1) A virgin gets married on the fourth day (Wednesday) and a widow on the fifth day (Thursday). The reason for the virgin marrying on Wednesday, since Beis Din only convenes on Mondays and Thursdays, so if he finds her not to be a virgin, he can rise early the next morning and present the case before Beis Din. [Background to Tosfos: later, we’ll say that, even if he proves that his wife was not a virgin at the time of Nisuin, for the majority of cases, he may still remain with her. Although it proves that she had relations with someone else, we apply a S’faik Sfaika that she didn’t have it in a way that prohibits her. For perhaps, the relations happened before the Kiddushin, when she was unmarried. Even if it happened after the Kiddushin (when they used to wait a period of time before the Nesuin), perhaps she was forced, which doesn’t prohibit her on her husband. However, there are two cases that prohibit her on her husband. One case is: if her husband is a Kohain. Even if she was forced, she becomes prohibited to her husband. This leaves us with only one Safeik to permit her, that perhaps it happened before the Kiddushin. Another case, where the father accepted Kiddushin for her when she was younger than three years old. If someone had relations with her before the Kiddushin, there wouldn’t be any lasting evidence of it. So, if he finds her not to be a virgin, the relations must have happened after the Kiddushin, when she was older than three. This also leaves us with only one Safeik perhaps she was forced. Therefore we cannot permit her to her husband with only one Safeik.

Tosfos explains: we need to enact by all marriages that they should marry on a night that the husband can rise early to go to Beis Din to claim that he didn’t find his wife to be a virgin since they needed to make such a rule for those cases which would prohibit her, we make a Lo Plug (we don’t differentiate), and apply this rule to all marriages.

Rashi explains the reason for this rule, not that the husband’s word will prohibit her (for that we may rely on a Sfeik Sfeika to permit her). Rather, his word should cause a rumor to go out that she had relations before the Nesuin, and if there are witnesses out there that observed when it happened and under which circumstances, we can find out if she’s prohibited or not. Tosfos asks on Rashi: later the Gemara wants to prove that we believe a husband’s claim that he found her in their first relations to be ‘open’ (without any feeling of pushing against the hymen) to prove that she wasn’t a virgin. We don’t say that we shouldn’t believe him; perhaps he’s making a mistake. The proof is from our Mishna that he comes to Beis Din, assumingly to claim that he found her to be ‘open.’ However, according to Rashi, our Mishna has nothing to do with if we believe the husband, since all we need from him is to make the rumor that will produce witnesses. So, what is the proof from our Mishna? Tosfos answers: the proof is that we can deduce that we truly believe him that he found her open. For, if we wouldn’t believe him, then even if he comes in and claims it, we wouldn’t consider what he said at all, since he could be mistaken. Thus, nobody would take it serious enough of an accusation to start rumors that would reach the ears of witnesses. Alternatively, Tosfos answers: Rashi never meant to say that the enactment was to produce witnesses. Really, the main purpose was for the Kohain and the woman that had Kiddushin before three years old. However, once they needed to enact this for them, they decided to include all women into this enactment, since there is a purpose that applies to them too, to produce witnesses.]

2) [Tosfos says over here we see that we’re concerned about the possibility that a woman had unlawful relations. However, in Gitten, we find an Amorah that is not concerned, as he said, regarding the reason they enacted to write the date on the Get, it is to know when the wife can keep the fruit of her fields, and not to prevent him to protect his niece, (who he married), if she committed adultery because unlawful relations are uncommon. That's because: over there, it’s protecting her from the death penalty, that one must produce witnesses to the act and warn her of the punishment. To have all those conditions by an unlawful relations doesn’t happen often. Alternatively, here we have more concern, since this unlawful relations would forbid her to him the rest of their lives. Which means, if we don’t find the truth, they’ll constantly commit sins by living together for the rest of their lives. So, we're more concerned even if it's not common.]

3) [Tosfos explains why we get married Wednesday during the day and not that night: since Chazal say that there is no Kesuva written without arguments (what each side should give), we worry that if you first start Wednesday night, that the arguing would push off the Chasuna and he won’t have relations that night.]

4) He needs to marry on Wednesday so that he'll go to Beis Din right away and won't wait until he calms down, and since Beis DIn convenes only on Monday and Thursday, and the Rabbis say not to marry on Sunday since the Rabbis were concerned that the husband should have enough time to make an appropriate feast, so they enacted to marry explicitly on Wednesday to give him three days to prepare. Therefore, if the time came where they should get married (they gave a year for a virgin after the groom tells her to get ready and prepare herself for the marriage, and a widow has thirty days), and if he’s not ready to marry yet, he’s now obligated to pay for the woman’s food and, (if he’s a Kohain), the bride may eat Trumah. However, if it falls out on a different day besides Wednesday, he’s not obligated to pay for the food (and she cannot eat Trumah) until Wednesday. [Tosfos says: the Gemara didn't answer the reason to marry Wednesday in order that they should have relations for the first time on Wednesday night (which starts the fifth day) as a blessing sign for children, since Hashem blessed the fish (that He created that day) to multiply (as we’ll say later). After all there is no enactment to get married on a certain night to receive this blessing; and it’s only good advice. If someone ignores this advice, we cannot classify him as a sinner.]

5) R' Yosef concludes: since we established that if something happens beyond his control to push off the marriage at that time, he’s not obligated to feed her, and then even if one of them gets sick or she became a Niddah, he’s not obligated to pay for her food. [Tosfos says: although the Yerushalmi explains that if a Yavam can’t do Yibum because he gets sick, he must pay for the Yevama’s food; it must refer to a case when he becomes sick after the time arrived that Beis Din said he needs to do Yibum. So, when he needs to run away or gets sick, he was negligent not to do Yibum beforehand, so we obligate him to pay for the food. However, our Gemara refers to when he got sick before the time came.]

6) Another version of the Gemara: they inquired what’s the Halacha if the groom gets sick? After all, perhaps, we can differentiate between it and getting married on Wednesday. As only there, where the rabbis prevented him from marrying, do we exempt him, but if he gets sick, which the rabbis didn’t cause the prevention, perhaps they didn’t extend this exemption. If you’ll say that we don’t exempt him, perhaps that’s only when he gets sick, since he’s the cause. However, when the bride gets sick, since he’s ready to marry, perhaps they exempted him. Or do we say that it’s as if his field floods and it is his loss, so too here, it’s his bad luck that his wife got sick, and we don’t exempt him. [Tosfos says: we consider this his bad luck more than her bad luck since the husband has the obligation to have children and not the wife, so the postponement is because of his luck that he can’t fulfill his obligation yet. Since she’s not obligated, so she wouldn’t be the one punished by this. Alternatively, (since we consider the man the purchaser of the woman to become part of his household), we consider the wife to be the husband’s field and not vice versa.] If we would say it’s his bad luck because it’s as if his field floods, what would be if she becomes a Niddah? If it’s the time that she expects to have her period, this is definitely not a case of his bad luck. Since we expect it to come, it was never a time to get marry and he’s exempt from paying for her food. The question is if she became a Niddah before the time we expected. Do we say that this unexpected seeing blood is a result of his bad luck and it’s as if his field flooded? Or do we say that some women’s periods change periodically, so she was naturally unfit for her to get married at this time, and we don’t consider it as if his bad luck changed her period. These inquiries remain unresolved.

7) Rava says: if a man gives a Get on some condition, and he wanted to annul the Get by making the condition unfulfilled, and something beyond his control fulfills the condition, it’s a valid Get. It's not only when he dies is it a Get since he wants the Get to take effect, since he doesn’t want his wife to fall to Yibum. [Tosfos says: this is because we assume that, in back of his mind, he thinks that he might die in a normal manner, so we assume it’s part of his deal that it should take effect if it happens. However, if he dies in a strange manner, like when a lion eats him, it never dawned on him the possibility, so we don’t assume that he thought about it to be part of his deal, and it's not a Get.] Also, not only by an Onness that is such a common occurrence, which should have dawned on him to make an explicit condition to exclude it. This is even true for an Onness that wouldn't dawn on someone. The rabbis decreed that the Get takes effect, so that there wouldn’t come out complications from the extremely modest women (i.e., very religiously sincere), who won’t remarry after twelve months perhaps an Onness prevented their husbands from returning. [Tosfos: and there is no reason not to marry and to worry perhaps there was an Onness, since in most cases there is no Onness.] Also, for the truly immodest women (i.e., religiously insincere) who would remarry by claiming that there was no Onness, [Tosfos: even if rumors persist that there was an Onness, or if she’ll know that there was an Onness, but it’s not common knowledge.] Since the condition voids the Get, her children would be Mamzeirim.

8) The reason why the rabbis allow someone, who the Torah still considers her married to the first husband, to marry someone else; since everyone makes Kiddushin on condition that the rabbis consent to the marriage. So, the rabbis no longer consent to this marriage, so they annul it. [Tosfos says for this reason we say by the Kiddushin “like the laws of Moshe and the Jews.”] This is not only if he made the original Kiddushin with money since we can define the money giving as a gift, [Tosfos explains: we have a concept that the rabbis may make people’s money Hefker], but, it's even if he made Kiddushin with relations, since they’ll define it as a promiscuous act.

10) Another version of Rava that he holds: an Onness from fulfilling a condition on a Get cancels the Get. [Tosfos brings R’ Chananal that Paskins like the first version of Rava, that Onness doesn’t stop a Get from taking effect. However, Tosfos asks on this from another Gemara in Gitten that a sick husband gave his wife a Get on condition that he dies from his sickness, or that on condition he doesn’t recover from his sickness. Then he died, not from the sickness, but from the house collapsing on him or a lion ate him or a snake bit him. In all these cases, the Get doesn’t take effect, Rava explains since an Onness prevented him from recovering, and an Onness is considered as fulfilling the condition.

Tosfos answers: when it comes to conditions on a Get, there are three levels of commonness. The above cases where those Onnsim that are extremely uncommon. Those, even the first version of Rava would agree don’t stop the Get from taking effect. The whole reason Rava held it prevented the Get is, because of the modest women who worry perhaps an Onness prevented her husband’s return, however, even they don’t worry about an extremely uncommon Onness. So, there is no reason to implement otherwise. Even according to the other reason, for the immodest women, we don’t need to be concerned. We never enact decrees for extremely uncommon cases. Then there Shmuel’s case, which is quite common. There we say, since it’s so common it should have dawned on him to insert a condition not to include it. If he doesn’t, he caused his own loss. Then there are Onnsim that are in the middle. They’re not too common, but, neither too uncommon. This is the argument between the two versions of Rava, and we Paskin like the first one.]

10) There is no Get after death. Therefore, if someone gave a Get on condition that he doesn’t return home within twelve months, if he dies within that time, the Get never becomes valid. This is even according to the version that it's not a valid Get with an Onness, since we know he wants his wife not to fall to Yibum, [Tosfos says: we don't worry that the modest woman won’t remarry for perhaps her husband died within the year since she would never worry about that. For if he died, rumors would circulate about his death, and she would have heard the rumors.]

11) Rabbosainu’s opinion is that one may give a Get on condition he dies. (Although he also holds one cannot divorce his wife after he dies), he holds like R’ Yossi that the date in the document is as if he wrote in the condition “from today.” Thus, it is as if he wrote, “it should be a Get from today until I die,” which we interpret it to mean that the Get takes effect immediately as long as he eventually dies. However, another Braisa holds that we don’t consider as if the condition contains the words “it should take effect today,” so it's not a Get since it takes effect after his death.

12) They only enacted to get married on Wednesday in places that keep Ezra's decree that courts should assemble on Mondays and Thursdays. However, if there is a city who have their courts open every day, then they can get married any day, even Sunday and Monday. We refer to when he prepared the whole feast already from before Shabbos, so we wouldn’t need to be concerned for the decree that the husband needs four days to prepare for the feast. [Tosfos says: it's not a problem that it's not a day of blessing, since they never decreed a woman to marry on any certain day for a blessing (as we explained, it’s only good advice). The main reason they decreed a widow to marry on Thursday is so that the husband shouldn’t get up the next day to go to work and leave her without spending any time with her. So, marry at the end of the week and you’ll have a three-day long weekend as a honeymoon. However, a virgin doesn’t need this (since he needs to spend seven days of partying with her).]

13) [Tosfos quotes the Ri: however, one shouldn’t get married on Friday because courts don’t convene on the next day (Shabbos). However, Tosfos points out that the custom is to get married on Friday. He explains that nowadays we don’t have established courts. (So, the process is that the next day he would gather three people and tell them he didn’t find his wife to be a virgin.) Therefore, he can also gather three random people Shabbos morning to tell like he would do the rest of the week. We can also explain this according to Rashi that the purpose of the court is to produce rumors that she wasn’t a virgin and perhaps witnesses would hear about it and testify. However, since nowadays we have no establish Beis Din, so there won’t be any crowds that hang around them to make the rumors anyways. Therefore we cannot get this function anymore from Beis Din, so, we can get married on a day that Beis Din doesn’t convene on the morrow, including Friday.]

14) In times of danger when they decreed that virgins marrying on Wednesday should have relations with the governor before her husband, and very modest women who would give up their lives before they’ll have relations with the governor, so it will be dangerous for them, if the people marry on Tuesday, the rabbis didn’t protest. Although we can prevent this danger by teaching them that it’s permitted, they didn’t object because of the immodest woman who will do it willingly and become prohibited to their husbands. Alternatively, because those who married Kohanim will be prohibited to their husbands even if the relations were against their will. [Tosfos says: the reason that it would be permitted to have relations with the governor, although we know that you must give up one’s life for sinful relations; R’ Tam answers: the Torah doesn’t obligate to give up one’s life for a relations with a non-Jew. Since Halachically, the Torah, (in matters of relations, consider them as animals) that the Torah made Hefker their children (as if they’re not their ancestors). One only needs to give up his life for relations with humans. So, R’ Tam permitted a woman who strayed from her religion and had relations with a non-Jew, after she returned (and received a Get from her original husband), and the non-Jew converted, to marry the non-Jew. This is despite that they had relations while she was still married to her first husband, which we usually forbid her both to the husband and the adulterer, yet, we still permit them. Since he holds that we consider relations with a non-Jew as relations with an animal, we don’t impose the prohibition on her husband or the adulterer. However, Rivam disagrees and brings many proofs that a woman becomes prohibited to her husband by having relations with a non-Jew, including our Gemara, that the immodest woman will become prohibited to her husband if she willfully has relations with the non-Jewish governor. So, Rivam answers since she doesn’t do any action, but has relations passively, like she would be a piece of land supporting the man.]

15) However, you can't marry on Monday [Tosfos quotes Rashi: even at a time of danger. We only push off the decree one day and not two. The Ri explains this line that it has nothing to do with the line before, explaining the times of danger. Rather, it refers to a regular groom. It just saying that you cannot get married on any day but Wednesday. He doesn’t exactly mean not Monday, but he can’t even get married on Tuesday. It only writes Monday for the follow up line. If there is a circumstance beyond his control, he can even marry on Monday. However, a danger shouldn't be worse than an Onness.]

16) They didn't uproot the enactment and let anyone get married any night because of the danger since the government’s decree will eventually get canceled. Therefore, we don’t uproot our enactments to avoid temporary government decrees.

17) If there is an Onness (situation beyond his control) he may marry on Monday. We refer to a case where a general will come to town on Wednesday and we’re afraid he’ll grab the whole feast for himself and leave the wedding party without a feast. It's also that his troops will arrive a day earlier to prepare his food for him, so, they’ll also take the whole feast from the party, so we can't make it on Tuesday. If he’ll show up and leave, we should just wait; but we refer to a case where he’ll be staying. [Rashi explains: if he’ll leave by next Wednesday, so instead of making the wedding early, just push it off a week. Tosfos asks: if that is so, that we want them to push off the wedding for a future date, so even if he’s staying for a month or two, so push it off to the next available Wednesday. Rather, the Ri explains: if the general would stay the whole Wednesday, then we would make the marriage early. However, if the general would leave later in the day, we could push off the wedding to start in the late afternoon when it’s safe.]

18) [Tosfos says: don’t ask why do we allow to marry two days earlier to save the feast, but for danger (Maharsha- according to Rashi that holds he can only marry on Tuesday), he can only marry a day earlier. Since it happens often that the government makes these types of decrees, so, if we let her get married whenever, people will forget the original enactment. Therefore, we don’t allow it to stray more than one day. However, the general’s coming doesn’t happen often. So, if once in a long while they let you get married two days earlier, it won’t make people forget about the original enactment.]

19) Alternatively, the Onness is: they prepared everything already for the feast. (They baked the bread, they slaughtered the animals and they diluted the wine.) Suddenly, either the groom’s father or the bride’s mother died. (These were the major preparers of the wedding. The groom’s father prepared the feast and the bride’s mother gets the bride ready. If we would push off the wedding now, there would be no one else able to help in those capacities.) So, we place the dead into another room for the meanwhile, and we bring the couple to Chuppah. They make their first relations (called the special Mitzvah relations) [Tosfos explains why we call the first relations the special Mitzvah relations since the Gemara says that a woman doesn’t make a treaty (i.e., becomes completely loyal to a husband) only to the one who makes her a vessel, (i.e., the one that breaks her hymen that makes her open.) Through this act, he makes himself close to her and will have many children.] Then, they separate until the mourning period is over.

18) However, we don’t allow this with the other parents’ death. [Tosfos adds: the same applies to the death of other relatives besides parents, even if he was never married before. Although the Gemara in Moed Katan says that a widower shouldn’t remarry until three Yomim Tovim after his wife’s death, but if he’s childless he may marry immediately to be Yoitza the Mitzvah of Pru U’Rivu, or If he has young children so that the new wife can take care of the children; the Gemara was not exact when it wrote he may marry immediately, but after the seven days of mourning. Even so, we would not allow relations with her until after the thirty-day mourning period.

The Ri says: we only allow someone with small children to marry within thirty days. However, someone who has no children, there is no reason to allow marrying within thirty days since we forbid relations with a new wife until after Shloshim, why should we permit him to marry beforehand? R’ Tam even allows the one who doesn’t have children to marry and have relations within thirty days (so he can right away work on having a family), but this doesn’t seem to fit well into Mesechta Smuchos.

Tosfos continues: the one with small children may even marry a wife who’s also in Aveilos. We don’t say that since he may marry someone else, it’s not necessary for her to break her Aveilos. R’ Tam permits every Avel, even for a parent, to get married after thirty days. Although the Gemara in Moed Katan forbids him to enter a party, that’s only to other people’s parties. However, to do the great Mitzvah of marrying, we permit it. Even if he already has children, it’s a Mitzvah. A proof to this, since the Braisa permits marriage after thirty days and doesn’t differentiate if the Aveilos is from a parent or not. R’ Yosef brings a proof from Mesechta Smuchos. We forbid an Avel to go to a party within thirty days. He may go after thirty days, unless it was for a parent. However, we allow him to go to a Mitzvah party. Tosfos ends that he was in doubt whether this Heter of going to a Mitzvah party applies to the first part of the Braisa, even within thirty days.]

21) R’ Chisda says that we refer only after they already poured water over the meat to prepare it. At that point he can’t sell it anymore at market, so it will become spoiled and you’ll lose the whole feast. Rava explained that we don’t have this Heter in a metropolis, since they can still have enough buyers to buy out the meat, so he won’t have any loss. So, they sell the meat and marry after Shiva.

22) R’ Pappa says that, in a small town, we don’t push off the wedding even if they didn’t pour the water over the meat since there are not enough people to buy all the meat even with a longer shelf life.

33) We must say that R’ Chisda, who only allows after he poured the water, refers to a middle-sized town.

34) Afterwards, they celebrate the seven days of feasts following with the seven days of mourning. All those days she sleeps among the women and he sleeps among the men (they’re forbidden to each other and they cannot even be secluded together.) This is like R’ Yochanan says: although someone shouldn’t keep Aveilos during Chol Hamoed, he keeps it for private acts (i.e., regarding having relations with his wife.) [Tosfos brings the Bahag who Paskins like R’ Yochanan. Although the rule is to Paskin leniently in Aveilos, and Rav and Shmuel argue, they only said it only regarding Tannaim’s arguments, but the rule doesn’t apply by Amoraim’s arguments. The Ri says (we don’t follow that rule here) since the Gemara here brings a proof to R’ Yochanan.]

25) We also seclude a bride and groom if she becomes a Niddah before they have their first relations before she became forbidden. However, if they had relations (so there is no pent-up desire for it), they can seclude themselves and we can trust them not to have relations.

26) However, by Aveilos, we explicitly forbid their seclusion after they had their first relation. This is because people take the prohibition of Aveilos lighter than they take Niddah so we need to prohibit an Avel to seclude even after the first relations since he’s more apt to transgress it. However, this is only when he’s an Avel, he might get very tempted to have relations. She won’t refuse, since she’s not in Aveilos. However, she takes her Aveilos very seriously; therefore, her husband can’t appease her to have relations. Therefore, we can be more lenient, as the Avel wife still needs to pour her husband’s wine, make his bed and wash his hands and feet. However, a Niddah wife cannot pour his wine (to pass it to him), make his bed and wash his hands and face. [Ri explains: here we define “making the bed” by spreading the sheet over the bed, which we consider as a gesture of closeness. However, we don’t consider setting up the pillows and blankets (mattress) as gestures of closeness, so a Niddah may set them up.]

27) R’ Ashi answers: really, Aveilos is generally more stringent in people’s eyes, and only in our case, where we give a tremendous leniency, people might take it to become even more lax. Therefore the rabbis needed to put an extra stringency here to prohibit him to seclude with his wife.

28) If a father-in-law or mother-in-law dies, you should keep the mourning customs in front of your spouse, and not if you're away from your spouse.

29) This leniency cannot be that we allow them to have relations after the parent’s death, since the Aveilos didn’t start yet. As we see that Aveilos only start according to R’ Eliezer when they carry the dead out of the house, and according to R’ Yehoshua when they close the Golel (we’ll explain in Tosfos.) Rather, we must say the leniency is that we allow them to have seven days of feast before the Aveilos start. [Rashi explains ‘Golel’ to mean the coffin’s cover, (and the Dofeik [that along with Golel, emits Tumah], as the walls of the coffin. The reason we call it ‘Dofeik,’ since the cover is ‘Doifeik’ [pushing] against it.) However, R’ Tam explains Golel is the tombstone, and the Dofeik refers to two smaller stones that prop up the tombstone, (one in the back and one in the front). However, Ri brings two sources that are questions to R’ Tam. See there.]

30) One cannot get married Erev Shabbos or Motzei Shabbos since he might prepare the feast on Shabbos and slaughter a little bird. However, you don't need to push off Yom Kippur that falls out on Monday because they will feast on Sunday, so someone might slaughter a bird on Shabbos for the feast. [Tosfos says: this is only a question on Yom Kippur and not other Yomim Tovim since it’s custom to eat light foods like fowl before Yom Kippur, (since they’re easier to digest). However, the custom on Yom Tov to eat meat, (so since one gets much more meat per animal than one gets by fowl, they don’t need to Shecht as many animals. Therefore there is less worry he’ll be pressed to Shecht them on Shabbos.] After all, Erev Yom Kippur, one only needs enough fowl for himself, which is not like a wedding feast where you need to Shecht for many people, so he needs to start Shecting earlier. Alternatively, they don’t feast on Erev Yom Kippur until Sunday afternoon, so they have plenty of time after Shabbos to Shecht, which is not like the wedding that they feast right away Motzei Shabbos. Since there is not much time to Shecht then, we’re afraid he may start Shechting earlier on Shabbos.

31) However, without that problem, we don't have to worry that perhaps he’ll calculate on Shabbos what he needs for his feast since he's allowed to calculate what he needs for a Mitzvah.

32) When someone marries on Wednesday, he may have relations right away in the afternoon, and doesn't need to wait until night in order that it should be close to the time to go to court and we’re not worried that his anger will cool off. As we see the only reason the Braisa says that a virgin should have relations at night, since it’s Halachically considered Thursday, the day that Hashem created fish, and they’ll receive the blessing of reproduction that was given to the fish. [Tosfos says: the practical difference is that first relations on a day of blessing is only good advice, but not a true enactment.]

33) A widow gets married on Thursday and has relations that night, which is Friday, to receive the blessing of reproduction that was given to humans on that day. Although the widow should also marry on Wednesday to receive the blessing of the fish; the human’s blessing is better than the fish’s. Therefore, the widow that has a choice which day to marry, we choose for them Thursday for the better blessing. Alternatively, (even if the human blessing is not better), they wanted a widow to marry on Thursday [Tosfos: since there is a blessing and] so that he should spend the weekend with her. Otherwise, since there is only one day of Simcha, he’ll get up the next morning to go to work without any time together.

34) The practical difference between the reasons if it’s because of the human’s blessing or because to give them the long weekend together: by an unemployed husband or if Friday is a Yom Tov. In either case, you don’t need to worry that the husband will leave to work Friday morning (so they can have relations Wednesday night), however, if you have a special blessing for Friday, they should wait to have relations until Thursday evening.

35) The Gemara inquires: may someone have relations with a virgin on Shabbos? We’ll find two possible Hilchos Shabbos problems for having relations with a virgin. First, he may cause her to bleed. Second, when he punctures the hymen, he makes an opening in her that enables her to have regular relations, which is equivalent to building. Therefore we can ask: is that blood considered like all other blood that is attached to the bloodstream (and thus puncturing it is wounding her on Shabbos), or perhaps we consider the blood as not attached to the rest of the bloodstream, but as if it’s gathered in its own area, and therefore we don’t consider puncturing it as wounding her. [Tosfos explains what Melacha is involved with wounding. Rashi says in Mesechta Shabbos that it’s dying the skin. However, Tosfos says that it cannot be, since we learn that if you wound one of the eight rodents listed in the Torah, he’s Chayiv even if he didn’t puncture the skin, since the blood gathered underneath (a black and blue mark). In this case he didn’t dye the skin, but yet he’s Chayiv. Also, in Chulin we say that he’s not Chayiv wounding the other creeping animals (that don’t have distinctive skins) until blood comes out (and not just gathers under the skin). However, since they don’t have the skins, why would he be Chayiv for dying? Also, in our Gemara, what type of dying is applicable by making his wife bleed? Also, why would someone be Chayiv for dying when he makes the child bleed during circumcision? Also, we see that Shmuel in Mesechta Shabbos has another reason, since he says that slaughtering on Shabbos is Chayiv for taking a life. Therefore Tosfos says the main reason that wounding on Shabbos is Chayiv is because it’s taking a life. Even Rav who gives the reason there because of dying, he doesn’t mean exclusively for dying, but besides for taking a life he’s also Chayiv for dying. We cannot say that the purpose of the Melacha is to weaken the victim, so it’s as if you removed some of its life since it wouldn't be applicable by having that relations for the first time are forbidden since he makes her bleed, since you don’t intend to weaken your wife. Also, the Gemara says that any Mohel that doesn’t do Metzizah, we stop him from performing Mila, since he leaves the child in danger, although the blood is attached to the bloodstream and therefore an Issur Torah to do Metziza; and you don't want to weaken the child.

Therefore, R’ Tam explains: since we consider the blood to be the soul, so removing blood is removing some of its soul. Although we say that when they punctured the Chalazon (to remove its blood for dye), you wouldn’t be Chayiv for taking the Chalazon’s life since the blood is better while it’s still alive, we don't say that the removal of blood in the first place is part of taking the life, since the blood that’s useful for dying is not attached to the bloodstream of the Chalazon, but we consider it just pooled in an area.]

Even if we say that the blood is pooled and not attached, we can ask what is the husband’s intention? Does he need the blood and therefore it’s permitted, or does he intend to make an opening in the woman and it’s forbidden. [Tosfos: R' Tam explains he needs the blood so it won’t stain any other bedding in the future. However, we wouldn’t permit it if we consider the blood attached to the bloodstream. Although this purpose is not the real purpose for the Melacha of wounding, we would still forbid rabbinically even when it’s needed for a Mitzvah. The Ri explains: he needs the blood itself, to inspect if she was truly a virgin.] Even if we say he wants the blood, and the opening only happens unintentionally, however we can ask: is the Halacha according to R’ Shimon who permits unintended Melachos [Rashi says: it's not a Psik Reisha since he can end up avoiding making the opening if he tries to go in at an angle], or is the Halacha according to R’ Yehuda who forbids them. Even if we say that the Halacha is according to R’ Yehuda and would forbid unintended Melachos, we can ask: is making this opening constructive or destructive (which the Torah doesn’t forbid).

36) There is a second version to these inquiries. Perhaps, we consider the blood attached to the bloodstream. Do we say that he needs the blood and it's forbidden, or that he’s only doing the act for his own pleasure and doesn’t intend to release the blood, so it's permitted. Even if he didn’t intend the bleeding, we can ask if the Halacha is like R’ Yehuda who forbids unintended Melachos, or like R’ Shimon who permits them. Even if we say the Halacha is like R’ Yehuda, it’s still can be permitted if the bleeding is destructive, or it could be forbidden if it’s constructive. Even if you say that it’s destructive, we can ask if the Halacha follows R’ Yehuda that exempts destructive wounding, or like R’ Shimon that holds he’s Chayiv.

[Tosfos says: according to R’ Shimon, even if it’s constructive, it’s permitted, since it was unintended. Although the reason one is exempt for being a destructive is because it’s not the Torah’s condition for a Shabbos Melacha, to be “an important/ thought out Melacha,” which doesn't apply by wounding, but unintended Melachos is not exclusively a Halacha by Shabbos, but one is exempt by all sins if he does them unintentionally. So, since this has nothing to do with being exempt on Shabbos because it’s not a “thought out Melacha,” we don’t say it's Chayiv by wounding.]

37) You're forbidden to fasten a rag in the barrel’s bunghole, since you’ll squeeze some wine from the rag. Although he didn’t intend to squeeze; R’ Shimon agrees it's forbidden when its’ a P’sik Reisha, (i.e., when the Melacha is unavoidable.) [Tosfos quotes Rashi and others who explain the Melacha here is squeezing. Tosfos asks: the reason squeezing is a Melacha because it’s part of laundering. Since you cannot be Chayiv for laundering with any other liquid besides water, as we see that we allow many times to soak a cloth in other liquids and we never decreed against it perhaps you’ll come to squeeze it, the same way they decreed by water; so why would there be a problem by squeezing wine out of the rag? Although you’re Chayiv for squeezing out other liquids as part of the Melacha of Mifarek (similar to threshing) like the prohibition of squeezing olives and grapes, however, in our original cases, you will not salvage the wine squeezed, so such a squeezing is not Mefarik, but only laundering (which doesn’t apply to wine). Although it’s a P’sik Reisha, but like the Aruch says, we permit any unintended Melacha even with a P’sik Reisha, as long as you don’t appreciate the Melacha’s outcome. (The Ri says a P’sik Reisha is forbidden since the Rabanan still forbid it like a Melacha Sh’ein Tzricha L’Gufa (that you don’t need the main purpose of that Melacha.)) Tosfos brings proofs against the Aruch. As we find two cases where the rabbis permit P’sik Reisha, to pop a pimple if he doesn't intend for the opening he makes and and takeing out a thorn with a small needle, since the bleeding is unintended and not wanted. We only permit them to relieve their pain, but, if not for this emergency, the Rabanan would forbid them.)

However, the Ri answers Rashi: we can say that one is Chayiv for laundering if he squeezes other liquids, but he doesn’t gain much to squeeze it out, since it will remain dirty, since the stain and smell will still be present. Therefore, we're not worried that he'll come to squeeze it out. The Ri gives another answer: when you purposely make the cloth wet, since you want them wet, we’re not worried that the dampness will bother you and compel you to squeeze it.

The Aruch’s alternative explanation: (the problem of placing the rag in the bung hole is not because of squeezing), but perhaps you may decide that it should remain there forever, and this would be fixing a utensil on Shabbos. Tosfos asks: If he intended to leave it there when he puts it in, it’s an intended fixing. If at the time he had no intention to leave it there, even if he ends up leaving it there and we consider it as if he fixed the utensil, since at the time he put it there it’s not definite that he’ll leave it there, then it’s not a P’sik Reisha that he’ll be fixing a utensil. Tosfos is forced to answer: the case is that he intended to leave it there, not to fix the barrel, (but he has no other place to put the rag). So, he didn’t intend to fix the barrel, but it’s a P’sik Reisha.]

38) If he had relations already the first night, even if there is still a chance to cause bleeding, it’s permitted to have a second relations since it’s not a P’sik Reisha. This is like how Shmuel allows someone to enter a tight entranceway and we don’t worry he’ll dislodge some loose pebbles (making the entranceway larger).

39) We have a Tannaic argument if a groom is exempt from saying Shma Friday night if he didn’t yet have his first relations. Rava explains that it’s an argument among Tannaim whether he can have relations that night. The one who obligates, although he’s preoccupied with the fact that he needed to have relations, and still does, and now he needs to stop and can’t have the relations, but we don't exempt someone from Mitzvos just because of regular preoccupation like if someone who has one of his ships sink. As we see that a mourner is obligated in all Mitzvos.

40) Abaya holds that both Tannaim prohibit the first relations on Shabbos. They only argue if we could exempt him because of his preoccupation that he needs to stop his effort to do the first relations. (This is considered being preoccupied for a Mitzvah.)

41) We have an explicit Braisa that the Tanna Kama says that someone can’t have his first relations on Shabbos and the Chachumim allow it. Rabbah explains: the Chachumim who permit hold like R’ Shimon that permit an unintended Melacha. Although he agrees that it’s prohibited if it’s a P’sik Reisha, we refer to having relations leaning to the side. Since it’s not a direct hit in the middle, it may not cause her to bleed. So, since most people are experts to lean without causing definite bleeding, so it’s permitted. [Tosfos explains: where he didn’t do a complete penetration and couldn’t impregnate the wife. but it's an uncommon ability to make a woman pregnant with relations through leaning. Anyhow, when they read Shma, since they never tried it before; they’re preoccupied that they’ll find themselves not experts. However, later by the relations, most people find themselves to be experts. Therefore, everybody can assume that they’re from the majority and probably they’ll be experts, therefore, we permit everyone to have relations on Shabbos, even when they’re not sure yet if they’re experts. However, this is only on Shabbos where they can only lean to the side, so there's no other preoccupation for an expert. However, during the week, where he needs to have regular relations, even an expert has preoccupations that would exempt him from Shma.]

42) Even if they are experts to have relations through leaning, we need to bring a sheet and have inspectors for perhaps she would see blood and he’ll get rid of the evidence. [Rashi explains: although he can lean and she wouldn’t bleed, and he can claim she wasn’t a virgin with the proof that there is no blood on the clean sheet, the woman can claim that she’s still a virgin. Tosfos asks: if so. the Gemara should have answered that she’ll realize to counter-claim that she is still a virgin, so, the main part of the answer is missing from the text. Rather, Tosfos explains we need the inspectors on Shabbos even though he needs to lean and not make her bleed, since we’re afraid that he’ll mistakenly make a complete penetration and cause bleeding, therefore we need inspectors at all times.]

43) We exempt someone who popped a pimple to remove the pus (but not for the intent to make a permanent opening), although he’s for sure making an opening [Tosfos says it’s a Torah prohibition to make a permanent opening, even though the rule is: that one is only Chayiv for making a permanent opening on Shabbos if you make it for bringing in and taking out, but not if it’s a one-way opening, since he uses this opening, not only to release the pus, but also to have fresh air come in to take over the space the pus occupied.] We can't compare it to a first relations where (according to that side in the inquiry) you also don't intend for the openning; [Tosfos says: even though we only permitted there do relieve pain, here too we should permit to perform the Mitzvah. Even if we say that we wouldn’t permit for a Mitzvah as we permit to relieve pain, we should permit the first relations. After all, only by popping the pimple do we only permit in order to relieve pain because it’s a P’sik Reisha, however, it’s possible to have relations that causes blood and doesn’t make an opening] After all, the pus is completely detached from the body, but the virgin blood, although it’s somewhat pooled, but it’s also not completely detached from the bloodstream either. [Tosfos explains the Gemara could have answered that we hold that he really intends for the opening.] The Gemara brings a few cases that they allowed relations with a virgin on Shabbos. Even if he didn’t write the Kesuva yet, (and you can’t write one on Shabbos), we permit it by giving her over objects the worth of the Kesuva. (This would be suffice in order to allow relations until he writes a real Kesuva.)

44) R’ Yehuda allowed first relations on Yom Tov. (R’ Pappi quotes Rava that he would have allowed it on Shabbos too, except that the case happened on Yom Tov.) R’ Papa quotes Rava that he allowed it only on Yom Tov and not on Shabbos. This is because, once the Torah allows wounds on Yom Tov for food preparations (Shechita), the Torah allows it in cases that are not for food preparations. [Tosfos explains: although we allow wounding for non-food preparations, but it needs to have some purpose to enjoy Yom Tov or for a Mitzvah, as we see we allow carrying a child for circumcision, a Sefer Torah to read or a Lulav to be Yoitza the Mitzvah. However, one is not allowed to burn Chametz he found on the first day of Pesach, not because of burning on Yom Tov, since we’re allowed to burn fires for food preparations or Mitzvos; but because it's prohibited to move it to a fire because it’s Muktza. However, we do not allow if it has no use on Yom Tov like carrying out rocks, or cooking on Yom Tov for the weekdays according to R’ Chisda that doesn’t hold of the Heter of ‘Hoyil,’ or carrying for a non-Jew. However, it's difficult that it became the custom to carry for non-Jews. Although our streets that are not sixteen Amos wide are not real R’shus Harabim, there is a prohibition on Yom Tov to carry in a Karmalus. You can't even allow carrying in a courtyard without an Eiruv since there is Eiruv Chatzeiros on Yom Tov.]

45) However, you can’t burn incense on Yom Tov because all people do not equally appreciate incense. (Since the Torah says you can do Melachos to “all souls,” it implies something that everyone appreciates.) However, if someone has a deer (which is uncommon, and therefore, not everyone appreciates it) he can still Shecht it since all appreciate venison (which is food). (Only those who indulge appreciate incense.) [Rashi and Tosfos- so too, all appreciate relations. Tosfos says: in Beitza, we say it’s prohibited to extinguish a candle to allow relations, and we don't say to allow Melachos to facilitate relations; because we only allow the first relations, which is a special Mitzvah, so we consider it to be a need of the day. Alternatively, we do not consider extinguishing the light doing Melacha for the relations, but just to prepare for the relations. It is only permitted according to R’ Yehuda who allows Melachos to facilitate the preparation of food, however, the Gemara is according to the Rabanan who prohibit it.]

46) Many Amaroyim allowed having relations for the first time on Shabbos, and that's the Halacha. [Tosfos says: we don't even need to worry that he'll Shecht a small bird.]

47) All marriages have Sheva Brachos except for a widower marrying a widow that doesn’t need Sheva Brachos for a whole week, but just for one day. Although they enacted only one day to make Brachos, they enacted that widows should marry on Thursday for the husband to have a joyous celebration with his wife for three days. Alternatively, they enacted that widows should marry on Thursday for a first-time groom to a widow. Although they would make Sheva Brachos for any meal in that week, however, they only required him to stay with her for three days of joyous celebration.

48) Sheva Brachos is only with ten people (or more).

49) Shmuel Paskined that one can represent a fetus to acquire for him possessions. [Tosfos says: Although we see Shmuel holds any transactions on objects that you don’t possess yet doesn’t take effect (even after it comes into your possession), So, of course he cannot make transactions with people who don’t exist yet since R' Huna says that even the authorities that allow making transactions with objects that haven’t yet come in existence, they agree that you cannot make transactions for people who are not yet in existence; Shmuel considers fetuses to exist. (Although they’re still in the mother’s womb, we consider as if they’re in the world already.) Alternatively, we may say he doesn’t consider them existing. However, he disagrees with R’ Huna and holds that it’s easier to make a transaction with a person who doesn’t exist than to do it with an object that doesn’t exist. We find that this is R’ Nachman’s opinion.] However, the Halacha is that the fetus can't acquire the object.

50) We make Birchas Nissuin at the Chuppah. R’ Yehuda says (in Judea) they made it by the Kiddushin, since they sometimes secluded themselves before Chuppah. [Tosfos explains: the Halacha is that a groom is prohibited with his bride without making the Brachos first.]

51) There's an argument whether they ended Birchos Airusin with Baruch Ato Hashem Mikadesh Yisrael etc. Those who hold there is no such ending because they compare it to a short Bracha, like a Bracha on fruits and Mitzvos that have no ending. Those who hold there is an ending because they consider it like Kiddush that has an ending to its Bracha. [Rashi explains: since Airusin has the name “Kiddushin,” we compare it to Birchas Kiddush. Tosfos disagrees. (Presumably, if the Bracha is truly not long enough in its own right to have an end Bracha, then we shouldn’t compose one for it just because it’s called Kiddushin.) Rather, Tosfos explains: the argument depends on how long does a Bracha need to be to end it with a Bracha. The first opinion holds that, since it’s not as long as Kiddush, it’s not applicable to end with a Bracha. The second opinion holds that it does have considerable enough length to categorize it as a long Bracha like Kiddush to end with a Bracha. According to the one that holds it’s not long enough to give it an end Bracha, then, Asher Bachar Bonu of Birchas Hatorah, which is even a shorter Bracha, doesn’t have an ending either.]

52) We make Birchas Nisuin all seven days, as long as there are Panim Chadashos (new people joining the party). [Tosfos explains: We only classify Panim Chadashos as those people who’ll they’ll add more Simcha to the party. The reason the Medrish considers Shabbos is Panim Chadashos since we add joy and food to the party for Shabbos’s honor.]

53) [ Rashi says: the first two Brachos, Shehakol Boro L’chvodo and Yotzer Adam start with Baruch Ata and we don't apply the rule that consecutive Brachos only need the first Bracha to start with Baruch Atah; since the real order of the Brachos about marriage only start by the third Bracha. R’ Chananal explains why the second Bracha (Yotzar Odom) has its own Baruch Atah, since not everyone said it, as we’ll see later. However, Tosfos explains: since the first two Brachos are short (and don’t end with a Baruch Atah). If we start the next one without a Baruch Atah, it would seem to just continue the first Bracha. Therefore, R’ Tam explained Birchas Hatorah that V’Haareiv Na is a continuation to L’Asok B’divrei Sorah, and it’s all one Bracha. Since L’Asok is a small Bracha (without its own Baruch Atah ending), if V’Haareiv is its own Bracha, then it should have started with a Baruch Atah. Tosfos concludes: Ashar Bara Soson V’simcha, which is after a long Bracha, needs to start with its own Baruch Atah, like Rashi explains, since sometimes you recite it by itself (when there are no Panim Chadashos), so we give it its own beginning Baruch Atah.]

54) Levi blessed five of the Brachos and left out Yotzar Odom. We must say the argument is whether Hashem created them in one creation or in two creations. [Rashi explains “one creation” like the opinion that Hashem created an extra face to Odom, so He didn’t need to create Chava from scratch, but rather, just separated them. Tosfos argues and says that “one creation” means having one face (and didn’t create both of them at the same time). Rather he says that he holds that there were two creations.] Therefore, we shouldn't say a separate Bracha for the creation of Adom by himself.

55) R’ Assi blessed all six Brachos since he held that they were two creations [Tosfos: one creation] since Hashem first created Adom and then Chava. The Gemara says this is not necessary, since everyone can hold that there was one creation, but, Hashem originally planned to create them separate, but changed His mind and created them jointly. One opinion holds that we should follow his original plan and the other holds we follow what He actually made.

56) If there isn't any Panim Chadashos, it’s just adding to the original Simcha, you only make a SheHasimcha B’Mo’ono and Asher Bara. From seven days until thirty days, you say SheHasimcha B’Mo’ono regardless. After thirty days, you only say SheHasimcha B’Mo’ono for the first twelve months when they specifically made a feast to celebrate the marriage.

57) Originally, (before the Chuppah), they may say it as soon as they throw barley in a bucket (to make beer for the wedding. Alternatively, to plant as a sign for the bride and groom should also produce a lot of offspring.) R’ Pappa made it right after Kiddushin, since he was already prepared to make the whole wedding.

58) We don't say SheHasimcha B’Mo’ono by a Bris since the people are preoccupied with the child’s pain.

59) Rav says that Brachos for grooms and for mourners require ten people to say. We can count the groom and mourners as part of the ten. This argues with a Braisa that says that we cannot count the mourners, but Rav has a status of a Tanna and argues with the Braisa.

60) R’ Yochanan also agrees that we can count the mourners. He holds that the Braisa refers to Birchas Hamazon. [Rashi explains Birchas Hamazon: to combine with two others who ate together to make a Zimon, and to teach us that we don't exempt mourners from Mitzvos. The Ri asks: if so, the Braisa should have written that mourners are obligated in Mitzvos. Rather, Tosfos explains: it refers to the special mourner’s Bracha in it, which needs ten people.] R’ Yochanan refers to (when the community fed them their first meal) in the streets, (where they make the Bracha Menachem Aveilim). [Tosfos says: if the mourners are counted when they're blessing them as they pile pass through two parallel lines of consolers, like the Gemara originally wanted to establish the Braisa, is dependant on the text if the Gemara's answer start with the word ‘Elah,’ (rather), or not. As the word ‘Elah’ connotes that our original answer is wrong.]

61) It used to be that the cost of funerals were through the roof (that they were very elaborate) to the point people were abandoning their dead. So, R’ Gamliel commanded that, when he dies, he should be dressed in simple linen shrouds, and then the whole nation followed that practice. Nowadays, we even dress them with canvas shrouds that cost only one Zuz.

62) R Elazar says: if a husband claims that on the first night he found his wife open (without the hymen intact), he’s believed and she’s prohibited to him. (I.e., we worry that she had illicit relations that would prohibit her to her husband.) [Rashi says although all virgins would bleed, so we should determine if she was a virgin if there was blood or not; we must refer to a case where the sheet was lost, so they cannot anymore determine whether there was blood. Alternatively, we refer to a case that the bride came from the Durkati family who didn’t have virgin blood. R’ Chananal answers: we refer to those who are a Bogeres or those that a piece of wood hit them (that made them bleed in that place). Although they lost their blood, but their hymen is intact. Although the Gemara in the third Perek says that you cannot claim against a Bogeres wife that she wasn’t a virgin since he found her open, but only that she didn’t have blood, we must say that R’ Chananal had a different text, and it reads that he can claim that he found her open but cannot claim that he didn’t find blood. Although the Yerushalmi seems not like R’ Chananal since It says that a Bogeres is like an open barrel of wine, (which connotes that they’re open), we can explain that it refers to blood. A closed barrel always contains wine, but an open one sometimes contains wine and sometimes it’s empty. So, too a Bogeres, sometimes they have blood and sometimes not.]

63) The Gemara concludes: regularly, we wouldn't be concerned that the relations she had prohibited her. (After all, to prohibit her, there must be two variables: the relations must have taken place after the Kiddushin and she must have done it willingly (i.e., she wasn’t raped). Therefore, we should permit her with a Sfeik Sfeika. Perhaps the relations happened before the Kiddushin, when she was unmarried. Even if it happened after Kiddushin, perhaps she was raped. However, there are two exceptions where she will be prohibited. The first: in the case that she’s a Kohain’s wife, (since even rape would prohibit her). [Tosfos says: we don't put her on a Chazaka that she’s permitted to him, and permit her with even with one Safiek, since we have a conflicting Chazaka that she was a virgin, and we should assume she was a virgin until the last possible moment, which would be after the Kiddushin. This is a better Chazaka since it’s explaining about the body, which is the essence of the Safeik, when did she lose her virginity and had relations.]

Also, it would prohibit her in the case that her father accepted Kiddushin before she was three years old. Since a punctured hymen grows back before she’s three, so we know that the relations happened when she was older, which was after the Kiddushin. [Tosfos says: we can't still permit because of a Sfeik Sfeika: perhaps she did it unwillingly and she's permitted, and even if she intended the act, perhaps she was a minor at the time, who can’t be held responsible for her misdeeds, and we consider it as if she did it against her will. After all, since both variables are based on that she had relations unwillingly, we consider them both together as only one Safeik. Although she has a Chazaka that she’s permitted to her husband, but since the Yerushalmi explains, if it was rape, there would probably be rumors to that effect, and such rumors don’t exist, we can say that the majority cases in this situations were done willingly. We always follow the majority of cases, and not the Chazaka. However, we permit when there is a Sfeik Sfeika (when she had Kiddushin after three years of age) and we don't say that we already ruled out the chance that she did it unwillingly, since it's not considered this a true majority of cases, but the Rabanan decided to give it that status. Therefore, when we only combine it to a Sfeik Sfeika, the Rabanan allowed taking into account the possibility that it was done unwillingly.]

64) [Tosfos says: on these two cases that there is only one Safeik, we don’t say it’s really a Sfeik Sfeika since we could combine that Safeik with the possibility she didn’t have relations at all but a piece of wood hitting her in that place caused it to open. That's not only according to R’ Tam who said: if she had such an accident, it would only make her bleed but she remains closed, but even if you hold like our text that she's open. Since there is no shame for the woman if this happened (as opposed to being raped), the fact that she could have claimed it, but didn’t, proves that it didn’t happen that way.]

65) The husband is believed when he claims that he found her open, and we don't say that he only thinks that he experienced that, but since he’s not an expert what to expect, he was mistaken. Even though we say that we don't establish a prohibition regarding Ervah with less than two witnesses, but a man is believed regarding himself more than two witnesses are believed. (We also prohibit a wife to her husband if he warned her not to seclude with a certain man and she secluded herself, and theres a single witness that they had relations.)

66) The reason why Bas Sheva wasn’t prohibited to her husband and Dovid [Rashi explains: since there were many witnesses who saw the act. Tosfos asks: how can that be? Although many people saw Dovid bring her over to the house, nobody saw the actual relations. Rather, Tosfos explains: since he knew that he had relations with her.] since he forced the relations, it didn’t prohibit her to her husband, so she wasn’t prohibited to him either. Alternatively, we can say she wasn’t technically married then to Urya, since the whole army gave a Get to their wives before they left. [Rashi explains: they gave them on condition if they die in the war, it would retroactively divorce them from the time he gave it. Tosfos says: although, this should only apply to those who have no children and have a brother that she would fall to Yibum, he wasn’t exact when he wrote that he made a condition if he dies, but the condition was if he didn’t return from battle. Although, Urya returned from the war, the condition was that if he doesn’t return at the end of the war, and not just if he visited in middle of the war. R’ Tam disagrees with Rashi and says they gave the Get without any conditions. The Gemara that refers to Bas Sheva as a Safeik married woman calls her that since they gave the Get privately so nobody should know about it and marry their newly divorced wives. (Since people didn’t know about it, they refer to it as if it was a Safeik.)]

67) [Tosfos explains: at this point in the Gemara that we would not consider him believed enough to prohibit her (for perhaps he’s not an expert that she’s open, so we’ll keep her on the Chazaka of her permitted status), yet, it still assumes that he wouldn’t have to pay the Kesuva. Even though he might mistake her to be open when she wasn’t, however, perhaps he was correct, and we never require one to pay money on the Safeik that he owes it. This is despite that there is a Sfeik Sfeika that tells us he really owes the Kesuva, for, perhaps he’s completely mistaken about finding her open and she was a virgin, and even if she wasn’t a virgin, perhaps she was raped and doesn’t lose her Kesuva. (Even a Kohain’s wife that becomes forbidden to her husband doesn’t lose her Kesuva if she was raped.) Even though, usually, if a Sfeik Sfeika tells us that he needs to pay, we don’t say leave the money with the one who is Muchzik (i.e., holding onto the money); but we do not consider this a Sfeik Sfeika, since the Safeik whether she was raped doesn’t necessitate her receiving her Kesuva, for perhaps she was raped before the Kiddushin.]

68) Shmuel holds we believe the husband to claim he found his wife open regarding losing her Kesuva. [Tosfos points out: he can hold that we also believe him to forbid her (like R’ Elazar holds). Even R’ Elazar can also hold of Shmuel, that she loses her Kesuva. He only said that she’s forbidden to him as a Chidush, as the above Sugya implies. (However, the Yerushalmi implies that R’ Elazar holds that she doesn’t lose her Kesuva.)]

69) In Judea, (where the groom and bride seclude themselves before the Nesuin), the husband can no longer claim by Nesuin that he didn’t find the wife to be a Virgin; but we would believe a groom in Galil. [Tosfos explains: we believe him (as we’ll say later) because we have a Chazaka that he wouldn’t go through the bother making a whole wedding feast and ruin it by getting rid of his wife right away. However, this Chazaka does not make us believe him in Judea, although he wouldn’t lie about it. As Rashi explains; he probably had relations with her and forgot. Alternatively, he didn’t penetrate her completely, so he didn’t realize he punctured her hymen. So, he’s under the assumption that he’s telling the truth, but we assume he’s mistaken. Alternatively, Tosfos answers: since they secluded themselves, we strongly assume that they definitely had relations, since a man cannot hold himself back. So, we assume he’s lying even when we have a reason to say he wouldn’t lie to ruin his wedding feast. Although we see we believe a Yavam that he didn’t have relations with the Yevama for thirty days after he brought her into his home; however, most people cannot hold themselves back, so we at least consider it a great chance that they had relations, and therefore dampers the Chazaka that he wouldn’t lie to ruin his wedding feast.]

70) [Tosfos explains: her claim was either the groom had relations with her after the Kiddushin, or that the groom lied and really found her to be a virgin. We don't believe the wife with her claim, since she has a Migo that she could have claimed that she was raped after Kiddushin (which she doesn’t lose her Kesuva), which we Paskin like R’ Gamliel that we believe her; since it’s degrading, she wouldn’t admit freely that she was raped from someone who’s not her husband. Alternatively, she wouldn’t claim this, since this would disqualify her to ever marry a Kohein. We also don't believe her with a different Migo, since she could have claimed that she was hit by a piece of wood that punctured it, (which is not degrading, or disqualifies her from marrying a Kohein) after the Kiddushin, which ruined his property, and she loses nothing from her Kesuva. After all, here we have a Chazaka that he wouldn’t lie to ruin his wedding feast) that tells us to believe him more. Although the Gemara in Bava Basra has an unsolved inquiry if we believe a Migo against a Chazaka, we can say that this Chazaka is a much stronger assumption than others. Also, if we hold that we don’t believe someone with a Migo to collect money, (but only not to pay money), then it fits in well here (where she wants to collect her Kesuva).]

71) Shmuel explains: we believe the husband to say he found her open. since the rabbis were the ones who enacted that a woman receives a Kesuva, so the rabbis also believed the husband. They believe him since he spent so much time and money on making the wedding feast, he wouldn’t lie and make all his efforts for naught. [Tosfos points out: the Gemara infers here that the concept of Kesuva is rabbinic. Therefore, Tosfos asks: how do people write in their Kesuva that he’ll owe “two hundred Zuz that she’s entitled to receive from the Torah?” Tosfos answers: we rely on R’ Shimon b. Gamliel who disagrees and hold that Kesuva is a Torah concept, since we always Paskin like R’ Shimon b. Gamliel that’s quoted in a Mishna. Also, R’ Ashi later disagrees, (and we always Paskin like the later authority). As he holds that you can only make her lose her Kesuva with a claim of not finding blood if there were witnesses inspecting them and the house and he cann’t get rid of any evidence that there was blood. So, he holds that we worry that perhaps the husband will lie (or cheat), and we don’t believe him just because he wouldn’t ruin his wedding feast.]

72) [Tosfos says: according to those that say, if her husband found her not to be a virgin, she’s still married, but just lose half her Kesuva he’s definitely not believed. After all, he wouldn't ruin the meal he made.]

73) Since Kesuva is a rabbinical enactment, he only pays from the lowest quality field. [Tosfos asks: we see that R’ Meir holds that Kesuva is from the Torah, yet he holds that she collects her Kesuva from the middle grade field, although you pay from the highest quality fields, for Torah obligations. Also, we only find that R’ Meir is the only Tanna that holds you may collect a Kesuva from movable objects, but not all the other Tannaim that hold Kesuva is from the Torah. Why doesn’t she collect from movable objects like all Torah obligations? Tosfos answers: these are special rabbinical enactments (to lessen what she may collect). First, we don’t want the public to worry about buying high quality fields and movable objects from husbands (since it will stifle business). Second, we don’t want the Kesuva to be too hard on husbands, so that they’ll be eager to marry.]

74) However, R. Shimon b. Gamliel holds that Kesuva is from the Torah. As he holds that if you marry in Kaputkya (whose currency’s worth more) you must pay with their currency even if divorcing in Eretz Yisrael. We are stringent because it’s a Torah obligation, not like those who argue and are lenient because they hold it’s only rabbinic. [Tosfos asks: why should one need to pay more in Kaputkya, since the Kesuva should be a universal amount, the equivalent of fifty Slayim of the Torah. However, if you want to say that we go after the coins of the particular country, then it makes sense, which seems to be an argument in the Yerushalmi. R’ Mona says that we gauge the Kesuva’s two hundred Zuz according to the Shekel Hakodesh (in the days of Moshe). R’ Abba (and many other Amaraim) hold that we gauge it with the coin that’s in circulation.] This is only by a virgin, but a widow's Kesuva is only rabbinically obligated.

75) Someone came before R’ Nachman to claim he found his wife open. R’ Nachman ordered for him to get lashes since hes suspected of Z'nus. Although he believes the husband to say he found her open; he’s believed but receives lashes. R’ Achai answers: we only believe those that were already married and had experience with relations, but don’t believe those getting married for the first time, but give him lashes since he was so brazen to promote unwarranted rumors on her.

76) Someone claimed to R’ Gamliel that he found his wife open. There are two versions what R’ Gamliel told him. The gist is: perhaps he leaned from the side and punctured it that way, so it didn’t feel like there was anything in the way. The first version is: even if he didn’t plan on coming in at an angle, perhaps it happened that way. The second version is: he must have planned going in at an angle to assume this. However, if he didn’t plan it, we can’t assume he actually came in at an angle by accident.

77) Someone came to R’ Gamliel to claim he didn’t find blood by his wife. She claimed that she was a virgin. R’ Gamliel took the sheet and washed it and removed the semen. Underneath they found drops of blood, so he permitted them to stay together. R’ Ashi said this tactic wouldn’t work in Bavel. Their washing was not good enough to remove the semen. The only way to get it as clean as Eretz Yisrael is to rub the stain with glass balls, and that would remove the blood too.

78) Someone claimed he didn’t find any blood. The wife insisted she was still a virgin, (since the husband didn’t puncture the hymen). R’ Gamliel b. Rebbi first experimented on two maid slaves a procedure to test if someone’s a virgin. He brought one virgin and one married maid and placed them, feet apart, over a barrel of wine. The wine’s smell lingered by the married one (since it absorbed in her cavity), but not in the virgin. He tested it on the wife and found that the smell didn’t linger. He deduced that she was still a virgin. He didn’t do the procedure right away on the wife since he never tried it yet and was concerned that perhaps he wouldn’t recognize the lingering. He wanted to first try it out on slaves, since it wouldn’t be right to try it first on a Jewess.

79) If she claims she’s from the Durkati family whose women don’t have menstrual or virginity blood, she's permitted.

80) If it's during a hunger, the problem maybe from lack of food that made her hymen dried and shriveled. You feed them and let them have relations and perhaps he'll find blood.

81) A virgin’s Kesuva is two hundred Zuz and a widow’s is one hundred. However, if she was a widow or divorced or had Chalitza performed to her before Nesuin, we assume she’s a virgin and her Kesuva is two hundred. Furthermore, despite her former marriage, the new husband can still claim that he didn’t find her to be a virgin. [Tosfos says: Chalitza is a Chidush that even though she’s so close to marriage, since the Yavam could force her to have relations and become his wife without consenting to go to a Chuppah (like a regular wife), we still don't say that she already had the status of a Nesuah.]

82) If a non-Jewish girl became a convert, or she was a slave and was freed, or she was captured and redeemed, if these happened before she was three years old, we still consider her to be a virgin, and her Kesuva is two hundred Zuz, and the husband can have a claim on her if he doesn’t find her to be a virgin, like regular virgins.

83) R’ Huna says: we Toivel a non-Jewish minor with the Beis Din’s consent to make them converts even without his father (and you can't say in this case that he's happy to go along with anything his father is doing for him) since we can make a transaction that is a benefit for someone even if he’s not around, or a minor who is not legally able to decide for himself to convert. [Tosfos says: although the legal explanation why one can make the transaction for his friend because he becomes his agent (Shliach), since, we consider it obvious that he would like to appoint him to become his Shliach, and a minor and a non-Jew cannot appoint an agent; however the Rabanan enacted to acquire for a minor’s benefit. Although the Rabanan didn’t make any provisions to acquire for a non-Jew; since this child is becoming a Jew, we include him with those that will eventually be able to make a Shliach, which the rabbis enacted that you can acquire for his benefit. Alternatively, since he’s becoming a Jew through this transaction, we consider him as a Jew regarding this transaction, so the Rabanan did enact for him that you can make a transaction for his benefit. Although, since he’s still a non-Jew from the Torah, we consider him as a Jew even when it will be a leniency and we allow him to marry a Jewess, consider his Kiddushin as Kiddushin, since this is according to those who hold that the Torah authorized the rabbis to enact decrees that would even allow someone to actively transgress Torah law. Even so, we find a minor convert from the Torah; when the mother converts while she’s pregnant. We say the mother’s T’veila takes effect for the fetus to become a convert too. Alternatively, if the text in Bava Metzia that "you can acquire for a minor when it’s to his benefit,” and it doesn't say that it’s only rabbinic. So, one can acquire for them from the Torah. Although this minor starts out as a non-Jew that you can’t acquire for, however, since he becomes a Jew through this transaction, we view him, regarding this transaction, as a Jew. Although we say that it works as if he’s your agent, and a minor cannot appoint an agent, that is only when there is an aspect of a downside.]

84) This is only by a minor, but not an adult since a non-Jew would be happier to live a loose lifestyle (where women would be more available to him), and he's already accustomed himself to this loose lifestyle. However, children who have not yet accustomed themselves, it is a benefit for them to convert. [Tosfos says: even according to the Rabanan who argue on R’ Meir who says it’s not a benefit for a slave to go free; as they only argue regarding the slave, where losing his obligation to his master outweighs any downside of a loose lifestyle, but a regular non-Jew who doesn’t have a master, his conversion is not to his benefit.]

85) R’ Yosef says: this child convert can protest his conversion when he becomes an adult. However, once he became an adult and didn’t protest, he can never protest afterwards [Tosfos says: although the fine by rape only applies to a Naarah, who’s officially an adult and we'll say soon that a Geyoris is paid after she can't revert to a non-Jew; since it doesn't happen that she can never protest immediately after she becomes an adult, but if we see that she also practices Judaism. So, the rape may happen right after she turns into a Naarah and had not yet shown that she practices Judaism.]

86) Rava says that a Geyores doesn't receive a rape fine until she grows up and can't reverse into a non-Jew so that she shouldn't take the money and become a non-Jew. However, she would collect a Kesuva right away since they would have awarded it to her, even if eventually she wouldn’t deserve it, as to deter him from divorcing her.

87) Abaya says you have to wait until the Geyoris is an adult to pay her Kesuva, but, she would collect her rape fine right away so that the sinner shouldn’t gain. [Tosfos says: even though it seems that Rava here does not agree with the logic that the sinner shouldn’t gain. However, we see R' Meir held that the Kusim (Samaritans) are true converts, but, (because of their major flaws), they fined them in their money regarding damages caused by goring bulls (that they pay us complete damages, even if the bull never gored before, and we are exempt from paying them anything). Yet, he holds that if someone rapes a Kusi, he’s obligated to pay the fine since we don’t want the sinner (rapist) to gain. Although Rava must agree to that logic or he can't reconcile R’ Meir’s opinions; that's only because the Kusi is a true Jew, we wouldn’t fine her to lose the money, (like we do regularly), so the sinner shouldn’t gain. However, the child convert that may end up being a true non-Jew, which she wouldn’t have a right to collect the fine, so, we don’t enact that he should give it even if she doesn’t deserve it in order that the sinner shouldn’t gain.]

88) If an adult male had relations with a girl less than three years old, her Kesuva is two hundred. If a boy less than nine years old had relations with an adult women [Tosfos: and didn't break her hymen] Rav held it to be equivalent to a woman who broke her hymen by a hit of a piece of wood, and Shmuel says that "flesh can't make her be considered as hit by wood." Tosfos says: however, if the hymen breaks, everyone agrees that she has the status of being hit by wood.]

89) If a woman's hymen was broken by a piece of wood; R' Meir says that she still enough of a virgin to receive two hundred Zuz for her Kesuva. The Rabanan say that she receives one hundred, and this is even if he wasn't aware of it when they were married (and he can't claim that it was a mistaken marriage) .

90) R' Meir holds to compare her to a Bogeres since she also loses her virginity (partly) not through a man's action, and the Rabanan compare her to a regular non-virgin since they both lose their virginity through an action.

91) Rava says: if she was a true non-virgin (who had relations prior to the marriage); if the husband was aware of that fact, she gets a hundred for her Kesuva. if he wasn't aware of it, it's a mistaken marriage and she gets nothing. [Tosfos says: however, someone who bled from a piece of wood gets a hundred even if the husband was unaware of it, since people don't care that much about it to say that the marriage was mistaken.]

92) If the first husband brought her to Chuppah, and there are witnesses that they didn't seclude, and even if there are witnesses that they secluded, but not for enough time for them to have relations, the second husband can't have a claim that she was not a virgin since she already was brought to Chupppah. Rabbah says that we can deduce from here that, even though someone married a wife with the assumptions that she's a virgin, and she came out not to be a virgin, she still has a hundred Zuz Kesuva. [Tosfos explains "since the first one brought her to Chuppah" according to this: and therefore, her Kesuva was already a hundred, so you can't make it go down further, since the claim of not being a virgin is only for the extra hundred that a virgin has over a non-virgin.]

93) R' Ashi pushes off the proof: there is different since she was already brought to Chuppah [Tosfos: and he understands that he's marrying a non-virgin, and he doesn't rely on the witnesses since she went to Chuppah, and assumes the witnesses just wanted to exaggerate her worth.] The Gemara asks why we don't need to worry that she had Znus while she was married to him (if he's a Kohein and there's only one Safeik). [Tosfos explains: this is only a question to R' Ashi, since usually she loses her Kesuva if she's found to be a non-virgin, and in this case she doesn't lose it, he'll assume since we don't need to worry about the Issur and won't come to Beis Din. Therefore, we should enact for her to lose her Kesuva so that he should bring her to Beis Din. However, according to Rabbah, no such woman loses her Kesuva, so there's no reason for him not to bring her to Beis Din than any other case.] The Gemara answers: we refer to a case where she had Chuppah and relations with the second husband right after the Kiddushin. [Tosfos says: since we refer to a Kohein, it must have been that she had relations right after the first husband's Kiddushin too, or else we would need to worry that she had Znus after the first Kiddushin and is forbidden to a Kohein.]

94) There are those who have a version that R' Ashi only had this rejection of the proof from a Braisa that says this by a wife that the assumption was that she didn't have relations with her husband, but not with witnesses. Therefore, R' Ashi rejects the proof by saying that he still expects her to be a non-virgin after the Chuppah. However, he agrees that our Mishna, where the case is that witnesses testified to that fact, he relies on that to prove she was a virgin, and yet, she has a hundred Zuz Kesuva.

95) In Judea, there were places where they secluded the bride and groom before the Chuppah, and there were places that didn't seclude them, but they appointed people to supervise their apartment to make sure that neither party will trick the other (that the husband shouldn't destroy the evidence of blood, and the wife shouldn't plant it). In Galil, they never secluded, but they didn't have this supervision. Rava says: they all can claim that the wife wasn't a virgin except for those who were secluded before Chuppah. R' Ashi says that no one can claim the wife was not a virgin unless there was supervision.

96) The Beis Din of Kohanim collected four hundred Zuz for a Kohein's daughter. [Tosfos explains: even though they wrote in the Kesuva "as is coming to her" instead of writing that it was an addition. So, we must consider it as an enactment for them to get that much, and she could collect that much even if it's not written in a Kesuva just like a regular Yisrael's daughter can collect two hundred.] The Gemara concludes that it's not only Kohanim, but by any Yisrael family that has Yichas. Even if she marries a Yisrael and there's no Kohein here. This is also if she marries a Kohein and we don't say that he's an upgrade to her Yichas, he doesn't need to pay the four hundred Zuz.

97) They first enacted a hundred Zuz Kesuva for a Kohein's daughter that's a widow. However, they saw that it disgraced them, they enacted it to be two hundred Zuz. [Rashi explains the disgrace: since it's easier to divorce them, although this applies to a Yisrael's daughter too, but divorce is a bigger disgrace to a Kohein's daughter. Tosfos disagrees since they would be aware originally that it would be easy to divorce them. Rather, some people refrained from marrying them since they seem as a disgrace since their Kesuva is only a fourth of their original Kesuva.] However, when they saw that people totally refrained from marrying them since they reason, why should I marry a widow that's a Kohein's daughter if, for the same price, I can marry a virgin Yisraelis, so they returned it to a hundred Zuz.

98) If someone married a woman and didn't find her to be a virgin; she claims that she was raped after the Kiddushin, so it's like the husband's field becoming ruined, and he claims that she was possibly raped before the Kiddushin and she fooled him at the Kiddushin. R' Gamliel and R' Elazar say that she's believed, and R' Yehoshua says she's not believed and we consider her as a non-virgin by the Kiddushin until she proves otherwise. Shmuel Paskins like R' Gamliel.

99) If someone claims to his friend that he owes him money, and the friend says that he's not sure whether he owes or not; R' Yehuda and R' Huna say that the definite claim is better than a Safeik claim, so he owes the money. R' Yochanan and R' Nachman say that he's exempt from paying since we keep the money in the Chazaka where it is. [Tosfos points out: this is only if he's not sure if he borrowed or not, but if he's sure that he borrowed, but is not sure that he paid back, everyone agrees he needs to pay.] The Halacha is like R' Nachman when it comes to monetary cases.

100) In order that the above two Halachos shouldn't contradict themselves, we must say that the reason that R' Gamliel believes the wife is not because she's the definite claim (and the husband doesn't know what happened) since we don't Paskin like R' Yehuda who holds that way, but like R' Nachman. [Tosfos adds: also, even R' Yehuda only says to follow the definite claim if it's a strong claim, like a loan, since it takes truth to claim it when his opponent would know it's untrue, and the Safeik claim is weak since the friend should know if he borrowed or not. However, he would agree in our case when the woman who claims this knows her husband doesn't know what happened, and the husband is not expected to know what happened, as we see this differentiation in many places in the Gemara.] Rather, it's because she has a Migo that she's saying the truth since she can claim that she was hit by a piece of wood and not make herself Pasul to a Kohein. Also, she has a Chazaka on her body that she was a virgin, so we assume she was a virgin until the last possible moment that she could be, which would be after the Kiddushin.

101) Even in a case where she claims that she was hit by a piece of wood, and he claims that she may no longer be a virgin since she had relations, we still say that R' Gamliel and R' Elazar say that she's believed, and R' Yehoshua says she's not believed and we consider her as a non-virgin by the Kiddushin until she proves otherwise.

102) R' Yochanan explains the Mishna like R Meir who holds that a woman who lost her hymen from a piece of wood still receives two hundred Zuz, and he also holds that, if someone married a wife with the assumptions that she's a virgin, and she came out not to be a virgin, she still has a hundred Zuz Kesuva. Therefore, the wife is claiming a Kesuva of two hundred, and he claims she only has one hundred. So, R' Gamliel and R' Elazar say that she's believed even though she doesn't have any Migo like the first case.

103) R' Elazar explains the Mishna like the Rabanan that a woman who loses her hymen from a piece of wood gets a hundred Zuz, and he holds that someone married a wife with the assumptions that she's a virgin, and she came out not to be a virgin, loses her whole Kesuva since it's a mistaken marriage. She claims that she's entitled to a hundred Zuz, and he claims that she shouldn't get anything.

104) If we see her 'talking with someone' (Zeiri explains that it's referring to secluding with someone, and R' Assi explains that we know that she had relations with him) or if she's pregnant from the person (R' Assi, who says that the first case refers to a definite relations, this case is added in order to validate the child); R' Gamliel and R' Elazar say that she's believed to say that the man was a Kosher Jew, and R' Yehoshua says she's not believed and we consider her as she had relations with a Mamzer or Nissin until she proves otherwise.

105) [Tosfos explains R' Assi's position. R' Yehoshua only forbids if she had definite relations, but if all we know is that she secluded with him, she's believed to say that she had relations with someone Kosher with a Migo that she could have claimed that they never had relations. Although R' Yehoshua holds that she's not believed to say that she was raped after Kiddushin with a Migo that she can claim that she was hit by wood, that's because R' Yehoshua wouldn't believe her claim to be hit by wood either.]

106) According to Zeiri, that R' Yehoshua forbids her even if we only know that she's secluded, this is despite that we are usually lenient by seclusion that, we give Malkos for seclusion [Tosfos: for a single lady, but not by a married lady so that not to cause rumors on the validity of her children], but we don't forbid her because of seclusion [Tosfos: a married lady on her husband. Alternatively, it's even for a single woman, if she secluded with a man, she's not forbidden to his son according to R' Yehuda who holds that a man is forbidden to his father's rape victim. Tosfos explains the comparison: just like we don't forbid with the single Safeik of the seclusion that she had relations, we shouldn't forbid here with a single Safeik, since she admitted that she had relations, if the man was Kosher or not. However, in a case where she denies having relations, then we permit because of a Sfeik Sfeika. Safeik if she had relations, and even if she had relations, perhaps it was to a Kosher Jew.] The reason R' Yehoshua is stringent in our case; he gives an extra stringencys for Yischus. [Tosfos asks on his above explanation: if the comparison is not since they're both seclusions, only regarding one Safeik, that this question is as apt on R' Assi who also forbids with one Safeik.]

107) [Tosfos says: we only say that a married lady is not forbidden after seclusion with another man is only if he's not a known adulterer, but she's forbidden if she was with this known adulterer unless there is some proof that they didn't have relations, like when the adulterer saves the husband's life.]

108) There's an opinion that holds that when R' Gamliel holds her to be Kosher, he holds that her children are also Kosher, and there's an opinion that holds that only she's Kosher, but her children is Pasul (and they learn the Mishna like Zeiri). [Tosfos says: and when the Mishna talks about her being pregnant, it's not telling us to permit the child, but it's a nicer way of saying that she had relations.]

109) R' Assi was disproved by a Braisa that says that they argue both by seclusion and by definite relations. As R' Yehoshua holds she's forbidden by being pregnant just like a captive is Pasul. [Tosfos says: R' Gamliel says that regular women are different since they make sure that the one's they have relations with are Kosher, but a captive can't discriminate.] R' Yehoshua by seclusion holds she's forbidden just like a captive is Pasul by seclusion. R' Gamliel holds that we should assume that the captive raped her since non-Jews are steep in promiscuity, but not if she secluded with a Jew. R' Yehoshua says that you need to assume the relations since there is no guards to protect from promiscuity. [Tosfos says: even though if she claims that she didn't have relations, she's believed because of a Sfeik Sfeika, but she can't be believed now that she says that she had relations that it was with a Kosher Jew with a Migo that she could have claimed that she didn't have relations, since she's afraid to claim she didn't have relations since people won't believe her since there is no keeper to protect from promiscuity.]

110) The one who permits, permits even in a case where there is mostly Pasul people by them, like in the wilderness, where most of the travelers are non-Jews, similar to a captive that we compare her to. [Tosfos adds: it's even like in that case where all the people are Pasul, she can claim she didn't have relations. We don't say that the reason to permit by mostly Pasul since we combine the Chazaka she's permitted with a the minority of people. After all, that would only create a fifty/fifty chance, which we would need to be stringent by a prohibition. We only allow it by Tumah in a Reshus Harabim because a Safeik is Tahor.] The one who Pasuls does so even if most people are Kosher, like in the city.

111) R' Yochanan says: the one who says she's Kosher, they hold her son is also Kosher. R' Elazar says that they only say she's Kosher, since she has a Chazaka of being Kosher, but not her son who doesn't have a Chazaka, we need to worry that he might be a Mamzer.

112) Even according to R' Yochanan who says the child is Kosher, and even if you know that the father was one of ten Kohanim, the child can't do Avoda since we need to know his Yichus. [Tosfos says: this is only a rabbinical enactment by Znus, but in a case of two marriages, where the child is a Safeik if he's a nine month gestation son from the first Kohein father, or a seven month gestation son from the second Kohein father, he may be made into a Kohein Gadol.]

113) There was once an Arusa who was pregnant, and both she, and he Arus admit that the Arus is the father, [Tosfos: as, if they didn't say anything; Shmuel holds the child to be a Shtuki, and Rav holds that the child is a Mamzer. According to Abaya, who says in Yevamos that we need to worry that the same way she was promiscuous with her Arus, she was promiscuous with other people, we must explain that it wasn't one night with the Arus, but they constantly had relations, so we can assume that the Arus was the father even if she had relations with others, the same way we say that most relations happened with a husband.] R' Yosef says: the child's Kosher. After all, the Arus admits that it's from him. [Tosfos adds: even according to the first version in Yevamos, it's only if she's not suspected with another person, and according to the second version, even if she's suspected with another person, but once we know she had relations with the Arus, the child's Kosher.] Even without that, Shmuel Paskins like R' Gamliel that she's believed. Even though Shmuel only Paskins that way B'dieved when most people are Pasul to her, we consider our case as B'dieved. [Rashi explains: if not, she'll be forbidden to her husband. Tosfos explains: then the child can't marry, not to a Kosher and not to a Mamzer (since she's Kosher from the Torah). There's one answer in Tosfos that the Arus needs to admit it's from him if she's suspected from another, and even R' Gamliel won't permit her.]

114) An Almanus Issah [Rashi explains: if his mother was a Safeik divorced or widowed, and then she marries a Kohein, so we don't know if the child is a Chalal. Alternatively, we add onto the Safeik that we don't know if he's a nine month gestation son from the first Kohein father, or a seven month gestation son from the second Kohein father, so there's a Sfeik Sfeika if he's a Chalal. Tosfos explains: there was a Safeik Chalal mixed into a family, so each member of that family has a Safeik whether they're from that Safeik Chalal or not.] R' Yehoshua holds that a woman who had relations with him is Kosher, even if she doesn't know for sure, even though he Pasuls a woman claiming she had relations with a Kosher; since this is a Sfeik Sfeika. [According to Rashi's second explanation and Tosfos; it's simple why it's a Sfeik Sfeika. According to Rashi's first explanation, even though he only has one Safeik, since the woman had a Chazaka of Kashrus, and the question is whether the relations with this Safeik made her lose her Chazaka, we consider it as a Sfeik Sfeika. Tosfos concludes: this is only by her, since she has a Chezkas Kashrus, but not her child that doesn't have such a Chazaka, even according to his explanation that it's a true Sfeik Sfeika. Although we allow a Sfeik Sfeika regularly, but they made an extra stringency here because of Yichus.]

115) R' Gamliel forbade by an Almunas Issah, even though it's a Sfeik Sfeika, since the woman can't claim definitely that she's Kosher, and he only allows it when she claims definitely that she had relations with a Kosher Jew.

116) The Tanna Kama says: if someone calls someone a Mamzer, Nessin or Chalal, if he screams in protests, he doesn't become Pasul. However, if he keeps quiet, he's Pasul. R' Meir argues. The Rabanan explains R' Meir's position: he only needs to scream when called a Mamzer or Nessin, since he'll be completely Pasul if it is true, but if he doesn't scream right away by a Chalal, where he won't be completely Pasul, he's not Pasul since he doesn't care too much to scream. [Tosfos says that you need to ask him afterwards if it's true, and if he doesn't deny it, but keeps quiet, then he's Pasul.] R' Shimon b. Elazar quotes R' Meir: he shouldn't scream when called a Mamzer or Nessin, since the Jews know the Mamzers and Nessins among them, and since he doesn't have a rumor on him that he is one, why should he scream (since people will ignore it). On the contrary, if he feels compelled to scream, it's only weakens the assumption that he's Kosher. However, he should scream if he's called a Chalal, since the Jews are not aware of the Chalalim among them. Therefore, if he's quiet, it weakens the assumption that he's Kosher since he just wants it to go away, for, if he screams, they'll look into it and find him to be not Kosher. [Tosfos says: this is the same reason why the Tanna Kama holds that he's Pasul if he keeps quiet by a Mamzer and Nessin.]

117) If a woman is raped; R' Yossi says: if most of the people in town are Kosher for Kehuna, she's still fit to marry a Kohein. [Tosfos says: regularly, we will only permit if we didn't witness her rape, so she would be believed that she was raped by someone Kosher Migo that she could have not told us that she was raped. However, if we saw her raped, we can't believe her without a Migo even according to R' Gamliel, since she didn't choose to do the act, we don't have a Chazaka that the lady will make sure to only have relations with someone who is Kosher.] Although R' Gamliel permits even when most people are Pasul to her, [Tosfos explains the answer: R' Gamliel only permits B'dieved, but R' Yossi permits L'chatchila. We can't say that R' Yossi disagrees with R' Gamliel since it would be a contradiction in Halacha, since we Paskin like R' Gamliel that it's B'dieved, and like R' Yossi. Alternatively, we must say in the answer that R' Gamliel only allows with a definite claim, and this case is that she doesn't claim definitely that the man who raped her was Kosher. Therefore], its Halacha is like R' Ami that it must have two majorities to permit, the majority of the city, and the majority of the caravans that are on the outskirts of the city. Although, by these caravans, we would say that we should follow the majority (and it's never considered an established place since they're always on the move), since they decreed to forbid because if you only had a majority in the city. Even though that in itself wouldn't be a problem if he went to her, since anyone that separated from their established place has the status of the majority (even if the doors of the city are locked, and we don't even need to worry of the majority of the rest of the world that is Pasul to wander in); but we must be afraid that she went to him, to his established area, where we say that we consider it as a fifty/fifty chance. Although, regularly, we don't need two majorities, as we allow a piece of meat that separated from one of ten stores, which nine sold Kosher; we're more stringent when it comes to Yichus.

118) [Tosfos says: this is only if the man was in his house, but if he was in the marketplace, he's considered as separated from his established place. This is despite that, regarding sending an agent to Mekadesh any woman for him (and he doesn't return saying which one), he's forbidden to all women in the world since they may be a relative of the woman the was Mekadesh, despite that the Kiddushin happened in the marketplace, but she goes back to her house, which is an established place, so you can't follow most women who are not relatives to the one you were Mekadesh. That's only when the present potential prohibited relations will be done in the house, in the established area. However, here, the prohibition is happening when the man is in a position of separation of his establishment, so we follow the majority.]

119) Anything in an establish place, the Halacha is to treat them as a fifty/fifty Safeik, even when it's a leniency. As, if there are a group of nine Shratzim and one frog, and you don't know which one you touched, if it's in a public domain, it's Tahor, and we don't follow the majority that are Tamai. Therefore, if there are nine Jews and one non-Jew standing around together, and one throws a stone among them he's exempt since it's like a fifty/fifty Safeik. [Tosfos says: this is even if a Safeik warning is a proper warning, but if a Safeik warning is not a warning, of course he's exempt since there is no warning. This is not similar to being Chayiv for hitting his two Safeik fathers one after the other that you're Chayiv if Safeik warnings are valid, since there he knows that, if he ends up hitting both of them, he will definitely transgress, but here he doesn't know when he throws the stone if it will hit a Jew or non-Jew.]

120) R' Chiya b. Ashi quotes Rav that the Halacha is like R' Yossi (that the raped woman is permitted even if there's only one majority). R' Chanan b. Rava quotes Rav that R' Yossi only permitted for the need of the moment, but not to permit regularly unless there are two majorities. R' Yirmiya brings a proof to this version of Rav, since Rav says that you can't rely on one majority regarding Yichus.

121) If you find a child that's left in the street; If the majority are non-Jews, he has a status of a non-Jew that you may feed him Neveila, but you may dig him out from a collapsed house on Shabbos since we don't follow the majority regarding danger. If the town is mostly Jews, he has a status as a Jew. Rav holds that it's regarding the obligation to support him to make sure he has a livelihood. [Tosfos says: however, you don't need to make sure of his livelihood if it's half Jews and half non-Jews.] R' Pappa says: we consider this child as a Jew that we return his lost object. [Tosfos says: however, if there is half and half, the child would need to prove he's a Jew before we need to return his lost object. We don't say that we should be able to keep it even when the majority are Jews because of the clause "we don't follow the majority by monetary cases." After all, that's only when he sold an ox that came out that it gores, where the money came into the seller's hand with the consent of its owner. However, here, by the found item, it didn't enter the finder's hand with the owner's consent. Tosfos says: R' Pappa doesn't argue with Rav, but he saying an extra Chiddush since it's a big prohibition to return a non-Jew's lost object, as it says in Sanhedrin. However, it's not a big Chiddush to give him a livelihood since we say that we support the non-Jewish poor along with the Jewish poor to promote peace.]

122) If it's half Jews and half non-Jews, then we give them a status of a Safeik regarding a goring ox. As the Halacha is that an ox that's a Tam pays half damage, but if it's a non-Jew's ox goring a Jew's ox, he pays full damages, and if it's a Jew's ox goring a non-Jew's ox, he's totally exempt. However, if this child's ox gores, he only pays half, and he'll only pay whole if you prove that he was a non-Jew. If your ox gores his, you're exempt until he proves that he's a Jew. As we always say that the burden of proof is on the one who's trying to collect. [Tosfos says: this can also be the practical difference in the other cases. If the majority are Jews, you're obligated to pay if your ox gores his ox. if the majority are non-Jews, he must pay a Jew full damage if his ox gores the Jew's ox.]