1) If someone is possessed by a Sheid that dwells in the new wine; and he commands to write a Get for his wife, his words are not binding. If a sane man commands to write a Get for his wife, and then is possessed by a Sheid and he commands not to write a Get for his wife, his last command can't be listened to.
2) Reish Lakish says that you can give her the Get when he is possessed by a Sheid; since he compares him to a sleeping person, and not like an insane man; since the healing of the insane is not in your hands, but you can get rid of the Sheid by feeding him lean meat roasted on coals with diluted wine. R' Yochanan says that you can't give the Get while he is possessed by a Sheid, since he's compared to the insane, and not the sleeping since you don't need an action to heal the sleeping like you do by the one who is possessed by a Sheid. However, when he's healed, you don't need to ask him again if he wants to give a Get.
3) Even though we allow someone who had both his Simanim Shechted, or most of both Simanim, that he can show with sign language to write a Get for his wife, and the Get will be valid; [Tosfos says: even though he's now with his mental facilities, but we should worry that he'll lose it after the time it takes to write and give it, which is even problematic to Reish Lakish since there's no way to heal him]; we must say that it may only be given when his mind is still clear [Tosfos: even if we didn't test him at the Get's giving, but we can assume that he's still of sane mind until we see that he's not.]
4) [Tosfos says: the Ri had a doubt about the Halacha if a Get that was commissioned by a death ill person, if he lost his mental ability between the writing and giving, can you give it, even if he came back to himself afterwards. Also, even if he's not with it at the giving, do we say it's problematic even to Reish Lakish since we have no way of healing him, or, perhaps, he's just lapsing into, and out of, that state, so we consider him like sleeping.]
5) Although someone who had both his Simanim Shechted, or most of both Simanim, is considered alive, and that's why you can write a Get for his wife, you can testify to his death since he can't live too much afterwards, and will die relatively immediately.
6) Even so, we don't send someone to Galus for accidentally Shechting most of someone's Simanim. Although we say here that you can testify to his death, since we may have concerns that the wind in the house caused his death. Alternatively, he could have caused his own death by flipping around. [Tosfos says: but he's Chayiv the death penalty for killing purposely in this fashion just like we don't need the victim to die right away when killed purposely, but it's only by Galus where the Torah is less strict, as we also differentiate between killing downwards or upwards. The one who blames it on wind doesn't hold it's a problem that he's flipping around, since most dying people flip around. The one who blames it on flipping holds that the wind's effect is considered as if he died by himself without any outside effect. Alternatively, they argue which effect will cause him to die faster. Alternatively, they're both true, and we need to say both reasons as there are practical differences between them, as we'll say.]
7) The practical difference between them are: if he died in a marble house where the wind doesn't blow, or if we see that he didn't flip, but he was outside.
8) If the husband became mute, if you can ask him if he wants to divorce his wife, and he shakes his head yes; you need to test him thrice to see if he's still of sound mind. [Tosfos explains: you ask him three questions in which the obvious answer is yes, and three questions in which the obvious answer is no.] You need to make sure that you ask them out of order (and wait an hour between questions) so that it shouldn't be like the insane who shake their heads in a pattern, one yes and one no. So you ask one no with two yeses, and then one yes with two nos. [Tosfos says: you ask him if he wants to divorce his wife, and he nods yes. then ask about divorcing his mother, and he nods no, then ask about divorcing a daughter, and he nods no etc.]
9) R' Yishmael's Beis Medrish taught: [Tosfos: the best type of testing, since people don't mistake between winter and summer] ask him if he wants certain fruits, some in season, and some out of season. [Tosfos explains: you need to ask him if you should pluck it off the tree, or, otherwise, he might think you have them preserved in honey or in another way.] However, it's not a good test if you ask him in the summer if he needs a coat, since he might have a chill. [Tosfos says: therefore, we shouldn't keep her as an Aguna to assume him to be insane because of this question.]
10) Rav says: if a deaf person can 'speak' through the written word; he may write and give a Get to his wife. Although he's a deaf-mute, we give him the status as a regular mute. [Tosfos says: since the deaf-mute's writing is like the mute shaking his head. However, we require him to write, and not only shake his head, since you need a bigger test for a deaf-mute.]
11) The reason the mute is Pasul to testify through writing [Tosfos: like we say here that he 'talks' through his writing]; because the Pasuk says to testify "from their mouths," excluding through their writing.
12) [Tosfos says: the reason we say that deaf-mutes can't do Chalitza since they can't speak, although we say writing is their speech; since the Pasuk says explicitly to 'say,' they need to be said by the mouth. Alternatively, they learn it from the Gezeira Shava from the Leviyim on Mount Eivel that they need to be said with the mouth, the same way we learn that they need to say it in Lashon Hakodesh.]
13) Really, it's a Tannaic argument. As the Tanna Kama says that all deaf mutes can't divorce, and R' Shimon b. Gamliel says only those born deaf and mute, but if they're born normal and then became deaf, but learned to write with a clear mind; he can divorce a wife.
14) If a deaf-mute marries another deaf-mute, he may remain married to her, or divorce her. After all, the same way he marries her by sign language, he can divorce her by sign language. However, if a Yevama falls to her from a normal brother, he can't do Chalitza, and if he takes her, he can never divorce her since he's not of sound mind to divorce from a true marriage. However, he can divorce a Yevama who fell to him from a deaf mute brother, since the same way the brother married her by sign language, he can divorce her by sign language, and we don't forbid it from a deaf brother because you might permit it from a normal brother.
15) If normal people marry, and she becomes a deaf-mute, he can still divorce her. However, if she becomes insane, he can't divorce her. (If she can guard her Get, but not herself), she can be divorced from the Torah since even an adult can be divorced against her will. However, the rabbis enacted not to divorce her so people shouldn't abuse her.
16) R' Yossi holds that the rule that words (i.e., commands) are not given to agency is even if they tell them to tell others to do an action. Therefore, if the people who wrote and signed the Get didn't personally hear the husband tell them to do so, the Get is invalid. This, that we used the word 'hear' from the husband is to exclude Rav's opinion that a deaf person who can 'speak' through the written word; he may write and give a Get to his wife. [Tosfos says: but a mute can divorce his wife when he shakes his head yes, since that's a show of his will like hearing his voice. As we see that you don't need to hear the voice of the one making an agency, as if the husband gave a Get to an agent, and if it would be a benefit to the wife to get divorced, he can't renege on the Get since the agent acquires it for the wife even though he didn't hear her appoint him as an agent. Therefore, this statement is only coming to exclude a deaf person who can 'speak' through the written word.]
17) If you give a Get “if I die,” it has a double meaning, as it could mean a condition, and it could mean that you want it to take effect after death. Therefore, by saying “it should be a Get if I die,” it's not valid since in means to take effect after death, and a Get can't take effect after death. However, if he says “it should be a Get from today until I die,” or “it should be a Get from now until I die,” we interpret it to be a condition that the Get takes effect immediately as long as he eventually dies.
18) [Tosfos says: if you say “it should be a Get from today until I die,” and he dies that day; R' Tam is in doubt if he's divorced or not, since he might mean it to take effect at the end of the day, or does he want it to take effect right away. However, R' Elchanan says that it's obvious that he wants it to take effect right away, since he's giving it since he's worried that he'll die, and he's worried that he might die that day. It's good to be stringent, though.]
19) This is only according to the Rabanan. However, R’ Yossi holds that the date in the document is as if he wrote in the condition “from today.” This is even when he says the "if I die" verbally, and is not written in the Get [Tosfos: that I might have thought that the verbal condition uproots the date written in the Get.] Rav Paskins like R' Yossi at least in the case where it's written in the Get [Tosfos: and Rav in the last Perek enacted to write explicitly "from today" in Gets to exclude R' Yossi's opinion; it's only to make the document more explicitly good, but not to say it's invalid otherwise.] There are two versions of Rava whether to Paskin like R' Yossi when he says it verbally, or not.
20) If he says "this is your Get for after my death;" it's an invalid Get. However, if he says "this is your Get from today and for after my death" the Tanna Kama says that it's a questionable Get and she needs Chalitza, but cannot get Yibum. Rebbi held, since he said "from today," the "for after my death" is only a condition. However, without saying "from today," he agrees to the Tanna Kama that it's not a divorce. However, according to R’ Yossi that the date in the document is as if he wrote in the condition “from today,” it will be a questionable Get according to the Tanna Kama.
21) If a sick husband gave his wife a Get on condition that he dies from his sickness, or that on condition he doesn’t recover from his sickness. Then he got better and walked in the market, got sick again and died; we need to assess if it was due to his original sickness, and it would be a Get, or if it's a new sickness, and she's not divorced.
22) R' Huna says: the Gitten of deathly ill people are like their gifts; that, if they get better, the Get is reneged [Rashi: even without having a condition written in the Get.] In the above case, where we say that you need to assess whether he died from the first sickness; it's only if he walked out on his own strength. However, if he didn't, we assume automatically that he died from his old sickness, even if he seemed to acquired a different sickness, since, probably, he still has somewhat his original sickness.
23) Therefore, similarly, even by the deathly ill's gift, [Rashi: that doesn't have the condition of "this sickness"], even if he seems to change sicknesses, it's a valid gift, and it’s not reneged.
24) However, Rabbah and Rava disagrees with R' Huna, since we need to worry that people will think that a Get can take effect after death (since it doesn't take effect unless he dies, so they'll assume that the death causes the Get to take effect). Although it's not a Get from the Torah, since he wants it to be reneged when he gets well; since everyone makes Kiddushin on condition that the rabbis consent to the marriage, and the rabbis no longer consent to this marriage, so they annul it. ] This is not only if he made the original Kiddushin with money since we can define the money giving as a gift, but it's even if he made Kiddushin with relations, since they’ll define it as a promiscuous act.
25) [Tosfos says: R' Tam says that everyone agrees that, without any conditions; the Get doesn't get canceled just because he got well, as the Gemara says in the fifth Perek of Bava Metzia; and it's pushed to say that it's going against R' Huna. Rather, we refer to him making a condition, but the condition works just like the deathly ill's gifts, that it's canceled when he gets well. Therefore, Rabbah and Rava were worried that people will mistake it to work like the deathly ill's gifts that they take effect after death.]
26) There's a Braisa that says: if a sick husband gave his wife a Get on condition that he dies from his sickness, or that on condition he doesn’t recover from his sickness. Then he died, not from the sickness, but from the house collapsing on him or by a lion eating him or a snake bit him; it's not a Get, and if he says "If I don't survive this sickness" it takes effect. [Tosfos says: the Yerushalmi says the difference is that the first condition is that the sickness must kill him, and the house or snake killed him, and the second condition is that it's a Get as long as he didn't recover, and he didn't. However, the Bavli doesn't differentiate in this manner, and holds that both conditions imply that he dies from the sickness.]
27) The Gemara answers: those Onnsim are very uncommon, so it never dawns on him that it should be part of his conditions. (This is also true if a lion ate him). Therefore, if someone sells something and accepts to pay for an Onness that happens to it, such uncommon Onsim are not included. [Tosfos says: although Rava in the beginning of Kesuvos says: an Onness from fulfilling a condition on a Get doesn't cancel the Get; our cases, where those Onnsim that are extremely uncommon, even Rava would agree don’t stop the Get from taking effect. Alternatively, here is different since he says the condition that the death should come from this sickness, and not from another place. Therefore, we can ask if he has in mind all other Onsim that will cause his death, or not. However, in the case of Kesuvos, where he says on condition that he doesn’t return home within twelve months, it could mean for any reason that I don't return, even for those that he didn't think about. Therefore, we can permit because of the modest women and for the immodest women, and we don’t need to be concerned that it looks like a joke.]
28) This deathly ill husband who writes a Get to his wife if he dies, she can't seclude with him. Therefore, she must have someone else in there, even a slave, except for her female slave who she's very close to and she may have relations before her. We have an argument in the next Perek what happens when a divorced couple rent a room together in an inn; Beis Shammai says she doesn't need a second Get, and Beis Hillel holds that she does.
29) There's an argument between the Tanna Kama and R' Yossi b. Yehuda; and in Rava's conclusion: the Tanna Kama holds that even when we see that the divorced couple had relations together, we don't need to worry about a Kiddushin (and he holds that, in truth, Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel don't argue, and everyone holds she doesn't need a second Get). R' Yossi b. Yehuda says that, even with them just secluding, she needs a second Get. That, which R' Yochanan says that Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel only argue if we see that they had relations, but not with just seclusion, it doesn't go like either Tanna.
30) [Rashi explains the following Gemara by the case when someone says "this is a Get from the moment I'm still in the world, (but if he says "from this day if I die," everyone holds that she's retroactively divorced). R' Tam explains the case of our Gemara, that he said "from this day if I die," which is as if he said "from the moment I'm still in the world."] R' Yehuda holds, in the days in between the giving and death, she has a status of a married lady until a moment before the husband dies. R' Yossi says that he has the status of a Safeik married woman. [Rashi says: R' Yossi doesn't hold of Breira, so every moment is in Safeik if it's a moment before death, even though afterwards it was shown that it wasn't the moment before death. Tosfos disagrees, since the Gemara in Eiruvin implies that, if you don't hold of Breira, then it doesn't take effect at all. Rather, he's in doubt if it's like R' Yehuda, that it takes effect a moment before death, or like R' Meir that it takes effect right away.] Therefore, if she has relations with someone else, they bring an Asham Taloy. [Tosfos says: it seems that R' Yossi hold that, to bring an Asham Taloy, you don't need the doubt to be one definite Issur piece out of two pieces.] R' Meir says that it all depends if he dies from the sickness. If he dies, it's a Get retroactively, and if he doesn't, then, if she had relations with another, they bring a Chatos. [Tosfos says: however, he doesn't need to bring an Asham Taloy in the meanwhile since the Safeik will be eventually resolved. However, if it's a Safeik if he died from the sickness, then they must bring an Asham Taloy.]
31) The Chachumim (and R' Yossi in our Mishna) agree to R' Meir, but they add a caveat that the husband is obligated to pay for her food in the meantime, and R' Meir held he's exempt. (Although we said R' Yossi disagrees with R' Meir, we must say it's a Tannaic argument what R' Meir held.)
32) If someone says: "this is your Get on condition you give me two hundred Zuz, she's divorced, as long as she gives it. R' Huna says that she's divorced right away since he holds like Rebbi that, when someone says "on condition," it's like he said that it should take effect right away. (Some say that the Rabanan don't disagree.) R' Yehuda says he's not [Tosfos: definitely] divorced but only after the money is given, since he holds like Rebbi's Rabanan who [Tosfos: are in doubt if he's saying for it to take effect right away or] if saying on condition is not saying "from now."
33) The practical difference if the Get was ripped between the Get's giving and the giving of the money. [Tosfos adds: or if she accepts Kiddushin from someone else in between.]
33a) Therefore, according to Rebbi (or according to R’ Huna according to all Tannaim) if he says "this is your Get on condition you give me two hundred Zuz,” and he dies; the Tanna Kama says that it implies that it’s only if she gave him money in his lifetime, but not to his heirs after his death. R’ Shimon b. Gamliel says that it does imply to give me or to my heirs.
34) They also argue regarding Kiddushin. [Tosfos says: however, if money was given for the Kiddushin, it takes effect even if it was lost before the money given even if "on condition" doesn't mean from now, since it was lost while it's in her possession. The Halacha is that saying "on condition" is as if you said "from now."]
35) If he said to give it within thirty days, the Get only takes effect if it was given within thirty days, and we don't say he doesn't care that much, and only added it to make her zealous to pay it.
36) If he says "on condition that she brings me my cloak" and his cloak gets lost; the Tanna Kama says she's not divorced, and R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that she can bring him the worth of the cloak. The Halacha is not like R' Shimon b. Gamliel in this case.
37) If she doesn't give the money, even if the husband forgives it, she's not divorced. After all, the whole thrust of the condition is to pain her to need to give money, and by forgiving, you're not causing her any pain. However, if someone makes an oath not to have pleasure from someone else if he doesn't give him money; the Rabanan hold that he can cancel the oath without a Chachum by forgiving the money, since he only made the oath to gain, and he finds that the gain was not necessary. However, R' Meir says that the oath can't be canceled with forgiving the money.
38) If the owner of the field makes a condition with his sharecropper that, usually, a sharecropper is obligated to water the crops thrice, and take a fourth of the produce, but I want you to do it four times and you'll receive a third of the crop. However, that year it rained enough that the field didn't need that amount of watering; R' Yosef says: he gets a quarter since he didn't do the watering. Rabbah says: he gets a third since the only reason he didn't do the extra watering because it was unnecessary, and the Mazal of the owner caused that he offered more when it will come out that it was not necessary. [Tosfos says: although we see that, if one hires workers to water the field, and rains came, the workers lose and don't get paid for the day; that's because they don't have a portion in the field and all they have is their wage for watering, which they didn't do. However, a sharecropper owns a portion in the field for that years crop, and they're also busy with other chores that need to be done. Therefore, at the time of the condition, he acquires the rights to a third of the crops, and doesn't lose it if the rains come just like a regular sharecropper doesn't lose his fourth of the crop if the rains come that make his chore to water the field obsolete. However, R' Yosef holds that here's different, since the higher ratio of the crop is only for watering, and he didn't do the watering.]
39) We don't need to say that the argument between Rabbah and R' Yosef is the same as the argument between the Rabanan and R' Shimon b. Gamliel (that, according to Rabbah, the rain can take over the watering the same way that the money can take over the cloak). After all, Rabbah can hold like the Rabanan since, there, the reason for the demand is to pain her, and he can't exchange the type of pain he wanted to afflict. However, here, the idea is for the owner to have extra gain; and he has it.
40) It used to be, when people bought a house in a walled city; the buyers would hide on the last day to redeem it after twelve months so that the seller can't buy it back. Therefore, Hillel enacted that the seller can just deposit the money in a storehouse in the Mikdash and take back his house with force, and whenever the buyer wants, he can pick up his money.
41) We can't bring a proof from here that, a forced 'giving' is considered as 'giving,' or not, (with the practical difference that, if the husband gives a Get on condition that the wife gives him two hundred Zuz, and then he doesn't want to accept the money {to keep the Get from taking effect}; could she force the money on him.) After all, perhaps Hillel needed to enact that a forced giving to be considered a giving when it was given when he's not there, but it would be a giving anyhow if he was there. Also, perhaps, even when he's there, he can't be forced to accept since it's not a giving, but Hillel only needed to enact it when he wasn't there. [Tosfos explains: perhaps they didn't need to hide, but just refuse to take the money; but it would be too brazen for them not to accept it in order to force the house to remain by them, so they felt it was easier just to hide.]
42) [Tosfos explains: only by Gitten we have a reason to say a forced giving is considered giving even though regularly, you can't force someone to accept a present. After all, since the condition was for her to give money, it seems as if it depends on her alone if she will give it. However, if a forced giving is not a giving, then she didn't fulfil the condition to give it.]
43) [In the case of the house in the walled city that we need to come onto a forced giving, although we see that, by all loans, you can force the lender to accept the loan unless it's a situation that it might be a loss to him (like returning it in the wilderness); it's considered the giving is a loss to the buyer since he would need to return the house. The same by the Get, that he'll lose his wife if you force the giving.]
44) If he says: this is your Get, but the paper is mine; it's not a Get. However, if he says that it's on condition that he returns the paper, it's a Get. The reason why the latter takes effect, even when the condition is that the paper is returned; it's either because he didn't make a "double condition," so the condition is not binding, so it doesn't need to be returned. or, it's because it's the action was said before the condition, so the condition is not binding [Rashi says this is held universally, but Tosfos says: in Bava Metzia, it implies that this is also only according to R' Meir.] Alternatively, the condition and action is in the same thing, (since we assume that saying "on condition" doesn't mean it to take effect right away, but after the condition is fulfilled, so it can't take effect until after the Get is removed from her hands, so it's impossible for it to take effect). These are all not binding since they're not similar to the condition made by the children of Gad and Reuvein; so the condition is canceled and the action remains. Alternatively, he holds like Rebbi that, when someone says "on condition," it's like he said that it should take effect right away. Therefore, the Get takes effect right away, and when the Get is returned, he just fulfilled the condition.
45) [Tosfos says: a condition against what's written in the Torah is not a valid condition, or that a condition only works when made on an action that you can make an agent to do, is all because conditions need to be similar to the conditions made by the children of Gad and Reuvein. Even with the condition of "if you go do my Mitzvos etc." is a condition (despite that some Mitzvos can't be done with an agent) since most Mitzvos can be done with an agent. It seems that the Halacha is like R' Meir that you need a "double condition."]
46) [Tosfos says: there are some conditions that you need to make a "double condition." There are some that are so implied that you only need to show that you want it even without making an official condition. Then there are some that are so assumed that we assume it even if you don't show that you want it.]
47) Rava says: all conditions need to be similar to the one made by the children of Gad and Reuvein, that the positive side of the condition needs to be made before the negative side. Therefore, when a deathly ill person gives a Get on condition that it should only take effect if he dies, and he doesn't want to start off saying about the side of death; he says it shouldn't be a Get if he lives, it should be a Get if he dies, and repeat that it shouldn't be Get if he lives.
48) The Mishna says: if he says that this should be a Get on condition that you serve my father, or nurse my son, which the time for nursing is, according to the Rabanan, for two years, and according to R' Yehuda, it's eighteen months; if the father or son dies, she's divorced. [Tosfos says: according to Rashi, it seems that if the father dies before he was ever served, or the son before he was nursed, she's not divorced. Tosfos disagrees since it's simple that the condition was only to serve the father through his life. Rather, even if she didn't have a chance to serve the father or nurse the son at all, she's divorced since he only made the condition to gain, but now he doesn't need the gain anymore, and if he knew that he would die and wouldn't need the service or nursing, he would divorce her unconditionally. This is not similar to R' Yosef regarding a sharecropper when the rains came and he didn't need the gain, since there, if he knew it would rain, he wouldn't have offered him a third.]
49) There's a Braisa that holds that she's divorced even if she served him one day, or nursed the son one day. To reconcile them; R' Chisda says that the author of the Mishna is the Rabanan and the author of the Braisa is R' Shimon b. Gamliel who's usually more lenient when it comes to conditions, like when he allows returning the worth instead of the cloak itself.
50) Rava answers: the Braisa refers to explicitly saying that it's for one day, and the Mishna refers to when it was unqualified.
51) R' Ashi held that, even if it's unqualified, it's assumed that it's only for one day. That, which we need to say two years, that the one day must be within the first two years of his life, or eighteen months according to R' Yehuda. If she nurses after that time, she hadn't fulfilled the condition.
52) The end of the Mishna says: if you made an explicit condition for two years; if the father or son died within two years, she's not divorced. It makes sense according to Rava that there's a difference between the beginning and end [Tosfos: in the beginning case, he just wants to gain as much as he needs, and when they die, he doesn't need the gain anymore. However, when he makes the condition for two years, he wants her to be pained for two years of service, which she didn't have.] However, according to R' Ashi, there's no difference between the two cases [Tosfos: since the first case, it's as if he said for a day, so he wants to pain her for that day, and she didn't have it.]
53) R' Shimon b. Gamliel says: even when he explicitly says for two years, she's divorced, since he holds that anything that prevents the condition to take effect that's not because of her doesn't prevent the Get from taking effect.
54) [Tosfos asks: there's a side to say that Rava holds that a forced giving is not a giving, and yet the Halacha is like R' Shimon b. Gamliel in a Mishna, and we say that, when the father or son dies, it's a valid Get since she wasn't at fault. Also, even R' Shimon b. Gamliel holds that you can't forgive the money in the condition; so why is this different? Tosfos answers: by the father and son, he only made those conditions in order to gain, and it's not needed anymore. However, when it comes to a forced giving, even though he refuses to take it, he still needs the gain. Even when he forgives the money, he's still not receiving the gain he originally wanted.]
55) If one says to his wife before two people "here's you're Get on condition that you serve my father two years," and doesn't hand it over yet. Then he says before other witnesses "it's on condition that she gives me two hundred Zuz," and then hands it over; each condition doesn't cancel the other (since he didn't cancel the first Get before the later witnesses) and it wasn't an additional condition (since he didn't say explicitly that the second condition is an add on to the first one). Therefore, she only needs to keep one of the conditions to be divorced.
56) However, if the first condition was "on condition that she gives me two hundred Zuz" and the second condition was "on condition that she gives me three hundred Zuz;" he definitely cancels the first condition with the second condition.
57) You can't combine one witness from the first pair and one from the second pair, even when the second condition doesn't cancel the first one; and we don't say that, since she can do either condition, it's like they're saying one testimony (even if she does both conditions).
58) If he says "on condition that he doesn't show up after thirty days if he travels from Judea to Galil;" if he reaches Atipras, and returns, the Get is canceled, and if it's the opposite, from Galil to Judea; he needs to reach Osnai, and return. This implies that he reached the other area when they reached those cities; and that cancels the Get since he reached the other area and returned, and if he afterwards leaves for thirty days, it's not a Get. Although there's a Braisa that Atipras is in Judea and Osnai was in Galil; the Gemara's first answer: it's a Safeik which area they're in, and therefore, it's a Safeik Get and she can't remarry, but she's forbidden to a Kohein.
59) Abaya answers: the condition was; if he reaches Galil, she should be divorced right away. If he doesn't reach Galil, that she's only divorced if he doesn't come back for thirty days. Therefore, since he only reached Atipras, which is in Judea, he never reached Galil, and he returned within thirty days, the Get is canceled.
60) If he says: this is a Get as long as I don't pass your face for thirty days; if he comes and goes many times and didn't seclude with her, it's a Get, even if he did pass her. R' Huna explains that this expression was an idiom to relations, and since they didn't seclude, they didn't have relations. R' Yochanan explains: it means that the condition is still in effect from a Safeik that he may leave her for thirty days until they seclude and cancel the get because it's a Get Yoshan. We don't worry for reconciliation, since we refer to a case where he said that he'll trust his wife when he claims that the Get was Pasul since they reconciled. Some say that this is needed in the case when he sent a Get to cross the seas to be given after twelve months, since we need to worry about him coming from across the seas and reconcile with her. Others say: we don't need to worry at all in this case as long as we don't see him come.
61) If someone gave a Get on condition that he doesn’t return home within twelve months, if he dies within that time, the Get never becomes valid. R' Yossi says that the date in the document is as if he wrote in the condition “from today.” According to all if he wrote, “it should be a Get from today until I die,” which we interpret it to mean that the Get takes effect immediately as long as he eventually dies, it's a valid Get.
62) There's an inquiry if she's permitted to marry right away, since the condition will definitely be fulfilled, or she needs to wait until after twelve months [Tosfos says: since we need to worry she might remarry when he didn't die, since not everyone hears about his death.]
63) If he makes a condition at night "when the sun comes out," it implies when it comes out [Tosfos says: and according to R' Yossi, it's a Safeik Get, like he holds when he says "and after death."] If he says "on the condition that the sun comes out,” it's a Get right away, since saying 'on condition' is like saying that it's from now. However, the argument between R' Yossi and the Rabanan if he says "if I die." R' Yossi holds it's like he said "from now if I die" and the Rabanan hold that it's as if he just said "if I die" by itself.
64) If someone says "if I don't come back until twelve months, write and give a Get to my wife," if he writes it before twelve months, even if he gives it after twelve months, it's Pasul. However, if he says "write and give a Get to my wife if I don't come back until twelve months;" if he writes it before twelve months and gives it after twelve months; the Tanna Kama says it's still Pasul, and R' Yossi says it's Kosher. It's not because he holds that, if you give a Get on condition, it's Kosher even if the condition is unfulfilled. After all, we can say here, since he says to write it before he says "after twelve months;" and not the other way around, he doesn't care if it was written within twelve months. However, the Rabanan don't hold that there's any different.
65) If someone says "this is a Get if I don't return after this Shmita cycle," he has a year to return after Shmita, since that year is considered "after the Shmita cycle." [Tosfos says: this is even if he says it at the end of Shmita, since he framed the condition in terms of Shmita cycles.]
66) If he says "after the year," he has a month. "After a month," he has a week. "After Shabbos," he has until Tuesday. After all, until Tuesday, it's called after the last Shabbos, and from Wednesday on, it's before the next Shabbos.
67) Rav says: if he says "after Yom Tov," he has thirty days afterwards, but the Halacha is not like him.