1) They enacted that the damager pays damages from his best quality fields because of a fix to the world. Although it would seem that the Torah obligates him, as the Pasuk says "from his best fields;" Abaya says: it's needed for R' Yishmael, who says that the damager pays from the best of the damagee's fields, even though he may have better fields, but because to fix the world, they enacted for the damager to pay from his best field. (However, when his best field is worse than the damagee's best field, he just pays his best field and he doesn't need to produce one that's equal to the damagee's quality.)

2) However, R' Akiva holds: the damager pays his best, and, of course, he pays it when he damages Hekdesh. (As he holds like R' Shimon b. Menasya that your obligated to pay full damage when a Shor Tam gores Hekdesh, but R' Yishmael holds like the Rabanan that you're exempt from payment since the Torah says you only pay when goring "your friend's ox." [Tosfos says: this may only be by goring, where it's written "your friend", but not when damaging by eating and trampling. Alternatively, he's exempt by any damage to Hekdesh, as the Yerushalmi says that we learn from a Tzad Hashava with Trumah that says you pay "when you eat it;" implying, but not when you damage it. (Although we see in Bava Metzia that you pay when damaging Hekdesh, that's only a rabbinical obligation.) That, which we see that you're obligated to pay when you damage Trumah, that's only because you're damaging the property of the Kohein.]

3) [Tosfos says: another practical difference between R' Yishmael and R' Akiva is according to the opinion that the damager either pays money, or from the best of his fields. According to R' Akiva who defines best according to the damager's fields, so he can give his best quality field even if the damagee's fields are of higher quality. However, according to R' Yishmael, it depends on the damagee's highest quality field, so he must pay money instead since he can't give a best field.]

4) Raveina explains the Mishna why giving the best field is "fixing the world" if it's anyhow obligated from the Torah: our Mishna's author is R' Shimon who Darshen's the Pasuk's reasons. The reason why the Torah requires giving the best quality field is to prevent someone from doing damage or to steal if he knows that, eventually, he would need to give up his best field for it. [Tosfos says: therefore, we make him give his own best field, and not like the damagee's best field.]

5) They enacted that a lender collects from the middle grade field to fix the world. As we don't want people to see a good field and lend in order to grab the field. For that reason, we should make him collect the lowest quality field, but they didn't in order to prevent people from closing their doors from giving loans.

6) R' Yehuda says that you pay the Kesuva from the lowest quality field in order to fix the world since women want to marry more than men (so it won't prevent them from marrying if they would need to collect from the lowest quality). [Tosfos says: even according to the opinion that Kesuva is from the Torah and should collect from the best quality like all Torah obligations; but they enacted not to collect from them so that the wife shouldn't cause fights in order to get divorced to get a great quality field. Therefore, they made them collect from the least quality field and they don't need to worry that they'll stop marrying like the lenders will stop lending since they want to get married more than the men.] R' Meir says that they collect from middle grade because of 'grace.' [Rashi explains: in order that the men should have grace in the women's eyes so that they'll marry them without worry whether they can collect the Kesuva. Tosfos disagrees since the Gemara in Kesuvos implies that it's the opposite, and logically it's the opposite since they want to marry more than the men. Rather, it's like R' Chananel's explanation: in order that prospective husbands should have an appreciation that she's not just some cheep object, and will marry them faster. This is also implied in the Yerushalmi.]

7) They didn't need to enact that a woman should pay anything to the man at the time of divorce [Tosfos: in order that she shouldn't force a divorce by causeing fights]; since she doesn't have the power to force a divorce, since it's in his hands whether he wants to give a Get.

8) Even if she's not collecting from orphans, but from her husband, she only collects from the lowest quality.

9) A cosigner of a Kesuva doesn't really obligate himself, so you can't collect from him. After all, he's doing it in order to promote the Mitzvah of marriage, and the woman is not losing anything if she doesn't collect. [Tosfos says: it needs both variables to be exempt from paying, and the cosigner is obligated if it's not a Mitzvah, even if the creditor is not losing anything, or if the creditor loses, even if it's for a Mitzvah.] However a cosigner for a loan, or a Kablan of a Kesuva, are obligated to pay even if the borrower, or husband, don't own anything to pay.[Rashi explains a Kablan as if the woman grabs objects to be collected for her Kesuva, gives it to the Kablan (momentarily), and takes it back and gives it back to the husband. Tosfos says: although the Gemara in Bava Basra says that the creditor collects exclusively from the Kablan and can't collect from the borrower; that's only when the Kablan gives it to the borrower, and here the woman (i.e., the creditor) gives it to the husband. Although it implies there that it all depends if he's called a Kablan; but it needs both the name Kablan and that the Kablan gives it to the borrower for him to only collect from the Kablan.]

10) [Tosfos says: even though a Kablan is not like a cosigner that you don't need to approach the borrower first even if he has land; however, if the borrower only has low quality land, you can only collect low quality land from the Kablan, even if he has also a better field.]

11) R' Nachman holds that a loan document that's produced to collect from the orphans, he can only collect from the least quality fields, even if the stipulation in the document is for him to collect from the highest grade. Abaya brings a proof to this from the fact that, normally, a creditor is entitled to collect from the middle grade, and yet he only collects from the lowest grade when collecting from orphans.

12) Rava dismisses that proof. After all, a lender is only entitled to the lowest grade from the Torah, but the rabbis enacted, because of fixing the world, that he should get mid grade. However, for orphans, they placed it on the Torah obligation to collect the lowest of grades. However, here, were he specifically put a lien on his highest grade, which he owes from the Torah, perhaps we don't downgrade it to the lowest grade. [Rashi explains: since he holds that a cosigner obligation is from the Torah from Yehuda saying "I will cosign for him;" and the liens are Torah obligated since your property are your cosigners to pay an obligation. Tosfos explains: Rava holds that liens are obligated from the Torah, since if it's only rabbinic, then you can only collect from the Torah from the father and not from the orphans. However, R' Nachman and Abaya held that it's only rabbinical, so the comparison holds up. Alternatively, they hold, once the rabbis enacted to collect from the lowest grade from orphans, they don't make any exceptions to their enactment.]

13) According to Rava, although we see a Braisa that says that you only collect from the lowest grade from a orphan even for damages (that's Torah obligated to pay from the best); it must be according to R' Yishmael, and in a case where the low grade of the damager is the highest grade of the damagee, that, from the Torah, he pays from his lowest grade, and the rabbis decreed that he collects from his highest grade. Therefore, when he collects from orphans, he pays from his lowest grade since it's the damagee's highest grade.

14) Those who should collect from Shafai Idyos, collects from mid grade. [Rashi explains that they made up to collect from the highest grade field that he has, but that got ruined by a tidal wave and it becomes uncollectable; he's then has the status of a regular creditor who collects from the lowest grade from the Torah, but the rabbis say to collect it from mid grade.] However, from orphans, he collects from the lowest grade (since we place it on the Torah's Halacha that creditors collect from the lowest grade). [Tosfos disagrees with the explanation. After all, in this case, the creditor should collect another field that's high quality since he shouldn't get a downgrade of what they made up to collecting the highest grade, as we see this logic in the first Perek of Bava Kama. Therefore R' Tam explains: if you have a field on the river edge, even if it's technically a high quality field, since it's destined to always be flooded, it's worse than the lowest quality field and is usually just designated for animals to graze there. Therefore, if someone else's animal grazes in there, it's not even considered as damaging since it's designated for this. Rather, it's like buying it and owing what your animal ate even if you did it without the owner's consent, which has the status of a creditor that, from the Torah, pays from the lowest quality, and rabbinically, from the mid grade.]

15) You can only collect from the orphans from the lowest grade and we don't need to worry it will prevent people from lending if they don't get mid grade since people don't expect for the borrower to die. Therefore, this reasoning helps even for adult orphans. Hence, you can only collect from orphans, whether minors are adults, by swearing and from the low grade. [Tosfos says: the only way that you collect from minor orphans, according to the opinion that you don't collect from them unless interest is accruing; we can say that it's when the father admits to owing it right before his death, where he doesn't even swear but just collects even from minors. The way that one swears to a minor to collect is only, according to R' Tam who holds that if you transgressed to partner with a non-Jew, which you're not allowed to do since it will cause him to swear to you in his idol's name, you may accept his swearing. So, if he has a lien on the property for interest, he can swear to the minor orphans. However, according to R' Shmuel who holds you can't accept him to swear to you; we refer to a Ger Toshav partner that doesn't worship idols. Alternatively, if the cosigner on the father's loan to a non-Jew is swearing to collect from the orphans. However, this is only if the condition of the loan is that the non-Jew tries to collect from the borrower first, or else, if he can collect from the cosigner first, it would be Ribbis for the cosigner to collect the money. Alternatively, our Gemara is according to R' Yochanan who holds that a woman can collect her Kesuva from minor orphans.]

16) You can't collect from sold properties if their are still unsold properties because of the fix of the world. [Tosfos says: this is a Chiddush even according to the opinion that liens are not from the Torah; still, I might have said that you should collect from sold mid grade properties before you need to collect from unsold low grade properties so that people shouldn't refrain from lending, so we're taught otherwise.]

17) We have an inquiry whether this is only by sold properties, but not by gifted properties, or it's even by gifted properties, since it wouldn't have been gifted unless he did a great favor that he was indebted to, so it's as if it was sold to him.

18) If a deathly ill person said to give two hundred Zuz to one person and three hundred to a second person and four hundred to a third person, they all collect evenly (and the later ones don't only collect if the former ones already collected). Also, if a loan document went against the estate, they also need to jointly pay it. [Tosfos explains: therefore, if there are limited funds, so we divide it between each one according to their ratio. However, this is only because the amount was different to each one, so we had to enumerate it to each one, so it doesn't show that you said one before the other in order to say that he comes before the other, but if the amount is the same, then we say that he wanted to give the first one before the second, and the second before the third, or else he would have said to give two hundred to all three, and not to enumerate them separately.] However, if he said to give two hundred Zuz to one person and then three hundred to a second person and then four hundred to a third person, then the creditor first collects from the last one, and if that's not enough, from the one before him etc. Therefore, it seems that even if the first one collects from mid grade, and the later from low grade, the creditor collects from the low grade, and we don't say that he collects from the mid grade by a gift.

19) The Gemara rejects this proof. After all, we can say that it's not a gift, but the person ordering to pay out verbal loans, so you pay out according to how the lender commanded. Alternatively, we refer to a gift, and the creditor takes the mid grade, but then the first one who had his land taken away can collect the low grade from the one after him since the last one needs to suffer the loss. [Tosfos points out: as we need to explain it in the first case, where they collect from everyone, that the creditor collects the mid grade, and they split the remaining fields between them.] Alternatively, we refer to a case that all the lands distributed were from the same grade, either they were all high, mid or low grade.

20) If someone bought a field that turned out to be stolen, he can't collect for the fruits that was taken away from him from property that the seller (i.e., the robber) sold to others. Reish Lakish says: since that obligation is not written in the document [Rashi explains: although it is written in the document that he'll pay back all the fruit, however, since at the time of the writing, the fruit wasn't in existence, it doesn't produce rumors to this obligation and it's as if it's not written.] The reason that you can't collect the food for your wife from sold properties [Tosfos: although she was in existence by the writing] and for his daughters [Tosfos says: even if he divorced the mother and remarried her when the daughters were in existence (or else they would have the same reason as the fruit)]; even if they're like they're written (since they're an official condition of the Kesuva) they enacted that it should be as if it wasn't written. That's because: or else, nobody would want to buy land since they could be always collected by the seller's wife and daughters. [Tosfos says: but you can't explain that we're afraid that the father already gave them movable objects to pay for the food, since we're not worried about that as long as he doesn't make a Kinyan with them.]

21) R' Chanina says the reason that they don't collect from sold fields: since these obligations don't have any set amount. There's an inquiry whether he needs two variables, a set amount and written, or it's enough to be a set amount without being written. [Tosfos explains: everyone holds that you can't collect verbal loans from sold fields since people borrow in private. However, if you accepted to feed your wife's daughters for five years, it's like a sale that we say that you can collect from sold land (if they're collected from you) from other sold land as long as it was sold before two witnesses. The Gemara comes out that you don't need it to be written.] This argument between R' Chanina and Reish Lakish is also a Tannaic argument.

22) If someone has two daughters and a son and dies, and then one daughter got married and received a tenth of the estate for a dowry, and then the brother dies; the second daughter forgoes her dowry and just splits the rest of the estate with her sister. [Rashi: it's because, since they enacted to get a tenth so that she'll have a large amount of money, and she gets a great profit from the split of the whole estate, she doesn't need the tenth.] R' Chanina argued: if you can collect the tenth from sold property, she can definitely collect it in this case where it's not sold. Anyhow, although we don't collect from sold fields for their food, the reason we collect from them for their tenth of the estate; it fits well if you only need a set amount even if it's not written. If you say that you need it also to be written, we must refer to a case where the father made a Kinyan with the daughter on this. However, even with a Kinyan, it won't help to collect them for food [Tosfos: although writing doesn't help for food, but we would think that Kinyan which is stronger than writing it down should make you collect] since it's a condition of the Kesuva, the father might have given over objects for them to collect from.

23) [Tosfos says: we're only worried that the father gave objects to collect from in order that they shouldn't collect from sold land, but we don't worry about it when they collect from unsold land. Tosfos finds this difficult. After all, since, regarding sold land, we're more lenient by a Kesuva that she can collect from them when swearing, but she can't collect food even when swearing. However, regarding unsold land, we're more lenient when it comes to collect food since you collect without swearing (untill the end when you collect the Kesuva), but you can only collect the Kesuva while swearing.]

24) The Mishna says: if you found a lost object, you never swear on it to "fix the world."

25) R' Yitzchok argues and says: if the owner claims that the finder must have found two purses since they were tied together, and the finder claims he only found one, he swears. However, if the claim involved tied oxen, he's exempt from swearing. After all, the purses don't detach from each other, (so it's a definite claim). [Tosfos: even according to Rebbi who says in Beitza that the tie sometimes falls apart; that's only when there's a reason to believe it did, like there where you left two tied purses, and you came back to find only one. However, usually, we don't assume that it comes apart.] However, since the tied oxen pulls and detaches from each other, (so it's only a questionable claim from the owner). [Tosfos says: we should say the text is that the following is a Braisa that supports R' Yitzchok. If the finder claims that he actually found two oxen, but he already returned one, he doesn't swear since he has a Migo that he could have said that he only found one. However, he would be obligated to swear if it was purses, like R' Yitzchok holds.]

26) If the borrower denies part of the claim; the Rabanan say that he doesn’t swear since it’s like returning a lost object. R’ Elazar b. Yaakov holds that he needs to swear, although usually, he agrees to the concept of not swearing on returning a lost object. We don't need to say that R’ Elazar b. Yaakov held like R' Yitzchok [Tosfos: and we should Paskin like him, even if he argues with our Mishna, since R’ Elazar b. Yaakov's teachings where a small amount (Kav), but very pure (and logical).] We refer to a case were the lender dies and leaves an adult orphan [Tosfos explains: but he doesn't swear to a minor orphan since we say that a minor can’t make someone swear on what he did when he was a minor even after he grows up since we have an exclusion that the money giving and claiming need to be done with the same status (and he can’t give the money as a minor and claim the money when he’s an adult) so it should exclude when the money is given from an adult (the father) and claimed by a minor (the son).] They argue on what Rabbah says that the whole reason that the Torah required to swear for admitting to part of the claim [Tosfos: and we don’t absolve him from swearing because of a Migo, believe me that I don’t owe more than I admit, since I could claim that I owe nothing and I would be believed without swearing.] As he says: since it’s natural for one not to deny brazenly in front of someone he owes money to. [Rashi says in Bava Kama: since he did him a favor by lending it to him. Tosfos disagrees, since it applies to watching an object like it applies to a loan. Rather, it's because he wouldn’t claim he owes nothing, since it’s too brazen to say that in front of a person who knows he’s lying.] Really, he would like to deny all, but that would be too brazen, which he wouldn’t want to do. So not to be brazen, he would like to admit to the whole loan, [Rashi explains the reason we must say that he wants to admit to the whole thing for, if we suspect he really wants to steal it, we wouldn’t allow him to swear because someone who we suspect to take other people’s money is suspected to swear falsely. Tosfos argues since we say that even if we suspect someone to steal, we don’t suspect he’ll swear falsely. Rather, Tosfos explains the reason we say that he really wants to admit the whole amount: in order not to say that we should believe him completely, since he doesn’t want to be brazen, so we should assume what he admits is the whole loan. So Rabbah explains, he really wants to admit more, so this is not that brazen. Although, even if we suspect someone to take other people’s money we don’t suspect him to swear falsely, the reason a thief can’t swear; only if he didn’t steal yet, but he’s in the process of stealing, do we say that we don’t suspect him to swear falsely and making him swear would stop him from stealing. However, if he already stooped to steal something, we say that the same way he didn’t stop himself from stealing, he wouldn’t stop himself from swearing falsely. Even if we force him to pay, it’s not T’shuva, and he’s still invalid to swear. Others answer: true, the Torah believes a thief to swear, but it’s a rabbinic enactment to suspect them of swearing falsely. Even though the Torah doesn’t allow them to testify, that’s because there’s a big punishment to swear falsely, as the world shook when Hashem commanded us from swearing falsely.] However, he tries to delay paying because he doesn’t have enough money now. So, we make him swear to force him to admit that he really owes it. [Tosfos says: although denying the whole loan is also trying to get an extension, as we say that it’s the reason the Rabanan imposed a Shvuos Heses (a rabbinic swearing) on someone who denies the whole amount. However, it’s more brazen to deny the whole loan than to deny part. So, you don’t have a Migo that you could deny the whole loan, since he doesn’t want to be that brazen.]

27) Therefore, the Rabanan hold that he won’t be brazen to the actual lender, but he could be brazen to his son, so he has a proper Migo that he could have denied it all. However, R’ Elazar b. Yaakov holds that he won’t be brazen even to the son, so it’s a regular case of partially admitting, which swears.

28) The orphans caregiver can't take off Trumah and Maasar for all their grain so it should remain tithed in a storehouse until they grow up. Rather, they can only separate enough for them to eat. He also can sell their property to buy them food and for all their needs.

29) He also buys for them a Luluv, Arava, Sukka, Tzitzis, Shofar, Sefer Torah, Tefilin, Mezuzah and Megilah. However, they don't put upon him to pay Tzedaka or to ransom captives or to give to console mourners.

30) The caregiver can't go to court to be detrimental for the orphans, even for it to be eventually beneficial to them [Tosfos in Kiddushin 42a explains: i.e., to pay off a debt, so that they shouldn't have the debt upon them anymore.] However, they can go to court on something that's purely beneficial for the orphans, since, even if they don't win, the orphans can reopen the case when they grow up.

31) The caregiver can't sell the orphans' bad or far fields to buy higher quality fields or those that are closer to them since the new fields may get flooded and ruined. They can't sell fields to buy slaves, but they can sell slaves to buy land. R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that you can't even do this since there may be people who claim that the new bought field belongs to them (and the seller stole it from them).

32) The Tanna Kama says that the caregiver can't free the orphans' slaves, but sell him to others. Rebbi holds that the slave can buy himself to go free, since it's like selling it to him.

33) When the orphans grow up, they can make the caregiver swear if anything of theirs remain in his hands. R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that he doesn't have to.

34) R' Yehoshua b. Levi says that you can sell their fields to buy oxen, as R' Yossi says "I don't call my oxen as oxen, but I call them my fields (since they make the field viable)."

35) You don't appoint a woman, slave or minor as their caregivers, but if the father appointed them, he has the right to.

36) If the orphans sold fruit, and the buyers pulled the fruit, but didn't give the money, and then the fruit went up in price; the orphans can renege on the deal since they enacted that the orphans' properties should have the status like Hekdesh that is only acquired through money. However, if the fruit went down in price, the buyer can't renege (even though money acquires by an orphan) since Hekdesh can't be worse off than mortals, and just like you can't renege after pulling the fruits when buying from regular people, so you can't renege by Hekdesh, and the same applies to orphans. Therefore, in this case, he acquires through pulling like he would acquire from a regular mortal.

37) If the orphans are buying fruit from someone else, and they pulled the fruit, but didn't give the money, and then the fruit went up in price; the buyer can't renege since Hekdesh can't be worse off than mortals, and just like you can't renege after pulling the fruits when selling from regular people, so too by Hekdesh. However, if the fruit went down in price, even though the orphans should be able to renege since there was no money to make the transaction binding; however, it will be harmful to them if they could renege, since people won't sell them fruits without first receiving the money, so they enacted that they can't renege.

38) If the orphans buy fruit, and they gave money, but didn't pull the fruit, if the fruit went down in price, the orphans can renege since Hekdesh can't be worse off than mortals, so they can renege until the pulling like just like mortals who buy can renege. [Tosfos says: although we say that even Hekdesh can't renege in this case, and we don't say that Hekdesh can't be worse off than mortals, since even the mortals who renege need to accept on themselves the curse of "Me Sheparah;" but that's by real Hekdesh that never had a Halacha on them to acquire by pulling. So, as long as mortals can't renege (without a curse) we don't say the logic that Hekdesh can't be worse off than mortals. However, orphans who are actual mortals and should acquire through pulling, but the rabbis enacted to acquire with money, we can say that they can renege without pulling.] However, if the fruit went up in price, though we should say that the seller shouldn't be able to renege after giving the money, the rabbis enacted that they could renege or else, if a fire breaks out and burns the fruit, the seller can claim that their fruit got burnt up and it's their loss. [Rashi says: and the orphans won't be able to renege after it gets burnt, since it went up in price, it was irreversibly in their possession, so it doesn't leave their possession after the burning. Tosfos says: and earlier when the buyers pulled the fruit from the orphans, but didn't give the money, that the orphans can renege, and we don't say that we're afraid that the buyer will tell the orphans that their fruit burned; since the buyers own the fruit before they go up in price, and they have a right to eat it, or sell it, beforehand; so we consider them obligated like a paid watchman after it went up in price. As we see, when a borrower finished his term and is returning the object, he has the obligation of a paid watchman, since he had pleasure, he gives the lender pleasure to accept on himself the obligations of a paid watchman.]

39) If the orphans sell the fruit and the buyers gave money and didn't pull the fruit; if it went up in price, the orphans can renege since Hekdesh can't be worse off than mortals. If it goes down in price, the buyer shouldn't be able to renege since money acquires by orphans, but the rabbis enacted for them to renege, or else, orphans may need money and no one will buy the fruits off them if they're not ready for delivery.

40) You can sell land from the estate without announcing to publicize the sale (to get the best price) if it's needed to pay the head tax [Rashi: of the orphans. Tosfos disagrees since you sell always without announcing it for all the orphans' needs. Rather, it refers to the wife's and daughter's head tax, which the husband is obligated to supply since it's under the heading of having to supply her food.] They also don't need to announce to pay for her food and for burial [Tosfos: we don't need to say this if he's laying there in disgrace waiting to be buried, but even to pay back the loans that they took to pay for burial so that people shouldn't refrain from lending for this in the future], since they're all needed immediately.

41) The caregivers can wear fancy clothing belonging to the orphans so people should listen to him when he's advocating for the orphans.

42) If the caregiver is ruining the property, like by not administrating their proper care; we remove him from his post.

43) The Rabanan say that, a caretaker only needs to swear if he was appointed by the father since he wouldn't have accepted if the father hadn't done him a favor, so he won't refuse if he needed to swear, but not if he's appointed by Beis Din, since he doesn't get anything from it, he may refuse if he needs to swear. Abba Shaul holds that a caretaker only needs to swear if he was appointed by Beis Din since he gets the perk of being known as a trusted person (since Beis Din trusts him), so he won't refuse if he needed to swear, but not if he's appointed by the father since he doesn't have any pleasure from it. R' Elazar b. Yaakov says that they both need to swear.

44) The Halacha is like Abba Shaul. [Tosfos quotes R' Chaim: the caregiver only swears that he didn't keep any of the orphans items for himself. However, he doesn't swear if he was negligent, since he's exempt if he was negligent since he wouldn't accept upon himself to be a caregiver if it would obligate him to pay for neglect. As we see that, if the orphans' ox damages, they set up a caregiver to guard it, and if it still damages, they pay from the orphans' estate, and not from the caregiver or else he'll refrain from taking over. However, R' Shlomo b. Yosef brings a proof that the caregiver is obligated, by a case where they bought an ox for them that didn't have teeth and it died, they would be obligated to pay if it wasn't for the fact that they weren't negligent since they handed it over to shepherds who should have noticed it. If so, we need to say that the case of guarding the ox is different, since your not guarding it to help out the orphans, but other people. Therefore, since it's not a lofty position, he would refrain if he would be obligated. However, we can say that he still doesn't need to swear since he might refrain to be a caregiver if he needs to swear, even if he won't refrain if he would be obligated to pay if he was negligent, as we see this explanation in the Yerushalmi.]

45) If someone makes someone else's fruit Tamai, mixed with Trumah, or libated to an idol, he's exempt from paying if he did it unintentionally, but obligated to pay if done intentionally.

46) Rav says that he's obligated by actually libating the wine, and Shmuel says that he's only obligated if he mixed the other one's wine with libated wine, but he's exempt if he actually libates the wine since he only gets the harsher punishment of the death penalty for serving idols. [Tosfos adds: you can't even obligate him as a fine, which is the only reason you obligate him if unnoticeable damage is not considered as real damage, since we shouldn't obligate him more than if he actually did a real damage.] However, Rav held like R' Yirmiya who holds you're obligated to pay for the wine when you lifted it (and stole it) and you're not obligated in the death penalty until you pour it afterwards. [Tosfos says: however, Shmuel holds: even though you’re obligated to pay if you stole someone’s forbidden fat and ate it, since you’re already obligated to pay (when you picked it up) before you transgressed the prohibition of forbidden fats (when you ate it); but there, it’s possible to eat the fat without picking it up if he bends down and eats it. However, here, you can't libate the wine without picking it up. Rav and Shmuel argue about the Halacha that, if you throw an arrow on Shabbos (in the Reshus Harabim) for four Amos (which one transgresses a Melacha on Shabbos), and it rips silk clothing on the way, he’s exempt from paying for the silk. Shmuel holds the reason is since, in order to have the arrow land after four Amos, you need the person to pick it up before; and it’s impossible for it to land four Amos away without picking it up. Rav holds the reason is: since when he starts the throw, there is no way to take it back, (therefore, we consider everything done with this throwing as one action). Therefore, he obligates when lifting the wine, since you don't need to libate afterwards. Alternatively, Rav holds it's possible to libate without lifting it up, so it's not like the need to uproot an item when carrying it four Amos. Alternatively, Rav disagrees with the whole concept that we consider the uprooting of the object as part of the Melacha to exempt payment. Alternatively, perhaps Shmuel also agrees with the concept that you don't need to lift it to libate. However, he's not obligated for the lifting, since, at that point, he can return it and say "behold, what is yours is before you," even if someone else libated it afterwards. He's also not obligated for the libation, since he gets the harsher punishment. However, Rav holds that your obligated for lifting it on all damages he'll do with it after that, even though you can't obligate for the damage since he'll get the harsher punishment.]

47) It's forbidden to cause Tumah to Chulin in Eretz Yisrael since the holy ones eat their Chulin in Tahara.

48) Chizkiya holds that unnoticeable damage is damage. The only reason we don't obligate if he did it unintentionally, in order to incentivize him to tell us that the fruit is Tamai. (However, if he did it intentionally, we don't need to incentivize us to tell, since he did it to pain us, and it only will pain us if we know about it.) R' Yochanan says: it's not considered as damage, and you're only obligated when done intentionally to prevent people from making their friend's fruit Tamai. [Tosfos explains: although when someone judges and errs and said that something Tamai is really Tahor, he needs to pay for it (if he touches it to other Tahor fruit to show his confident in his P'sak) even though he didn't make them Tamai intentionally; we must say that this Gemara held like R' Meir who obligates to pay for Garmi. According to Chizkiya, we don't need to incentivize the judge to tell us, since it's all Tamai now anyhow. Alternatively, since he was negligent, since he didn't need to touch it to Tahor fruit. In the case where he says a Tamai fruit is Tahor and mixed it with his Tahor fruit; we don't need to incentivize the judge to tell us, since he usually only reneges from his P'sak when others convince him he's wrong, and they'll tell us it's Tamai.]

49) If someone does work with the Parah Aduma waters, he's exempt to pay from Beis Din, but needs to pay to satisfy Heaven. According to the opinion that unnoticeable damages is damages, the reason he's exempt in Beis Din is that we refer to using it as a weight to weigh the item on the other side of the scale. After all, its P'sul is not dependant on your action, but on your thoughts, since it's Pasul since you lost focus on guarding it, so it's only considered as indirectly causing damage, and not actual damaging. After all, without the lost of focus, the Parah waters would still be Kosher. However, if he uses the actual water to measure an item (by putting the item in it and seeing how much the water rises because of it) it's using the actual water and it Pasuls it because you did work with it, and you would be obligated if you hold unnoticeable damages are really damages.

50) We disprove Chizkiya from the following: if someone steals a coin, and it becomes outdated and unaccepted, or Trumah and it becomes Tamai, or Chametz and it passes Pesach; the robber can return the item saying "what's yours is before you." [Tosfos explains the proof: if this unnoticeable damage is considered a damage; then it's not the same item that you stole since it's now considered damaged, and he should have acquired it because the item has been changed.]

51) If someone makes someone else's fruit Tamai, mixed with Trumah, or libated to an idol, R' Meir says that he pays whether he did it unintentionally or intentionally, since he fines him when done unintentionally so that he shouldn't come to do it intentionally. R' Yehuda says he's exempt from paying if he did it unintentionally and we don't fine him when done unintentionally so that he shouldn't come to do it intentionally.

52) We see that their opinions are switch to what they held if someone does a Melacha on Shabbos. As R' Meir holds to permit the item if done unintentionally, and only forbids it if done intentionally. We must say that he's more stringent by rabbinical enactments since they need strengthening than by Torah laws that don't need strengthening since it's already strict in everyone's eyes.

53) R' Yehuda is stringent on Shabbos and forbids the item when done unintentionally, since it's forbidden from the Torah, we fine him so that he shouldn't come to do it intentionally. The exception is libating, even though it's forbidden from the Torah, we're not stringent by it since people usually have a special separation from idol worshiping.

54) [Tosfos says: even according to R' Yehuda, they didn't fine Kohanim who make Pigul unintentionally even though it's from the Torah in order not to discourage them from doing the Avodah.]

55) Although we see that Shvious is a Torah law, and R' Meir fines him for planting a tree unintentionally so that he shouldn't come to do it intentionally, and R' Yehuda doesn't fine him; we must say R' Meir was more strict by Shvious, since all will know when the Arlah becomes permitted, and they'll count back three years and see that it was planted on Shvious. However, he wasn't as strict on Shabbos, even in a case where thirty days before the end of the year fell on Shabbos, and we can only count that year as one year for Arlah if planted then; and when we permit the fruit two years later people would realize it was planted on Shabbos; we must say that R' Meir was more stringent for Shvious since people take it lightly, but they don't take Shabbos lightly.

56) However, R' Yehuda's town was very strict when it comes to Shvious, so he didn't fine them when planted unintentionally even though it's forbidden from the Torah.

57) (If a non-Kohein ate Trumah Tamai, and paid back Chulin Tamai, it's valid) if he ate Tahor Trumah, and repays it with Tamai Chulin. [Rashi says that he pays the volume. Tosfos says: you need to pay the worth (even according to those who say it's dependent on paying volume), since it's no worse than stealing, that you need to pay the worth. However, it's still a downgrade since you're giving something that people don't jump to buy as they did for what you ate.] R' Meir says: if he did it unintentionally, the payment is valid, and if it's done purposely, it's not a valid payment; [Tosfos: and he needs to pay it a second time.] The Chachumim say that you need to pay a second time even if he does it unintentionally, since he decrees it then so that you don't neglect paying a second time when done purposely.

58) Although the prohibition of paying Tamai Chulin for eating Trumah Tahorah is only rabbinic; R' Meir doesn't fine him since, if he's trying to do a Mitzvah of paying back, should we fine him? Also, R' Meir doesn't fine if he sprinkled the blood in Tumah unintentionally and the Tzitz appeases to permit the meat (and the owner is atoned anyhow and doesn't need to bring a new Korban since the Torah says the Tzitz appeases); since he's trying to bring an atonement, should we fine him? The same way that R' Meir didn't fine for someone Toiveling his utensils on Shabbos; since, if he's trying to make his utensils Tahor, should we fine him?

59) Although R' Yehuda holds that when a forbidden Perech nut got mixed up with other nuts, and it's too Chashuv to be Batul, and he cracks it (and makes it not as Chashuv anymore), and makes it Batul, it's forbidden even when done unintentionally despite the prohibition to make it Batul is rabbinic; since we fine him especially here since he can say that he didn't intend to Mevatel it when he really did intend. (R' Meir also forbids it unintentionally, and R' Yossi and R' Yehuda permit it.)

60) Although R' Yossi permits when you detach fruit from trees where an Arlah tree is mixed in between them (and they're Chashuv and not Batul when they're on the trees) even when done intentionally; that's because it's not common to have an unknown and unmarked Arlah tree among his other trees, so the rabbis didn't enact these decrees in uncommon situations.

61) If someone was helping you work with your Tahros, and he claims that he made them Tamai, he's believed, but not if he claims it on Taharos that he helped with on an earlier day. Abaya explains: since it's not in his hands anymore. Rava says: he's only not believed if you met him in between and he didn't say anything the first time, he's not believed afterwards. However, if he tells you the first time you meet afterwards, he's believed despite that it's no longer in his hands. [Tosfos says: this is only if it was in his hands originally. However, if it was never in his hands, one person is not believed unless the person happens to trust him as if he was two witnesses, so he made the Taharos like a piece of Issur. According to Abaya, the reason the Gemara in Kiddushin believed the one witness that the blind man's wife did Z'nus when he kept quiet, it's not because the single witness is trusted, but because we say that we take the blind man's quietness as a sign that he admits to the charge. However, this is only when the witness claims that the husband should know about it. However, if the husband claims he doesn't know, or the witness doesn't claim that the husband should know about it, he's not believed.]

62) R' Yitzchok wanted to bring a proof from the fact that the Kohein Gadol can have a Pigul thought during the Avoda inside the Heichel or Kodesh Hakadashim, and nobody can be there with him. [Tosfos: and even if there's no real Pigul for Avodah in those inner areas, but it still makes the Korban Pasul.] So, we must believe him when he tells us when he leaves the Heichel, even if it's not in his hands anymore. We can't say that someone heard him say words of Pigul from within, since he wouldn't know if it was done at the time of the Avodah, or afterwards. However, the Gemara rejects this proof: it could be that someone saw him do it through a window.

63) If a Sofar says that he didn't write the names of Hashem L'shma in a Sefer Torah that he wrote; R' Assi says that he's believed to make him lose his wages (and not only the wage of writing Hashem's name), since there's no way to fix the Torah. After all, even according to R' Yehuda who says that you can write over the name L'shma; that's only by one name, but not by all of them, since the Sefer will seem speckled (since all the write over names will stick out). However, he's not believed that the Sefer is Pasul since it's no longer in his hands, but in the buyer's hands. However, this is only regarding claiming not writing it L'shma, since he might have said it just to pain the buyer, since he might have been under the impression that he wouldn't lose all his wages, but just for writing all the names, since he might not know about the logic to Pasul for being speckled. However, if he claims that he didn't tan the parchment L'shma, he's believed since he knows he'll lose everything, so he's definitely saying the truth.

64) R' Yochanan b. Gugida testified that a deaf-mute wife can be divorced (even when she was married by her father) since the wife receives the Get without her consent. Therefore, Rava says: if someone tells his wife to take a loan document, but it was really a Get, she's divorced since we don't need her consent. We also don't say that, by calling it a loan document, you're canceling it from being a Get. The reason it's not considered a canceling is because you didn't tell the witnesses that it's a loan document. So, the only reason he says it that way to his wife since he's embarrassed to tell her directly.

65) He also testified that a Kohein's minor wife may eat Trumah. [Tosfos says: we only permit her to eat rabbinical Trumah, according to the opinion that the rabbis didn't have the power to uproot a Torah law. Also, you won't allow Torah Trumah even to a minor according to the opinion that Beis Din is required to stop a minor eating Neveila. Also, even if Beis Din is not commanded, but they can't feed it to her, and here it implies that you may even feed her this Trumah with your hands.] However, we don't allow a deaf-mute married to a Kohein to eat Trumah, whether the husband is normal or also a deaf-mute, and even we don't need to separate people who don't have their full mental faculty, like minors, from eating Neveila. After all, it's a decree so that a normal woman who marries a deaf-mute Kohein shouldn't eat Trumah. She's forbidden to even eat rabbinical Trumah since she might end up eating Trumah from the Torah. [Tosfos says: however, a minor wife eats rabbinical Trumah, and we don't decree because of Torah Trumah, since she's presently a minor.]

66) If someone stole a beam and he builds it into his house, Beis Shammai says that he needs to chisel it out of the house to return the beam. However, Beis Hillel says that he only needs to pay back the worth of the beam in order to help him do Teshuva.

67) He also testified that a stolen Chatos that the public was not aware that it was stolen does atone, but not if it's known to the public. This was decreed to "fix the world."

68) Ulla says that the robber didn't acquire the animal before he made it Hekdesh since he holds that Yiyush by itself can't acquire. [Tosfos says: although he acquires it by the Hekdesh since there's a change in the name; but since he only acquired it through the Hekdesh, it's considered as a Mitzvah that came through a sin.] Therefore, it shouldn't atone even when the public is unaware that it was stolen. However, since the Kohanim were fearful to eat the Korbanos since they might be Pasul, and this will curtail them doing the Avoda, so they enacted that it will atone. However, they didn't enact it for a Korban Olah since it's not eaten.

69) R' Yehuda holds that Yiyush by itself acquires. [Tosfos says: therefore, he acquires it before the Hekdesh, so, we don't consider the Hekdesh as a Mitzvah that comes from a sin.] However, when it's known to the public, they Pasul it so that people shouldn't say that the Mizbeach is eating stolen property. This is extra applicable by an Olah since it's completely burnt on the Mizbeach. [Tosfos qualifies: this is only before the blood sprinkling, the rabbis Pasul and forbid you to sprinkle it. However, if it was sprinkled, since he's Yoitza the Korban from the Torah, the rabbis couldn't enact for him to bring a second Chatos that's unnecessary from the Torah, since they don't have the power to actively uproot a Torah law.]

70) If someone stole an animal and made it Hekdesh, and then Shechted it or sold it, he's only obligated to pay back double, and not four or five times the worth [Tosfos: since he already acquired the animal before the Shechita or selling through Yiyush and change of name]. If it's Shechted outside the Mikdash, he's Chayiv. Although Yiyush by itself doesn't help and it's not fit to be brought inside the Mikdash (which is a requisite to be Chayiv for Shechting it outside the Mikdash); we must say that the rabbis make him acquire the Korban to be in his possession so that he's Chayiv. [Rashi says: since the rabbis fined the robber to be Chayiv. Tosfos disagrees since it implies that everyone is Chayiv, even someone who didn't steal it. Rather, since we refer to a case where it's not known to the public, the rabbis enacted that the animal should belong to the robber, since Beis Din has a power to make items Hefker, so it should be a Kosher Korban.]

71) The rabbis only made the robber acquire it from the time of the Hekdesh, but not retroactively from the robbery, and he doesn't get the fleece or children of the animal [Tosfos: according to the opinion in Bava Kama that a robber usually doesn't get the fleece or children.]

72) The following Halachos of buying a stolen land from a non-Jewish mafia robber don't apply if it's in the time that the government decreed that you may kill Jews, since the Jew gave it to him completely so he wouldn't kill him. It only applies after they decreed that you can't kill Jews, and he doesn't give it away completely since he feels he can eventually remove it from his hands in court (when it becomes politically viable).

73) Originally, we taught: if one first buys it from the non-Jewish robber and then goes to buy it off the original owner; the sale is not valid. However, if he first bought it off the original owner, and then he bought it off the non-Jewish robber, the sale is valid. However, a later Beis Din enacted that, if the original owner can't buy it, the sale is always valid, but he must give a fourth to the original owner (since that's the discount he got from the robber, because he sells it cheap since he got it for nothing). Rebbis' Beis Din enacted that this is only after you waited twelve months while it's in the non-Jewish robber's hands.

74) The same (as the original law) applies to a woman. if one first buys it from the husband and then goes to buy it off the woman; the sale is not valid. However, if he first bought it off the woman, and then he bought it off the husband, the sale is valid.

75) According to the original law [Tosfos: and by the woman]; when you buy it off the non-Jewish robber [or husband] first, the sale is invalid, if the original owner tells him to "go and acquire it." However, if he writes a sale document, he acquires it. [Tosfos says: although, in Kesuvos, we say: If a husband writes a document to sell a field to one person, and the wife signs on to it; she doesn't lose anything since she only signed on to do her husband a favor, but didn't mean to actually sell her rights; we must say that, there, she just signs the husband's document, but she sold it if she writes an independent document to the buyer. Alternatively, we can differentiate that even if she writes in her husband's document that she sold it, it's legally sold, and it's only nothing when she writes that she forgoes and forgives the lien that she has.] Shmuel says: it's only acquired if he writes that he has the responsibility to replace it if it's collected from him.

76) If someone bought it from a non-Jewish robber, ate the fruit for three years, and then sells it to someone else, the original owner can't claim anything on the buyer even if the buyer doesn't claim that the seller also bought it off the original owner; since we will claim it for him. [Rashi says: even according to the opinion that we don't usually claim for the buyer, here we'll assume that the seller bought it with the original owners' consent since we can assume that someone won't throw away his money to buy it off the robber in a way that it won't help. Tosfos disagrees that there is any opinion that holds that we don't make claims for the buyers and orphans, as we say in Bava Basra.]

77) If the non-Jew that takes the field is coming to collect a loan, it doesn't have the status of a robber and you can buy it off him. If he just steals it without any threats of death, then the original owner can just collect it from the buyer for free without paying him back. However, this is only if there are no courts that he could have taken it out of the non-Jewish robber's hands right away; but if there is a court, the fact that he didn't go to court shows that he forgives it to the robber, so he can't take it out of the hands of the buyer from the robber.

78) If the owner of a valley went away, and another person offers the government to pay the taxes for three years so that he can have the fruits for three years. The owner comes back after one year and agrees that the year that he ate is his, and he'll pay the taxes for now on, and he'll eat the fruits, he can push the tax payer aside. [Tosfos says: this is only if he traveled from there, but not if he was purposely running away from paying the taxes.] He doesn't even need to pay back the taxes the other one paid since it was like he threw away the money ("by putting it on a deer's horn").

79) When we say, according to the last enactment, that the buyer from the non-Jewish robber gives a fourth to the original owner; Rav says that it's a fourth from the outside, i.e., keeping four shares for himself, and returning one share to the owner. Shmuel says it's a fourth from the inside, i.e., keeping three shares for himself, and returning one share to the owner. Rav holds that the robber only discounts it a fifth, and Shmuel says that he discounts it a fourth.

80) Although we say that, usually, by monetary court cases, the greatest judge opens the deliberation, Rebbi started the deliberations from the side (with the lesser judges). [Rashi says: that he learns that the Drasha not to argue with the greatest judge even by monetary cases, so the greatest must be the last to talk. However, Tosfos says: it doesn't seem that anyone argues that it's only by capitol cases. Therefore, he only did it because of his humility.]

81) A deaf-mute husband can sell movable objects and divorce his wife (since the same way she marries through sign language, she can be divorced through sign language). Ben Beseira says that he can sell moveable items with moving their lips. The Gemara's first version is: it's only for selling, but not for a Get. The second version: it, of course works by a Get (since the same way she marries through moving their lips, she can be divorced through moving their lips).

82) Pe'utos (older minor children); their sales and buying of moveable items are binding. They're considered becoming Pe'utos anywhere from from six years old to ten years old, each one according to how sharp they are. They enacted this so that they could live (if it's necessary for them to do it themselves) and if they make a mistake in the price, the amount it's considered as overpaid (or underpaid) is a sixth of the price like any other person.

83) Gifts of Pe'utos are binding, whether it's given while they're healthy or deathly ill, whether it's a large or small gift. [Tosfos says: this is only by moveable items, but not for land until they're adults. Although we say he can't sell land until he's twenty, implying that he can gift it when he's younger; it must be when he's at least thirteen, but not when he's a minor.]

84) The Torah says to make Kohanim Kodesh, that they get the right to go first in all honors, whether regarding Torah, or sitting at the head. He makes the Bracha by the meal first and he takes the first portion. [Rashi says that he chooses the first portion when splitting with a partner. Tosfos disagrees since the Gemara in Pesachim says that, in such a case, you won't find a blessing in your endeavors. Rather, he receives Maasar Ani or Tzedaka first, and when friends eat together, he gets first pick what to take.] However, if he wants to honor others, he may.

85) This is only by a meal, but he can't honor someone else to get an Aliya in Shul before him so that people don't fight who should get the first Aliya. However, this is only by Shabbos and Yom Tov, but he can allow someone to go before him during the Torah reading on Monday and Thursday. [Tosfos says: R' Chananel explains that it was only in the days of Chazal when the masses didn't come to Shul during the week since they were too busy with their livelihood. However, nowadays, when everyone goes to Shul during the week, you can't call a Yisrael to read before a Kohein.]

86) If the Yisrael is a Talmid Chachum that all the Kohanim Talmidei Chachumim are under him, he may be called first.

87) If there's no Kohein, then "the rope comes apart." [Rashi quotes Ri b. Yehuda and the Levi can't read at all. Ri Halevi explains that you could have a Yisrael follow a Levi, or the Levi follow a Yisrael. According to Ri Halevi, the reason the Gemara in Kesuvos says that he has a Chazaka he's a Kohein since he got the first Aliya before a Levi; it's only when they call a Yisrael for Shlishi that's greater than the Levi, or the Levi was greater than the first person called, so he wouldn't have been called first unless he was after a Kohein.] If there's no Levi the Kohein has two Aliyos.

88) You only give the same Kohein both Aliyos. [Tosfos says: before they enacted to make a Bracha for each Aliya, we would separate those first two Aliyos by having the Kohein sit in the middle. However, after the enactment for everyone to make a Bracha, you break the two Aliyos with Brachos. If there are only Kohanim in the Minyan, you have one Kohein having all the Aliyos, and he makes a new Bracha for each Aliya.] However, you can't call another Kohein since it will cause rumors that the first Kohein wasn't really a Kohein, so you needed to replace him with another Kohein. (This is only a problem for those who left before Gelila, for those who stayed realize that they counted the first one called up as one of the seven Aliyos.) However, there can't be any rumors that the second one is Pasul. After all, we know his father was a Kohein, so if he's Pasul, he wouldn't be read as a Levi.

89) You also can't call up two Levis to have Aliyos one after another, since people will think one of the two are Pasul. After all, maybe the first one's Pasul since you need to replace him with a second Levi. Or, perhaps, the second one's Pasul, so he's being called in the Yisrael's spot.

90) The order of giving Aliyos: first Kohein, then Levi, then Talmidei Chachumim who are appointed as the leaders on the public, then Talmidei Chachumim who are fit to be appointed as the leaders on the public (i.e., those who can answer Halachos from all areas of Torah), then the children of the Talmidei Chachumim who are appointed as the leaders on the public, then the heads of the Shul, and then goes the rest of the public.

91) You can't read a Sefer Torah that's missing a page of parchment. Not only that, but you can't read in a Chumash, even though it's not missing anything from being a Chumash, since it's not proper honor to the public.

92) You may read in a Sefer of Haftorahs. Although, from the Torah, you shouldn't write any Psukim without writing a whole Sefer, but we allow it the same way we allow reading scrolls of the Torah Shebal Peh. Since people can't remember that much anymore, we say it's better not to do those Halacha so that Torah should be preserved (Eis Lasos Lahashem).

93) You can't write a Megila (a small amount of Psukim) for kids to learn with. Even according to the opinion that the Torah was given piecemeal in Megilos, but once they were attached, the Torah is now only valid by having it written attached.

94) You always need to put the Eiruv in the same house because it's the way of peace. We cannot say that it's for his honor, since we say that you can change the place of the Shofar [Rashi's second explanation that Tosfos felt was the best: the Pushka that collects money for the Talmidim]. Rather, the reason is so that it shouldn't lead to suspicion. [Rashi explains: since, if someone doesn't see the Eiruv in its usual place, he'll assume people are carrying without any Eiruv. Tosfos explains: they'll suspect that the reason they switched houses was that the owner was stealing from the Eiruv to eat.]

95) If you have a flowing river without it being dammed up to fill pits, everyone agrees that everyone along the river could draw what they want [Tosfos: even if the flow is small and it sometimes will dry up.]

96) However, if it's dammed up to fill pits and fields; the "way of peace" of who gets first dibs to water his field; Rav says that the bottom one gets the first dibs since the natural flow of the river is to go down to the bottom. Shmuel says that the top field gets first dibs since it's closer to the source of the water. R' Huna b Chalifta says, since we don't have a tradition who to Paskin like, the stronger one has the power to direct the water to his fields. [Rashi says: since he doesn't have the rule to Paskin like Shmuel in monetary laws. Tosfos says: alternatively, it's not so simple in this case since Rav's P'sak here is compelling.]

97) R' Shimi b. Ashi offered to water Abaya's field (so that Abaya could have more time to learn with him). His field was in the middle. He told the bottom field that they should let the top one water their fields, and told the top one to let the bottom one water their fields, and in the meantime, he watered Abaya's field. [Tosfos says: he held that, since we say that the stronger one should water first, even the middle ones may do so.] However, Abaya didn't want to eat from the fruits since he didn't have the rights to water it first. [Tosfos: as he holds that only the top and the bottom field has a right to use force to water first. However, perhaps he sold the fruit since it wasn't really stealing, but it's only transgressing "the ways of peace."]

98) If the bottom one trained the river to surround his field, but that prevented the flow of the river and caused flooding to the higher fields. They wouldn't be able to dig deeper by their fields or else the water won't flow into their ditches to water their fields. So, the P'sak was that they must remove themselves. [Tosfos says: it seems like the bottom one needs to remove his work like Rashi explains; and not like how R' Chananel explains, that the top ones lose since we say "the stronger one has the power to direct the water to his fields." After all, it's not comparable to the case of Rav and Shmuel (Tosfos Harosh- since you changed the river's flow.)]

99) If traps for fish, animal or fowl has a receptacle where the animal is in, he definitely acquires the trapped animal since it's in his utensil. However, without a receptacle; the Tanna Kama says that he didn't acquire it, and it's only "the way of peace" not to take it from the one who set the trap. R' Yossi held it's true stealing. [Tosfos says: although, in Bava Basra, we say that you need to distance your traps from the fish that your friend is trapping from the letter of the law (and not because of peace); that's when it's his business to catch fish, and your intruding on his livelihood.]

100) It's forbidden to take what a deaf-mute, insane or minor found. If you take it; Tanna Kama says that he didn't acquire it, and it's only "the way of peace" not to take it from him. R' Yossi held it's true rabbinical stealing. The practical difference between them if you can get the courts to force him to give it back.

101) If a poor person hits the olives on top of the tree to knock them down; the Tanna Kama says that he didn't acquire it, and it's only "the way of peace" not to take it from him. R' Yossi held it's true stealing. However, if he harvested it in his hands, even the Tana Kama holds it's true stealing. [Tosfos explains: like he pulled it off with his hands and let them drop, it's still considered as if he acquired it by holding them even if they didn't remain in his hand long, but just for enough time to pull them off.]

102) We feed the non-Jewish poor along with the Jewish poor because of "the way of peace." We visit the non-Jewish sick along with the Jewish sick because of "the way of peace. Also, We bury the non-Jewish dead along with the Jewish dead because of "the way of peace."

103) A woman may lend to her friend who's suspected to transgress Shvious a sifter, sieve, mill, and oven because of "the way of peace." [Tosfos quotes R' Tam: this is only if we know that she only has Shvious produce, and we could only have a pushed way to say that, perhaps, she'll still do some permitted use with it, like sifting coins and using the sieve for sand and use the mill to grind spices, and the oven to heat up flax, like the Yerushalmi explains. However, if there's also permitted produce, we can assume she's using it on the permitted produce even without "the way of peace." This is like we sell him an ox on Shvious since he might not need it for plowing, but for Shechting. The same applies by selling to a cow to idol worshippers since they might not need it as a sacrifice, but for eating. After all, it's not applicable to say you need to sell for "the way of peace," since he might not want to sell his object.] However, you can't help her sift or grind etc.

104) However, a Chaver woman may lend to her friend who's an Am Ha'aretz a sifter, sieve, mill, and oven and you can't help her sift or grind etc. [Tosfos says: according to R' Tam that said the Shvious case is that we know all her produce is Shvious, the way that the Gemara compares it to Damai that's not definitely Tevel; that we assume it had its Chazaka of being Tevel, so we consider it definite Tevel.] Abaya says since it's only a big stringency since the majority of Am Ha'aratzim take off Maasar correctly. [Tosfos says: although in the first Perek of Shabbos Abaya is afraid that, if they eat together, the Am Ha'aretz will give him something that wasn't properly tithed, we must say they felt to be stringent there.] Rava answers: we're referring to an Am Ha'aretz of R' Meir who does not keep Tumah and Tahara, but separates Trumas and Maasar. [Tosfos says: even though Rava agrees to the concept that Damai is only a big stringency since the majority of Am Ha'aratzim take off Maasar correctly; but once they decreed on it, it's a rabbinical prohibition, and you can't help someone transgress that rabbinical prohibition.] After all, since the prohibition to make Chulin Tumah is only rabbinic, we don't worry because of "a way of piece" to help them.

105) [Tosfos explains: R' Meir's definition for an Am Ha'aretz is regarding a Chaver's daughter who marries him, we can't do Tahros with him. However, regarding that we don't join him in Ziman and we don't announce what he lost must be one who doesn't even read Sh’ma morning and night.]

106) When they put the water into the flour, it's forbidden to help them. According to Abaya who says the reason you may help before that since it's only a big stringency since the majority of Am Ha'aratzim take off Maasar correctly, but that's before it gets susceptible to Tumah (i.e., Hechsher); but now it became Muchshur to Tumah with the water, you can't help it to become Tamai. According to Rava, it was permitted to help even if it was Muchsher beforehand because Tumah on Chulin is only rabbinic; however, now that the water is poured on it and it becomes Tevel to Challah, the prohibition of making it Tamai is from the Torah. [Tosfos says: even though you're not obligated in Challah until it's kneaded; they were still stringent by the water pouring which precedes it a little bit. Although the Gemara in Avoda Zara says that you can't harvest grapes with an Am Ha'artez since you're making the Trumah Tamai, and that's not obligated in Trumah until much later when you finish the process; we must say we're stricter there since, even if you're not obligated to separate Trumah then, you're able to separate it. However, by the dough, if you separate the Challah before the kneading, it's not Challah. Tosfos concludes: this is only if he's not definitely Tamai, but if he is, you can't even help him even when he's separating the grain from impurities.]

107) [Tosfos says: in Mesechta Avoda Zara, it says that if a Safeik Tumah happened before the kneading, you can knead it in Tumah. However, if it happened after the kneading, you must finish it in Tahara. We're more lenient there and not worried about it after the water pouring since the Kohein can't eat the Challah, so he's not losing, so we don't need to worry unless it's actually obligated in Challah. However, we're stringent by the prohibition to help make it Tamai from the water pouring.]

108) This is only if the Am Ha'aretz is a Yisrael, but if he's a Kohein who's suspected to eat the Trumah Tamai, you can't help him from the time he's separating the grain from impurities or grinding.

109) You are allowed to give Trumah to a Yisrael Am Ha'aretz to watch, since he would listen to you not to touch it. However, you can't give it to a Kohein Am Ha'aretz since he's comfortable handling it and feels that he can touch it. Even if you put it in an earthenware utensil with a fastened lid, since we're worried that his Nida wife might move it. [Tosfos says: you don't need to worry about him moving it, although they decreed that all Am Ha'aratzim have a status of a Zav; but they didn't decree it on what he moves since most of the public can't stand it. However, his spit is Tamai, and not like R' Moshe from Pontiza who says the spit of an Am Ha'aretz, which has the status of liquid, becomes Tamai when his Tamai lip touches it, since it's implied not that way in many places. We only need to worry about it by Trumah that it shouldn't be in the Am Ha'aretz's hands, but not regarding Chulin.]

110) However, this is only by fruits that were already Muchsher for Tumah, but, otherwise, there's no other way that a Kohein Am Ha'aretz can make it Tamai.

111) You don't need to worry that he'll exchange the Trumah with other fruit, since we're not worried that an Am Ha'aretz will exchange fruit like that unless it's your mother-in-law, since she might want to give her daughter better quality, and she's embarrassed to give poor quality to her son-in-law.

112) Also, if someone gives his food to his innkeeper to hold, you need to Maasar what you give her, and Maasar what you receive, since she exchanges it since she justifies it by saying "the rabbi should eat warm, and I should eat the cold." [Rashi says: therefore, she exchanges it so the rabbi could eat the warm bread, and she'll keep the cold one for herself. Tosfos says this is not the implication of justifying, that she's trying to do you a favor. Also, from R' Meir's opinion, that we're not worried about feeding Tevel to a trickster, implies that she's trying to trick you. Rather, she justifies taking the warm bread for herself since she's working hard for him, should it be that "he eats the warm bread and not me?"]

113) We say that a Chaver's wife can grind with an Am Ha'aretz's wife when she's Tamai, but not when she's Tahor. [Rashi says: we refer to the grain of the Am Ha'aretz. So the Chaver's wife can help out since the Am Ha'aretz's wife won't give her any of the Damai grain, but not when she's Tahor since she might give her some of the grain to eat even though it's her husband's grain, and this will prove that they are suspected to take what's not theirs. Tosfos disagrees since you wouldn't be allowed to help with the Damai grain. Also, it's not stealing from their husbands since you can except a small thing from a woman. Rather, we refer to the grain of a Chaver, and the Am Ha'aretz's wife can help when she thinks she's Tamai since she won't touch the grain, but not when she thinks she's Tahor since she might take some of the grain and make it Tamai.] R' Shimon b. Elazar holds even if she's Tamai, since the Am Ha'aretz's wife friend might take it for her. [Rashi explains: and place it in her mouth. Tosfos explains: the Am Ha'aretz's wife will tell her friend who she thinks is Tahor to take some of the grain and give it to her.] Although, it would seem from here that Am Ha'aretzim take what doesn't belong to them; but here is different since they justify it that it's no worse than an ox threshing that you must allow to eat what he's threshing.

114) R' Elazar b. Chasma says that a Chaver kneader shouldn't separate Challah for an Am Ha'aretz in Taharah. [Rashi says: since the dough is already Tamai when the Am Ha'aretz made it, and the Kohein might rely that it's Tahor since a Chaver separated it. Tosfos says: according to this, if he separates the Challah from a different dough, it would be permitted. However, it seems that this too is forbidden since we only allow it for his livelihood, as we'll say soon. Therefore, we only allow it when he does the whole kneading which he gets a nice profit from it, and not for a small fee to separate Challah.] However, he can make the Chulin dough, and separate Challah and put it in [Rashi: in worn out utensils that's not normal to place dough in it, and they're not susceptible to Tumah. Tosfos explains: wooden utensils without receptacles.] Therefore, there's some distinction to remind the Am Ha'aretz not to touch it. The Am Ha'aretz takes them and is warned not to touch the Challah or it will go back to being Tevel. (Since we see that he was careful that Challah should be taken, he'll be careful not to touch it so that it shouldn't become Tevel.) This is permitted for his livelihood.

115) You can encourage non-Jews who are working the land on Shvious, but not Jews, and you can't help the non-Jew in his work. [Tosfos says: this is not like Rashi in Sanhedrin who permits to prune in a non-Jew's field. They only allowed it to pay taxes, since it's a threat to life if the tax wasn't paid, or if it's not life threatening, they allowed it for the king since Shvious these days is only rabbinically forbidden, although they didn't allow it for other non-Jews.]

116) We say Shalom to a non Jew because it's the way of the peace. Even on the day of their holidays, you tell them Shalom in a soft tone and with a seriousness, but you can't enter their houses to give them Shalom.

117) However, you can't double the Shalom said to non-Jews. R' Chisda made sure to say Shalom to them before they said it to him. R' Huna told them "Shalom to my master" [Rashi explains: he didn't intend to bless them, but just intended to to go on his Rebbi. Tosfos disagrees since it's fooling him (Gezelas Daas). Also, it doesn't seem to be a problem to say this to the non-Jew since you're not doubling the Shalom.]

118) [Tosfos quotes the Yerushalmi that you can't say Sholom Aleichem to a non-Jew. Rather, you encourage him and giving him Shalom is one thing, that you tell him "Yasher Koach".]

119) It's forbidden for a person to eat anything until he feeds his animals.