subject of marriage, but they were still engaged in speaking about related issues (how much dowry she has, or how much fields he has to support her.)

24) Shmuel’s says: anybody who does not know well the Halachos of Gitten and Kiddushin should not deal with them. The Gemara qualifies: that it includes this Halacha of presenting the money in middle of discussing marriage, that we consider it a good Kiddushin [Tosfos explains: we need to tell judges of this Halacha so they shouldn’t err and we don't say that it happens infrequent enough, that it’s not necessary.]

25) If someone gave a Get to his wife and said “you’re now a free woman,” she’s not divorced. If you said to a maid-slave “you’re permitted to (marry) everyone,” she’s not freed.

26) If he says to his wife “you are now to yourself,” he’s divorcing her. After all, if it works by freeing a slave writing “you’ll be a free person” or “you shall be to yourself” whom you completely own his essence, of course it should release a wife, which you don’t own her essence. [Tosfos points out: although we said before that “you’re now a free woman” doesn’t take effect by divorce although it takes effect by freeing a slave and we don’t make this Kal V’chomer, if it takes effect to free a slave, of course it should take effect by divorce; since we only make the Kal V’chomer by terms that apply to both divorce and freeing. However, the term “you’re now a free woman” doesn’t apply to divorce, so the fact that it works by freeing a slave is inconsequential.]

27) If someone writes to his slave “I don’t have any business with you,” he means completely to free him, and not only that the slave may work for himself.

28) If you sell a slave to a non-Jew, (after we require him to buy the slave back) you must free him. R’ Shimon b. Gamliel qualifies he's already freed if you written him a freedom document before you sold him that will take effect immediately after his escape (release) from the non-Jew. [Tosfos points out that it shouldn’t read, “it should take effect retroactively when you sold him” since you would create a more difficult situation for him since it'll be now obligate him to keep more Mitzvos, which would be difficult while under his non-Jewish master.]

29) If someone is Mikadesh a woman with her loan (the money he lent her) she’s not Mikudeshes. However, if he Mikadesh her with the “pleasure of a loan,” i.e., for extending the time to pay back the loan, she’s Mikudeshes. However, it’s forbidden to do so because it’s a trick way to pay interest. (Though it’s technically not interest, the Rabanan forbade it.) [Rashi explains: since she would have to pay at least a Pruta to hire someone influential to convince him to extend the loan’s time, so it’s as if he gave her that Pruta, so he’s Mikadesh her with that Pruta. However, it’s not the Torah’s prohibition of interest, which you make up to pay more. However, Tosfos disagrees since we consider it as if he received an extra Pruta for extending the time of the loan, it is complete Ribbis.

Rather R’ Tam explains: we refer to a woman who borrowed from Ruvein. Shimon gave a Pruta to Ruvein to extend the loan and Mikadesh the woman with this service. Although we learned that a third-party may give four Zuz to the creditor to convince him to give a loan to the borrower since the Torah only forbade extra money given from the borrower to the creditor, but not from a third-party; that's only when the third-party doesn’t get paid from the borrower. However, in our case, where the woman is paying him (by giving herself over to marriage), it looks as the third-party is no more than the borrower’s messenger to give over the money to the creditor.]

30) Rava says: if someone gives something on condition the recipient returns it to him, we consider it as a gift. Therefore someone can give his Esrog as a gift on condition he returns it to him afterwards. So, he was Yoitza if he returns it, but not if he didn't return it. [Tosfos says: although we Paskin that you need to stipulate explicitly the flip side of the condition (T’nai Kaful), and he did not say what happens if he doesn’t return it; we must say that you don’t need to stipulate the flip side if the condition is obvious, like here, where we all know that the gift was only given for him to make a Bracha over the Esrog and be Yoitza the Mitzvah. As we see that if someone sells his property to move to Eretz Yisrael, if he never made it to Eretz Yisrael, R’ Huna says he cannot go back on the deal since he didn’t mention anything, it’s only a condition that he held privately in his heart, which is not a valid condition. This implies if he did mention that it’s for relocating to Eretz Yisrael, it’s a good condition despite not stipulating the flip side. Similarly, if a dying man said, I though my wife was pregnant and I would have a child to pass on my possessions, but, now that it’s not true, I give my estate to Ploni. If it’s eventually revealed that his wife was indeed pregnant, then the above giving is invalid, since he showed that he only gave this gift on condition that his wife wasn’t pregnant despite that he didn’t compose it legally with the flip side. So, obvious conditions don’t need a true legal condition.

Tosfos says: although our condition is with the same object that they made the transaction with, i.e., the Esrog, and the Gemara says that all conditions cannot be involved with the same object that you do the transaction with; the Gemara’s conclusion may disagree with this. Alternatively, we only say that when the condition is a contradiction to the original action. For example, there he gave a Get on condition that she’ll return the paper after she receives it according to the opinion that, when someone does something under a condition, the transaction is not valid until he fulfills the condition. If so, the Get cannot take effect until after she returns the paper, and at that point, she no longer has the Get and it cannot take effect. However, our Gemara holds the transaction takes effect right away. Therefore, though he returned the Esrog, we considered he owned it throughout the time he had it in his hand, and the fact he returned it is not a contradiction to the gift.]

31) Therefore, if someone gives money on condition the recipient returns it to him, we consider it as a money acquisition regarding a sale, or Pidyon Haben, and giving Trumah to a Kohain, although one shouldn’t do it since the Kohein agrees to do this so he can receive the giver’s other Trumah, it’s the same as a Kohain who needs to work to receive his share of Trumah, which is forbidden.

32) However the exception is Kiddushin, since one cannot Mikadesh a woman through Chalipin (an exchange). [Tosfos explains: although giving money on condition to return is not Chalipin, and even by Chalipin, if the one who received the utensil doesn’t want to give it back, he doesn’t need to; but, since it’s general practice to return the utensil of Chalipin, it’s similar to Chalipin, so the Rabanan enacted that it shouldn’t be a valid Kiddushin perhaps you’ll Mikadesh with Chalipin and assume it’s also valid.]

33) If a woman says: give money to Ploni and with that I’ll be Mikudeshes to you, she’s Mikudeshes. Although she receives nothing for herself, however, we see a precedent to this from the Halachos of a cosigner who does not receive any personal benefit, he can create an obligation for himself when someone else receives the money.

34) If a woman can tell a man “give me money, and by that I’ll be Mikudeshes to Ploni,” although Ploni never paid anything for his wife, yet we see a precedent to this from the Halachos of a non-Jewish slave where a third-party could free someone else’s slave when he pays his worth to redeem him.

35) Even in the case that the woman said to a man: give money to Ploni and through that I’ll be Mikudeshes to Ploni, she’s Mikudeshes to Ploni. This we learn from a combination of a cosigner and a slave.

36) The same way it works by Kiddushin, it's considered as giving money for a sale too.

37) A woman can give the man money and be Mikudeshes if he's an important person (that usually does not accept gifts from people). Therefore, by the pleasure she receives by his recognition to her by accepting her gift, she becomes Mikudeshes.

38) If a man says to a woman “be Mikudeshes to half of me,” it’s a valid Kiddushin. However, if he says “half of you should be Mikudeshes to me,” it’s not a valid Kiddushin because the Torah says a man takes a woman, which connotes the full woman and not a half of a woman. Although the Torah says a man should take the woman, but not a half of man; but since he can marry two wives, when he says, “I want half of me married,” he only means to inform her that he may take a second wife. However, a woman cannot marry two men, therefore there is no other way to define what he said except that he only wants to Mikadesh half of her.

39) We don't say, although he only wants to Mikadesh half of her, the Kiddushin spreads over the whole body and therefore Mikadesh the whole woman the same way we see this by someone who’s Mikadesh the foot of an animal, the Kedusha spreads through the whole animal and the whole animal is Kodesh. Even those who disagree only do so where you made Kodesh a limb that is not necessary for the animal to live, but, if you made Kodesh a limb that the animal cannot live without, then all agree that the Kedusha spreads throughout the whole animal. [Tosfos says: although, by Hekdesh there is a special Drasha that it spreads and, there is no such Drasha for Kiddushin; for this reason, Rashi was exact in his explanation that the man said explicitly he’s Mikudish to her, which means that she’s now forbidden to all others like Hekdesh. Since he uses the term of Hekdesh, we assume he meant it to take effect the same way as Hekdesh, i.e. that it spreads. However, any alternative term to connote marriage, like Eirusin, the Kiddushin would not spread through the whole woman.] After all, over there, it all depends on what his master implemented, but a woman is her own master and since she only consented to Kiddushin on half of her, that is the most that you can Mikadesh her. It's compared to Hekdesh of a partnership in an animal, and one partner Makdish his share. Even if he bought out his partner and Mekadish the rest, R' Yochanan says he may not bring it for a Korbon. If someone tries to exchange it on another animal (of course the Kedusha does not come off the original animal), the second animal is also Kodesh, but like the first one, he cannot bring it as a Korbon.

40) We learn three things from R’ Yochanan. (Logic dictates that the closer it is to being a Korbon and at that point and it’s still not fit for a Korbon, the more we say that you could no longer bring it as a Korbon, even after it becomes fit.) We say that once the Korbon is not fit you can never use it even by a live animal (that it doesn’t need to be in middle of sacrificing it), or by an animal that was never fit completely in the first place (like our case where, when he originally sanctified half of it, one couldn’t bring it), or by those animals that you only sanctified it for its money, (like our case, since we said it was not originally fit to bring on the Mizbeach, so he only designated it to sell and use its money to buy a Korbon.) So R’ Yochanan teaches us, that despite all these cases are very removed from a fit Korbon, once it started to have Kedusha and is unfit, you can never bring it as a Korbon. [Tosfos says: the reason we separate the last two into separate categories, although anything that original Kedusha wasn’t fit to be a Korbon is, by definition, only Kodesh to sell in order to use the money to buy a proper Korbon; if someone started worshiping Avodah Zara, if he separates a Korbon, it’s unusable even after he does T’shuva (because the sacrifices of wicked people are abominable), so it can never become fit again. So it’s a separation for a Kosher Korbon (since it’s only a technical reason it’s not Kosher, since the owner is not worthy of bringing it), but since it's unfit from its conception, it’s always unfit. On the flip side, we also find a case of being only Kodesh for the money, although it was fit to use right away by designating a female Korbon Pesach, which only has Kedusha for money to buy a Korbon Pesach, since a Korbon Pesach can only be male, and then it gives birth to a male. So, the male is perfect for the Korbon, so he was never originally unfit for the Korbon but since he comes from the Kedusha of his mother, which is only for its worth, you can never bring it for a Korbon.]

41) There are inquiries: if a man says to a woman “half of you is Mikudeshes to me with a half of Pruta and the other half with the other half of Pruta” is she Mikudeshes? Do we say, since he originally said “half of you” it's the end of that deal, so he made a half of Kiddushin, which is nothing. Or do we say that he was continuing with the second half, and it’s one big Kiddushin on the whole woman. Assuming that the answer for the first inquiry is that he’s just continuing and it’s one big Kiddushin, let’s say if he was Mikudeshes each half with a full Pruta. Since each half of Kiddushin has a full Pruta for it, we can consider it more that each half is the end of its deal, or do we say that, since we consider all acquisitions in the same day as one big acquisition, it's one big Kiddushin on the whole woman. [Tosfos says: although the only reason that if you say Kiddushin on half a woman doesn’t spread to the whole woman is because you need the woman’s consent to spread to the other half and here, she consents to Mikadeish her whole self, so the first part of the Kiddushin should spread through the whole woman; that's only true if he used the term Kiddushin (as we explained that it should work the same way as Hekdesh); but our Gemara’s inquiry refers to a case where he uses the term Eirusin or any other term of marriage besides Kiddushin.] Assuming that anything that he proposed in one day, we consider it as one Kiddushin; what would be in the case that he said half of you today and half tomorrow? [Tosfos points out that he said this at one time, and did not say “half of you” today and then added “half of you” on the second day.] Since the acquisition takes place over two days, we cannot consider it as one big Kiddushin, or, do we say that he meant to start the Kiddushin today and to stretch the acquisition out until it finishes tomorrow. Also, we inquire; what happens if he says “your two halves for a Pruta?” Do we say that he definitely means to make one Kiddushin, or do we say that a woman cannot get married in halves under any circumstance. The Gemara leaves these as unsolved inquiries.

42) Rava inquires: if one man has two sons and the other man has two daughters and the first one says, “I’ll be Mikadesh my two sons to your two daughters with one Pruta.” Do we say, since it’s money regarding the fathers (who are the ones that give and receive the money) it’s a valid Kiddushin, or do we focus on the daughters and each one receives a half Pruta for their individual Kiddushin, you don’t have money (we don’t consider less than a Pruta as money), therefore the Kiddushin is not valid. We leave the inquiry unanswered. [Tosfos explains: we refer to when the daughters are still minors where their father keeps the money, so, if he winds up with a Pruta, he received money for Kiddushin. However, if the daughters are adults that appointed him as their agents, of course the Kiddushin is not valid. After all, since the daughters can’t have Kiddushin by receiving a half Pruta each, their agent cannot do more than they can do themselves. However, the boys’ father cannot marry off his sons without them making him their agent, so inquiry was that, perhaps we only follow who receives the money, which is the girls’ father, and as long as he received money, the Kiddushins are valid, and not regarding the giver. Also, the case must be that they explicitly spoke out which son was marrying which daughter or else it won’t be a valid Kiddushin. Since we wouldn’t know who married who, they cannot have any relations among them (perhaps he would have relations with his brother’s wife and Rava’s opinion is that, if one’s Mikadiesh a woman in a way that he cannot have relations with her, it is not a valid Kiddushin.)]

43) R’ Pappa inquires: what happens if he said a Pruta for your daughter and your cow. Does he mean that a half Pruta for each, and it’s not a valid Kiddushin, or perhaps, he means the Pruta for the daughter and he throws in the cow, which he’ll acquire via pulling. R’ Ashi inquires: what if he said a Pruta for your daughter and land. Do we say that he means a half Pruta for each and the Kiddushin is not valid; or perhaps, the Pruta is for the wife, and he throws in the land, which he’ll acquire via Chazaka. They don’t resolve these questions. [Tosfos explains: first we inquire by a cow, since you can’t acquire it at all with money (since the acquisition is only through pulling) where we’re more apt to say that the money was solely given for Kiddushin. Then the Gemara inquires about land that one can acquire through money.]

44) If someone was Mikadesh a woman with a silk cloth; Rabbah says she’s Mikudeshes even without assessing its worth and R’ Yosef says she’s only Mikudeshes if they assessed it (before Kiddushin). The first version explains: if he explicitly states that he’s Mikadesh her no matter how much it’s worth, since we know it’s more than a Pruta, all hold she’s Mikudeshes without an assessment, and if he said it’s worth fifty and it wasn’t, all agree she’s not Mikudeshes, since it’s not the amount he promised. They argue in a case where he said it’s worth fifty, and it’s truly worth that amount. Rabbah says therefore she’s Mikudeshes, but, R’ Yosef holds, since she’s not convinced without an assessment that it’s truly worth that much, she doesn’t rely on it and doesn’t accept the Kiddushin with confidence that it’s a valid Kiddushin. Therefore, she doesn’t truly believe that she’s really Mikadesh herself; therefore it’s not a valid Kiddushin. The second version says they also argue in the case when he says he’s Mikadesh no matter how much it’s worth. R’ Yosef holds she’s not Mikadeshes until you know the worth. Since he’s Mikadesh with the object’s worth, which we consider as money, we need it to have the same characteristics of money, that it has a known worth.

45) R’ Yosef brings a proof from the following; that the Pasuk says a slave may give money to redeem himself, which we Darshin to exclude grain and utensils. We cannot say that we refer to objects that are not worth a Pruta, then even actual money wouldn’t redeem. We must say, even those that are worth a Pruta cannot redeem if we don’t know their worth. However, Rabbah can say that it’s not a proof. Really, we refer to less than a Pruta’s worth, and I might have thought that you may acquire with objects (even though you can’t acquire with money), since someone can get direct pleasure from them, so we learn otherwise.

Then, R’ Yosef brings a proof from the following Braisa. If someone gave a calf or Talis for a Pidyon Haben, he didn’t redeem his son unless he said “this calf or Talis that’s worth five Selayim.” Rabbah held it’s not a proof since we may say that it was not worth five, and I might have thought if the Kohain accepted it for himself as if it was worth five, it can redeem the son like R’ Kahana who accepted a turban for a Pidyan Haben, though it was not worth five. [Tosfos says: although the Gemara in Pesachim implies that R' Kahana was not a Kohain but married a Kohain’s daughter; we must say there were two R’ Kahanas, one was a Kohain and one was not. Alternatively, there was only one R’ Kahana but, he received the Kohain’s gifts on behalf of his wife.] So they taught otherwise, that only R’ Kahana who was a Talmid Chachum who desperately needed a turban to go out in public could accept it for more than the value, but, other people who are not desperate for something cannot accept it for more than its worth. [Tosfos says: this is worse than a gift given on condition to return it since in that case, the Kohain received his full amount, despite the fact that he needs to return it. However, here, since the turban is not worth five, he never received the full money for redemption, so he never fulfilled giving the redemption money to the Kohain.]

46) If a man says to a woman “I’ll Mikadesh you with a Manah (a hundred Dinarim)” and he gave her one Dinar, she’s Mikudeshes and he eventually needs to pay her the rest. Since he only produced one Dinar after promising a Manah, we assume he wants to Mikadish her with a Dinar on the condition he eventually pays the rest which we hold that the transaction takes effect immediately, as long as you eventually fulfill your condition.

47) Although we have a Braisa: if someone says to a woman “I’ll be Mikudeshes to you with a Manah" and he started counting out Dinarim, both can renege on the Kiddushin until he gives the last Dinar; we refer to a case where he said “this Manah” which connotes that you only want to Mekadesh her with the whole Manah.

48) R’ Ashi answers: even if the first part refers to a regular Manah, since the Braisa writes that he’s continuously counting, it’s obvious that he intends to give the whole Manah, so he hasn’t finished the Kiddushin until the final Dinar.

49) In a case where you need to give the whole Manah; if it's missing or he gave a copper Dinar, it’s not a valid Kiddushin. We don't say that she saw that it was copper and accepted it anyhow since we refer to a case where she received it at night or mixed up with the other coins, so it wasn’t obvious to her that it was copper. [Tosfos says: even if she doesn't renege from the Kiddushin, since she's not confident for getting the last amount.] However, if it's a case where it’s not widely accepted, but you can eventually find people who still accept it; she's Mikudeshes, but he needs to exchange it for a better coin.

50) If someone told a woman that he’ll Mikadesh her with a Manah and gave her a collateral, but no money for her to keep, she’s not Mikudeshes. Since he didn’t give her the money yet, he didn’t give her anything, and the collateral (which is not hers) is inconsequential. [Tosfos explains: We cannot consider collateral as money, since it will not remain by her. (Of course if you stipulated that she may keep the collateral, she’s Mikudeshes.)] Similarly, if someone wants to give a friend a present, and gives him a collateral on it, he doesn’t acquire the present through taking the collateral. [Tosfos says: although we see in Bava Metzia that if someone hires workers for harvesting flax or any other work that, if not completed on time, would lead to a loss, and, they quit on him in the middle, if the owner can't find suitable replacements with the same pay, he may either hire more expensive workers on the original workers expense, or trick them to return to work if they left a collateral (that you may hire as much as its worth) i.e., their tools that they deposited by the field’s owner; and here we say that depositing collateral is not like you gave anything to the person; over there is different since the workers cause him a loss. Alternatively, we must say that we refer to a case where they stipulated explicitly that they gave it over to collect from if they renege. Therefore, in a case of an engagement, that the two families make a condition to fine the party that breaks the engagement, they must do more than give a collateral for it but they must stipulate that the other side actually acquires a certain amount of the given object. However, this rule of the collateral not being binding may not apply by an engagement, since breaking an engagement is damaging by causing undue embarrassment to the other family.]

51) However, you can Mikadesh a woman with a collateral that you received from someone who borrowed money from you since you become somewhat of that collateral’s owner. As we see R’ Yitzchok says that a creditor owns the collateral he receives. [Tosfos points out: although R’ Yitzchok refers to a collateral given not at the time of the loan; but once we see that the Torah considers a collateral given after the loan as completely acquired by him until the owner redeems it (by paying off the loan), so, even if the borrower gives it at the time of the loan, although it’s not a complete acquisition, we should consider it as if he owns it enough to make other acquisitions with, like to Mikadesh a wife, and Shmita doesn’t annul loans on such a collateral.

Rashi in other places says: he acquires it so much, that he takes the place of the owner for the responsibility. Therefore, it’s his loss if it gets ruined, even through an Onness (an accident beyond his ability to save it). However, Tosfos says this cannot be since the Gemara in Bava Metzia says that we consider him like a paid or unpaid watchman. Rather, he only acquires the collateral enough to obligate him to pay if it’s stolen or lost (like a paid watchman).]

52) If someone says to a woman “I will be Mikadesh you with a Manah,” of course if she takes it and threw it back at him there is no Kiddushin, but even if she takes the money and immediately throws it into the sea she’s not Mikudeshes since, by doing so, she shows that she has no interest to receive Kiddushin from him, and we don't say that, if she destroys it, which would obligate her to pay back the money and be a loss to her, she really accepts it for Kiddushin so she wouldn’t need to pay it back and only threw it away to test her new husband if he has a temper.

53) If someone offers a woman Kiddushin, and she says to give it to another, she shows she doesn’t want the Kiddushin, so she’s not Mikudeshes. [Rashi and Tosfos say: although, in an earlier Gemara, we say that if a woman says that she wants her Kiddushin money to go to a different person, she’s Mikudeshes; that's only over there, where she initiated the Kiddushin and said she would accept the Kiddushin by another person’s reception, so we assume that she means it sincerely. However, our case is that he proposes to her, her response is to give it to another is assumed to be said sarcastically, and she really doesn’t want the Kiddushin.] However, if she says to give it to them to accept it on my behalf, she’s Mikudeshes.

54) If someone tells a woman “be Mikudeshes to me with a Manah;” and she says to place it on a rock, she’s not Mikudeshes. If it’s her rock, she’s Mikudeshes. We have a Shaila if the rock belongs to both of them, is she Mikudeshes or not. [Rashi says: the reason she’s Mikudeshes if it’s her rock is because she acquires the money, since it’s as if she acquired the money in her courtyard. Tosfos asks: if so, why would we inquire if the rock belongs to both of them? As the Gemara in Bava Basra says that partners in a courtyard cannot acquire objects from each other by having them placed in the joint courtyard unless the seller places the objects in the buyer’s vessel that is in the joint courtyard. Rather, Tosfos answers: it has nothing to do with the acquisition, but when she says to put it on a rock, she’s not confident that she’ll receive it, so we assume she didn’t really agree to the marriage. If she says to put it on her rock, then she is confident that she’ll receive it, so we consider it a full agreement to the marriage. The question is how she feels about a rock that belongs to both of them. (R’ Simcha of Dessau (from the back of the Gemara) explains Tosfos like the Rosh. We refer to a case where he afterwards placed the money in her lap, so she made a proper acquisition. However, we examine her words of placing on a rock to figure out if she wanted the Kiddushin or rejected it.)

55) If a man tells a woman to be Mikudeshes to him with this loaf of bread and she responds to give it to a dog, she’s not Mikudeshes. If it’s her dog, she’s Mikudeshes. The Gemara has an unresolved inquiry: is she Mikudeshes if the dog’s pursuing her? On one hand, she would agree to marry him to be saved from the dog’s attack, or, perhaps, the Torah anyhow obligates him to save her, she only tells him to do what he’s obligated to do.

56) If a man tells a woman to be Mikadesh to him with this loaf of bread and she responds to give it to a poor person, she’s not Mikudeshes even if she supports this poor person (and we might assume that she tells him to give it to this poor person on her behalf), since she may only be saying is that, just as I have an obligation to support this poor person, so do you, so give it to him on your own behalf.

57) When a woman asks a man that sells beads to give her enough for one strand to make a necklace. He says “if I give you, would you be Mikudeshes to me?” She responds “Hava Meyhav” (a double Lashon of giving, connoting “just give it to me”), she’s not Mikudeshes. The same holds true if he sells beer and they go through the same routine until she ends up saying “Ashkuyai Mashka” (connoting “just give me to drink.”) Also, the same holds true to someone that’s harvesting by throwing down dates from a tree. If they go through the same routine until she ends up saying “Shaduyai Mishade” (connoting “just throw some down to me”.) The Gemara inquires: if they only say it in a single Lashon (‘give’ or “give me to drink”, or “throw down.” The connotation is not as strong that she rejects the proposition as if she uses a double Lashon.) Ravina says she’s Mikudeshes and R’ Sama says she’s not Mikudeshes, and that’s the Halacha. [Tosfos explains: this is different from what we said before that even if she says give it to someone else, the Kiddushin is valid, and, of course, it should be valid if she says to give it to herself; since she originally approached him to give it to her under a different pretense than Kiddushin. So, when she responds after the proposal to give it to her, she asks for it under her original pretense, not for Kiddushin.]

58) The Gemara also Paskins that one doesn’t need to assess the silk he’s Mikadesh with (like Rabbah and against R’ Yosef). [Tosfos says: although the rule is we always Paskin like Rabbah against R’ Yosef (except in three cases), the Gemara needs to Paskin like Rabbah in our case; as R’ Tam says: they wanted to stress that we only don’t need to assess silk, which we know approximately how much it costs, but not jewels and pearls, which some are of poor quality and are only worth a little and someone may mistake it to be worth a lot more. They need to be assessed before the Kiddushin since she’s not confident that she received a jewel that’s worth as much as she thinks it may. Therefore, our Minhag is not to Mikadesh a woman with a ring with a stone. There are those who explain the reason here we need to Paskin like Rabbah, (and not rely on the regular rule that the Halacha is like him), since R’ Yosef brings many proofs. There are those that explain the reason so not to say we only Paskin like the version where he says explicitly I’ll be Mikadesh you with it no matter how much it costs, but not if he promises it is worth fifty, even if it’s worth fifty (since she’s not confident in that fact), so we Paskin that we don’t need to assess silk in all cases.]

59) The Halacha is also like R’ Eliezer (if someone says he’ll Mikadesh her with a Manah and only gives a Dinar, she’s Mikudeshes as long as he eventually pays off the rest.) Also, the Halacha is like Rava in the name of R’ Nachman (that you cannot Mikadesh a woman without money by giving a collateral.)

60) The way someone is Mikadesh with a document is: you write on paper or pottery “your daughter is Mikudeshes to me.” [Tosfos says: although the Gemara in Kesuvos says one can’t write a document on pottery; that's because one can forge documents written on pottery without detecting the forgery, so it's Pasul according to R’ Meir who says the signing witnesses validate the document, so one needs to write a document on something that people cannot forge. However, R’ Elazar says that those that witnessed the handing over validate the document so we don’t care if someone can forge the document, since we don’t rely on the writing in the document, but on the testimony of those witnesses what was written in it when it was handed over. Although the Gemara in Gitten says that R’ Elazar permits writing on something that one can forge only by Gitten, it doesn’t mean to invalidate regular documents, but, it only comes to exclude a document that you need for proof, since their purpose is to remain around a long time and retrieve it when you need the proof. However, documents for Kiddushin and selling a field that you only need momentarily to create a transaction, they’re similar to Gitten that only needs to exist for the moment he divorces his wife.] This is even if the paper that he wrote it on is not worth a Pruta. [Tosfos points out: but if it would be worth a Pruta, you can Mikadesh the woman with the paper’s worth, even if it wouldn’t be a valid document.]

61) Although by a sale document, the seller writes the document, and over here the husband (who’s buying the wife’s rights to marriage) writes the document; the reason for the discrepancy is because they’re Halachos [Tosfos says: either it is a Halacha L’Moshe Misinai, or to Halachos Medina (laws of the country) i.e., the custom of who gives the document.] The Gemara gives an alternative answer: we learn that the buyer receives the document from the Pasuk that Yirmiya (who bought land) said, “I took the sale document.”

62) You need to write the Kiddushin document L’Shma (with this woman in mind, or even if you wrote it for one woman and changed your mind, you can use the document for another woman), since we have a Hekish between marriage and divorce, just as you need to write divorce documents L’Shma, so too Kiddushin documents, and we don't use the Hekish between the different types of Kiddushin, and just as you don’t need to mint money to Mikadish this woman, so too, you don’t need to write the document L’Shma. (We pick this Hekish over the other, since the whole source that you can make Kiddushin with a document is from this Hekish.)

63) If you wrote it L’Shma but didn’t tell her that you’re writing it, Rava and Ravina say it’s a valid document, from the above Hekish and the woman doesn’t need to be aware of the Get's writing. R’ Pappa and R’ Shravya say it’s not valid since it needs to be like a Get, that the one who gives (i.e., the husband who releases the woman from the marriage) needs to know and consent to the writing, so too Kiddushin, the woman who sells her rights of marriage needs to be aware and consent to the writing.

64) When the groom’s parents say what they’re willing to give for their son and the bride’s parents do the same for their daughter, and they rise and perform the Kiddushin. With that, one side acquires with the other side’s words (of how much they’ll give). This is among the few binding transactions with nothing more than words. However, you cannot write a document to show what each one owes without both families’ consent. [Tosfos says: although the Mishna at the end of Kesuvos writes, if a father made up an amount of money to give to his future son-in-law, and at the day of Nesuin he reneges, the son-in-law may refrain from making Nesuin (indefinitely) until she’s old and her hair turns white, and we don't say he can marry her and then bring his father-in-law to court to collect what he promised, since it’s binding; that when the groom doesn’t want to bother with the whole litigation process, so he has the choice to boycott the Nesuin until he receives what is rightfully coming to him. The Rashbam answers: our Gemara holds that it’s only binding if they make Kiddushin immediately after the meeting of how much to give, and the Gemara in Kesuvos refers to a case where he didn’t do the Kiddushin immediately afterwards, so it’s not binding and he can’t bring him to court over it. R’ Tam answers: that we refer to a case where she marries for the first time, where the father has a special relationship to such a son-in-law, so we say he meant his promise strong enough to make it binding. However, in Kesuvos, we refer to a second marriage. Also, this only applies when the father marries her off and makes the promises, and not if the father’s dead and the mother or brother promises.]

65) If ten people made non-regular relations to a Naarah M’Urasah and she’s still a virgin, the Chachumim say she remains having her virgin status, and all ten get stoned. Rebbi says that only the first one gets stoned, but, she loses her virgin status by this relations, and the rest are strangled. However, Rebbi agrees that, regarding the penalty for having relations with a non-married virgin Naarah, that she still has the status of a virgin (after non-regular relations) unless she did it with a husband (while they were married and gets divorced afterwards), since it's a Gezeiras Hakasuv by a married woman, as the Pasuk says there “and the man dies himself” implies only that first man gets Skila, and no other one after him gets the same punishment.

66) Because of a Gezeiras Hakasuv, Rebbi agrees that a husband that has non-regular relations with her makes her no longer a virgin.

67) According to the Rabanan, the Pasuk “the man dies by himself” teaches us the the Drasha of R’ Yonason. For R’ Yashia says, from the Pasuk “you kill both of them” that only if the man and the woman are equal do you kill him [Rashi- that they are people who can receive punishment, which excludes if an adult male has relations with a minor.] However, R’ Yonason argues and says: he receives punishment regardless of the woman, as it says, “the man dies himself.” [Tosfos asks on Rashi’s explanation of R’ Yashia: since the Mishna in Nidah says explicitly that if someone has relations with a three-year old girl who’s an Ervah gets killed, and it would be difficult to say that the Mishna is not universally held, but it is only like R’ Yonason, and Rashi only explained R’ Yashia’s view. Rather, R’ Tam explains they need to be equal in their punishment, that if the minor was able to receive a punishment, that punishment would be the same as the male’s. However, in this case they’re not the same, at least to R’ Meir who holds only someone has relations with a Naarah get Skila, but if he has relations with a Ketana, he only gets Chenek. Therefore, if the Ketana was a Gadola, she would receive Skila, while the male would receive Chenek, therefore their punishments are not equal, and therefore we would exclude him from getting the death penalty from this Drasha.]

68) Rava says: all who make Kiddushin with relations intends that the end should make the Kiddushin. Therefore, if she stretches out her hand to receive money from someone else in middle of the relations; the Kiddushin of the man who gave money came first. Also, when a Kohain Gadol marrying a virgin, he can't be Mekadesh through relations,since she’s no longer a virgin at that time that Kiddushin takes effect. [Tosfos says: although the Gemara in Yevamos says that someone can Mikadesh a woman with just a small penetration, which we learn from a Gezaira Shava (Kicha Kicha) from Arayos; The Rashba answers: that refers to when the man only does the small penetration and then separates himself. As we see by his action of not finishing the relations that he didn’t intend to Mikadesh with the ending of the relations. However, when he finished the act, we assume he only intends to Mikadesh with the end. This seems the implications of our Gemara that says “anyone who has relations” (implying the complete act), and not “anyone who made a small penetration.” Rivam answers: the Gemara in Yevamos refers to a case where the man explicitly stipulated that he wants the beginning of the relations to make the Kiddushin. However, regularly without any stipulation, we assume that he intends to have the end of the relations make the Kiddushin. R’ Tam answers: once we say a penetration is like a complete act, when we refer to relations, we also refer to the penetration. Our Gemara’s inquiry was if it meant the beginning stage of the penetration or the end stage according to the opinion that defines ‘penetration’ as entering of the whole top of that limb (and not just the smallest penetration); so that there is a beginning and end to the act. R’ Nissim Goan answers: the Gemara in Yevamos refers to after Kiddushin, that the relations would be in place of Chuppah, so the penetration can only do Nesuin and not Kiddushin. However, Tosfos asks: that cannot be true, since we learn it from a Gezaira Shava from the word ‘Kicha’ and that word is only written by Kiddushin (when a man takes (YiKach) a woman) and not by Nesuin. So it must teach us that penetration can make Kiddushin.]

69) The Gemara inquires: if someone makes Kiddushin with relations, is it like a regular Kiddushin that only makes Airusin, or is it more and makes even Nesuin, and, then, if she dies afterwards, then the husband would inherit her property, he can become Tamai to her dead body even if he’s a Kohain, and when alive, he can annul her vows by himself?

70) A father has the power to Mikadesh his daughter with money, documents or relations. He keeps what she finds and keeps her wages. He has the power to annul her vows and to accept her Get from her husband. [Tosfos explains: he can only accept the Get after Kiddushin, but not after Nesuin. As the Yerushalmi in Trumah says that if a woman was eating Trumah, and in the middle of eating, someone informed her that her husband died or he gave her a Get, she’s like any other non-Kohain who ate Trumah. Since she wasn’t aware of her status before she started eating, there is an argument between R’ Eliezer and R’ Yehoshua if she’s obligated to pay the worth plus a fifth like any other non-Kohain that ate Trumah. The Yerushalmi only found a way that she might not be aware that she received a Get back in the days when they allowed an Arusah to eat Trumah, and her father accepted her Get or when she set up a messenger to accept her Get in a place ten days travel away and the messenger found an incredibly fast horse and got there in record time, in five days. However, since the Gemara didn't give a simpler case of after Nesuin where she’s allowed to eat but news comes to her that her father already accepted her Get while she was still a Ketana, is a proof that a father has no power to accept her Get at that point.] However, the father cannot eat the fruit of her land (that she received by inheriting her maternal grandfather), but, when she does Nesuin, her husband can even eat the fruit of the land.

71) A three-year old girl (who we consider technically able to have relations) can be Mikadesh with relations. If a Yavam has relations with her, she becomes his wife. If another man has relations with her, we punish him for having relations with a married woman. [Rashi explains: if the father received Kiddushin for her, after she’s three, we consider someone else having relations with her is having relations with a married woman. Tosfos asks: we will say later that any Ervah that has relations with her receives capital punishment,which includes the Ervah of a married woman. So, Ri explains that the statement goes back on a Yavam who can acquire her with relations that she’s so much his wife, that anyone else that has relations with her gets punished as having relations with a completely married woman, and we don't say that since the woman is a minor, the Yavam doesn’t completely acquire her and is only a rabbinic acquisition (like a Maamar).] If she was a Nidah, she makes someone who has relations with her Tamai like her (except that he does not make Tamai what he sits on to make other utensils Tamai, but only as Tamai as utensils he carries, that just make food and drink Tamai.) If she has Nesuin from a Kohain, she may eat Trumah. If an Ervah has relations they get killed (but she’s exempt, since she’s a minor). Also, if any person who regularly Pasuls a woman (if he has relations with her) for Kehunah (like a Chalal or Mamzer) would Pasul her too.

72) R’ Yehuda b. Besaira held that we can permit an Arusah to eat Trumah from the following Kal V’chomer. We see by a Kohain buying a non-Jewish female slave, that he cannot acquire her through relations, yet, she can eat Trumah after paying money for her. So a wife, whom he can acquire through relations, should of course eat Trumah (from the Torah) after buying her through money. (According to the side that relations only make a regular Kiddushin; the extrapolation is from relations with Chuppah since we say that if a slave eats through money without Chuppah, despite that she doesn’t eat through relations even after Chuppah.) [Tosfos says: we don't say Dayo (enough) to the Kal V’chomer, or ask anything on it; as we’re only trying to learn with the Kal V’chomer what’s included in what the Torah specifically says that what the Kohain buys with money may eat Trumah.] However, the rabbis forbid her until she goes to Chuppah, as Ulla says the reason: since she’s still living by her family, perhaps she may pour them a cup from Trumah wine. However, b. Bag Bag disagrees with this logic.

73) One version: b. Bag Bag argues that she shouldn't eat from the Torah, since we cannot compare Kiddushin to slave buying. After all, when one buys a slave for money, he acquires her completely and he’s not missing anything in his ownership; but, a wife after Kiddushin is not completely the husband’s yet, since the Chuppah is missing from his transaction.

74) Ravina says: really R’ Yehuda b. Besaira and b. Bag Bag agree that she may eat Trumah after Kiddushin from the Torah. They only argue if you need to worry for Simpton (she may have a blemish that the husband might claim that he would never had married her if he would have known of this hidden blemish, which may invalidate the marriage retroactively (since he mistakenly married her) and therefore she was never really a Kohain’s wife the whole time of Airusin). So R’ Yehudah b. Besaira learns from the Kal V’chomer from a slave that she may eat after purchasing her and you don’t need to worry that you’ll find something damaging to cancel the purchase retroactively, so too by a wife. (However, the problem of giving a relative to drink is not applicable to a slave). However, b. Bag Bag disagrees and holds that one cannot compare selling slaves with marriage regarding finding a blemish that would cancel the transaction. For, if we refer to a blemish that one can see while they’re clothed, we assume the buyer saw it and bought them anyways. If we refer to a blemish under the clothes, why should the buyer care, since it doesn’t impede his work? If he finds out that he robs or is a Kuvyustos [Rashi- a kidnapper, Tosfos- a gambler], it also doesn’t cancel the sale since most slaves are involved with these things, he should have assumed they were such, and yet he still bought them. If you’re worried that perhaps the slave is an armed robber or the king sentenced him to death, then rumors of it would persist, so the buyer should know about it. [Rashi explains: therefore if he bought it and they had these problems, we assume he heard of it and accepted the deal as is. Tosfos says: although the Gemara in Bava Basra says explicitly if the buyer finds out about these defects in the slave, he may return it to the seller; that refers to a case where he didn’t deposit the money yet, so we cannot assume that he checked him out completely. However, our Gemara that holds that he must have heard the rumor and accepted the deal as is, refers to after he paid for the slave. (We assume that someone would check into all details before he hands over the money.) However, for that question R’ Tam explains our Gemara: although if he found out after the deal he can return it, since there should be persistent rumors, it’s highly improbable that anyone would not know about it before he bought it.]

75) The practical difference whether the reason for an Arusah not eating Trumah is for perhaps she’ll have a blemish or perhaps she may give her relatives to drink are in the following cases: ‘acceptance,’ [Rashi explains: the husband accepts to take her as a wife no matter what blemishes she has.] “Also, by "handing over” and ‘going.’ [Rashi explains: “Handing over and going” refers to two similar cases. In both cases the father delivers her to the husband’s group that came to fetch her. The first case he totally hands her over to them and the second case he goes along with the group to the husband’s house. In these cases, since she moves away from the family, we no longer worry she might feed Trumah to a relative, but, we still worry that the husband didn’t check her completely and still might find a blemish. Tosfos disagrees, since, in Kesuvos, R’ Assi says that when the father hands her over to the husband’s group, she’s completely married in all areas, even to eat Trumah. Therefore we see that we no longer worry at that point that nobody checked her and he’ll find a blemish. Therefore Tosfos explains, “handing over and going” as one case. Only after he goes along with the group after handing her over do we assume that they won’t check her completely (while the father’s there) and will wait until they come to the house and we need to worry that afterward he still might find a blemish. However, R’ Assi refers to a case where he completely hands her over, when she’s totally under the husband’s jurisdiction, we assume that they checked her out completely and we no longer worry that he’ll find some blemish.]

76) Beis Shammai requires the Kiddushin money to be a Dinar, (and Beis Hillel says a Pruta). R’ Zeira explains Beis Shammai: since a woman cares not to receive a degrading amount for Kiddushin, so she doesn’t accept anything less than a Dinar for Kiddushin. However, when they stick out their hand to accept less, then she’s married with any amount she wants to. Beis Shammai is referring to accepting money at night, or if she sent an agent to receive the Kiddushin for her. (Therefore, she doesn’t know how much she’ll receive, so we can assume she doesn’t agree to the deal if he gave less than a Dinar.) [Rashi explains: the truth is, if R’ Yannai’s daughters accept Kiddushin at night or through an agent, there is no Kiddushin unless she received the basket-full of Dinarim since the Gemara says they are more particular than others and usually won’t accept Kiddushin for less than a basket-full (that hold three Kav worth) of Dinarim. Tosfos disagrees: if so, it makes the amount they said dependent on everyone’s personal threshold and the amount of a Dinar is meaningless. Rather, Tosfos explains: by accepting Kiddushin at night and through an agent, all women are equal (even R’ Yannai’s daughters) that they’re Mikudeshes when they receive a Dinar. After all, they know that their agents won’t receive more than other women since they’ll receive the standard, and since she still sends the agent to receive Kiddushin, it’s as if she stuck her hand out and accepted a Dinar.]

77) When the Torah refers to money (Kesef) it refers to the Tzuri currency, and when the Rabanan referred to it (when they made their monetary enactments), they referred to their country’s currency. (Their country’s currency is an eighth of Tzuri’s.) Therefore, when they enacted for someone who hits his friend to give four Dinrim, it's really a half of Dinar (of Tzuri).

78) Reish Lakish says the reason for Beis Shammai is like Chizkiya who says that you can't sell a Jewish maid for a Prutah, since there must be an amount that she can redeem herself for less then she was sold if she works some time, and that can't be if she's sold with a Prutah (since you can't split it). It prevents the sale if she can't be redeemed, just like it prevents it if the master can't marry her (like if she was sold to a close relative who she's an Ervah to). Therefore, since the Torah removes it from a Prutah, logic has it that the Torah wants it to be an important amount, like a Dinar, and we extrapolate Kiddushin from a Jewish maid's sale.

79) Rava says: the reason for Beis Shammai is so that Jewish women shouldn't be so cheap and are like Hefker. Therefore, the rabbis uprooted all Kiddushins that are less than a Dinar.

80) Beis Hillel holds that she's Mekudeshes with a Prutah, which fluctuates between an eighth to a sixth of an Italian Issur. It all depends on the fluctuation of the Issur, but not on how large the the coin Prutah is in that generation, that they sometimes enlarge them, or sometimes shrink them.

81) Shmuel says: if someone gives something that's worth less than a Prutah, it's a Safeik Kiddushin since it may be worth a Prutah in Madai. The Shiur of a Prutah for Kiddushin was only said to have it as a definite Kiddushin.

82) However, R' Chisda disagrees with Shmuel. Therefore, when a case came before him when a Kiddushin was made with something that's worth less than a Prutah [Tosfos adds: and then, the Mekadesh's brother gave a Prutah to her for Kiddushin] she's permitted to the second one [Tosfos: and she doesn't need a Get from the first one, or else she'll be forbidden to his brother.] Even if her mother said that it was worth a Prutah on the day of the Kiddushin, she's not believed to forbid her on the second husband. As we see that Yehudis the daughter of R' Chiya, who had trouble with her labor pains, claimed that her father accepted Kiddushin for her when she was a minor (in order to get her out of the marriage), and we didn't believe her to forbid her on her husband.

83) Even though [Tosfos: there's rumors] that there are witnesses [in Eretz Yisrael] that it was worth a Prutah at that time; we still don't worry about it the same way we're not worried about it by a captive where there was [rumors that there were] witnesses in a different country that they were captives (and the girls wouldn't be believed anymore to say that they were captured, but wasn't defiled). [Tosfos: however, if we know for sure there were witnesses to these facts, we surely need to be stringent.]

84) Abaya and Rava argue with R' Chisda since you can't compare this to the Heter by a captive where she makes herself very unattractive to the captives. [Tosfos says: there are those who explain: since, even if we have witnesses to her capture, it's no proof that she had relations and is forbidden from the Torah, but if there's witnesses that she's a married lady, she would be forbidden from the Torah.]

85) The Rabanan separated themselves from the family that R' Chisda permitted, not because they held like Shmuel, but because they held like Abaya and Rava.

86) Rav gave lashes for someone who made Kiddushin in the marketplace or with relations. Also, for one who gives Kiddushin without a Shidduch, and for one who cancels a Get after he sent it [Rashi explains: in front of the agent since the agent might give it anyway. Tosfos disagrees: after all, are we referring to wicked people who would do this? Rather, canceling before three people, when the agent won't hear about it and will give it anyhow. Even according to R' Shimon b. Gamliel who says that the Get doesn't become canceled, and nothing bad can come out of it, even so, he did wrong by causing people to say that there might be something problematic with the Get.] Also, on someone who protests against the validity of a Get he gave (like he was forced to give it, which will spread rumors about the legitimacy of her new children) Also, on someone who was brazen to a rabbi's agent. Also, to one who had an excommunication on him for thirty days and didn't even request from Beis Din for it to come off. Also, to a son-in-law who lives in the house with his mother-in-law. R' Sheishes lashed someone suspected to be romantic with his mother-in-law for just going around to her house.

87) Nahrdai says that Rav only lashed someone who made Kiddushin through relations without a Shidduch. Others say this is true even with Shidduchim since it's very immodest. [Tosfos quotes R' Tam: since they need witnesses to the relations, or at least to the seclusion, which is not proper. Ri disagrees since we say the same by Yibum without Maamar, and that's impossible not to have those witnesses for it. Rather, it's promiscuous to do Yibum without Maamar since you have relations as the beginning of your acquisition, and the same with Kiddushin.]

88) [Tosfos says: we rely on this opinion to live in the house of your in-laws. Even according to the first view, perhaps it's only if there's no good reason to do so, you need to worry that he's doing it for promiscuous reasons. However, if he’s doing it to save on rent or other reasons, it's permitted.]

89) If a person says to a woman to be Mekadesh her with a mat. She takes it and says that it's not worth a Pruta. He says that there are four Zuzim wrapped in side it; Rava says: she's only Mekudeshes if she says that explicitly that she wants the Kiddushin, but if she's quiet, she's not marries since the proposition came after the money came to her hand. This is similar to a case where it was originally given to her to watch, and then he says that it should be for Kiddushin; she's only Mekudeshes if she says that explicitly that she wants the Kiddushin, but if she's quiet, she's not married since the proposition came after the money came to her hand. R' Huna b. R' Yehoshua says that a watched item is not a proof to the mat case, since there, she has accepted responsibility for it, and if she throws it down, she would need to replace it if it's lost. However, she can throw the mat from her hand, so keeping quiet is an acceptance to the Kiddushin. However, Rava says that, since women are not experts in Halacha, they might think that they have the responsibility to pay if they throw it away.

90) If he grabs a coin from her, and then hands it back to her saying "you should be Mekudeshes to me." Or, if he's first giving it to pay back his loan, and then turns around and says it's for Kiddushin; she's only Mekudeshes if she says that explicitly that she wants the Kiddushin, but if she's quiet, she's not married since she could claim she's only taking what's hers. This is only without Shidduchim, but with Shidduchim (and they agree to marry) she's Mekudeshes even if she's quiet.

91) Just like a woman is not Mekudeshes with less than a Prutah, also land can't be bought with less than a Prutah. However, that's only with a money acquisition, but the utensil for Chalifin doesn't need to be a Prutah.

92) Shmuel says: a woman who gave birth who brought her Chatos and died, her heirs must bring her Olah if she already separated it. However, if she didn't separate it, the heirs don't bring it since liens on property is not a Torah concept even to obligations written in the Torah. However, R' Yochanan obligates the heirs to bring it even if she didn't separate it since he holds that liens on property is a Torah concept.

93) [Rashi explains "an obligation written in the Torah" as obligations that you don't bring on yourself, but is brought upon by the Torah. Tosfos explains: things that we wouldn't know how much you owe unless the Torah tells us, like Korbanos, Pidyan Haben, Erichin and damages. However, loans are not included, although the Torah obligates paying them, but we know how much to pay back, i.e., the amount borrowed.]

94) [Tosfos says: the Mishna there concludes that, if the mother brought her Olah, but separated her Chatos, but didn't bring it, her heirs don't bring it since it's a Chatos who's owner died. This implies that she can bring the Chatos if she was still alive. Even though a Chatos must be brought before an Olah, and the Gemara in Pesachim implies that, even B'dieved, you can't bring it; that may only apply to the order of the Metzorah's Korbanos that their order are even B'dieved needed since it says "this is the way it should be." Alternatively, according to the Gemara's conclusion, the Gemara reverses itself and says that you can bring it B'dieved.]

95) There's an argument if a verbal loan collects from heirs and buyers. Rav and Shmuel say that they don't since liens on property is not a Torah concept. R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish says they do since liens on property is a Torah concept.

96) R' Pappa holds: the Halacha is that you collect from heirs since liens on property is a Torah concept, but not from buyers since it didn't produce rumors to the loan, the buyers can't watch out for it. [Tosfos says: in Bava Basra, the text is the opposite; R' Pappa says that you don't collect from buyers since liens on property is not a Torah concept, but you collect from heirs so that it shouldn't close the door to people lending money. R' Chananel reconciles that our Gemara refers to obligations written in the Torah, and the Gemara in Bava Basra refers to obligations not written in the Torah.]

97) You can have Chalitza with a sandal that's not his, and the Torah only means by calling it "your shoe" that the sandal can't be too big that he can't walk in it, and it can't be too small that it doesn't surround most of his foot, and it must also have a heel.

98) You acquire a Jewish slave with money or with a document.

99) A non-Jew's acquisitions is only with money. [Rashi says: without pulling it. Tosfos disagrees, since the Halacha is like R' Yochanan who says that the acquisition for Jews are with money, and non-Jews are with pulling. Rather, it means that the non-Jew's only acquisition in slaves is with money, and not with documents. Another explanation: all her acquisitions, even on land, is with money and not with documents, as it implies in Bava Basra.]

100) There's an argument between the Tanna Kama, who holds that a Jewish slave who sells himself is not just sold for six years, it doesn't apply to him the Halacha to pierce his ears, you don't need to give him presents at the end of his term, and his master doesn't give him a non-Jewish maid to marry; and R' Elazar who holds that he is sold for six years, it applies to him the Halacha to pierce his ears, you need to give him presents at the end of his term, and his master gives him a non-Jewish maid to marry.

101) Originally, the Gemara wants to make the argument dependent on whether we Darshen a Gezeira Shava "Sacher, Sacher" from Beis Din selling him as a slave. The Gemara says it's not necessary since everyone can hold that there's a Gezeira Shava, but the Tanna Kama learns Drashos by those Halachos that excludes selling oneself from them.

102) The Tanna Kama says that we exclude the one who sells himself from the parting gifts since the Pasuk says that it's given to him (the one sold by Beis Din), and not to one sold by himself. R' Elazar says the Pasuk excludes giving it to his creditor, although, usually, R' Nosson holds that you owe to your creditor's creditor like you owe it to him. The Tanna Kama doesn't need it for that Drasha since he regularly doesn't hold of R' Nosson. [Tosfos quotes R' Tam and Ri that the Halacha is like R' Nosson like Abaya and Rava established their cases like him in Pesachim. Although it would make him agree with R' Eliezer, who we don't Paskin like; but in truth, our Tanna is not R' Eliezer the student of Beis Shammai, but R' Elazar. Although R' Samlai says the way a Mamzer can make his children Kosher by stealing and have him sold as a slave and marry a non-Jewish slave; but it won't help to sell himself since the Halacha is not like R' Elazar; perhaps only regarding marrying a slave, but not regarding the parting gift. Alternatively, R' Samlai only said to steal to be Yoitza all opinions, but not that he's Paskining against R' Elazar.]

103) You pierce the right ear of a male slave, but there's no piercing to a female's slave's ear.

104) Regarding selling oneself to a non-Jew as a slave, there are three ways of getting redeemed: redeeming yourself (where you definitely go out free); being redeemed by relatives, and being redeemed by non-relatives. The Pasuk says: "if you don't go out with this, you leave at Yovel" implying that one of them, (which is the "this"), he goes out free, but the other one, he goes out at Yovel, since he's obligated to work for the one who redeemed him. Therefore, R' Yossi Haglili says: it's probable to say that he works for the non-relatives who redeem him, since they don't have an obligation to redeem him, if they don't work for them, they'll refrain from freeing him from the non-Jew. However, R' Akiva says that the opposite is probable, that he's obligated to the relative since he didn't have a choice but to redeem him, and he'll keep on selling himself, and the relative will be obligated to redeem him again and again.

105) Rebbi held that the Pasuk of going out with "this" (redeeming) excludes that he doesn't go out after six years like when sold to a Jew. Therefore, he doesn't have any exclusion to say that he still needs to work for anyone, so, no matter who redeems him, he doesn't work for them. Even though it says "he goes out at Yovel” [Tosfos and it doesn't mean from the non-Jew, since it said it once earlier for that]; that only teaches us that, even if we have the upper hand and rule, we shouldn't take him out of the non-Jew's hand's before that with trickery or force.

106) A female Jewish slave is acquired with a document; R' Huna says that the master writes it, and R' Chisda says that the father writes it.

107) The Mishna says: a Jewish slave (sold to a Jew) acquires himself back with the six years, with Yovel, with paying for the time he has left with money, or with items worth that money.

108) The Braisa says that he also leaves with a freedom document [Tosfos says: but the Mishna only lists those things that you can go out against the will of the master.] However, it's not enough to quote the [Tosfos: the words of the document "you're a free man"] since his body is owned by the master. [Tosfos says: it definitely helps to make him Hefker just like it works by a non-Jewish slave, and even according to the opinion he still needs a freedom document, that's only to permit him to marry a Jew. It's only when he says the words of the document, it doesn't help to acquire his body back without having it written in a document.]

109) Since the body of the Jewish slave is acquired by his master, it doesn't help for the master to forgive the money that's owed for the rest of his term. [Tosfos infers: if his body wasn't acquired by the master, the forgiveness itself will help and he would go free even without an acquisition. This proves that you don't need an acquisition to forgive a loan. However, we can push off the proof by saying: since the slave is in possession of his body, he did make an acquisition on his body.]

110) A female Jewish slave can also leave when she gets her pubic hair.

111) Reish Lakish says that the death of her father allows her to leave since it would be a Kal V'chomer from her pubic hairs. After all, if she goes out from the master with pubic hairs, even though she doesn't go out from her father's auspices; of course she should go out with her father's death since it makes her leave her father's auspices. However, the Gemara disproves this since it's not similar to pubic hairs since her body changes. [Tosfos says: you can't put it in the Kal V'chomer that if it doesn't remove her from her father despite having her body change. After all, regarding a female slave, when her body change, we can say it's not the slave he bought. However, by a father, even after the body change, he's still her father.]

112) The parting gift of the female slave goes to her father. If he dies, she receives it and it doesn't go to her brother since we have a Drasha that a daughter is not inherited to sons.

113) You give the slave the parting gift and not his creditor, although, usually, R' Nosson holds that you owe to your creditor's creditor like you owe it to him.

114) If he redeems himself for the remainder of the term; R' Shimon says he doesn't receive a parting gift since he's not considered one that "you sent away," but one who went out himself. R' Meir says he needs to give it since he's considered that "you sent away" through redeeming himself.

115) If the slave ran away, everyone agrees that you don't give a parting gift because he's not considered as "you sent away." However, this is only if Yovel comes that he doesn't need to return to finish his term, but he must return if only six years past, and we don't say that he goes out after six years from his sale.

116) If the Jewish slave got sick; if he worked for three years when he was well, and then didn't work because of his sickness for three years; he doesn't need to make up that time. However, if he was only well for less than three years; if for the rest of the time he did some work, even if it's light work like sewing, he doesn't need to make up the time. If he did no work, he needs to make up the time. [Tosfos says: this is not similar to a hired worker who doesn't get paid for what he didn't work if he stops in middle of the day, even if it's for an Onness; since a slave is different since the master owns his body, and that body can't work more than it's able. Alternatively, since the Pasuk says in Yeshaya "at the end of three years, the years of a hired worker." Since the slave worked for three years, it's considered as a time of being hired, and he's considered as if he did his job.]

117) R' Meir holds that the amount of the parting gift is fifteen Slayim. After all, we learn a Gezeira Shava "Reikam, Reikam" from Pidyan Haben that you need five Slayim, and since there's three types of gifts written in the Torah, sheep, wine, and oil, you need five Slayim of each. He's allowed to add more from one type and subtract from another type, as long as they add up to fifteen Slayim. R' Yehuda says it's thirty Slayim, since he learns a Gezeira Shava "Nesina, Nesina" from an ox goring a slave. R' Shimon holds it's fifty Slayim, as we learn a Gezeira Shava "Micha, Micha" from Eirichin.

118) According to R' Yehuda and R' Shimon; the reason the Torah writes three types that you give (if you don't say that you need their amount for all three types like R' Meir does); from sheep and oil, we learn a Klal U'prat V'chlal that you may give anything similar to those types, that they're blessed (to grow more). As the sheep procreate, and the olives grow from the ground. We need 'wine' to add another item that doesn't totally fit in that Klal U'prat V'chlalal. R' Shimon b. Eliezer b. Yaakov says it includes money, that also can expand through investments. The Tanna Kama says: it includes mules, even though they don't procreate, but they grow larger.

118a) The Tanna Kama says that he must pay the parting gift whether he got blessed by his worth or not, but he should pay more according to the blessing. R' Elazar b. Azarya says he only pays it when he got blessing from his work.

119) A male Jewish slave who's master dies; he only finishes his term by a son, but not any other relative who may inherit him if there's no sons. However, a female Jewish slave, or a male slave who extended his term by having his ear pierced, or one who was sold to a non-Jew, doesn't serve any heirs, even the sons.

120) From the Torah, a non-Jew inherits his father. However, if he converts, he only inherits him rabbinically. the rabbis enacted it so he shouldn't return to being a non-Jew in order to inherit. [Tosfos Yeshanim says: granted that he can't renege on his conversion, but he'll mistakenly think that it will help.] Since it's only rabbinically, he can make up with his brothers for them to take the idols and Yayin Nesech, while he'll take items permitted to him for his share. [Tosfos explains: after all, they enacted that he should only inherit permitted items, and not the forbidden ones.] Therefore, we don't consider those items as an exchange for the forbidden items. However, if the idol already came to his hands, he can't exchange it for permitted items. [Tosfos says: however, the reason why the permitted ones are not an exchange for the idols can't be because of Breira, (that we consider what came to your hands as what you inherited, and not as an exchange for your share in what comes to your brother's hands); for, if so, it would be permitted to exchange it if the idol got to your hands.]

121) However, a non-Jew doesn't inherit from his converted father, nor a convert inherits from his convert father, even rabbinically. Thus, if he borrowed money from the father, you don't need to return it to his son. However, if you do, one Braisa says that the rabbis are happy with you, and another Braisa says that they're not happy with you. The Gemara reconciles them: one is when the child was conceived when he's a non-Jew, but was born when he was a Jew, and the other was when he was also born as a non-Jew, and they converted later. [Rashi says: you should return it when he was born a Jew since a combination since he looks like a regular Jew and as a favor to the father who did you a favor. Tosfos quotes R' Tam who says: although Rava didn't want to return the money to R' Mari b. Rachel even though he was born after his conversion; that's because it was money he watched for his father, Issur the Ger, where he's doing the father a favor, and not a loan where the father did him a favor. Ri explains: there's no difference between a loan and a watched object. Rather, when he's born a Jew, they didn't want you to return it since people will think him to be a true son and will come to do Yibum with his younger brother's wife, and they'll think he doesn't need anything from the other brothers who were all conceived as Jews. However, you should return it if he wasn't born a Jew since no one will make that mistake that he's a true son.]

122) If the master married the female slave; she's no longer a slave and doesn't go out like all the ways that slaves go out, but like a married lady that only goes out with a Get.

123) One Braisa says that you can sell a slave a second time, and another Braisa says that you can't because of the Pasuk "you sell him for his robbery;" implying only once. (It also excludes selling him to pay off his fine to pay double, or to sell his witnesses who became disproved, and you do to them the same as what they wanted to do to their victim.) You can't differentiate between if he stole once or twice, since that Pasuk of selling him once infers even for many times he stole. Rather, the Gemara reconciles: one is stealing from one person, and the other refers to stealing from two people. [Rashi says: if there's only one court case for one victim, he doesn't get sold again; but he does get sold a second time with a second court case with another victim. Tosfos argues since this wouldn't fit into either opinion (later); since the Rabanan say that you always sell him a second time, and R' Eliezer holds that you don't sell him the first time if the stolen money is not worth exactly the price he can be sold. Rather, the Ri says: from one person, you can sell him even many times. However, if you steal from two people, you can't combine what you owe both of them to be sold.]

124) If he stole a thousand, and is worth five hundred; the Tanna Kama says that he can be sold twice. R' Eliezer says that he's not sold at all. However, if he stole five hundred and he's worth a thousand, everyone agrees that he's exempt from being sold. (Therefore, R' Eliezer holds that you don't sell him the first time if the stolen money is not worth exactly for the price he can be sold.)

125) Rava says: R' Eliezer has a good claim against the Rabanan. After all, the same way that they Darshen that he's not sold when he's worth more since "he should be sold" completely, and not partially, so too we should Darshen that "he should be sold for what he stole", and not for part of what he stole.

126) By a female Jewish slave; there's a force through the family to redeem her against the father's consent. [Rashi says that the family can force the father to redeem her if he has money. Tosfos explains: we force the family to redeem her even if the father is upset that she's coming back to his house.] However, this cannot be applicable to a male Jewish slave [Mahrsha- even though they caused him to sell himself since they didn't help him financially] since it's to no avail since he'll keep selling himself. However, the father can't resell the daughter (according to the opinions later who say that he can't). [Tosfos says: it implies that, if he could resell her, there's no way to fix the situation. Therefore, it doesn't seem like Rashi's explanation that we force the father to redeem her, since he will be constantly forced to buy her back. Rather, it must be that the family redeems her.]

127) There's an argument between R' Akiva and R' Eliezer [Tosfos: and there's an argument who held which opinion]. One learns the Pasuk to say the father can't resell her, like the way it's written, Bugad; once someone "spread his cloak over her (in marriage), and the other says he can't resell her in the way it's read, Bigdo, that he abused her by selling her the first time. R' Shimon says that you follow the way it's written and read, so you can't resell her after he sold her once or after he married her off.

128) The Gemara has an unresolved inquiry whether Yiyud makes only Kiddushin, or also Nesuin, with the practical difference if he can become Tamai to her if she dies, and to annul her vows. Also, after they divorce, if her father can marry her off again.

129) According to R' Yossi b. Yehuda (according to those who explain that he doesn't hold that the original sale money is Kiddushin for Yiyud); then, even according to those who say that you can’t sell her for a slave after she had Kiddushin, he can sell her after Yiyud. After all, there's a big difference between when the father receives Kiddushin for her, and whether Kiddushin happens without the father. However, this is only if Yiyud does Kiddushin, but if it does Nesuin, she's anyhow out of the father's auspices and he can't marry her off.

130) R' Yanai says "Yiyud can only be done through an adult (and the master can't marry her off to a minor son), and Yiyud is only done with consent. The Gemara asks: why both statements? [Rashi: why say both since they're dependent on each other. Tosfos (in the name of R' Elchonon) says they're contradictory. After all, the first statement implies that it takes effect as long as he's an adult, even without consent.] The Gemara answers: he's saying one statement that the reason why Yiyud is only by an adult since it's only with consent. Alternatively, the second statement is that you need the girls knowledge.

131) You only need to have the knowledge of the girl according to R' Yossi b. Yehuda who holds that the original sale money is not Kiddushin for Yiyud, and that's why he needs to still have a Pruta of work left in her term to do Yiyud, since that's the money that he's giving for Kiddushin. R' Nachman b. Yitzchok says that even R' Yossi b. Yehuda holds that the original sale money is Kiddushin for Yiyud; and the reason why he needs to still have a Pruta of work left in her term to do Yiyud, since it's a Gezeiras Hakasuv that Yiyud is written next to redeeming, so you can only do Yiyud when it's still applicable to redeem. You also need the knowledge of the girl from a Gezeiras Hakasuv of "Yiyud to her;" implying with her knowledge.

132) The reason we need a Pasuk of "a wife of a man" to exclude the wife of a minor, even though we already exclude Yiyud for a minor; it means to exclude a minor Yavam. [Rashi says: his relations with the Yevama acquires her. Tosfos disagrees since we say that relations with a minor is equivalent to Mamar to an adult, so it's only rabbinical. Rather, without that Drasha, I would say that the minor Yavam acquires completely, so the Drasha tells us that he doesn't acquire.]

133) A minor is not Chayiv for having relations with a married lady. [Tosfos says: even though he's not someone who gets punished for sins; but I might have thought you kill him anyways since he brought on a punishment of death to the woman.]

134) From R' Yossi b. Yehuda (if he holds that the original sale money is not the Kiddushin for Yiyud), you can deduce that someone can send his minor daughter to accept Kiddushin for herself. [Tosfos says: if it's not true that she has a 'hand' to acquire Kiddushin (with her father's command) the Pasuk shouldn't say that it helps by Yiyud too. Even though a minor can acquire something by herself, it's different when someone else is giving it to her, so you have the giver's knowledge to help make the acquisition.]

135) We can also deduce that, if you're Mekadesh with a loan on her that you have a collateral on, she's Mekudeshes. [Tosfos says: it's not because she's receiving the collateral, which he owns somewhat like R' Yitzchok says; since we refer to a collateral at the time of the loan. Rather, she's Mekudeshes from the pleasure of having her loan forgiven. However, I might have thought that she's not confident of getting her collateral back, so we're taught that it's not problematic and she's married. This is like Yiyud, where the girl herself is a collateral by being in her master's possession. [Mahrsha- although she's holding onto herself, but since she's a minor, she doesn't have confidence that she'll be able to leave and it's equivalent to an adult with a collateral object.] Although the master owns the Jewish slave body, and perhaps you'll say that the Kiddushin is by returning her body to her; that can’t be because he didn't give her a freedom document to release her body. Therefore, we must say it's done by forgiving the money that she would need to redeem herself.]

136) The Rabanan argue with R' Yossi b. Yehuda and say that Yiyud can happen right before sunset of the end of the sixth year (even though she doesn't have a Prutah of work to do) since the original sale money is the Kiddushin.

137) Therefore, according to the Rabanan [Tosfos explains: if someone tries to Mekadesh the female slave after she's sold before the master's Yiyud, she doesn't need a Get from this second person. After all, it's similar to someone who's Mekadesh a woman "from now until after thirty days," that we don't say a Kiddushin made within thirty days takes effect at all since she's retroactively Mekudeshes. Although he didn't say "from now" by a Yiyud, but since every sale consists of the ability to turn into Kiddushin, it's as if he says "from now." However, according to R' Yossi b. Yehuda, the second one's Kiddushin takes effect, and they can laugh at the master (that he loses the ability of Yiyud) similar to one who is Mekadesh "after thirty days," that another person's Kiddushin that was given within thirty days takes effect. Although the master didn't say "after thirty days" and she could have Yiyud anytime, still, since he didn't say explicitly "from now," it's like it said "after thirty days." This is not like how Rashi explains it.]

138) R' Meir holds that you can sell a daughter on condition that the master can't do Yiyud. Although he holds that, if someone makes a condition against what is written in the Torah by monetary laws, it's not binding, like when he gets married on condition that he's not obligated to pay food, clothing or have timely relations, he's obligated in all of them; here is different since the Pasuk says "for a slave," implying that you can sell her for a slave only.

139) The Rabanan hold that the master could do Yiyud. [Tosfos says: although they hold that, if someone makes a condition against what is written in the Torah by monetary laws, it's binding, Yiyud is not monetary laws.] They learn from the Drasha "for a slave" that they may sell her to people that are forbidden to her with a Lav that Kiddushin could take effect. R' Meir learns that from "if she's bad in the master's eyes" i.e., she's bad because it would be sinful.

140) R' Elazar learns that both Drashos teaches taht you can sel her to people who are forbidden to her, so the second includes even relatives who are so forbidden that Kiddushin doesn't take effect. However, the Rabanan and R' Meir held that you can't sell them to those relatives.

141) There's an argument according to the Rabanan; if you can sell your daughter to your father. Do we say you can't because she's an Ervah to him by being his granddaughter, or you could since it's possible for his son to do Yiyud. However, everyone agrees that you can't sell it to your son since she's forbidden to him as a sister, and forbidden to his son as an aunt.

142) The Pasuk says "if he comes in by himself, he goes out by himself." This teaches us that, if he was married, the master can give him a non-Jewish female slave to have children with, but if he wasn't married, he can't.

143) If he was sold for a hundred, but his worth went up to two hundred, and vice versa; you only make the calculation based on one hundred from a Gezeiras Hakasuv.

144) You need that the Jewish slave to "be with you" with food and drink. I.e., you can't eat pure bread and aged wine and your slave eat coarse bread and newer wine. Thus, we say: someone who acquires a slave acquires a master for himself. [Tosfos says: in a case where you only have one utensil to use, you can't use it without your slave using it too, so the slave will end up using it, and not you. You can't say that neither should use it, since we force people not to act like Sodomites.]

145) There's an inquiry whether a slave could redeem himself half way. For, perhaps he can't since we learn a Gezeira Shava "Goel, Goel," from a sold land (that's his inheritance). Or, perhaps, we only learn it leniently, but not stringently. [Tosfos says: it's not a real Gezeira Shava, since we don't Darshen them halfway. Rather, it's just a reveal to us.] After all, it's a stringency if he was worth two hundred, and he paid a hundred to redeem half. Afterwards, his price dropped and then he's only worth a hundred; if it's a redemption, he would be half redeemed and he would need to pay another fifty to redeem the other half. However, if it's not a redemption, and the money was only given to be watched, and now it's his complete worth, the redemption takes place. However, a leniency would be if he was worth a hundred and he paid fifty, and then he went up to be worth two hundred. Therefore, if it's a redemption; he's half redeemed, and only need to pay a hundred to complete the redemption. However, if it's not, then he needs to pay a hundred fifty to redeem himself. (We must say that he was worth two hundred at the sale, and then his price went down, and went back up, or, otherwise, he never needs to redeem for more than a hundred, like we said earlier.) The Gemara's conclusion is: there's no redemption half way similar to what we said earlier that if one stole five hundred and he's worth a thousand, he's exempt from being sold since the Pasuk says "he should be sold" completely, and not partially, so too we should Darshen that "he should be redeemed," completely, and not partially.

146) If someone sells his inheritance land, he can't redeem it halfway, and he can't borrow in order to redeem it. However, if he made it Kodesh, he can redeem it halfway, and he can borrow in order to redeem it. If he sells a house in a walled city; the Rabanan say he can't redeem it halfway, and he can't borrow in order to redeem it since he learns a Gezeira Shava "Goelaso, Goelaso" from a sold land. R' Shimon says that he can redeem it halfway, and he can borrow in order to redeem it like a Kodesh field since he Darshens the reasons of the Torah, and the reason why it allows it by Hekdesh since it will eventually be completely lost to him if he doesn't redeem it, the same is by the houses in a walled city, so we should compare them.

147) There's an inquiry whether houses in walled cities, or a slave sold to a Jew, are redeemed by relatives (according to the Rabanan who argue with Rebbi, but Rebbi Darshens that ""those who are not redeemed by these (relatives)," (i.e., those sold to Jews) go out by six years). The Gemara concludes that the side to say that relatives can redeem houses in walled cities is difficult.

148) R' Yehoshua says that relatives redeeming sold land is only voluntary, and R' Eliezer says it's obligatory.

149) Everyone agrees that the Torah obligates relatives to redeem a slave sold to a non-Jew (not to be mixed up by the non-Jews). [Tosfos says that R' Yehoshua's position is difficult since he doesn't have the same type of Drasha for sold land and slaves sold to a non-Jew.]

150) The slave that want's to stay after his term is acquired by piercing his ear. There's a general statement, details, and another general statement in the Pasuk. R; Yossi b. Yehuda Darshens it with a Riboy, Miut, V'Riboy that includes all ways that you can make a hole except one, and that's through acid. However, Rebbi learns it as a Klal U'prat, V'chlal, so it needs to be similar to a drill that is metal. Others say that you need the great drill since the Pasuk says "the drill," which connotes the best of the drills.

151) R' Eliezer Yudeen Barebbe held that the piercing needs to be done in the lobe, and not in the actual ear. the Chachumim say it's in the actual ear since they have a tradition that a Kohein can't be pierced since the Torah says that he will need to eventually return to his family position; and if he's pierced, he can't return to do the Avodah since he's blemished. If the piercing is in the lobe and not the actual ear, why would he be considered blemished?

152) Rav held that you give a female non-Jewish slave to a Kohein Jewish slave. Shmuel says you can't give it, since it's only gave the Chiddush to a regular Yisrael, but not to a Kohein who has more Mitzvos. However, they disproved Shmuel from the above reason why a Kohein can't have a pierced ear, and if he doesn't get a female non-Jewish slave, he wouldn't be eligible anyhow since he can't say "I love my wife and kids."

153) Rav permits a Kohein to a Yafas Toar, and Shmeul forbids him. The first version: everyone agrees that that the first relations is permitted, since the Torah allowed it to overcome the Yetzer Hara. They argue with the second relations. Shmuel forbade since she's a convert, and a Kohein is forbidden to a convert, and Rav held; once the Torah permitted her, she remains permitted. A second version: everyone agrees that she's forbidden by the second relations [Tosfos says: and it's not similar to what we allow a Kohein slave to a non-Jewish slave since that's even a Chiddush to allow her to a Yisrael, who would otherwise transgress the Lav of marrying a slave. However, here, where she's a convert and is not a Chiddush for a Yisrael to marry her; so there's no reason to say that the Torah permitted her to a Kohein.] They only argue regarding the first relations. Rav holds it's permitted since the Torah allowed it to overcome the Yetzer Hara. Shmuel forbids since the part of bringing her to his house to be a wife doesn't apply to him, the whole Parsha doesn't apply to him.

154) She's only permitted if he became infatuated with her at the war, but not after she became a slave to him. It's even if she was a married lady [Tosfos: although the prohibition of a married lady doesn't apply to non-Jewish ladies; but there's still an Asei "to stick with your wife," implying, but not your friend's wife.] After all, the Torah allowed it to overcome the Yetzer Hara. As, it's better to eat a Shechted dying animal than to eat Neveila. It's even when she's not pretty, as long as he desires her. He can only take one, not two. He can't take one for his father or son. He can't inflict her during the war [Rashi explains: you can't have your first relations there. Tosfos says: although the Torah allowed it to overcome the Yetzer Hara; still, since he knows that he eventually has permission, it calms him down. Although at that time it's not a Chiddush to allow it since she's a convert, we must say that the Chiddush is that you allow this forced conversion, who was not totally converted. The reason they permit Tamar to Amnon (if she wasn't conceived before her mother converted, but afterwards, and he should be her brother); we must say that her mother was pregnant with her from another man before the war. However, Tosfos concludes with a question: what's the difference between the first relations and the second one since they're both not a Chiddush since they're both after the conversion? Rather, R' Tam says that we permit the first relations during the war, but we don't inflict her then to start her month long disheveling until she reaches his house. There's an argument in the Yerushalmi if it's like Rashi or R' Tam.]

155) When the slave gets his ear pierced, he needs to say "I love my master etc." He needs to say that he does not want to leave while there’s still a Prutah of work to be done, and after that, when there’s less than a Pruta’s work to be done.

156) The slave and master must be the same that they both must have a wife and children; you need the master to love him, and he needs to love the master. The slave can't be sick since it says "he should be good," and the master can't be sick, as it says "with him." It's unresolved if they're both sick. After all, it's not "he should be good," and if it's the main condition, he can’t be pierced, or maybe the main condition is "with him;" which you have, and he could be pierced.

157) The master is required to feed the wife and children of the slave.

158) You need to pierce the slave's ear until it gets to the door. It's only valid by a door that's up, but not on the ground, since it's compared to the doorpost.