Daf 29

1) The Mishna list the Naaros girls who receive the fine of being raped. This includes a Mamzeres and a Nesina. [Rashi says: (that they’re the Givonim) who Dovid enacted that they can’t marry regular Jews, because he enacted them to be like slaves (to cut wood and to draw water), like it says in Yevamos. Tosfos disagrees, since the Gemara implies that they’re forbidden to Jews from the Torah. As Rava’s conclusion in Yevamos is that the Pasuk that prohibits marrying them, (i.e., the seven nations who lived in Eretz Yisrael), is after their conversion. Rather, R’ Tam explains: the Nesina is forbidden because of the Lav “you shall not marry them,”and Dovid only enacted that they must be obligated to work these menial jobs for Jews, but did not enact that they should be prohibited to marry regular Jews, since they’re already prohibited in that from before from the Lav of “not marrying them.” They enacted for them to work these menial jobs so that the Jews shouldn’t mix with them. This, that they enacted on them more than any other people who can’t marry into regular Jews is because they’re a complete nation.] Also, he pays a fine if he rapes a Kuthian. [Rashi says: that our Mishna held that they converted to be saved from lions (and are not true converts), therefore, they have the Lav of “you shall not marry them” to have relations with them. Tosfos says: this is Rashi consistent to his opinion above who holds this Pasuk forbids them when they’re non-Jewish.

However, the Rivam disagrees. If they’re not true converts, why would they receive a fine? Rather, they’re completely Jewish,, but I might think that you shouldn’t give it to them (to separate them from Jews) so that we shouldn’t mix with them. Even according to the opinion that a female-slave got married into the Kuthians (therefore, there are some in their population that are slaves); we can establish each one on her father’s Chazaka that they’re Jews (and we keep it on that Chazaka and we don’t say it changed by him marrying a slave). Although we don’t keep her on her Chazaka regarding allowing her to marry Jews, however, we keep her on her Chazaka regarding this fine so that the evildoer (the rapist) shouldn’t prosper.]

2) He also pays if he rapes a convert or captive or slave who converted or redeemed or was freed before they’re three-years old. (However, if this happened afterwards, since we can’t guarantee them being virgins, they can’t collect the fine.)

The same applies to someone who raped those who are forbidden with a punishment of Kareis, like his sister, one of his parents’ sister, his wife’s sister, his brother’s wife or his uncle’s wife, he pays a fine despite the fact that there is Kareis involved. [Tosfos quotes R’ Chananel who brings a Yerushalmi that asks: why do you pay anything because of relations with your brother’s wife? After all, since she obviously is no longer married, or else she would be a married woman, which receives the death penalty and not only Kareis. She must be a virgin to receive the fine, therefore she never had children. Therefore, if the brother dies without children, it’s his prerogative to do Yibum by having relations with her. The Yerushalmi answers: we refer to a case where the brother had children from another wife (so, she doesn’t fall to Yibum). We also only refer to a case where she became a widow from Eirusin (before he brought him to his home, or else she wouldn’t be a virgin). Also, the Yerushalmi could have answered that the brother divorced her, (so, she doesn’t fall to Yibum even if he dies). Although R’ Pappa in Sanhedrin who explains our Mishna refers to seducing (rather than to rape), and if she’s divorced after the Kiddushin, the fine comes to her, and since she did the act willfully, she forgave any fine she would get; our Mishna holds of the Braisa’s version of R’ Akiva’s opinion that the fine belongs to the father even after she had Kiddushin and was divorced. Although the next part of the Mishna doesn’t fit well according to this R' Akiva that if someone has relations with his daughter he’s exempt since he gets the harsher punishment of a death penalty, and we don't say it's because he forgives the fine to himself; we can say that the case is when the relations happened when the father was alive, but died right afterwards, or the daughter became a Bogeres and the fine reverts to herself.]

3) Our Mishna says that Naaros receive fines, which connotes, but not minors; is like R’ Meir. However, the Rabanan hold there is a fine from when she is three years old until she becomes a Bogeres.

4) Even though the Pasuk says “she becomes his wife,” which implies that she needs to be a woman fit to be his wife, and these forbidden women aren't fit; we have two extra words. One to include a woman who’s a Lav to him [Tosfos: or an Asei, since they're on the same level here, that they're forbidden, but Kiddushin takes effect], and one to include a woman who’s a Kareis to him.

5) Our Mishna that disagree with Shimon Heteimani who says that that the fine is only on women that Kiddushin takes effect on her, and R’ Shimon b. Menasia who says that it must only refer to a woman that he may remain married to. R’ Zeira says that the practical difference between them is a Mamzeres and Nesina since Kiddushin takes effect on them, but you’re not allowed to remain married to them.

6) According to R’ Akiva who holds that Kiddushin doesn’t take effect on Lavim, and according to R’ Simai who says that R’ Akiva considers all children from Lavim a Mamzer except for a widow to a Kohain Gadol; we can say the practical difference is a widow to a Kohain Gadol. As he can't keep her, but Kiddushin takes effect.

7) However, according to R’ Yeshovov who says that “we must defeat R’ Akiva’s opinion, since he holds all illicit relations makes a Mamzer,” (implying, even including a widow to a Kohain Gadol); if he is only coming to argue with R’ Simai and wasn't exact to say all illicit relations make a Mamzer, but he's just coming to argue on a widow to a Kohain Gadol, which is a Lav, but agrees that R’ Akiva doesn’t make the children of Aseis Mamzeirim; the difference is a woman who is an Asei, like an Egyptian or Edomite convert. If he’s saying an independents statement, and forbids the child of all illicit relations including Aseis; the practical difference is a non-virgin to a Kohain Gadol, which is more lenient than any other prohibition, since it’s an Asei that’s not applicable to all people. [Rashi says: (how a non-virgin can still have her virginity to receive the fine), we refer when she had relations in an irregular manner (from behind). Tosfos says: although this depends on an argument between R’ Elazar and R’ Meir whether or not she’s invalid to a Kohain Gadol; we don't care that it's not according to all, since we only care for them to fit into R’ Akiva, since R’ Shimon b. Menasa is a later generation, we would like to make him fit into the opinion of his Rebbi, R’ Akiva. However, we’re not concerned if he argues with R’ Meir, his contemporary. R’ Chananel answers our original question: we’re not referring to a woman who had relations from someone else, but rather, from the Kohain Gadol when he raped her. (So, when she was raped, she was a true virgin.) We don’t consider her as someone who’s fit for him to marry, although we say in Yevamos that, although a Kohain Gadol should not marry women he raped or seduce, but if he does, he may keep them; since you can’t L’chatchila marry her.]

8) [Tosfos says: According to R' Akiva and the Tannaim who say that a Mamzer is by a Kreises; if a child is a Mamzer is dependent on whether Kiddushin takes effect on his mother or not. However, according to R' Yehoshua who says a Mamzer is only from a death penalty Ervah, he agrees that Kiddushin can't take effect by a woman with a Kareis.]

9) R’ Chisda says: they would both agree that someone is obligated to pay the fine if he rapes a Niddah since Kiddushin takes effect on her and you’re allowed to keep her as a wife. This comes to exclude R’ Nechunya b. Hakana’s opinion who says that we don’t give a second lighter punishment for something that gets Kareis. Abaya says the reason for R’ Nechunya: he learns a Gezeira Shava ‘Ason Ason’ from the human court's death penalty to Heavenly death penalty. Rava says the reason for R’ Nechunya b. Hakanah is from a Hekish comparing Beis Din’s death penalty to Hashem’s giving Kareis. The practical difference between Rava’s Drasha and Abaya’s Drasha is if he ate Trumah (which has the punishment of heavenly death, but it’s not Kareis).

10 [Tosfos says: when someone eats Trumah unwillingly, or when he purposely partook pleasure from Hekdesh (according to Rebbi who says the punishment is heavenly death), the Torah obligated them to pay even though they have the heavenly death penalty, even according to Abaya, since it’s a Gezeiras Hakasuv (it’s a Torah decree that these should be the exceptions) that he should pay.

Tosfos asks: according to Abaya, if you say that R’ Nechunya holds like Rebbi (that the punishment for partaking pleasure from Hekdesh is heavenly death); we see that it says in Pesachim that if someone eat Hekdesh’s Chametz on Pesach, R’ Nechunya says that he’s exempt from paying since there is Kareis for eating Chametz on Pesach. However, we say if someone ate Chametz Trumah on Pesach unwillingly, he pays the principle plus an extra fifth. Even though he doesn’t get any punishment, but we hold that even if he did a sin with a strong punishment unwillingly, you’re still exempt, but yet we obligate here; we must say it's because the payment for eating Trumah is an atonement and not a payment for damages. As we say that the Kohain can’t forgive payment, since it’s not payment for him, but an atonement for the giver. Even if he ate his own Trumah (that he inherited from his Kohain maternal grandfather), he must give the principle replacement to himself and give the extra fifth to a Kohain. Even though a Safeik Kohein who eats Trumah doesn’t pay the principle plus a fifth, although he needs to make sure he’s atoned; we must say he needs to separate food for this, (since that’s the atonement), but he doesn’t need to give it to a Kohain (but can sell it to him).]

11) The Gemara asks: when he steals the Trumah and eats it, he’s obligated to pay before he gets the heavenly death penalty. After all, he’s obligated to pay when he picks it up, and he only receives heavenly death when he eats it. The Gemara answers: we refer to a case where a friend stuck it into his throat where he can only remove it from his throat with difficulty. [Tosfos explains: you can no longer say that you should force it out, since the owners wouldn’t gain anything since it’s all disgusting at this point. We can only obligate to pay for what you’ll benefit by having a full stomach, however, you get heavenly death at the same time, so you’re exempt from paying. Even though the Gemara in Chulin says that swallowed food that was regurgitated has worth since it’s edible for someone who doesn’t know any better; we refer to a case where it was originally worth only a Prutah, and if you would cough it up, it would be worth a little less, (so if you’ll spit it out, it will be Halachically worthless). Although it’s now worth less than a Prutah, so you’re not damaging a Prutah by swallowing it, you’re still obligated to pay the Prutah since you had pleasure from something that was originally a Prutah.) It's not like someone receives pleasure while someone else doesn’t lose anything from it, where you’re exempt from paying,since it’s worth a little bit (even less than a Prutah), then you’re obligated to pay for the whole loss (even if you’re pleasure is less than that).The Ritzva answers: really, we refer to food that doesn’t get disgusting in the person’s throat, so we consider it as if he stole it then. Although this is a little before he completely swallows it, but since he swallows it and has pleasure right away, we consider it as if it all happened at the same time. This is similar to a case where we say that a Kohain became Tamai and blemished at the same time.]

12) However, if he can remove the food from his throat and spit it out without difficulty, he would need to remove it. [Tosfos explains: and if he doesn’t remove it, he’s obligated to pay at that point and he can’t be exempt by getting the heavenly death penalty, since that only comes afterwards, when he completely swallows it.] If it’s to the point of no return, he's not obligate at all. [Rashi explains: he's not Chayiv the death penalty since it was forced on him. The Ritzva explains Rashi: we must be referring to when his friend put it in his mouth against his will, for, if he had consent, the eater should be obligated to pay when it was in his mouth, since he acquires it for stealing when it enters the airspace of his mouth. Therefore, we must refer to having it done against his will, so he’s exempt from heavenly death, and even from paying. Although we’ll usually obligate someone for the pleasure he had eating it), however, we know for sure (as if we have witnesses on it) that he’s not happy at all for eating this prohibition.

The Ri explains: he's not obligated to pay money since he didn’t personally steal it, and you can’t obligate him for his enjoyment. Although we say that if someone stole food and he fed it to someone, if the owners don’t have Yiyush (gave up hope from retrieving it), you can collect payment from either the robber or eater; that’s only when the stolen food was around when the second one took it and ate it. However, here, when it comes into the eater’s possession, since it’s in a place of no return, the item is already considered destroyed, so, you can’t collect from the second one at all.]

13) R’ Pappa answers: we refer to a case where they put Trumah juice in his mouth. (Therefore, it becomes disgusting right away, and therefore, he’s only obligated to pay for what he swallowed.)

14) R’ Ashi answers: we refer to someone eating his own Trumah. (Although he’s not damaging other people’s Trumah to be obligated to pay), we refer to a case where he simultaneously ripped someone’s silk clothing at the same time. [Rashi says: (although the obligation to pay is not to the same person that he gets his death penalty from), still, R’ Ashi holds that you’re exempt from paying. This is not like Rava’s opinion in Sanhedrin, if witnesses testify that a man had relations with a married girl, and they get disproved, (so in order to give them what they conspired) we give them the death penalty plus the payment of the Kesuva, since they get the punishments on account of two separate people. They receive death on account of the alleged seducer and pays the Kesuva to the father of the girl.

Tosfos disagrees. After all, how would Rava in Sanhedrin learn the Mishna in Bava Kama that says, if someone burns someone’s haystack on Shabbos, he’s exempt from paying since he receives the death penalty. However, according to Rava, he gets the punishment for two different causes, the death penalty for Shabbos and the need to pay is to the owner of the haystack. So, we must say (it’s not considered punishments on account of two people) but as if both punishments are to one person, since he receives the death penalty on account of heaven and not because of a person. Although the Gemara in Sanhedrin says: if the husband brings witnesses that the wife had illicit relations, and then the father brings disproving witnesses to disprove the husband’s witnesses, we give the husband’s witnesses the death penalty, but they don’t need to pay the father for the loss of the Kesuva. However, If the husband brings other witnesses to disprove the father’s witnesses, then the father’s witnesses must receive the death penalty on account of the witnesses they wanted to kill and they must pay the husband for the Kesuva they wanted him to pay unlawfully since they’re punishments to two separate people, we don’t say that the death penalty will exempt the payment; you only gave both punishments if it affects two people by disproved witnesses, since you need to give them a punishment of what they conspired, they can’t get away by not getting punished for conspiring against someone.

The Riva says: you always get both punishments when you get it because of two people. Only in the case of the slave and goat, or the case of the pursuer, where everyone is obligated to save him by killing the pursuer, we consider it as if he’s getting the death penalty because of everyone, even the goat’s and utensil’s owners. [Maharsha- also, when it’s a death penalty on account of heaven, we don’t consider it as if the punishments are for two people.]

15) All that happens is from heaven except for hot and cold weather [Tosfos: some say that it's only cold] (that is caused by human neglect). [Tosfos says: if you have enough clothes and you don't need to travel on the way. Otherwise, you might not even be able to protect from that. Also, of course you can protect yourself from neglect, after all, you can commit suicide if you want, and someone shouldn’t pass under a leaning wall. We only say that when it’s brought unexpectedly from heaven you can’t protect yourself, except from cold and hot weather, if you prepare yourself, it won’t happen that you’ll be unprepared and can’t protect yourself.]

16) Even though the Sanhedrin disbanded from the day that the Beis Hamikdash was destroyed, the punishment of the four death penalties didn’t stop (since heaven carries them out). [Tosfos says: although we find many sinners and idol worshippers who die in bed (instead of meeting their end through the above means); we must say that if they did T’shuva, Hashem reduces their punishment and, perhaps, he may forgive the act completely. Alternatively, perhaps for some good deed they performed, Hashem doesn’t give him his punishment in this world.]

17) We say that R’ Nechunya agrees that you’re obligated to pay if you stole someone’s forbidden fat and ate it, since you’re already obligated to pay (when you picked it up) before you transgressed the prohibition of forbidden fats (when you ate it). Although R’ Avin says that, if you throw an arrow on Shabbos (in the Reshus Harabim) for four Amos (which one transgresses a Melacha on Shabbos), and it rips silk clothing on the way, he’s exempt from paying for the silk, since in order to have the arrow land after four Amos, you need the person to pick it up before; that's only by throwing where it’s impossible for it to land four Amos away without picking it up. However, it’s possible to eat the fat without picking it up, if he bends down and eats it. [Rashi explains the reason he didn’t acquire it since he didn’t lift it three T’fachim off the ground. Tosfos disagrees: since he doesn’t need to pick it up to acquire it if he has it completely in his hand or mouth. Rather, the Ri explains: you can bend down if the fat is stuck onto a reed, and you can maneuver yourself that it should stick down your throat (so you don’t acquire it until it’s fully down your throat). Although you didn’t do this in this eating, and you couldn’t eat it in this manner unless you picked it up, still, since there’s a possible way to eat it without picking up, we don’t say that picking it up is an essential part of the eating. The Gemara could have also answered that a friend stuck it down your throat.] Alternatively, the case of throwing is different, since when he starts the throw, there is no way to take it back, (therefore, we consider everything done with this throwing as one action). However, with the fats, once he picks it up, he’s not forced to eat it and could renege on his thoughts to eat it, (therefore, we don’t consider the lifting and eating as one action). The difference between the two answers is if someone carries a knife four Amos in a Reshus Harabim and ripped silk. According to the first answer, you can’t have it put down after four Amos unless you picked it up at the beginning of the four Amos, but according to the second answer you can stop walking whenever you want. [Tosfos: This Sugya is only according to R' Avin, but R' Yirmiya argues and says that you're exempt even if you can reverse your actions.]

18) If someone steals a purse on Shabbos, he’s obligated to pay (although he carried out to a Reshus Harabim) since he was obligated to reimburse for the stealing when he lifted the purse. Even though the lifting up of the purse is necessary to carry out, [Tosfos: according to those who hold you're exempt when you need to lift it in order to carry it outside and not according to those who say you're exempt when you can't take it back, since you don’t need to finish carrying out after you lifted up the purse], we must say that he first picked it up to carry out, and stood still before going out to rest, which is considered a Hanacha. (However, if he stood still to balance his load, it's not considered a Hanacha.) Alternatively, the author is Ben Azai who considers walking like you’re standing still. (We view every step as if you’re still and have completely stopped and made a Hanacha.) [Tosfos says: according to Ben Azai, you transgress carrying four Amos in the Reshus Harabim, even though each step is as if you put it down, so you could never carry four Amos in one step; since it's a Halacha L’Moshe M’sinai, and it says that you’re obligated even if you walk four Amos. You can’t extrapolate (to carrying outside through a Karmelus, which Ben Azai exempts him since we consider as if he put the object down in the Karmelus before you carried outside), since four Amos in the Reshus Harabim is different, because each step is in a place where there is a possible obligation. However, the Yerushalmi asks the same question and answers: we refer to a case where the person jumped four Amos at once.]

[Tosfos says: according to R’ Tam who holds that you can acquire an object when you only lift it a Tefach, you acquire the object when you lift it a Tefach, but it’s not considered “lifted up” regarding carrying until you lift it three T’fachim off the ground, as we see the Gemara says; if you carry half a dried fig to the Reshus Harabim within three T’fachim of another half of fig that you placed in the street, it's considered resting on it and he’s obligated in the Chatos, you're Chayiv to pay unless the purse is on top of a stick that’s above three T’fachim from the ground, where, when you lift it, the acquisition and the starting of the carrying comes simultaneously.]

19) However, if he didn’t lift the purse, but dragged it, then he didn’t acquire it until he took it out, he’s exempt for paying since the stealing comes simultaneously with the Melacha of carrying out. However, it's only by a large purse, or a middle size purse, where dragging is the way to carry it out, but not a small purse that dragging is not the proper way to carry it out, and it's a Shinoy (change to the way the Melacha is done) and is exempt for Shabbos.

20) If he drags it out to a Reshus Harabim, he wouldn’t acquire it for stealing since you can’t acquire objects by dragging them in the Reshus Harabim. [Tosfos says: even according to the opinion in Bava Metzia that says; they enacted for someone to acquire objects that are within their four Amos even in the Reshus Harabim; they only enacted to acquire a lost object or by a Get, but they never enacted that a robber should acquire what he robbed.] So, it must refer to the shoulder of the Reshus Harabim according to R’ Eliezer who considers it like a Reshus Harabim regarding Shabbos since, sometimes during heavy traffic, travelers may walk there, but he holds it doesn’t have that status regarding acquiring an object through dragging, since, generally, the masses don’t enter there.

21) R’ Ashi answers: we refer to a case where the robber put his hand below three T’fachim from the ground to catch the dragged purse as it gets pulled into the street. This is like Rava said: that a person’s hand is considered like an area of four T’fachim squared. [Rashi says: therefore, you can acquire the purse in a Reshus Harabim, because, the same way Rava considers a hand a Chashuv area that it's considered like four T’fachim squared regarding Shabbos, we’ll consider it as if you lifted it above three T’fachim regarding acquisitions. Tosfos asks on this: what’s the comparison from considering the hand like four T’fachim regarding Shabbos to making an acquisition? Therefore, Tosfos explains: Rivam's text is: “that we refer to putting his hand below three. Alternatively, like Rava” (that someone’s hand is like four T’fachim). If it’s in your hand, we know you acquire it, but we’re answering why it’s considered as resting on four T’fachim squared. So, it’s either that his hand is within three T’fachim from the ground, and even if a hand is not four T’fachim, anything within three T’fachim from the ground is Lavud, as if it’s on the ground, and the ground is larger than four T’fachim squared. Alternatively, even if your hand is above three, we can still consider it as if it’s on a four T’fachim squared area like Rava’s rule, that a hand is considered like four T’fachim.

R’ Tam says that the text should read “and like Rava” and no more (because it does not refer to his statement that it’s like four T’fachim). We don’t say that the hand follows the rest of his body (that’s inside, so we shouldn’t consider it as if it landed in the street like Rava that we don’t consider the hand to be ‘attached’ to the rest of the body, (and is independently in the street). However, if the hand's above three (we don’t consider the hand to be more associated to the ground), and we consider it to be attached to your body and gets the status of the domain where your body is.]

22) Raveina argues with R' Ashi and holds you can acquire an object by dragging it in a full Reshus Harabim. [Tosfos says it's like the Ritzva who says he argues with Abaya and Rava who hold that someone can’t acquire an object by dragging it in a street, and not like Ri who says they don’t argue with Raveina, since Raveina only says a robber acquires it regarding that it would give him an obligation to pay for an Onness, however, he agrees that a buyer cannot acquire an object in the street to become his. After all, the Sugya in Bava Kama says that a robber doesn’t get an obligation to pay for an Onness if he doesn’t make an acquisition that would acquire an object to own.]

23) We hold that someone doesn’t receive Malkos and pay, since the Torah says to get one punishment. Ulla says: therefore, you pay money and don’t get Malkos. [Tosfos says: you can't give someone Malkos and obligate him to pay a fine from “framing a wife,” that he gets Malkos and also pays her father money. As we learn that, generally, you can’t get Malkos and not pay from the Pasuk “you get one punishment” by disproving witnesses, and disproved witnesses don’t get Malkos and payment in any case, whether it’s a true payment or a fine, like if they simultaneously Shechted or sold a stolen animal when they testified falsely. Since it's the general Pasuk we learn about getting one punishment, so we extrapolate this to the rest of the Torah’s Malkos and payments, even fines, rather than extrapolating them from framing your wife. The Ritzvah says: we can say that the Rabanan agree that disproved witnesses are a fine., and they didn’t want to extrapolate from “framing a wife” (that you should receive Malkos and payment) since the plain meaning of the Pasuk saying he gets one punishment refers to all cases, even with Malkos and payment, (not like R’ Meir who establishes it to only refer to not giving the death penalty and payment). Alternatively, the Rabanan don’t extrapolate from “framing a wife” to give both punishments is like the Yerushalmi says, since it's a Chidush, since he didn’t do anything but speak (to make his accusation), and he still gets punished for it, and is not similar to disproved witnesses who also get punished by speaking, since they actually can cause their victims to get punished by their words. However, the husband who frames his wife doesn’t cause anything detrimental to her by his words, since she only gets punished by the false witnesses’ testimony.] Ullah learns his Halacha from a Gezeira Shava "Tachas, Tachas" by wounding where you pay and don’t receive Malkos. [Tosfos explains: it’s possible that, according to this conclusion, Ulla only said this by the three cases where the Torah says so explicitly, (wounding, disproved witnesses, and the fine for rape, because of the Gezeira Shava). However, in other cases, you can get lashes and don't pay.]

24) Therefore Ulla answers why our Mishna claims that you pay the fine when you rape a prohibited relative, and the Mishna in Makos says; that you receive Makos for them; you pay the fine when you have relations with your Naarah sister and get Malkos by a case of seduction, we can say the case refers to seducing a Bogeres or an orphaned Naarah (who receives her own fines). After all, since she was seduced, she forgave any money coming to her. Otherwise, there is still payments, even if the Bogeres doesn't get the fine, because of embarrassment and damaging her worth, and even to rape an insane girl who doesn't have embarrassment or worth to damage, there's still money to pay for the pain of throwing her to the ground.

25) However, R’ Yochanan says that you get Malkos instead of paying money. Both Mishnayos refer to a Naarah sister, and he gets Malkos if he was warned for the Malkos, and pays if he wasn’t warned. [Tosfos says: Ulla couldn't answer this way since he holds that, if we say that you get Malkos instead of paying, we should say that you won't pay even if you weren't warned since he holds that doing unwillingly sins of Malkos is exactly like doing them willingly to exempt payment.] Only by disproved witnesses who testified that someone owes money, and by wounding, they pay and don’t get Malkos since the Torah explicitly teaches us that they're the exceptions and he pays instead of getting Malkos. You only get Malkos for wounding if you wound someone in a way that didn’t cause a Prutah’s worth of damage. You only get Malkos for disproving witnesses when they testified that a supposed Kohein was really a son of a divorcee or someone who had Chalitza. [Tosfos says: even though we have a rule that any testimony that you can’t do to them what they conspired to do, can’t be a valid testimony; that rule only applies in a case they testified on a person who is a Treifa, since you can’t give the witnesses neither death or Malkos, since you wanted to kill a terminally ill person who we consider as already a dead person. However, our case is different since you can (somewhat) consider it as if you did to him as he conspired by giving him Malkos.] R’ Yochanan didn't learn like Ulla since he needs the word Tachas to teach us Abaya’s Drasha (and therefore, he can’t use it for the Gezeira Shava). As Abaya says: it says you pay the fine “(Tachas’) in lieu of what you tortured her,” implying that you still need to pay more money (besides the fine) for her damage and embarrassment. (Ulla learns this Halacha from Rava’s Drasha. See there.)

26) R’ Eliezer says: the reason why disproved witnesses pay and don’t receive Malkos is because they’re not warned. In truth, it's possible to warn them [Tosfos asks: and it’s not a doubtful warning, since you don’t know if they’re lying; since that only applies when nobody knows if they'll transgress it, like if they'll leave over Korbanos to make it Nossar. However, the warned know that they’re testifying falsely (so they’re definitely warned).] Although if you warn them right before they say testimony, it might frighten them that they might refrain from testifying (even if they’re saying the truth); but you can warn them after the testimony within the amount to greet someone, when they can retract from their testimony. [Tosfos says: although the warning takes more than the amount of time to greet someone, but as long as they’re still involved in the testimony (one way or another) it’s still considered within the prescribe time of greeting.] Also, we can also warn them way earlier, and then at the time of the testimony, we can hint to the warning, and a gentle hint wouldn’t startle them to retract their testimony if it’s true. Rather, Abaya says: since they wished to kill their victim without any warning (since they lied when they said they were warned), we need to only kill them without warning since the Torah says that we must give to them as they conspired. Although testifying that a Kohain is really a son of a divorcee or a woman who received Chalitza, where we give the witnesses Malkos, and the punishment is not from the Pasuk “you give them as they conspired,” we still don't need to give the witnesses warning since the Pasuk says “it’s one law,” that all witnesses receive the same treatment.

27) R’ Shisha b. R’ Idi says: the source that you pay instead of receiving Malkos by wounding from the Pasuk “when men fight and one hits a pregnant lady and makes her miscarry.” We must say it means that he hit strong enough that it could have killed the mother since it says “if he caused her death, we take his soul for a soul (you kill him).” It must be that he was warned, because how can you kill him without warning? So, it must be after he’s warned, and if he doesn't kill the woman, he pays the worth of the fetus. [Tosfos says: we don't say he shouldn't pay anyhow since he’s planning to give a death blow, he’s an assailant, and anyone can kill him at that time, which we consider as if he has the death penalty, and he has the stricter punishment; since we refer to a case where someone can subdue him by just damaging one of his limbs.] Also, we consider someone who’s warned for a stronger punishment as if he’s warned for a lighter punishment, so if he doesn’t kill the lady, but wounded her, he should be considered warned to receive Malkos for the wound, and yet, the Pasuk says that, if it doesn’t cause her death, he pays. So, we must say that, when someone wounds, he needs to pay and doesn’t get Malkos. We can't say that perhaps Malkos is stricter than death since Rav says; if they would have hit Chananya, Mishoel and Azarya (instead of trying to kill them) they would have, bowed down to the statue. [Tosfos says: although we say that the Pasuk “with all your soul,” (i.e., to give up your life for Hashem) refers to allowing yourself to go through untold suffering, like R’ Akiva says; this statue was not an idol, but only made for the king’s honor. However, they felt that it would be a Kiddush Hashem to resist, so they gave themselves over to death.] However, that's only by a flogging that doesn’t have a set amount (that could be worse, since it could be endless). It's more lenient with a limited flogging (like by Malkos, which can’t be more than thirty-nine). However, this only makes sense to the Rabanan who say that the Pasuk of “a soul for a soul” refers to killing, but according to Rebbi who says it means you pay her worth, it's not a proof.

27) R’ Yaakov from Nahar Pakod gives the source from here: the Pasuk says “if the victim walks out on his own strength (that shows that he recuperated and the attempted murder didn’t kill him) the attempted murderer goes free.” I.e., we lock him up, and if the victim dies, we kill him. If the victim recuperates, he pays the victim’s unemployment and doctor bills. They must have warned him, or else you can't kill him, and we consider someone who’s warned for a stronger punishment as if he’s warned for a lighter punishment. So, even though he’s warned to get Malkos, he still pays the victim’s unemployment and doctor bills. So, when you wound, you only need to pay and you don’t get Malkos. R’ Mari rejects it: since this Pasuk may not refer to killing purposely for perhaps he’ll receive the death penalty, but refers to killing accidently, and we lock him up until we see if he’s obligated to go into Galus. [Tosfos says: it says in Gitten that, if someone accidently Shechted someone’s throat, he doesn’t go to exile. After all, perhaps the cut didn’t cause the whole death, but the wind agitated the wound and made him die. (Although this is not an excuse for someone who killed this way on purpose) still, there are many ways we’re more lenient regarding exile like one only goes into exile if he killed in a downward motion, therefore, we’re more lenient by exile where it says “he falls on him and he dies” that implies he dies immediately afterwards (and doesn’t linger). The reason we would lock him up to see if he's Chayiv Galus even if the victim doesn't die immediately; we can refer to a case where he was in a marble house (that protects from wind) that we’re not afraid that the wind would agitate the wound. Alternatively, we only worry about the wind agitating when he Shechted most of the windpipe and gullet, since it’s very apt that the wind would affect it. However, with other wounds, the wind doesn’t affect them too much since it’s possible to protect the wound from the wind by wrapping something around the wound. Although damaging by accident doesn't usually obligate to pay the extra four payments; you find cases where you’re obligated to pay them even when done accidently, like, if the one who gives Malkos accidently added an extra hit, that we say; (if he dies), he goes into exile, and if he doesn’t die, he pays the four extra payments, and it’s not similar to other accidental damage (since this is done with great negligence), or if a carpenter invited someone to join him in his shop and he accidently hurts the visitor, or if someone is thrown off a roof with a common wind and damages. Alternatively, the case could be if he purposely hits the person, but accidently ends up killing him.]

28) R' Ashi also didn't hold it's simple to consider someone who’s warned for a stronger punishment is as if he was warned for a lighter punishment.

29) Reish Lakish answers the contradiction between the Mishnayos, since our Mishna is like R’ Meir who says you can receive Malkos and pay, but doesn’t hold you get the death penalty and pay. Although if someone stole and Shechted an animal on Shabbos, or to serve an idol, (or if the animal killed somebody that it needs to be stoned), R’ Meir holds that he still pays four and five times the animal he stole, it's not because R’ Meir holds you still pay when he receives the death penalty for Shechting on Shabbos or for serving an idol, since we refer to having it Shechted by an agent. Although if you would have sinned personally, you would be exempt from paying, [Tosfos says and you don't even need to pay to satisfy heaven like usually in such cases, since it doesn't apply to fines where you’re not obligated until Beis Din obligates you], but in truth, you’re also obligated to pay, but Beis Din can only administer the stronger punishment.

30) [Tosfos says: Although Reish Lakish holds that you can’t be obligated for Shechting if you can’t sell it, and since you can’t sell an animal that needs to be stoned (since it’s forbidden to partake pleasure from it), you're still obligated by Shechting it since he only comes to exclude Shechting Kodshim, where there is no application at all to sell. However, if you sell this animal destined to get stoned to a non-Jew, the money doesn’t receive the same prohibition (and you may use the money). Also, according to R’ Tam who says that the animal is not prohibited to partake pleasure from while it’s alive (only after you kill it), it fits in well (since you could sell it to plow until Beis Din kills it).]

31) The Chachumim who argue with R' Meir and hold that he’s exempt from a four or five payment on those animals is like R’ Shimon who exempts for any invalid Shechita. Even Shechita on Shabbos is invalid since he holds like R’ Yochanan Hasandler who forbids it. However, there's an argument between R’ Acha and Raveina if it’s a Torah prohibition to eat food that you did a Melacha to, or it’s only rabbinical. The one who says it's only rabbinical and is a valid Shechita from the Torah holds the Chachamim only exempt the other cases (of Shechting for an idol or an animal who supposed to get stoned). [Tosfos explains the positions of the Tannaim about forbidding a Melacha done on Shabbos. R’ Meir says that you may eat it on Shabbos if you cooked forgetfully, but you may not eat it until after Shabbos if cooked intentionally. R’ Yehuda says; if you did it forgetfully, everyone may only eat it after Shabbos. If cooked intentionally, the cook can never eat it. R' Yochanan Hasandler says that would be the case if cooked unintentionally, but if cooked intentionally, it's forbidden to everyone forever.]

32) The Gemara asks: according to R’ Meir who obligates for Shechting an animal to an idol although when you start Shechting, it becomes forbidden to partake pleasure from, and becomes worthless and can't have any ownership) and when you finish the Shechita, it no longer belongs to the owner. [Tosfos explains: however, it's not a problem by every Shechita to say it’s not the owner’s at the end of the Shechita because once you start Shechting, you made a change in the animal and the robber acquires it, since such a small change as the starting of the Shechita is not enough of a change to acquire the animal.] The Gemara answers: we refer to a case where he said that he’s not worshiping the idol until the end of the Shechita.

33) The reason he's obligated to pay for Shechting an animal that supposed to get stoned that you’re prohibited to partake pleasure from it, and it’s not the owner’s; Rabbah says: we refer to a case where the owner handed it over to someone to guard it. It killed while it was by the guard and Beis Din sentenced it to death while it was by the guard, and it was stolen from the guard and Shechted. The robber needs to pay the guard since R’ Meir holds like R’ Yaakov that a guard could return the animal to the owner and it would be a proper returning (and would exempt him from paying for it, even though Beis Din will stone it), and he also holds like R’ Shimon who holds that something that causes you a loss of money is considered as your money. (So, even though you don’t own this animal, yet, since you could have returned the animal without paying for it, and now that the robber Shechted it, he’s no longer able to return it and would need to pay for the whole animal. Therefore, in the aspect that he needs the animal to save him money, we consider the animal as his, and the robber needs to pay the guard.)

34) [Tosfos says: we didn't just say that R’ Meir is consistent to his opinion that he judges ‘Garmi’ (a cause to damage, even if it’s not a direct damage); we could have also said that R’ Meir only holds of Garmi, like burning a document or making someone’s grain ‘Kodesh,’ where you’re damaging these items that have universal worth, but perhaps he doesn’t obligate Shechting this animal that’s supposed to be stoned, which is worthless to everyone, and only has worth to this guard so that he can be exempted from paying. Alternatively, the Ritzva answers: we don’t bring R’ Meir’s opinion by Garmi, since he holds it’s only a rabbinical obligation to pay, as the Gemara in Bava Kama implies.]

35) Rabbah answers why R’ Meir holds you pay four and five times for Shechting a stolen animal on Shabbos: although he regularly agrees that you only pay with Malkos and not with the death penalty, however, he holds you need to pay fines with the death penalty. Since the whole concept of fining is a Chidush, that you shouldn’t be obligated, yet the Torah obligates you, so they extended the Chidush to obligate when you don't regularly pay, like that you pay even with the death penalty. Similarly, if you stole a lamb before Shabbos and Shechted it on Shabbos, you’re obligated to pay four times since you need to pay the fine despite that you also get the death penalty, and the principle is obligated because the stealing happened before it involved a prohibition of Shabbos. However, if you stole and Shechted on Shabbos, (where you get the death penalty for stealing, since it came by carrying it out to the street), you’re exempt from paying anything. As the rule is: if you’re not obligated for the stealing you’re not obligated for the Shechting or selling, since the Torah requires to pay four or five times and not three and four times. Also, a similar case regarding tunneling into a house to burglarize it, where the Torah allows killing him, and we consider it like the death penalty, and he’s not obligated to pay for any damage he does while he’s in the tunnel. If he steals an animal outside the tunnel and Shechts it in the tunnel, then he’s obligated in four and five times. If he stole and Shechted in the tunnel, he’s exempt even for the fines, since; if you’re not obligated for the stealing, you’re not obligated for the Shechting or selling.

36) R’ Pappa says that you’re not obligated to pay for the borrowed animal's death when you lead it out of the owner’s property but only when it dies. So, if you Shecht it on Shabbos, you were doing a Melacha at that moment, you’re exempt from paying.

37) Rava says: if someone borrows a cow and he dies, the heirs can use the cow for the rest of the allotted time that he borrowed it. If the cow dies, they’re exempt from paying for an Onness, since they didn’t personally borrow it, they never accepted this responsibility. [Tosfos says: but they're obligated if it gets lost or stolen, since they receive the pleasure to use it (they accept upon themselves this responsibility) as the Gemara says in Bava Metzia.] If the heirs thought it was their father’s cow, and they Shechted and ate it, they only need to pay the price for cheap meat. He concludes: However, if the father left them real estate, the owner can collect the full amount from them. Some say that it refers to the first case (where the animal dropped dead by itself), and of course it applies to the last case (where they actually killed it). This would disagree with R’ Pappa and holds that the father's obligated for anything that will happen to it, even if it’s beyond his control as soon as he leads it out of the owner’s property. Therefore, there is a lien on his real estate and must pay for the animal even if it dies after his death. Some say that he only said it on the latter part (where they Shechted it since they were under the impression that it was their father’s). [Tosfos explains: since he was negligent by not informing his heirs that it’s not his, he was already negligent in his lifetime, so he became obligated at that moment, and there is a lien on his property from this obligation.] However, it doesn't apply to the first case (where the animal died). This is like R’ Pappa that you're only obligated by the animal's death.

38) R’ Yochanan and Reish Lakish both hold: if one sins with the death penalty forgetfully and damages at the same time; he's exempt. As the Beis Medrish of Chizkiya Darshens; the Torah writes about smiting an animal next to smiting a person. We learn, just like smiting an animal, it doesn’t make a difference if you did it purposely or forgetfully, whether intentionally or unintentionally, whether you did it in an upward motion or downward motion, in all cases, you’re obligated to pay. The same is true by smiting a person, it doesn’t make a difference if you did it purposely or forgetfully, whether intentionally or unintentionally [i.e., whether he intended to kill the woman or intended not to kill the woman, but someone else. This point argues with Rebbi who said that you pay her worth, and the Rabanan who say he gets the death penalty, but Chizkiya holds he’s exempt both from the death penalty and for paying her worth.], Nor, whether you did it in an upward motion or downward motion, in all cases, he’s exempt for paying.

39) Reish Lakish and R’ Yochanan argue when Malkos was done forgetfully, and plus he damages at the same time; R’ Yochanan holds he needs to pay since he wasn’t warned since the above Hekish was only by sins that have the death penalty and not by sins with Malkos. Reish Lakish holds he’s exempt from paying, since he’s exempt when he’s warned he’s exempt even when he’s not warned as the Torah explicitly made Malkos just like the death penalty from a Gezeira Shava.

40) Abaya says: according to Rabbah who says (according to R’ Meir) that fines are a Chidush and you pay them even when you did something that obligates the death penalty along with it; our Mishna that says you don't pay a fine when raping a girl that has the punishment of the death penalty, but pays when the punishment is Kareis and Malkos is like the Rabanan, and Rabbah held of R’ Yochanan that they pay when they transgress Malkos forgetfully. However, he can't hold like Reish Lakish. After all, it can’t be R’ Meir, since it would be a question why someone doesn’t pay the fine by a girl that's punishable by the death penalty? It can’t be R’ Nechunya b. Hakana, since it would be a question why he pays for a Kareis since he holds you don’t pay when you have the punishment of Kareis). It can’t be R’ Yitzchok (who says you don’t get Malkos for sins that are obligated in Krieses, so, although you pay for a Kareis, since he holds that Krieses don’t exempt payment and there is no obligation of Malkos either to exempt payment), but it would be a question: why do you pay for a Lav, since Malkos should exempt you from payment. [Tosfos points out: of course, it can’t be the Rabanan (who say that you’re exempt from paying when you get Malkos and that there is Malkos for every sin with Kareis), since we would have a question both from Karies and Lav.] Therefore, we must say that Rabbah agrees with R’ Yochanan.

41) According to Reish Lakish that the Torah says that someone’s exempt from paying for transgressing a sin with Malkos forgetfully as if he did it on purpose, the opinion who argues on R’ Nechunya; it’s either R’ Meir (who holds anyhow that you can receive Malkos and pay) or R’ Yitzchok (who holds that you don’t get Malkos for Krieses). However, according to the Rabanan who hold that there is Malkos for Krieses, and even if done forgetfully, it should exempt payment. (However, R' Yochanan can say it's the Rabanan and you are not exempt to pay when you didn't get warned for Malkos.)

42) A girl (whose father died and her marriage is only rabbinic) who refused her husband doesn’t receive fines (for raping), nor money for seduction. [Rashi says: (we refer to a case where she’s raped or seduced after the marriage), and she doesn’t receive the fine since we assume her not to be a virgin after her first marriage. The Ri explains: the husband doesn’t need to pay fines if he raped or seduced her while she was married to him before the refusal, even though, after the refusal, she wasn’t his wife retroactively.] R’ Meir holds a girl can refuse until she gets two pubic hairs, and R’ Yehuda holds until the blackness (of those hairs) become more than the whiteness (of her skin). [Tosfos says: there are those who don’t have in their text “more than the whiteness,” as the Gemara in Niddah says that it doesn’t need to have that many black hairs, but as long as they’re long enough to rest on each other and it looks like she has a lot of black. However, R’ Chananel explains “more than the whiteness” (in a way that it could agree to the Gemara in Niddah), that the blackness of those hairs is more than the whiteness of those hairs. That is, the part of the hairs closest to the skin are black and the part of the hairs by their top are whiter. Anyhow, R’ Yehuda agrees that she can’t refuse him after relations since we need to worry that the relations made a Kiddushin from the Torah.]

43) According to R' Meir, an Iylanus (a woman who never matures) doesn't receive fines (for raping), nor money for seduction. Since he holds that minors don't receive fines and an Iylanus is a minor. Since she never matures, she’ll never be a Naarah, and she goes directly from being a minor to being a Bogeres when we determine her to be an Iylanus.

44) If you married a deaf-mute or insane girl, you can't claim (when you first marry) that you didn’t find her to be a virgin, according to R’ Gamliel who holds we believe the woman. Although, here, the deaf-mute and insane are not making any claims, but we apply here the Pasuk “to open the mouth for a mute” and make the possible claim for them. [Rashi says: since, if they were normal, they could have claimed that they were raped after the Kiddushin (where she doesn’t lose any of her Kesuva). Tosfos says: although, the reason R' Gamliel allows it usually since the woman is making a definite claim, which she's not making here; but she has a Chazaka of her body (of being a virgin until now) that helps her even to collect money, like when the husband finds her blemished after Nesuin, we say that she didn't have the blemish before Kiddushin because we keep her body on a Chazaka that it was blemish free until now, and if he divorces her, she can collect her Kesuva. However, it doesn’t help if it was found before Nesuin for her father to collect the Kesuva, since her body's Chazaka doesn't help for him (since it’s not his body), and this is even if he claims he knows for sure when the disfiguration came.

However, the Ri explains our Gemara: the reason you can’t claim that they weren’t virgins is because we can assume that they hit something that broke their hymen. Although all women also crash around and perhaps broke their hymen too, and you can have claims on them; that's because, if they didn’t claim that they did get hit, we can assume it didn’t happen. However, the deaf-mute and insane can’t tell us if they broke their hymen, therefore ,we can assume that it happened to them.] However, R’ Yehoshua holds the woman is not believed so he can have claims on the deaf-mute and insane. [Rashi says: and she's never believed to say that she was raped after the Kiddushin. Ri explains: we can't assume that her hymen broke by being hit by wood since it's not common, so we must assume that she had relations.]

45) You can’t claim by a Bogeres that you didn’t find her to be a virgin by saying he found her to be open (since a Bogeres’ opening is not that tight anymore, if it didn’t feel tight, it’s not a proof that she had relations). However, from the fact that we consider her Tahor if she sees blood on the first night of her wedding, since we assume it’s virgin’s blood, proves she still has virgin blood. Therefore, if he claimed that she didn’t have blood, then he can claim she wasn’t a virgin. [Tosfos points out that this is Rashi’s text, but R’ Chananel had the opposite text, that he can claim that he didn’t find her open, but can’t claim she didn’t have blood. I already explained this in the first Perek.]

46) R' Meir holds you can’t claim against a blind girl that you didn’t find her to be a virgin because she trips and hits herself against the ground (which may cause her hymen to break). Although all girls also trip and fall to the ground; but they tell their mothers, but since the blind ones don’t see, she can never inform her mother about it. [Rashi explains: they should have told the other side of her not being a virgin, and if they didn’t, they misled the husband (and it’s a mistaken marriage). Tosfos asks: R’ Meir holds that someone who lost her hymen from a fall (or was hit by a piece of wood) receives her full Kesuva regardless if the husband knew about it or not. Rather, Tosfos explains: other girls see the blood, tell their mothers, and they always know that they lost their hymen (even if it happened when they’re quite young), since their mothers inform them. Therefore, if a husband claims he found her not to be a virgin, and she says she was a virgin, we can’t assume that perhaps she lost her hymen by a fall, since, if it would be true, she would have said so. However, by the blind girl, we may assume that she lost her hymen by a fall even if she doesn’t claim she was, since she wouldn’t know about it. After all, since she doesn’t see the blood, she doesn’t inform her mother, and her mother can’t inform her later.]

47) Someone who had a bad reputation in her youth (and we suspect her not to be a virgin) doesn’t receive fines (for raping) and not money for seduction. Also, you can’t collect with a suspicious document. The case is that witnesses testify that she asked them for relations, and although they refused, there are many lewd people and she’ll find one who’s willing. We’ll compare it to the document that they testify that this person asked them to forge a document. Although we can't assume any other Jew is suspected to forge (to say that he found someone to forge it for him); but once he’s trying to find someone to forge it for him, perhaps he decided to learn how to forge it himself.

48) Converts, captives and slaves that converted, redeemed and freed when they’re older than three years old don’t receive fines.(since we suspect them not to be virgins). [Tosfos points out: although the Torah doesn’t consider a captive as probably not being a virgin (but it’s only a rabbinic stringency that they shouldn’t marry Kohanim), they still enacted that they shouldn’t receive fines either to strengthen their enactment for them not to marry Kohanim.] R’ Yehuda says that even older redeemed captives remain with their status of purity.

49) R’ Yochanan says: R’ Yehuda and R’ Dosa hold the same Halacha, as R’ Dosa says: a captive may eat Trumah. Rabbah rejected the necessity to say they hold of each other. Perhaps R’ Yehuda only says she receives a fine so that the sinner (rapist) shouldn’t gain, and also, he says that she gets a Kesuva of two hundred Zuz so, people shouldn’t reject her for marriage (so they shouldn’t think she’s probably not a virgin), but by Trumah, he holds like the Rabanan who forbade her from eating it. Also, perhaps R’ Dosa only permitted rabbinic Trumah, but not Torah-obligated fines.

50) [Tosfos sets up the Gemara: according to R’ Yochanan who holds that R’ Yehuda holds we assume she’s pure.] Although we have a Braisa that; the Tanna Kama says that, if a Kohain redeems a captive and testifies she's pure, he’s allowed to marry her, but not if he just testifies she’s pure, and R’ Yehuda says she shouldn’t marry him either way (since we assume she's not pure); R’ Pappa says: (you need to change the text) R’ Yehuda permits in both cases. R’ Huna b. R’ Yehoshua answers: R’ Yehuda is only responding to the Rabanan’s opinion who hold she’s not pure, he shouldn’t marry her in either case. On that, the Rabanan responded, when he redeems her, we assume he’s testifying correctly, since he wouldn’t throw his money away for no reason. However, by just testifying, he might lie since he has an eye for her.

51) R’ Yehuda held that a captive has the status of being pure. the Gemara asks: R’ Yehuda says that a convert needs to wait three months to marry to differentiate between a child that she conceived before she was Jewish and a child she conceived after she was Jewish, (and R’ Yossi holds she can marry immediately), so too, we should assume he held that a captive is not pure. [Tosfos asks: although R’ Yehuda agrees to our Mishna that converts don't collect a fine; since they definitely are not assumed a virgin since they probably had relations before they decided to convert. Even if she wanted to convert before she was three, there is still no proof that she guarded herself then since she couldn’t get pregnant anyhow. However, here we refer to an adult who wants to convert and guards herself to make sure she wouldn’t get pregnant, and we still make her wait three months since she may not be able to protect herself while she’s still dwelling amongst non-Jews (since they’ll force themselves on her), of course a captive can’t guard herself since she’s totally in their hands.] The Gemara answers: you can’t compare a convert to a captive, since a convert may not guard herself before her conversion, but a captive will. [Tosfos explains: we must say we also refer to a minor captive, and she doesn’t know how to guard herself; but such a small child wouldn’t at all have any interest in relations (so we don’t assume someone would entice her). Once she’s old enough to be interested in relations, she would be mature enough to be able to guard herself.]

52) If a convert converts and sees blood, R’ Yehuda says (you don’t need to worry she was Tamai a day before like by other women), but we say that it’s enough to consider her Tamai from the time she actually found blood. R’ Yossi says that she’s like other women, and she has to worry that she was Tamai for the last twenty-four hours, or from the last time she checked herself for blood, whichever came last. [Rashi explains R’ Yehuda’s reason: since she couldn’t make herself Tamai retroactively for twenty-four hours (since she was not yet Jewish to become Tamai from blood) we disregard the whole enactment, even from her last checking. R’ Yossi who says that she has to worry about her Tumah for twenty-four hours was not exact, since she wasn’t Jewish for that long to be Tamai. Rather, she becomes Tamai retroactively because of the enactment “to make Tamai for twenty-four hours,” but she’s only Tamai from the time she converted.]

53) A convert, captive and slave that we saw had relations, R’ Yehuda says that they must wait three months before they marry (so we can know, if she has a child, who’s the father). R’ Yossi says that he may receive Kiddushin and have Nesuin right away. R’ Yossi holds that such a woman always has relations with soft material (as a contraceptive). After all, an eventual convert will do so, since she’s making sure she doesn’t get pregnant since she’s waiting to convert, and a freed slave also could have overheard her master that he plans to free her. Even a seduction and rape that happens unexpectedly and she can't prepare the soft material can marry right away; since women who have an out of wedlock relations stir the semen inside them (to remove it) to make sure that they don’t get pregnant. [Tosfos explains: however, R’ Yossi agrees that a slave who got her tooth or eye knocked out needs to wait since they had no reason to stir out the semen.] R’ Yehuda argues for, perhaps, she didn’t stir well enough (to be effective).

54) [Rashi's text is that R' Yehuda even requires a child who converts to wait three months as a decree not to permit it by adults. Tosfos says: even though we find that we don't decree a child converting needs to wait because of an adult; that refers to a case where we didn't see that she had relations. However, the Ri says that the right text should not read "from three years old" but just a convert, i.e., an adult one.]

55) A Naarah who had Kiddushin and got divorced, R’ Yossi Haglili says that there is no fine if she’s raped, as the Torah says that the rape happened on a girl “that didn’t have Kiddushin.” R’ Akiva of the Mishna says that there is a fine, and she can keep it, (not like what happens usually that her father keeps the fine), since the Torah is saying; if she didn’t have Kiddushin, then the fine belongs to her father, and If she had Kiddushin, then the fine belongs to her. Although we see by the Torah’s other conditions, that she needs to be a Naarah and not a Bogeres, or that she needs to be a virgin and not a non-virgin, that there's no fine and not just she keeps the fine; since we need the word Arusa to learn a Gezeira Shava with it. After all, it says this both by rape and seduction, but It only says he pays fifty coins by rape and only says by seduction he pays Shekalim. So we learn, just like rape he pays fifty, so too by seduction; and just like seduction the coins used are Shekalim, so too by rape. R’ Akiva held that that “Arusa” is used for a Gezeira Shava and ‘virgin’ is used to exclude a non-virgin and Naarsa to exclude Bogeres; since it’s logical to say that we exclude a non-virgin and Bogeres before excluding one who received Kiddushin, since her body changed. R’ Akiva in the Braisa contradicts his opinion in the Mishna and says her father gets the fine. R’ Akiva in our Mishna holds that the Gezeira Shava doesn’t completely uproot the meaning of the Pasuk. R’ Akiva of the Braisa holds that the Pasuk should be read "that's not presently betrothed,” (and not, “was never betrothed”). Although, if she's presently married, we know anyhow that she doesn’t receive a fine since she’s supposed to receive stoning, however, I might have thought, since fines are a Chidush, that you must pay even if you get the death penalty, so the Pasuk teaches us otherwise. Rabbah who says that you actually pay fines with the death penalty because it’s a Chidush, must hold like R’ Akiva of the Mishna (who reads the Pasuk that she didn’t receive Kiddushin in the past).

56) Abaya says: if the raped girl dies (before the father had a chance to bring the rapist to court), he doesn’t pay, because the Pasuk says “you give to the father of the Naarah,” and not to the father of the dead. However, Rava inquired; (we know that if a Naarah was raped and then she turned into a Bogeres before the court case, the girl receives the fine.) However, if she dies before she turns into a Bogeres, (and they waited before the court case after the time the girl would have become a Bogeres) do we say that she becomes a Bogeres in her grave or not? If she becomes a Bogeres (then it’s hers). If you say there is no Bogeres, then her father still receives the fine. [Tosfos says: although, since a Naarah can't have a child, then the father should receive the money anyhow, since he’s the sole heir of his daughter; we can say it makes a difference if she has debts. Also, it could be included in the rule that fines cannot be inherited, although there might be a difference, as we'll say later.] Mar b. R’ Ashi says: Rava’s inquiry is as follows; do we say that the death itself has the same effect as becoming a Bogeres (while she’s alive) and breaks the father’s power to collect (like Abaya says), or not. The inquiry remains unresolved.

57) However, she can't have her son inherit her since she can't become pregnant (to have a child when she’s a Naarah). As we have a Braisa: R’ Meir says; three women may have relations with a soft material (as a contraceptive); a minor, for perhaps without it, she would get pregnant and die. (A pregnant lady for, perhaps without it, (Rashi- perhaps she’ll become pregnant a second time, which may push and (kill and) deform the first fetus to look like a fish), and nursing lady because, perhaps without it, (she’ll get pregnant) and will be forced to wean her child prematurely.) A minor is defined as from eleven-year-old until twelve-year-old. The Chachumim say that they all should have relations normally, and heaven will have mercy on them, as the Pasuk says “Hashem guards the foolish.” [Rashi says: R’ Meir permits them to use the contraceptive, but all other women are forbidden, since it’s destroying the seed. R’ Tam asks: if having relations that the seed can’t impregnate is forbidden, why would this be any different than having relations with a minor or Iylanus, which is permitted, and we don’t consider it destroying seed. Rather, R’ Tam explains: R’ Meir held these women should have relations with the contraceptive, and other women are voluntary.

The Ri defends Rashi: since the material is stuck in her canal, having relations (where the seed ends up absorbed in this material), is similar to spilling the seed on stone and wood. It’s not comparable to having relations with a minor or Iylanus. Furthermore, (even if the soft material wasn’t in her during the relations), but she would use it to wipe out the seed afterwards. After all, we see the Gemara in Niddah says, the more a woman checks her area since women don’t have feelings (that bring on destruction of seed) and men do. This implies that if the women would have feelings, it would be forbidden too. (So, we see they’re obligated not to destroy seed, and they shouldn’t wipe out the seed after relations.) However, Tosfos concludes: perhaps the Gemara there only means that they don’t have the prohibition of “having feelings” (i.e., of destroying seed).] Even if she’ll get pregnant when she’s a Naarah she can't give birth while she’s still a Naarah since someone can’t give birth if she was only pregnant six months; and there is no time between the time she became a Naarah to the time she became a Bogeres but six months.

58) [Tosfos says: it seems from here that someone can inherit a fine, but the Gemara in the next Perek seems to say that you can't. Ri answers: our Gemara is referring to the payment of damage and embarrassment, which are true payments and not fines. Ri Halavan answers: really, someone inherits fines, and the Gemara in the next Perek is regarding swearing to deny that he owes it, that the Torah exempts him from bringing a Korbon on it. When the Gemara there only says a fine is considered real payment that the children inherit is when their father went to court over and Beis Din obligated him to pay, it can obligate the denier to bring a Korbon for swearing falsely since, when the debt came into the possession of the heirs, it was already a real payment and not a fine.]

59) The Gemara has an unresolved inquiry: what happens if the Naarah receives Kiddushin after the rape (does the father still receive the fine)? [Tosfos explains: this inquiry is only according to R’ Akiva in the Mishna who holds that, if she’s raped after her Kiddushin and divorce, the fine is hers, so, we see she’s removed from the father’s power of collecting fines by having Kiddushin, therefore, perhaps by having Kiddushin, she’s removed from the father’s power to collect (and she could now collect it for herself). Or, perhaps, since she doesn’t leave the father’s power over her in other aspects, the fine remains by the father. However, according to R’ Akiva of the Braisa, it’s simple that the father still receives the fine. Even according to R’ Yossi Haglili, granted he holds after Kiddushin there are no more fines, it’s not because the Kiddushin removes her from her father’s power at all, but it’s just a command from the Torah to say there are no fines. Therefore, we never see she leaves her father’s power in any aspect, as we see the father still keeps the Kiddushin and her salary (even after the Kiddushin).]

60) If she has Nesuin after the rape, she receives her own fine. it's similar to a Bogeres who completely leaves the father’s power and receives the fine.

61) The rapist needs to pay for her pain even if he didn't knock her onto the floor since he had to roughly pull apart her legs. [Tosfos says: even though there's also pain by a virgin's first relations, but it's not felt at the time of relations because of the desire for the relations, so it's only felt later, so it's not a direct pain, only causing a future pain, and is exempt from paying. The Rashba says: he holds that you can subtract anything that you gain by the damage, and since, if she didn't have the pain now, she would anyhow have it later when she marries, he doesn't need to pay, just like we say by a seduced girl.] However, a seducer doesn't need to pay since the pain is minimal to her and she would anyhow would have received the pain when she marries. R' Shimon says that even the rapist doesn't need to pay pain because she would have the pain anyhow when she marries.

62) The rapist needs to pay the fine immediately, and the seducer only needs to pay if he doesn't end up getting married to her. However, they both need to pay the damage and embarrassment immediately.

63) Whether by a case of rape or seduction; both the father and daughter may prevent the marriage. They're all explicit in the Pasuk except for the father's right to prevent the marriage by rape. Abaya learns it from the logic that the sinner shouldn't gain (to force a marriage against the father's will). Rava disagrees with this logic, since he's not gaining since he needs to pay the fine. Rather, Rava says we learn it from a Kal V'chomer from a seduction that, although it was only done without the father's consent, we say that both the father and daughter can prevent the marriage, of course that should be the Halacha by a rape where it didn't have either one's consent. However, Abaya rejects it since, perhaps only by seduction where the seducer can refuse the marriage [Tosfos: even if he seduced for it to be Kiddushin, he can divorce her and prevent the marriage], so the father can refuse also. However, by rape, where the rapist doesn't have a choice, perhaps the father doesn't have a choice either.

64) [Tosfos says: even though by a seduction, if the seducer and the father wants, they can make the marriage by the father accepting Kiddushin for her even if she doesn't want; even so, but regarding the fine, if she refuses the marriage, the seducer needs to pay immediately. Also, if the father refuses, even if she becomes a Bogeres right away and marries him, he still needs to pay the fine.]

65) Since the rapist can't divorce her against her will, when he dies; the Tanna Kama says: the original rape fine would be in the place of the Kesuva. After all, the reason why the rabbis enacted Kesuva since it shouldn't be easy to divorce her, and he can't divorce her anyhow, so they didn't enact a Kesuva for her. However, R' Yossi b. Yehuda says that she has a Manah Kesuva so he shouldn't have an incentive to pain her untill she consents to be divorced. [Tosfos explains: the reason she's not entitled to a Kesuva from the Torah since, after the rape, she's a non-Virgin. However, if she's raped analy, she's still a virgin and she should receive a Kesuva from the Torah, yet our Gemara doesn't differentiate and imply that she doesn't have a Kesuva.]

66) [Tosfos says: although the reason for the Kesuva, so it won't be easy to divorce her, only applies to a divorcee and not to a widow. Still, they enacted for a widow to collect the Kesuva because of receiving grace in the eyes of the husband. However, that is not enough to make the enactment, but once they needed to enact a Kesuva to make it hard to divorce, they also enacted it for a widow for grace. When R' Meir forbids to live with a wife without a Kesuva, and that's why, if the wife damages, she can't sell her Kesuva to the husband since it will be easy to divorce her, she can't even sell it only to collect it in advent that he dies. Although it doesn't have the problem that it's easy to divorce, you still have the problem that you don't have the enactment of grace. Therefore, the Tanna Kama needs the reason here that the original rape fine would be in the place of the Kesuva in order to counteract the enactment for grace. Otherwise, he would need to give a Kesuva even if there's no problem of being easy to divorce.]

67) The seducer can divorce his wife, but not the rapist, even if she's blind, lame or has a very bad skin disease.

68) However, the rapist can't marry a woman who he's forbidden to, and we don't say that the Asei of "she should be to him a wife" supersedes the Lav since we only say that when there's no way to keep the Asei without transgressing the Lav, but here, there's no Mitzvah to marry her if she refuses him. [Tosfos says: however, you can't say that you can't put wool Techeiles on a linen clothing, and we don't consider it as able to keep the Mitzvah without transgressing by wearing wool clothing. Once you're putting wool Techeiles on the linen garment, you can even use white linen strings on a wool Talis. Tosfos has a Safeik if there is no Techeiles, can you have a mix of two white linen strings and two white wool strings. However, you can't have them all white strings of one material for a Talis of the other material. As we see that they forbade in Yerushalayim Tzitzis on linen because the Techiles might be forged and is really Kala Ilan (a plant based substitute).]

69) [Tosfos says: although we have a Pasuk to say not to listen to your father if he tells you to transgress a prohibition, and we don't say that you can't do it anyway since it's possible for the father to say he doesn't want it anymore; we must say that, once he commanded you to do it, it's a Mitzvah for you to do. Also, we only say by the rape victim that she must say no since she's commanded not to marry him as he is obligated not to marry her.]

70) The Halacha is like R' Elazar who Paskins like his Rebbi R' Akiva, if the rape victim was once betrothed, and then divorced, she keeps the fine.

71) It's logical to say that her damage and embarrassment goes to her father since he had the ability to damage and embarrass her by marrying her off to a vulgar or skin diseased person, and now that the rapist made it that he'll lose some of the worth of doing so.

72) The embarrassment payment always depends on the stature of the one embarrassing, and the one who embarrassed him.

73) We assess the worth of the damage of how much more a master would pay to buy [Tosfos: such a prestigious woman] to a slave that served him well that she's a virgin than if she would be a non-virgin.

74) R' Meir says that one only needs to pay the fine for raping a Naarah, and not a minor. The Chachumim say that you pay for a minor too.

75) If he says that he seduced a certain person's daughter; the Chachumim say that he pays the damage and embarrassment for admitting to it, since it's a regular payment, but he doesn't pay the fine because one is exempt when admits to owing a fine. R' Shimon says that he doesn't even pay the damage and embarrassment by himself, since we shouldn't assume that she's a damaged person because of this person claiming it. This is even true if the daughter and father and all known relatives want it, since there must be some relative overseas, and he may not want it. [Tosfos says: even though R' Shimon in Shvuos obligates a swearing for denying the damage and embarrassment; that's because the father originated the claim, if the seducer admits to it, it is not adding much damage to say we shouldn't collect. Alternatively, it refers to a Ger's daughter who we know there's no relatives overseas. Therefore, we're not forced to say that there's a Tannaic argument what R' Shimon held.]

76) If someone claims that his ox gored and killed a man or animal, he obligates himself to pay. [Tosfos explains: this is even according to the opinion that the ox's owner pays his own worth for Kofar, which might be worth more than the victim, we don't say it's part of the rule that a fine is defined as when you pay more than you damaged. After all, since it's an atonement for his soul, he's not paying more if he's paying his own worth.]

77) R' Pappa says that the half damage that you pay for your Tam ox damaging is a true obligation, and really he should pay full damage, but the Torah had mercy on him and only obligated him half. R' Yehoshua b. R' Huna says that it's a fine. He should be completely exempt (since it was close to an Onness) but the Torah fined him to pay half. The practical difference between them: if you can obligate yourself to pay if you admit to it.

78) The Halacha is that the half damage is a fine. Although we have the rule that a fine is paying more than you damaged, and not paying less than you damaged, it's not coming to exclude half damage of the Tam ox, but half damage of a flying pebble (that shot out under your animal's feet). That is a definite payment and not a fine, but it's a Halacha L'moshe M'sinai that it pays half damage.

79) Therefore, if a dog ate a sheep, or a cat ate a big chicken, (since it's not normal to damage, it's like a Tam ox) and you can't collect in Bavel (since you can't collect fines there). (However, if it's a small chicken, he's obligated to pay.) If he grabs the half payment, you can't remove it from him. [Tosfos says: you can only grab the actual damaging ox. After all, if you grab any other properties, you would be able to grab all his properties and Beis Din can't remove it from you since its would be judging a fining case in Bavel.] Also, if the damagee makes an appointment to go to Eretz Yisrael, the ox's owner must go, and if he doesn't, we put him in excommunication. Also, we anyhow put him in excommunication until he gets rid of his damaging animal. As we say that you can't raise a vicious dog, or have a shaky ladder.