1) You give a virgin a two hundred Zuz Kesuva, and a widow a one hundred Zuz Kesuva. However, if he wants to add a hundred Manah, he's allow to and they didn't enact to forbid it not to embarrass those who can't afford it. [Tosfos says: nowadays, we're accustomed to write a hundred Literons, even for people who don't have a penny to their name. (Now, it definitely works for those who have property, since the liens takes effect on their land, and even if they sell it, once the lien starts, it takes effect on all lands bought afterwards.) The reason it works for those who don't own anything, even though they can't make acquisitions for items that hadn't come into the world yet, but he can make a lien on property that hadn't materialized yet. After all, the lien is formed by a personal obligation to pay, and not on his property per se. We see a similar case by a paid watchman that he can obligate himself to pay like a borrower with a regular acquisition, implying in all cases, even without making an acquisition on his property. However, there are those who explain that he's making an acquisition through his admission that he has the property. This is like how R' Tam says that, when you write a document, write that he's making an acquisition to give over four Amos of land even if he doesn't own any, since his admission obligates himself.]

2) The additional amount added to a Kesuva has the status of the Kesuva. The practical applications: if she sells or forgives the Kesuva, she sells and forgives the addition since it's called part of the Kesuva. Also, regarding a rebellious wife, that, when we deduct from her Kesuva, we even deduct from the addition. [Tosfos points out: this is only according to the Rabanan who hold that you only deduct her Kesuva and not more, but according to R' Yossi who says that you can deduct even more than her Kesuva just in case she inherits money, then this is not an applications since the addition could be deducted even if it's not considered to be a Kesuva.] Also, regarding collecting some of the Kesuva [Rashi explains: if she collects from the addition, she can't even collect her main two hundred without swearing. Tosfos explains: if you started collecting from the main two hundred, you can't collect the addition without swearing even if it's on a second document.] Also, regarding claiming the Kesuva [Rashi explains: if she makes a claim on the addition, she doesn't get fed anymore from the estate. Tosfos says: this doesn't fit according to the Rabanan who hold that she's fed unless she claimed her whole Kesuva. Rather, even if she claims her whole main Kesuva, she still gets fed since she didn't claim the addition, since it's not considered claiming the whole Kesuva.] Also, regarding a wife transgressing Torah law, that she loses the addition along with the Kesuva. [Tosfos says: granted, that a husband pays the addition to a minor who refuses him, or a Shniya, or if she comes out to be an Iylanus although they don't have a Kesuva; that's because he understood the possibility for this to come out, and he wrote it for her without making a condition, it was even for these situations. However, she loses the Kesuva since it's not dependant on his writing it for her, but because of Beis Din's enactment, and even if he doesn't write it for her, she gets it. Therefore, he only intends that it should only be collected like the rabbis' enactment. However, it wouldn't dawn on someone that his wife will transgress Torah laws; so we say that he wouldn't want to have it obligated when she loses her Kesuva.] Also, regarding the improvements of the property [Rashi explains: if the property she collects was improved from the time that the Kesuva was owed until the collection, she's not entitled to collect the field as it was worth at the time it was owed and as if the field was improved in her possession, but can only collect the amount of her Kesuva of what it's worth at the time of collecting. Tosfos explains: when she collects sold properties, she doesn't collect the improvement that the buyer's made in the fields. This is not like regular lenders who can collect the improvement from buyers (who can collect from the seller) but not from one who received it as a gift (since the giver is not obligated to reimburse him). However, he may collect from orphans' improvements even if they have no recourse in recuperating their money since they're somewhat obligated to pay back their father's loan. However, if the field was an Apotiki, it was as if it belonged all along to the lender, and the orphans improving it are like people who improve someone else's fields without their permission, where they're entitled to be reimbursed for the money they spent to improve it.] Also, regarding swearing [Rashi says: when she needs to swear if she collects when the husband is not there, or when a single witness testifies that she already collected it, or when she collects from a buyer or from orphans. Tosfos says that this doesn't fit well according to those who say that this is the Halacha by all documents, so it would apply to the addition even if it wouldn't be a Kesuva. Rather, if she swore on the Kesuva, when she collects her addition, she doesn't need to swear on it, since it was included in the original swearing on the Kesuva.] Also, regarding Shvious [Tosfos explains: according to the opinion that Shmitta wipes out even if it wasn't a loan, then it makes sense to say that the addition is not wiped out like a Kesuva isn't. According to the opinion that it only wipes out loans, the application is; if the Kesuva is somewhat paid, (and according to those who need one to officially make the balance into a loan, we refer to a case where the wife did that), and just like the Kesuva was made into a loan, so too is the addition, and they get wiped out by Shmitta.] Also, if the husband writes all his property to his children, and leaves a little bit of land for his wife, and she accepts it, she loses her Kesuva, and similarly, she loses the addition too. You also collect the addition from the lowest grade fields. Also, if she stayed in her father's house for twenty five years without collecting, she loses her Kesuva, and also her addition. Also, they enacted that her son will get the addition if he inherits the Kesuvas Binyan Dichran.

3) Pumbadisa held that the sons can't collect their Binyan Dichran from sold property since they're like heirs, and Matta Machsa says that they do collect it from sold land since they're like creditors. The Halacha is that they don't collect from sold property since they're like heirs.

4) If the husband designates items for her Kesuva, if they're still intact, she doesn't need to swear to the orphans that she didn't grab other things for the Kesuva, since the designated items are intact, she won't grab anything else. However, if they're not intact (but got lost); Pumbadisa says that she doesn't need to swear since she won't grab other items once she had items designated for her, and Mattah Machsa says that she needs to swear, and the Halacha is that she doesn't swear.

5) If the husband designates fields for her collections, if he assigned all four borders, she's definitely assured to collecting her Kesuva and wouldn't grab, so she collects without swearing. However, if the husband only assigned one side; Pumbadisa holds that she has enough confidence that she'll collect that she doesn't grab anything else, so she doesn't need to swear, and Mattah Machsa says that she's not so confident, so she needs to swear she didn't grab. The Halacha is that she collects without swearing.

6) If one says to witnesses to write and sign a document and give it to someone, if he made a Chalifin acquisition on it, the witnesses don't need to consult him at the end whether to give the document. [Tosfos adds: since he strengthened the transaction with an acquisition. This is even true if he didn't command to write and sign, since the average acquisition is intended to write a document for it. However, according to the opinion that, if it's not written in the document that it makes a lien on the property, we don't assume that the scribe mistakenly left it out; you may need to consult him about making a lien from the document. Also, if the seller wants to renege on giving the document before it's given, it's his option. The Riva says: it only applies to selling documents since the seller might not want to give the document since he doesn't want the buyer to collect from sold land. However, he can't renege on giving a document on a gift, since it doesn't create a lien, so it's just a trick so that the receiver shouldn't have proof that he owns it. However, R' Tam says that he can refuse it since he doesn't want many people to have documents that come from him, since people will think he has great debts and the price of his property may go down (since people will assume he's desperate to sell). We only say that, if someone already had a document and it burned, he needs to write another document (and not say it's detrimental to him) since the other person already had a right to have a document.]

7) If there was no Chalifin acquisition; Pumbadisa says that they don't need to consult again if he wants the document written, and Mattah Machsa says that they still need to consult before they give it over. The Halacha is that they need to consult again.

8) The Tanna Kama says: if the husband dies when she was an Arusa (and she wrote him an addition to the Kesuva); the orphans need to pay the addition. R' Elazar b. Azarya says that they only need to pay the main Kesuva and not the addition since it was only written if he would take her into his house (as a full wife).

9) There's an argument between Rav and R' Nosson if the Halacha is like R' Elazar b. Azarya or not. We see that they both hold of the concept of assessing someone's thoughts, as R' Nosson Paskins like R' Shimon Shezuri that, if a sick person tells an agent to write a Get and he didn't say to also give it, we assess his thoughts that he wants it to be given too. (He also Paskins like him regarding Trumas Maasar, if it falls back in to the Damai it was taken from , we ask the Am Ha'aretz if he separated the Maasar himself. [Rashi explains: the rabbis believed him in a case of a great loss. Tosfos explains: he's worried about the transgression of the prohibition of Trumas Maasar, even if he's not concerned of the prohibition of Tevel.] However, the Tanna Kama says that they only permit believing him by Shabbos [Rashi says: they were lenient when it comes to enjoying Shabbos. Tosfos says: since he has the fear of Shabbos upon him to lie on that day]. However, it becomes forbidden to eat right away on Moitzie Shabbos.)

10) Also, Rav follows the assessment of someone's thoughts. After all, he says that if a deathly ill person writes into a gift document that he made an acquisition on it, we put on the gifts the ability of a deathly ill person and of a healthy person. We say it has the ability of a healthy person's gift that the giver can't renege on it even if he survives his sickness. We give it the ability of a deathly ill person's gift that he can give over a loan. [Rashi says: however, regularly, coins can't be acquired with Chalifin. Tosfos disagrees: since it could be acquired along with land. Rather, we refer to actual loans that the money is not in existence (since the borrower didn't pay back). Although you can sign over a loan by a Harsha, but we concluded in Bava Kama that you're only making him your agent to collect, but he doesn't acquire the loan money. Although, if he collected and then found out that the lender had died, and if he's an agent to collect, he couldn't represent him, and we say he doesn't need to return the money; that's because it was collected through Beis Din who acted in good faith assuming the lender is still in his Chazaka of being alive.]

11) [Tosfos says: the Rivam explains that it's only if the acquisition was written in the document, but not if the acquisition was made without it being written in the document. After all, the Gemara in Bava Basra says that if the deathly ill doesn't distribute all his property, but leaves over a small amount, he can't renege if he survives. He can only renege if he distributes everything. We must say that he made an acquisition, or else the gift of not giving away all his properties wouldn't be binding. We also must assume that a document was written since the average acquisition is meant to write a document over it, and yet he can renege if he distributed all his properties. However, the Riva explains that he can't renege even if the acquisition wasn't written in the document. The Gemara in Bava Basra refers to making a Chazaka acquisition which is not assumed that it's made in order to write a document for it, but he can't renege for a Chalifin acquisition.]

12) (However, Shmuel says that we're afraid that he only wrote the acquisition in the document in order for it to take effect after his death, and acquisitions don't help after death [Tosfos explains: it's a problem even if he made the acquisition without writing it in the document. However, Shmuel admits that it takes effect if you write extra in the document implying that you want to give him more power to collect.]

13) [Tosfos says: therefore, since we Paskin like Shmuel, you got to be careful to write some extra phrases that gives more power to collect in the document.])

14) Therefore, the opinion who Paskins like R' Elazar b. Azarya held that we assess his thoughts that he only wants to give the addition if he brings her into his house as a wife, and the other assesses his thoughts that he's giving it since he came close to her, which is also by Eirusin. The Gemara concludes that the Halacha is like R' Elazar b. Azarya.

15) There is an inquiry whether R' Elazar b. Azarya only holds she gets the addition after their first relations, or even with the dearness of entering Chuppah together. If you want to say that it's the dearness of the Chuppah, is it only if she was not a Niddah and was fit for relations, or even if she was a Nidda.

16) R' Yehuda says that the husband needs to write a Kesuva of two hundred Zuz, but the woman can write him a receipt right away that she received the Kesuva. This is in spite that R' Yehuda holds, regularly, that you don't write receipts (so the borrower shouldn't need to be careful to watch his receipt from mice so that the lender wouldn't be able to collect twice. R' Yossi says that you write receipts [Rashi says: so that the lender shouldn't need to write up a new document for the remainder and lose the power to collect liens from the date of the first document. Tosfos quotes the Gemara's conclusion that it forces the borrower to pay up quickly so that he shouldn't need to pay again if his receipt was taken by mice.]) Abaya explains: R' Yehuda only holds that you don't write a receipt when you paid and you would need to guard it to prevent paying a second time, but not here where the whole receipt is a gift. If you guard your receipt properly, you get the gift, and if you don't guard it, you lost your gift. R' Yirmiya explains: we refer to a case where the receipt is written in the document (and you can't produce the document without producing the receipt). [Tosfos says: even though she could hide the document and collect without it since it's a Beis Din's enactment, and the husband needs to prove he doesn't owe it anymore; we refer to a case where she has her dowery written in there (that she would collect when she's entitled to the Kesuva) and she'll lose more if she hides it. Alternatively, in a place where it's normal to write the Kesuva in a document, or if witnesses claim that it was written (even if it's not normally done), she can't collect without producing a Kesuva, even if he admits he still owes, since we don't force a receipt on him, he doesn't pay until she gives him the Kesuva document. You don't need to worry that the document would burn before witnesses, since the same way the witnesses know that it was a Kesuva, (and it wasn't some regular paper), they would see the receipt in it.] However, he didn't want to learn like Abaya since he shouldn't write a receipt here by a gift, since it might lead to writing a receipt by a payment.

17) However, this is only if she wrote the forgiveness in a document, but it doesn't help to forgive it orally. Although R' Yehuda usually holds that, if someone makes a condition against what is written in the Torah by monetary laws, it's binding, like when he gets married on condition that he's not obligated to pay food, clothing or have timely relations (and R' Meir holds it's not binding); we must say that R' Yehuda holds that Kesuva is only a rabbinical enactment, and they were stricter by them than Torah law since they need strengthening. Although R' Yehuda allows making a condition regarding the husband receiving the fruit of his wife's field, that's because it's not too common for a wife to bring in these fields, they didn't enact not to allow conditions. Although we see by the case of two peddlers on donkeys who ride into town and one says mine doesn't have Maasar separated, but my friend's grain does; the Chachumim say that he's not believed, since he may be saying it so his friend will say it about him in the next town, but R' Yehuda permits it and he doesn't forbid it too to be strict by Damai which is only rabbinic; Abaya says since it's only a rabbinical enactment on a Safeik (that the Am Ha'aretz maybe didn't separate Maasar himself). Rava answers: Damai is different than other rabbinical Mitzvos since it's only a big stringency since the majority of Am Ha'aratzim take off Maasar correctly.

18) [Tosfos says: R' Meir says that since the condition is not legal, she's Mekudeshes and the condition is cancelled. We don't say that since he only wanted to marry her under those conditions, and since he can't have those conditions, the marriage shouldn't take place. After all, we learn all conditions from the condition of the sons of Gad and Reuvein, and it's a Chiddush that a condition can cancel an action. Therefore, if the condition is canceled, the action takes effect. However, Rashi explains: since he says "you are Mekudeshes to me," she's married, and the words afterwards "on condition etc." is nothing. However, Tosfos asks: R' Meir couldn't have hold that he says "you're Mekudeshes to me" first since he holds that the condition must precede the action.]

19) [Tosfos says: this is only if he's trying to uproot the Mitzvah. However, if he's not sure there's a Mitzvah, and he makes a condition; so the condition is really that he wants it only if the Halacha is that you may make such a condition, and if you can't, I don't want the Kiddushin at all.]

20) [Tosfos says: the reason you can forgive payments for damages and for redeeming your first born; we must say that you said "on condition that I'll be exempt" and not that the Halacha shouldn't apply. If so, he would be exempt from providing his wife food, clothing and timely relations if he said that he should be exempt and not that it shouldn't apply to him. Alternatively, you can't have a marriage without providing the wife food, clothing and timely relations, and it would be considered as if he's trying to make a partial Kiddushin.]

21) [Tosfos says: the reason the four types of watchmen can make a condition to be obligated like a different type of watchman; since the Torah gives many types of watchmen to say that it's permissible to pick one that you want to be. Alternatively, we see that the paid watchman has extra obligation since he gets paid, and a borrower needs to be completely obligated since all the pleasure is his. Therefore, the Torah is just saying what he probably accepts on himself. However, the Torah didn't care for them to make a condition for a different acceptance.]

22) R' Meir holds that if you make a condition to pay less than two hundred Zuz to a virgin and less than a hundred to a widow; the condition is canceled, and you need to pay it in full, and your relations with her are considered as promiscuous. Even though she receives her full Kesuva, but since she's not confident that she could collect, it's a promiscuous relations. Although R' Meir only holds that all conditions against Torah law is not binding, but against rabbinic law is binding; we must say he holds that Kesuva is from the Torah. [Tosfos says: granted that the widow's Kesuva is rabbinical, but since mainly Kesuva is from the Torah, even the rabbinical manifestations of it has the same Halachos of the Torah law. Although Rav needed the reason that a husband can't forgo the rabbinical inheritance of his wife since the rabbis made a special enactment to strengthen it like Torah law, and he didn't say since the main inheritance is from the Torah, since the husband doesn't inherit like the Torah inheritance to call it a rabbinical manifestation of inheritance since he doesn't inherit for being a relative.]

23) [Tosfos says: the Rabanan who say that you can make a binding condition against the rabbis' enactment since they don't strengthen rabbinical laws the same way that they do it by Torah law; it's only when there's no prohibition or fine, but just monetary cases, like by a Kesuva. However, for prohibitions and fines, they strengthen them like they did for Torah law.]

24) R' Meir says: anyone who gives less than two hundred Zuz to a virgin, has promiscuous relations with her. R' Yossi says that he's allowed to. R' Yehuda says it only works if she writes him a receipt that she accepted the money.

25) Although R' Yossi forbids to designate movable objects for her Kesuva even if he accepts responsibility for anything that happens to it since their worth may decrease and the Kesuva will be less than two hundred, and you would think that, of course, he should hold that he can't get rid of the whole Kesuva; we must differentiate that he doesn't allow it if the wife doesn't know about the loss and didn't forgive it. However, if she knows about it and forgives it, it's permitted.

26) However, his Tanna Kama says that you can designate movable objects for her Kesuva if he accepts responsibility for anything that happens to it. [Tosfos says: that, which we say, if you don't have time to write a Kesuva before Shabbos, the husband can designate movable objects for her Kesuva; it's only if he accepts responsibility for anything that happens to it. You don't need to worry that he'll tell her, when he's angry, take your Kesuva and leave with a Get, since he accepts responsibility for anything that happens to it; she'll give him permission to sell them for profit. Therefore, the husband will lose if he divorces her. It's only no loss if he didn't accept responsibility for anything that happens to it; where she won't give him permission to sell them. Therefore, since the husband won't lose anything, we're worried he'll tell her when he's angry, take your Kesuva and leave with a Get. However, he's allowed to designate land even without accepting responsibility since the husband will lose out the fruit if he divorces her.]

27) Even though the Chachumim held that someone can leave his wife without a Kesuva two or three years [Tosfos: and even more], however, since R' Meir holds that it's forbidden to leave his wife without a Kesuva at all, and we Paskin like him by enactments; if she loses her Kesuva, the husband needs to write another one immediately.

28) R' Dimi quotes R' Shimon b. Pazi who quotes R' Yeoshua b. Levi quoting Bar Kappara that the argument between R' Yehuda and R' Yossi whether she can forgive her Kesuva orally, or only if it's written is only by the beginning of the Chuppah, but at the end of the first relations, everyone agrees that she can only forgive through writing. R' Yochanan quoting Bar Kappara says that they argue from the beginning of the Chuppah until the end of the Chuppah, which is the beginning of relations. Therefore, it comes out that R' Yehoshua b. Levi and R' Yochanan don't argue.

29) The Rabanan taught in the name of R' Shimon b. Pazi who quotes R' Yeoshua b. Levi quoting Bar Kappara; their argument is only at the end of relations, but in the beginning of the Chuppah, everyone says that she can forgive orally. R' Yochanan quoting Bar Kappara says that they argue from the beginning of the relations, which is the end of the Chuppah until the end of the relations. Therefore, it comes out the R' Yehoshua b. Levi and R' Yochanan don't argue.

30) It's better to establish an argument that they argue about reason (since we can say that both opinions are the words of Hashem, and they're both very logical) than to establish it that they argue what they heard from their Rebbe, since one must have been mistaken to what he heard.

31) A minor and her father can prevent her Nesuin. It's obvious that the minor can say she's not ready for it, but even if she claims she is, but the father can say that he's afraid that she's too young and won't be able to hack him, and she will rebel and run back to his house, and he would need to provide her new adornments when she's ready to marry. [Tosfos says: however, without that claim, it would be considered that the wife is rebelling for not marrying now. Although it's not her fault, but her father's; still, since her father gets her Kesuva, he can divorce her without giving a Kesuva.]

32) If a Naarah or Bogeres during her first twelve months gets Kiddushin, they give her twelve months to prepare for the wedding from the time he asks her to get ready. However, if she was a Bogeres for twelve months, we give her thirty days to get ready [Tosfos: after Kiddushin, since we assume that she already had prepared the bulk so she can marry right away after she finds a husband.]

33) If it reaches the time that they should marry, but he wasn't ready, she is fed from her husband and she could eat Trumah.

34) From the Torah, a woman who received Kiddushin from a Kohein can eat Trumah since she's his "money acquisition." However, they decree not to allow her. Ulla says that reason is: since she still dwells in her father's house, she might give her siblings to drink from the Trumah. Although we don't have this problem when you have a Kohein worker who eats with you, and we don't worry that he'll give others to drink Trumah, since he eats from you as part of his salary, he's not going to give you his food. [Tosfos says: of course we don't need to worry that a Yisrael worker will eat Trumah from his Kohein employer, since the employer needs to feed him, he's careful to feed him exactly what he needs to give, so he'll make sure that he won't give him Trumah.] The reason why she's permitted to eat after the time of marriage came; since the husband is feeding her, he reserves a place for her to eat away from her family so that they won't make him spend extra if she shares with them.

35) R' Shmuel b. Rav Huna held the decree for her not to eat is: her husband might find her to have some blemish, and it will be a mistaken marriage, and she ate Trumah retroactively without being a Kohein's wife. We don't need to worry about this after he brought her to Chuppah, even before relations, and she's permitted to eat Trumah since he definitely has her inspected for blemishes at that point .

36) A slave may eat Trumah after the Kohein buys him and we don't need to worry about a blemish to make it a mistaken sale. After all, if it's on a seeable part of his body, he saw it. If it's on a covered part of the body, since he's only needed for work, why should he care? If it comes out that he's a robber or a Kuvyustos [Rashi: a kidnapper, Tosfos: a gambler], since most of them are that way, it's not a mistaken sale. If he turns out to be an armed robber, or if he's condemned to death from the king, there would be rumors to that effect. [Rashi: therefore he heard about it and accepted it. R' Tam disagrees since there's a Gemara in Bava Basra that, if you found that the slave was an armed robber or was condemned to death from the king, he can return it saying "I'm returning what's yours." Rather, since it's not at all common that he had not heard of the rumors, it's not common for it to be a mistaken sale, so he may eat Trumah. R' Eliyahu defends Rashi, and says that the Gemara in Bava Basra refers to a case where he didn't pay for him, but by the time he gives the money, we assume he checked out everything and heard the rumors, and accepted the consequences.]

37) The practical difference between the two reasons: if he accepts to keep her no matter what, even if he finds a blemish (that the only reason to stop her from eating Trumah is that she'll share with her siblings), or when she's handed over to the husband's agents to be brought to the husband (that you don't need to worry about sharing, but you need to worry about a blemish).

38) When you give food to an Arusah that the time came; if the wife's a Kohein's daughter, you can give it completely from Trumah (since she's an expert to keeping it in Taharah and to sell it when she's Tamai). When she's a Nesuah, you give half Trumah and half Chulin (since it's not honorable for a Jewish woman (who's considered royalty) to go out to sell, and she's no longer living with her father and brothers who can sell it for her). However, if the Arusah is a Yisrael's daughter, R' Akiva says he gives her half Trumah and half Chulin. R' Tarfon says she gets only Trumah (and only the exact amount of her food, even if she needs to sell it when she's Tamai and she won't get the amount she would need to buy her food in Chulin). R' Yehuda b. Beseira says she receives two thirds Trumah, and a third Chulin. R' Yehuda says: she receives only Trumah, but enough that she can sell it during her Tumah days to buy enough Chulin for her food. R' Shimon b. Gamliel says: she takes double Trumah so that she can sell it cheap when she's Tamai and be able to buy all her food in Chulin and doesn't need to have any bother selling it.

39) If the husband dies within twelve months, and she falls before her Yavam, she doesn't eat Trumah even after twelve months since the Torah says that she eats if she's "his money acquisition," but this woman is the money acquisition of his brother. [Rashi says: even if she had twelve months before the husband, she can't eat when she falls to Yibum because of the above Drasha, and the only reason we said that he died before twelve months or else she would at least have eaten Trumah while her husband was alive. Tosfos disagrees since he held the Pasuk is only an Asmachta, and according to this first teaching, they only forbade when she didn't eat before her husband. However, once she ate before her husband and when the above worries to forbid her don't apply, she could eat when she fell to Yibum.]

40) According to the Mishna Achrona (the later teachings), they forbade a wife to eat Trumah until she enters the Chuppah. According to the opinion that the Mishna Rishona forbade since we're worried that she'll share the Trumah with her siblings, they forbade more by the Mishna Achrona since they were worried that she might find a blemish, and you don't know for sure that she doesn't have a blemish until Chuppah. According to the opinion that Mishna Rishona forbids because of a blemish, and after twelve months we assume she checked her out through his relatives, but the Mishna Achrona says that we don't rely on the relatives and she has to wait until Chuppah where he will check her out personally.

41) [Tosfos says: according to the Mishna Achrona, even she fell to Yibum after she was a Nesuah, she can't eat Trumah since she's similar to an Arusah who's time came to bring her to Chuppah, since their time to be brought into the house is immediate; since the Yavam has a choice of doing Yibum or Chalitza. So, if you give the Yevama to eat Trumah, you'll end up feeding an Arusah Trumah too.]

42) The Mishna says: if someone says that his wife's salary is made Kodesh to Hashem; the woman can keep her salary and it's not Kodesh. Rav explains: we refer to a case where she says " I won't work for you, but I won't receive my food from you." After all, since the main enactment is for her to be fed, and her salary only goes to him because of animosity if he needs to feed her and she keeps her salary. Therefore, it's the wife's prerogative to say that she refuses giving up her salary for food, and the husband has no rights to her salary.

43) Reish Lakish says: she can't say that "I won't work for you, but I won't receive my food from you," since the main enactment is to give him his salary. Therefore we must say the case is that he doesn't feed her. Even according to the opinion that you can say to a non-Jewish slave to "work for me, but I won't feed you," but you can't say it to a Jewish slave, and, of course, you can't say it to a wife. Therefore, he's not entitle to her salary since she needs it to feed herself.

44) If the husband makes Hekdesh his wife's extra money from her salary (that's more than her food); R' Meir says that it's Kodesh. Rav says: since someone may make Kodesh something that hadn't come into the world yet. Reish Lakish says: since she can't refuse to work for him, even if you hold someone may not make Kodesh something that hadn't come into the world yet; it's as if he made a vow on her hands regarding what they make, and the hands are in this world. Even though he didn't say her hands, since R' Meir holds that someone doesn't say words that have no effect (and he meant to say something that takes effect), it's as if he said her hands.

45) (However, we see that R' Meir holds someone may acquire something that hadn't come into the world yet. As he says that you can give Kiddushin to someone who Kiddushin can't take effect now for when it will take effect. Like, giving Kiddushin to a non-Jewess for it to take effect after she converts, or to a married lady for after she gets divorced etc. [Tosfos says: even though, regularly, even if an acquisition can be made on an object that's not in the world yet, they hold that you can't make an acquisition to people who hadn't come into the world (like to the unborn) and these people don't exist yet regarding Kiddushin; we must say that it's different here since the people exist, but they're just not fit yet for Kiddushin. This is also why it's more lenient than other cases of acquiring what's not in the world that they, at least, need to be something expected to come into the world, even though these people need not to be expected to become able to have Kiddushin. Granted, since it's a lenient case, this is no proof that R' Meir held completely that you can regularly acquire something that's not in existence yet; but, since we see he holds like this opinion partially, we can assume he holds it completely.])

46) However, R' Yochanan Hasandler argues with R' Meir and holds that the husband can't be Mekadesh the extra of her salary since he holds someone may not acquire something that hadn't come into the world yet. (According to Reish Lakish, we must say that they argue whether someone will say something that will not have any effect.)

47) According to R' Meir, who says that the husband can Mekadesh her extra salary; Rav and Shmuel says that it's for only after her death when he inherits it. R' Ada b. Ahava says that it's even when she's alive. After all, Rav and Shmuel holds that they enacted her main salary for her food, and the extra for the silver Maah allowance. As they enacted something common to be instead of something common, and the uncommon to be instead of something else that's uncommon. Therefore, we refer to a case where he doesn't give her a silver Maah, so she keeps her extra. [Tosfos explains: it must be that way, since we established the case that's she's not getting fed, and that's why her main salary is hers, so he definitely wouldn't give her an allowance.] However, R' Ada b. Ahava held that they enacted the silver Maah for her main salary, and food for her extra, since they enacted a set amount to be instead of another thing that's a set amount, and they enacted something that doesn't have a set amount for something else that doesn't have a set amount. So, we can say that he feeds her, but doesn't give her a silver Maah, so he gets her extra salary, but not her main salary. So, he can be Mekadesh the extra.

48) Shmuel Paskins like R' Yochanan Hasandler that someone may not acquire something that hadn't come into the world yet.

49) Even though Shmuel Paskins like R' Yochanan b. Nuri in the following Braisa: a woman who tells her husband that the salary that I will make will be prohibited to you (through a Konam); the Tanna Kama says that he doesn't need to annul this vow. [Tosfos explains: we refer to a case where he provides her food and a silver Maah allowance; so the Tanna Kama holds that makes him entitle to everything she makes, even extras.] R' Akiva holds that he needs to annul it. [Tosfos explains: since he holds that the extra she makes when she pushes herself is hers. The reason this is considered as a vow that's applicable to him (to allow him to annul), since it's very hard to estimate what belongs to him and what belongs to her. Alternatively, even if it's hers, he has the right to buy a field with it and eat the produce as long as they're married. Although you may assume that, since the money is obligated to go for his use, that the vow shouldn't take effect; since the rabbis who decreed that he gets the fruit didn't decree it so strongly that a vow can't take effect. They only decreed it by her salary since he receives the money completely, but not here where the land is hers, but he just gets the produce.] R' Yochanan b. Nuri says he needs to annul the vow since she may get divorced [Tosfos: or, according to Rav, she can refuse the feeding, and she can keep her salary], and he can never take her back, even though it's something that hadn't come into the world yet.

50) [Tosfos sets up the Gemara: according to Rav who holds that a woman can refuse to give her salary by saying that she won't be fed], we'll say the case is when she says that she's Mekadesh her hands. Although she can't be Mekadesh it now, it's like saying that the field that I'll be selling to you shall become Hekdesh when I buy it back, it becomes Kodesh. [Tosfos explains: even though there he can be Mekadesh it this moment, but the woman can't be Mekadesh it at this moment, but since she has the ability to Mekadesh it if she says that she won't receive food, it's considered in her hand to Mekadesh it. However, according to Reish Lakish who says that she doesn't have the power to keep her salary] we can say that it's different since a woman doesn't have the ability to Mekadesh it now. It's more similar to a case where a person says "your field should be Mekudesh when I buy it," it's not Mekudesh. It's not similar to a case where he's Mekadesh his field that was given as a collateral, that it takes effect since it's in his hands to redeem it. He can even Mekadesh it even if the condition is that he can't redeem it for ten years, since he can redeem it after ten years. However, a woman can only have her salary after she's divorced, and she doesn't have the ability to force a Get. [Tosfos points out: it seems from here that you can't be Mekadesh while it's a collateral. However, we see that an owner can be Mekadesh a rented house and forbids it on the renter, and we don't say it doesn't take effect during the rented days; that's because the Kedusha falls on the share that the renter doesn't own, and the renter can't live there since he'll do Meila on the share that he doesn't have rights to. However, here, we're dealing with making it Hekdesh completely, even what the owner no longer has rights to. Alternatively, Hekdesh works to forbid more than what they can forbid through a Konam. (According to this, we can also explain why the woman can sell and Makdish a field from when she's divorced, and she can't make it forbidden through a Konim.) Alternatively, there you can be Mekadesh the body of the field, and the produce will come along later when she's divorced. However, her hands can't be Mekudesh but for the produce, so it's considered not in the world.]

51) R' Ashi answers: Konams are like Hekdesh that ruins liens, as Rava says: Hekdesh, Chametz and freeing a slave can remove a lien on an object, so it's not something that only works for the future. However, the rabbis strengthened the power of the husband that the Hekdesh is pushed off that it shouldn't take effect now. [Tosfos says: the same strengthening they did for all creditors since we don't want to allow the lender to make a Konam on his fields and forbid them all to his creditor. However, this is only a Konam that forbids it on only the creditor, but they didn't enact if he makes it Kodesh, since it will be lost to him, and he won't make all his property forbidden to himself. Although we have an opinion that a slave of Nichsei Melug doesn't go free when the husband or the wife knocks out a limb, even though we should compare it to Hekdesh, and not to Konam; we must say that Rava holds like the opinion that the wife's blow will free him. Alternatively, the husband has a bigger lien on it than regular creditors since he has the produce in his lifetime. Therefore, we say that his hand is stronger than her hand in these properties.]

52) The Mishna says: a wife needs to grind, bake, launder, cook, nurse the baby, make the beds and work with wool (to sell) for her husband. This argues with R' Chiya who says that a wife is only for being pretty and for children. [Tosfos explains: he only argues about grinding, baking and nursing that effects her prettiness. However, he agrees she must work with the wool and make a salary, as everyone agrees that they enacted the wife to work in leu of getting fed.]

53) Beis Shammai says that she's not obligated to nurse her son, and Beis Hillel holds she's obligated. Therefore, if she vows not to nurse, Beis Shammai holds it takes effect and she's not able to, and Beis Hillel holds she can since it doesn't take effect since she's already obligated to her husband, (so it's not hers to forbid).

54) If she's divorced, she's no longer obligated to nurse. However, if the child already recognizes her, she must nurse because of the danger to the child not to, and she receives a wage from her ex-husband to do so.

55) Rav says the child recognizes her after three months. R' Yochanan says: after fifty days. They don't really argue, but it depends on each child's cognitive abilities. Shmuel says it's thirty days, but it's difficult to say that a child can recognize its mother at such a young age.

56) Rami b. Yechezkal holds that Shmuel held to test the child if he recognizes the mother within a lineup of women. Even a blind child can tell who's its mother through smell and taste.

57) R' Eliezer says: a child can only be nursed for twenty four months, and afterwards, it's as if its nursing from a non-Kosher animal. R' Yehoshua says it can nurse for four or five years, [Tosfos: four for a healthy child, and five for a unhealthy one.] However he agrees that, if after twelve months, it stops nursing for three days, it can't return to nursing and it's as if its nursing from a non-Kosher animal. The Halacha is like R' Yehoshua.

58) From the Torah, the blood and milk [Tosfos: and even the flesh torn from a living being] of a human is not forbidden. However, the rabbis forbade milk if it didn't separate from the woman's body (since it's as if its nursing from a non-Kosher animal). The blood is the opposite, that they only permit if it didn't separate from the person. Therefore, if blood fell on a loaf, you need to rub it off, but you can suck the blood between your teeth.

59) Someone who's heart is hurting may suckle from a Kosher animal on Shabbos, [Tosfos: even if it's not a danger for his life, since if it would be, he could do a Melacha from the Torah. Although the Gemara in Yevamos only permits to suckle from a Kosher animal on Yom Tov that's only a regular Lav, but not on Shabbos since it has the punishment of stoning, even though he has pain; R' Tam explains: here it's a true sickness, but there we refer to when he's in pain because he's starving. Ri asks: it implies there that we don't allow suckling on Shabbos unless it's a danger. Rather, he explains: it's an argument between the two Gemaras.] As we consider it as a backhanded way of 'releasing' (and is only rabbinically forbidden), and they didn't forbid when there's pain. [Tosfos says: i.e., it's like threshing, and you only need that reason to allow it according to R' Yehuda who says that threshing is applicable by items that don't grow from the ground. However, the Rabanan hold that it's only applicable to items that grow from the ground. Although we sometimes call animals "growing from the ground" since they get sustenance from the ground, but since we learn that threshing needs to be done as they did in the Mishkan, and those items actually grew from the ground, so animals are not comparable to them.] The Halacha is like this, that it's permitted.

60) If you have a roof gutter that is filled with twigs (and blocking the rain draining of his roof, and it might seep into the house and damage it), you can press it down with your foot in private. [Tosfos says: Although whenever the rabbis forbade something since it can lead to suspicion, they forbid even when doing it in private; that's only when you'll be suspected for Torah law, but here, even if they see you stamping your foot on it, they would only suspect you of doing a rabbinical prohibition.] As they didn't enact to forbid fixing in a backhand manner. This is the Halacha.

61) If a nursing woman's husband dies, R' Meir (and Beis Shammai) says that she can't receive Kiddushin until after the child's twenty four months, and R' Yehuda (and Beis Hillel) says eighteen months (since the child doesn't need to nurse at that point that urgently). R' Shimon b. Gamliel says: according to R' Meir, it's enough to wait twenty one months, and R' Yehuda, it's enough after fifteen months. After all, even if she becomes pregnant right away, it won't effect her milk until after three months.

62) There were some Amorayim who wanted to permit after fifteen months since the Halacha is like R' Yehuda when arguing with R' Meir, and like Beis Hillel when arguing with Beis Shammai, but Shmuel Paskins: she needs to wait twenty four months, but you count the day the child was born and the day she receives Kiddushin as part of the twenty four months.

63) It's even forbidden to Paskin before your Rebbe that you may eat an egg with the milky dip Kutach. [Tosfos says: it it can't be referring to such a simple case that a regular egg can be eaten with milk, since there is no ignoramus that doesn't know that. Rather we refer to a completed egg that was found in its Shechted mother. Although we're stringent not to eat the same completed egg if the mother was a Neviela, and we still say that it's like the meat; the Bahag explains, we're only lenient by milk and meat, since fowl and milk is only a rabbinical prohibition. Although, according to this, this P'sak is not too simple, (and the Gemara is trying to imply that it's the simplest P'sak, but you still can't Paskin it before your Rebbi), since there are opinions that fowl and milk is a Torah prohibition; still, they take it as a simple P'sak since the whole world is accustomed to be lenient. R' Tam differentiates that Neviela is in itself a prohibition, so we're more stringent than by fowl and milk, where each one starts out permitted, and you're trying to create a prohibition when mixing them together.] Even if it doesn't look like Chutzpah [Tosfos: in a case where your Rebbi gave permission] since you won't get help from Heaven to get the right P'sak.

64) If someone from the Reish Gelusah's house gives her child to a wet nurse, where you know that the wet nurse won't renege on her, she may remarry. However, everyone else is forbidden since the wet nurse may renege. Even if she weans the child, she can't remarry [Tosfos: since she might wean the child too early and he needs more time to nurse.] Mar b. R' Ashi forbids even if the child dies, since the mother may kill the child to allow her to remarry. However, the Halacha is not like him since only the insane would do so. [Tosfos says: we can't forbid because we don't make any exceptions to the decree, since we see that we did make exceptions by allowing the Reish Gelusa's household to remarry.]

65) Since the Halacha is like R' Meir in his decrees; we hold like him that even a widowed Arusah needs to wait three months even before receiving Kiddushin even though there's no way for her to be pregnant. (However R' Yehuda and R' Yossi held that an Arusah can get married right away, and even a Nesuah can receive Kiddushin right away and only needs three months until the Chuppah).

66) [Tosfos quotes Rash Hazaken who permits her if she's divorced and is not obligated to her first husband to nurse the child. However, R' Tam says that the Gemara in Yevamos implies that she's still obligated. Also, she shouldn't be better than a widow who's not obligated to her husband after she collects her Kesuva, and yet she can't marry until after twenty four months.]

67) If a wet nurse accepted to nurse a baby, she can't nurse any other baby. Not only if the other baby is her son, where we're worried that she'll might give more milk to him and won't feed enough to the one she accepted, but even if it's another child, and we don't say that she wouldn't accept a second child without knowing for sure that she has enough milk for all.

68) If they made up to feed her modestly, she needs to buy more food for herself to make sure that she produces enough milk.

69) She can't eat foods that are bad for her milk, like hops, unripe grain. small fish, dirt, gourds, quinces, unripe dates the milky dip Kutach, and fish basted in flour and their brine and fats.

70) If she wants to nurse, and her husband wants her not to nurse, we listen to her since it's her pain (if she gets engorged). If he wants her to nurse, and she doesn't want to; if it's normal for both his and her families to nurse, we force her to nurse. However, if it's not normal for the women of her family to nurse, or even if it's normal, but it's not normal for the women of his family to nurse, she doesn't need to nurse since he brings her up to have the advantages of his family, but doesn't bring her down to have the disadvantages of his family.

71) If he brings into the house one maid; she doesn't grind, bake or launder. If he brings in a second maid; she doesn't cook or nurse. If he brings in a third maid, she doesn't need to make the bed or work with wool [Tosfos: but she still needs to do little chores around the house]. If he brings in a fourth maid; she doesn't do any work [Tosfos: even small chores].

72) She can't claim that one maid should be in her stead and do all her jobs; since she's a third body, the maid would need to do work for the husband and herself, but the wife will need to do work for herself. When the second maid comes, she needs to do extra work for all the guests who now come to the larger household. When he brings in a third maid, there are extra guests who come. However, when there four maids, since there are many hands helping each other, they fulfill taking care of all the guests.

73) [Tosfos asks: why would the husband bring in all the maids? After all, he doesn't gain at all, since his wife would be doing all this work anyhow, and now he would need to support all of them.]

74) Even if he didn't buy the maids yet, but the dowery she brought in is enough for the husband to buy some maids with part of the money, she doesn't need to do the work.

75) She's entitled to maids if she limits herself from taking what's coming to her. [Tosfos: like she limits the amount of perfume and other items enough that the savings can buy a maid. Others have a text that "if he has of his own;" i.e., if he's so rich that he can afford to buy many maids.]

76) Even with four maids, she needs to perform the chores of endearment, like to fill his cup, and to make the beds, and wash his heads hands and feet. [Tosfos explains: here, making of the beds is spreading out the sheet, but what we said earlier that she's exempt from making the bed with the third maid, it refers to preparing the pillows and covers which is a bother and not an act of endearment.]

77) All acts that a wife does for her husband, she needs to do it when she's a Niddah except for making the bed, pouring his cup, and washing his head, hands and feet. Making the bed is only forbidden in front of him, but she may do it if he wasn't there.

78) The wife of Shmuel changed her regular way and poured the cup with her left hand. [Rashi says: when she was already counting the clean days. Tosfos explains: it's only if she Toiveled after her Niddah days is there a leniency for the clean days, since she's only forbidden then rabbinically. However, without Teveila, she's forbidden from the Torah like she was when she was a Niddah and you can't have any leniency.] Abaya's wife put the cup on a barrel. Rava's wife placed it above his head. [Tosfos brings Rashi that was stringent in other things that is not pouring the cup, like he forbade passing a key from his hand to her since he might come to touch her.]

79) R' Huna held that you don't need to give the waiters right away any food except for fatty meats the whole year round and old wine in the summer (when the smell is stronger). R' Pappa argues and says that all items that have a smell and are vinegary, it's a danger not to give it to him right away. Therefore, you must feed him from each dish before he serves it to all the participants of the meal.

80) A wife doesn't need to serve her husband's father or son, and she doesn't need to feed his animals, but she feeds his cattle. [Rashi says: he doesn't feed the animals that have a desire to lay with her, so the animals are horses and donkeys, but regular cattle don't show such desire. He concludes that he heard 'animals' are defined by male animals, and 'cattle' are the females. However, Tosfos says: the right text is that she's exempt from them both, as it says in Nedarim, that it's not something that's between the man and wife (to be able to annul the vow regarding it).]

81) R' Yehuda says: she only needs to work with wool or regular linen, but not Roman linen since it makes her mouth sour and her lips split.

82) R' Elazar says: even if she has a hundred maids, we force her to work with the wool since idleness leads to promiscuity. R' Shimon b. Gamliel says: the reason is because it will lead to her going out of her mind. The practical difference between them, if she has puppies to play with. After all, she won't go out of her mind, but it may lead to promiscuity. The Halacha is like R' Elazar that she always must work with wool. [Tosfos says: although the Halacha is always like R' Shimon b. Gamliel when he's in a Mishna, we must say that this wasn't that R' Shimon b. Gamliel that was in the same generation with R' Elazar, but an earlier one.]

83) If someone makes a vow not to have relations with his wife (if he vows that he can't have pleasure from the relations, but he can't make a vow to forbid her on receiving pleasure from his relations, since he's already obligated to give her pleasure from the relations); Beis Shammai says that we give him two weeks and then he has to divorce her with her Kesuva. As they learn it from the two weeks that a woman who gave birth (to a girl) is forbidden to her husband since he cause both the vow and the pregnancy (so it's apt to learn vows from birth). Beis Hillel says that we give him one week similar to a Nidda since they're both things that are common (since it's common for a husband to get angry at his wife and make vows on her, so we learn it from Nidda, since births are not so common).

84) Rav says: it's only if he said the time limit in the vow, but if he didn't give a time in the vow, we force him to divorce her right away. Shmuel says that you still don't divorce until the time (despite that it's regards to a thing that someone can't provide it as a proxy, like by food), for, perhaps, he'll find an opening to permit the vow. (This is true even if her designated time that her husband needs to be with her is not that week anyhow, since she doesn't have "bread in her basket.")

85) The same applies when he vows from giving her food, and we set someone up to feed her for a month. Rav says: it's only if he said the time limit in the vow, but if he didn't give a time in the vow, we force him to divorce him right away (despite that it's regarding a thing that someone can provide it as a proxy). Shmuel says that you still don't divorce until the time, for, perhaps, he'll find an opening to permit the vow.

86) The Torah students can leave their house to learn in Yeshiva for thirty days without the permission of their wives, and a worker for a week. [Tosfos explains: even though they regularly learn or do work in their own city, and their times to be with their wives is for the students every Friday night, and the workers twice a week; they can change their custom and leave, respectively, for thirty days, or a week.]

87) Even when receiving her permission, you shouldn't convince her to allow you to leave more than, according to Rav, a month away, and a month home, and according to R' Yochanan, a month away and two months home. By this, you didn't have sinned by convincing her to give more time than appropriate. [Tosfos says: R' Akiva and his friends who went away for years was because their wives insisted on it, and not that they convinced them to allow that much. However, the Ri says: this Halacha was only said by workers, since the students can leave for a month even without permission.]

88) The time for the unemployed (to have relations with their wives) is everyday (since they're not bothered with work). Rav says: even elementary school Rabbeim since they have what to eat from themselves, they sleep in their own house, and they're not bothered by the king's messengers for the king's work since they don't appear to them as rich people. Ravin says: the same applies to the people who live it up, since through the eating and drinking, they're very healthy and can withstand having relations every night.

89) The time for workers who work in the city is twice a week. If they do work in a different city, it's once a week. [Tosfos explains: but he can't change his custom to push it off longer than a week, although the twice a week worker can change it to once a week. R' Baruch says: there are three levels. If he does work in the city, it's twice a week. if he does work outside the city, but comes home every night, he does it once a week because of the bother of traveling. Also, if he works out of town for a week and then returns every eighth day, he's obligated on the day he returns.]

90) A donkey driver can't become a camel driver even though he'll make more profit for the woman to benefit from; but she rather a smaller amount and to be more with her husband than a lot of money and be more celibate [Tosfos says: however, if it's an exorbitant profit, perhaps the wife would agree to it.]

91) The time for a donkey driver is once a week, a camel driver is once in thirty days, and a captain of a ship is once in six months.

92) All of this is the opinion of R' Elazar, but the Rabanan say that you may leave for two or three years without permission. However, it's a danger to rely on them (since you may be punished for depriving your wife).

93) [Tosfos says: the reason that R' Akiva can permit the vow of his father-in-law not to support them with an openning that he won't have vowed if he would have known that he would become a Talmid Chachum, even though you can't make an opening for events that happened after the vow; but since he already went to Yeshiva, it's very expectable that he would turn into a great Talmid Chachum. Alternatively, he vowed explicitly that it's on condition that he doesn't become a Talmid Chachum.]

94) You deduct from a rebellious wife from her Kesuva. R' Yossi says that you can deduct even more than her Kesuva just in case she inherits money. Also, if a husband rebels against his wife, you add onto her Kesuva.

95) Everyone says that rebelling regarding relations is a rebellion. R' Huna says that it's not rebellious to refuse working. [Tosfos says: this is him being consistent to his opinion that she can say that "I won't work for you, but I won't receive my food for you." This includes any work she's obligated to do, even chores. As the more chores she needs to do, the less she needs to work to sell.] R' Yehuda b Chanina holds that rebelling against working is a rebellion. [Tosfos says: since he holds like Reish Lakish: she can't say that "I won't work for you, but I won't receive my food from you." Even though you can force her through sticks to work, but you still subtract from her Kesuva since "he doesn't want to live in a basket with a snake."]

96) It's applicable to say that the husband rebelled regarding work, that he refuses to support her. [Tosfos says: it fits in well according to Shmuel by vowing that you don't divorce right away, so there's time that he can end up adding onto the Kesuva, even though you can force him to feed her, since she doesn't want to live in a basket with a snake. However, the Gemara asks according to Rav that you divorce right away, how does it end up that you add on.] So, the Gemara says: you don't divorce right away, but you give him some time in order to change his mind on his rebellion. [Tosfos explains: you need to say this anyhow by relations, that after some time, you force the divorce, since we don't allow him to accrue to owe a large Kesuva, and you will leave her an Agunah in the meantime.]

97) [Tosfos quotes R' Eliyahu who says: it seems from here that someone needs to hire himself out to bring food to his wife, since that is his 'work.' However, Rashi just says that he needs to feed her, which is instead of her salary, but doesn't say he needs to work if he doesn't have the money. R' Eliyahu wants to prove it from the words in the Kesuva that "I will plow and gather the fruit." However, you can push off that proof that he would do it for his own fields, but not hiring himself out to others.]

98) We consider it a rebellion from relations even if she's a Nidda. Although she's anyhow forbidden, since they don't have "bread in their basket." [Tosfos says: even though we learn by a vow the amount from Nidda, since there she has more confident there that she'll get it than by an ongoing rebellion. A proof to that, we don't add anything onto the Kesuva when he makes a vow.]

99) However, the rabbis reversed the rules and enacted that we announce about it in Shul and Beis Medrish for four consecutive Shabbasos [Tosfos, but not during the week]; and Beis Din sends an agent to inform her that, even if your Kesuva is a hundred Manah, you'll lose it. Rami b. Chama says that they send the agent twice, once before the announcements, and one afterwards. R' Nachman b. R' Yitzchok says that the Halacha is like the later rabbis. Rava says that you need to check with her, and R' Nachman says that you don't need to check with her. [Rashi says that Rava holds like our Mishna that you check in with her periodically, and she doesn't lose her Kesuva at once. Tosfos explains: the later rabbis needed them to check in with her once and Rami b. Chama says that they send the agent twice. R' Nachman holds like the simple explanation of the rabbis that you need to check once, and Rava holds like Rami b. Chama says that they send the agent before the announcing too.]

100) The Gemara concludes: we wait twelve months, and she's not fed from the husband at that point. [Tosfos says: we're not referring to a case where she claims that the husband is disgusting to her, since, in that case, if they both want a divorce, why do they need to wait twelve months?]

101) This is only when she claims that she still wants [Rashi: to be married to him], but she wants to pain him; but if she says he's disgusting to her, you don't force her to stay. Mar Zutra held that you do force her to stay, but we don't Paskin like him. [Tosfos says: some explain; we force the husband to divorce her and we're not worried that she's saying it since she has eyes on another man, since she doesn't receive her Kesuva. (We only worry about it in a place where she'll receive her Kesuva.) Also, it must be in a case where there's reasons to believe she's saying the truth, (and that's the reason we say in Gitten that they didn't enact a Kesuva for a man, since most of the cases, he doesn't get divorced against his will. So, it must be not common for a wife to be able to claim he's disgusting.) The reason why R' Yossi says that we subtract from a rebellious wife more than the Kesuva, even though she could have originally said that she's disgusted with him, and he would need to divorce her with her only losing her Kesuva; but since she may be divorced sooner than later, and won't lose too much of her Kesuva, she takes the chance of rebelling. However, when she sees that it's dragging out and she's losing all her Kesuva and more, she can't claim anymore that her husband disgusts her since it's obviously a trick.

However, R' Tam says that this is not the implication, but you force the wife, and not the husband, and so explains Rashi that "we don't force her to stay with her husband," and not that the husband is forced. Rather, R' Tam explains: if she says that she wants her Kesuva, and she wants to pain him untill he divorces her without her losing much of her Kesuva, then you subtract from her Kesuva. However, if she says that he disgusts her enough that she wants to be divorced right away even without her Kesuva, the Kesuva is forgiven and he can divorce her right away without giving her a Kesuva. However, Mar Zutra was concerned that it was a mistaken forgiveness, and thus, if he divorces her, he needs to give her a Kesuva.]

102) There's an unresolved inquiry if a rebellious wife loses her worn out clothing that she brought into the marriage with her dowery. Therefore, the husband doesn't need to give it to her, but if she grabs it, she may keep it.

103) The same applies to a woman who fell to Yibum, that she gets fined for being rebellious. This applies if he wants to do Yibum or Chalitza, and she refuses, that we fine her since we wont let him marry someone else until it's settled. It also applies when he refuses her request. Although she's not obligated to have children, still, she has a valid claim that she wants to marry and have children so that she'll have someone to lean on in her old age, and someone to bury her when she dies. However, this is all according to the original teaching if he wants Yibum and she wants Chalitza, since they originally had intention for the Mitzvah, so Yibam is better than Chalitza. However, according to the later teaching that Chalitza is better than Yibum since they don't intend for the Mitzvah anymore, we force Chalitza and he can't do Yibum.

104) [Tosfos says: the Gemara in Yevamos says that Rav says we don't force. Rashi explains: if both want the Yibum, we don't force a Chalitza. However, if she wants out and he wants Yibum, we force the Chalitza, like where the Yavam is a tanner (and smells), that we would force him to do Chalitza. Another proof: since we don't fine her if she's rebellious. However, Ri disagrees since a tanner is different since we would force him to divorce her even if they're already married. Also, that you fine him is a proof that it's the most that you can do, but can't force the Chalitza. Rather, Ri says: even if she wants Chalitza, we can't force it. However, R' Tam explains: according to the first teaching, we don't force the Yibum if they both want Chalitza, even though the main Mitzvah is through Yibum. According to the later teaching, we don't force the Chalitza, but we try to fool him to do Chalitza with the condition that she needs to give him two hundred Zuz (which the condition is not binding). If he doesn't want to do Chalitza or Yibum, you need to force him to do one of them. However, if we don't know if they have the right intentions, we force them to do Chalitza with threats, and not with brute force, to separate them from Yibum.]

105) The amount they subtract from her Kesuva is seven Dinrim per week (a Dinar a day). R' Yehuda says: seven half Dinrim. If he rebelled, we add three Dinrim a week, and R' Yehuda says three half Dinrim.

106) They deducted from her even for Shabbos, since deducting doesn't look like receiving wages for Shabbos. However, we don't add on for the husband's rebellion for Shabbos, since adding money looks like Shabbos wages. [Tosfos explains: this is not considered as accepting Shabbos wages among weekday wages, which is permitted, since you pay for each day separately. Therefore, if they make up in middle of the week, you only need to pay only the amount of days before they made up.]

107) The reason why he gets more than her, since his pain for refraining from relations is more than hers. After all, we see that the men pay for Zonos, and not women. Alternatively, she doesn't physically show when she desires, but he shows out to people.

108) Someone who has an attendant to feed his wife when he's away, he needs to supply her with two Kav of wheat a week, (or four Kav of Edom barley, since they're of poor quality. However, you don't provide double for regular barley.) Even though it's greater than fourteen meals that she needs for a week; the extra are for guests.

109) You must give her many types of food, but not wine since she can only drink when her husband's around (so she won't get promiscuous). Rather, if she usually drinks two cups when her husband is around, you give her one cup. However, if she only drinks one cup, you can't give her wine at all to drink. Some say you provide her enough to add to a stew. Therefore, if she usually drinks one cup before her husband, she can't drink anything if her husband's not there, and even when he's there, she can't drink if they're guests staying by someone since they're forbidden to have relations.

110) You give her a bed, bedding [Tosfos: to lean on], and a mattress if the bed doesn't have a leather spread on it, but just ropes, and is painful to lay on without a mattress.

111) If it's only normal to his family to have pillows and blankets, but not to her family [Tosfos Harosh: and she only gets his families advantages when he's with her]; the Tanna Kama says: he doesn't need to leave her with pillows and blankets. R' Yonason says that he does since it might happen that he shows up a twilight, and he won't have it. [Rashi says: therefore, he'll just take her mattress, and she'll be left with none. Tosfos asks: but then it would be enough just to have two mattresses. However, he says: since he's used to pillows and blankets, he'll take both mattresses to make it up. Rivam explains: since he's there, she's entitled to his advantages, and even though he doesn't have pillows and blankets either, he's still obligated to provide her with them.]

112) He needs to supply her with a hat for her head, a belt, and shoes each Yom Tov. (We establish this case when she lives in the mountains that the shoes wear out, and she needs them thrice a year. However, we're taught that it should be given by Yom Tov because of Simcha.) Even by the poorest people, the husband needs to provide clothes of fifty plain Zuzim per year. (However, if they don't live in the mountains, he should put most of the provision to get better clothes and not in the shoes.) The clothes should be given for the winter, so when it wears out by the summer, it would be less warm.

113) Any left over from her food reverts back to the husband, but she keeps her worn out clothing so that she can wear them when she's a Nidda so that she wouldn't be disgusting to her husband that she's wearing the same clothes when she's Tahor that she wore when she was Tamai. However, if the husband dies, the orphans get the worn out clothes since we're not concerned about looking disgusting to them.

114) The husband must 'eat' with her every Friday night, R' Shimon b. Gamliel says: also during the day. R' Nachman learns it like its simple meaning, that he eats the meal with her [Tosfos say: even a donkey driver and ship's captain needs to, since they give her to and attendant all week.] R' Ashi explains it as a metaphor for relations. R' Shimon b. Gamliel would only require it by day in a dark house, or, otherwise, Jews are holy and don't have relations by day.

115) When she's nursing, you add onto her food, and lessen her work load. From here they deduce that, although you're not obligated to feed you're children, but you need to feed your very young children. That's why you add to her food, to feed the child too. Therefore, you need to feed the child until they're six years old, since they need their mother until then, as we see that they go out with the mother's Eiruv T'chumim until that time, and not with the father's. However, the Gemara rejects the proof that, perhaps the reason you give more food is because the average nursing lady is sick. He needs to provide her with wine, since it's beneficial to produce milk.