1) In a case where a woman was widowed or divorced. She claims that she was a virgin when she was married, and her husband, or his heirs, claim that she was already a widow. If she brings witnesses that she went out with a Hinuma at her wedding, it proves she was a virgin and her Kesuva is two hundred. [Tosfos says: we must say that we refer to a case where she doesn't have a Kesuva, or else we should see her status in the document. Therefore, she collects two hundred even according to the opinion that holds that you may claim that you paid by a Kesuva and other acts of Beis Din (without a Kesuva), he wouldn't be believed that his wife was a widow when they married and he only owes one hundred with a Migo that he could have said he paid back in full. After all, you're not believed with a Migo when it contradicts witnesses.]
2) However, if there are no witnesses, he pays only a hundred. This is even according to R' Gamliel who says that the definite claim wins the Safeik claim, but here is different since the husband is also making a definite claim, and we don't say that the fact that most women get married as virgins makes it like the husband's claim is not as definite as the wife's.
3) We don't say that the woman should collect two hundred without witnesses since we should follow the majority of women who are virgins when they marry [Tosfos: at least according to Rav who follows the majority to collect money]; that's because most virgins who get married have rumors that they were virgins. Therefore, since this one doesn't have these rumors, it weakens their 'majority' and we can't follow it. [Tosfos says: although an adult is allowed to testify what he saw when he was a minor that the woman went out with a Hinumah, which would only be believed if there's a reason to assume she's a virgin like there's a majority; we must say that the majority of women marrying are virgins is stronger than the majority of virgins have rumors to that fact. Therefore, the majority of women married are virgins was just weakened, but is still active, and by this testimony of what he saw when he was a child takes away the weakening and makes it revert back to a complete 'majority.']
4) We allow her to collect two hundred without producing a Kesuva document, despite that it would seem problematic since she could collect her Kesuva again in a different Beis Din. [Tosfos says: this is not only true according to the opinion that you can deny owing an act of Beis Din, since, without the Kesuva, he could claim that he paid it up, but also to those who hold that he can't claim he paid, since, without a Kesuva document, he can claim she was a widow and save a hundred Zuz. Alternatively, if she claims it in a Beis Din who don't know that they were married, he can claim that he paid it with a Migo since he could have claimed never to have been married to her.] R' Avahu says: from here we say that we write a receipt when the document is not produced. [Tosfos says: even though we would anyhow need for her to write a receipt (even if she would return the Kesuva) so that she wouldn't collect again in Beis Din with witnesses for her going out with a Hinuma according to those who say that you can't deny an act of Beis Din; however, if usually we don't write a receipt, we won't collect here with a receipt since it could lead to some loss if she still has the Kesuva (if he loses the receipt and she doesn't have Hinuma witnesses, she can collect with the Kesuva). Although we say the reason to write a receipt because of the Pasuk "the borrower is a slave to the lender" (and here there was no borrowing); but it wasn't exact to call him a borrower, but it refers to any one who owes money.] R' Pappa rejects the proof, and regularly we don't write a receipt, but we refer to a case that it was written in a place that don't write Kesuvos, and you always need a receipt for collecting a Kesuva.
5) We also don't need to worry that she'll collect a second time with Hinuma witnesses, since everyone agrees that, in a case where you can't do otherwise, you need to write a receipt.
6) There are other proofs that she was a virgin when they married; if they would bring a virgin's handkerchief when they were dancing before her, or if they brought a cup of Trumah wine (that symbolizing that, just like Trumah is the first, so too is this her first time).
7) They used to carry closed barrels before virgins, and open barrels before non-virgins. We don't rely on not carrying anything before a non-virgin since we're afraid that she'll grab two hundred and claim that the reason they didn't carry a barrel before her since there was some Onness. [Tosfos says: grabbing doesn't help but in a case where they don't know she grabbed since she has a Migo since she could have said she didn't grab anything. We only need to make a counter showing by a non-virgin by the barrel, which is a large object, and the woman has some believability that they had some Onness that they couldn't produce it. However, they didn't need to do anything by a non-virgin to counter distributing parched wheat or other small things since the woman won't be believed at all that an Onness prevented it from happening.]
8) When they danced before the bride: Beis Shammai says that they said about the bride like she really is [Tosfos says: thus, if she has some blemish, they don't speak about it, but keep quiet. Alternatively, they find some feature that she has that is nice to praise.] Beis Hillel says to say "a beautiful bride and pius." [Tosfos says: after all, if they do like Beis Shammai and only praise what's nice by them, it infers that the other parts are not nice. However, Beis Shammai held that you shouldn't enact to say a lie since the Pasuk says to stay away from lies.] From here, the Rabanan deduce, that you should always be nice to people.
9) R' Yehuda b Ilaya nd R' Yishmael b. Yitzchok danced before the bride with myrtles and it wasn't considered below the dignity of Talmidei Chachumim.
10) It's forbidden to stare at a bride, and it's not an excuse that you're only doing so to make her more dear to her husband.
11) You push aside a corpse (carried to burial) for a bride to pass. [Tosfos says in the name of Ravya: therefore, if there is a groom and a mourner in Shul, the groom and his entourage leave before the mourner and his entourage. Also, if someone is related to the bride and to the mourner, he should go to the wedding. Also, you should first escort the bride to the Chuppah before bringing the dead to burial, unless you can bury it before they start escorting the bride.]
12) However, you push aside the bride and corpse for a king to pass, and the king can't forgive his honor. However, if it's not so obvious that he's allowing her to pass, like if he's at an intersection (where he can feign that he's just turning in the other direction), then it's allowed. [Tosfos says: this can't be compared to a king standing for the Torah reading that's permitted since it's a Mitzvah, that's because he's showing that the Torah's honor is greater than his own, which is true. However, the bride's honor is not greater, so it's not a Mitzvah to show her honor.]
13) You stop Torah learning for escorting the dead and bringing in a bride to Chuppa, if they don't have enough people to. Rav says: “enough people” is defined to twelve thousand men, and six thousand others blowing the Shofar. Others say that the six thousand Shofar blowers are part of the twelve thousand. Ulla holds: you need enough men to make a 'wall' from the city's gate until the cemetery. R' Sheishes says: just like the giving of the Torah is with six hundred thousand, so the taking it away (i.e., the death of one who learns it) needs six hundred thousand. This is only one who learned himself, but for those who taught others, there is no amount that fulfills it. [Tosfos says: when we say that, if there is a burial society, people don't need to stop working; that's before the funeral procession, but not afterwards.]
14) [Rashi quotes Shiltios: however, if he didn't learn, you only need enough people to bury him. Tosfos adds: this is only regarding stopping learning, but you must stop working even for those who hadn't learned as long as there's no burial society group.]
14a) [Tosfos says: this, that R' Eliezer told R' Akiva that it's like he killed someone for every step that he took to bring a Meis Mitzvah to a cemetery, it's not because he stopped learning to do it, since we said here that he must stop learning to bury the dead. Rather, it's because a Meis Mitzvah acquires the place where he was found and it's forbidden to bring it to another place.]
15) Zeiri defines the Hinuma as a myrtle Chuppah. R' Yochanan defines it as a veil that covers most of her face.
16) R' Yochanan b. Broka says that, in Judea, they distributed parched wheat by a virgin's wedding. However, when a widow married, [Tosfos: even though people randomly distribute parched wheat to children, and it might come out that someone will mistake her to be a virgin; we must say that they were very careful] not to distribute parched wheat that day.'
17) In Bavel, the women were accustomed to place oil on the head of the rabbis by a virgin's wedding.
18) R’ Yehosua admits: if someone tells his friend: this field belonged to your father, but I bought it off him, he’s believed since the mouth that forbade something (saying it was not originally his) permitted it (by saying that he bought it and it is his to keep). [Rashi says: this is only when the son hadn’t claimed it first, and he only knows that it was ever his father's by the present owner. Tosfos says that this logic is still applicable even if the son claimed it first from the present owner.] The difference between this, and what he doesn’t believe the raped woman that she was raped after the Kiddushin; because, there, “the ox is Shechted before us,” and here, it’s not Shechted. [Rashi explains: over here, the son didn’t know to claim it from him since he wasn’t aware of it, but the husband knows to claim it from her since he didn’t find her to be a virgin. Tosfos explains: since she’s found to be open, she can’t claim anymore that she’s a virgin like you can’t claim a Shechted ox is really alive. However, in our case, he could have claimed that it never belonged to the other one’s father.]
19) However, if there were witnesses that it once belonged to his father, the present owner is not believed that it belonged to him without witnesses testifying that he bought it, or that he has a Chazaka.
20) If he has a Chazaka, but not all of them in front of the father, but two years before the father, and a year before the son, it’s not a valid Chazaka. After all, we say that a Chazaka before a minor is not a Chazaka, even if he grows up afterwards. [Rashi explains: this is only when he was a minor when his father died, but not if he was an adult then. Tosfos says: this is also inferred in Mesechta Bava Basra when it says that a Chazaka two years before the father, and a year before the son, it’s a valid Chazaka. However, the Rashbam says that it’s not a Chazaka. R’ Tam explains the Gemara in Bava Basra according to him; it’s only if the son was an adult from the beginning of the Chazaka.]
21) If the owner of a field runs away in middle of a Chazaka, if he’s running for his life, it’s not a Chazaka since he can’t protest (since he needs to lay low). However, if he’s running away because he owes money, it’s a Chazaka since he should have protested to break the Chazaka. After all, we say that protesting, even not in front of the squatter, is considered as a protest. [Tosfos explains: the reason we say that “a protest that’s not in front of the squatter is a valid protest” more than a “Chazaka not in front of the original owner is a valid Chazaka;” since there’s a bigger rumor that someone is making a Chazaka than someone is protesting. Therefore, even if the original owner could hear about the Chazaka, it still depends if his protest also can reach the ears of the squatter.]
22) We only say that a protest in Galil doesn’t help to reach Judea, and vice versa, since there’s usually a Cherem between them (that didn’t allow travel), the protest won’t reach the squatter. [Tosfos says: however, by a Get, you don’t need to say “it was written and signed before me” from one state to another in Eretz Yisrael, since, during the Regel, where everyone goes up to Yerushalayim, you’ll find people to recognize the signature. That is because: the woman who needs to verify the signatures will actively seek out witnesses to verify them. However, the squatter doesn’t actively seek out if the original owner’s protesting. So, perhaps, that vital information may not reach him from the travelers for the Regel. Although we see the opposite by the townspeople of Mechuzah (that we need to worry about verifying witnesses, but don’t need to worry that they wouldn’t hear the original owner’s protest), as we see later that one needs to say, “it was written and signed before me” even if it was written and given in Mechuzah, since the townsmen are always on the run, we’re afraid that we won’t find people to verify signatures. However, we don’t find anyplace that a Chazaka won’t work in Mechuzah. So we can assume that the protest will reach the squatter’s ear; that’s because, in Mechuzah, although those people (who the original owner protested to) are on the run, and won’t have the time to inform the squatter, they’ll definitely tell someone before they leave. The second one will tell someone else, until it will eventually reach the squatter’s ear. However, when the woman tries to find people to verify signatures, perhaps those people who could verify will be out-of-town, and she would be left unable to verify it for an indefinite time until their return. Therefore, they enacted that they should always say, “it was written and signed in my presence.”]
23) If he tells his friend that he borrowed money and paid back, he’s believed even if there’s witnesses to the loan. After all, we Paskin that, even if one borrows before witnesses, he doesn’t need to pay back before witnesses unless the lender specifically makes a condition that he must pay back before witnesses.
24) If the lender’s son makes the claim from the borrower [Rashi says that he’s a minor, and although you don’t swear on a minor’s claim, that’s only if it comes from his own action, but not if his claim comes from his father. Tosfos disagrees. After all, we say that he can’t make someone swear even after he grows up since we have an exclusion that the money giving and claiming need to be done with the same status (and he can’t give the money as a minor and claim the money when he’s an adult) so it should exclude when the money is given from an adult (the father) and claimed by a minor (the son). Rather, we must say that the son is an adult, but he’s only considered as a ‘minor’ concerning his knowledge of his father’s business.] If the borrower denies part of the claim; the Rabanan say that he doesn’t swear since it’s like returning a lost object. R’ Elazar b. Yaakov holds that he needs to swear, although usually, he agrees to the concept of not swearing on returning a lost object. [Rashi says: as the Mishna says that the rabbis enacted you don’t swear when returning a lost object. Tosfos disagrees, and says he’s exempt from the Torah with a Migo that he could have denied everything, and the fact that he didn’t and admitted to part of it is like returning a lost object] However, here is different as Rabbah says the whole reason that the Torah required to swear for admitting to part of the claim [Tosfos: and we don’t absolve him from swearing because of a Migo, believe me that I don’t owe more than I admit, since I could claim that I owe nothing and I would be believed without swearing. We know the Torah only obligates someone who partially admits and not one that denies all from the passage “Ki Hu Zeh,” (only this), which connotes that he claims he doesn’t owe all, but only this amount, meaning, he admitted partially. Alternatively, it works like a Gilgal Shvuah, that once you admit, and need to pay part, you would need to swear on the rest.] As he says: since it’s natural for one not to deny brazenly in front of someone he owes money to. [Rashi says: since he did him a favor by lending it to him. Tosfos disagrees, since it applies to watching an object like it applies to a loan. Rather, it’s like the Chazaka that a woman wouldn’t be brazen before her husband to claim she’s divorced, since a person is not comfortable to deny something completely. Riva says: because he wouldn’t claim he owes nothing, since it’s too brazen to say that in front of a person who knows he’s lying.] Really, he would like to deny all, but that would be too brazen, which he wouldn’t want to do. So not to be brazen, he would like to admit to the whole loan, [Rashi explains the reason we must say that he wants to admit to the whole thing for, if we suspect he really wants to steal it, we wouldn’t allow him to swear because someone who we suspect to take other people’s money is suspected to swear falsely. Tosfos argues since we say that even if we suspect someone to steal, we don’t suspect he’ll swear falsely. Rather, Tosfos explains the reason we say that he really wants to admit the whole amount: in order not to say that we should believe him completely, since he doesn’t want to be brazen, so we should assume what he admits is the whole loan. So Rabbah explains, he really wants to admit more, so this is not that brazen.] However, he tries to delay paying because he doesn’t have enough money now. [Tosfos says: although denying the whole loan is also trying to get an extension, as we say that it’s the reason the Rabanan imposed a Shvuos Heses (a rabbinic swearing) on someone who denies the whole amount. However, it’s more brazen to deny the whole loan than to deny part. So, you don’t have a Migo that you could deny the whole loan, since he doesn’t want to be that brazen.] So we make him swear to force him to admit that he really owes it. Therefore, the Rabanan hold that he won’t be brazen to the actual lender, but he could be brazen to his son, so he has a proper Migo that he could have denied it all. However, R’ Elazar b. Yaakov holds that he won’t be brazen even to the son, so it’s a regular case of partially admitting, which swears.
25) [Tosfos says: if it’s true that, if we suspect someone to take other people’s money we don’t suspect him to swear falsely, the reason a thief can’t swear; R’ Yehuda Hachasid explains: only if he didn’t steal yet, but he’s in the process of stealing, do we say that we don’t suspect him to swear falsely and making him swear would stop him from stealing. However, if he already stooped to steal something, we say that the same way he didn’t stop himself from stealing, he wouldn’t stop himself from swearing falsely. Even if we force him to pay, it’s not T’shuva, and he’s still invalid to swear. Others answer: true, the Torah believes a thief to swear, but it’s a rabbinic enactment to suspect them of swearing falsely. Even though the Torah doesn’t allow them to testify, that’s because there’s a big punishment to swear falsely, as the world shook when Hashem commanded us from swearing falsely. Alternatively, stealing has one Lav, and swearing falsely is an additional Lav besides the Lav of stealing]
26) If witnesses come in and claim that it's their signatures on the document, but they were forced to sign, or they were minors at the time, or they were invalid witnesses at the time, they're believed since the mouth that forbade something (saying it was their signatures and needs to be paid) permitted it (by saying that it was invalid).[Tosfos says: even though a document that's signatures are verified is if there are witnesses who testified that it's Kosher, so even if they have a Migo, we should not believe the Migo in place of witnesses; still, since the Migo contradicts the verifying, and it's said within the amount of time that connects it to their verifying statement (i.e., the time it takes to say three words); it uproots the verification, and the document is not considered verified.]
27) However, if there are different witnesses to verify their signatures, they're not believed since it's not from their mouths that makes him pay. [Tosfos says: and they're not believed with a Migo that they could claim that it was already paid, since we have witnesses to the signature, and we don't believe a Migo against witnesses. Also, since we consider their signatures as testifying to the loan, they can't retestify on something they already testified to. Alternatively, we don't say that two witnesses to have a Migo since they could claim something else, since each person doesn't know what the other one would claim. However, in the first case, we believe them, since they don't need to think what to claim, since it's simple that they could have been quiet.]
28) Even without other witnesses, we only believe them that they were forced under the threat of death and not under threat of confiscating their money. After all, it's forbidden to sign under that circumstance, and a person can't testify to himself being a Rasha. [Tosfos says: we don't split someone's words that we should believe them that they were forced, but not because of money, but because of threat of death. Although, we regularly hold that we split his words; since we don't split words to invalidate a document since the need to validate it is only rabbinic. After all, from the Torah, we consider the witnesses' signatures on it as if they were already interrogated in Beis Din. Alternatively, since it's not so common for the force be under threat of death, even if they said they were forced, and didn't say because of money, we would assume it wasn't through threat of death unless they explicitly said so. Alternatively, since "because of money" explains how they were forced, you can't split the words like if you said that an action happened, and you're not believed to say who did it. Alternatively, your main testimony that you didn't see a loan, which basically says that you were a Rasha unless you produce a valid excuse. This is not like other cases where we split their words that their main testimony is on the action, and not who did the action, or to whom the action was done to.]
29) However, R' Meir held that they're not believed even if there are no other witnesses. After all, we have a Chazaka that the lender makes sure that his witnesses are valid. [Tosfos says: but the Rabanan say that, even if they were Pasul when they signed, but are Kosher now (since they're no longer related) they can't testify now to the loan even to make it a verbal loan, since they need to be Kosher from the time they see the action untill they testify.] Also, he holds of a Chazaka that a person doesn't sign on a document unless he's an adult [Tosfos: since the lender makes sure that the witnesses are Kosher. Tosfos asks: there's an unresolved inquiry in Bava Basra if we believe a Migo against a Chazaka (like, is he believed after the due date that he paid before the due date, although we have a Chazaka that people don't pay then, Migo he could have claimed that he paid by the due date). However, it seems here that R' Meir holds that he's not believed and the Rabanan hold he is believed.]
30) R' Meir says they're not believed either to say they were forced, since he holds that you don't need to verify a document if it was admitted to that it was written, like R' Huna says. [Rashi explains: we refer to a case where the borrower admits that it was written. Tosfos disagrees. Even if the borrower didn't admit to it, the witnesses admitted to it. Therefore, just like the borrower is not believed if he admits to the writing, so too are the witnesses not believed. However, the Rabanan, although regularly holding like R' Huna, hold that the witnesses are stronger and they can invalidate the document.]
31) [Tosfos says: the reason, when he admits to writing, he's not believed to claim it's paid since he could have claimed that it was forged; since he's afraid to claim it's forged since it could be contradicted by witnesses. Alternatively, Rashi explains, and Ri holds it to be the main explanation: since verifying the signatures is only rabbinic, they only required it when claiming that it's forged, but not for a claim that it was paid. However, you can't answer that we don't believed it's paid since, if it was really paid, what is the document doing in the lender's hand? After all, that answer will not work for a later Gemara why he's not believed to say that it's a trust document (that it was written with my permission, although it's not true, in order to impress others, and I trusted him not to wrongly collect it from me).]
32) [Tosfos says: However, R' Nachman disagrees with R' Huna and holds that only R' Meir holds that, if you admit to the writing of a document, you don't need to verify it, and the Rabanan hold that you still need to verify it. There's no difference between the borrower or the witnesses.]
33) Nobody is believed to claim that it's a "trusted document" (that wasn't written to be collected). The borrower is definitely not believed because of the rule: if you admit to the writing of a document, you don't need to verify it anymore. Also, the lender is not even believed in a case where it's detrimental to another person, like when he owes someone else money, and he doesn't have what to pay him if he doesn't collect from this document. The lender's debtor has a right to collect this loan because of R' Nosson's idea of liens (that a borrower has a direct obligation to his lender's debtor). [Tosfos asks: although Shmuel holds that the lender can forgive the loan even after he sold it (and is obligated to another); so why isn't the lender believe that it's only a trusted document since he has a Migo that he can forgive the loan? This is like we say in Bava Metzia that you return the Kesuva receipt to a husband if the wife claims that he paid, and we don't need to worry that she sold it and making the buyer lose since she could anyhow forgive the loan. Tosfos answers: he doesn't want to forgive the loan, since, even if he lies that it's a trusted document, the borrower will still pay him back since he's not a robber, but won't pay back if it was forgiven. However, we're not worried about this in Bava Metzia since the fact that there's a receipt written lends to the narrative that it was paid. Alternatively, you can only forgive the loan after it's sold, since the whole concept of selling a loan document is rabbinical, but not by R' Nosson's lien, which is from the Torah. Others explain: you can only forgive a loan sold since it was originally owed to the lender before he sold it, but not by R' Nosson's lien, in a case where the lender owed money before he loans out to others, where it's owed right away to his debtor. Our Gemara infers that the Halacha is like R' Nosson.
We can't say that he has a Migo since he could have burned the document, since the case is that Beis Din was already aware of the existence of the document, or that it was given over to a third party's hands.]
Even the witnesses are not believed to say that it was a 'trust document' since we have a Chazaka that witnesses won't sign a document that can lead to dastardliness. [Tosfos says: even though we write a document for a borrower even if the lender is not with him (and you're not sure if he lent it yet, and the lender might use it without lending), we must say that you can only give it to the borrower and not to the lender.]
34) R' Nachman says that the witnesses are not believed to say that it's a trusted document, nor a protested document (that the borrower protested to them in private that they're being coerced to agree to make the loan document). [Tosfos points out: although he holds regularly that you still need to verify the document if he claims that it was paid, that's only with such a claim that doesn't contradict the whole document. Also, the witnesses are believed in a case where they claim they were forced, or were minors or were Pasul, since they're claiming there was no valid document. However, here, where the document was written correctly with everyone's consent, but he contradicts it by saying it was a trust or protested document, their mouth can't be believed to contradict what's in the written document.] Mar b. R' Ashi says that they're not believed for a trust document since it shouldn't be written, but they're believed for a protested document since they're allowed to write it since they're protecting the borrower from being coerced.
35) R' Kahana says that you can't keep a trust document since it's a dastardly thing (since you can collect money not owed to you). R' Yehoshua b. Levi says that you can't keep a paid document either. However, R' Kahana did not hold that a paid document is forbidden since you can keep it around after it's paid in order to collect from the borrower the Prutah that you paid the Sofar to write the document. [Tosfos says: therefore, he holds that it's not so bad keeping any paid document since people are accustomed to keep it when the Prutah is still owed. R' Yehoshua b. Levi holds that you still need to be careful about it. However, it's permitted according to everyone if you actually are keeping it until you collect the Prutah that you laid out for the Sofar wage.]
36) It's forbidden to leave a Sefer with a mistake uncorrected for thirty days so that you shouldn't have something dastardly (that can make someone mistake the true text).
37) Even according to R' Nachman, if they claim that there was a condition to the document that wasn't fulfilled, they're believed since it's a separate thing than the actual document. [Tosfos explains: it's an addition to the document, which is not similar to a protested document that the protest is contradicting the actual document. However, you can't say that the condition is a totally different and unrelated testimony than the document, like saying that it's paid. After all, R' Huna b. R' Yehoshua later asks that two people shouldn't be believed that there was a condition, and it's simple that they would be believed to say that the loan was paid.]
38) If two witnesses verified the document, but one of them said that there was a condition on the document that wasn't fulfilled; R' Pappa says: since we have two witnesses who say it's a valid document, and one witness claiming that there's a condition, we don't listen to the single witness against the two, so we consider it a valid document without any condition. R' Huna b. R' Yehoshua says: if you are separating the testimony (as the claim that it was conditioned is not attached to the claim that it's a valid document), then we shouldn't believe them if they both testified that there was a condition since it's saying another testimony than their original testimony, and once you testified, you can't testify anymore. Rather, since both are not testifying that he can collect with this document, it's not a valid document. The Halacha is like R' Huna b. R' Yehoshua.
39) In a case where two people sign a document, and two other people testify that it's their signatures but that they were forced to sign, or they were minor, or they were invalid witnesses [Tosfos qualifies: it's only if they testify that they were related at the time, but that they became non-relatives later (through a divorce). However, if they're testifying that they're still Pasul, why shouldn't they be believed in all cases? The reason we don't say to believe them with a Migo that they could have claimed them to still be related, or why any later witnesses who contradict earlier witnesses are not believed with a Migo that they could have said the earlier witnesses were Pasul; since two people don't have a Migo since each one doesn't know what's in the heart of the other one to say one thing.] Therefore, if there's no other place that you can verify the signature, they're believed. If you can verify them from another place, it's like an argument between two pairs of witnesses, and you leave the money in the place that it was. [Rashi says: therefore, Beis DIn doesn't collect with this document, but if the lender grabs the money, they don't take it from him. Tosfos explains: although we say that a Kohein who grabs a Safeik Bechor, we take it away from him; that's because he also has a Safeik, but the lender is claiming that the money is definitely his. The Rashba explains the case: it's witnesses on a receipt. Therefore, we need to have a Safeik that the loan was paid, so you can't collect it because the receipt might be valid.]
40) [Tosfos asks: when witnesses contradict each other, we say that we keep each pair of witnesses on their Chazaka for being valid, and they can testify in the future (and we don't Pasul them saying one of them lied). Therefore, since in this case, where they're not contradicting each other on the loan, but the other witnesses are saying that the others were not valid, so they should cancel each other regarding their status, and believe the witnesses on the loan. Tosfos answers: we can't leave them on their Chazaka. After all, minors, and relatives from birth were never Kosher, and the forced ones through death threats never became Pasul to say that we should keep them on a Chazaka. Rashba says that you can't keep them on the Chazaka of being Kosher, since they might have admitted to this if they would be before us.]
41) We see this also in the case of a person who's sometimes normal, and sometimes insane. If he sold a field, and we have conflicting pairs of witnesses if he was in his right mind when he sold it, or not; the witnesses cancel each other and we keep the field in the Chazaka of the seller. [Tosfos says: this is only by land, but by moveable objects, the one who's holding onto it can say that you need to prove that I don't own it to take it away from me. He points out: this is not similar to the case in Kiddushin and Bava Basra; if someone gave away a field, and we don't know if he was deathly ill at the time (and can renege on his gift) or not (and can't renege); it depends on his status now. If he's deathly ill now, we assume that he was also that way when he gave the gift, and its upon the receiver to prove that he was healthy then. If he's now healthy, we assume that was his status at the gift, and it's upon the giver to prove otherwise. After all, we can't put this person on any Chazaka of his state of mind of the moment since he very easily changes status, so we can't assume from a Chazaka that he was this way earlier.]
42) It's only if the field came to the insane from his fathers, but if he bought it off someone else, we can say; the same way he might have sold it when he's insane, he bought it when he was insane too. Therefore, he doesn't have a Chazaka to being the first owner.
43) You can only disprove witnesses before them, but you can contradict them even when they're not there. However, you can say a disproving testimony (that the witnesses weren't where they claimed they were) not in front of them and it would count as contradicting the witnesses.
44) You can only verify a document if the witnesses come to testify that they're their signatures. Also, from a document that someone questioned its validity, so Beis Din verified it. However, you can't verify from a document that Beis Din didn't verify since you'll need to worry that the signatures of that document are also forged. The same from two Kesuvos, or documents of selling a field that the buyers was there for three years without anyone protesting them. This is only if these documents where held by others and not by the one holding the document that we're trying to verify. Since it was in his hands, he might have tried to forge the signature. However, that's not a problem if it's in someone else's hand, even if he had once saw it, but he can't be too good forging it by that glance. [R' Tam explains: this is only if witnesses don't recognize the signatures, and we're trying to verify it by comparing the signature from a different document. However, if witnesses recognize the signature, they would be able to tell a forgery even if the one holding the document tries to forge it when he has a document with the signatures in his hands.]
45) Someone may write his testimony down on a paper and say his testimony after many years. R' Huna says: only if he remembers it by himself [Rashi: the main part of his testimony without seeing the paper.] R' Yochanan says: even if he doesn't remember himself [Rashi: but after seeing the paper, he jogs his memory and remembers it. However, if he can't remember it all, the testimony is invalid since the Torah says "from their mouths," implying, but not form their writing. Tosfos says: we're not worried that he'll come to testify from the paper the same way that they didn't enact dating by Kiddushin, even though it might prove if she was a married woman when she had the affair; since you can't give it to the witnesses, since we have the problem that, perhaps, they'll forget the testimony, and they'll say testimony based on what they see in the document; that's because Beis Din gave it to them to hold. Therefore, they'll think the reason Beis DIn gave it to them for testimony is to testify from the paper. However, here, they wrote it themselves, so they won't make the same mistake.]
46) [Tosfos says: although we rewrite a burnt document from testimony what was written in it, it's not considered testifying "from their writing." After all, it's as if they testified to what they saw witnesses testified in Beis Din, since a signed document is as if Beis Din interrogated the witnesses. However, in our case, one witness signed on the paper, so it doesn't have the status of a document, since it's not similar to a sale document that has two witnesses on it. (Thus, testifying from this document is like testifying what you heard from another witness, which is not valid. R' Tam held that there's no problem testifying through writing only in a case where they don't remember the testimony by themselves, However, if they can testify by themselves, then they can testify with an affidavit. However, Rashi in Chumash explains it that you can't write down your testimony and throw it into Beis Din.) Ri says: if two witnesses write their testimony on two separate documents, they can combine to make it as if they signed together on one document. Although here we don't consider it as a valid Shtar; that's because it wasn't written with the consent of both parties. Although it's valid by a testimony that someone protested against a Chazaka, since it's only a rabbinical enactment, they allowed it. This is similar to the leniency that they allow making this protest not in front of the squatter and rely it will travel from one person to another until it reaches the squatter's ear even though it may never reach his ears. Ri also says: even if you don't need the consent of the parties to be a Shtar, but since here, when he signed, he didn't intend it to be a Shtar, but just as a reminder to him, it doesn't have the status of a Shtar.]
47) According to R' Yochanan who doesn't require him to remember it by himself, he can testify even if his fellow witness jogged his mind, but not if the party who this testimony will help reminds him, since he might be persuaded by him, unless his a rabbi who knows not to rely on this person at all and wouldn't testify unless he's able to jog his own memory.
48) All mounds are Tamai if they're within fifty Amos of the path to the cemetery (since there might be a corpse buried there if they were bringing him there Erev Shabbos and they don't have enough time to bring him to the cemetery before Shabbos). Also, if it's within fifty Amos of a city next to a cemetery (since women bury their miscarriages, and people with a disease that dismember limbs will bury their limbs). However, if it's further than fifty Amos, then they won't go there themselves to bury them, so you may assume we would know about it if anythings buried there if they're still new (and it wouldn't be a problem that somethings buried there in early generations). [Rashi says: since they'll bring someone along, he'll reveal to everyone that something is buried there, however, it will be forgotten what was revealed by the old ones. Tosfos explains: after fifty Amos, once they'll go that far, they'll bring it already to the cemetery. However, by old ones, it's possible that, many years ago, the city extended further and this mound was within fifty Amos and somethings buried there, and now some of the outer part of the city was destroyed, and now it's out of fifty Amos.]
49) The definition of 'old ones'; R' Meir says that it was there for sixty years. R' Yehuda says: as long as someone in town doesn't remember it never being there.
50) The Gemara concludes: although it seems that R' Meir doesn't allow someone to testify on something that happened more than sixty years ago, that's only in the case of the mounds since it wasn't upon you to say testimony. However, if you made into a witness at the time, since it's upon you to remember, you can testify after sixty years.
51) Rebbi holds that you need two witnesses to testify on each one of the signatures. Therefore, you can't have each witness to testify on their own signature, but they must also testify on the other witness's signature too. The Rabanan say that each witness can testify on their own signature and it's enough.
52) Rebbi holds the testimony is on the signatures per se, so you need two witnesses on each signature, and the Rabanan hold that the testimony is on the money owed in the document. [Tosfos says: it seems that Rebbi would hold he's testifying on the signatures even if he claims that he's testifying on the money, and the Rabanan hold that he's testifying on the money even if he claims that he's testifying on the signatures.]
53) [Tosfos quotes the Yerushalmi: we refer to a case where the witnesses don't remember by themselves, but only after they viewed the document. Therefore, Rebbi holds like R' Huna that they can't testify on the loan, since they don't remember it without the document; so they can only testify on the signatures. However, the Rabanan hold like R' Yochanan that they can still testify on the loan since they remember it after they saw the document.]
54) Rebbi would be a leniency in a case where one of the witnesses die. Therefore, the other witness can testify on his and his friend's signature with a different person, but the Rabanan would not allow it. Since he's believed on his own signature by itself, if he would be believed on his friend's signature partially, then we'll believe him on three quarters of this document. Therefore, they would require that two witnesses from the street to testify on the other witness's signature.
55) However, if there is no second person to testify on the dead witness's signature; the other witness should sign his name on an earthenware shard and throw it into Beis DIn. Beis Din then verifies his signature from the shard, so he could now testify on the other's signature since we don't need his testimony for his own signature.
56) However, he needs only to sign on earthenware, since it's possible to forge, it can't be used as a document. [Tosfos points out that he can also write it on the top line of the paper so that a document can't be written above it.] However, he shouldn't sign it on a regular parchment since some dastardly man might find it and write a loan document above it (and it would be like an I.O.U.). [Tosfos says: we only allow writing a document on earthenware according to R' Elazar who says that witnesses who see the handing over of the document makes it valid, but according to R' Meir that the signing witnesses validate the document, the document needs to be made of a material that can't be forged. (Since no one sees what's written on it when it's handed over, we need to know that it wasn't tampered with before giving it over.) Even R' Elazar allows it by documents needed to make a transaction, like a Get or land acquisition, but not one written for a proof.] After all, if someone produces a loan document that is signed by who it claims to be the borrower, he needs to pay from his unsold properties. [Tosfos brings the Rif: he only pays if he claims not to have written it, but he's believed to say that it was paid off. The Ri doesn't understand the difference between this and other documents where you can't claim that it's paid since you can claim, "if it's paid, what's the documents still doing in my hand?"]
57) Shmuel Paskins like the Rabanan, since we only Paskin like Rebbi when he argues with a single colleague, but not with multiple colleagues. Although Shmuel himself wrote on a verification of a document that each witness testified on his own signature and of his friend's signature, that's because it was an orphan's document and he was worried that the Beis Din on the case to collect will make a mistake and think the Halacha is like Rebbi even when he argues with multiple colleagues.
58) R' Yehuda quotes Shmuel: if one witness testifies to his signature, and one of the judges on the verification below the document testified to his signature, they combine to validate the document. Rava says that they don't since they're not testifying on the same thing.
59) If three judges are sitting around to verify the document, two of them recognize the signatures, and the third one didn't; if the two didn't sign yet, they can testify on the signatures before the third and they all can sign on it. If they already signed, they can't testify [Tosfos: since it seems that they're testifying to their own interest, since they need to corroborate that they signed truthfully.] The Gemara asks: it implies that it's fine after the verification was written as long as it wasn't signed, yet, R' Pappi says that if the verification was written before the document's verification, it's Pasul since it looks like a lie. [Tosfos says: even though we say that we don't hold like R' Pappi; R' Tam says that it's the Gemara's way to ask from opinions that we don't Paskin Halacha like them. Therefore, since we don't Paskin like R' Pappi, we can write a Harsha (i.e., power of attorney to collect in your place) for moveable objects that the holder denies belongs to you, and we don't Pasul it since it looks like a lie, since your ownership is disputed. Others say: we don't say that we don't hold like R' Pappi completely, but only by Beis Din's action (like writing a document's verification), but not by other documents. The Ri from Diftri answers: we Paskin not like R' Pappi B'dieved, it's not Pasul if it's written, but L'chatchila, we still need to write it in a way that it won't look like it's lying. However, you may L'chatchila write a Harsha for moveable objects that the holder denies belongs to you, since there is no other way to do it, it's like it's B'dieved.]
60) We see from here that even witnesses who testify can become judges. Although we say by Kiddush Hachodesh that they can't and must testify in front of other judges; verifying the witnesses' signatures is different since it's only rabbinically required. [Tosfos quotes Rashbam: the reason, regularly, you need to testify before other judges, since the Pasuk says that "the people (i.e., witnesses) stand before Elokim (i.e., the judges)." However, you can't say that the reason is because they can't be disproved from other witnesses, since the judges won't accept disproving witnesses against themselves; since the disproving witnesses can testify against these judges in a different Beis Din. However, the ones that don't actually testify may remain to judge on the case, except according to R' Akiva by capital cases since the Pasuk says that the judges must try to find a way to save the defendant from the punishment, and if he saw the crime, he could never find a way to save him.]
61) Also, we see from the fact that you only need testimony before the judge who didn't recognize the signature that, if the judges recognize the signature, you don't need to testify before them. [Tosfos says: even though this should be obvious since we have the rule that seeing it themselves is better than just hearing the information from witnesses; we might say this is different since you might need a testimony to look like a Beis Din's action, or else it would just look like a witness saying what another witness is telling him. Therefore, you need three judges for a verification, even though, regularly, a two judge Beis Din is B'dieved valid. Alternatively, we might need to decree testimony so in a case where the judges looked at the signatures at night, which is similar to the beginning of hearing testimony, which is only Kosher by day.] R' Ashi rejects it as a proof. After all, perhaps here you don't need a testimony before the judges who recognize the signature since you have a testimony here before the one who doesn't recognize it.
62) We also wanted to prove from here that, if two of the judges heard testimony to verify the signatures, the third judge can't rely on them and must hear it himself. R' Ashi rejects it as a proof, since perhaps the only reason they need to testify before this one judge here who doesn't recognize the signature since there was no testimony yet, but when there was testimony before two judges, perhaps the third judge may rely on them.
63) If three sat to verify the document, and there was a question to the validity of one of them (through the testimony of two witnesses) if they didn't sign yet, [according to Rashi's text and explanation] the two other judges can testify to his Kashrus and they can finish validating the document. However, if they already signed, they're not believed since they have a personal interest for him to be Kosher. We can't say the case is that the witnesses wanted to invalidate the judge that he's a robber, since the other judges' testimony won't remove that problem, since it would be contradictory testimonies, and we can't make the judge valid because of the Safeik. You can't say that it was invalidating him because of a problem in his Yichus, like he's a slave, then they should be able to testify since it will be revealed (since it will eventually come out if he's a slave, or not). Rather, we must say that the case is that the witnesses originally said he stole, and the judges testify that he did Teshuva and returned what he stole.
[However, Tosfos disagrees. After all, we Paskin like R' Huna that, when there's a question from contradictory witnesses if someone is a valid witness, we leave him on his Chezkas Kashrus and we consider that he's valid. Also, you can never find out if he's a slave or not, since you have two witnesses saying he's a slave, then, even if all other witnesses contradict them, they're not believed more than the original witnesses since two witnesses are equal to a hundred witnesses.
Rather, we must explain it like R' Chananel: if they already signed before the witnesses come in, the signing was invalid, and is Pasul even after they resurrect his status. On that, the Gemara asks: if it's through stealing, then, through the contradictory testimony, we should have left him on his Chazaka of being Kosher even retroactively. Even if it's a testimony on him being a slave and there's no Chazaka to leave him on, since, if he's a slave, he was always a slave. Still, the way to rectify it is having disproving witnesses (claiming the witnesses weren't at the place they said they were) and that just reveals that their testimony was never true, and we should say the judge was always Kosher. Therefore, the Gemara concludes: we refer to a case where the other judges agreed that he stole, so he doesn't have a Chazaka, and you need the other judges testimony that he did Teshuva to remove the status of being a thief on him.]
64) If three people get together to verify a document, but one of them died before they signed, they need to write [Tosfos: L'chatchila] we were three sitting here to verify the document, but one is no longer with us. [Tosfos: however, B'dieved], even if he doesn't write but "we were part of R' Ashi's Beis Din, and R' Ashi told us to write the document," we can assume that there were originally were three and they weren't making a mistake thinking that two can also be a Beis Din. [Tosfos says: even according to Shmuel who says that, B'dieved, two people is a Beis Din; but you need three to verify a document.]
65) We know the Halacha that "the mouth that forbids can make it permitted" from logic. Therefore, we don't need the Pasuk of the father saying "I gave my daughter as a wife" (which would forbid her to all) "to this man" (to permit him), since it's logical to believe him. Rather, it's needed to say that only the husband can be Moitzie Shem Rah, but not a Yavam. [Tosfos says: we need the beginning of the Pasuk to say that he's believed to forbid her on other people, even though we always believe someone what he has the ability to do, and the father has the ability to marry her of; we must say because it's not totally up to him, since he might not find someone who wants to marry her. Tosfos concludes: it would seem that he's not believed after she became a Bogeres that he married her off when she was still a Naarah, since he no longer has the ability to marry her off.]
66) A woman first claims to be married, and the next day she claims that she's unmarried. If she gives a proper excuse to why she lied earlier (like, she only said it to push off improper suitors) she can marry. However, without an excuse, she makes herself into a "piece of Issur" and can't marry. The same applies if she says that she's a Niddah one day, and the next day she claims to be Tehorah.
67) If we have contradictory witnesses if a woman's husband died or divorced her; the Tanna Kama says that she shouldn't marry out, but if she did, she can remain married. R' Menachem b. R' Yossi says: you only don't leave the husband in this case when she married him first before the second witnesses came, but if she married afterwards, she needs to leave him.
68) We need to say that she married one of her witnesses, and she claims she knows it's true, or else the husband who doesn't know any better, would be obligated to bring an Asham Toloy on such a relations where there are two conflicting pairs of witnesses if she's still married to another person. [Tosfos says: this is even according to the opinion that you need to have one piece of definite prohibition that's mixed with a Kosher piece to bring an Asham Taloy, and it's not enough to have one piece that you have a Safeik whether it's Kosher or not, and here there is no definite married lady; still, since, according to the opinion why you need two pieces is to have a piece left over that you might be able to find out if the remaining one is Kosher or not, you also can find out if she's a married lady if disproving witnesses show up and say that the witnesses that testified about his death was really with them someplace else at that time. Also, according to the opinion that you need to have a Chazaka that there was a prohibition that exists here, you have a Chazaka that she was originally a married lady. Although we Paskin that contradicting pairs of witnesses are only a rabbinical Safeik, but from the Torah, we keep it on the Chazaka, the reason why we don't say that she has a Chazaka of being a married lady and should bring a Chatos; since the Chazaka that the wife will properly examine the evidence ruins the Chazaka of being a married lady. Tosfos says: the witness can marry her since we say in Yevamos that you don't need to worry that two witnesses will lie so one of them can marry her. Although we say that when the testimony is that "we killed him," a witness can't be the one marrying her (since he might lie), that refers to a single witness who claimed while he was with other people, we killed him.]
69) R' Yochanan says that you must leave the second husband with contradictory witnesses on the first husband divorcing her, but not on his death. Abaya explains that we refer to two single witnesses contradicting each other. Therefore, by testimony about his death, the witness who said he died is believed by Chazal like two witnesses, and the one witness contradicting him is not considered as anything against what we consider to be like two witnesses. [Tosfos says: it's only if they came one after the other, but not at the same time, as it says in the Mishna in Yevamos. This is only by a single witness on a dead husband, where the rabbis enacted to believe the single witness. However, by a Sotah, where the Torah believes a single witness that she committed adultery, he's believed against a contradictory witness even if they come at the same time.] She shouldn't L'chatchila marry to avoid rumors on her kids. However, by contradicting single witness by a divorce, they both claim that she was once married and is assumed to still be a married lady, and one claims that she was divorced, so we don't listen to him since the other contradicts him. [Tosfos explains: although we shouldn't listen to the one witness even without one witness contradicting him since you need to witnesses to confirm anything referring to an Ervah prohibition; but since we only establish her as a married lady through this testimony, we should only not believe him about the divorce if the other witness contradicts him. Although you might think to believe this witness that she's divorced since he has a Migo that, if he didn't say anything, we wouldn't assume her to be a married lady; since he might not want to keep quiet about the divorce since he may want the testimony to forbid her to a Kohein.]
70) Rava says: really, R' Yochanan refers to a case of contradicting pairs of witnesses. We are more lenient with the testimony of the husband's death since there is no way to contradict the husband if he shows up. However, we're stricter by the testimony of the divorce, since, even if the husband shows up and claims he didn't divorce her, they can contradict him saying that he did. Although, usually, a woman is believed to say that her husband divorced her (since she wouldn't have the gall to lie like this before him), that's only if she doesn't have backing of witnesses. However, with their backing, she will have the gall to lie.
71) R' Assi explains it: we refer to the witnesses claiming that the husband died now, or divorced her now. Therefore, they are not believed regarding the divorce, since they're not believed to say that the Get was lost immediately after it was given, but the testimony on the death doesn't have any believability problems.
72) We have a Braisa: if there are contradictory pairs of witnesses whether a woman received Kiddushin; she shouldn't get married to someone else, but if she did, she doesn't need to leave. However, if they contradict regarding a divorce, then, even if she married someone else, she must leave him. The difference between them is as follows. [Tosfos says: you can't say simply that it's because we leave each one on his Chazaka just because, from the Torah, the Safeik of conflicting pairs of witnesses is settled by following the Chazaka, but the rabbis enacted that we should still consider it as a Safeik, so she would rabbinically need to leave her second husband. Alternatively, since we don't differentiate whether the second witnesses came after her other marriage or not, it's not according to R' Menachem b. R' Yossi, so we would need to know why she can't remain married by a Get.] We must say that we refer to two contradicting single witnesses. Therefore, by Kiddushin, they're both saying, originally, she's not married, and one is saying that she got married, he's not believed against the two. [Tosfos says: also, we shouldn't believe any single witness about a Kiddushin even if he's not contradicting two witnesses since you need two witnesses for any Ervah prohibition. The reason we don't allow her to marry L'chatchila; we refer to a case where there's reason to believe that there is a Kiddushin, like in the case where he threw the money, and the conflicting testimony is if it was closer to him and it didn't take effect, or closer to her and it took effect. Alternatively, when they agreed that the place was set up for a wedding ceremony, that the lights were lit, and the beds were made.] However, by a Get, they both agree she was a married lady, so the one who says she was divorced is not believed against the two who says she's married.
73) R' Ashi says: really, we refer to two contradictory pairs of witnesses, and we learn the opposite (she can't stay by Kiddushin, but she can by divorce). We refer to a case where one pair testified that they saw the Kiddushin or Get, and the other said that they didn't witness this despite living in the same courtyard. After all, we don't accept the fact that, if it happened, they would have seen it, since people sometimes marry, or divorce, in private.
74) If two other witnesses come to claim a woman was married, the woman is no longer believed to say she was divorced since she's not the mouth that's making her a married lady to say that the same mouth is believed that she's no longer married. The same by a captive. if she says that she was a captive, but wasn't defiled, she's believed since she's the one saying that she has a problem. However, if we have witnesses to the fact of her capture, she's not believed to say that she wasn't defiled.
75) We learned: if she gets married, she doesn't need to leave her husband. Some say that it even refers to the case of getting divorced since a woman is believed to say she's divorced since she won't have the gall to lie even if her claim is not in front of the husband. [Tosfos says: at least when she's already married, but she only could get married L'chatchila when she claims it in front of the husband.] Therefore, of course she can remain married by a captive who's only rabbinically forbidden. However, some say it's only by a captive since we can be lenient by a rabbinical prohibition, but not by a divorcee since she has the gall to say she's divorced as long as she's not saying it before her husband.
76) Shmuel's father says that it's not exact to say that she needs to be married when we allow her to remain married, but, in reality, we're saying that once the rabbis gave her permission to remarry, she doesn't leave that permission, even if witnesses to her capture come before she marries a Kohein.
77) However, this is only if there is witnesses for her capture, but if there's witnesses to her defilement, she needs to get divorced. However, this is only if there is witnesses before us, but if there's no witnesses before us, but there are rumors to witnesses of her defilement are across the seas, she doesn't need to leave her Kohein husband. [Tosfos asks: although in Mesechta Kiddushin, in the case where someone Mekadesh with a blue stone that was not worth a Prutah here, we need to worry that there are witnesses across the sea that it was worth a Prutah in Madai, and here we don't need to worry about witnesses. We can't say that we're more lenient by a captive since it's only rabbinic, since the defilement is a Torah prohibition. We can't say the difference is that it's only a Lav if she marries a Kohein, but a married lady would get the death penalty; since there would lead to a prohibition that carries the death penalty if her son does Avodah in the Beis Hamikdash. Rather, we must say that we're lenient here since it's uncommon to have witnesses to her defilement, but it's very common to have witnesses in Madai that knew of its worth in Madai, since all the people who live there are aware of it.]
78) If someone had witnesses to her capture, she's not believed on herself [Tosfos: even in a case where she wasn't aware that there are witnesses when she said that she was captured.] However, she's believed on her friend that she's Tahor. They're both believed on the other one [Tosfos: and we don't worry that they're only testifying on their friend so that their friend will testify on her that she's also Tahor.]
79) If there are no witnesses, she's believed to say that she's defiled (since she's making herself into a prohibition), but not that her friend was defiled.
80) In a case where there are witnesses to their capture; and one of the captive said testimony on herself and on her friend, and another single witness said exactly the opposite of what she said; she's believed to forbid herself (even though the other witness says she's Tahor, since she makes herself into a prohibition) and to permit her friend, but she's not believed to permit herself or to forbid her friend. She's believed to forbid herself even though she also forbade her friend, and we don't say that she only forbade herself in order to lend credence to her friend's prohibition, as the proverbial "let me be killed with the Philistines." She's also believed that her friend is permitted even if she testifies that she is also Tahor, and we don't say that she only said her friend is permitted to give credence to her own permission.
81) Also, if two people both claim on themselves that they're Kohanim, they're not believed. However, the Chachumim say: if each one says that the other one's a Kohein, they're believed. R' Yehuda says that they're not believed, and they're not considered to be Kohanim until two witnesses testify to that fact.
82) Everyone agrees that they don't allow him to marry a woman until he has two witnesses. [Rashi explains: if we have no verification to his Yichus, we need to worry that he's a Mamzer or Nessin. Tosfos disagrees. After all, we see in many places in Shas that everyone is assumed not to be a Mamzer or Nissin and are Kosher to marry to the Kahal. Rather, it means, a Kohein can't marry his daughter until there are two witnesses to his status. As we say that a Kohein doesn't marry untill we check out four generations of Yichus on all the ascendants. (Although she can't be a Chalalah if one of her maternal ascendants was a Chalalah, because a male Jew is a Mikvah to make her offspring no longer a Chalal; still, once we have to check some of the male ascendants for Chalalim, we check all sides to see if there is any Mamzer or Nissin there.) This is only according to R' Meir, but the Rabanan say that you don't have to check any Yichus unless there's some claim that there's a problem. Tosfos concludes: the Gemara could have also have said that everyone holds that you need two witnesses to allow him to do the Avodah.] They only argue if you can give him Trumah. The Rabanan say you could, and R' Yehuda forbids without two witnesses.
83) Some say that they argue if we're concerned that they're only saying that the other is a Kohein so that his friend should say he's a Kohein. The Rabanan aren't concerned, and R' Yehuda is concerned. The Gemara asks: we see the opposite, that the Rabanan are usually concerned to this, and not R' Yehuda. As we see that if two peddlers on donkeys ride into town and one says that my grain are newer and my friend's grain is older [Rashi: this is not referring to any prohibition, but just saying that his friend's grain is better than his because it aged. Tosfos says that R' Tam agrees. After all, it can't be saying that his friend's grain grew before the Omer and is Yashan, and his grew afterwards and it's Chadash, or whether it grew on Shvious or beforehand, since we never see that an Am Ha'aretz is suspected to transgress them, as they're only suspected for not separating Maasar.] Also, mine doesn't have Maasar separated, but my friend's grain does; the Chachumim say that he's not believed, since he may be saying it so his friend will say it about him in the next town, but R' Yehuda permits it. Rav answers: we must switch their opinions to reconcile them. Abaya says that you don't need to switch the opinions. After all, R' Yehuda is only lenient by Damai, since most Am Ha'aretz separate Maasar. [Tosfos says: although Abaya says the reason not to make a Bracha on separation of Maasar from Damai since they didn't enact a Bracha for the rabbis' Safeik, and not like Rava who says since most Am Ha'aretz separate Maasar; it's not because Abaya doesn't hold that most Am Ha'aretz separate Maasar, but he holds that you can't even make a Bracha on a fifty/fifty Safeik.] The Rabanan could answer that it's different with their utensils of the trade in their hands.[Rashi says: since these peddlers have their measuring cups etc., he definitely wants to sell, so there's a bigger suspicion that he's just praising his friend's grain for him to reciprocate. Tosfos quotes R' Chananel: a Kohein has special utensils that he uses for Kodesh that is not susceptible to Tumah, like dung and mud utensils. This gives credence to the fact of him being a Kohein.]
84) Others say: they don't argue whether we're worried about reciprocating. Rather, whether we accept the fact that he's eating Trumah to tell us he has total Yichus. Therefore, the Rabanan say that you don't assume him to have total Yichus, so you give give him Trumah through a single witness. R' Yehuda says that you assume that he has total Yichus. Therefore, you can't give him Trumah if you don't have proof to assume him to have total Yichus, i.e., without two witnesses. [Tosfos says: still you need to answer for the Rabanan who are not worried about reciprocating, even though they're worried about it by the peddlers, like we answered before; since he has his utensils of the trade in his hands. The reason for whether we assume Trumah is proof to Yichus, that R' Yehuda held that, even if you would say that we shouldn't assume it and we should give everyone Trumah, people will make a mistake to think it's proof to his Yichus. Therefore, it's better to say not to give them Trumah without two witnesses, and therefore, if he gets Trumah, you can assume his Yichus. The Rabanan didn't have this concern, so they allow distributing to all who have a single witness.]
85) [Tosfos says: according to the first explanation of the Gemara about the argument between R' Yehuda and the Rabanan that they argue whether they're worried about reciprocation; although R' Yehuda says explicitly later that we assume Yichus from Trumah; the reason they didn't explain it simply like the second way, since, without the problem of worrying about reciprocation, we shouldn't deprive him of the Trumah that's coming to him in order to assume Yichus from Trumah eating. However, now that we don't believe them because of reciprocation, we can now assume Yichus from Trumah.]
86) If witnesses sign on a document that Mr. Ploni the Kohein borrowed; there's an argument between R' Huna and R' Chisda if we can assume his Yichus since witnesses are signing to this effect, or the witnesses are only signing about the loan, and not on his Yichus. [Tosfos says: in a place where there are two people named Yosef b. Shimon, and you need some indication to differentiate between them, and you write that he's the Kohein, of course the witnesses are attesting to that fact. After all, if it wasn't true, how do we know which Yosef b. Shimon is the borrower. Also, it could lead to a problem if we believe the person to claim he's the Kohein without knowing the truth since he can tell them that he's the Kohein and write a document that the Yosef b. Shimon that's a Kohein is borrowing, and it comes out that the other one's a Kohein and he can collect money wrongfully. Therefore, we must say that, in this case, they testify that he's a Kohein.]
87) There's an argument between R' Chisda and R' Avina if we can assume Yichus from Duchening. One says that we assume his Yichus from Duchening even according to the one who says not to assume it by Trumah. After all, Trumah is eaten in private, and Duchening is done in public. [Tosfos asks: they were only arguing whether you assume Yichus by the distributing of Trumah not by eating Trumah. After all, that's why we prevent a slave from receiving Trumah without his master so not to assume he's a Kohein. However, eating is no proof since he may be a slave. Tosfos Yeshanim answers: they mainly argue can you assume he's a Kohein when eating Trumah if we can prove he's not a slave, like when he went to Yeshiva. Now, after this opinion held that we assume Yichus by eating, we need to prevent a slave from receiving Trumah since we might also take it as an indication that he's a Kohein.] The other says that you don't assume his Yichus even according to one who assumes it by Trumah. After all, eating Trumah for a non-Kohein receives the heavenly death penalty, and a non-Kohein Duchening is only an Asei.
88) We can't bring a proof that, when they came up to Eretz Yisrael from Bavel, Ezra allowed a Kohein, (Ben Barzili), who didn't have his documentation of Yichus to do what he was accustomed to in Bavel (i.e., eating Trumah and Duchening) and we don't say that it will lead him to a full Yichus; since there's a weakening of his Chazaka. [Rashi says: since all other Kohanim eat Kodshim, and not him, since he can only eat Trumah, it reminds us that he doesn't have full Yichus. Tosfos disagrees since we may assume his Yichus now to eat Kodshim when we see him Duchen. Rather, since he had Yichus that he's a Jew, but didn't have documentation to his Kehuna, that weakens any Chazaka he had and they won't assume him to be have full Yichus.] After all, if we don't say that, then we would have a problem according to the one who says we assume Yichus when he eats Trumah. Alternatively, we only allow him to eat rabbinical Trumah and everyone holds that you don't assume Yichus from rabbinical Trumah. They only argue when he eats Trumah from the Torah.
89) There's no proof from the Braisa that compares the Chazaka of Duchaning to the Chazaka of eating Challah, that the Chazaka is to full Yichus. Rather, it holds that Challah these days is rabbinical, and Trumah is from the Torah, and the Chazaka of Challah and Duchening is to allow eating Trumah from the Torah. (However, this is only in Bavel, or any other place with an established Beis Din who makes sure that only real Kohanim go up to Duchen, and they check all people wanting to Duchen.)
90) There's also no proof from the Braisa that compares the Chazaka of Duchaning to the Chazaka of being distributed Trumah, that the Chazaka is to full Yichus. Rather, it holds that Trumah these days is rabbinical, and Challah is from the Torah, and the Chazaka of Trumah and Duchening is to allow eating Challah from the Torah.
91) The Tannaic argument if Challah these days is from the Torah is dependant on the argument between the Rabanan of Rav who says that Trumah is rabbinical and Challah is from the Torah since Challah was practiced the seven years that the Jews split up Eretz Yisrael after they captured it, but not Trumah; and R' Huna b. R' Yehoshua who says that Challah is rabbinical and Trumah is from the Torah. After all, the Torah says that you're Chayiv in Trumah when you all come, and not when part of you came. When Ezra came up from Bavel, the majority of Jews stayed in Bavel.
92) We even accept testimony from a Chazaka. I.e., if they say that he has a Chazaka he's a Kohein since he got the first Aliya before a Levi (so you can't assume that he got the first Aliya even if he's a Yisrael since he's the greatest man, or else they wouldn't have a Levi follow). [Tosfos says: even according to Ri Halevi in Gitten who explains that you could have a Levi follow a Yisrael who gets the first Aliya, but here we must say that he got it because he was after a Kohein, or else they wouldn't give him the second Aliya if they call a Yisrael for Shlishi that's greater than him.] We also can assume someone's a Levi if he had an Aliya after a Kohein [Tosfos: that had one Aliya. After all, the Kohein has two Aliyos if there's no Levi.]
93) R' Yochanan and R' Elazar says that an Aliya helps to consider him to be a Kohein even if he doesn't receive Trumah by the grain piles. Reish Lakish says that we can't assume he's a Kohein unless he receives the Trumah. R' Yochanan and R' Elazar holds that, if so, if there's a place without grain piles, you would cancel everyone's status of a Kohein.
94) A father is believed to say that this child is his son and he's a Kohein [Tosfos: i.e., that he's not a son of a divorced woman or Chalutza]. However, he's only believed regarding Trumah since he has the ability to feed it to him [Tosfos: and logic says that he may continue eating Trumah after the father's death, even though he doesn't have the ability to feed him anymore. This is not like we say that we need a Pasuk to say that a person's believed which child is his Bechor, even though he anyhow has a Migo that he could gift it to him in his lifetime, for properties that come to him while he's dying and can't gift it to him then, and there's no continuation of the Migo] However, he's not believed [Tosfos: with another witness] regarding Yichus. [Tosfos explains: although we should believe him since he had a Migo that he didn't need to say that he's his son, but once we know that he's his son, he's not believed. We only believe the Migo regarding Trumah since he could feed it to him, since he has that Migo even after we know him to be his son.]
95) [Tosfos asks: the Gemara in Kiddushin says that a man who comes back from across the sea with children, but without a wife, he's not believed on the children without a proof. However, if he has a wife, if he brings a proof to the Yichus of the older children, he doesn't need a proof for the younger ones too (since there's a Chazaka that they're the woman's children since they tag along with her). Reish Lakish says that the Chazaka works for Trumah, and not Yichus. Therefore, the father's not believed regarding Trumah, not like our Gemara. Tosfos answers: Rebbi here is a Tanna and can argue with the Tanna in Kiddushin. R' Tam answers: the opinion in Kiddushin is like R' Yehuda who says that you can't bring someone to Kehuna with a single witness. When Reish Lakish says that it applies to Trumah, he means Trumah and all other aspects like Yichus. When he says "but not Yichus," it means that we don't punish him based on the Chazaka (if he marries a relative) since he holds that you don't stone for a Chazaka. When R' Yochanan says that it applies to Yichus too, that's even regarding punishments since he holds that you can stone someone based on a Chazaka. Tosfos concludes with another answer: our Gemara refers to a case where his wife is with him.]
96) R' Chiya argues with Rebbi and says that the same way the father's not believed regarding Yichus [Tosfos: even with one witness], he's not believed regarding Trumah either. However, a relative is believed if he said it L'fi Tuma (in a matter of fact manner). Like, when someone said matter of factly that he remembers that, when he was a child and riding in his father's shoulder, he was taken out of Yeshiva [Tosfos: which proves he wasn't a slave] and they Toiveled him so that he can eat Trumah at night. His friends used to keep away from him (not to make him Tamai) and nicknamed him "Yochanan the Challah eater." The rabbis brought him up to get the status of a Kohein through this statement. [Tosfos brings the Gemara in Bava Kama that says that R' Ashi only allows matter of fact statements for rabbinical prohibitions, and they only permit him to eat rabbinical Trumah. According to that, Tosfos asks this, that Rebbi allows Trumah and not for Yichus, so he must hold that we don't assume his Yichus from Trumah, and we said earlier that those who don't assume Yichus from Trumah, you can allow him to eat Torah Trumah if he already eats rabbinical Trumah; then it will come out that they'll allow giving this man Torah Trumah since he'll be eating rabbinical Trumah. Tosfos answers: we only allowed earlier to allow someone who ate rabbinical Trumah to eat Torah Trumah according to the opinion that we don't assume Yichus from Duchening. Therefore, perhaps R' Ashi holds that we assume Yichus from Duchening, so we won't allow him to eat Torah Trumah just because he eats rabbinical Trumah. Alternatively, we can say that there are two types of rabbinical Trumah; Trumah of grains and grapes in Eretz Yisrael that are rabbinical nowadays, but originally they were from the Torah. Only from eating those rabbinical Trumah can we give him also Torah Trumah. However, if he eats Trumah of other fruits, or grains and grapes in Chutz L'aretz, that are always only rabbinical, we don't allow him to eat Torah Trumah from it. Therefore, Rebbi only allowed him to eat the fruit Trumah, or those from Chutz L'aretz, and not that of grains and grapes in Eretz Yisrael these days.]
97) R' Akiva says that, from the Torah, you give Maasar Rishon to the Levi, and after Ezra fined the Levi (since they didn't come up with him) they gave the choice to give it either to a Kohein or a Levi. However, R' Elazar b. Azarya held that, from the Torah, you may give it either to a Kohein or Levi, but after the fine, you give it exclusively to the Kohein.
98) If they distribute Maasar Rishon to a person, you can't assume him to be a Kohein, even after the fine according to R' Elazar b. Azarya. After all, someone might chance to give it to someone else [Tosfos: i.e., the Levi, since they originally gave it to him.] However, if we know his father to be a Kohein, we can take the distribution as a proof that he's a Kohein. Since his father was a Kohein, he's not receiving it because he's a Levi. The only question is if he's a son of a divorce woman or Chalutza and is a Challal, and they wouldn't give him Maasar if he would be. This is not only according to those who say that a non-Levi can't eat the Maasar, but even according to those who allow him to eat, but we wouldn't distribute it to him if he's a Challal. In this case, we can assume him to be a Kohein just like by Trumah.
99) If he got a portion in his father's Trumah when they split his estate, it's not a proof that he's a Kohein, and to say that the same way that his brothers (who have a Chazaka of being Kohanim) got their portion to eat, so too this son. Rather, we need to worry that he only got his portion to sell.
100) R' Yehuda says that you can't assume someone's a Kohein through the testimony of a single witness. R' Elazar says that we only need to worry that he may not be a Kohein (when a single witness won't help to tell us he is a Kohein) when there is an outcry that he's not a Kohein, and such an outcry is only when there are two witnesses. (Therefore, a single witness doesn't take him out of the status of being a Kohein.) Therefore, if you know his father is a Kohein, if there's a rumor that he's a sone of a divorced woman, you remove him from being a Kohein. if a single witness comes to confirm him to be a Kohein, you put his status back to being a Kohein. [Tosfos says: although, if there are rumors that a Kohein divorced his wife, he can't keep her since there's no way to cancel rumors; here is different since this will Pasul him from ever eating Trumah, while the woman has a chance for marriage since she could marry a non-Kohein. Alternatively, we only allow here to give him rabbinical Trumah.] If then two more witnesses come in to say he's not a Kohein, we remove his status again for being a Kohein.
101) [Tosfos says: even though a rumor seems stronger than a single witness, as we remove someone's status from being a Kohein through a rumor, and not through a single witness, yet we say that a single witness that he's a Kohein wins the rumors that he's not a Kohein; that's because we combine the Chazaka of him being a Kohein to the single witness to win the rumor. However, we need two witnesses to remove his status of being a Kohein against the Chazaka. After all, even when you have a rumor that he's not a Kohein against the weaker single witness that he's a Kohein, you can't remove him from a Chazaka without two witnesses. Of course with neither, you need two witnesses to remove him from his Chazaka.]
102) If another single witness comes afterwards to say he's a Kohein; the Tanna Kama (and R' Elazar) say that you can't combine the two single witnesses to make them a pair of witnesses since you need them to testify at the same time. However, R' Nosson (and R' Shimon b. Gamliel) say that you can combine a witness that testified one day with one that testifies the next day.
103) [Tosfos quotes Rashi: the reason we say he's a Kohein here when you have contradictory pair of witnesses; since we say the pairs cancel out and you leave him on the Chazaka. Although this didn't work for King Yanai in Kiddushin with contradictory witnesses that his mother was taken into captive, that's because Yanai personally didn't have a Chazaka to be a Kohein, and we can't put him on his mother's Chazaka that she was fit for a Kohein. Tosfos disagrees since we Paskin that the Chazaka of the mother helps for the child. Rather, the Ri explains: from the Torah, we can say to leave it on the Chazaka, but the Rabanan enacted it to be a true Safeik that we don't pay attention to the Chazaka. Therefore, the rabbis were only stringent by Torah prohibitions, but not for rabbinical prohibitions. Therefore, we can keep him on his Chazaka of being a Kohein for rabbinical Trumah. Although R' Meir is stringent if there's contradictory witnesses whether an Eiruv became Tamai before nightfall, or after; that's because he holds T'chumim is from the Torah. Alternatively, we're more stringent here since we know that it's definitely Tamai now, it's a weakening to the Chazaka of being Tahor, and we don't say that the Chazaka tells us that it became Tamai at the last possible moment.]
104) [Tosfos says: when we have contradictory witnesses if a woman's husband died or divorced her; the reason why we don't say that she has a Chazaka of being a married lady since the Chazaka that the wife will properly examine the evidence ruins the Chazaka of being a married lady. Even though we don't usually have the stringencies on the lady when two witnesses permit her, so she won't examine the evidence; but here we'll put the stringencies since there's a contradicting pair of witnesses. Even when they testify to a divorce (where the husband showing up doesn't prove it false); there's still a chance to be disprovened by disproving witnesses, or that they testify on her witnesses that they were robbers and Pasul for testifying.]
105) [Ri b. Baruch wants to claim that, if the witnesses who say that he's a Kohein shows up first, he has a Chazaka of being Kosher, and if invalidating witnesses show up afterwards, you leave him on the Chazaka of being Kosher. Ri disagrees since, in our case, when the second single witness shows up, we should say he's not a Kohein, since the last status we left him on is a non-Kohein from the two witnesses, so, according to this, he has a Chazaka of not being a Kohein.]
106) However, if first came witnesses that he's not a Kohein and we remove his status of being a Kohein, and then two witnesses say that he is a Kohein, everyone agrees that you bring him back to the status of a Kohein and you don't need to worry to Beis Din's disgrace that they lowered him, and not they need to reverse it.
107) The Tanna Kama says that you need two witnesses to see the action at the same time, and R' Yehoshua b. Korcha holds that it's even if they witness it one after the other (i.e., one saw the loan, and then the other witness the borrower admitting to the loan.)
108) A wife who was locked up in the hands of a non-Jew; if it's because he owes money, she's still permitted to her husband [Tosfos: even if she's a Kohein's wife] since he's afraid to abuse her since he may lose his money. However, this is only if the Jews rule the land, but not if the non-Jews rule the land since he's not worried that they'll fine him, therefore, he's not afraid to abuse her [Tosfos: and he'll rape, and forbid a Kohein's wife]. If she's held because of the death penalty, then she's forbidden to her husband [Tosfos: even a Yisrael's wife] since she might willfully have relations in order to save herself. [Tosfos says: we need to worry even about the extremely modest women who we'll assume would rather die than to have forbidden relations as we said in the beginning of the Mesechta; since we need to worry that any given woman is not as modest as she makes herself look.] Rav explains: we refer to robbers' wives (that the kingdom hangs the husbands) and abuse their wives and daughters. Levi says that we refer to murderers' wives (but the kingdom wouldn't abuse the wives of those who only steal money).
109) Chizkiya says that it's only if they were already sentenced to death. R' Yochanan says that it applies even before the sentencing.
110) If you have a city that was sieged, all the Kohanims wives are forbidden. The Gemara asks from the case where an army came to a town during a war, all the wine is permitted (and we don't say that they did Nisuch with it) even in open barrels. (However, if it's during peace time, the open barrels are forbidden, and the closed ones are Kosher.) So, we see that the army doesn't have time to defile the city. R' Mari answers: they'll find time to rape since they have such a desire for it, but they won't have time for Nisuch since it's not that important to them. R' Yitzchok b. Elazar differentiates between an invading army and the army of this country. [Rashi explains: the country's army doesn't want to destroy the city, but they want to inhabit it and collect taxes, while invading armies don't care about the city's destruction.]
111) [Continuing with Rashi's explanation:] even with an army of that country, even if there are guards watching the city who can see each other (so they would spot anyone trying to sneak in), but we need to worry that one can sneak in to rape when the guard is nodding off to sleep unless the city is surrounded with foliage, sticks and metal chains to make noise if someone is sneaking through, and paroling dogs. [Tosfos disagrees with Rashi's explanation since he's always assumes to be stringent to forbid if there is a chance of rape, and later, we'll assume that she wasn't rape if there's a chance she escaped, like if there was a hiding place. Rather, it's like R' Chananel says: we forbid her if it's this country's army since they don't have anyone pursuing them within their borders. It's only invading armies that are worried since they have the fear that the country's army will pursue them. Even in that kingdom, it's only that they surrounded the city in a way that no one can escape. Otherwise, we can assume that some escaped and are permitted.]
112) If there's one hiding spot in the city, it saves all of them even if there's only room for one woman, since each woman can claim that she was the one who hid there an is Kosher.
113) The Gemara asks: this seems to contradict the rule by two paths that a corpse is buried on one of them. We say, if one person goes on a path, he's Tahor since it's a Safeik Tumah in a Reshus Harabim. If two people took a different path, if both asked their Shailos one after each other, everyone permits each one individually. If they ask together, everyone forbids both. If one asks for him and his friend [Tosfos explains: it can't be that he asked for both at the same time, since then everyone will say they're Tamai, but he first asked on himself and then on his friend] R' Yehuda says they're both Tahor since he compares it to the two asking for themselves one after another, and R' Yossi holds they're both Tamai since he compares it to them asking at the same time [Tosfos: since he asked on both by the same meeting]. Therefore, we should forbid the women in the sieged city too [Rashi: since we Paskin like R' Yossi when he argues with R' Yehuda. Tosfos says that it's forbidden even according to R' Yehuda since it was asked on all of them at the same time.] The Gemara answers: we can be lenient by a captive since, even if she was not in hiding, it's no proof that she's defiled. However, the person who walked down the path with the grave is definitely Tamai.
114) If the woman claims that she didn't hide, but she wasn't defiled, she's believed with a Migo that she could have claimed that she hid. The Gemara asks: we don't say that Migo by a renter of a donkey who the owner told him do not go through Nahar Pakud since there's water (and it will be negligence if anything happens to the donkey), and the donkey died on the way and the renter claims that he went through Nahar Pakud but there was no water then (and it wasn't negligence), he's not believed with a Migo that he could have claimed that he didn't travel through Nahar Pakud. The Gemara answers: you're not believed there with a Migo since it goes against witnesses. After all, it's so much of a fact that there's water in Nahar Pakud it's as if we have witnesses that there was water there. However, the woman was not definitely defiled by non-Jews, but it's only a suspicion.
115) Even if there's a slave (male or female) who says she wasn't defiled, we believe them, but neither she or her husband is believed. The Gemara asks: we see by the case of the deathly ill who writes a Get to his wife if he dies, that she can't seclude with him [Tosfos explains: since the Get takes effect the last second of his life, so seclusion will make it a Get Yashan, which we forbid since people may say that the child was conceived after the Get was given. Rashi says that the Get takes effect retroactively at the time it was given, therefore, seclusion to him would be suspected to be a Kiddushin through relations.] Therefore, she must have someone else in there, even a slave, except for her female slave who she's very close to and she may have relations before her. Therefore, we don't believe her slave. R' Pappi answers: we're lenient by a captive (which is anyhow a big stringency to assume she was raped). R' Pappa answers: we only allow his female slave to testify that she wasn't defiled, but not her female slave. R' Ashi says: even if both refer to her female slave, we have a problem by Get Yashan, since she doesn't need to say anything, and as long as she remains quiet, the Get would be assumed to be valid. However, by a captive, she needs to affirmatively say that she's not defiled, we're not worried that she'll lie outright.
116) We find a similar Halacha. If someone comes from across the sea and claim to be their long lost brother, and he wants a portion to the estate. they claim that they're not sure. This is a good claim [Tosfos: and it doesn't look like a lie that they can't recognize if he's their brother] since his appearance had changed since he left before growing a beard, and now he has a beard. Therefore, he needs to bring witnesses that he's the brother. If he claims that all witnesses are afraid to come since the brothers are powerful individuals; R' Chisda Paskins that the brothers need to bring witnesses that he's not their brother. [Tosfos explains: we refer to a case where this person's witnesses claim that they don't want to say anything on the subject, and there's reason to believe he has what to fear the brothers. However, no one has the ability just to claim that his litigant is a thug and needs to bring the witnesses.] Although these witnesses would keep quiet because of fear, but they won't lie outright that he's not a brother.
117) We have a contradiction in the Braisos whether her female slave is believed to say she wasn't defiled. According to R' Pappi and R' Ashi, we need to say it's a Tannaic argument. However, R' Pappa can say that the Braisa that says she's believed refers to a case where she said it matter of factly. [Tosfos says: still, we don't believe the wife and husband even in this manner, even though we believe the Kohein on himself when he was reminiscing that he acted like a Kohein when he was a kid, but we're stringent by a captive because of Yichus. Although people are not believed speaking manner of factly by Torah laws (except when testifying on a husband's death); but there's no Torah prohibition by a captive, since it's only a rabbinical enactment to suspect rape.]
118) If there are no witnesses to permit her; if she's a Kohein's wife, they're forbidden to live in the same house, but she may live in the same courtyard. However, they must be careful not to come to seclusion. Thus, when she leaves, her children follow her, and when she comes in, her children precede her (to make sure the kids are always with her). This is only by a captive that lends to leniency, however, if your ex-wife marries someone else, you can't live in neighboring houses. A Kohein who divorced his wife can't live in the same alleyway. [Tosfos explains: this is only if she still single since she's more lenient by people, but if she marries, she's like all married ex-wives that are only forbidden in the neighboring houses, which is within three houses.] A small village has the status of neighboring houses [Tosfos: but only if it's very small, but a mid-size village not.]
119) If the courtyard belongs to the husband, it's simple that the wife needs to move out. If it belongs to the wife, it's simple that the husband needs to move out. Even of it belongs to both of them, then the wife must move out since it's easier for her to move than a man.
120) If the husband originally borrowed from her from what she received from her father, he can only pay it through an agent. If he comes himself to Beis Din; R' Sheishes says that we don't deal with him. R' Pappa says that we put him into excommunication. R' Huna says that we lash him [Tosfos: besides excommunicating him, or else he would be lowering the punishment, and he seems to be adding onto it. After all excommunication is worse than lashes.]
121) This is only if they divorced after Nesuin, but not just after Kiddushin, unless we see them to be extra friendly.
122) An adult is believed what he saw when he witness when he was a minor that a certain signature was his father's, or his Rebbi's or his elder brother's. Therefore, he can combine with another adult to verify the signature in a document. Although we regularly don't believe someone what he saw as a child, since verifying signatures is only a rabbinical enactment, so the rabbis believed him. [Tosfos held it's difficult to say that verifying signatures are only rabbinically needed even if we don't recognize the signatures at all, since it can lead to anyone to forge a document. Therefore, Tosfos says: it must be that you don't need to verify from the Torah if the borrower admitted that it's not forged, but it was paid (and believe me that it was paid since I could have claimed it to be forged). Alternatively, that we verified it from one document, or by two documents that was held by the lender. However, Tosfos concludes: it infers from the Gemara in Gitten that verification is only rabbinical even if you don't recognize the signatures at all.]
123) He's also believed to say that he remembered as a child that a certain woman went out with a Hinuma at her wedding (proving that she was a virgin at the marriage and she should collect two hundred for the Kesuva). After all, most women are virgins when they marry, so it's just revealing the truth.
124) He's also believed that he saw as a child a certain person was taken out of Yeshiva and they Toiveled him so that he can eat Trumah at night to prove he's a Kohein and may eat Trumah. However, you can't say that he's a slave [Tosfos: and now he's freed and is taking Trumah incorrectly] since you treat him like a free child by sending him to Yeshiva, and a slave is prohibited to learn Torah. Although we don't say a slave was free if he reads three Psukim in Shul (or if his master borrowed money from him, or appointed him a caregiver, or if he put T'filin on before his master); but the proof here is that they treated him like a free child.
125) [Tosfos says: the reason why the opinion who says that you can't distribute Trumah to a slave since it might have people wrongfully assume he's a Kohein, and not because he might collect Trumah when he's freed; since he's afraid to collect it so people shouldn't think that he's still a slave. You don't have to worry that they would distribute to him after he's sold to a Yisrael, since the master pays for his food, there's no reason for him to sin to collect food. We don't need to suspect that the master will reject feeding him saying "work for me, but I'm not feeding you."]
126) He's only believed for feeding him rabbinical Trumah. [Tosfos says: therefore, since we don't assume his Yichus with this Trumah, he doesn't need anyone else to testify on himself. He definitely doesn't need another adult with him, or else that adult should be believed by himself. Therefore, the rule is: whatever needs two witnesses, this former child is believed with a second person. If it only needs one witness, this former child can be that witness.]
127) [Tosfos says: this seems that he's only believed after he becomes an adult, but not while he's still a child, and the rabbis don't even believe him for rabbinical prohibitions. Although we say that women and children are believed regarding searching for Chametz, since you only need to do Bitul from the Torah, the rabbis believed them by their rabbinical decrees; they only believe them when it's in their hands to do it. Although we believe women on Torah prohibitions; we only believe her by searching for Chametz because it's rabbinical, like the Yerushalmi says, since it takes a lot of effort and women are lazy.]
128) He's also believed that someone collected Trumah in the granaries with us (and thus a Kohein) according to those who say that you don't distribute it to slaves not in front of their masters. This is the opinion of R' Yehuda who holds, for this reason, we can assume Yichus from this distribution. However, R' Yossi holds that you can distribute Trumah to a slave without his master since we don't assume his Yichus for receiving Trumah. [Tosfos says: although we don't assume his Yichus but from Torah Trumah, so he must have testified that he received Torah Trumah, but he's only believed to allow him rabbinical Trumah since he's only testifying on what he saw when he was a minor.]
129) He's also believed to say that a certain place is a Beis Hapras (a field that had a grave that was plowed over) [Tosfos: that if you B'dieved made Taharos after walking through] you can check out the place you walk by blowing on the ground of a Beis Hapras (to see if there any loose bones the size of a barley kernal).[Tosfos says: this is even above the grave itself since it's a Safeik Tumah in a Reshus Harabim. Although they never enacted any Tumah regularly by a Safeik Tumah in a Reshus Harabim, that's because it's usually just a temporary situation, but this field will always be ina Safeik, so they didn't want to permit.]
130) we allow a Beis Hapras after it's been trampled on (since we assume that all the bones were crushed to less than the size of a barley).
131) He's also believed to say where the T'chum Shabbos is since T'chumim is rabbinical.
132) He's not believed to remove any money from his friend.
133) A 'Katzitza' is when one brother married someone who he shouldn't, his family comes and brings a barrel of fruit in middle of the street and break it. They announce that their brother is marrying someone he shouldn't and this is a reminder that you shouldn't confuse his deficiently-Yichus children with ours.
134) Therefore, he's believed to say that he saw when he was a child this Katzitza (and who was the Kosher brothers), and he's also believed to say that a family is Kosher Kohanim since they sent him with Challah and the Kohanic gift portion of an animal to deliver to them. (This is only if he was sent, and not if his friend was sent.)
135) The Tanna Kama says that only an adult is believed to say what he saw as a child, but we don't believe a freed slave to say what he saw when he was a slave, or a convert to say what he saw when he was a non-Jew. After all, we don't assumed that he was too particular to pay attention to these things when he was not Jewish. However, R' Yochanan b. Broka says that we do believe him. After all, since he was thinking of converting, he pays attention.