1) If the court obligated a fine; the Chachumim say that it's like all other moneys that you're obligated to bring a Korban if you swear falsely on. R' Shimon exempts him since you're only obligated when swearing on something similar to the loan and an item given over to watch, (which are written in the Pasuk), that was always a true obligation. [Tosfos says: in the Gemara's conclusion, R' Shimon agrees that if he admits to it, he's obligated to pay and it's not like if he was admitting to a fine. Now, according to R' Yochanan who holds that money makes the acquisition, we can say that the simple case is that you set aside a utensil to acquire if he's awarded the fine, as it says in Bava Metzia. So, R' Shimon exempts since it was set aside for a fine. However, that wouldn't acquire according to Reish Lakish who says that the pulling acquires, and he won't be Chayiv unless he pulls the utensil into his possession and gives it back to for the payer to hold, and at that point, it's totally his and should be Chayiv according to everyone. We need to say the case is where it was given to him as a collateral if he would win, and he gave it back to him to watch. Therefore, since it never came into his possession as a payment, it's not considered completely his money.]

2) Rabbah holds: R' Shimon only holds regarding swearing that, even after Beis Din obligates it, it still has the status of a fine. However, it's considered money that your sons can inherit from you [Tosfos: and to obligate him if he admits to it]. However, this is only regarding other fines, but for rape and seduction, he can't have the sons inherit it unless he received it before his death. As the Pasuk says that it's given to him, which is not applicable after his death, so the daughter gets it and not his sons. (However, the Rabanan held that his sons inherit it from him as long as Beis Din obligates it.)

3) However, R' Shimon holds that, if she becomes a Bogeres and gets the fine, but she dies and her father inherits her, the rapist is still exempt from swearing, [Tosfos although it came into his possession as real money], since the original obligation came from a fine and it's not similar to the loan and item watched.

4) R' Shimon held that, even according to the Rabanan's opinion that you swear on the fine of rape and seduction after Beis Din obligates, since it's already his money, but they'll agree that he doesn't swear before Beis Din obligates. Since it's only a fine, if he would admit to it, he would be exempt from paying, so his denying it is not denying any money, so he's exempt from swearing. [Tosfos adds: besides that, the father can't have acquired an item to be as payment for the fine (that the seducer can deny holding), since R' Shimon holds that no one can acquire an item that didn't materialize yet, and the obligation to pay the fine doesn't materialize until after Beis Din obligates. So, R' Shimon is saying that, besides the problem of not being able to acquire an item for the fine, it's also a problem that there's no obligation to deny.] However, the Rabanan say that he's still Chayiv for swearing since he owes real money for the damage and embarrassment.

5) R' Shimon says that someone would mainly claim the fine since it's a set amount, and not the damage and embarrassment that's not a set amount. However, the Chachumim say that he mainly claims the damage and embarrassment that the rapist can't admit and exempt himself, and not the fine that he could admit to and exempt himself.

6) Rav holds that a daughter who gets fed from her brothers (from their father's estate after his death, which is one of the conditions of the Kesuva), her salary doesn't go to the brothers. This is not similar to the father, who gets her salary, since he feeds her from his own will; but the brothers have no choice since they're forced by the Kesuva's condition. [Tosfos asks: we say that they get the salary of the widow because they're forced to feed her, implying that they wouldn't get her salary if they were only voluntarily feeding her. This is the opposite logic as by a daughter.] Although the brothers get the widow's salary for feeding her, that's because the father is not as interested that his widow should have extras like he's interested that his daughter will have extras. Although we see the opposite by a small estate (that there's not enough money to feed the daughters and sons until the daughters become Bogeresses), that the daughters get fed before the sons, but the widow gets fed before the daughters (and then the sons and daughters need to beg for their food); that's because, despite not wanting extra for his widow more than his daughter, he doesn't want his widow to be disgraced more than his daughters.

7) [Tosfos explains: we only calculate that there's not enough money to feed the daughters and sons until the daughters become Bogeresses, but not how much the widow will eat. After all, since she can eat her whole life, there's no amount that you can calculate. However, once you need to dedicate the estate to feed the daughters, you need to feed the widow first. However, if there's no daughters, or there's no sons, (and the daughters inherit completely), we don't dedicate any of the properties to be reserved for the widow's food.]

8) R' Sheishes Paskins that the daughter salary goes to her brothers. However, if they can't provide food for her, they don't get her salary. Not only the amount that she needs to feed herself, since it's simple that they can't tell her to work for us, but we won't feed you, but even what she makes more than what needs to feed her doesn't go to the brothers.

9) [Tosfos says: from the Torah, the brothers don't take over the father receiving the daughter's salary. After all, we learn it from "you leave slaves as an inheritance to your sons," implying; but not your daughters to your sons.]

10) The Gemara concludes: the Halacha is like Rav that she keeps her salary.

11) If one marries off his Naarah daughter and she eventually gets divorced or widowed; if it's when she's still an Arusah, the father collects the Kesuva. If she was already a Nesuah, she can collect her own Kesuva. R' Yehuda argues and says it belongs to the father since the Kesuva was written while she was in his possession. However, this is only if the Nessuin happened while she's still a Naarah, however, if she gets Nesuin when she became a Bogeres, she keeps it since it was written when she was already in her possession.

12) (Rebbi says: if a woman becomes a widow twice, someone shouldn't marry her since he holds two times is a Chazaka, so she has a Chazaka that she causes her husbands death [Tosfos says: according to the opinion that she transmits a disease to him, that's only if he died after they had Nesuin and had relations, and according to the opinion that it's her Mazal that kills them, it applies even if he dies before they had Nesuin.])

13) We have an argument from when can she collect from sold properties with liens on them. [Rashi says: if we say that you can collect from the Kiddushin when the rabbis enacted for her to have a Kesuva, or only from the Nesuin when the Kesuva was written. After all, you only collect from liens when it's written in a document and not from the Kiddushin since the document is not written. Tosfos disagrees since, if so, the Gemara should have framed the argument as whether an Arusah can collect from sold properties with liens on them, or not. Rather, the argument is according to R' Yehuda that the father doesn't have the Kesuva anymore if it's written after his daughter left his possession, is it because the original Kesuva from the time of Kiddushin is forgiven, so she can only collect from the Nesuin. Or, do we say that it's not forgiven, but it's part of the rabbis enactment that the father can't collect unless it was written while she's in his possession. However, everyone will agree that she can collect from the Kiddushin if she was divorced before Nessuin. However, the Rashba says that it's pushed to establish it only according to R' Yehuda. Rather, it's like the Rabanan. If the father wasn't alive at the Kiddushin, she definitely collects from the Kiddushin, but the question is if there's a father, since his possession falls off after the Nesuin, do we say the liens from before also fall off.] R' Huna says that she can collect the basic one or two hundred from Kiddushin, and all additions from Nesuin. R' Assi says that you collect it all from Nesuin.

14) R' Huna's opinion here is not a contradiction to his opinion regarding if someone has two documents, and the earlier one is written two hundred, and the later one says it was three hundred; you have the choice to collect from the first one from the earlier time, or the second one from the later time, and we don't say that you can collect two hundred from the first time and the extra one hundred from the second time (like we split it up here that you collect two hundred from the Kiddushin and the rest from the Nesuin); since the three hundred document doesn't say that it's an addition, so you can only have the first document or the second one, and not both (and that's why he can't collect five hundred). However, by the Kesuva, you write the extras as an extra from the basic Kesuva, so you can collect the basic Kesuva from Kiddushin and the extra from Nesuin.

15) R' Huna's P'sak that you may collect from whichever document you choose is not necessarily in conflict with R' Nachman's P'sak that says that if someone writes two documents, we say that the second is a redo and cancels the first one, and she only collects with the latter one (from the later date), since that's only if there's no addition to the second document (like to add a palm tree to the land sold). However, he agrees in R' Huna's case where you add something in the second document.

16) However, R' Nachman admits, even without adding anything, if he writes the first document as a sale, and the second as a gift, it doesn't cancel the first one, since the second one is to push off someone on his border who claims that he should have first dibs to buy it. [Tosfos explains: and you'll hide your sale one so the man on the border shouldn't realize that the seller has a responsibility to reimburse you if it's taken away. There are those who say: this is a good excuse why there's two documents even if the buyer is also on the border since there's still a difference since he can use the gift document to claim that it includes more. After all, even according to the opinion that people sell stingily, he gifts generously.] Also, it's this way if he wrote the gift document first and then the sale document, since he only wrote that he has a responsibility to reimburse him if it's taken away.

17) However, if both documents were the same, both was a gift, or both was a sale, the second one cancels the first one. Rafram says: since it's like he admits that the first one is forged (and that's why they needed to write a second one for it to be authentic). R' Acha says: when they wrote the second one, the buyer forgives the original lien on his properties. [Tosfos says: the practical difference between them if they're both gifts, and there is no lien on them anyhow; we must say that if the giver bought a field on the border between the times of the document, that the receiver won't take it away from him because he was at the border at that time. Alternatively, that he's allowing the borrower who lent the giver between the two times to be able to collect from this field.]

18) The practical difference between the two reasons: if it ruins the witnesses on the first document [Rashi says: Rafram holds they become Pasul. Tosfos says: the borrower and lender doesn't have the power to Pasul the witnesses, but if they have another document with these witnesses on it, they can't collect from it since they claim that they're Pasul. Alternatively, they can't use that document to verify the signatures of these witnesses since they admit it to be forged.] Also, according to Rafram, the buyer needs to pay for all the fruit that he ate from the date on the first document until the date on the second document, but not according to R' Acha. Also, according to Rafram, the seller needs to pay the taxes between the dates on the documents, and R' Acha holds that the buyer pays the taxes.

19) The Halacha is that she collects the whole Kesuva, the one and two hundred and the extras, from the time of the Nesuin. [Tosfos says: although we Paskin like R' Nachman that the second document doesn't cancel the first one if it adds something; that's because. since he's still holding onto the first document, it shows that it's not coming to cancel it. However, in our case, there's no first document and it's only owed because of a condition of Beis Din, the document cancels the original lien that came from the condition of Beis Din (that even an Arusah receives a Kesuva).]

20) If a girl less than three years old converts with her mother [Tosfos: but a Beis Din wouldn't convert her without a mother, since they only would convert her on request, and a girl less than three doesn't convert], even though we know that she's a virgin, if she's a Naarah Murasah, she only gets strangulation and not stoning, and there's no Halacha to do it by a father's door and there's no hundred Slayim for Moitzie Shem Rah. However, if she was born Jewish, but her mother was a non-Jew at conception, she gets stoning, but there's no Halacha to do it by a father's door and there's no hundred Slayim. However, if the mother was a Jewess at conception, she has the status of a Jewess in all aspects.

21) R' Yossi b. Chanina holds that if someone is Moitzie Shem Rah on an orphan, she doesn't get a hundred Slayim since you need "the Naarah's father," but he doesn't exist. [Tosfos says: this is only according to R' Yossi Haglili who says in the last Perek who holds that, when a divorce Naarah Murasah got raped, she doesn't receive any fine and doesn't Darshen that it doesn't go to the father, but to her. However, according to R' Akiva who holds that the fine doesn't go to the father, but to her, so, here, it goes to her too. Therefore, the only case that the Mishna writes doesn't get a fine is a convert, since it holds like R' Akiva, and therefore, doesn't hold that a Jewish orphan doesn't get a fine.] She only gets the fine if the father died after the Moitzie Shem Rah.

22) However, Rava argues with R' Yossi b. Chanina because of the Braisa of Ami that quotes the Pasuk "Jewish virgin," to exclude a converted virgin. However, a Jewess who's similar to a convert, i.e., an orphan who doesn't have a father, has a fine [Tosfos says: you can't say that the Braisa is not like R' Yossi Haglili, but like R' Akiva, since it's not probable to say that anyone argues with the Drasha.]

23) Someone's exempt from being Moitzie Shem Rah on a minor.

24) Shila taught: if a Naarah Merusah had Z'nus and then became a Bogeres, she gets strangling. After all, since her body changed, her death penalty also changes. The exception is if it's a case of Moitzie Shem Rah. As the Torah says a Chiddush that she gets stoned even though she's now a Nesuah, so the same if she turns into a Bogeres. [Tosfos quotes Rashbam who explains: even if she had Z'nus after Chuppah and before she had relations with her husband, that she should get strangulation at that time, she gets stoning by Moitzie Shem Rah, since it says that he didn't find her to be a virgin, implying in all cases, even if she had the Z'nus after Chuppa. However, the Ri said this is difficult. After all, later, we have the Drasha "she had Z'nus in her father's house," excluding when they're on the way to the husband's house, and the father's agents hand her over to the husband's agents.]

25) R' Huna b. R' Yehoshua rejects this proof. After all, perhaps the Torah only says this Chiddush by Nesuin where her body hadn't changed, but not after she becomes a Bogeres since her body changed. [Tosfos says: that we don't consider her body changed because the husband had relations with her since she was already a non-virgin from the adulterer's relations. It's not even considered as her body changed by the adulterer's relations since she's Chayiv at the finish of the relations, and her body already changed at that point.]

26) We don't need to say it's like R' Shimon who holds that a Kohein who sinned, and was appointed a Kohein Gadol before he brought the Korban, or a Yisrael sinned and was appointed king before he brought a Korban, can't bring a any Korban, not like a regular Jew from before the appointment, and not like a Kohein Gadol or king like after the appointment. (However, the Rabanan say that he brings like a regular Yisrael like he was originally.) [Tosfos explains: the same way he'll say that changing his status and Halacha makes his Korban change, so too the change of her body will change her death penalty.] After all, R' Shimon holds that you also follow the time that you found out that you did the sin, and not exclusively after it, and that's why he doesn't bring like a Kohein Gadol, or like a king. [Tosfos asks an unanswered question: how can you compare them? After all, if you would bring the big Korban, you can't be Yoitza the obligation if you would need to bring the small Korban. However, if one's obligated in stoning, you're Yoitza if you strangle him. As we see that if someone who has the strangle penalty on him mixes with those who are supposed to be stoned, you strangle all of them.]

27) R' Yochanan holds that the right text is "even if she became a Bogeres, her death is through stoning." After all, even though she's no longer a Naarah, but the Torah writes "the Naarah," implying that she was once a Naarah. [Tosfos says: from here he learns that we never say that the death penalty changes just because the body changes.] However, the husband doesn't get Malkos or pay the hundred Selayim for lying since he defamed her when she's a Bogeres, and can't be compared to stoning where she receives it for the sin she did when she was a Naarah.

28) If the Naarah has a father, but he doesn't have a house to have an opening to it, or there's an opening to his house, but the father is no longer living; she still gets stoning. We only need the father and his house's opening for a Mitzvah, but it doesn't prevent the Halacha of her getting stoning.

29) We learned in the Beis Medrish of Shilo: if the witnesses come to testify on her Z'nus when she was already brought in her father-in-law's house; she gets stoned at her father's house entrance, as to say; see the badness of the one you raised. However, if the witnesses come when she was still in her father's house; she's stoned at the city's gates.

30) We learned: if there's a father's house's entrance, she gets stoned there. If not, she gets stoned at the city's gates. If most of the city are non-Jews, she gets stoned at Beis Din's entrance. [Tosfos says: a distance from it, as it says in Sanhedrin, so it shouldn't look as if the Sanhedrin are killers. We must say that, when most of the city are non-Jews, the connotation of "your gate" is the gate of Beis Din, but the city's gate doesn't fulfil the definition. Although we say that you need to take him out of the three camps in order to execute him, which is usually outside the wall city, but here, where the city is mostly non-Jews, it loses its holiness of a walled city. Thus, the whole city is considered outside the three camps. This is also why we don't send a Metzorah outside the walled city when there's mostly non-Jews living in there.] Also, when we stone for idolatry, we do it by Beis Din's gate when the city is mostly non-Jews.

31) The Rabanan say: the Halacha of defaming a wife is applicable whether the husband had relations with her or not. However, R' Elazar b. Yaakov says that it's only if he had relations. [Tosfos explains: since R' Elazar b. Yaakov learns "checking out the sheet" as literal, to see if there's blood on it, and since there are witnesses to her Z'nus, and finding blood would not disprove them since the adulterer could have leaned and didn't break the hymen; he holds that she doesn't get stoned unless she was very brazen to claim that there were a lot of blood when there wasn't.]

32) Even if he didn't have relations, he gets Malkos (if proved to be a lie). [Rashi says: since he transgressed the Lav of "don't bring Rechilos." Tosfos asks: if so, you would give Malkos to any husband who insults his wife telling her she's a Zonah. Rather it's a rabbinical Malkos Mardos.]

33) R' Elazar says: the Lav for defaming a wife is from "don't bring Rechilos," and R' Nosson learns it from "guard yourself from anything bad" (However, R' Elazar doesn't want to learn it from there since it's only telling you not to have improper thoughts during the day that might lead to you letting out semen at night, and R' Nosson didn't want to learn from Rechilus, since it's only telling a judge not to be Rach, soft to one litigant, and harsh to another.

34) The Rabanan held that the husband gets punished for defaming even if he didn't hire the false witnesses. R' Yehuda says that it's only if he hired them.

35) We have many inquiries according to R' Yehuda. Does he get punished if he exchanged land for the testimony? Does he get punished if he hired them for less than a Prutah's worth? Does he get punished if he hired them both for a Prutah? We have an inquiry according to all; Does he get punished if he divorced her, and remarried her?

36) However, a Yavam doesn't get punished since the Pasuk says that the father says "I gave over my daughter to this man," and he didn't give her to the Yavam.

37) According to R' Elazar b. Yaakov: although we find in the whole Torah that anal relations has the status of regular relations, but for the defaming, we need the adulterer and husband to have regular relations (or else he can't claim "I didn't find your daughter a virgin.")

38) If someone says "I'll pay half your Erech," he needs to pay a full Erech as a decree that you'll confuse it with someone saying "I'll pay the Erech of half of you," which you need to pay the full Erech since you promised the Erech of a limb that you need to stay alive.

39) A father has the rights to the Kiddushin of his Naarah, or minor, daughter, from the Torah, whether she gets the Kiddushin through money, a document or by relations.

40) The father has rights to objects she finds because of animosity. [Rashi says: since he supplies her food. Tosfos says: even if she doesn't support her, since we want to keep him happy since he has the power to marry her off to a disgusting person, or someone with a dangerous skin disease.]

41) [Tosfos says: what Rashi said earlier that there's no concern of animosity by a girl and her brothers because they must give her food against their will; Rashba disagrees. After all, we say that the widow's work goes to the orphans even though they must support her against their will. Thus, there's a problem that it might lead to animosity that the widow must go to Beis Din constantly to get her food if the orphans refuse to give it because of animosity. (However, this is problematic, since, how could the Rashba learn the Sugya earlier that the sisters don't need to give her brothers what she made. See P'nei Yehoshua.)]

42) The father receives his daughter's wages.

42a) It's permitted from the Torah to get married on Shabbos and Yom Tov, and is only rabbinically forbidden. [Tosfos says: even though we say you can't get married during a Yom Tov (even on Chol Hamoed) not to mix two different Simchas; we can say that they can marry in the obligated addition from weekday onto the Yom Tov right beforehand, although it's forbidden to do Melacha, but you can marry. Alternatively, it's permitted to marry on Yom Tov without a wedding feast since there's not much of a Simcha.]

44) A father can annul his daughter's vows, can accept her Get from her husband on her behalf, and inherits her if she dies.

45) The Tanna Kama says that the father doesn't receive the fruits of her field while the daughter is still living, since they enacted this fruit should be for ransoming her if she's captured, and it's not necessary to enact it for a father since he'll anyhow ransom his daughter. R' Yossi b. Yehuda says that they enacted it for a father, or else he'll say that she has her own money that he doesn't have access to. Therefore, let her ransom herself, and if it's not enough, he's not supplementing it.

46) If a father writes that he'll supply her with fruit, clothing and utensils when he goes to her husband's house, and she dies [Rashi: after Kiddushin, but before Nesuin], the Tanna Kama says that the husband doesn't receive them anymore, but they say in the name of R' Nosson that he does get them. [Tosfos brings R' Tam who disagrees with Rashi's explanation. After all, how can R' Nosson say the husband gets it since she never went into his house, which is the stipulation. Therefore, R' Tam says: we're referring to after Nesuin, but the Tanna Kama holds that there's an assumption that the father would only give it in order that his daughter have pleasure from it, but since she died immediately after the Nesuin, she didn't have pleasure. R' Nosson held that, despite this, he still acquires the items.]

47) The Gemara wanted it to be dependant on the argument between the Tanna Kama who says: if the husband dies when she was an Arusa (and she wrote him an addition to the Kesuva); the orphans need to pay the addition, and R' Elazar b. Azarya says that they only need to pay the main Kesuva and not the addition since it was only written if he would take her into his house (as a full wife). [Tosfos says: according to Rashi's explanation, the similarity is simple: do we say that it's written for now, by the Kiddushin, or for after the Nessuin. However, according to R' Tam's explanation, just like R' Elazar b. Azarya holds to make an assumption, so too the Tanna Kama in our Gemara makes an assumption.] However, the Gemara rejects it since everyone can hold like R' Elazar b. Azarya's assumptions, but R' Nosson holds that it's only when it's coming from him to her, but when it's coming from her to him, the father just wants her to be married, so he gives it under all circumstances. [Tosfos asks on R' Tam's explanation: how can you compare our argument to that argument there since the Gemara there says that both the Tanna Kama and R' Elazar b. Azarya held of making assumptions, the question is what assumption do you take? Also, why did the Gemara need to differentiate by who's giving it, and not differentiate between after Kiddushin or after Nessuin?]

48) [Tosfos says: although we say that R' Elazar b. Azarya held that you only acquired the Kesuva's addition on condition that he brings her to Nessuin, but if someone buys an animal and it gets killed by a beast afterwards, we don't say that the assumption is he only bought it on condition that it would live, since he would of bought it even if it was spoken out on condition that he'll lose it if it would be killed. Also, this is only by things that can be dependent on other people, like there are two sides in a sale; but if he's the only opinion here, like in the case where he returned to the Kohanim what he stole from a Ger before he died, and the robber dies before his Asham, his heirs would be able to claim that it was a mistaken giving if it wasn't for the fact that he receives somewhat of an atonement for returning it. After all, since it's all dependent on what he gives it for.]

49) They enacted to give a wife food instead of her salary that goes to the husband. [Tosfos points out: according to R' Huna who says that a woman can tell her husband that she won't work for him and she won't receive food, the text should be the opposite; that they enacted the salary instead of the food. However, Reish Lakish says that she can't say that she won't work and won't get food, so the main enactment was the salary, so the text doesn't need changing. However, he agrees that the husband doesn't have the choice to tell his wife that he won't support her and he won't take her salary if the salary doesn't cover her food. Rather, we only consider the salary the main enactment regarding that the wife can't opt out of it.] They enacted ransoming the wife from captivity instead of the fruit he receives from her Nichsei Melug fields. Therefore, the husband eats the fruits and we don't say that he should just leave it to be ready for ransoming [Tosfos: until he doesn't have any other support]. After all, if at that time she's captured and the fruits are not enough to ransom her, he will refuse to supplement the amount. Therefore, it's better for him to just eat all the fruits, and when she's captured, he wouldn't know how much he ate and thus would ransom her unconditionally.

50) The reason they didn't enact the opposite; that her salary is for the redemption of captivity, and the fruit is for her support: since it's more apt to enact the salary for the food since they're both common, and the fruit for the ransoming, since both captivity and a woman to have Nichsei Melug are uncommon.

51) [Tosfos says: even though the main enactment was to make sure that she's ransomed (and not to give the fruit to the husband), the wife can't say that she'll keep the fruit and she won't be ransomed. After all, it's not similar to receiving food, where she can refuse it to keep her salary; since that won't completely uproot the enactment, since she could opt into it later. However, here, since the enactment is to be the fruits of her whole lifetime for her redemption, she can't just opting in and out of it, and once she opts out, it's canceled. Alternatively, we don't allow her to opt out so that she won't be lost forever among the non-Jews. Alternatively, since the husband already has an acquisition in the field for the fruits, the wife can't get it away from him, but he doesn't have any acquisition on the woman's hands to say that he already owns her salary.]

52) They enacted for him to pay for her burial because he keeps her Kesuva. [Rashi: the dowery that was put into the Kesuva. Tosfos explains: it can't be the hundred/two hundred that's standard for the Kesuva since the wife was never entitled to it when she dies in his lifetime. Thus, he's not obligated to bury her if she was an Arusah.]

53) There's an argument to what's the definition of "Sher, Kesus and Onah" that the Torah obligates a husband. The Tanna Kama and R' Elazar explain that it's food, clothes and relations. R' Elazar b. Yaakov explains them describing Kesus, clothes. It needs to be according to Sher, the age. As older women need them not to be too wide since it's hard for them to wear the large loads, but younger ones need them to be wide for style. Also, it's needed to be according to Onah, the time of year. The new clothing should come in time for winter to keep her warm, and it should become worn out in the summer to keep her cool. [Tosfos explains: even so, R' Elazar b. Yaakov requires him to supply her with food and relations, as a Kal V'chomer from clothing. As, if he's obligated to give her clothing which is not essential for life and people don't get married for it, of course he's obligated to provide food which is essential for life, and relations which is the purpose of getting married.]

54) By relations, you need to have his body touching her. if he insists that he can only have it when they're both attired, then she goes out with her Kesuva.

55) The Tanna Kama says: her burial should be according to her family's standards, and not his. As we only say that he brings her up the his family's standards in her lifetime, but not after her death. However, R' Yehuda says that you need to bury her according to his family's standard, since she gets uplifted to that standard even in her death. The Halacha is like R' Yehuda.

56) If he says that he doesn't want his property to go after his death to pay for his wife's burial (who outlives him), he's allowed. After all, the orphans are not obligated to pay for her burial since she already received her Kesuva. However, he can't say that he doesn't want to have his property not used to bury himself, (and it should be collected from charity) since he can't enrich his children and place the burdon of his burial on the community.

57) If the husband goes insane, the Beis Din goes into his property to support his wife and kids, and to give her another thing (as explained later). [Tosfos explains: this is only if he was supporting the kids before he went insane, and we know that he wants to support them.]

58) This is only like by the insane, where he leaves his conscience without planning it and can't appoint people to feed them. However, if he left to overseas and hadn't appointed people to feed his family, we only take from his property to support his wife, since he's obligated to her [Tosfos: even though he fed his children before he left]. Since he didn't prepare or command people to feed them, he doesn't want to continue feeding them.

59) The "other thing" that we give the wife; some say that it's perfume. [Tosfos says: although a husband is obligated to provide perfume for his wife; that's only if she's with him in order that she shouldn't become disgusting to him.] Others say that it's Tzedaka for her to distribute, but you always give her perfume (even if he doesn't go insane, but leaves by himself) since he doesn't want his wife to become disgusting.

60) The daughter is always in his father's auspices until she enters the Chuppah, so she can't eat Trumah until then even if the time came for the husband to take her (like the later teachings, and not like the earlier teachings that permits it).

61) When she's handed over to the husband's agents to be brought to the husband; Rav says that she's considered in her husband's auspices except for Trumah, and R' Assi says that it's even regarding Trumah. [Rashi says that Rav held the reason is that her husband might find her to have some blemish, and it will be a mistaken marriage, and she ate Trumah retroactively without being a Kohein's wife, and R' Assi held the reason is she might give her siblings to drink from the Trumah, and that's not applicable after she's handed over. Tosfos asks: we say later that, according to the later teaching, everyone agrees that the reason is that her husband might find her to have some blemish. Rather, R' Assi holds that we assume that, before she's handed over, they'll check her out and she didn't have any blemish. Granted that this is the opposite of the Gemara in the fifth Perek where we say that the practical difference between the two reasons: is when she's handed over to the husband's agents to be brought to the husband, and Rashi explains: you don't need to worry about sharings since she's not around her family, but you need to worry about a blemish; still, the Mishna that calls the girl in her husband's auspices forced R' Assi to to permit it since it implies that he's in his auspices completely. Alternatively, we can explain the Sugya in the fifth Perek opposite of Rashi, that when she's handed over, she's no longer a problem of blemishes, since before she's handed over, they'll check her out and she didn't have any blemishes. However, we still need to worry that she might share the Trumah with the husband's agents.] However, we disprove R' Assi since we see a Braisa that she doesn't get Trumah when she's handed over.

62) Shmuel says: we consider her in her husband's auspices regarding that he inherits her if she dies. Reish Lakish says: it's considered as a Nesuin in the aspect that, if he dies and she marries someone else afterwards, she's considered a widow to only receive a hundred Zuz from this second husband. [Tosfos says: Shmuel doesn't mean to exclude that she's not a Nesuah regarding her husband annulling her vows, or that she doesn't get stoned for Znus anymore, but strangulation. Rather, it's just a Chiddush that the husband inherits her at this time even though inheriting a wife is only a rabbinical enactment. Alternatively, I might think, since the father hasn't endowed her with an dowery until after the Chuppah, the husband doesn't inherit her either, so we're taught otherwise. Alternatively, he only excludes Reish Lakish's opinion and holds that her Kesuva from the second husband is two hundred. Therefore, Reish Lakish tells us his Chiddush that her Kesuva is only one hundred. Alternatively, Reish Lakish argues with Shmuel and holds that she doesn't inherit her for the reasons we said earlier why Shmuel is a Chiddush that he inherits her.]

63) When the father's agents are escorting the husband's agents, it's not Nesuin yet. If they encamp in a place, if it's in her courtyard, it's not a Nesuin unless the husband encamps explicitly for Nesuin. However, if it's in his courtyard, then it's Nesuin unless they explicitly stay there only for an ordinary encampment and not for Nesuin.

64) At the point that the father's agents hand her over to the husband's agents, if she has Z'nus, she gets strangulation, and not stoning. Even if she's divorced or widowed afterwards, it was a Nesuin. [Tosfos explains: even if they didn't have relations, they didn't cancel the Nesuin. Therefore, she never returns to the father's auspices.]

65) R' Meir says: it's a Mitzvah to support your daughters, and Kal V'chomer to your sons who learn Torah. [Tosfos explains: i.e., you shouldn't be extra strict on those who learn Torah not to support them, in order that they can continue to learn Torah.] R' Yehuda says: it's a Mitzvah to support the sons, and Kal V'chomer to the daughters so that they're not disgraced by having to beg at people's doors. R' Yochanan b. Broka says: there's no Mitzvah to support either one. However, everyone agrees that there is no obligation to support either one. After all, one's only obligated to feed the daughters from a condition of the Kesuva after his death, but not in his lifetime.

66) In Usha, they enacted that one should support his minor children. [Tosfos says: however, he anyhow has a real obligation to feed his very young children, as it says in the fifth Perek]. However, the Halacha is that he doesn't need to feed them, but we embarrass him in public saying that he doesn't want to support him (in order to pressure him to feed them). However, this is only if we don't assess him to be rich, but if he's rich, we anyhow force him to give Tzedaka. [Tosfos says: although Tzedaka is a positive Mitzva that has a reward written by it, which we usually don't force people to keep; we must say that we only force him with threats, but not with lashing. Alternatively, if the city places a price for him to pay for Tzedaka, they can enforce it, as we say in Bava Basra, that a city can enforce their enactments. Alternatively, it's not only a positive Mitzvah, but even two Lavs, of not refraining, and not closing his hands.]

67) They also enacted in Usha that, if one writes over all his possessions to his sons, he and his wife still gets supported from it. [Tosfos says: this is only if it was given to the sons, but if it was given to another person, it's considered as gifted property with a lien for his obligations, where you can't collect obligations to feed from it. (However, that's only by regular gifts from a well person (with a proper acquisition) but not a gift from the deathly ill (without a proper acquisition) since it's only a rabbinical gift.] This is despite that the husband can hire himself to support him and his wife. This is even more apt when he dies and it's to support his widow that may not have the ability to support herself. Therefore, when he dies, and if his daughter inherits him (when there's no sons) and she marries [Tosfos: which is considered as if the husband bought her property]; she collects her support from that property.

68) However, the Gemara concludes: the Halacha is not like that enactment, and you can't force the sons to feed their father [Tosfos: to lash them] but you force them [with words] to feed their father. (However, the widow can collect her food from her son-in-law.)

69) They enacted in Usha that someone shouldn't spend more than a fifth to give to the poor, for, perhaps, he would become poor himself and would need to come on to charity. [Tosfos brings the Yerushalmi that explains: the first year, you can spend a fifth of your whole property, and from that time on, you only can give a fifth from your profits of that year.]

70) R' Acha b. Yaakov says: the two 'tenths' that makes up the fifth is not equal, since the first tenth you take on your whole property, and then you take the second tenth from what remains. R' Ashi says that the two 'tenths' are equal and you take a full fifth from the whole property.

71) [Tosfos starts up: when your son is five, you start your son slowly learning P'sukim.] When he's six, you teach him a lot of Psukim like you would stuff your ox with food. [Tosfos: when he's ten, you start teaching him Mishna.] Even if he's not gaining much, you still teach him with a nice attitude until he's twelve. If he's not learning by that point, then you act harsh to him (to lash him and to refrain some bread from him).

72) There are some who say that if you bring him to learn before he's six, he will be weak and he will never able to regain that strength, and others say that his friends will try to keep up with him in learning and they wouldn't be able to. Some say that both are true, he will be smarter, but weaker, than everyone else. Others reconcile it, he will lose if he's naturally a weak child, and he will gain if he's naturally healthy.

73) (Girls start fasting for Yom Kippur when they reach eleven, and boys from when they reach twelve. [Rashi says: since girls get their strength early. Tosfos disagrees. The reason is; since they become obligated in Mitzvos a year earlier than boys, so their Chinuch age is a year earlier.]

74) They also enacted in Usha: if the wife sells her Nichsei Melug, and she dies, her husband can remove it from the buyer whenever he wants. [Tosfos explains: this is only needed according to Reish Lakish who holds the main acquisition is the one who owns the actual land. However, R' Yochanan who holds the main ownership of the field is who owns the produce would anyhow hold that the sale is not binding since the husband has the acquisition on the produce. Alternatively, there's a practical difference if the husband wrote her “I don't have any right to your property,” that he doesn't get the produce, but he still inherits her when she dies. Alternatively, he could have given her the fruits afterwards as a gift.]

75) Just like a son can only collect his mother's Kesuvas Binyan Dichron from land, and not from movable objects, so too the daughters can only collect for their food from land, and not from movable objects. Although they enacted "in the attic" that they should collect from movable objects, but the Halacha is not like them. [Tosfos says: therefore, any Beis Din that collects from movable objects is considered as if they erred in a explicit Mishna teaching, and is not considered a P'sak, and must return what they did.] Although we usually Paskin like Rebbi when he argues with a colleague, and he says to collect from movable objects, but R' Shimon b. Elazar argues with him and Rava explicitly Paskins like him. [Tosfos says: however, from the enactment of the Gaonim to say that you nowadays collect from movable objects even in cases where Chazal say to collect from land; we can collect for her food from movable objects just like from land.]

76) Any produce on trees that's designated to be harvested, it's considered as if they're already harvested. [Tosfos says: this is like how we Paskin in Bava Kama like R' Shimon who holds that, if your animal eats completed produce from someone else's field, we assess the damage as eating fruit, and not just assessing the land how much it loss with the damage to what's growing on it.] Therefore, she can only collect from fruit that needs the land to grow more, but not those that are ready for harvest [Tosfos: even if it's not damaging the tree by being on it too long], since they're not considered as attached to the land.

77) If a girl orphan is being married off by her mother or brother; you give her the same amount of dowry as the father gave her older sister in his lifetime. [Tosfos says this is only by giving less than a tenth, but you're not allowed to give more than a tenth since you're removing the inheritance from his sons. The only way that we assess him to be generous to his daughters if he wants to give the tenth from his movable objects just like from his lands. This is like R' Yehuda, but the Chachumim say that, just because he gave that amount to the other sister doesn't mean he would give the same to this sister since people are sometimes more generous at one time and stingy at another time. Rather, we always give the daughters after his death the standard tenth of his estate. However, if you can't assess the father] Rava says that you only collect from the land and not from movable objects. [Tosfos says: however, from the enactment of the Gaonim to say that you nowadays collect from movable objects even in cases where Chazal say to collect only from land; we can assume every father wants to give the daughters from movable objects just like from land, and they get a tenth from the movable objects too.]

78) R' Meir says: if any husband writes a Kesuva for less than two hundred for a virgin and a hundred for a widow, his relations with her are promiscuous. [Tosfos says: Rivan explains that he made a condition that does not take effect, so she really has it, but she's not confident that she'll receive it. However, if she really doesn't get it, the relations aren't promiscuous. Ri disagrees since the Gemara in Bava Kama says that, because of R' Meir's opinion, the husband can't deduct the Kesuva if his wife damaged him, although she's not entitled to the Kesuva. Therefore, we're saying: not only is it promiscuous if she really doesn't have a Kesuva, but even if she has one, but she's not confident that she'll collect it.] He also says that, if the Kesuva doesn't mention anything about being obligated by making liens on his property, it's not a mistake of the scribe that he left it out, and she can only collect from unsold properties.

79) R' Yehuda says: a woman can't verbally forgive her Kesuva, but could write a receipt to the husband as if she received the money.

80) Shmuel's father says: a married woman who was raped is forbidden to her husband [Tosfos: from the Torah] since we're worried that, although she was forced by the beginning of the act, but, perhaps, she participated wilfully at the end of the act. [Tosfos says: although all the time Esther was with Achashveirosh, she was permitted to Mordichai; that's because we knew her to be a great Tzadeikis.] However, we're lenient by a captive not to forbid her to a Yisrael's wife since we're not even sure that she was raped. When the Torah permits a raped wife, that's only if we have witnesses that she screamed from the beginning until the end of the act.

81) Rava argues and holds: if she was forced in the beginning, even if she wants it at the end, and even if she says to let him, and even if she claims that if he didn't do it, she would have hired him to do it; she's permitted to her husband. After all, after the act started, it caused her Yetzer Hara to become strong, which is also an Onness.

82) Those women who were kidnapped are permitted to their husbands, even though they were helping their captives by preparing their foods and arrows, since they only help them because of fear. However, if they stayed after they allowed them to leave, they're forbidden to their husbands.

83) If Achashveirosh raped her, since he's a real king and he would never take her as a wife, or if she's raped by a regular robber, who it wouldn't be advantageous to be his wife; she's definitely permitted to her husband. However, if the king of the robbers raped her, she's forbidden to her husband since we're concerned that she was wilful for the possibility that he may take her as a wife.

84) Only a Yisrael's wife is permitted to her husband after a rape, but not a Kohein's wife. However, if it turns out that their original Kiddushin was a mistake (like when a condition wasn't fulfilled), she's allowed to the Kohein since it was shown retroactively that she was not married at the time of the rape.

85) Therefore, we have a condition of the Kesuva that, by a captive Yisrael's wife, that he needs to ransom her and return her to his house. However, the condition by a Kohein is that he ransoms her and returns her to her place of origins. (However, she can't return to him, since she's forbidden to her.)

86) If a Yisrael married a Mamzeres or Nesina, he definitely doesn't need to ransom her. [Tosfos says: however, her husband eats her fruits, as the Gemara says in Yevamos, and through that, he would ransom her up to the amount that he ate, but he doesn't need to supplement to ransom her completely.] After all, the condition to return her to her house is not applicable since he's anyhow forbidden to her.

87) However, if a Kohein Gadol marries a widow; Abaya says that he needs to ransom her since it's applicable to keep his condition, to return her to her place of origins. However, Rava says he doesn't need to ransom her, since he's only obligated to ransom if the prohibition of a captive is preventing her to returning to him, but not other prohibitions.

88) If the husband vows not to have pleasure from his wife and she's prohibited to him, (and Sumchas says only if he vowed before she was captured, but not afterwards since it's only a trick so that he shouldn't have to ransom her); R' Eliezer says he still needs to ransom her since at the time of the condition, it was applicable to her. However, R' Yehoshua says that he doesn't have to ransom (Abaya for a Yisrael, and Rava, even to a Kohein) since it's not applicable at the present time.

89) The Halacha is that orphans don't need to ransom her after her husband dies, even though the husband was aware of her capture before his death. After all, the condition of "returning to their house to be his wife" is not applicable.

90) The Tanna Kama says: if a wife was captured and they are demanding ten times her worth, he has to pay it the first time, but he doesn't need to pay it again if she's captured a second time. [Rashi explains: since the rabbis only enacted the husband to only ransom once. Tosfos deduces from Rashi's explanation that he doesn't need to ransom the second time even if it's only her worth. Therefore, we can explain that they enacted fruit for redemptions since they're both uncommon, that the ransoming is uncommon since you only need to do it once. However, burial is considered more common since it's normal for the wife to die before the man, as the Yerushalmi states. However, R' Chananel explains: the husband is obligated to ransom the wife a second time, but only the amount of her worth. Therefore, his text is that the redemption is common, but the burial is uncommon since it's only applicable once.]

91) R' Shimon b. Gamliel held that the husband doesn't need to ransom his wife for more than her worth, even if it's not equal to her Kesuva, and he doesn't need to pay more than her Kesuva even if it's not more than her worth (so that this secondary Kesuva obligation shouldn't be more than the main obligation). The Rabanan say that he's obligated to pay the first time even ten times her worth, but he doesn't need to pay the second time more than her whole Kesuva.

92) [Tosfos says: even though we say that we shouldn't ransom people for more than their worth, but that limitation is only on the community and not on an individual for his own body. This is not only because of the reason that it shouldn't be such a pressure on the Jewish community, which is not applicable when he's fitting the bill, but even according to the reason that the non-Jews shouldn't be so anxious to capture Jews. After all, we can't limit him from ransoming himself even if it will get others captured, and the same for his wife since his wife is like himself. However, a daughter is not like himself, so he can't overpay to ransom his daughter according to the reason that the non-Jews shouldn't become anxious to capture Jews.]

93) You can't send a Get to a captured wife with her Kesuva and say to ransom herself, since he was already obligated to ransom her before the Get. However, if she's sick, he can divorce her and give her the Kesuva and tell her to heal herself.

94) A widow gets supported from the orphans' inherited property. If she's sick and needs treatment; if it's a constant treatment, it's like food, and comes from the orphans' property. If it's a set amount, then it's not like food and we deduce the cost from her Kesuva. Therefore, if the orphans are smart, even if the treatments are ongoing, they can make a deal with the doctor to give a set amount for all future treatments and then it will come out of the woman's Kesuva.

95) You're allowed to give legal advice to a relative to maneuver a strategy, but an important person shouldn't do it.

96) The rabbis enacted a Kesuva Binyan Dichran. I.e., if the wife dies before her husband, her sons inherit her Kesuva. After all, if it would also go to her husband's other children (and would be lost to her descendants), her father would refrain from giving a dowery, which is necessary in order to fulfil his obligation to help his daughter get married to make sure people jump to take her. It's not considered as if he's taking the money away from his sons' inheritance, which is not allowed, since it's his obligation to give the dowery to help his daughter get married. However, it's only up to a tenth of his property.

97) Her sons even inherit her one hundred, or two hundred, Zuz, even though it's not coming for the dowery; since the father won't contribute the dowery if the husband won't contribute from himself to the Binyan Dichran. Even if the father didn't give a dowery, the sons get Binyan Dichran because we don't make exceptions to the enactment. If she only had daughters from him, they don't inherit the Binyan Dichran from the husband's sons (from other wives), since they enacted to work like an inheritance. Even if the husband only had girls, her daughters don't get her Kesuva since we don't make exceptions to the enactment that only males get it. They can't collect movable objects, since it has the Halachos of a Kesuva. You can't collect from sold properties, since it has the Halachos of an inheritance. However, it's only collected if there's an extra Dinar to the estate after the Binyan Dichran is collected by all sons, but it's not collected otherwise since we don't push off the Torah inheriting to satisfy the rabbinical inheriting of the Binyan Dichran.

98) If a woman sells her Kesuva to someone, even if it's the husband, if she dies, her sons get the Binyan Dichran. After all, she's not forgiving the Kesuva, but because she needs money, she sold it. Therefore, what wasn't in the sale remains. However, if she forgives her Kesuva, there's no more Binyan Dichran since she forgave everything to her husband.

99) If she forgives her Kesuva, she's not supported after his death since the conditions of the Kesuva has the same status of the Kesuva, and we don't say that we're repaying the good she did to her husband by forgiving the Kesuva with meanness by preventing her from having support.

100) If she says that her husband died, and she married someone else, and her original husband returns, we say that she loses her Kesuva and Binyan Dichran from both husbands, and we don't say it's like selling her Kesuva since she's also forced by her Yetzer to marry someone else, so she shouldn't be giving up her Binyan Dichran just because she forgoes her Kesuva. After all, it's not dependant on her idea of what she's willing to give up, but it's the fine the rabbis impose on her, and they fined her to lose everything, even the Binyan DIchran.

101) If a man's Arusa dies, he's not obligated to bury her. [Tosfos says: although she has two hundred for her Kesuva from then, but they only enacted to bury one's wife for the dowery that he inherits, which doesn't apply before Nesuin] since he's not obligated to pay out the hundred/two hundred, since it's not owed until she can fulfil the condition that she could marry someone else, which is not applicable when she dies. Therefore, we don't consider the husband inheriting this from her, so he didn't inherit anything to obligate burying her. [Tosfos explains: we hold like Beis Shammai who says that we Darshen the words of the Kesuva as they're simply translated even if it's to her detriment, like in this case. However, if it's to her benefit, even Beis Hillel admits that you Darshen it.]

102) One of the conditions of the Kesuva is that, if he dies, his estate feeds the daughters until they become a Bogeres or marry. Rav (and Tanna Kama) says: even if only by Kiddushin. Although the husband is not legally obligated yet to feed her, but our concern to obligate the estate to pay for her food is so that she shouldn't be disgraced to have to beg for her food, but now she has a husband who would make sure that she won't be disgraced and supply her with food even if he's not obligated. However, Levi (and R' Elazar) says that it's only after Nesuin, (or when it comes time for Nesuin, when the husband is obligated to feed her.) After all, we don't assume he would feed her beforehand, since he didn't inspect her from blemishes, so he wouldn't throw out his money if it might come to naught.

103) A widow and a divorcee in her father's house [Rashi: from Airusen, that never had Nesuin] gets fed from the estate. [Tosfos explains: even though it seems simple, since even an Arusa gets fed from the father's estate, is the inference, that she doesn't get if she was widowed or divorced after Nesuin. However, R' Tam explains: we refer to her being divorced and widowed from Nesuin, but if she went back to her father's house while he was living and was fed by her father, then she's continued getting fed from the estate after his death, since she didn't lose her rights. However, if she became widowed or divorced after her father's death, she doesn't get fed from the estate, since she lost her rights. However, Tosfos doesn't like this explanation since, once she has Nesuin, she totally leaves her father's auspices and doesn't have rights to be fed.]

104) There's an unresolved inquiry whether there's food to a Yavam's daughter. [Rashi says: since the Yavam may be obligated in it like in the Kesuva when there's nothing left from the first husband's estate to pay it. Tosfos says: or do we say that he only owes the Kesuva to the wife, but not to her daughter even if there's no more estate of the first husband. However, if there's still some estate left from the husband, she gets fed from there. However, there are those who explain: we inquire if even the first one's estate needs to pay since this is not his daughter. Or, even the Yavam's obligated to pay even if there's no more from the first husband's estate, because it's his actual daughter.]

105) [Tosfos asks: if we can inquire about the Yavam paying Binyan Dichran. After all, perhaps he doesn't have to pay since they're not the sons of the original husband, or do we say that it's still part of the enactment since the father might refrain to give for a dowery on the chance she falls to a Yavam and his descendants won't get any of it.]

106) We have many unresolved inquiries. Does a daughter of a Shniya (i.e., rabbinical Ervos) get fed from his estate or not. (After all, the Shniya doesn't get a Kesuva, but, perhaps they only fined the Shniya herself since she transgressed the prohibition, but not her daughter.) Also, does a daughter of an Arusah gets fed. (After all, she has a Kesuva [Rashi: if he writes one for her, or perhaps it was enacted.] Or, do we say that you're not obligated to write a Kesuva for her that has the Kesuva's conditions until Nesuin.)

107) A daughter of a rape victim (after the forced marriage) definitely is fed according to R' Yossi b. Yehuda who holds she receives a Kesuva, so she gets all the Kesuva's conditions. However, it's an unresolved inquiry according to the Rabanan. Do we say she doesn't since the mother doesn't get a Kesuva, or do we say that the hundred/two hundred Zuz is unnecessary since it's not needed as a deterrent from divorcing, since he can't divorce her; but she has all the others Kesuva conditions. [Tosfos asks: why didn't they ask about the rape victim herself, if she's entitled to be fed after her husband's death.]

108) One of the conditions of the Kesuva is that she may stay in his house all the days of widowhood. However, it infers that only a house, but not a small hut. [Tosfos says: therefore, if he only has a hut, she loses her rights completely. however, if he has a house, even if he has many of them, the heirs can't push her to live in a different smaller house, or even if it's the same size., since the Kesuva says "like the way you used it in his lifetime.] Even if he doesn't have a house for her to stay, she's still fed from the estate. Mar b. R' Ashi says: she doesn't receive food, since all the conditions of the Kesuva is dependant on each other, and once she loses one, she doesn't have any. However, the Halacha is not like Mar b. R' Ashi.

109) If people ask the widow to marry her, if she defers since she's still morning over her first husband, she still gets fed. However, if she defers since they're not good enough for her, she doesn't get fed from the estate since she's no longer in widowhood.

110) R' Chisda says that a widow that had Z'nus doesn't get fed anymore, and, of course, if she's starting to pretty herself with make up since she's no longer keeping in her widowhood. R' Yosef says that she only loses it if she puts on make up, but not for Z'nus since her Yetzer forced her to do it.

111) However, the Halacha is not like those statements, but she only loses it if she claims her Kesuva in Beis Din, or she sells it, uses it as collateral, or makes it into an Apotiki (which is like she collected it) even if she did it outside of Beis Din. [Tosfos explains: that she doesn't lose it for making herself up or Z'nus, but if she defers marriage because they're not good enough for her, she definitely loses it.]

112) The people of Yerushalayim and Galil were accustomed that the widow still gets fed after the orphans paid her the Kesuva, and the people of Judea held that she doesn't get fed. Rav Paskined like the people of Judea, and Shmuel like those of Galil. [Tosfos says: therefore, in a place that has a custom to do it one way, they should continue like their custom. However, in a place that doesn't have a particular custom, the Halacha is like Shmuel and she gets fed.]

113) Rav says: clothing that the widow is wearing still gets assessed and its worth is deducted off her Kesuva. Shmuel says that it's not assessed on her. There's an argument whether these two Amarayim reversed their opinions regarding a hired worker (if we deduct the worth of the clothing he's given from his wage, or not), or if they're consistent to their opinions here by a widow.

114) The Halacha is like Rav, and we deduct her clothes. Granted that we consider it hers when they were together, and if the husband makes his property Hekdesh, his wife's clothing is not included. However, it's not given to her from when she's leaving his auspices, so we assess the worth and deduct it from her Kesuva.

115) If the father commanded before his death that a certain amount of his estate should be used to buy jewelery etc. for his daughters, and the price of them went down, the orphan sons gain the extra, and they don't need to spend more like they were worth at the time of the command.

116) If he commands that four hundred Zuz of his wine is for his daughter's jewelery, and the price of wine went up, the profit goes to the sons since the daughter's didn't own the wine, but it was only dedicated to be sold to buy the four hundred Zuz of jewelery.

117) If there's a widow that ate a lot of food, if the orphans, in an attempt to curve the bill, designated a field for her to take her food, and she consented; if they said that it should go "towards your food;" then it's only to give her extra food. If she's given enough for basics, she can sell the field to get an abundant amount of food. However, if they said it's "for your food," then it's a set amount for her food, and it's as if they paid her off. [Tosfos says: and you can advise a relative to do this, even if he's an important person, since the wife is consenting to it.]

118) [Tosfos points out: it seems not like this regarding a place where it's accustomed to write double the amount the father promises in the Kesuva in order to make it seem like he's getting a great amount; so she can only collect half of what's written in the Kesuva, since that was what was actually given. So, if he says to bring four hundred towards the Kesuva, or for the Kesuva, it's only that four hundred should be written in the Kesuva and he's only supplying two hundred, and we don't say either one is to write eight hundred and he'll supply four hundred; so we don't say that 'towards it' tells us to give more. We need to differentiate between the case of a widow who is already entitled to food, so we assume that it means more, than by a dowery, where the daughter is not entitled to any dowery yet. Alternatively, over there, without mentioning anything about the Kesuva, we know he's referring to the dowery, and by saying that he's providing four hundred, we would know to write eight hundred. Now that he adds in about the Kesuva, it's coming to take away from the pledge and to say that it's only what to be written in the Kesuva. However, by providing food, the orphans must mention the concept that it's for food, or else, how do we know why they're giving the field for? Therefore, the mere mentioning of food is not a reason to lessen what's being given.]

119) You're obligated in all the Kesuva's conditions even if it's not written explicitly in the Kesuva.