1) If someone sent a Get, and then he, or his agent, reach the agent with the Get, or reach the wife, and say that the Get is canceled; it's truly canceled, and we don't say that he didn't want to cancel it, but he just wanted to bother the wife. [Tosfos explains: at least, I would think, that we should assume that for stringencys (even though it's simple that it's not that strong of an assumption to assume that completely). Alternatively, perhaps we should assume it completely since he didn't reserve witnesses to see his cancelation.]

2) When the Get came to the woman's hand, it can't be canceled anymore. Even if he's running after you to cancel it before it's given, we don't say that it shows retroactively that he wanted to cancel it before it was given. [Tosfos says: even to Rava who says that we take into account of he shows that he wants to cancel it before the giving, but that's only when we know originally that he wanted to cancel it. However, here, where we never knew he ever wanted to cancel it, even if we believe him that it was his intent to cancel it, but since we didn't know it by the Get's giving, it's considered "things of the heart" (thoughts that was never expressed), which doesn't play a factor. Although you might claim that it's not similar to the case of having thoughts, like when someone sells his property in order to move to Eretz Yisrael, but he never expressed the reason at the sale; if he wasn't able to go to Eretz Yisrael, he can't renege. After all, there, he should have expressed the condition, but he didn't, but the husband here didn't have a chance to express that he wants to cancel the Get. However, the rabbis decided to consider this like if it's "things of the heart" since it's similar. This is not considered as they're going against the Torah (by making it into a get, when it's not) since it's similar to "things of the heart." We see even a greater power that they have, that even if the husband says that he wants to cancel it, but not to the woman or the agent bringing the Get, it's a valid Get. However, this needs more investigation, since they might have only made it a valid Get for a stringency, but not for a leniency. Alternatively, it may be a true "things of the heart" like when we force someone to bring a Korban, we force him to say that he wants to bring it even if we're forcing him to not to cancel those words.]

3) If the husband says "it's canceled" or "I don't want it," it's a valid cancelation, since it implies that he's canceling it from this time an on. However, if he says "it's Pasul" or "it's not a Get," it's nothing. After all, he's saying on the past that it was Pasul, or it was not a Get, and we know it's to be a valid Get.

4) This seems to contradict the following. If someone receives a gift and says "it's canceled," it implies in the past [Rashi: since it's like he's admitting that he's never received it as a gift, and an admittance of the litigant (that it's detrimental to) is like a hundred witnesses] and it breaks the gift. (However, if he says it will be canceled, the gift remains since it was already given, and he can't uproot it by saying it will be canceled.) The Gemara reconciles: it can mean both tenses, and we assume it means the one that it helps. [However, the Ri held that the text in Kreises seems the opposite: it's a gift if he says "it's canceled" but not a gift when he says "it will be canceled." Therefore, we must explain: when it's in the past, it implies that you're saying it wasn't given, and we know it was given. However, when he says that it will be canceled, he means that it will be canceled by him making it Hefker. When our Gemara says that it means the past when it's helpful, (not as helpful as what he wants to break the gift), but helpful to keep the gift.]

5) Saying "bring this to someone" is not like saying "acquire it for him" by a gift.

6) There's an inquiry if he just says 'canceled,' and not "it's canceled," does it mean past tense, or future tense.

7) If he says that this Get shouldn't help, permit, release, send, divorce; or if he says it's should be earthenware, or it should be like earthenware, it's all future tense and cancels the Get. However, if he says it doesn't help, permit, release, send, divorce, or it's earthenware, or it's like earthenware; it's in the past and doesn't cancel the Get.

8) There's an inquiry if he says "behold it's earthenware," and we resolved it from saying "behold it's Hefker" or 'Hekdesh,' it works since it implies that it's future tense. [Tosfos asks an unresolved question: it implies in Nedarim that "this bread is Hekdesh" helps, but if we compare it to Get like in our Gemara then "this Get is earthenware" would cancel it, and yet we know that it doesn't help. After all, since "it's canceled" cancels the Get, and "canceled" is an inquiry; so if "this Get, it's earthenware" doesn't cancel the Get, so, of course, saying "this Get is earthenware" wouldn't cancel the Get.]

9) R' Nachman says that he can divorce another time with this canceled Get, and R' Sheishes says that he can't, since he made it Pasul. [Tosfos says: although R' Sheishes held in Kiddushin that words can't cancel an action, and even logical, someone can't take a Sefer Torah that's written L'shma and cancel it; however, he doesn't consider the finishing of the action of a Get until it's given.] The Halacha is like R' Nachman that you can give the Get again.

10) Even though we Paskin like R' Yochanan that, if yu give Kiddushin that it should take effect after ten days, that you can orally cancel the Kiddushin; that's because the action didn't happen yet, and words can cancel the words of agreeing to the Kiddushin. However, here the writing if the Get is an action, and words can't cancel the action. [Tosfos says: this implies that he can't Pasul the Get even if he explicitly says that it should lose it's validity. However, in Kiddushin, it explains that R' Nachman holds that he's only canceling the sending through his agent, and not Pasuling the Get. this implies that, if he explicitly says that it should lose it's validity, it's Pasul. That Gemara holds that it's not words canceling an action, since a Get's action is not finished until it's given, like we anyhow needed to say earlier according to R' Sheishes.]

11) Originally, they made a Beis Din in another place to cancel the Get. R Nachman says that it's before two [Tosfos says: even if you hold that, if two people judge like a Beis Din, it's not binding at all, however, two are enough of a Beis Din since] two is a Beis Din regarding a Pruzbal. However, R' Sheishes needs it before three, since, even for a Pruzbal, you need three people for a Beis Din.

12) A Pruzbal written as witnesses, but signed as judges, or vice versa, is valid. [Rashi explains: if he writes the Pruzbal "we remember what we witnessed in front of us" or writes "we were a Beis Din, and Ploni came before us." Or, he signed as Ploni the witness, or Ploni the judge. However, Tosfos explains: it doesn't matter if the Beis Din is written in the text of the Pruzbal, even if it was signed by witnesses who claim that it was true that it was done in Beis Din, or if it was signed by the judges, even if the Beis Din wasn't mentioned in the text of the Pruzbal.]

13) However, R' Gamliel the elder had decreed that one should not cancel the Get in Beis Din to fix the world. R' Yochanan explains: because of the fix of Mamzeirim, so that the wife shouldn't get married thinking that it's a Get. The reason is, since he holds like R' Nachman that the cancelation is done before two, rumors won't come out to that fact, and she won't find out that she wasn't divorced. [Tosfos says: although we say, when buying land before two people, it creates a rumor that he bought it, so there's a lien on the seller's property; but you need extra exposure by Get. They can't enact to only cancel before three, because you'll need to worry that she'll be left as an Agunah, as we'll say later.] However, Reish Lakish holds like R' Sheishes that you need to cancel before three, so it creates rumors and she won't get married [Tosfos says: although we say that, if someone borrows before three people, it doesn't produce rumors, and therefore, there's no liens; that's because people are more secretive of borrowing and do it in seclusion, and they always deny to people that they borrowed.] However, we're concerned that she will be stuck now as an Agunah and can't get married. [Tosfos says: even though there's a good reason why she can't remarry, since she's like everyone who wasn't divorced; but we see that we consider this as an Agunah, as this is the reason they allowed writing the unimportant parts of the Get not L'shma so that it should be ready to write it quickly if the husband is in a rush to depart across the sea, so she shouldn't remain an Agunah.]

14) If you B'dieved cancel it; Rebbi says that the Get is canceled. [Tosfos says: according to R' Nachman, only in front of two people, and according to R' Sheishes, only in front of three, but not before two, since there's a concern for Mamzeiros, and not before one even to R' Nachman since there's a much bigger concern for Mamzeiros, even Rebbi agrees that it's not canceled.] R' Shimon b. Gamliel held that he can't cancel it, nor to add some condition on to it. Even though it's not a valid Get from the Torah, she's allowed to marry someone else since everyone makes Kiddushin on condition that the rabbis consent to the marriage. So, the rabbis no longer consent to this marriage, so they annul it. [Tosfos says: for this reason we say by the Kiddushin “like the laws of Moshe and the Jews.”] This is even if he made Kiddushin with relations, since they’ll define it as a promiscuous act.

15) [Tosfos says: the reason the rabbis aren't worried that the husband will use this as a way to get his adulterous niece wife out of getting executed, by sending her a Get, cancel it, and then the rabbis will uproot the marriage retroactively: R' Shmuel says: they're not worried, because, truth be told, this would be a valid way to save her (and he didn't do anything wrong). However, you can't say that you can't have a definite warning for Z'nus since the husband can always uproot the marriage retroactively; since we can rely on the majority of marriages that aren't uprooted. Also, she has a Chazaka for being a married lady until the husband actually cancels a sent Get. R' Tam says: the rabbis don't uproot the marriage if the husband's intent is to uproot the marriage to save his niece or to make a Mamzer Kosher in order that the Jewish women shouldn't act promiscuous. However, if it wasn't his intent, then, in truth, it would save his wife.]

16) If a husband commanded ten people to give a Get to his wife; Rebbi says that he can cancel one agent not in front of the other ones. [Tosfos explains: even L'chatchila. This has nothing to do with his earlier position that holds that cancelation of the Get works, since he agrees that it doesn't work if he cancels it before one person, or even if he cancels before two of them, if he didn't cancel before both of them together, since we need to worry more because of Mamzeiros since the wife won't hear about it. Rather, the reason he allows here] since he holds that, by canceling some of the agents, he doesn't cancel them all. So, if the others who weren't canceled give the Get, it's valid. However, R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that he can't cancel one agent not in front of the other ones. Either because he says, by canceling some of the agents, all the agents are canceled, and we need to worry that the rest who he didn't personally canceled will give the Get. [Tosfos says: this will then be effected through R' Shimon b. Gamliel's earlier position, that even if it was canceled, the rabbis enacted that the cancelation doesn't take effect.] Alternatively, even if he holds the rest aren't canceled; but he holds even the ones he canceled are not canceled since he holds that if you appointed the ten together, you can't cancel any of them unless all of them are together. [Tosfos explains: even though, from the Torah, he can cancel a Get before any two people even if they're not agents; but once the rabbis enacted to get rid of such cancelations; they got rid of even canceling the agents if you don't do it before all the agents.]

17) We have an inquiry according to R' Shimon b. Gamliel if he can cancel one agent not in front of the others if he commanded that they all must give it. After all, if the reason that he can't cancel some, since the others are also canceled and they might still give it anyway; but here they won't give it unless all of them are there. However, if we say that the cancelation doesn't work unless he cancels them before the others, the cancelation doesn't take effect, so they all can give the Get since none of them are effectively canceled.

18) R' Yosef and Rabbah b. b. Chana held like R' Shimon b. Gamliel regarding a cancelation that's not before the agents don't cancel the Get. [Tosfos explains: even though R' Yosef, in Kiddushin, gave lashes for someone who canceled a Get; it's not because it took effect, but because he'll spread false rumors on the Get that it was invalid.] However, they Paskin like Rebbi that canceling some of the agents doesn't cancel all of them. However, R' Nachman even Paskins like Rebbi that a cancelation not before agents B'dieved takes effect.

19) This seems to contradict what R' Nachman holds in the following. If minor heirs want to split the estate [Tosfos: but not if only one wanted, and the others didn't want. However, if they just weren't there to consent, we can compare it to the splitting of Eretz Yisrael that they did it even though many children were there, and it's considered if they weren't in front of us. However, it's not a true proof, since that splitting was done with Hashem's command and with the Urim V'tumim.] Beis Din appoints an administrator for each one, and they pick out a good portion for their client. [Tosfos explains "pick out a good share": he can only split by making even plots, and then draw lots on them, but they can't buy out any indivisible property. Even so, the Gemara calls it "pick out a nice share" in order to make sure that the plots were divided with common sense, that you have the fields of every plot together, and not a half of field here, and another half further away. The Ri was in doubt whether you can split with a partner without him there if there may be a reason that he would want a certain side. Although we see that if a third brother shows up after the splitting from across the seas (Rav holds that the whole original split is canceled and) Shmuel says that each one gives him a piece of their share, that may only be when they make a new lot, and if the third brother's lot fell on what the brothers wanted to give him anyhow, then they can keep the rest of their original share and they don't need to hold to what the new lottery might have given them a different share.] Shmuel says that the minors could protest the split after they grow up. R' Nachman says they can't protest since, if they could, what power does Beis Din have (if their split is not binding)? Although R' Nachman here says that the cancelation of the Get takes effect and we don't say; what power does Beis Din have? Since he only says that by monetary laws, but not by prohibitions. [Tosfos says: even by money, R' Nachman only holds that Beis Din's ruling is always binding because, otherwise, what power does Beis Din have, is if Beis Din didn't make a mistake. However, if they assessed wrong, R' Nachman in Kesuvos Paskins like the Chachumim that says you can reverse the decision.]

20) The Halacha is like R' Nachman that we Paskin like Rebbi in both cases; a cancelation not before agents B'dieved take effect, and that canceling some of the agents doesn't cancel all of them.

21) If a husband shows his intention that he wants to cancel the Get, but didn't actually cancel it; Abaya says that this is nothing and it's not canceled, and Rava says it's something and it's canceled. Rava admits that if the Get was already given, but there was a condition, and the husband wanted to fulfil the condition to cancel the Get, but didn't, that the Get is valid since there's no Onness to a Get. After all, that case is different since he already gave the Get, and it only needed for the condition to be fulfilled to take effect. We Paskin like Abaya (and this is the Gimal, Giloy Daas, in Yaal K'gam).

22) They originally didn't write all the husband's and wife's names in the Get; but R' Gamliel enacted to write "this woman Plonis and all other names that she has" to create a fix that people who only know her by one name shouldn't start rumors that she didn't receive a Get with her name on it. [Tosfos says: in the Bahag's Gets, it's written a standard "and all names or nicknames that she may have." However, R' Tam held this to be problematic since, if she doesn't have any other name, people will assume that she wasn't the wife since she doesn't have any other name. Rather, the Sofar needs to write all her names in the Get like "the woman with the name Plonis, who is also known by this other name Plonis."]

23) This is only if she is known by both names. [Tosfos says: if a Meshumad is writing a Get for his wife, you don't write his name from his new religion so not to have this idolatry name in a Torah required document. It's still Kosher, and it's not a problem of not writing all his names in a Get; since that's only a need when he's known in one place (where it's written) with one name, and in a second place (where it will be given) with a second name. We then have a suspicion that the people in one place won't know that he's also known with this other name. However, it's not a problem if everyone knows both names in the same place even if he only writes the nickname. However, L'chatchila, you should mention all possible names in a Get. Although the great people of Yerushalayim only wrote one name into the Get, that's because they know that all people in all places recognize him with that name. Alternatively, it's not a problem if the nickname is extremely close to his real name.]

24) [Tosfos says: from our Sugya, it seems that we should write the main name is the one known at the place of giving, with the one known in the place of the writing. However, in the Tosefta, it says the main name that they're known by in the place of the writing with the name that they have in the place of the giving.]

25) If most the world calls her Miriam, and some call her Sarah, we should write the main name Miriam, and some call her Sarah, and not write the main name Sarah, and some call her Miriam.

26) A widow can't collect her Kesuva from orphans until she swears that she didn't collect yet, since she might have already received it from her husband. [Tosfos says" even though she's not entitled to collect a Kesuva while her husband is alive, and we have a Chazaka that someone won't pay an obligation before it's due; but a Kesuva, which is a special condition of Beis Din, maybe the exception and someone will allow his wife to hold onto objects to collect from even before he's obligated.] We don't say that they exempt her from swearing because of grace (that the husbands should have on their wives when they marry); [Tosfos: besides that the Kesuva wasn't due yet. This is why it's a bigger Chidush by a widow than by a divorcee.] The same applies to all creditors, that they can't collect from orphans without swearing.

27) However, widows stopped swearing (and stopped collecting) since the punishment of swearing falsely is horrible. As by the case of someone leaving a Dinar by a widow to watch, and she left it in the flour jar for safekeeping. She forgot about it an baked it in a bread, which she gave to a poor person. When the owner claimed it, she swore that she didn't have pleasure from it, (but she really did have pleasure from it, since it saved her flour in producing such a thick bread.) She received a great punishment from Heaven that one of her sons died. However, this was only a problem by widows since they were afraid that they once justified taking something from the estate for their bother of taking care of it for the orphans, but divorcees don't have that problem. [Tosfos says: even though someone's exempt when he mistakenly swears false (since he was under the impression that it was the truth); but she's considered negligent when she's watching the Dinar, since she should have paid more attention, and since she should have also realized that she will need to eventually swear, and she should have been more diligent.]

28) Therefore, R' Gamliel enacted that they should make a vow instead that she shouldn't partake pleasure on any item that the orphans deem if she already received her Kesuva. [Tosfos says: it must be an item that she would be able to keep not to have pleasure from, or else it wouldn't take effect. Even though someone would get Malkos right away for such an impossible vow, but since the prohibition is not constantly on her for the rest of her life, it wouldn't be a good deterrent. Nowadays, we're accustomed to have her accept a Cherem on her, which has even a less of a punishment.]

29) Shmuel (and some say that Rav) says: it's only a problem if she swears in Beis Din, but not if she swears by herself, since the punishment is not as harsh. [Rashi says: since she holds a holy object when swearing in Beis Din. Tosfos says: even when the swearing is a rabbinical enactment (like here), and not like Rashi in Kesuvos. The Aruch explains the difference, then, between a Torah and rabbinical swearing; that they extinguish the candles by a Torah swearing. Alternatively, the difference is as it's explained in Perek Shvuos Hadayanim.] However, Rav says that they can't swear outside Beis Din (and this would contradict his first statement according to the "some say" that it was Rav's statement). Also, they didn't except vows in his days, since people didn't consider it too stringently. Thus, Rav never collected a Kesuva for a widow. However, R' Yehuda argues and Paskins that you can collect either from a vow or from swearing outside Beis Din.

30) R' Huna says: she only collects if she makes the vow before she remarrys, but not afterwards since her husband can annul it. [Tosfos says: it's not a solution to have her vow not to eat from a certain bread and have her eat it there and then; since, like we say before, she would only be deterred by an ongoing prohibition, not for a one time prohibition. Also, you can't have her vow in front of her new husband and have him agree to the vow, and he can no longer annul it since he might annul it quietly before he agrees to it. It doesn't held to have her vow on the public's intention, which can't be permitted by a Chachum; since a husband can annul it since it's not dependent on the intent of the wife, since he annuls it even without her having regrets over the vow, so he doesn't need the public's consent even if the intent for the vow was given over to them. Alternatively, R' Huna disagrees that Beis Din can't permit when she vows on the public's intent.] However, we don't need to worry that the husband will annul the vow she made before she remarrys since he can't annul vows she made before their marriage. You don't need to worry that she'll have a Chachum permit it since he holds that a Chachum doesn't permit until they tell him about the whole vow, and when he knows that her vow was because of collecting the Kesuva, he won't permit it.

31) [Tosfos says: even though you don't annul a vow if the one you made it before is not there, we don't say that the husband can't annul this vow if the orphans aren't there, since it's only L'chatchila, but B'dieved, it's annulled. The Yerushalmi brings an argument why you can't annul without the other before him. Some say it's because he'll suspect you that you're transgressing your vow if he didn't witness the anulling. Others say in order to embarrass her that she made such an insulting vow to forbid her to have pleasure from someone. They also argue, according to their opinion, if someone should list his sins on Yom Kippur. According to the one who holds to embarrass you, you should be embarrassed about your sins too. However, if your worried about suspicion, you shouldn't list your sins so that people shouldn't suspect you about other sins.]

32) R' Nachman says: when going to a Chachum to permit a vow, you shouldn't say what it was, since he might leave out a detail and the full vow wouldn't be permitted. R' Pappa says that he needs to say what it was to make sure that the Chachum shouldn't permit a vow that shouldn't be permitted, like one that's in order to stop him from sinning or from stealing a Kesuva. [Tosfos says: the Yerushalmi implies that the Halacha is like R' Pappa.]

33) According to the one who says you don't say the vow, the way that it helps for a Kohein who married a divorcee to divorce her and vows any pleasure from these women to allow him to do the Avoda (which we fined him that he can't do) [Tosfos: or the woman who collected a Kesuva with a vow] if he can get the vow permitted; he needs to make this vow in public and they hold that those vows can't be permitted. Alternatively, even if they can be permitted, he needs to make a vow on the public's intent, since those can't be permitted unless it's for a Mitzvah [Tosfos: since we assume that the public would agree to the permitting so that the Mitzvah can be done. The Halacha is: if he makes this vow in public, they can be permitted, and if he makes a vow on the public's intent, it can't be permitted. R' Tam says that, in order to be on the public's intent, you need to say "on the intent of this person and that person" and not just say "on the public's intent." Also, if you only say it's on an individual's intent, you can have it annul even without that individual's consent.]

34) They enacted to sign a document. Some explain it according to R' Elazar who says that the witnesses that see the handing over of the document validates the document. However, they enacted to also have witnesses sign just in case the ones who saw the handing over died or moved across the sea; so, if the husband claims that the Get was not valid, you can verify the document with the witnesses' signatures.

35) Alternatively, it's according to R' Meir who says the signing witnesses validate the document. Granted that you need signatures, but they only need to sign "I'm a witness" without a name, and we can verify that it's him from his letters and writings. However, it was difficult to know who it was in order to verify it from his writings. Thus, they enacted to only sign their names, so that you may go to people who knew them and verify the signatures. However, this was only by regular people, but rabbis are famous and they could sign with their figures that they used as signatures since you can always validate it.

36) Hillel enacted a Pruzbal that Shvious shouldn't wipe away loans. This was to prevent the rich from stopping lending to the poor, and transgress "be careful etc." However, if the loan wipes away from the Torah, the rabbis wouldn't have the power to cancel it. [Tosfos explains: since there's no good reason to uproot the Torah law. Although, by handing over the documents to Beis Din, the loans aren't wiped out, however, they shouldn't enact a loophole to completely disregard the Torah obligation to wipe away loans. However, Rashi explains (Maharam- since he doesn't hold it's a problem to enact a loophole, so he can't say like Tosfos): that it's not a solution from the Torah to hand over the documents to Beis Din, and the Pasuk that we Darshen that it's permitted is only an Asmachta, and it really only teaches us that a loan with a collateral is not wiped. Therefore, the only reason to permit with a Pruzbal is because of what the Gemara will say.]

37) Abaya says: it's because he holds like Rebbi who says that Shmita these days is only rabbinical, since it's only applicable from the Torah when Yovel is still in effect. [Rashi says that Yovel wasn't applicable during the second Beis Hamikdash. Tosfos brings many Gemaras that implies that it was applicable during the second Beis Hamikdash. Rather, Hillel only enacted a Pruzbal for after its destruction, even though he lived during the time of the Beis Hamikdash.] However, the rabbis enacted Shvious as a rememberance to the Torah law. [Tosfos says: they didn't enact Yovel as a rememberance to Yovel from the Torah since it would be an enactment that most of the Jews won't be able to keep their land fallow for two consecutive years.] Although the Torah says that, nowadays, loans don't get wiped out, the rabbis can enact that it doesn't need to be paid since they can enact to passively cancel a Mitzvah.

38) Rava says: they can wipe out the loans since Beis Din can make money Hefker. [Rashi explains: therefore, even if Shmita is from the Torah, they can enact that the money belongs to the lender with a Pruzbal. Tosfos says: this is only because it's rabbinical, but not if it's from the Torah, since we shouldn't enact that the loans shouldn't be wiped out if the Torah wants it to be wiped out.]

39) There's an inquiry if Hillel enacted a Pruzbal only for that generation [Tosfos: according to his explanation, for the first generation after the Beis Hamikdash's destruction], or for all generations.

40) You need to have the Pruzbal written in an important Beis Din that has the strength to remove money. [Tosfos says: therefore, R' Tam wrote them since he considered himself as an important Beis Din in his days.]

41) [Tosfos says: a predated Pruzbal is Kosher, but a post dated one is Pasul, since it only covers documents dated before it was written, but not afterwards.]

42) One Beis Din can't cancel the enactments of an earlier Beis Din unless their greater than them in wisdom and students. [Tosfos says: if they're greater, they can cancel it even though it spread through most of the Jews and it's something that they have the ability to keep, as long as the earlier Beis Din didn't put themselves in danger over it, like Beis Shammai's eighteen decrees, as it says in Mesechta Avoda Zara, that even Eliyahu and his Beis Din can't overturn them. However, if it didn't spread among most of the Jews, even if they put themselves in danger, it could be overturned. Even for an enactment for one city that spread through most of its inhabitants, you need someone greater to permit it.]

43) Orphans don't need a Pruzbal since the Beis Din of the generation are their fathers and they're responsible to appoint people to take care of them and their money, it's as if they handed their documents over to Beis Din.

44) You only write a Pruzbal if the borrower has land, even the smallest amount, like a cabbage stalk. [Tosfos explains: since it's only common to lend money to someone with land, since it's always available to collect since it can't be lost like other properties. Even if he has the smallest amount of land, he can collect his whole loan since, when the borrower ransoms it, he can collect it again until he pays back his whole loan. The Rashbam explains: since there's no overcharging for land, each field has unlimited worth. However, Tosfos held this to be difficult since there's still a mistaken sale if it's sold for double its worth.]

45) If the borrower doesn't have any land, the lender can still write a Pruzbal if he gives him a piece of his own land.

46) If he borrowed an area to place his utensils, it's enough land that they can write a Pruzbal on it. Although we see a Halacha that you can only write a Pruzbal on a flowerpot if it has holes (and is considered attached to the ground) and it's not enough that he has a place to put the flowerpot on; we refer to a case where it's suspended on pegs, so it's not resting on land, but the holes still consider it as attached to the ground. [Tosfos says: although the flowerpot can be hidden, and it doesn't apply to the reason that we say someone will only lend money to someone with land; but the rabbis didn't want to make exceptions and allow it if he owns anything that has the status of land.]

47) The rabbis of R' Ashi gave over their loan documents to Beis Din verbally, and they didn't need to actually write a Pruzbal.

48) Even if the borrower doesn't have land, but the cosigner has land, you can write a Pruzbal. Even if the cosigner personally doesn't have land, but someone who owes him money has land, you can write the Pruzbal like R' Nosson who says that, if Reuvein lends money to Shimon, and Shimon to Levi, Levi equally owes Reuvein as he owes Shimon. [Tosfos says: it seems that the Halacha is like R' Nosson.]

49) Rav and Shmuel says that even a document that's written in it that the lender has a lien on his properties gets wiped out on Shvious, and R' Yochanan and Reish Lakish holds that it doesn't (since it's considered as if you already collected the land). [Tosfos says: even though we say that the fines for rape and seduction that the father agreed to make it into a loan, or a woman who collected some of her Kesuva, and they agree to make the remainder a loan, gets wiped out by Shvious despite having a lien on the loan; but the lien is stronger when it's explicitly written out in the document.]

50) Although we have a Braisa like R' Yochanan, he didn't want to rely on his own position since we can push off the Braisa that it's authored by Beis Shammai who held that a document that's supposed to collect is as if it was collected already.

51) If he lent money with a collateral, it doesn't get wiped out just like if you would have grabbed the money beforehand. Although if you loaned someone [Tosfos: on condition to live in his courtyard], and he lives in the courtyard, the loan is wiped out by Shivious, a collateral is different since R' Yitzchok says that the lender acquires the collateral. [Tosfos explains: even though our Sugya refers to giving the collateral at the time of the loan, and R' Yitzchok says that the lender only acquires the collateral that was given after the loan took place; we must say that the logic is, if you acquire it completely after the loan, you should have somewhat an acquisition at the time of the loan to say Shvious shouldn't wipe it out. However, when we say that R' Yitzchok holds you can give the collateral as Kiddushin, it's only when it was taken not at the time of the loan where the lender has an acquisition in it like a paid watchman. The reason he's like a paid watchman since he then has pleasure with the ability to use the utensil to make an acquisition.]

52) If someone returns a loan on Shvious, the lender needs to say that it's wiped out. If the borrower says "I know it's now mine, but, even so, I give it to you as a gift." However, he can't say that it's a payment to the loan. The lender is permitted to suspend the borrower on a tree and force him to say "even so, I'm giving it as a gift."

53) The Tanna Kama says that the lender must produce his Pruzbal along with his loan document to collect. However, the Chachumim say that he's believed to say that he had a Pruzbal, but lost it. After all, he wouldn't leave collecting in a permitted way in order to collect in a forbidden way (since it's so easy to write a Pruzbal). [Tosfos says: R' Tam says that he's, therefore, believed even without swearing.] Even if he doesn't claim this, we claim it for him since "we open up the mouth of a mute." (I.e., we claim something for people who don't know this to be a believable claim.)

54) If a slave was taken captive; the Tanna Kama says: if he was ransomed to remain a slave, he's still obligated to work as a slave. If he was ransomed to be a free man, he becomes a free man. R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that, either way, he remains a slave.

55) Abaya held that they argue if he was ransomed before the master had Yiyush. Even so, the Tanna Kama held that if he was ransomed to be a free man, he becomes a free man, since we're afraid that, if we make him return to be a slave to his original master, he'll refrain from ransoming him. [Tosfos says: however, if he ransomed him to be a slave, he would only serve his first master, and we don't say that we should steal him from his first master or else people will refrain from ransoming him. After all, that reason is only applicable if they ransom him for a Mitzvah so that he can be a free Jew.] R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that he remains a slave since, the same way it's a Mitzvah to ransom a regular Jew, there's a Mitzvah to ransom a slave.

56) Rava says: they argue after Yiyush. The Tanna Kama held that if he ransomed to be a slave, the ransomer becomes his new master, and if he's ransomed to be free, he goes out free since he's no longer obligated to his first master. However, R' Shimon b. Gamliel holds that we should always have him to be a slave like Chananya said: so that he won't let himself to be captured in order to get out of being a slave. [Rashi and R' Tam says that, according to R' Shimon b. Gamliel, even if he was ransomed to be a slave, he returns to his first master so that he shouldn't gain, since he would gain that he can keep gifts and what he found, as we say later, that, when you buy him from the non-Jews, he keeps those items and he's only obligated to his master for the work he does. Also, sometimes the first master is a difficult person, so he might let him be captured to get another master. However, Tosfos concludes: perhaps, it's not such a reason to say that he argues with the Tanna Kama in this aspect and goes to the second master, since he won't let himself become captured for slight gains.]

57) According to the Tanna Kama who holds that the second master acquires for himself if he bought him as a slave after Yiyush, he only acquires his work, but not his body.

58) If the slave escapes them (after Yiyush), even R' Shimon b. Gamliel holds that the master must free him by giving him a freedom document. After all, since he put himself in mortal danger to escape the captives, we don't need to worry that he would have allowed himself to be captured in the first place.

59) Shmuel says: if someone made his slave Hefker, he's no longer a slave (and doesn't need to receive a freedom document). [Tosfos points out: this only helps if he says he's Hefker, but not if uses the term of a freedom document “you are now a free man.” That only works in a document, but not verbally.] The same with Yiyush. Therefore, when a slave is captured and the master has Yiyush, he goes free and doesn't need to receive a freedom document. [Tosfos says: he learns the Mishna like Abaya that it refers to a case before Yiyush, and not like Rava since he would be completely free after Yiyush without being ransomed to be a free man.]

60) If a non-Jew ransoms a female slave to marry, the master needs to send her a freedom document. Either we refer to a case where they can't ransom her as is, so you need to free her so people will have mercy and ransom her, and this would not be like R' Shimon b. Gamliel who says that people won't have more mercy if she's freed. Alternatively, we refer to a case where this non-Jew won't accept ransom because he wants to marry her. Therefore, you should free her in order to publicize that she's a Jewish slave and it will embarrass him and he'll won't want to marry her and he'll let us ransom her. Although we say that non-Jews enjoy even Jews' animals more than their own wives (and, of course, Jewesses); that's only in private, but it's an embarrassment in public.

61) Anyone who frees a slave transgresses an Asei of "you shall always work them." [Tosfos says: although we say that, if a father commands on his death bed not to work a slave, but to free him, the son must free him because of the Mitzvah to listen to people who died; we must say it's not transgressing the Asei. After all, since the father commanded not to work him, you're not allowed to work him, so it's not your doing to stop him working, so you can give him a freedom document.]

62) If you have a female slave that is sinning with others, it's not an excuse to free her since you can make her marry a slave who will keep her in check. However, if she's a half slave and half free woman and she's acting promiscuous, he needs to free her because she can't marry, since she's forbidden to both a free man and a slave. [Tosfos says: also, we free any half slave and half free man since he has a great Mitzvah that he can't fulfil otherwise of having children and populating the earth.]

63) Someone can free a slave in order to combine him to a Minyan since a [Tosfos: public] Mitzvah is a reason to allow freeing a slave.

64) R' Yishmael says that "you shall always work them" is voluntary (and is not an Asei), but R' Akiva and R' Eliezer says it's an obligation.

65) You shouldn't establish a meal Erev Shabbos, and not on Shabbos during the time of the Beis Medrish.

66) Rav says: if you made your slave Hekdash, he goes free. After all, his body can't become Kodesh [Rashi explains: since he's not fit for a Korban or for fixing up the Mikdash] and he didn't say that it's for his worth, he must be saying that it's for him to join the Kodesh nation. ([Rashi says: although, when you make an unkosher animal Kodesh it's for its worth even though he didn't say so; that's because there's not a second way to explain it like we can say by a slave.] We have a Braisa that's not like that, if you Mekadesh your property and there's a slave among it, the Tanna Kama says that the treasurer can't free him, but sell him to others. Rebbi holds that the slave can buy himself to go free, since it's like selling it to him. (However, the Tanna Kama held that, since Hekdesh doesn't own his body, but only to get its worth, it can't free him). However, Rav was a Tanna and argues. [Rashi says: however, you can't reconcile them that the Braisa refers to saying explicitly it's for his worth, since it would still mean that he goes free similar to what we say by being Mekadesh a unblemished animal for fixing up the Mikdash, it must be brought as a Korban.]

67) [Tosfos disagrees. After all, if you're comparing it to an unblemished animal, you would need to also give the money to the Mikdash, and we don't see here that he needs to do it. Also, there are other difficulties. Rather, Rav holds that Kedusha can't take effect on a slave's body, and it's not like an unkosher animal where Kedusha takes effect and you're Chayiv Meila on it when you take pleasure. Even if you made land holy, and there's no Meila by land; you still have a prohibition to take pleasure from it. However, there's no prohibition by a slave. The Braisa that's brought as a disproof shows that Kodesh does take effect on the body of a slave, and the reason the Tanna Kama doesn't allow the slave to redeem himself is because it looks as if your charging him less to help him become free and you look as if you're cheating Hekdesh. Therefore, he must sell him to others to show that he's sold for his full worth.]

68) According to R' Meir who says that nobody says things (to Hekdesh) for no reason (i.e., doesn't have any effect) and we assume he meant to make something Hekdesh; we should assume he meant to pay his worth the same way if someone makes himself Hekdesh it means to make your worth Hekdesh.

69) R' Yosef quotes Rav: only if you made your slave Hefker does he go free, but not if you made him Hekdesh.

70) If you made your slave Hekdesh, the Tanna Kama says there's no Meila on him, and R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that there's Meila on his hair. Everyone holds that when you Mekadesh a slave, he's Kodesh, but since a slave has a Hekish to land, and there's no Meila by land, so there's no Meila by a slave too. [Tosfos says: although, in Bava Basra, we say that you can have Meila on Hekdesh's pit; that's only if you dug up some dirt from it and it's no longer attached to the ground.] They argue about hair that's supposed to be cut; that the Tanna Kama doesn't consider it as if it's already cut, and R' Shimon b. Gamliel holds it's like it's cut.

71) It's not dependent on the argument between R' Meir and the Rabanan if someone partially admits to owing vines that are ready to be harvested; that R' Meir says that he must swear, although you don't swear on land, since the grapes are supposed to be harvested it's as if they're harvested, and the Rabanan say you don't swear since it's not as if it's harvested. After all, perhaps R' Meir only holds that fruit are like they're harvested since the more time they're left on the vine they get worse, but hair improves as it stays on the head, so everyone may consider them as not detached.

72) Rava and R' Yochanan hold: even though, if you make your slave Hefker, he goes free; but he still needs to receive a freedom document. [Tosfos points out: this is not like Shmuel who says that you don't need to.]

73) If a convert dies and leaves adult slaves, they go free. Rabanan say the same applies by minor slaves, and Abba Shaul says that who ever acquires them first keeps them [Tosfos: since a minor can't acquire something from the Torah by themselves, but only when others give it over to them to acquire]. Although nobody gave those slaves a freedom document, and the convert's death is like making it Hefker; Ullah answer R' Yochanan; a master's death is different since it frees him just as a husband's death frees him from marriage; as we have a Gezeira Shava "Lah, Lah" to compare a slave to a wife. Only by a Yisrael who has heirs we say that the slaves fall to inheritance as the Pasuk says "you inherit them to your children;" but, otherwise, he would go out with his master's death.

74) Ameimar says: if a master makes a slave Hefker and dies, the slave has no resource to make him free and permitted to marry a Jewess, since the children don't inherit him, since he's no longer obligated to work for them, so they can't write a freedom document for him. However, the Gemara asks on him, if the children don't inherit them, they should go free by the master's death like we say by a convert's death.

75) R' Yehoshua b. Levi holds that the Halacha is like Abba Shaul since we need to compare the death of a master to the death of a husband that it only permits the prohibitions, but not any ownership. (Thus, a minor slave who can't acquire himself can't go free.) [Tosfos says: however, he can be freed by a freedom document since the Pasuk writes it about a slave, so it doesn't need to be similar to a wife's Get.] R' Yochanan says the Halacha is like the Chachumim since it's similar to a wife that you can divorce both an adult and a minor, so the death of a master should work on both too. [Tosfos says: we Paskin like R' Yehoshua b. Levi when he argues on R' Yochanan.]

76) If a slave redeems himself with money, the Tanna Kama says that he doesn't need a freedom document too, but R' Shimon requires it. The Halacha is not like R' Shimon. Therefore, he goes free with giving money, or even if he acquires himself with Chalifin. However, it's only if the slave gives the utensil, and not the master [Tosfos: as we Paskin like Rav that Chalifin works with the acquirer's utensil.] Thus, if the dying master tries to free him by giving the slave his utensil, the slave doesn't go free. [Tosfos says: and it's not even a gift of the dying that doesn't need an acquisition, since he only gave away part of his properties. Also, he didn't command his children to free him that there would be a Mitzvah for his children to listen to the dead person's command.]

77) Rebbi says: if you made your slave Hefker, he's not free since he's compared to a wife that you can't make her not a wife through Hefker. Therefore, at this point, you can only free him with a document, but he can't buy himself out, since the master doesn't own his worth anymore after he made him Hefker.

78) If a master marries off the slave to a regular Jewess, it's a sign that he was freed, since the master wouldn't sin like this if he wasn't freed. Also, it's a sign if his master put him on Tefilin. [Tosfos says: even though there's no prohibition per se to wear them, and even if he makes a Bracha, since the slave is like a woman who can make Brachos on time-based Mitzvos. Rather, it's not normal for slaves to put on Tefilin, and he would never put it on him if he wasn't freed.]

79) However, if the slave marries himself to a Jewess, even in front of his master, or he puts Tefilin on in front of his master (or his master appoints him as a caregiver over his property or he read three P'sukim in Shul before his master); we don't assume that he's freed.

80) If someone writes a document to his female slave that "she should go out with it and be Mekudeshes to me;" R' Meir says that the connotation is that she should be free, so he's married to her. However, the Rabanan say that it doesn't connote freedom, so she's not freed or married to him.

81) R' Dimi quotes R' Yochanan: if the master says at the time of his death "don't work this female slave after my death," his heirs need to free her. R' Ami and R' Assi ask R' Yochanan: since he only said don't work her, but if she's not freed, she can have children that would be slaves to the heirs, and by forcing them to free her, they're losing those children.

82) R' Shmuel b. Yehuda quotes R' Yochanan that he really said: if someone says by his death "since this female slave gave me great pleasure, reciprocate the pleasure;" you need to listen since there's a Mitzvah to obey the command of a dead person.

83) Some quote Ameimar: if someone made his slave Hefker, the slave doesn't have any fix (even when the master lives) since the master doesn't have any ownership anymore to write for him a freedom document to allow him to marry a Jewess. Other say that it's only a problem after his death since he doesn't give over the acquisition for only prohibitions as an inheritance to his children. This must be like R' Shmuel b. Yehuda quoting R' Yochanan, but according to R' Dimi quoting R' Yochanan, even though he doesn't leave over any acquisition in owning the slave, the children can free him. Even R' Ami and R' Assi only argue if he meant to free her, but if he would explicitly say to free her, she would be able to be freed by the children. [Tosfos says: although we said earlier that R' Yochanan shouldn't require a freedom document after making her Hefker and after he dies, and here he would need a document; that's perhaps only according to R' Shmuel b. Yehuda and not to R' Dimi. Alternatively, it's only rabbinic so the master can never claim again that he's her master, just like one opinion held why you need to write a freedom document to a slave that you knocked out a limb.]

84) [Rashi explains "there's no fix" for this slave, i.e., to marry either a Jewess or another slave. Tosfos disagrees since, otherwise, why do we need a reason to force the children to free him since it's a Mitzvah to listen to the dead person? Since he can't marry any woman and he should be like a half slave half free man that we force to free the second half so that he can marry. Rather, as it implies in the Yerushalmi, that a female slave in this position can eat Trumah, and it would seem that a male slave can marry a female slave. Rather, there's no fix for him to marry a Jewess.]

85) Raveina says: slaves that were sold to a non-Jew should get freed from their original master's children for a freedom document and not like Ameimar who says they can't write him a document. The Halacha is like Raveina.

86) There was a person who's partner freed his half of their slave. Since Beis din forces him to free the other half, and in order to avoid it, he gifted over to his minor son, who is not commanded in Mitzvos, so Beis Din can't force him. Beis Din appointed a caregiver for him, and they dangled (a small amount of) coins before the child so that he'll agree to the sale; and we write a freedom document on his name. [Rashi explains: on the child's name. Tosfos disagrees, since a minor's transaction is not binding. Rather, we write it on the name of the caregiver. Although, usually, the caregiver is not authorized to free the child's slave, but here is different since Beis Din gives it over to him since they have a right to make property Hefker. This is the same way they give the produce over to the caregiver so that he can separate Trumah and Maasar, since, otherwise, the caregiver is not authorize to take it off. The only reason that you need to dangle the money in front of the children, even though it's not technically theirs anymore, that's so it shouldn't look like a joke if they're protesting and the freedom document still takes effect. Although, usually, a slave who gives money for himself doesn't need a freedom document, here they required one since it's done against the father's will.]

87) If he writes "I made my slave a free man," he's free. If he writes "he shall be free" or "I will make him a free man," Rebbi says he's a free man since these are terms of freeing. The Chachumim say that he's not free since these are terms of promising to free them. All these terms must be written and not just stated. The same applies to selling land.

88) If he says that he freed his slave or he gave away land to someone, and the slave and the receiver deny it; we say that he [Tosfos: definitely] gave the land and freed the slave through having someone else to accept it for them.

89) However, if he claims that he wrote a document for them and gave it directly to them, and they deny it; they're admitting that they didn't receive it is like a hundred witnesses. (However, the giver's admitting is not as strong since he might have thought that he gave it, but really didn't give it.) Therefore, the giver eats the fruits from the field. This is only if the receiver denies it, but if he died and his heirs denied him receiving it, we keep the fruit in escrow since there might be witnesses that the father received the gift.

90) If the slave was made into an Apotiki (that his creditor will be paid by collecting him) and he was freed, really, the slave is not obligated to his master at all, but we enacted that the master writes him a freedom document, and the slave writes that he owes his worth to the master. R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that it's not written that the slave owes, but the one who freed him owes the master.

91) Rava establishes the case that the original master freed him, and it breaks the obligation to his creditor, as we say that Hekdesh, Chametz and freeing a slave can remove a lien on an object. [Tosfos adds: or if he made a Konem, or he worshipped it as an idol, or he designated it to bury the dead since they all have an Issur on the item that can't be rescinded. The Gemara in Pesachim says that this is Rava consistent to his position that a creditor only considered as if he owns it from the collection and on, but not retroactively. However, this is only Hekdesh Haguf (a Korban) that can't be rescinded, but a Kedusha for its worth,s ince it could be redeemed, the lien also prevents it from having it take effect. However, the rabbis enacted that a personal Konam doesn't take effect by strengthening his lien since he only made it to forbid him from ever collecting money. However, other types of Hekdesh that forbids it on everyone, the rabbis didn't enact to strengthen the lien.] However, because of having a "fix to the world" that his second master shouldn't meet him in the street and call him his slave and, therefore, cause rumors on the Yichus of his children, we force that master to write him a freedom document and we force the slave to write a document for his worth. R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that the slave doesn't need to since the first master owes the money.

92) Their argument is whether someone is obligated to pay for damaging the liens of his friend. [Tosfos explains: it must be in the case where they made the condition that payment for this loan will only be from the slave, or else the borrower is still obligated to pay his loan after the slave's freeing.] The Tanna Kama says that he's exempt, so there's no obligation on the first master; and R' Shimon b. Gamliel says that the damager is obligated to pay, so the first master needs to pay.

93) Ulla establishes the case where the second master gives the slave a freedom document. Although it's not really freeing him, since he doesn't own him yet, but the rabbis enacted for the fix of the world to force the first master to free him since people hear that he became a free man. The Tanna Kama says that the slave needs to repay his worth, while R' Shimon b. Gamliel holds that he doesn't need to since the second master is obligated to pay for him.

94) Their argument is whether a damage that's not recognizable (like the freeing of the second master) is considered a damage or not. The Tanna Kama says it isn't, so the second master is exempt, and R' Shimon b. Gamliel says it is, so the second master is obligated. [Tosfos says: we must say that this is a stronger damage that's not recognizable than usual, since we usually Paskin that it's not considered damage, yet we Paskin like R' Shimon b. Gamliel when he's mentioned in a Mishna, like here.]

95) [Tosfos says: Abaya, who holds that a lender collects retroactively, can't learn their argument like Rava since he would hold that freeing doesn't break the lien since it was considered as if he already collected the slave. Therefore, we must say that he holds like Ullah. Although it should be considered as if the second master already collected the slave and he freed his own slave; we must say that the case was that the first master wanted to pay him with money.]

96) [Tosfos says: we say in Yevamos that, if the husband's heir takes the cloak of what his wife brings into the marriage (and is on her Kesuva) and makes it as his shrouds, it becomes forbidden. Although the wife has the right to collect it for her Kesuva, and even Rava who says usually that you only collect from the point its collected and not retroactively, would say that here she should collect retroactively. After all, his reason that it's not collected retroactively since the borrower has a choice to pay him in money, and here, the woman has the right to collect those items she brought into the marriage and they can't push her off to pay with money. However, since the husband has the right to use it the whole time and, if he sells it, the wife can't collect it from the buyers, and she would need to accept money for her Kesuva; Rava wouldn't hold that it's collected retroactively.]

97) If someone makes his field and Apotiki (that the lender only collects from it); and it gets ruined by an overflowed river; R' Yochanan says that he can't collect from his other properties, and Shmuel's father says that he could collect from other properties. However, if it wasn't a stipulation that you can't collect but from this field, all agree that he can collect from other properties. [Tosfos explains: the borrower can sell this land if he wants, and the lender will need to collect from his other properties.]

98) However, an Apotiki of a wife's Kesuva can't be sold so that she should collect from other properties; since it's not easy for a woman to go into Beis Din to find out which is the last field bought so she can collect from it, and go to court with the buyers. [Tosfos says: Rashi in Yevamos says: if the husband sells it, the wife can collect it, and the same if the wife sells it, the husband can remove it from the buyer. R' Tam explains: even if the husband sells it, the husband can renege on it, since the rabbis enacted that it shouldn't be a sale at all. this is not similar to his other properties that he can sell, since there, all his properties are a lien for the Kesuva. However, in our case, this field was specifically designated for the woman to collect. This explanation is also implied in the Yerushalmi.]