99) Beis Hillel says that a half slave/half free man works for himself one day, and works for his master the next day. However, Beis Shammai says that it works well for his master, but not for him since he can't marry anyone, not a slave, nor a free woman [Tosfos says: but it wouldn't be a problem if he could marry a female slave, although he won't be Yoitza Pru U'rivu, but he'll fulfil the Pasuk of "I didn't create the world to be desolate." We don't say that the Asei to have children will supersede the Lav not to marry a slave, since we don't say that you can supersede the Lav unless there is no other way to keep the Asei, and it's possible to keep it by forcing the master to free him. Alternatively, it only supersedes when they happen simultaneously, and here you transgress the Lav as soon as you penetrate her, and the Asei is only done by the end of the relations which can beget children. Also, she's forbidden since she doesn't have a Mitzvah of Pru U'rivu, and even if she did, she can fulfil it by marrying someone else.

Also, he can't sell his half for a Jewish slave who is permitted to have relations with a non-Jewish slave, since a convert can't be sold for a slave since the Pasuk of him "returning to his family" (after his time as a slave is over) is not applicable. It's not away out to allow him to marry a Mamzeres (since a slave is permitted to a Mamzer), since it's not a fix to produce more Mamzeirim through this marriage. Also, he can't marry a Nesina since a Nesina is also forbidden to a slave, and we just don't say that all people who can't marry into regular Jews, and therefore, can marry a Mamzer, are allowed to marry slaves. After all, they're still obligated not to marry someone that can only have out of wedlock relations, (which includes slaves since they don't have any Kiddushin). Only Mamzerim don't have this prohibition since they're made from Z'nus.] Therefore, Beis Shammai holds that you force the master to free his half, and they write a document that the slave owes his master half his worth. After all, the Pasuk says "I didn't create the world for it to be uninhabited." [Tosfos says: the reason we allow freeing the half slave, although he's transgressing the Mitzvah "you should always enslave them;" since we say that someone should do a small sin so that his friend won't do a bigger sin since "I didn't create the world to be desolate" is it's a greater Mitzvah. We only say that you can't do a smaller sin when your friend was negligent in doing the sin, so we say you can't do the smaller sin of removing bread from an oven so your friend shouldn't transgress baking on Shabbos.] Beis Hillel eventually agreed to Beis Shammai.

100) Rebbi says that a slave can acquire half of him from a master, and the Rabanan say that he can't. Rabbah says that they only argue about accepting a freedom document on half of him, but everyone agrees that he can redeem half of himself with money. R' Yosef says (after he was disproved to say that Rebbi doesn't hold of freeing a half of slave with a document) that they argue in both cases, Rebbi holds you can free half a slave with a document or money, and the Rabanan say that neither method works. The only way the Rabanan find a case of a half of slave is when he was owned by partners, and one of them freed their whole interest on the slave.

101) Rabbah holds that they only argue if he frees half and leave the other half from himself. However, if he frees half and sells the other half, all agree that he's half free since he completely leaves his possession. Although we have contradicting Braisos if someone gives all his possessions to two slaves, if they acquire half of themselves and half of the other (and they need to free each other), or they don't acquire anything; we don't need to say to reconcile that one's the Rabanan and the other is Rebbi. Rather, both can hold like the Rabanan, and they acquire when the documents are on all their property, and don't acquire when it's on half. [Rashi explains: since they might be given the same half. Tosfos asks: but it implies that he's giving away all his property, so he must have explained that they were opposite halves. Tosfos explains: then he leaves over for himself half of the slave, so he didn't free him completely. However, you can't say like R' Shmuel that it's because, anything that you can't do half at a time (when giving one slave first half, and then giving the other one half), it doesn't take effect if it's done at the same time (when giving it to the two slaves at the same time), or else it shouldn't work if the documents give themself completely (since you can't give those documents one after the other and have both of them take effect). Rather, you can't compare money that can be split, like here, where he gives both of them the document on everything at the same time, that we say can take effect even when you can't give it away half at a time.] Alternatively, even if they both write everything on both documents, he's not freed if the document for both slaves were written on the same document. After all, we compare it to a Get and you can't divorce two wives with the same Get.

102) This is only if the master gives both documents at the same time, but if he gives it one after the other, only the first one acquires everything and the second one doesn't acquire anything.

103) He's freed even if he writes the document to "Ploni my slave," and we don't take it as saying that he's still his slave, but that he was once his slave.

104) If an ox gores a half slave and half free man; if it's on the day he works for his master, the payment belongs to the master, if it's on the day he works for himself, the payment goes to himself. [Tosfos points out that this is only according to Beis Hillel's original teachings, but according to their conclusion, the slave always gets it since the master is holding back his lawfully obligated freedom document, he keeps everything that he works for. However, there's still practical differences these days too, like if she's a female slave that's not acting promiscuous (who doesn't go free), or if the master is a minor. The reason in the story mentioned earlier that the father can sell his half to his son even though he doesn't really own him since the slave may keep all what he works; we must say that he sold it to his son before his partner freed his half when he heard that his partner is planning to free him.] However, this is only if there's no permanent damage, but they split the payment for permanent damage. [Tosfos explains: we only find a case of not permanent damage when his hand was hit and it blew up, but it will come back according to Abaya who says, when a human damages, that there's a major damage payment (what he loss worth if he would be sold) and a small damage payment (what he can't work at present). However, this wouldn't fit in well according to Rava who holds that you only pay the amount he lost for every day's work, and you don't pay unemployment for damages from oxen like here (unless you somehow able to establish our case by a human damaging him).]

105) [Tosfos says: some say that you exempt a watchman or borrower from impermanent damages since even a human is only obligated to pay for loss work when damaging a human, but not an ox. However, R' Chananel says: it's only applicable to consider impermanent damage as unemployment by damaging humans, but by an ox, it's definitely considered damage and you assess how much it was worth before the damage and how much it could be sold after the damage.]

106) There's an unresolved inquiry; if a master owes a freedom document to his slave, does he not get the fine of thirty Shekalim if he's gored since he doesn't own his work, or he still gets it since he hadn't given him the freedom document yet?

107) We can't bring a proof from the Braisa that says: if he blinds a slave and then knocks out his tooth, he goes free from his eye, and the master pays the tooth (even without giving a freedom document). [Tosfos says: it's similar to the fine for killing, since there's not much different when killing partially (by knocking out a limb) and killing completely.] After all, it might be according to the opinion that says that, when knocking out a limb, the slave goes free even without a freedom document. We Paskin that he doesn't need a document for eyes and teeth that are written explicitly in the Torah, but you need for other limbs that are only learned from a Drasha [R' Tam explains: it's a rabbinical decree so that his master shouldn't see him in the market and claim that he's still his slave. However, he can't claim that by an eye and tooth since they'll just tell him to read the Pasuk.]

108) There's also an inquiry; if a master owes a freedom document to his slave, does the slave not eat Trumah since he doesn't own his work, it's not considered as the master's "money acquisition," or do we say that as long as he didn't give the document he's considered as the master's "money acquisition." [Tosfos says: this inquiry is not according to Reish Lakish who says in Kreises that he still eats. Alternatively, Reish Lakish only permits by a slave that was made Hefker, since he's also still permitted to marry a female slave. However, our inquiry is about a half slave and half free man (See Pnei Yehoshua who asks that it's simple that he can't eat since his free half can't eat.)]

109) There's no proof from the case of mixing up a child of a Kohein and his slave that they both can eat Trumah. [Tosfos says: although we say that if one out of ten Kohanim went to have relations with an unmarried lady, we don't allow the child to eat Trumah, that's because of a decree by non-marital relations. Alternatively, we refer to a case that they recognized them at birth, and then they were mixed up.] This is despite that they need to free each other when they grow up. After all, he's not really owed to be free, as if Eliyahu shows up and tells us which one is the slave, does he get freed?

110) We have an inquiry if a master can sell a slave for it's fine when he gets killed by an ox? This inquiry is even according to the Rabanan since it might not be considered as selling something that didn't come into the world yet, since the slave is in the world. However, perhaps you can't even according to R' Meir who holds that someone can sell something that's not yet in the world, but that's only something that's expected to come into the world, but it's not probable that the goring will come, and even if it would come, perhaps the owner will admit to owing the fine, which exempts him. [Tosfos adds: this is also not compared to a palm tree that produces fruit that even the Rabanan allow to sell the tree, since, over there, the fruit comes from the tree itself, but the fine doesn't come from the slave's body.] We can't bring a proof against this from finding a case that the slave is worthless since he has a disfiguring skin desease, and we don't say he has worth since he can be sold for his fine. After all, we can establish the case that he's also a Treifa, so there's no fine either if he's killed.

111) If someone Mekadeshes a half of woman, she's not Mekudeshes. We have an inquiry if he's Mekadesh a half slave and half free woman if she's Mekudeshes. After all, you Mekadesh a half of woman, so it shouldn't take effect. On the other hand, you didn't leave over any of the woman that you could Mekadesh, it takes effect. Although we say that an ox that gored a half slave and half free man, he pays half of the thirty Shekalim fine to his master and half Kofer to his heirs [Tosfos explains: and if Kiddushin can't take effect on the half free part because of the slave, the children also shouldn't have any Yichus to him and he can't have heirs]; we could explain it that, theoretically, he should pay it to his heirs, but he can't have any heirs to give it to them.

112) It's also not a proof from the argument if a Shifcha Charufa is a Jewish slave that married a half slave and half free woman or if he's a Jewish slave married to a full female slave (that the former holds Kiddushin takes effect and the latter didn't want to learn like the former since he holds that Kiddushin doesn't take effect). After all, we can say that everyone agrees that Kiddushin doesn't take effect and the former held that he's just designated to be married to her without Kiddushin just like the latter holds that he's just designated to the full slave without Kiddushin.

113) Rava says that Kiddushin doesn't take effect on a half of slave, and R' Chisda and Rabbah b. Avuha says that it does take effect.

114) R' Chisda says: if Reuvein gives Kiddushin to half a slave and then the master frees that half and Reuvein's brother, Shimon, gives her Kiddushin; and then both brothers die; the third brother,Levi, can do Yibum no matter what, and it's not a problem of doing Yibum to a wife of two brothers (like in a case where Reuvein died, Shimon gave Maamar to the Yevama and then died, Levi can't take her, but does Chalitza) [Tosfos explains: although that case is only forbidden Midarabanan so people shouldn't say that you can do Yibum to two women from the same husband, which is not applicable here; that's only in that case where it's only a wife through a second husband through Maamar, which is only rabbinic, but regularly, she's forbidden from the Torah.] After all, whichever way you go, she's only married to one of them, but we don't know to who. [Rashi says: since he has a Safeik whether Kiddushin takes effect on half a slave or not. Tosfos disagrees since we said that R' Chisda holds it takes effect. Rather, he's in doubt whether the freeing makes the first Kiddushin finish and spread over the whole woman, or the first Kiddushin falls off after the freeing, so the second one can take effect, like we'll say soon.]

115) If Reuvein gives Kiddushin to half a slave and then the master frees that half and Shimon gives her Kiddushin; R' Yosef quoting R' Nachman says the first Kiddushin falls off, and R' Zeira quoting R' Nachman says that the first Kiddushin spreads over the whole woman and finishes. [Tosfos explains: we don't say that it doesn't do either, but stays the same as we see that an animal that a partner was Mikadesh his half, when he buys off the second half from his partner, the Kedusha doesn't spread to the second half or falls off from the first half. After all, an animal can remain in this half way stage and graze untill it gets a blemish and sell it and buy a Korban with half its worth. However, a woman can't stay half married, so logically, the Kiddushin either spreads or falls off. Alternatively, an animal that was always applicable to be made Kodesh and hadn't changed any, the Kedusha doesn't spread just because he bought the second half. However, it's not applicable by a woman before the freeing of her second half for Kiddushin to take effect on her slave half; therefore, when it does become able, logic dictates that it will either spread completely or fall off.]

116) Although we see a Braisa that forces one to free a half female slave; either it held like R' Yehuda b. Bava that women are also commanded to have children, or we refer to a case where she's acting promiscuous.

117) If someone sells his slave to a non-Jew, he goes free, and the master needs to write him a freedom document. However, R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that, if he wrote a document at the time of the sale that he'll have nothing to do with him when he runs away from the non-Jew, he doesn't need to write him another document afterwards. [Tosfos explains: this freedom document helps even according to Ameimar who says that you can't free a slave after you made him Hefker, it's not similar to selling it to a non-Jew who only owns his work, but he's still considered owned by the Jew that he gets the fine if he's gored and his children belongs to him. Therefore, it doesn't leave his possession until he writes him a freedom document.]

118) If a Jew borrows money from a non-Jew that the payment, if not paid back with money on time, will be in the form of collecting the slave, as soon as they make up the time when the non-Jew can collect the slave; he goes free. Even though by a parallel case, when a non-Jew has land in Eretz Yisrael (and according to the opinion that he can own it to a point that it uproots the obligation of Trumah and Maasar); who has it set as a collateral to a Jew, it's still exempt from Maasar after they set the time to collect it; we can answer as follows. Both refer before the time to collect (since it's simple the slave goes free when the time for collecting came) and the slave has his body collected, and the field is only collected for the fruit. [Rashi explains: since you sell the slave for his body to be left by the non-Jew, we fine them to free him even before the time came. However, the most the field will become the Jews after the time came is to keep the fruit, so the actual field still belongs to the non-Jew, so it's exempt from Maasar. Tosfos disagrees and says that how can we even have a thought that the field will be obligated in Maasar before the time for the Jew to collect fruit. Also, then both Halachos are true before and after the time came, so the Gemara should have said that it applies both before and after the time came. Rather, the field refers to eating the fruit right away, and will collect the field when the time comes. However, before the time collecting, he's only eating the fruit, which the slave, even before the collecting, is held in the non-Jew's house where he's not able to do Mitzvos.]

119) Alternatively, we refer to a case where the condition was to take it as a collateral right away [Tosfos: or, even if it wasn't for right away, we refer when the time comes to collect] but he hadn't collected it yet. Therefore, we fine him by a slave since he didn't pay up and the slave is in the position that he could be collected, but by the field, we go according to the actual collecting.

120) If the non-Jewish mafia takes the slave, or a non-Jewish creditor collects the slave against your will, we don't fine you to free the slave since it's an Onness. However, if the king forces you to pay your debt with you granary, you need to separate the Trumah and Maasar from another place on it (but not if the king unlawfully takes it away from you). That's because you gain by having your debt paid from the Trumah and Maasar, (but by the slave, the fine comes from selling it to a non-Jew, and the creditors collecting him against your will is not considered a sale.)

121) If you sell a slave to a Parhang [Rashi: a gangster that makes up you owe him money, and you give him the slave as 'payment' for the made up debt] he goes free since he should have appeased him [Rashi: by giving him something else, but he gave the slave over with his consent. Tosfos disagrees with the definition since it doesn't seem to be a sell or an appeasement. Rather, a Parhang is taking the slave against his will and paying for him, but since he's paying for it, if the master wanted, he can appease him to give him something small in order not to take his slave.]

122) There's an inquiry if he only sold the slave for thirty days, if he goes free. He's not similar to a Parhang [Tosfos: who also only uses him for a short time, and then returns the slave, and the master returns his money] since that sale was forever.

123) We also have an inquiry regarding selling him for everything except for work, or except to allow him to do Mitzvos, or to allow him to keep Shabbos and Yom Tov. A slave to a Ger Toshav has a status as selling him to a non-Jew. If you sell him to a Kussi or Jewish Mumar; some say it's like he sold it to a Jew and some say that it's like selling it to a non-Jew.

124) We say that if you sold a house to a non-Jew in Eretz Yisrael, it's forbidden to partake pleasure in the proceeds (since he transgresses on Lo Sichaneim "you shall not give them encampment in Eretz Yisrael.") The same when you sell a slave to a non-Jew. However, if you're forced to sell, you may keep the money. You're also allowed to write a document on it and have it verified in their courts since you're saving from their hands. [Rashi says: you may have it verified in their court even though you're giving them prestige. Tosfos disagrees since we said in the first Perek that we allow documents from the courts L'chatchila. Rather, we don't say like he's trying to make the sale work.] This is not only true by a house where we're not worried that you'll sell your house without being pushed since you need a house, but even by a slave that you don't need that much, we don't decree to forbid the money when he's forced to sell in order that he shouldn't take it when he's not forced to sell and sold it anyhow.

125) It says that, if you sold your slave to a non-Jew, you would need to buy him back for even a hundred times its amount, and we also say that if you sold your animal to a non-Jew, you need to buy it back for ten times the amount. The Gemara inquires if these amounts are exact, or not. [Rashi says: or, perhaps, they didn't expect you to redeem them for that amount. Tosfos asks: if so, we wouldn't know up to what amount you need to buy it back for. Rather, the question is if any amount is not exact, but you need to buy them back with all your money.] You can't bring a proof from the fact that you have two separate amounts for an animal and slave that they're not exact, since there may be a reason to fine selling a slave more since you're making him not do Mitzvos every day he's by the non-Jew. We have another version that it says that you buy an animal for a hundred times more and a slave ten times more. They could be exact since there's a reason not to fine as much for selling a slave since it's not a very common occurence.

126) We have an inquiry whether we fine the son if the father who sold the slave died. Even if you say we fine the son of the Kohein who made a blemish in a Bechor that he can't eat it on that blemish, that's because it was a Torah prohibition, but perhaps they didn't fine a son by a rabbinical prohibition. [Tosfos quotes the Gemara in Bechoros that says the opposite: even if we fine the son by selling a slave, perhaps we won't fine him by a Bechor since we may only fine the son when you're making him not do Mitzvos every day he's by the non-Jew.] Even if we don't fine the son who's father left his work to be done on Chol Hamoed so he can do it then to avoid a loss, (where we fine the father not to do it on Chol Hamoed); that's because the prohibition wasn't done by the father (since he didn't do any work on Chol Hamoed), but, perhaps we fine him for selling the slave since he already did the prohibition.

127) The Gemara wants to solve it from the following. If someone removed thorns from his field on Shvious [Tosfos: i.e., that are detached, since removing attached thorns would be forbidden from the Torah since he's improving the field]; he can still plant it on the eighth year. However, if he did Niteiva [Rashi: i.e., he fertilized, and Tosfos disagrees since that's rabbinical, but it's plowing] or Nisdayra [Rashi: you left your animals in the field to fertilize it; Tosfos says: even though it's only rabbinically forbidden, it's a more valuable act than removing thorns, so we're more stringent]; he can't plant it on the eighth year, and if he dies, his son's permitted. [Tosfos says: this proves that they didn't fine the son by Torah prohibitions. Although there's a reason to be more stringent by selling a slave since you're making him not do Mitzvos every day he's by the non-Jew; but there's also a major reason to fine him by Shvious because people don't keep it seriously, and we still don't fine the son, we shouldn't fine the son in any case.]

128) [Tosfos says: an heir can't collect from a loan document that has Ribbis (even the principle) since the borrower already merited to keep it in the lender's lifetime. When two people gave a watchman money to watch, one one hundred and the other two hundred, and both claim that they were the one who gave two hundred; according to R' Yossi who fines them and the watchman holds all three hundred until Eliyahu comes, you can return one hundred to the son. After all, we only fine the father so that he'll admit that the extra hundred is not his, and that's not applicable to the son.]

129) If someone makes someone else's Tahoros Tamai, and he dies, his son is exempt from paying. After all, we Paskin that damages that are not recognizable are not considered damage, so they only fined the father to pay, but not the son.

130) Also, if you sell a slave to someone in Chutz L'aretz he goes free even if the buyer is Jewish. R' Shimon b. Gamliel says it depends. If the buyer has a house in Eretz Yisrael, and it's not written in the document that the buyer who comes from Chutz L'aretz "lives in Chutz L'aretz;" he doesn't go free since there's a chance that he'll end up staying and live in Eretz Yisrael. However, if the buyer only has a rented space in Eretz Yisrael, or it's written in the document that the buyer presently lives in Chutz L'aretz; he goes free.

131) If an Eretz Yisrael woman marries a man from Chutz L'aretz and she brings into the marriage slaves for Tzon Barzel; we have an unresolved inquiry if it's like selling it to Chutz L'aretz. Perhaps, even according to the opinion that the woman can collect it for her Kesuva since it has sentimental value to her, it may still be a sale since, in the meantime, he owns what the slaves produces; or even to the opinion that she can't collect the Tzon Barzel for the Kesuva, perhaps it's not a sale since he doesn't own his body and he must give it back when she's widowed or divorce, it's like hers. (Rashba: although he's not obligated to do so, but in most cases, he allows the wife to reclaim what she brought in for her Kesuva.)

132) If a slave follows his master to Suria on his own (since a person can't force his slave to follow him to Chutz L'aretz); if the master planned to return, then the slave didn't lose his right not to be sold to Chutz L'aretz, and if he is, he goes free. However, if his master didn't plan on returning, the slave loses his right, and if he's sold there in Chutz L'aretz, he doesn't go free.

133) [Tosfos explains: the reason that the one who got sold to Chutz L'aretz goes free even though the second master can't anyhow force him to follow him to Chutz L'aretz; we still fine him since he's putting him in a situation where the second master might try to convince him to follow him to Chutz L'aretz.]

134) We force the second master to free him, and the seller doesn't need to return the money since we fine the second one since that's where the prohibition is (i.e., he's holding the slave to bring him back to Chutz L'aretz).

135) If you sell a field during Yovel; Rav says that the sale is valid, and the field gets returned right away. Shmuel says that the sale is not valid and the seller must return the money. We don't say it's like what Shmuel holds when someone gives Kiddushin to his sister that, since everyone knows that there's no Kiddushin, he means to give it as a gift. (Rav holds that it's given for the sister to watch.) [Tosfos explains: since people don't realize it not to be a sale since we find that Rav held it to be a sale.]

136) R' Achi b. R' Yoshia explains: "don't bring back a slave to his master after he ran away to you to save him;" that it refers to a slave that ran away from Chutz L'aretz to Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, the master frees him, and the slave writes a document that he owes the master his worth.

137) Rebbi says that it refers to a case where he writes to someone else's slave a freedom document that he'll be freed when he buys him, he's freed after he bought him. This is because someone can make a transaction on an item before it comes into the world (or into your possession).

138) You can't ransom a captive for more than his worth because of a "fix to the world." The Gemara has an inquiry if the reason is; so that it shouldn't be such a burden to the community, and an individual can ransom him for more. Or is the reason is: that the pirates shouldn't put more effort to capture Jews since they'll fetch a higher price, so even an individual can't ransom him for more.

139) [Tosfos says: this is only by a non relative, or even by a father ransoming his daughter. However, for a wife, that's like your own body, you need to ransom her for more, since you can definitely spend all the money you want to ransom yourself. Although R' Yehoshua b. Chanina ransomed a boy captive for a lot of money; that's because he saw that he was extremely wise and will be a great Chachum. Alternatively, since it was at the time of the Churban, it's not applicable to decree that the non-Jews will put more effort to capture Jews.]

140) We also don't help captives escape. The Tanna Kama says because of a "fix of the world" that other captives will keep them in chains that they won't be able to escape themselves. R' Shimon b. Gamliel says: in order that the captives shouldn't torture the ones left behind. The practical difference is: if there's one captive. There's no reason to worry about torturing the others, but we need to worry that they might extra guard their future captives.

141) You don't buy Sefarim, Tefilin and Mezuzos for more than their worth. (Either that it shouldn't be too big of a burden on the community, or that the non-Jews shouldn't put too much effort to steal them.)

142) A Sefer Torah that was written by a apostate (Min) should be burned. If it was written by a non-Jew; according to R' Eliezer, who holds that we assume that all that non-Jews do is for idols, you also need to burn it. However, to those who don't say that we assume all what they do is for idols, you need to bury it since we have a Hekish tying Tefilin to writing it to teach us that anyone who writes Stam must be someone who ties Tefilin on himself. (Therefore, we also Pasul an apostate, informant, slave, woman, Kuti and Jewish Mummar.) [Tosfos says: from here, R' Tam wanted to forbid a woman from tying a Lulav and to make Tzitzis since they're not obligated in those Mitzvos. Tosfos disagrees since the Gemara in Menachos only Pasuls when a non-Jew makes them, and not women. Stam is different since we have a Hekish tying Tefilin to writing it.]

143) R' Shimon b. Gamliel allows you to buy Stam from a convert who went back to acting like a non-Jew out of fear that the non-Jews will kill him.

144) However, R' Shimon b. Gamliel holds that it needs to be written L'shma, so a non-Jew writing it is Pasul, the same way we see he holds that the parchment needs to be tanned L'shma. [Tosfos asks: why don't we say that all writing Stam is assumed L'shma (and doesn't need explicit intent), and it's not similar to tanning that you may tan for other reasons and it's not assumed to be tanned L'shma.] (However, the Chachumim say that the parchment doesn't need to be tanned L'shma.)

145) [Tosfos says: it seems that the Halacha is like R' Shimon b. Gamliel. Although the Gemara in Sanhedrin links this argument with the argument between Abaya and Rava whether preparing is considered something (that it's as if it was used and Kedusha falls on it); and we Paskin like Rava that it's nothing; we must say that Rava held like R' Shimon b. Gamliel, or else we'll have a contradiction in the Halacha. Therefore, since little action of preparing the skin to be tanned is not considered much, so we need to make the great action of tanning to be L'shma. However, Abaya held that the preparing the skins is enough for it to be L'shma, you don't need the tanning to also be L'shma.]

146) If you find a Sefer Torah in the hands of an apostate, you need to bury it (since it might have been written by a regular Yisrael). If you find it in a non-Jew's hand, some say that you also bury it, and some say you can use it to read from. [Rashi explains: it's a Sfeik Sfeika. It's a Safeik if a Jew wrote it, and even if the non-Jew wrote it, maybe he wrote it L'shma. Tosfos disagrees since, even if the non-Jew wrote it L'shma, it's Pasul since we have a Hekish tying Tefilin to writing it. Rather, it's more probable to say that a Jew wrote it, since it's uncommon for non-Jews to write a Sefer Torah.]

147) You can pay for Stam an extra half of Dinar than its cost. [Tosfos says: this is only by Tefilin and Mezuzos, and not by a Sefer Torah like Rashi seems to say since the Sefer Torah is so much more expensive than the others, it should have a much higher amount that you can add onto it.]

148) If you divorce a wife because she has a bad reputation of promiscuity, or because she makes vows, they enacted that he can never take her back. There's two reasons. One, if he said at the divorcing that this is his reason [Tosfos: but it wasn't made into a formal condition], we're afraid that it might come out that the bad reputation was false, or a rabbi permits and undoes the vows, then it would ruin her if she remarried, since he'll claim that he didn't intended to divorce her if that was true, and her new children will be Mamzeirim. [Tosfos says: it's not exact since he didn't make a condition on the divorce; but it will cause rumors to come out to that effect. Although we find cases where it's enough to just show your intent without a condition, like when you write a sale document to hide property, or if someone sold property because he needed the money, but it ended up that he didn't need it; but it's not always the case, and it's not the case here. After all, R' Meir requires for every condition to speak out both sides of the condition, and we don't say by speaking out one side, it shows his intent. Therefore, since he knows that he can't take her back, he won't even make a claim that will produce rumors. However, Rashi explains the reason why there's no problem anymore: since he knows he can never take her back, he can't say anymore that she was so dear and I wouldn't have divorced her otherwise.]

149) Another reason: so that Jewish girls shouldn't be so unscrupulous with promiscuity and vows. Therefore, they enacted to say at the time of the giving that it's because she has a bad reputation of promiscuity, or because she makes vows. (However, even if he didn't say it, he can't take her back.)

150) R' Yehuda says: it's only by a vow made in public that can't be permitted, but if it wasn't in public, he can take her back after the divorce. After all, he holds like the second reason, and as long as she didn't make a vow that can't be permitted, she's not so unscrupulous in making vows, so we don't fine her.

151) R' Nachman explains how much is the public (lit. the many) is three, since it's learned from Ziva that's three consecutive days as it says "many days." R' Yitzchok says it's ten people, as the Pasuk says that the princes of the EIda swore to the Gevonim (that connotes ten), and they didn't just have it permitted.

152) [Tosfos says: however, when someone swears "on the consent of the public," it's on two people according to Rashi explains in Shvuos that Moshe made them swear "on my consent and the consent of Hashem" so that it will be on the consent of the public. However, if this would be true, then we wouldn't be able to permit Cherems when we say "on the consent of Hashem and of the congregation." The reason why you can permit a vow that's only made on the consent of an individual, since someone doesn't completely subject himself to do what an individual wants him to, but only by many people.]

153) R' Meir says: they only enacted that he can't take her back by a vow that he needs a Chachum to permit, but one that he could annul himself, he can't claim that he mistakenly divorced her since he didn't know that he has the power to annul him. R' Elazar says: they originally made the enactment for vows that the husband could annul himself, since he can claim that he mistakenly divorced her since he didn't know that he has the power to annul them. They enacted not to take her back for vows that only a Chachum can permit because, if not, they would take back those that he could have annulled. However, they didn't need it for itself since we know (as if there are witnesses to the fact) that he wouldn't anyhow want his wife to embarrass herself and go to Beis Din to permit it. (Both of them must hold of the reason of the enactment because it will ruin her second marriage).

154) However, if a husband makes a vow to divorce his wife, (i.e., he vows from eating fruits if he doesn't divorce his wife), if he divorces her, he may take her back. We don't fine her not to because he did something wrong with the vow, as we say that vowing is like building a Bama when it's forbidden, and when he keeps it, it's as if he brought a Korban on it.

155) If someone divorces his wife because she seems to be an Iylanus, R' Yehuda says that he also can't ever take her back because of the problem that it might ruin her second marriage. The Chachumim say that it's not a problem. [Tosfos says: this is only if you only suspect she's an Iylanus, that she needs a Get to be released. After all, we say afterwards about having children by the next husband. However, by a definite Iylanus, she doesn't need a Get, even according to the opinion that says that if you make a Kiddushin on condition of not having a blemish, that, when you have relations with her, you forgive the condition and you have relations to make a complete Kiddushin; that's only on other blemishes, but he doesn't forgive for an Iylanus. Alternatively, since an Iylanus is so uncommon, it never dawns on him to make a new Kiddushin for, perhaps, she's an Iylanus.]

156) If she marries someone else and has children and she's claiming her Kesuva from her first husband, we say it's better for her to keep quiet. [Tosfos says: granted he never made a condition, so the Get was valid, but we're afraid of rumors that it was invalid.] After all, he will say: if I have known that you would collect your Kesuva, I wouldn't have divorced you.

157) Even though R' Yehuda, regarding vows, doesn't worry about ruining the second marriage, and the Chachumim does; and by Iylanus is the opposite; Shmuel says that we need to switch their positions. Abaya says that you don't switch their positions. By vows, R' Yehuda holds that there's no way of having a claim to ruin the second marriage, since, like R' Meir, he knows that he could annul those vows that he could, and he holds like R' Elazar about vows that need Beis Din to permit, he holds that he doesn't want his wife embarrassing herself in Beis Din. The Chachumim who are not worried here about the Iylanus ruining the marriage holds like R' Meir that, even when you make a condition, he needs to spell out both sides of the condition. So, since here, without a condition, if he didn't even repeat his words, it's nothing [Tosfos: and won't even create rumors that it's invalid. When the Chachumim say it's problematic by vows, it refers to the case where he repeated his words.]

158) If someone sells himself and his son as a slave to a non-Jew thrice, we don't redeem him again unless there's a suspicion that his life is in danger. However, we do redeem the son after the father dies so that he shouldn't be lost religiously living among the non-Jews. However, this is not a problem when his father's alive since his father will look after him to make sure he doesn't stray.

159) If one sells his field to a non-Jew, one needs to buy the fruit to bring it for Bikkurim to "fix the world." [Rashi explains that we bother the seller to buy some of the fruit, even for a high price, as a deterrent to sell the field in the first place. R' Tam explains that it's not forcing the seller to buy the fruit, but, anyone who buys the fruit should bring it to Bikkurim. After all, the Gemara wants to prove that a non-Jew acquires the field so much to release the obligation of separating Trumah and Maasar, since this is only because of "a fix for the world," but, according to Rashi, the fix may be only that we force him to buy the fruit, not the obligation of taking off Bikkurim.]

160) Rabbah holds that a non-Jew doesn't acquire the field so much to release the obligation of separating Trumah and Maasar, and R' Elazar says that a non-Jew acquires the field so much to release the obligation of separating Trumah and Maasar. After all, he learns from the Pasuk "your grain piles," excluding non-Jew's grain. Rabbah holds the Drasha is that it's only obligated when a Jew smooths the grain in a pile, but not if a non-Jew does it. [Tosfos says: Rabbah doesn't disagree with that Drasha, since it's a Tannaic argument whether it's exempt when a non-Jew smooths it, and it's pushed to depend this Amoraic argument on that Tannaic argument. Rather, everyone holds of that Drashsa since the Pasuk says it as Dagan, a grain pile, and not just Tevuah, grain. Those who obligate even when the non-Jews smooths it out is because it says Diganecha twice, and the rule is that two exclusions makes an inclusion.]

161) In Surya, a non-Jew has a complete acquisition in the field to release the obligation of separating Trumah and Maasar, since he holds that what a single person conquered doesn't become part of Eretz Yisrael.

162) We find a Mishna "the Leket, Shichicha and Pe'ah" of a non-Jew is obligated in Maasar unless he made it Hefker. We don't need to explain that, before the Hefker, it's obligated in Maasar since a non-Jew doesn't acquire the field so much to release the obligation of separating Trumah and Maasar. Rather, we refer to grains of Jews that a non-Jew grabbed, and the Jew only made it Hefker for Jews to take them, but not non-Jews. [Tosfos says: this is even according to R' Yochanan in the Yerushalmi who says that you can make Hefker for only Jews (and Reish Lakish disagrees); it's only Hefker when it gets into the hands of Jews, but not if non-Jews take them.]

163) Although the Mishna says: if someone sells a field to a non-Jew, he needs to buy it and bring Bikkurim because of the fix in the world is not a proof that, from the Torah, a non-Jew acquires the field so much to release the obligation of separating Trumah and Maasar. Rather, there was a two step enactment. They first enacted, since people thought it's fine to sell the field to a non-Jew since it retains its Kedusha, so they enacted not to bring the Bikkurim. then they saw it didn't help and the people who needed the money sold it to the non-Jew and it was left in his hand, so they enacted again to bring it.

164) If a Jew has a partnership with a non-Jew in a field (according to Rabbah, only in Surya, and according to R' Elazar, even in Eretz Yisrael since a non-Jew doesn't acquire the field so much to release the obligation of separating Trumah and Maasar); Rebbi, who doesn't hold of Breira, holds that the crop is a mixture of Tevel and Chulin.[Rashi says: therefore, you can't use it to separate Maasar for other crops, but you may take it off from it to permit the rest since we can assume that every grain is half yours and half the non-Jew's. However, Tosfos brings a proof that you can't know at what ratio in any given part of the crop is yours and the non-Jews, therefore, you can't separate from this crop, since you might be taking off from the Chulin to permit the Tevel. Therefore, you can only bring from other produce and separate the Maasar, but that other produce is problematic since it could have been taken Maasar for Chulin, so you need to separate Maasar from another place on that. Repeat this until the last Maasar is very small, and that will remain problematic, and you need to give all the Trumah and Maasar to the Kohein and Levi.] However, R' Shimon b. Gamliel holds of Briera, and the whole share that the Jew gets after splitting is Tevel, and what the non-Jew gets is regular Chulin.

165) Rabbah says: a non-Jew acquires the field in Eretz Yisrael that he can dig ditches and pits into it, as the Pasuk says "the land was given to humans." However, R' Elazar says that they can't since the Pasuk says "the land belongs to Hashem."

166) If someone sells his land for its fruit; R' Yochanan holds that he brings Bikkurim and reads the Psukim about his land since he holds the main ownership of the field is who owns the produce. Reish Lakish says that he doesn't read since he holds the main acquisition is the one who owns the actual land. Reish Lakish says that a proof to this is from the Drasha "and for his house," that one brings the Bikkurim of his wife. This seems to exclude other people who own the produce of a field. [Tosfos says: even though, from the Torah, the husband doesn't have the fruit of her fields, but the Pasuk can refer to it since it was always normal for the husband to get it.] However, R' Yochanan says that this is where the Torah shows us that the main ownership of the field is who owns the produce.

167) Although we have a Braisa that says, if someone brings his wife's Bikkurim, and he hears that she dies, he reads the Psukim, which would imply that he doesn't read if she didn't die; [Tosfos: and it's not like he bought fruits and then bought the land that doesn't read, since the husband is considered attached to the field from beforehand for the fruit]; since that's not the real implication. Rather, he definitely reads if she doesn't die. However, when she dies, I might think that he doesn't read the same way if you send an agent with your Bikkurim, and he dies, the second agent can't read since you need the taking and bringing in the same fashion; so we're taught that the husband before and after the wife's death is considered in the same fashion.

168) [Tosfos quotes R' Shmuel in Bava Basra that it's not considered taking and bringing in the same fashion if the owner harvested the fruits and sent it with an agent. This is even true if the agent dies and the owner finishes bringing it, since it wasn't completely took and brought in one fashion. Also, even if the agent harvests and brings it and dies, the owner can't read since it's still not took and brought in one fashion. However, R' Tam doesn't explain taking as harvesting, but just gathering the fruits to bring them to Yerushalayim.]

169) [Tosfos says: we also must say that he originally intended to send it with two agents. After all, we say: if the Bikkurim was first slated to have the Psukim read, and then it became impossible to do so, you don't bring it anymore, but you need to leave it to rot, since it was fit, and was pushed off. Although the lack of reading doesn't prevent someone from being Yoitza bringing Bikkurim, but we have the rule that, it's only if it's fit to read, lack of reading doesn't prevent its Kashrus, but if it's not fit to read, then it prevents its Kashrus.]

170) Also, we see R' Yochanan holds that, if you buy a field when Yovel is in effect, which he'll need to return, he brings the Bikkurim and read since he holds the main ownership of the field is who owns the produce. Reish Lakish says he doesn't read, since he holds the main acquisition is the one who owns the actual land.

171) This is only by the second Yovel, when people already were accustomed to return fields by Yovel, but by the first Yovel, even Reish Lakish says that you bring it and read since the original owner wasn't confident that it will be returned by Yovel.

172) R' Yosef says: if it wasn't for R' Yochanan holding the main ownership of the field is who owns the produce; since brother splitting the estate are buying each others share from each other, and it gets returned by Yovel, we wouldn't find someone who would bring Bikkurim and read unless he was an only son and all his forefathers were also only sons until the days of Yehoshua b. Nun. [Tosfos says: although we don't hold that owning the produce of an object is as if you own the object, and we hold that brothers are buying out their Shiur since we don't hold of Breira from the Torah (and it's not like it was always destined for you to inherit), If so, you can ask how can anyone bring Bikkurim unless they're the single heir the son of a single heir until Yehoshua? However, we can answer: that we don't Paskin that owning the fruit is not like owning the land but in the case in Bava Basra if a father writes over the actual land to his son in his lifetime, but he reserves the fruit until his death for himself, if the son sells it and dies before the father, that the sale is a sale; since the father forgives his stake in the field to his son. Alternatively, only R' Yochanan held this as a problem, but others learn that you only need to return land at Yovel by actual sales, and not by splitting an inheritance, or by a gift.

Tosfos concludes: according to R' Yochanan, the reason it's called "a field of inheritance" even though it returns by Yovel; since he will always get a replacement field, it can be called his inheritance.]

173) We have a Pasuk and Braisa supporting Reish Lakish. After all, the Pasuk says by returning the fields by Yovel that it's sold for the count of the crops; implying that the crops are sold, not the land. The Braisa says that a first born receives double of a sold field when it's returned by Yovel, and we consider it at the father's death to be what's in his possession, and not what's coming to him.

174) Abaya says that the Halacha is: if a husband wants to take someone to court because of his wife's possessions, she needs to write him a Harsha. This is only if it's something that he doesn't get the produce from it, but if he gets the produce, once he's taking him to court for the fruit, he can be a claimant for his wife on the field too.