1) If a messenger brings a Get from overseas, he needs to say "it was written and signed before me." Rava says: since it's uncommon to find witnesses to verify the signatures, therefore, we're afraid that the husband will come and claim it to be forged, so they enacted to believe the messenger. Granted that, usually, we say that we can't establish anything regarding an Ervah except with two witnesses, however, since, from the Torah, you don't need verification since signatures on a document are considered as if witnesses were interrogated in Beis Din. When the husband comes with his claims [Tosfos: it will only produce rumors to that effect, but Beis Din wouldn't consider the Get as Pasul because of it]. Therefore, the messenger needs to say, “it was written and signed in my presence” before two or three judges, and we can assume that the messenger really made sure the husband wanted to divorce her when he received the Get. This gives him extra credence, and we don’t believe the husband to contradict him [Tosfos: and it wouldn't even create rumors that it's Pasul.]

2) The reason you have to mention the writing, even though the main concern is about the signature, so people shouldn't confuse it with verifying the witnesses from other documents. After all, they'll make a mistake since saying "we recognize the signatures" works [Rashi says: we believe the messenger to say that they recognize the signatures." Since the whole concern is to verify the signatures, what difference does it make whether he testifies that it was signed before him, or he recognizes the signatures? Tosfos asks on Rashi: if so, according to Rava it’s not necessary for a messenger to use the term “it was written and signed before me,” which seems not true throughout our Perek. Rather, Tosfos explains: we never believe one messenger to say he recognized the signatures, We only believe him saying “it was written and signed in my presence,” since he’ll make sure that his words are true. Rather R’ Meshulom explains: Rava only allows two people to say they recognize their signatures. So, since we believe witnesses to verify the signatures the same way we allow the verification by all documents, we may confuse it to believe one person too, like we do by Gitten. However, it's not a distinction that saying “it was written and signed in my presence" is different since a woman and the one who it's brought for is believed by a Get, and not in other verifications; since it's uncommon.]

3) Rabbah agrees with Rava that part of the decree is because it's uncommon to find verifying witnesses. But he adds that it's also to counter a concern that the people of Chutz L'aretz weren't experts in the Halacha that it needs to be written L'shma. Therefore, they need to say it's written before them to know it was written L'shma (according to R' Elazar who holds that the text of the Get needs to be written L'shma), and he needs to say it was signed before them for the signatures' verification.[Tosfos says: but Rabbah wasn't concerned that we'll confuse it with other verifications since he doesn't hold that two people are believed to say "we recognize their signatures." Also, it's a distinction that a woman and the one who it's for is believed by a Get, but not by other documents.]

4) [Tosfos says: the reason Rabbah is concerned only with L’Shma, but not by other Halachos of Get, like writing in on items attached to the ground; since they were experts of all the Halachos, but they didn’t accept the Halacha that you need to write it L’Shma, since they didn’t agree to the Drasha of “you should write her (a Get)” to mean you write it specifically for her.]

5) Although the rule is that we need two witnesses to verify facts by Ervah; the messenger is believed since it's not a real concern, since most scribes are experts in the Halachos of L’Shma. Even according to R’ Meir who is concerned about the chance that it’s from the minority cases, still, there is no concern since the average scribe is an expert. [Tosfos explains: therefore, the possibility that the scribe was not an expert is too small, which even R’ Meir is not concerned about.] However, the rabbis required it [Tosfos: so the husband shouldn't claim that the Sofar wrote it for practice and he found it in the garbage and had witnesses sign on it.] since the messenger needs to say, “it was written and signed in my presence” before two or three judges, we can assume that the messenger really made sure the husband wanted to divorce her when he received the Get. This gives him extra credence, and we don’t believe the husband to contradict him [so the husband won't be believed when he claims it's not written L'shma].

6) [Rashi explains the reason saying “it was written etc.” tells us that they wrote it L’Shma; since this statement will prompt Beis Din to ask if they wrote it L’Shma. Tosfos disagrees. If this would be true, the Gemara somewhere should have mentioned Beis Din’s role of asking this. Furthermore, when the Gemara asks what’s the practical differences between Rabbah’s reason and Rava’s reason, they should have said if Beis Din needs to ask if they wrote it L’Shma or not. Therefore, Tosfos explains that we assume it to be L’Shma. (See Ran who explains: either he should realize on his own that the reason he needs to say this is because there might be a problem in the writing and signing. So, if anything strange happened, he’ll reveal it to us. Alternatively, since he claimed that the husband made him a messenger and he watched the writing of the Get, we can assume that they wrote it L’Shma and they did not find it prewritten for someone else.)]

7) The practical differences between Rabbah’s reason and Rava’s reason; if two messengers simultaneously give the Get over. (You don’t need to worry about validating the Get, but you still need to be concerned if they wrote it L’Shma.) Also, if you bring the Get in the same province in Chutz L’Aretz. (You can find validating witnesses, but you still need to be concerned they didn’t write it L’Shma.)

8) After Chutz L'aretz learned L'shma, even Rabbah held that they must continue saying it was written before them since it might be still needed if they ever revert to their original ignorance. However, they permitted in uncommon cases like when a completely normal person brought the Get, but, right after he gave it, before he had a chance to say, “it was written and signed in my presence,” he became a deaf-mute. Another uncommon case, when two messengers bring the Get [Tosfos says: according to this; it's no longer a practical difference between Rabbah and Rava if two messengers bring it. However, we can still say that they argue in a case where one brings it and two people verify the document.] However, a woman bringing her own Get is required to say, “it was written and signed in my presence," even though it is not common, so we shouldn’t need to differentiate which messengers needs to say and which ones do not. [Tosfos explains: although we already made a deaf-mute and two messengers as exceptions, we mean, not to differentiate between single messengers that have the ability to say, “it was written and signed in my presence.”]

9) After they learned about L'shma, if the messenger did not say "it was written etc.," but there were verifying witnesses; if she B'dieved marries, Rabbah allows her to remain married since it's only because of a concern that they might revert to their old ways. However, she definitely shouldn't L'chatchila get married.

10) A husband who brings a Get doesn't need to say “it was written and signed in my presence," since he won't turn around and claim it was written incorrectly. [Tosfos explains: since we’re not really concerned that they wrote the Get incorrectly, rather, that the husband wants to create a stir, and we don’t want these claims to start rumors that the Get was not valid. However, if the husband himself brings the Get, we don’t assume that he’s going to turn around to try to start rumors.]

11) We believe one witness to verify that something is not prohibited as long as we hadn't establish the piece to be once definitely prohibited (Chezkas Issur). [Tosfos says: unless it's within your hands to fix, like Shchita, or separating Trumah. We even believe women to say it was Shechted properly, though they’re not experts in Hilchos Shchita, so they can’t Shecht themselves; since we consider it as if she can Shecht, since she could learn. Alternately, she can make it Shechted since she can hire someone who knows how to Shecht. This is even when you can't apply the rule that most people who do Shchita are experts and we can assume that they did a good job without any other verification, like where we can no longer recognize that someone did Shchita at all, like when the head was completely cut off. However, if it's not in your hands and by regular prohibitions that have a Chezkas Issur; the Gemara in Yevamos has an unresolved inquiry if you need two witnesses, or not.]

12) [Tosfos says: the source that we believe one witness is Niddah, that the Gemara Darshins “she counts the days for herself” that we believe her when she can become Tahor. Although she has a Chezkas Issur; however, she doesn’t have a Chazaka to constantly bleed, thus it will automatically come to a time when she can go to the Mikvah, and she has the ability to Toivel, which helps even with a Chazaka.]

13) R’ Meir and R’ Elazar argue which witnesses validate a Get. R’ Meir holds it’s the signing witnesses, while R’ Elazar holds it’s those who witnessed the handing over of the Get. Therefore, R’ Meir holds that it’s the signatures that need L’Shma, but the writing of the Get's text could be [Tosfos: L'chatchila] written not L'shma. Therefore, he holds that you can sign witnesses on a Get written for practice. [Tosfos says: R’ Meir doesn’t allow writing the Get on growing plants, for perhaps they may sign while it’s attached. Although we allow them to write the Get not L’Shma, and we're not concerned that they may also sign not L’Shma; since you brought it to the witnesses after the writing, and they’re aware that they must sign L’Shma, there is nothing to detract them from doing so. However, if you write the Get attached to a growing plant, when the witnesses come to sign, it may still be left attached. This may lead them to leave the Get as is, and sign while it’s attached too.]

13a) [Tosfos asks: we see a Gemara later that says according to R’ Meir, if the messenger didn’t say “it was written and signed in my presence” it invalidates the Get so much, that if she remarrys, the husband must divorce her and the children she has from him are Mamzeirim. But why must he say "it was written before me?" It fits well to Rava. We enacted “it was written in my presence” to show that this belief in the messenger’s words are different than usual and we won’t allow one witness to regularly verify. However, according to Rabbah, who doesn’t hold of the reason that we need “it was written in my presence” not to confuse it with regular signature verifications, we remain with the question why the Gemara requires to say “it was written etc.” according to R’ Meir?]

14) R’ Elazar holds it’s those that witnessed the handing over of the Get validates it and we don’t need witnesses signing on the Get. However, he agrees if you have witnesses signing, they need to be proper witnesses. So, if they forged it (even though the witnesses that saw the document’s handing over were on the level), the document is invalid. So too, if they signed a Get not L’shma, it’s invalid. [Tosfos says: although the problem If the signatures are forged or signed by relatives or other invalid witnesses is that we might mistakenly rely on those witnesses to allow her to remarry or to collect money is not applicable when witnesses sign not L’shma; but we decreed to sign L’shma, because if you don’t, you’ll also come to write the Get not L’shma.]

15) The Halacha follows R' Elazar regarding divorce documents. [Tosfos explains: we don’t mean the Halacha is only according to R’ Elazar by Get and not by all other documents, but also in all documents. The Gemara only says here that the Halacha is like him in Gitten, because that’s our Gemara’s topic. Tosfos concludes: therefore, one must be careful by a Get to have witnesses observing the giving over of the Get, since they make the Get valid. If you don’t have these witnesses, the Get is invalid and she’s not divorced, even if you have witnesses that signed the Get. The only function of signed witnesses is, when you need to use the Get as proof and you cannot produce the witnesses that observed the handing over because they died or moved away, then you rely on the signing witnesses. Therefore, you must make sure that you have proper handing-over witnesses by all transaction documents (like those that acquire land, whether through sale or gift). However, Tosfos concludes that this may not be the case. (Although, technically without handing-over witnesses there is no transaction), but by money, you can give something away without a transaction. As long as you admit you owe it, although it may be a false admittance, entitles the receiver to keep the land. So, giving over a signed document, even without witnesses present, is no worse than admitting that the land belongs to the receiver.]) R’ Elazar even holds the handing-over witnesses makes it a loan with a document that you can collect from properties the borrower sold. [Rashi has two versions. The first explains that our Gemara refers to collecting a Kesuvah. As we say, that if someone cannot produce the Kesuvah document, she can still collect the Kesuvah by producing her Get, and, such a Get can collect the Kesuvah from the husband’s sold property. The second version is: that this applies to all documents, and a lender can collect from the borrower’s sold property. Tosfos says that R’ Tam agrees to the second version as we find another Gemara that held that way. Although the Gemara in Bava Basra implies that R’ Elazar only said it by Gitten, and says that we only allow it by a Kesuvah; Rashbam has a different reading of the text, that ‘Kesiva’ (writing) is different. Perhaps only in a case where they wrote it with intent to hand it over in front of witnesses that create rumors of the loan, and would help protect buyers from buying property with unknown liens on them. However, if the borrower only wrote it himself, not to make a document that he’ll present before witnesses, but just as a type of admittance to the loan, it wouldn’t create a buzz about it, so he can’t collect from a lien. However, R’ Chananal doesn’t change the text, therefore he held it to be an argument between the Sugyos what R’ Elazar held. He Paskins like the Sugya in Bava Basra, therefore one cannot collect from a lien with just witnesses that observed the handing over of the document. Although the Gemara later says: in the case that non-Jewish Persians signed a Get and Jews observed its handing over, then they should collect even from sold properties; we refer to a case that non-judges signed it. So, it's a Chiddush that combined with the fact that Jewish witnesses observed the handing over, we would consider the signing non-judges as if judges signed it. However, Rashi later implies also that you don’t collect from sold properties with a document that no one signed.]

16) There are three rabbinically invalidated Gitten. Although one cannot marry with them, if one does, his children are Kosher (not Mamzeirim). [Tosfos says: even according to R’ Meir who holds that any changes done to the rabbis’ protocol of how to give a Get invalidates the divorce to the point that the children from the second marriage are Mamzeirim; but here, it's the exact way that the rabbis enacted these three Gitten, that the children don’t become Mamzeirim.] The first one is that the husband wrote the text without witnesses signing. [Tosfos says: even according to R’ Meir who considers the signatures as the main part of the Get, the husband’s handwriting is as good as witnesses’ signatures. (Since the point of witnesses is to confirm that the husband authorized the Get, confirming the husband’s handwriting confirms that the husband wrote, and therefore, authorized the Get.) Case two: witnesses signed, but the Get wasn’t dated. Case three: there was a date written, but just one witness signed. [Tosfos explains: Amaraim argue what the case refers to. To those who hold it’s the husband’s handwriting, then it fits well, like we explained before. An added signature will not ruin it. Even to those who explain it to mean that a scribe wrote it, R’ Meir (who needs signing witnesses) holds it’s Kosher since we’ll consider the scribe’s handwriting to be as one witness, since his writing attests to the husband commanding him to write it. We're not worried that the scribe wrote this Get in practice and threw it in the garbage and the husband found it and signed one witness to it since the scribes were mostly careful not to leave these Gitten in the garbage so people shouldn’t take them and lead to such problems. However, they weren’t thoroughly careful with this, so the rabbis didn’t allow us to rely (L’Chatchila) on considering the scribe’s handwriting as a witness. It's simple to understand this according to the reason why we enacted a date for a Get is that he shouldn’t protect his niece. (It was customary to marry one’s niece. If she committed adultery, and he’s worried that she’ll receive the death penalty, he’ll give a Get without a date. Therefore, when they come to prove she committed adultery, she’ll produce the Get without a date, and they cannot prove she was married at the time she committed the act. So they enacted to write the date to avoid that.) We need to make sure the date the husband inserted into the Get is true. However, even to the other reason, that we need to know when he wrote the Get so we’ll know when he cannot claim fruit from her fields, we can't just say that we’ll just not believe the date concerning the fruit buyers for perhaps it’s the true date and we’ll make the wife lose fruits that she’s entitled to. Now that the rabbis invalidate the Get, we say that the wife lawfully is not entitled to those fruit since the rabbis only entitled her to the fruits when he writes a Kosher Get, and not a Pasul one. Alternatively, although the date is not reliable for Beis Din to collect fruits for her, however, if she grabs the fruits, Beis Din can’t remove it from her to return it to the buyers. Therefore, they enacted that we need a reliable date for the Get.]

18) You don’t need to say it from one sovereign state in Eretz Yisrael to another. According to Rabbah that the problem is L’Shma, but they're experts in L'shma in Eretz Yisrael. Even like Rava, we’ll assume you can produce people to verify the signatures [Tosfos: even between Galil and Judea which the governments were at odds and restricted travel] since, during the Regel, where everyone goes up to Yerushalayim, you’ll find people to recognize the signature. Even after the Beis Hamikdash was destroyed, since they had established courts there, the traffic still flowed from Galil to Judea. [Tosfos says: but if they don't established courts, they would need to say "it was written and signed before me."] R’ Yitzchok said that there was two jurisdictions in one city in Eretz Yisrael that were at odds with each other and were scrupulous to block the traffic from one side to the other. If a Get is given from one side to the other, they required the messenger to say it. [Tosfos says: we must say that the two jurisdictions were stricter than the governments of Galil and Judea regarding disallowing travel. (Therefore, we allow there not to say it, because there will still be some traffic. However, here we require saying it, since traffic was excessively stifled.)]

19) [Tosfos says: we see regarding a three year Chazaka the opposite, that even if the original owner was not in town within three years, we believe the person who claimed he bought it, since he still could have protested from afar, since we’ll say that the protest would travel from person to person until it would reach the ears of the squatter. However, the original owner at least needs to be stationed in a place where travel is common to the original place, so that the protest can reach the squatter’s ear.) The Gemara says, that if the field is in Judea and the original owner went to Galil, then it’s not a Chazaka, since the governments of the two territories were hostile with each other and restricted travel. So we see that there are not enough people traveling to Yerushalayim for the Regel to spread the protest. We must say that, here, where the woman who needs to verify the signatures will actively seek out witnesses to verify them, they don't need to say it. However, the squatter doesn’t actively seek out if the original owner’s protesting, so, perhaps that vital information may not reach him from the travelers for the Regel.

However, we find quite the opposite by the townspeople of Mechuzah that we need to worry about verifying witnesses, but don’t need to worry that they wouldn’t hear the original owner’s protest. We see later that one needs to say, “it was written and signed before me” even if it was written and given in Mechuzah, (at least if it’s outside the immediate neighboring houses), since the townsmen are always on the run, we’re afraid that we won’t find people to verify signatures. However, we don’t find anyplace that a Chazaka won’t work in Mechuzah, so we can assume that the protest will reach the squatter’s ear. We must say; in Mechuzah, although those people (who the original owner protested to) are on the run and won’t have the time to inform the squatter, however, they’ll definitely tell someone before they leave. The second one will tell someone else, until it will eventually reach the squatter’s ear. However, when the woman tries to find people to verify signatures, perhaps those people who could verify will be out-of-town, and she would be left unable to verify it for an indefinite time until their return. Therefore, they enacted that they should always say, “it was written and signed in my presence.”]

20) R’ Yochanan says that the messenger needs to say “it was written etc.” in front of two people, and and R’ Chanina said before three. Since Rabbah also hold of Rava’s reason, and all are concerned to verify signatures we should hold you need to say it in front of three. Also, everyone holds that a witness can become a judge regarding rabbinical laws, like saying “it was written and signed before me,” so the messenger can be counted in the three. However, since a woman can bring a Get and she cannot combine to make a Beis Din, R' Chanina requires three in all instances, so they shouldn’t rely on saying it in front of two when a woman brings it. However, R' Yochanan holds that, since a woman that brings the Get is obviously different, we’re not afraid they’ll make a mistake. A Braisa agrees with R’ Yochanan.

21) If someone brings a Get from overseas, but fails to say “it was written etc,” if she remarries, R’ Meir holds the new husband needs to divorce her, and any children from that union are Mamzeirim (since he holds this way to all change in the rabbi's enactment by Gitten). The Chachumim hold they’re not Mamzeirim. What should they do? [Tosfos explains: to the Chachumim, what one needs to do to allow marriage, and if she’s already married, to avoid divorce. However, according to R’ Meir, we can only have a fix before she’s married. However, after the marriage, there is no way to fix the marriage. Since R’ Meir considers her still married to the first one to the point that the children from the second husband are Mamzeirim, since the Get is not valid, we give them the Halacha of someone who got married because she thought she received a valid Get, but didn’t, that she cannot remain married to either husband.] He should take back the Get and reissue it saying “it was written etc.” [Tosfos says: this implies that one needs to say it when he hands over the Get (since he needs to take it back). He can also give it and say it immediately afterwards (Toch Kdai Dibur- within the time to say three or four words.) As we see later the case where he hands it over, and immediately afterwards, he became mute and couldn’t say “it was written etc." Tosfos is in doubt what is the exact time you can say it afterwards. Perhaps, you can say it after Toch Kdai Dibur, as long as you’re still involved in the Get, or perhaps you have only the time of Toch Kdai Dibur. Tosfos is also in doubt if you must say it at the giving, or perhaps you may say it beforehand. We cannot bring a proof from a Mishna later that says: if the messenger becomes sick on the way and needs to make another messenger to continue, he says “it was written etc.” before a Beis Din and hands it to the new messenger. Although we see that he says it before the Get reaches the woman’s hand, however, we may allow this only because he hands it over to someone else. This is no proof if he can say it while the Get is still in his hands.]

23) R’ Achai required the messenger to watch the whole Get’s writing. R’ Ami and R’ Assi held it was not necessary and we shouldn’t be stringent and require it, for perhaps you’ll cause rumors on the earlier Gitten (that they’re invalid) since they were written without this stringency. R’ Elazar allows it even if one line was written before him L’Shma. [Tosfos explains: since the scribe wrote the first line L’Shma, we can assume he wrote the rest of the Get the same way, L’Shma.] R’ Ashi allows even if he didn’t go into the room during the Get’s writing, but just hears the quill scratching against the parchment. [Tosfos says: (although we don’t allow a blind person to say “it was written etc.” even if he can detect the sound of the quill), however we cannot compare it. (Rosh: since it looks like the blind man is lying saying “it was written etc.” which connotes that he saw it. He cannot say, “I heard the quill’s scratching,” since this is not the exact language that the rabbis enacted for him to say.)]

24) Even if the scribe goes in and out the whole day, it’s a valid Get and we're not worried that, perhaps he met another husband whom he and his wife have the same name of the first couple, and he orders him to write a Get, and the scribe will return and write the rest of the Get for the second couples sake, (and will not be L’Shma for the first couple).

25) Rav held that Bavel has the same Halachos of Eretz Yisrael regarding Gitten [Tosfos: even from one jurisdictions to another], and Shmuel hold it’s like Chutz L’Aretz. Everyone holds the reason to say it is because we worry perhaps we won’t find witnesses to verify the signatures. Rav holds that you’ll find witnesses to verify all over Bavel, since there were Yeshivos around, many people traveled between jurisdictions to go to the Yeshivos, but Shmuel held we can’t rely on them, since those who go to Yeshivos are too engrossed in their learning, they wouldn’t recognize people’s signatures. [Tosfos says: but he agrees they don't say it within the same jurisdiction. All he means that those who travel cannot make Bavel better than the rest of Chutz L’Aretz, but definitely, this doesn’t make it any worse.]

26) R’ Chisda required the messenger to say it when he brought a Get from the city of Aktisfon to Ardisher, but not from Ardisher to Aktisfon. [Tosfos says: it’s bringing a Get to a different country, which we’re worried that we cannot find verification for the signatures.] Since people of Ardsher go to Aktisfon for market, they end up signing on documents, so the people of Aktisfon recognize their signatures. However, the people of Ardsher, when they’re at Aktisfon, are too busy at the market to study the people of Aktisfon’s signatures. [Tosfos says: even according to Shmuel, who says that the traveling scholars of Bavel do not make verifying signatures easier, since they’re too busy learning to recognize their host city’s signatures, and doesn't say that their host city should recognize their signatures; we must say they’re way too busy learning to even sign documents at all.]

27) Rabbah b. Avuha required to say “it was written etc.” in Mechuzah if he brings the Get from one side of the street to the other side since the townspeople of Mechuzah were constantly on the move, and perhaps when you need witnesses who recognize the signatures, they’ll be out-of-town. R’ Sheishes even required to say it if he brought it from beyond three houses down. Rava required it even within a group of three houses. [Tosfos says we can explain the argument of how close you need to live to hear that the witnesses are heading out-of-town, so you can catch them before they leave. Nowadays, all messengers need to say “it was written etc.” since all the people in our cities are also on the constant go, like the people of Mechuzah.]

28) Rav says even if one is not required to say “it was written etc.,” however, if he does say it, it helps if the husband comes and claims it’s forged, (that we believe the messenger) and not the husband, and you don’t need to find witnesses to verify the signatures.

29) R’ Aveisar held that Gitten sent from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael do not need the messenger to say “it was written etc.” since there are many people traveling from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael, they’ll find verification. R’ Yosef did not rely on R’ Avaisar’s testimony. He asks: is R’ Avaisar someone to rely on? Abaya told him that you can rely on him.

30) R’ Yitzchok says that one may write two words without a line under it, but not three words. A Braisa allows three words without a line, but not four. [Tosfos brings R’ Chananal who Paskins like R’ Yitzchok, although he argues on a Braisa; we must say the reason R’ Yitzchok Paskins against the Braisa is because he knew that the Braisa is not the main opinion of the Tannaim. R’ Tam and Riva say: we only require making a line when one writes a Pasuk for a Drasha, but not if he’s only using the Pasuk as some flowery term to describe something ordinary. Although the Gemara says that T’filin doesn’t need lines to write over (like Mezuzos), and the writing the P’sukim of the T’filin shouldn’t be worse than any other Pasuk, and should require lines; since, for P’sukim, (even when writing many rows), you only need to scratch one line on top, and you can write many rows of P’sukim underneath, and T’filin also requires this. (However, Mezuzos require lines for each row of P’sukim). Also, one should make sure not to have scratched lines for each row of P’sukim since the Yerushalmi says: if someone does something that is not required (is not a pious man, but) a commoner. However, if the Sofer has a hard time writing straight lines without scratched out lines guiding him, he should scratch out lines. After all, he needs to beautify the writ, which is fulfilling the command “this is my G-d and I will beautify Him.” Although it’s written in Mesectos Sofrim that you need to etch the parchment (of T’filin) with lines, and If it isn’t, it’s Pasul; we must say it doesn't mean to scratch lines for each row of words, but just scratch out borders for the writing, one on top, one on the bottom, and one on each side.]

31) One shouldn’t act fearsome to his family. Rav says: anyone who is too fearsome to his family will end up causing three sins: forbidden relations, murder and Chilul Shabbos.

32) Someone should announce in his house Erev Shabbos right before nightfall, “did you take Maasar, did you make an Eiruv, and light the candles.” One needs to say them gently, so that his household accepts those chores. [Rashi explains the type of Eiruv they need to make is to carry in the courtyard. Tosfos disagrees. He said he prefers Rashi’s explanation in Shabbos that you must make Eiruv T’chumim before Bein Hashmushes. The reason we’re stricter by Eiruv T’chumim, (although it’s also only a rabbinic prohibition), since we have some hint from the Pasuk to forbid it. As it implies there that putting up a courtyard Eiruv is permitted Bein Hashmushes.]

33) Even when a wicked man is before you and harassing you, you should keep quiet and not inform on him.

34) Music is forbidden even without musical instruments. [Tosfos quotes Rashi that the prohibition is only by parties. Tosfos agrees. Someone should also be careful of what the Yerushalmi forbids, waking up and going to sleep with music. You should also be careful not to do anything similar to that, anything that has extra enjoyment. However, we permit music for Mitzvos. So we can have music at weddings to give joy to the bride and groom.]

35) Crowns, i.e., (head pieces for grooms)and tambourines are forbidden. [Rashi says: we refer to actual crowns. Tosfos asks: the Gemara in Sotah says that we only forbid ‘crowns’ of roses and myrtles, but not of reeds and Chilas (a different type of reed). People don’t make crowns from reeds. Rather, Tosfos explains: these ‘crowns’ are really domes carried over their heads. We only forbid this ‘crown’ to grooms, but other people may use them. As we see that in Mesechta Sotah we forbid bride ‘crowns,’ which is defined as a golden ornament with the image of the city of Yerushalayim etched in it., but, in Mesechta Shabbos we forbid women to wear them on Shabbos, implying that we allow them during the week. So we must say that this prohibition applies only to grooms and brides because they experience extra joy, like they also enacted to put ash on the groom’s head.] They only forbid it to males, similar to the Kohain, and not to females, so it's permitted to a bride.

36) Even the poor should give from what they receive from Tzedaka to others for Tzedaka.

37) The Tanna Kama permits any city that’s close to Eretz Yisrael, and R’ Gamliel permits only if it’s “swallowed by the borders” (i.e., there are parts of Eretz Yisrael that jut out more East than that city, although the border at that city is drawn in and doesn’t include it.) R’ Eliezer requires it in all cases so not to differentiate between different places in Chutz L’Aretz.

38) We have a contradiction of Braisos if a Get that they wrote on a boat is like bringing it from Eretz Yisrael and we don't require him to say “it was written etc.,” or if it's like he brought it from Chutz L’Aretz and we require him to say it. R' Yirmiya reconciles the Braisos, that this is the argument between Rabanan and R’ Yehudah whether something growing in such a boat is Chayiv in Maasar. The Rabanan say that a boat floating in the boundaries of Eretz Yisrael and has dirt from Chutz L’Aretz, all that grow there is Chayiv in Maasar. R’ Yehudah says: when is this so, only if it’s banking against the bottom. If it’s floating above, it’s exempt. [Tosfos points out: although, even to R’ Yehudah, the floor of the river is obligated in Maasar (theoretically if something would grow there), we don’t consider the floating boat part of Eretz Yisrael, and We consider it worse than cities that are close to Eretz Yisrael that are surrounded by the boundaries (that some don’t require the messenger from there to say it.) [See Dibros Moshe that he's not sure why there should be a differentiation between them. Some suggest the reason is because those cities are constantly close to Eretz Yisrael, but the boat is constantly on the move.] Also, it's worse than a second floor in Eretz Yisrael that has dirt imported from Chutz L’Aretz, which is exempt from Maasar, and a Get brought from the second floor doesn't require the messenger to say it; since second floors are different, since you can plant the ground directly under it and be Chayiv in Maasar. You can’t compare this to boats where you cannot plant under the boat.]

31) Alternatively, Abaya answers: we may say that both Braisos follow R’ Yehudah, and he has to say it in a case of a floating boat, and doesn’t need to say it in a boat banked in the riverbed.

32) R’ Zeira says: whether what grows in a perforated flowerpot lifted upon pegs (that the hole is hovering over the ground, but doesn’t touch it) is obligated in Maasar, depends on the above argument between R’ Yehudah and Rabanan. (We compare the floating boat hovering over the riverbed to the flowerpot hovering over the ground.) [The reason only the flowerpot needs to be perforated and the boat doesn’t; Rashi says that only wood needs perforation and not earthenware. Tosfos disagrees since many Gemaras seem the opposite, that wood doesn't need perforation, only earthenware. As wood, still has more moisture in it than earthenware (that the earth’s nutrients can penetrate). This fits in well, since most ships are made from wood.] Rava rejects this assumption. Perhaps R’ Yehuda needs the boat to connect to the ground because it’s moving, but he may hold that the flowerpot is connected, since it’s stationary. Also, perhaps the Rabanan consider the boat connected to the ground because they consider the water to be an extension of the riverbed (as if it’s one solid piece of earth), but they may hold the flowerpot is not connected, since there is airspace separating it from the ground. [Tosfos concludes: truth is, we consider the suspended flowerpot as attached to the ground as we say that you can write a Pruzbal (where the borrower needs to own land) if he owns a flowerpot suspended on pegs. Although the Gemara in Shabbos implies that we consider it detached since it says if someone lifts a perforated flowerpot off the ground onto pegs, he’s Chayiv for the Melacha of detaching; we must explain like Rashi explains there, (he’s not really Chayiv from the Torah, since it’s still attached), but rather, the rabbis forbid it, since it looks like detaching.]

41) [Tosfos says: we can't reconcile the contradiction of the Braisos in our Gemara, if we consider a boat as in Eretz Yisrael, if it’s made out of earthenware or wood, or if it has a hole or not; since it only depends if it's considered the area Eretz Yisrael or Chutz L’Aretz, but once it’s in a position that it’s Eretz Yisrael (according to R’ Yehudah if it’s banked, or to the Rabanan even if it floats); we don’t consider it as Chutz L’Aretz regarding a Get just because of a technicality that you’re in a utensil that exempts produce from Maasar.]

42) R’ Nachman b. Yitzchok explains the argument between the Braisos differently. All agree if the boat is on a river in Eretz Yisrael proper, it has the status of Eretz Yisrael. They argue if the boat is in the Mediterranean. The Tanna Kama held: to figure which islands off its coast in the Mediterranean we consider part of Eretz Yisrael, we draw an imaginary line from Mount Amnon in the north until the Egyptian river in the south. All islands east of that line have the status of Eretz Yisrael. R’ Yehudah argues and includes the whole Mediterranean that’s opposite Eretz Yisrael, until the Atlantic Ocean. So, we draw an imaginary line from the northernmost town, Kapluria, until the Atlantic Ocean, and then you draw another imaginary line from the southernmost point, the Egyptian River, until the Atlantic. The whole Mediterranean between these lines have the status of Eretz Yisrael. [Tosfos quotes R’ Tam: the reason why we aren’t Chayiv in Trumos and Maasar according to R’ Yehudah, although we’re in the West of Eretz Yisrael, since we don’t Paskin like R’ Yehudah, therefore, we are exempt. (See Yaavetz that asks that France is definitely more north than R’ Yehuda’s line. However, the question is valid for Portugal.)

Tosfos explains: how can R’ Yehudah hold that all the places lining the Mediterranean until the Atlantic don’t need to say “it was written etc” since they’re technically in Eretz Yisrael, since they couldn't know if they’re all experts in the Halacha of L’Shma, or that there will always have people to verify signatures. Since, perhaps, those who came from Bavel to resanctify Eretz Yisrael did not sanctify the whole area (but just a small part). Therefore, it’s easier to keep track of that area. Alternatively: perhaps R’ Yehudah does not refer to the land mass on both sides, but only the islands in the sea. Another answer: they knew that they were experts in L’Shma to the areas that Jews lived. Past that point (although it’s still Eretz Yisrael), Jews didn’t live (so no one will bring a Get from there.).]

43) Surya is like Eretz Yisrael in three ways and like Chutz L’Aretz in three ways. It’s like Chutz L’Aretz that you need to say “it was written etc.” when you bring from there a Get. If you sell a slave there, he goes free. Also, its dirt is Tamai.

44) It’s like Eretz Yisrael that it’s Chayiv in Trumos and Maasar. (This is because he holds that what a single person conquered becomes part of Eretz Yisrael. [(Rashi explains: the reason we consider Surya conquered by a single person, since Dovid conquered it without most of the Jews with him and he did it for his own use. This is different than Yehoshua’s conquering that most Jews were with him, and he conquered the land for the nation’s sake. Tosfos says the Sifri explains it otherwise: because Dovid conquered it before completely conquering all of Eretz Yisrael proper. Since you didn’t conquer what’s near the palace, why are you conquering Surya? However, if they would finish conquering Eretz Yisrael proper, then they could annex any part they conquer of Chutz L’Aretz, even if a single person conquers it.]) There is some way you can go into there without becoming Tamai, when he enters enclosed in a cabinet, box or closet. As, regularly, there is an argument between Rebbi, who holds you cannot enter Chutz L’Aretz in a box, since it moves, it doesn’t protect him from Tumah, and R’ Yossi b. Yehudah, who holds it does protect him, despite moving. So, even Rebbi would admit that you may enter Surya within a box; since they only decreed its ground to be Tamai, and not its airspace. [Rashi explains: therefore we must say the Braisa is according to Rebbi. Tosfos infers from this, that Rashi holds that there is no difference according to R’ Yossi b. Yehudah between Surya and the rest of Chutz L’Aretz, and only permits in a box and forbids out of a box. Tosfos says that it was unnecessary for Rashi to explain it this way, and we weren’t exact by saying the only way to come in is through a box. They only used that as an example since the Braisa where Rebbi and R’ Yossi argue refers to boxes. However, the same is true (that he remains Tahor) if he enters riding a horse or in a wagon. After all, Rebbi held that moving tents don’t have a status of tents to protect from Tumah, yet he allows him to go in that way unprotected since he only has contact to the airspace, and they didn’t enact Tumah on the airspace. So,we can say the same to R’ Yossi, he doesn’t become Tamai by entering on a wagon or riding a horse, which is not the case by actual Chutz L’Aretz.]

45) [Tosfos says: although the Gemara in Nazir inquires whether they decreed the airspace of Chutz L’Aretz to be Tamai, or they only decreed Tumah on the ground; here we only say that they only definitely decreed that the ground is Tamai, but if someone hovers over the land, the Tumah would rise from the ground and render him Tamai. However, there is one leniency, that being in a box could protect him from the rising Tumah. The Gemara there inquires: perhaps they decreed Tumah in the airspace too. So, even being in a box that protects you from the ground Tumah cannot protect you from the airspace Tumah.]

46) [Tosfos explains why our Gemara doesn't contradict a Mishna in Ohelos that says Chutz L’Aretz makes other objects Tamai by touching them or by people carrying them, but not by hovering over them; since the Mishna in Ohelos refers to a clump of dirt from Chutz L’Aretz transplanted in Eretz Yisrael. They only decreed the airspace in Chutz L’Aretz to be Tamai and not the airspace in Eretz Yisrael that hovers above a transplanted clump of dirt. However, Tosfos concludes; this isn’t correct, since the Mishna connotes the countries themselves, and not a transplanted clump. Rather, Tosfos explains the Mishna in Ohelos refers to a board or bridge that spans over the border between Chutz L’Aretz and Eretz Yisrael. If you placed utensils under them on the Eretz Yisrael side, we don’t say the Tumah from Chutz L’Aretz travels under the covering to make those utensils Tamai. Alternatively, although we would regularly assume that they decreed that the Tumah should rise like any grave (which is the reason they decreed the Tumah, for perhaps there is an unknown grave there), however, we would only consider it like a grave of a non-Jew and that the Mishna in Ohelos is according to R’ Shimon who claims non-Jewish graves don’t have rising Tumah, so we shouldn’t be more stringent on the land of Chutz L’Aretz than the actual non-Jewish grave. Our Gemara is according to the Rabanan who hold even non-Jewish graves have rising Tumah. R’ Tam gives another alternative answer: the Gemara in Shabbos says that they decreed to make Chutz L’Aretz Tamai in two steps; first, they only decreed on the ground and then they decreed on the airspace. We may say they taught the Mishna in Ohelos before they decreed on the airspace.]

47) Also, buying a field in Surya is as if buying it in the Yerushalayim district that you can ask a non-Jew to write a sale document for you on Shabbos, since the rabbis didn't forbade commanding a non-Jew to do a Melacha for you on Shabbos when it comes to helping settling Eretz Yisrael. [Tosfos points out: however, they would not permit commanding a non-Jew to do a Melacha D’oraisa for other Mitzvos, as we see in the Gemara in Eiruvin says that, when the hot water prepared for a child spilled and they needed to replace it; Rava told them to ask the mother, who we still consider sick and weak from giving birth, if she needs hot water. If she needs it, we may use the leftovers for the child for his Mila. We must say it was before they did the Mila. If it was afterwards, of course you can cook it up for the child without his mother, since he’s already in danger. We must also say, that we want a non-Jew to cook the water, as Rashi and R’ Chananal claim; since the Mila is on the eighth day of the birth, and by that time the mother is not in true danger. As we say, from day seven to day thirty, even if the mother insists she needs something and she will be in danger without it, we don’t believe her, and no Jews can Mechalel Shabbos for her. It is a stretch to say that we allow Chillul within seven 24-hour periods of the birth. (So, if she gave birth at the end of the day, the Bris can be within those seven 24 hours period. However, Tosfos feels this is a pushed explanation and not true.) Although: the Gemara there in Eiruvin says that they allowed bringing hot water from one house to another for the Bris we refer to carrying it through a courtyard without an Eiruv, which is only a rabbinic prohibition. However, they didn’t allow asking the non-Jew to heat water, which the Torah prohibited. Tosfos says further; this is no proof to allow a non-Jew to carry a Sefer Torah to Shul via a Karmalus (which is only a rabbinic prohibition); since we may only permit by a Bris, where the actual Bris supersedes Shabbos, but not for other Mitzvos.

However, the Bahag allows us to tell a non-Jew to do a Torah prohibition for a Bris, and the Gemara regarding carrying hot water refers to a non-Jew who carried it in a street (Reshus Harabim). The Gemara that only allowed heating up water because the mother needs it refers to a case where the mother is within seven days (24-hour periods) of birth, and he holds that we allow even a Jew to heat water for her. However, Tosfos says this cannot be. After all, the Gemara in Chulin says that if you cook for the sick, the healthy may not eat the leftovers, for perhaps you may add extra for him. So, even if you cook for the mother, you cannot use the extra for the Mila. However, if we ask a non-Jew to do it, we allow him to add extra for the Mila. However, it’s possible that we only allow to add extra for Mila, but not for other uses. Although we find many cases by Yom Tov that we allow people to add to their cooking for other uses; we are lenient to add by Yom Tov, (to encourage cooking) for Simchas Yom Tov.]

48) If a slave comes from afar with a document that his owner gives him his freedom and all the master’s property. (The slave says “it was written etc.” which helps to verify the document for his freedom, but not for the property.) We believe him to allow his freedom, but, we don’t believe him to grant him the property without signature verifications.

49) If the document bequeaths him all the master’s property, where the same words that gives the slave freedom grants him the property too; Abaya says you can’t split it. Originally he says, since we must give him his freedom, we must grant him the property too. Then Abaya changed his mind and said, since we can’t believe him regarding the property, we cannot believe him concerning his freedom. Rava says: regardless of how they wrote the document, we split it and only believe the slave regarding his freedom and not regarding the rest of the estate.

50) The Tanna Kama (R’ Meir) says: if someone gives a document to his slave that says, “I give you all my property excluding one parcel of land” he doesn’t go free. R’ Shimon says: he always goes free unless he writes “except for a thousandth of my property.” In this case, he may mean he leaves out the slave. (Although his true worth is more than that, the master can say, in his eyes, the slave is not worth more.) [Rashi understands the proof that R’ Shimon holds we split the belief in his words, since he said ‘always.’ Not only in a case where the master explicitly says which parcel of land he leaves out, and therefore the slave will receive the rest, but even if he didn’t say which land he leaves. Since, we don’t know which land he leaves, he can’t collect any land, (since any land he wants to collect can be the land the master left for himself.) In that case, the only thing the slave gets is himself. This is what the master refers to when he wrote “all my property.” Although such a statement connotes some land, however, R’ Shimon holds he can split the statement. So “all my property” can mean “part of my property.” Tosfos argues. He says, even if he didn’t explicitly write which land he leaves over, the slave would still receive all the properties except one. The master has a right to choose which one he’ll keep, which would be the one of the highest quality. However, the slave would receive the rest, as we see in Mesechta Bava Basra. Rather, the Ri explains: R’ Shimon includes all cases, even when all he owns is one field. Since when he excludes a parcel of land, it must be this land (since there is no other land), so the only thing he gives his slave is his freedom.] R’ Nachman Paskined like R’ Meir.

51) We can't say the reason for R’ Meir is because we don’t split his words. As R' Nachman Paskins like R' Meir and yet he Paskins that when a dying person gives a gift of all his property to a slave and he revives (which we usually say that he only gave it because he thinks he’ll die, so when he lives, he automatically reneges on the gifts), he can only renege on the property he gave, but he cannot renege on the freedom he granted his slave since the rabbis enacted him to go free, since people already consider him to be free. [Tosfos says: even though it can't take effect after his death, we refer to a case where he wrote explicitly that it should take effect “from today.” Alternatively, even if he gave it without explicitly writing when it takes effect, we can assume that he meant for it to take effect in his lifetime, because otherwise it couldn’t take effect. Although the master wrote his freedom with the understanding that he’ll still have him if he survives, so when he revives, he technically never freed him; we must say since the whole concept of a dying man’s gift reverts back to him if he survives is only a rabbinic enactment, so we assume that he gives it as the rabbis enacted. Therefore, since the rabbis enacted for the slave to go free, we assume that it’s the givers intention too. However, if he wrote specifically that the slave should return to him if he revives, then the slave reverts back to him.]

52) Rather, the reason R' Meir holds he doesn’t go free is since such a Get “doesn’t cut off completely.” [Rashi explains: since we see the master keeps something for himself, once he starts keeping for himself, he really wants to keep even more for himself. So, perhaps he leaves the slave for himself, so he doesn’t go free. Tosfos says: if so, then if the slave is all that’s left from his property after he leaves over what he explicitly said, he’s the default gift and goes free. However, Tosfos disagrees since the Tosefta we quoted implies that “even if he only has that one field,” R’ Meir disagrees. Rather, Tosfos explains why this is not cut off completely. He tries to free him with the words “all my property goes to you.” Since he then goes back and limits that statement to exclude something, so the master still retains something that’s included in the term “all my property.” Therefore, a statement that the master still keeps some of it for himself cannot free a slave. However, when the slave brings a document that the master gives everything and doesn’t leave anything for himself, we can split his words to believe him only on his freedom.]

53) If a messenger brings a Get in Eretz Yisrael, if the husband comes and claims against the Get, we bring witnesses to verify the signatures. [Tosfos adds from the Yerushalmi: also, if the woman comes to collect her Kesuvah from someone who bought a field from her husband, the buyer has a right to claim the Get might be forged.] However,when one witness says it’s forged, we never believe him until there is a second witness with him. If it’s two witnesses, we wouldn’t believe the signed witnesses even after they’re verified. After all, this would be an argument between two sets of witnesses, so we cannot rely on the signed ones more than the ones who claim it’s forged. [Tosfos says: this is not true by money documents, which one cannot collect from the borrower’s property if he’s not there to defend himself. Similarly, the same applies when collecting from his heirs, or from buyers (that your document created a lien on their bought properties). We cannot allow a collection from this document unless he validates the documents with witnesses, or else anyone can forge a document and collect from those that are ignorant of the original owner’s affairs and cannot defend their rights. Therefore, it makes sense when you don’t deal directly with the original owner, that you cannot collect without proving it’s not forged. Therefore, the only way to protect them is to enact that we claim on behalf of the heirs that perhaps the documents are forged. Although a Gemara in Bava Metzia says that, if someone found a loan document that doesn’t create a lien on sold property, the Rabanan say you cannot return it; even though there's no harm that can ever come to the borrower if it’s returned if the lender needs to validate the document; but once we see something fishy that he didn’t guard his document well and let it drop, it gives us extra concern perhaps it was forged and these forgers did an extra good job. However, we only don’t return it because of the combination, that it’s fishy that he allowed it to fall, and that the borrower denied borrowing it. However, if the borrower wasn’t around, and the lender brought witnesses to establish the document, we allow him to collect since the borrower didn’t deny it. Even afterwards, when the borrower returns and claims that he never borrowed the money, we don’t believe him, since the lender already collected it legally.]

54) [R’ Tam explains the reason for the custom to write twelve-line divorce documents is because twelve is the Gematria of ‘Get.’ However, Ri quotes R’ Hai Goan’s and R’ Sadya Goan’s explanation: because the Torah calls a Get a Sefer and the Gemara in Bava Basra says that you must leave four lines between each Chumash in a Sefer Torah. There are twelve lines between the first four Chumashim. (We do not count the lines between Sefer Bamidbar and Devarim, since Devarim is mostly a review of the first four Chumashim).]

55) A divorce document and a freedom document are similar (in ways that Kiddushin is different from them) that the messenger that brings them from across the seas must say "it was written and signed before me." [Tosfos explains: although the only reason they were lenient by a woman to rely on the messenger saying “it was written etc.” is so she shouldn’t remain unable to marry; but we also consider it as the slave being held back (in such an inferior situation by remaining a slave) where he cannot marry a free woman and is not obligated in all Mitzvos.]

56) They’re the same regarding allowing a Kuti witness to sign on them. (Since there is a Halacha that all signers must be present by everyone’s signing, the Jewish witness would see which Kuti would sign with him and if the Kuti wouldn’t be a fine person who is associated with our Judaism, the Jew would refuse to sign.) They’re also the same regarding the non-Jewish courts signing on them. Although they’re valid on other documents, they invalidate the Get and freedom document. [Tosfos points out: the Get will be invalid even if a Jew writes the text. First, to validate a Get, you need to be someone who personally can divorce. However, a non-Jew cannot give a Get to his wife, so he cannot validate a Get. Second, you need to sign L’Shma. We assume the non-Jew will not sign it L’Shma, even if you insist, since he always does things on his own terms. Another reason: since the husband needs to order them to write and sign the Get, we see that they are his Shluchim (agents) and we see that the Torah excludes non-Jews from being a Shliach. Finally, non-Jews are invalid witnesses. However, the rabbis enacted to believe them by other documents when we know they would say the truth, because they assume that the judges won’t ruin their reputations by lying. However, we say later that a document to give a gift is invalid, (since you need a valid document to make the transaction), and this is not a valid document. (Rashi explains: because the law of the land is binding.)] It's like R’ Eliezer who says the real witnesses that validate a document are those who witness the handing over but he agrees the Get’s invalid if they forged signatures, or by any invalid signatures, like here where they’re invalid witnesses. R' Shimon allows by distinctive non-Jewish names where we won’t mistake them for valid witnesses.

57) According to R’ Meir, there is another similarity. As he holds (that both a divorce and a freeing are detrimental to the recipient. Therefore, nobody has a right to acquire their documents for them without them appointing him.) Therefore, if the husband or master gives the document to a messenger, he can’t acquire it for them. Therefore, the transaction didn’t happen and the husband/master could renege on giving the document. This is different than Kiddushin since in this case, Kiddushin is not comparable, since it cannot be given against her will. [Rashi explains: we can’t compare the messenger of Gitten (or freeing slaves) that you can send against the will of the recipient, to Kiddushin, that you can’t. Tosfos asks: if so, then this case wouldn’t only be according to R’ Meir, but even according to the Rabanan. If the slave explicitly doesn’t want the freedom, you can renege on giving the document after you handed it to the messenger, (since he cannot represent the slave against his explicit will. We only say that they assume the slave wants you to represent him if we don’t have any reason to say that he’s against it.) Rather, Tosfos explains like R’ Chananal: that, although you can renege after giving to all messengers, there is only a special Chidush by Gitten and freedom documents that you may give the documents against their will, since I might say that you may also set up messengers to receive the documents against their will, so we're taught that they can’t. However, by Kiddushin that you can’t give without her consent, of course you can’t set up a messenger without her consent, so it’s not like the others.]

58) However, in a case where the witnesses don’t know how to read, you read the Get for them. [Tosfos says: having someone reading for them what’s written in the Get is not a problem of a witness testifying what he heard from other witnesses; since the readers didn’t tell them anything on the main testimony (the divorce), but just revealing to them what’s written in the document they’ll sign. However, in order that the witnesses may rely what the readers tell them is written in the Get so they can sign, two people must read it to have two witnesses to establish what the document truly says. Or, you may have one person read it to you if he fears you, so he won’t dare change anything.] If they don't know how to sign, you ‘rip’ a blank paper in the shape of their names and they trace over it. [Rashi explains: they scratch the names onto the paper, and the witnesses trace the scratches. Tosfos says although the scratching is in itself writing, the signatures over them are not a problem of being "writing over writing" that we say, once someone wrote something, we don’t consider writing over it a second time as writing; since the scratches are just marks and not real writing, so we consider tracing with ink over it as writing. However, Tosfos argues with Rashi’s definition since ‘ripping’ doesn’t connote scratching. Rather, Tosfos explains like R’ Chananal: they rip a blank paper to make a stencil of the letters of their names. The witnesses just need to trace through the ripped spaces over the Get, and you’ll have their signatures. The Yerushalmi asks: this is the original signature; i.e., that we cannot verify the signatures, since they only fill in the space someone else cut for them, so there is nothing personally distinct in the way they signed. The Yerushalmi answers, they made the rips wide. I.e., that the witnesses didn’t fill up the whole ripped area. Therefore, each one traces in their own distinct way.] However, this only applies by women’s Get. However, for freedom documents and all other documents, they can only sign if they can read and write.

59) All documents that a Kuti witness signs are invalid except by Gitten and freedom documents.

60) Regarding Kuti-made Matzos; the Tanna Kama says they’re permitted to eat [Tosfos says: we refer to a case where the dough belongs to a Jew and a Kuti baked it, but regularly, the rabbis forbade eating Kuti bread.] Someone can be Yoitza his obligation with it. [Tosfos says: although we know that Kutim don’t understand the Mitzvah of Lifnei Iver to mean not causing others to sin, and we can't be sure that they made the Matzos L’Shma for us; we refer to a case that we know that the Kuti does not have any other Matzos for himself. Therefore, we know he made these Matzos Kosher for himself.] R’ Elazar says you may not eat them because the Kutim are not experts keeping all the details of Mitzvos. R’ Shimon b. Gamliel says, all Mitzvos that we established that Kutim keep, they’re more detailed oriented to keep them than Jews [Tosfos: even if it's not written explicitly in the Pasuk. The Tanna Kama needs the opposite, written explicitly, even if we didn't established yet that they keep it. However, Tosfos was in doubt what R’ Shimon b. Gamliel will hold in that case.]

61) Our Mishna that allows one Kuti witness is really R’ Elazar who regularly never trusts them. However, here we refer to a case that the second signature is a trustworthy Jew. If he didn’t know that the Kuti signed before him was a Kosher one, he would never signed with him. [Tosfos says: we don't say that since the whole reason we trust this document is because of this one Jew, we're believing this document based on one witness’ account; since the Kuti is a Kosher witness from the Torah, since he holds that they’re true converts, although the rabbis invalidate them since they felt they’re untrustworthy as a whole, but all we need is some sign to say that he’s trustworthy to revert to the Torah’s Halacha that he’s a valid witness.] By all documents, there's no proof that the Kuti is Kosher since he didn’t know who would sign after him, he might have signed by skipping a line, for perhaps the second witness would be an honorable man and he’ll sign in the first slot. It's only a proof by a Get since all witnesses must be present while the others sign. They enacted this for perhaps the husband would demand all those who hear his command (to write a Get) to sign. If they’re not all there at the same time, perhaps they’ll mistakenly give it after only two of them signed, and therefore, be invalid.

62) R’ Gamliel permits two Kuti witnesses. [Tosfos points out: R’ Gamliel’s reason is that he holds that trusting Kutim depends on whether we know that they keep the Mitzvah properly. We know they keep it by Gitten, but we don’t know if they keep it by all documents.]

63) The Tanna Kama says that all documents written and signed by non-Jewish courts are valid, except Gitten and freedom documents. It's simple why a sale document is valid, since the transaction happened through the giving of money. You only need the document for proof, and we know that the courts wouldn’t risk ruining their reputation to write a sale document without witnessing the giving over of the money. The reason it works also for a gift document that you need the document to make the transaction, and documents made by non-Jews are invalid and are no better than a pottery shard, [Rashi explains: the Gemara could have answered that he holds according to R’ Elazar, that the Jewish witnesses observing the handing over of the documents validate it. Tosfos asks: we said that they hold like R’ Elazar, that the signatures don’t make the document, but, only those who observe the document’s handing over. Rather, the Ri explains: we invalidate the gift document for the same reason why we invalidate the Get and freedom document; we’re afraid that we’ll rely on the signatures without verifying with Jewish witnesses that observed the handing over. The rabbis only enacted to believe only sale or loan documents, which has no other function but for proof of transaction. However, a gift document (that you need to make the transaction) is not valid from the Torah unless you have Jews witnessing the handing over. Even if you would say that Jewish signatures without witnesses for the handing over is good enough to validate the document because, (the signatures verify that they wrote the document correctly and handed it to the gift giver), thus, finding it in the receivers hand is proof of the handing over. Alternatively, it’s no worse than the giver admitting that he gave the gift, which is if he has a hundred witnesses to it. However, non-Jewish signatures don’t establish the above situation. Thus, seeing it now in the receiver’s hand is neither as if we observed the handing over, nor as if he admitted giving it.] We must say that gift documents written by non-Jewish courts are valid because of Dina D’Malchusa Dina (the law of the land is binding). Alternatively, gift documents written by non-Jewish courts are not valid, and the Mishna means to invalidate all documents similar to Get (that make transactions).

64) R’ Shimon’s permits it since he holds like R’ Elazar that one only needs witnesses who observe the handing over. Although he agrees that if you have signatures, they cannot be forged (or any other invalid signatures since we’re afraid that we’ll rely on the signatures to verify the document’s validity); we refer here to distinctive non-Jewish names where we won’t mistake them for valid witnesses. There are two versions if he allows it with laymen with distinct names, or only with judges. [Tosfos explains: they argue if they invalidate them even with Jews witnessing the handing over and with distinctive names, for perhaps we’ll validate those monetary documents without Jews watching the handing over, as they validate by the courts, or not.]

65) The Chachumim only validate monetary documents signed by the courts who won't lie, but not by laymen.

66) R’ Shimon told the Rabanan he argues with in his generation; R’ Akiva and the Chachumim (the generation before them) agree that any document written in the non-Jewish courts are valid, and they only argue with documents written by laymen, that R’ Akiva hold they're valid, and the Chachumim only validate the Gitten and freedom documents, but not the monetary documents. [Tosfos explains: they argue when laymen write it and the Chachumim decree to forbid it by monetary documents. Since we allow the courts to sign even without witnesses observing the handing over, we worry that you may allow it with laymen too.]

67) R’ Shimon b. Gamliel only permits in places that don’t allow Jews to sign,but he doesn’t allow in places that allow Jews to sign even with distinct names, because they’ll end up allowing even without distinct names. However, where Jews can’t sign, we don’t worry that they’ll confuse different places from each other, as we only worry they’ll mix up the types of names.

68) We only allow an established court to write a monetary document to validate it, but we don't allow temporary judges.

69) Rava said: a Persian document that they handed over in front of Jewish witnesses is valid, but you can only collect from property still in the borrower’s possession. It doesn’t create a lien to collect property the borrower sold. We refer to a case where they understand Persian, but if the Jews don’t understand what’s in the document, they can't be considered proper witnesses on this document. It must be they wrote it on material that one can't forge, or else we can't say the document is Kosher. [Tosfos says: even though those who hold that the witnesses to the handing over makes the document, and usually they hold that you can write the document on something that can be forged (since the witnesses can observe what’s written on it when he handed it over), it's said according to R’ Elazar (the Amorah) who says R’ Elazar (who holds the witnesses to the handing over make the document) only holds you can write on something that can be forged by Gitten, but he holds that you must write other documents (that may contain many more conditions that witnesses won’t remember so well) on something that cannot be forged. Although it’s a perfect document, it doesn't make a lien since it’s in a foreign language, and nobody knows about it to create rumors about it (in order that the buyers should beware of the lien).]

70) Documents brought from across the sea that had non-Jewish names signed are Kosher since, most Jews overseas adopted non-Jewish names [Tosfos: and we assume a Jew signed it, although non-Jews also had non-Jewish names, since it’s not common for non-Jews to sign on our documents]. So, we see they’re valid. However, in Eretz Yisrael, it's not Kosher since we need to worry that a non-Jew signed it [Tosfos: despite that it’s not common for non-Jews to sign on our documents].

71) If you tell a Shliach to give a Get to your wife or a freedom document to your slave; the Chachumim say that you can renege on the Get, but not on the freedom document, since it's a benefit for the slave to be free, the Shliach can represent him and acquire the document on his behalf. R' Yehuda held that you can renege for either one since it's to his detriment. [Tosfos quotes the Yerushalmi that asks on the Chachumim: if he's a slave of nobility, it would be a detriment for him to leave, and if she's a wife of someone with skin disease, it's a benefit? The Yerushalmi answers: since the noble master can sell him against his will to a commoner, it's not considered a benefit. However, you can't divorce your wife against her will through someone else. (See Tosfos Harosh who answers a wife of someone with skin disease: it's still better to be with someone than to be lonely.)]

72) R' Huna originally wanted to prove from the Chachumim that, if someone grabs items from a borrower of his friend for his friend to collect when it's detrimental to other people (like other creditors are also trying to collect), that it takes effect and it's considered collected for his friend. This is why the master can't renege on the freedom document since it was already grabbed by the Shliach for the slave to acquire it. [Tosfos explains: the slave is considered as a creditor even though the master technically doesn't owe him anything; still, he wants to free him for all his top service to you, its like you owe it to him for the debt of gratitude. However, it's considered detrimental to others, i.e., the master, since there is no true obligation to give it.] However, R' Yirmiya pushes off the proof since R' Yochanan held that the creditor doesn't acquire it when it's detrimental to others [Tosfos says: even when he makes the grabber his agent, as it says in Kesuvos. Although R' Yochanan holds that you can acquire a lost object for a friend even though it's detrimental to others (who may want to acquire the Hefker object); since the grabber has the right to acquire it for himself, we can say the logic as "once he can acquire it for one person, he can acquire it for others too."] Rather, the reason for the Rabanan is because they hold that saying "give the document to him" is like saying "acquire the document for him." [Tosfos says: this is only if someone is giving it to him to acquire. Also, it's only in this case where there's some type of obligation, but not by a gift.]

73) [Tosfos says: according to the opinion that they didn't enact Maamad Shlashtan (that you can give over in an acquisition what's in a third party's hands by just telling the holder of the object that you're giving it to this other person) only by an object you left by him to watch, but not by a loan (that the money is not there anymore since it's spent); that which they didn't acquire it anyhow by saying "give it" which is like saying acquire it for him; since they wanted something to work even if the object is not resting in the guard's possession at the moment. Alternatively, that it will work even against the guard's will. However, R' Tam says that we only say that saying 'giving' is like saying 'acquiring' is at the time the owner gave it over to the third party. Also, it only works by obligations, and not by gifts.]

74) If someone gathers Pe'ah for a certain poor person; R' Eliezer says that the poor person acquires it, and the Chachumim say he doesn't, and the gatherer must give it to the first poor person he meets. We don't need to say that they argue whether if someone grabs items from a borrower of his friend for his friend to collect when it's detrimental to other people, if he acquires it. We can say everyone holds, regularly, that he doesn't acquire, and R' Eliezer held that since this gatherer, even if he's not poor, can make his property Hefker and become poor and be eligible to collect it for himself, and "once he can acquire it for one person, he can acquire it for others too." The Rabanan still forbid it from the Pasuk "don't collect it, it's for the poor," that it could be read "don't collect it for the poor."

75) Rav says: a master can't tell his slave to work for him, and he won't feed him. Although we have a Braisa that, if the master made the slave's hands Kodesh, that the slave can borrow money for food and work to pay it off; it's not because he's not being fed (or else his master can't make his hands Kodesh), but the master was feeding him, but he needs some extra. He's allowed to do this since Hekdesh wants him to have the extra, since he'll work better for Hekdesh. Therefore, he pays it back when he works for less than a Pruta at a time so Hekdesh wouldn't take effect on the wage. [Tosfos says: even though Hekdesh can take effect on less than a Prutah, but here, it becomes Kodesh according to the intention of the person who made it Kodesh, and he only intended for the slave's work to become Kodesh on a Prutah at a time.]

76) However, R' Yochanan holds that a master can tell his slave to work for him without feeding him. Therefore, if someone cuts off his friend's slave's arm, he gives the money for his healing and his unemployment to his master. Of course the master must use the money to heal him, but if he uses a very sharp ointment to heal, and it heals him faster, the leftover of the money remains by the master, although the slave received the extra pain that is caused by the sharper ointment. [Tosfos says: although the Gemara in Bava Kama says that if you wound your own slave, you're exempt, implying even to pay for his healing; we must differentiate between getting paid for it from someone else, or if you need to pay for it from your own pocket. Alternatively, all it means is that he's exempt from paying the extra if he used a sharp ointment on him, like over here.]

77) Even according to Rav, if the master says that he should work for his own food, anything he makes more than he needs to support himself belongs to the master. We don't say that the extra should be left by the slave just in case he can't make as much as what he needs on another day, so he can use today's extra to supplement it.

78) In a hunger, R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that the slave can tell his master that either feed me or free me. The Chachumim say that he doesn't need to have this alternative. We don't need to say that it's dependent on the argument between Rav and R' Yochanan whether a master needs to feed the slave. After all, even Rav agrees that the master can tell him work for himself even if he can't make enough money to support himself. However, R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that the slave can claim that the master should free him so that he can collect alms, since people will have more compassion on a regular Jew than a slave. The Chachumim hold that, anyone who will have compassion on a Jew will have it on a slave too, so he wouldn't gain by his freedom. [Tosfos says: R' Yochanan will hold that R' Shimon b. Gamliel only held this to be a proper claim in times of hunger, but the slave will be able to beg at people's doors and get his food at regular times.]

79) R' Yehuda held that it's detrimental to a slave to be freed, although the freedom will allow him to marry regular Jewesses, but it also makes him forbidden to female slaves, which he would like better since their looser people and will be more willing to have relations with him. [Tosfos says: however, he agrees that it's a benefit to a child slave who hasn't yet 'tasted' having relations, just like we say it's a benefit to convert a child. Although we say it's not beneficial to convert an adult according to all since he likes a more looser lifestyle, that's because he's also not ruled by anyone else like by a slave.]

80) [Tosfos sets up the next Gemara: R' Yehuda has the next claim to the Rabanan, even to you who say that it's regularly beneficial] R' Yehuda says it's detrimental for a Kohein's slave to get freed since he'll miss eating Trumah [Rashi: that's cheaper than Chulin; Tosfos: and, according to R' Yehuda, he can actually collect it at the granary.] You can't say that it's not a benefit since he can be freed against his will, since he can run away and can't be freed. The Rabanan say that there is still a way for him to lose his Trumah without him there to receive his freedom, by selling him to a Yisrael. [Tosfos says: but R' Yehuda holds that, if he ran away, the master won't find a Yisrael willing to buy him.]

81) If one said to give a Get to his wife, or a freedom document to his slave; and he dies beforehand, he can't finish his agency since there's no Get after his death [Tosfos: and we don't consider him still his agent after his death, and he'll get the status if he's the sender, just because he was appointed as an agent in his lifetime.]

82) However, if a person says to give a hundred Zuz to someone and dies, you still give it after his death. Rav qualifies it: if the hundred Zuz was piled up in the corner.

83) R' Zvid explains that the giver was a regular healthy person, and the acquisition works because of Maamad Shlashtan. [Tosfos says: this is no proof that Maamad Shlashtan doesn't work by documents, and that's why the earlier cases don't take effect; since they might refer to a case of Maamad Shlashtan, and although they're in the same Mishna, we don't need to say that all the cases are exactly the same.] The reason Rav holds that the money needs to be piled up since he holds that Mamad Shlashtan only works when it's given to someone to guard (and exists in his possession) and not by a loan (where it's already spent and not in his possession anymore).

84) R' Pappa establishes the case by a deathly ill person (who they enacted that he can make acquisitions with his command). The reason Rav held it needs to be piled up is because he's consistent to his opinion that only if a deathly ill person says to give this hundred Zuz, you give it to the recipient, but not if he says an undefined hundred Zuz, since he might be alluding to a buried hundred Zuz. However, we Paskin not like that, and we don't worry that there's a buried hundred Zuz that he wants to give.

85) [Tosfos says: that, which we don't establish it with a healthy person, and you still need to give it if he dies suddenly since there's a Mitzvah to fulfil the dead's man command, which would apply even if it wasn't piled up; since, although we Paskin like R' Meir that you need to fulfil it, perhaps Rav couldn't establish it in this way since he might Paskin like R' Yossi who says that you don't fulfil his wish. Alternatively, perhaps that obligation is only if the person handed over the object for that purpose, and not if he commanded it after he already handed it over.]

86) [Tosfos concludes: perhaps, it's not applicable to say that it's a Mitzvah to fulfil his command if the one holding it doesn't agree to it, so only Maamad Shlashtan works in that case. R' Tam concludes: we don't say this Mitzvah by a convert since he completely lost power over the object at his death, since it becomes Hefker, and it's not like a regular Jew that still has some power by giving it over to heirs.]

87) Really, Rav does hold that you can acquire loans through Maamad Shlashtan. [Tosfos says: this is even true when it's against the will of the one holding on to it, i.e., the guard or borrower.] This doesn't work with any reason, but it's an enactment that works without a reason. [Tosfos says: they, of course, had a reason to enact it, so to make it easy to acquire it without an official transaction. What we mean is that there's no reason that the transaction to take effect legally.] We see such similar enactments that, if someone writes a document for his wife to receive all his property after his death, it only makes her the caregiver to his orphan heirs. [Tosfos explains the rationale: since we assume someone won't totally disinherit his children to give it all to his wife.] Also, that if you marry off your eldest son in your house, he acquires the house [Tosfos explains: if the father clears out all his items from the house, the acquisition transpires since the son is now confident that his father wants to give it to him.]

88) However, you can't give the rationale for the enactment it's as if, when he gives it over, he said that it should be returned and owed to me, or anyone I choose to be in my stead; since it wouldn't work for people who weren't born yet at that time. After all, even R' Meir who says that a person can acquire something that doesn't exist yet will agree that you can't make an acquisition for someone who has not come into the world yet. [Tosfos says: this is only according to R' Huna, but R' Nachman holds you can acquire for a fetus who's not in the world, but can't acquire an item that doesn't exist yet.]

89) You can't say that we assume the holder agrees to hold himself liable to the new person since he's getting the pleasure of having a new person to deal with who he didn't owe it for a long time and doesn't feel so pushed to pay it back. After all, the new person can be someone who's a lot harder to deal with and pressure him more to pay back. Therefore, we must say there's no reason behind it.

90) [Tosfos says: it implies from here that you can't forgive a loan after you give it over through Maamad Shlashtan (although you can forgive it if you sell it in a more conventional acquisition). Also, we can say that you can't sell your Kesuva through Maamad Shlashtan since it's a document that one may never come to collect.]

91) [Tosfos says: they didn't enact Maamad Shlashtan to sell to a non-Jew, since the holder can't acquire it on a non-Jew's behalf. Also, if the non-Jew is the holder, you can't give it over to a Jew through Maamad Shlashtan since he can't acquire for others, since non-Jews can't be a Shliach. However, if the non-Jew gave it to a Jew to watch, if he says to give it to another Jew, the other Jew acquires. After all, if it takes it out of a Jew's possession, of course it should take it out of the non-Jew's possession. Also, the Jews can claim that since it takes effect according to the non-Jewish law, the acquisition should take effect even if it doesn't take effect by us.]

92) If you give it over with Maamad Shlashtan, he can't renege on it, but only if he said it in front of the one who's receiving the gift. Even if it's a small gift, you still need it to be said in front of him.

93) It's just if you didn't give it him based on a false premise, but if you gifted it by mistake, it doesn't take effect.

94) If someone gave money to another person to deliver to someone else he owes, the one who gives the money is still obligated to make sure the money gets to his creditor, and would need to pay again if something happened to it before it reaches the creditor's hands. Rav says that he can't even renege on it and take the money back from the delivery man, and Shmuel allows you to take the money back. Everyone agrees that saying, "bring it to him" is as you said to "acquire for him." Rav says that you don't say, just because it's upon you to pay if anything happens to it, you can renege, and Shmuel allows it. [Rashi explains: however, by a gift, where there's no obligation to give it again, even Shmuel agrees that you can't renege on it. However, Tosfos says that we don't say that "bring it to him" is as you said to "acquire for him" by gifts, but only on obligations. However, if the creditor forgives this obligation to pay if anything happens, or by a freedom document (that we consider it as somewhat of an obligation to give, but he's not obligated if anything happens to it); than Shmuel would agree that he can't renege.]

95) There was a story with the sons of Rochel that they grew thorns in their vineyard. The mother said when she was deathly ill that she gives a certain piece of clothing to her daughter; the rabbis honored her wish. R' Elazar says that, usually, we don't say the words of the deathly ill are written in a document that's handed over, but here they fined the sons since they were wicked for keeping Klayim. (R' Elazar is consistent to his opinion that thorns are Klayim in a vineyard.) However, the Chachamim say that you may keep thorns in your vineyard, and there was no reason to fine the sons. They only honored her wish because the words of the deathly ill are binding.

96) If a deathly ill person bequeaths his possessions to someone, as long as the receiver was alive at the bequeathing, even if he dies [Tosfos before the giver] it goes to the receiver's heirs. [Tosfos says: even if they were born after the bequeathing. After all, the bequeathing is the acquisition, and the receiver got it then. This is not like "a Mitzvah to listen to the command of the dead" where the receiver needs to be alive at the time of the giver's death.]