Daf 68

67) Rav says that one person can be Mevatel to his friend, and then, later, the friend can Mevatel it back to him. Shmuel holds that he can't Mevatel it back.

68) You might think it's dependant on the argument between R' Eliezer and the Chachumim whether you Mevatel your house along with your courtyard or not. After all, you might have thought that R' Eliezer, who holds that you Mevatel the house too, you're completely out of this courtyard and the other person can't be Mevatel to you anymore. The Chachumim will hold, since you still have the house in the courtyard, you're still in the courtyard, so the friend can still Mevatel to you. However, really, it's not dependant on the argument. Rav can say that R' Eliezer only holds that you Mevatel your house since people don't live in a house without a courtyard, but you don't completely remove yourself from the courtyard that you can't take it over anymore. Shmuel can hold like the Chachumim. Although he didn't remove himself from his house, he removed himself completely from his courtyard. Therefore, we consider his house as if it is in a different courtyard, and Shmuel holds that you can't Mevatel from one courtyard to another. [Tosfos adds: they could have also said that they hold the reason that you can't Mevatel back because it would look like a joke.]

69) It's also not dependant on the argument between R' Meir and R' Yehuda if the Mevatel carries out forgetfully, if it would forbid or not. That is; R' Meir who holds that the one who carries takes back his Reshus since he wasn't completely removed from the courtyard, so his friend could also Mevatel to him. After all, we can say that everyone holds that he can't Mevatel, and he can't reclaim the courtyard by carrying out there forgetfully. R' Meir only holds that it's forbidden to carry there since we decreed it to be forbidden when done forgetfully, for they might be lenient also if done purposely.

70) However, R' Ashi concludes that Mevateling back is really dependant on the argument between R' Eliezer and the Chachumim.

71) There's a Tannaic argument whether R' Gamliel held that a Tzedoki can Mevatel his Reshus, or do you need to rent from him. R' Yehuda holds that you need to rent from him, and R' Meir says that he can Mevatel. However, everyone agrees that the Chachumim hold that you need to rent from them and they can't Mevatel. [Rashi holds; however, since R' Gamliel doesn't say that a Kusi may also Mevatel, everyone holds that you must rent from a Kusi since their "converts from lions" and not real Geirim. Tosfos argues; since both R' Meir and R' Gamliel holds that they were true converts. Rather, we must say; just like he argues with the Chachumim regarding a Tzudoki, he argues regarding Kusim too since he holds them to be true Geirim. He only mentions Tzedoki because he wants to bring a proof from a story that they allowed a Tzedoki.]

72) Although R' Meir allows Bitul by a Tzedoki, but you need to carry out into the courtyard before the Tzedoki does. After all, if he carries out first, he reclaims his share in the courtyard. However, when we carry out first, we acquire the share, and he can no longer take it back even through carrying out. [Tosfos adds: even if he doesn't carry out from his house, but he carries in from the courtyard into his house, he acquires the Tzedoki's share and it can't be reclaimed since he did an action that's forbidden to do without the Bitul.]

Daf 69

73) R' Meir says that, if before the Bitul, the one who didn't make the Eiruv carries out purposely or forgetfully, he can still Mevatel afterwards. R' Yehuda says that he may only Mevatel if he does it forgetfully, but not if it's done on purpose. [Rashi says: since he's a Mumar for Shabbos, R' Yehuda holds that he can't Mevatel. Tosfos asks; the Gemara implies that this applies in all cases, even if it was carried out privately, and not publicly. Also, why does it pick carrying out into the courtyard more than any other action of Chilul Shabbos? Rather, Tosfos explains: we must say that he doesn't do it usually an is not completely a deviant Jew, but only transgresses once in a while when he's in a bind. He just holds that he can't be Mevatel anymore this Shabbos since he claims his share since he carried out, just like he can't Mevatel again if he carried out after the Bitul. R' Meir permits to Mevatel in all cases since he didn't carry out after the Bitul.] R' Yehuda holds that someone reclaims his share and cancels his Bitul if he purposely carries out, but not if he carried out forgetfully. R' Meir holds that, when he takes it out, it cancels the Bitul even when carrying out forgetfully, because they decreed to forbid when it's done forgetfully since you might come to permit when done purposely.

74) The first version of R' Yehuda: a Tzedoki or Mumar (someone who doesn't keep Halacha) can't be Mevatel at all. The second version of R' Yehuda: they can't be Mevatel if they transgress their sins in public, but not if they do it in private. (R' Nachman b. Yitzchok says that it's a special Halacha by Bitul Reshus, even if you don't consider him to be a Mumar for the whole Torah. R' Ashi explains that they hold like the opinion (later) that holds that he's a Mumar for the whole Torah if he transgresses Shabbos.) However, if they were Mevatel, you can only carry out before they carried out, but when they carried out, even if they carried out after you did, you didn't acquire his share and you can't carry anymore. [Tosfos explains; although the Tzedokim didn't care at all about rabbinical prohibitions (and you should assume that they transgressed them flauntingly); but they didn't, and they only did it in private, since they were afraid to start up with the Pirushim.]

75) There was a Mumar who walked out with a Medusha ring, [Rashi that its signet was made of a different material than the ring, or a spice. Tosfos agrees with the former explanation.] When he saw R' Yehuda Nessia, he covered it up (out of embarassment). R' Yehuda Nessia commented: such a person can Mevatel his Reshus according to R' Yehuda. [Tosfos quotes Ri who explains: although the Gemara in Moed Katan says that R' Yehuda Nessia himself went out with this ring, he only went out into a courtyard. Since it's not considered to be an ornament, it wasn't part of the decree of not wearing ornaments in a courtyard because you might wear them out to a Reshus Harabim. Alternatively, R' Tam explains: there, he wore it on his finger (and it's not a problem of going out with an ornament, since they only forbade it to women since they might take it off to show it to a friend, and men don't show it off); and this Mumar carried it in his fist.]

76) There is a three-way argument what's considered to be a Mumar to the whole Torah. R' Meir holds that, even if he's suspected to transgress one sin, he's suspected on transgressing the whole Torah. The Chachumim say that he's not a Mumar for the whole Torah until he transgresses idolatry. The Tanna of a Braisa says he's a Mumar for the whole Torah if he either transgresses idolatry or Shabbos.

77) If he's a Mumar for the whole Torah, each Tanna according to his opinion how to define it, he can't bring a Korban. However, a Mumar for other sins may bring Korbanos.

78) If one person of the courtyard forgot to contribute to the Eiruv, and he's Mevatel to the rest of the residents there, and both them and him can carry from their houses into the courtyard, but not from his house, since we hold like the Rabanan who hold that, when you're Mevatel your share in the courtyard, you don't automatically Mevatel your house too. However, he may carry from their houses, even though he was Mevatel his share in the courtyard, but we can view him as being a guest by them.

79) However, if the other residents Mevatel their Reshus to him, then only he could carry from his house to the courtyard, but they can't carry out even from this individual's house. After all, we can only consider an individual to be a guest by many people, but many people can't be a guest by one person.

80) You can't Mevatel your Reshus to two people (who didn't make an Eiruv together) even if one of them afterwards Mevatel his share to the second one. After all, once the Heter to carry doesn't come along at the time of the original Bitul, it's no longer in effect. this is true even if they Mevatel their shares to the two on condition that one of them will be Mevatel to the second one.

81) However, two people can Mevatel their shares to one person, and we don't decree to forbid it for, perhaps, they'll come to allow when one of them will be Mevatel to two.

Daf 70

82) There's an argument between Abaya, who holds that you don't need to Mevatel to each person in the courtyard, but it's enough to Mevatel to one of them, and Rabbah, who holds that you need to be Mevatel to all of them. [Tosfos explains: they didn't hear the Braisa brought at the end of the second Perek that this is an argument between R' Eleizer and the Rabanan.]

83) Even according to Rabbah, if there were originally three in the courtyard, and one dies on Shabbos, it's permitted when one is Mevatel to the other, and they don't decree that if they permit Mevateling to one person when one dies, that they'll come to permit Mevateling to one person when the other two are both alive. [Rashi explains: we refer to a case where they're on the way in a caravan, and they enclosed an area for Shabbos. However, this won't work in a real courtyard since the heirs will forbid them. However, Tosfos says that it's not a problem since we don't Paskin like R' Meir who holds that a house without people living there still forbids the other people in the courtyard. Therefore, as long as the heirs don't move in, they don't forbid them from carrying.]

84) The Beis Medrish of Shmuel didn't allow, if a person who didn't contribute to the Eiruv and dies, for his heirs to Mevatel the Reshus on Shabbos. [Rashi and Tosfos: however, if he contributed, we don't need any Bitul. After all, the rule is: if it's permitted at the onset of Shabbos, it remains permitted for the whole Shabbos.] The reason why the heir can't Mevatel: since it's impossible for him to Mevatel from Friday afternoon. [Tosfos explains: this is even according to the opinion that, if a non-Jew was there and didn't accept rent, and he died on Shabbos, they could Mevatel after his death; since they could Mevatel from Friday, but it just doesn't help since the non-Jew prevents the Heter from taking effect. However, here, where he can't Mevatel until he inherits it could be compared to a non-Jew building an enclosure across a Reshus Harabim between houses on Shabbos, that you can't Mevatel since you couldn't Mevatel from the beginning of Shabbos.] However, R' Nachman permits the heir to Mevatel [Tosfos; even according to those who don't allow being Mevatel when the non-Jew died] since we say that the son is the foot (i.e., the extention) of his father. (Therefore, since his father could have Mevatel, the heir takes his place.)

85) We learned in a Braisa: if one person from the courtyard dies, and he has an heir that didn't live in the courtyard, nor contributed to the Eiruv), if he dies before Shabbos, they're forbidden [Tosfos: this Braisa holds that he forbids them even if he doesn't live there.] However, if he died after nightfall, the heirs don't forbid them. However, if the owner was someone who didn't live there and didn't contribute to the Eiruv and he dies and leaves it to a heir who lives in the courtyard and contributed to the EIruv; if he dies on Friday afternoon, they're permitted to carry. If he dies after nightfall, then they're forbidden. [Tosfos explains: it must be that the heir didn't live at the dead person's house, or else it would be permitted just like if any member of a household contributed to the Eiruv, even if he's not a partner in the house.]

86) If a Ger, who has a house in the courtyard, dies on Shabbos, you can continue carrying in the courtyard. Although this Ger didn't have any heir, and his house becomes Hefker, and someone acquires it in middle of Shabbos; still, since he couldn't acquire it at the outset of Shabbos, we say that the courtyard remains with its Heter for the rest of Shabbos. However, if he dies before Shabbos, even though no one acquires it before Shabbos, but on Shabbos, it's forbidden to carry in that courtyard since he could have acquired it on Friday. (Therefore, you can't classify it as if it was permitted from the outset of Shabbos since it was destined from then to get a new owner.)

Daf 71

87) Beis Shammai forbids to Mevatel your Reshus on Shabbos, and you may only do the Bitul on Friday afternoon. This is because they consider it to be an acquisition, and you can't make an acquisition on Shabbos. [Tosfos explains: although we see that they allow someone who is terminally ill to make an acquisition on Shabbos; that's because we make him the exception since we don't want to upset him, which may lead to him to die early. We even allow him to divorce his wife then, although it's a true rabbinical prohibition on Shabbos. Even if he gives away part of his property, which needs a proper acquisition, they allowed it. (However, if he's dividing all of his property, it's definitely permitted since they enacted that they don't need an official acquisition, but they acquire by the terminally sick saying that they'll get it.)] However, Beis Hillel says that you can Mevatel on Shabbos since it's just removing yourself from your Reshus.

88) If a house owner had a partnership with two neighbors, each one with wine; if they're all in one vessel, it's a valid Shituf. However, if one's with wine and the other one is with oil, and it must be that he put them in different vessels, it's not a valid Shituf. [Rashi and Tosfos say: although Beis Hillel allows making an Eiruv in two vessels if you can't fit it all in one vessel, and they also allow making a Shituf with different types of foods even if they need to be put in two vessels; that's only when it's originally gathered to make an Eiruv, but, here, it wasn't originally put in these vessels to make an Eiruv.]

89) R' Shimon permits it even if one's with oil and the other with wine. Rabbah explains that we're referring to a case where each neighbor shares a different alleyway with him, and R' Shimon is consistent to his opinion that; if you have three courtyards in a row, and the inner one made an Eiruv with the outer ones, but the outer ones didn't make an Eiruv with each other, the inner one is permitted with the outers, but the outers are forbidden with each other. [Tosfos says; according to R' Sheishes there who establishes the case where everyone puts the Eiruv in the inner courtyard, and the reason we don't consider the outers as if they made an Eiruv with each other since the two Eiruvs were put in different houses, however, here, where it wasn't put there for an Eiruv, it wouldn't be valid even if they're put in the same house. After all, we're referring here to a Shituf (since it's not bread) and it's put in the courtyard, so both barrels are in the same courtyard, which is equivalent to placing an Eiruv in the same house.]

90) R' Yosef establishes the case where they placed the wine and the oil together, and the argument is the same as the following argument between the Rabanan and R' Yochanan b. Nuri. If you have oil and wine of Trumah in the same vessel, and a T'vul Yom touches the top oil, the Rabanan say that they're considered separate, and the T'vul Yom only invalidates the oil. R' Yochanan b. Nuri says that they're connected, so the T'vul Yom invalidates both the wine and oil. [Tosfos says: the reason why it says that he's a T'vul Yom, and not regular Tamai, is because they consider oil to be a 'drink' that becomes a Rishon when touched by any Tumah, and then it will make the wine Tamai too. Although the Gemara in Menachos says that the Halacha is like R' Shimon b. Shezuri that oil is not a 'drink;' that refers to when the oil was congealed.]

91) R' Elazar b. Tudai even argues with the Rabanan regarding if they're both wine in the same vessel, and holds it's not a Shituf. Rabbah says that all agree that it's valid if each one pours their wine into the vessel. They argue when they bought the barrel together. The Rabanan hold of Briera, and R' Elazar b. Tudai doesn't hold of Breira. [Tosfos explains: this is not the same type of Breira as we have in all of Shas. Rather, it's as Rashi explains: since it's not noticeable which wine belongs to which neighbor, it's as if they made a Shituf with money, which doesn't work.]

92) R' Yosef says: we refer to a case where they only made a Shituf and not an Eiruv, and R' Elazar b. Tudai held that a Shituf doesn't work if you don't have an Eiruv and the Rabanan held that it does. This is like the argument between R' Meir and the Rabanan.

92b) [Tosfos says: it seems from the Gemara that it's better to have wine for a Shituf than bread since it's more noticeable that it's made for a Shituf (and not for an Eiruv).]

93) There's an argument between R' Rechumi and Rabbah b. R' Yosef. One held that the argument is only if they made a Shituf with wine. However, you don't need both an Eiruv and Shituf when made with bread. [Rashi explains that if you made an Eiruv Chatzeiros with bread, you don't need a Shituf for the alleyway. Tosfos disagrees. After all, since you anyhow need to make an Eiruv out of bread, it's nothing special to say that it should work for both. Rather, it refers to making a Shituf with bread. Since you can use any type of food, and yet you upgraded and used bread, it's strong enough to work for the Eiruv too.]

Daf 72

94) The other held that they argue with bread [Rashi and Tosfos both explain that you used it as a Shituf, and they argue if it takes effect for an Eiruv too.] However, everyone agrees that a Shituf with wine doesn't help for the Eiruv.

95) [Rashi says that a Shituf may be placed in the courtyard or a house, and the Eiruv only in the house. Tosfos asks: if so, why doesn't an EIruv work also as a Shituf. It's difficult to say that, just because you designate the name 'Eiruv' to it, it can't work as a Shituf. However, we can answer Rashi that if one courtyard made an Eiruv for their courtyard only, and then they decide that all the courtyards should come together and they add their Eiruvs, since the original Eiruv was only for this courtyard, you can't count it as a Shituf. However, the Ri holds that you can only place a Shituf in the courtyard and not in a house. However, the Yerushalmi holds like Rashi.]

96) Rav says that the Halacha is like R' Meir. R' Huna says that the custom is like R' Meir (i.e., we don't Darshen this Halacha in public, but we Paskin to individuals who ask a Sheila.) R' Yochanan says that people are accustomed like R' Meir (i.e., we don't Paskin like him, but if someone does like him, we don't protest.) [Tosfos asks: since R' Meir is a stringency; how is it applicable to protest someone who is stringent like him? Tosfos answers: there are some aspects that he's lenient; and we don't protest making the second, unnecessary, Shituf or EIruv, and making a Bracha over it, that would be a Bracha L'vatala according to the Rabanan. Alternatively, if you only have one of them and you don't want to carry a Mila knife from one house to another and you won't do the Mila on the eighth day. Alternatively, if you have a courtyard between two alleyways, the people of the courtyard usually passes through one of them (and regularly forbids them to carry without a Shituf), and they don't usually pass through the other one. Each courtyard that uses the second alleyway made an Eiruv together, but didn't make a Shituf in that alleyway. Thus, R' Meir holds that the people can't carry in the alleyway with the Eiruv, and the Rabanan held they can. Therefore, if the first alleyway made a Shituf with all it's courtyards except with this middle courtyard; R' Meir who holds that you can't carry in the second alleyway, will hold that we force the courtyard to exit this Shabbos in the second alleyway so not to forbid on their usual alleyway. However, according to the Rabanan, since the people in the second alleyway can carry, we can't force this courtyard to exit by it, since this courtyard will forbid the people in the second alleyway, and the first alleyway where it usually exit will remain forbidden. Alternatively, in the same set up of a courtyard between two alleyways, if the middle courtyard made an Eiruv with both sets of courtyards that lead to the two alleyways, but the outer courtyards didn't make an Eiruv with each other, however, one set of courtyards made a Shituf with the middle courtyard for that alley, but the second alley didn't. According to the Rabanan of R' Shimon who says that the middle courtyard is forbidden with the outer courtyards, according to R' Meir, they only have connections to one alley, so they're permitted to it. However, according to the Rabanan of R' Meir, through the Eiruv, the middle courtyard has connections to both alleys, so he's forbidden to both.]

97) Everyone agrees, if you have one building, but different people live in different apartments and floors, they forbid each other to carry, and they all need to contribute to the Eiruv. [Tosfos explains: it must be that they all have a private entrance to the street. However, if they lead from one to the other, and they must pass the outer ones to get to outside, we consider only the innermost one as the true house and the outer ones as just a foyer for it, and only the innermost one needs to contribute to the Eiruv. According to R' Yochanan later, he'll consider the two innermost ones as real houses (since you don't make such a foyer for a singular house) and those two only need to contribute to the Eiruv. Also, this is only if they're all equal partners in the house. However, if they're borders, then, even if they have a private room and eat their own food, only the owner needs to contribute to the Eiruv. This is not only when they all eat in the same dining room, as we Paskin like Rav that the place where you eat defines your house, and all the people in the house eat in the same room, but even if they all eat in their own room, they're permitted, since they have joint use with the appliances in the house, like the stove, they're all secondary to the owner. Alternatively, the owner doesn't give them his possession of the house so that they'll forbid him to carry, (so he reserves that much ownership for himself). This is like live-in workers by a non-Jew that one of them didn't contribute to the Eiruv, that he doesn't forbid the rest. If this is true by a non-Jew, who we don't consider his living there as a true living there, of course we'll say that people bordering by a Jew, who is considered living there, don't forbid him since they're Batul to him.]

98) However, if it's not separate rooms, but there are partitions between them that don't reach the ceiling; Beis Hillel holds them to be one household, and Beis Shammai holds them to be separate households. [Tosfos explains: however, if the partitions reach the ceiling, even if they're not true walls, but just curtains; everyone holds them to be separate households.]

99) R' Nachman says that they even argue without a proper partition, like stakes separating the two areas. As Beis Shammai also holds that they're considered as two households.

100) We learned: when is this so; when the Eiruv is placed in a different house. However, when it's placed in this many-compartment house, everyone agrees that they all don't need to contribute. [Tosfos says: it's difficult to say that he's only saying this to explain Beis Shammai's opinion (who we don't ever Paskin like). Rather we must say that it teaches us that, even to Beis Hillel, even if the curtains reach the ceiling, they all only need to contribute if the Eiruv is by another house, but not when the Eiruv is by them.] The reason why Beis Hillel allows one of the household to contribute: since they're all together without true partitions, they're enough together like a courtyard that made an Eiruv together. Just like there you only need one person to contribute to an Eiruv with a different courtyard, here too, you only need one person in this building to contribute for all of them.

101) Another version of this; they only argue when the Eiruv comes to them, but if the Eiruv is placed in a different house, everyone agrees that each compartment must contribute to the Eiruv.

102) If brothers live with their father in one courtyard and they are sustained at his table, but they have their own house, they all need to contribute to the EIruv. However, this is only if the Eiruv is placed by someone else's house, but if it's put by them, or there are no other people living in the courtyard but them, they don't need to contribute.

103) Rav says that the place where they eat defines where they live, but Shmuel says that it's the place where they sleep. Therefore, according to Rav, in the case above, if all the children eat at the father's table, they don't need to contribute to the EIruv since they all live in the same place. Although the Mishna says that they need to contribute "even if their sustained at their father's table;' that's only if they receive the food from him, but eat in their own home. [Tosfos explains: still, this support from the father, at least, helps that if the Eiruv comes to their house, or if they're the only ones in the courtyard, they don't need to contribute to the Eiruv.]

104) They also argue this regarding R' Yehuda's opinion that if nobody is living in a house, the owner doesn't need to contribute to the Eiruv since he doesn't forbid the rest of the people in the courtyard. (However, R' Meir says that a house that's fit for someone to live there forbids the others, so the owner must contribute to the Eiruv.) According to Shmuel, you only forbid the rest of the courtyard if you sleep there, and according to Rav, if you eat there. They also argue where is your resting place regarding the T'chum. Shmuel says it's the place where you sleep and Rav holds that it's the place where you eat.

Daf 73

105) Shepherds, and other people that work in the fields, everyone agrees that their resting place is where they sleep. After all, we know that they would rather eat there too if it would be practical. (However, since they can't abandon their job, they must eat in the field where they're working.)

106) Women and slaves that live in their own house, but they receive their food from their husbands and owners, respectively. R' Yehuda b. Beseira says that the wives don't need to contribute to the Eiruv, but the slaves need to. However, R' Yehuda b. Bava holds the opposite.

107) However they both agree that a student who receives his food from his Rebbi is permitted without contributing to the Eiruv.

108) Although we say that five people who make an EIruvin their courtyard, only one of them needs to contribute to an EIruv in the next courtyard; all the brothers in our case (who we should assume is comparable to people who made an Eiruv) need to contribute. Since there are other people in the courtyard that forbid on their father without an Eiruv, once you have people forbidding and we need an Eiruv, we say that the brothers also forbid and need to contribute to the Eiruv.

109) A student who eats in the field, his resting place for Shabbos is by his Rebbi since we know that, if it would be practical, he would rather eat by his Rebbi's house. However, if someone sets up an EIruv within two thousand Amos of his house, he has his resting place there by his Eiruv. Although he sleeps in his house, since we know that if he can completely encamp by his Eiruv, he would do so, his resting place is there.

110) A father with his sons, or a Rebbi with his students ;if they don't have any other residents in their courtyard, they are considered like an individual that doesn't need to make an Eiruv. [Rashi says that those who live in an inner courtyard doesn't forbid those who live in the outer courtyard. Tosfos says that this seems simple since we Paskin that the inner never forbids on the outer when they can carry in the inner by themselves. Rather, the Chiddush is: they don't need an Eiruv and we don't require it so that they wouldn't forget about an Eiruv in this courtyard.] Also, their alley can be permitted with a Lechi or Korah (pole or crossbeam) and we don't say because their like one individual, that they don't have the prescribed two courtyards with two houses apiece opened up to the alley.

111) Even according to R' Meir who needs both an Eiruv and Shituf; if they all joined to make a Shituf, and everyone also joined in the Eiruv except one person, it's permitted. After all, the reason why you need an Eiruv if you have a Shituf so that they shouldn't forget about the concept of Eiruv, and since most of them joined the EIruv, they won't forget about it.

112) One of the people of the alleyway can Mevatel his Reshus to the other people of the alleyway. [Tosfos says: even according to the opinion that you can't be Mevatel from one courtyard to another (and part of the people you need to Mevatel to in this alleyway are in a different courtyard), that's because each courtyard has its own people who exclusively use it, and you can't be Mavetal to a place that you're not one of the exclusive owners. However this alleyway is used by everyone equally, so he's Mevatel to the people who he shares this alleyway.]

113) Rav says that you can't make a Shituf in the alleyway if its courtyards have an opening between each other. After all, we need to worry that they'll make an Eiruv together through those openings, and thus have the status as one big courtyard, and an alley needs to be open to two courtyards (with two houses apiece) to be permitted with a Lechi and Korah. [Rashi says: in the case of fathers and sons who don't need to make an Eiruv, they're already considered one courtyard even without making an Eiruv, therefore, even without openings, you can't permit with a Lechi unless the two courtyards are on opposite sides of the alley (and the alley separates them from being one courtyard). However, Tosfos says that even if they're on the same side of the alley, as long as they're not opened to each other that they can't make an Eiruv even if they would want to, we don't consider them to be one courtyard.]

114) [Tosfos asks: according to Rav, how can we have an argument between the Rabanan and R' Meir if you made an EIruv between the courtyards without a Shituf, do you also need to make a Shituf? After all, once the courtyards make an Eiruv with each other, he says that a Shituf won't work either. Tosfos answers: we refer to courtyards without openings, but you can climb ladders from one to the other. As we said that the ladders are only considered an opening when it's a leniency to make an Eiruv, but not to make it as one courtyard. Alternatively, we refer to a case where they made an Eiruv through windows that are four Tefachim off the ground (but within ten). This is like having a Daka (a small wall) between the courtyards (i.e., the wall under the window). Therefore, they're still considered separate courtyards even after they make an Eiruv between them. Although it's not so comparable to a Daka since you close up an opening with a Daka, but the window was made to have a section of wall underneath it, so it's not showing that you remove yourself from the opening; still, since it's not easy to get through it, it's similar to a ladder that it's not a complete opening. This may be true even if the window is only above three Tefachim. Also, we say by a complete opening (from a courtyard to an alley) that you don't forbid (on the alley) if it's not the regular way to exit there, and windows, by definition, are not the regular way to exit. However, in our case by openings, where they sometimes walk between courtyards, they become one courtyard. Even if it's more common to walk through the alley than the courtyard, it doesn't make it that it's comparatively not common to walk between the courtyards. After all, we expect you to walk through the alley more since it's made for people to walk through.]

115) However, he doesn't require them to bring the Shituf from one courtyard to another through the alley. (Therefore, you can't say Rav's reason to forbid if the courtyards are open to each other that he might bring the Shituf from one courtyard to another through the connecting opening and not through the alley.) After all, we say that if everyone's eating together in a courtyard, and it's becoming nightfall, they can rely on the food on the table to be a Shituf even though they didn't bring it through the other courtyards at all, let alone through the alleyway.

Daf 74

116) Shmuel says that you allow an alley with a Lechi if it has only one house (even without a courtyard), and one courtyard (with a house).R' Yochanan permits it even with an uninhabited house (on one side, and a courtyard and a house on the other). However, we don't allow this by a path through a vineyard since the area is not fit for people to have living space there.

117) R' Yochanan is consistent to his opinion that the Halacha is like R' Shimon that roofs, courtyards and Karfeifs are one Reshus (and you can carry from one to the other), regarding utensils that wasn't in the house Bein Hashamashes, even if the courtyards made an Eiruv. We don't forbid utensils that were in the courtyard Bein Hashamashes because you'll might come to take out utensils that were in the house Bein Hashamashes. [Tosfos explains; although it's anyhow permitted to carry from the house to the courtyard to the alley, and we don't need to worry that you'll carry from the alley to the uninhabited house, just like we didn't forbid carrying it into a courtyard and we're not worried that you'll carry from there into a different courtyard; still, you couldn't permit it with a Lechi. After all, if you forbid carrying from the alley to the inhabited house and vice versa, we wouldn't consider it part of the alleyway to count it towards what's necessary to allow a Lechi. However, now that he Paskins you can carry from the alley to the uninhabited house, you can include it to the alleyway's necessities for a Lechi or Koreh.]

118) There is an unresolved inquiry whether Shmuel reverses his opinion and held that he needs courtyards and houses to permit an alleyway with a Lechi or Koreh.

119) If you have an alleyway that, on one of its sides, it's open to a courtyard full on non-Jews, and on the other side, it's open to a courtyard that's open to a Jew's house, and there are many other Jewish houses that have windows that are open to this house, they can't make an Eiruv between them to make the courtyard as if it has houses open to it to allow the alley with a Lechi and Koreh since you'll have two courtyards with two houses open to it. The Gemara originally assumes the reason is; we don't consider the non-Jews' living there to be Halachic living there in this aspect to say that it's open to two courtyards. [Tosfos asks: if so, then you have two reasons not to permit it. You don't have two houses in the Jews courtyard, and you also can't count the courtyard with the non-Jews. So, why mention both if it wouldn't be permitted with either one? Therefore, Tosfos explains: there are two rows of courtyards, one row on each side of the alley. One row has the proper structure, that they have two houses opened up to the courtyard, and since you have two courtyards like that, it should permit the alley, but they're inhabited by non-Jews that make them not applicable to count. The other row was inhabited by Jews, and if they had the right structure, we would have two proper courtyards to allow the alley. However, since each one had only one house opened to it, but other houses open to that house, we don't consider them as two houses opened to the courtyard and we can't count them either.

Tosfos brings two opinions about, if the houses are attached by doors instead of windows; do we say that it definitely doesn't permit, since the doors between them gives it the structure of being one big house. Or, perhaps, since there is more access to the courtyard, it's considered open to two houses.

R' Tam explains: we refer to one courtyard on each side, and we do consider the house open to the other house as two houses are opened to the courtyard. However, the reason why you can't use a Lechi is because the second courtyard can't be counted since it's inhabited by non-Jews. The Chiddush is, if you would have two such structured courtyards of Jews, it would be permitted.]

Daf 75

120) The Gemara concludes that the reason it's forbidden is because you're not allowed to take someone out of the status of being a single person living with non-Jews. Therefore, if they would make an Eiruv with him, he would fill confident to live there. However, without the Eiruv, he feels that he's there by himself and would be scared to stay there alone with the non-Jew and he'll leave. [Tosfos says: however, if they didn't make this decree and they would make an Eiruv together, they can carry in the alleyway if it has a Tzuras Hapesach or two boards (one on each side) since it doesn't have a second proper courtyard to allow it with a Lechi. Alternatively, according to the Gemara's conclusion, we can count the non-Jews' courtyard as if they're Halachic living there when it's a leniency, (but not to forbid when they're with one other Jew where it will be a stringency). Therefore, it would be permitted if you rented from the non-Jew. Alternatively, it would be permitted without renting. After all, since the other Jews have to use the courtyard through one house, we consider it as an individual with a non-Jew that's permitted without renting. Alternatively, any courtyard that hold jews is considered one regarding the non-Jews in the other courtyard (since they're one entity, just like if there is one Jewish home in a courtyard they're permitted with a non-Jew, even if many Jews live in that house since there is only one unit of a Jewish home.]

121) [Rashi says that this is true even with doors between the houses. the only reason why the case is with windows since it's not normal to have doors opened between houses. However, Tosfos holds that it's only with windows, since the person in the house feels safe if there are other people with doors opened to his house since the non-Jew would be afraid that the other Jew will come in any minute.]

122) The Tannna Kama says: if you have two courtyards, one inside the other (and the inner one needs to pass the outer to get to the street); if the inner one is permitted by itself, i.e., if they made an Eiruv by itself, the outer one can also be permitted by itself. However if the inner one is forbidden (since they didn't make an Eiruv), they forbid the outer one even if they made an Eiruv. R' Akiva forbids the outer one even if the inner one made an EIruv for themselves unless they make a Daka by their opening. The last Tanna says that the outer one is permitted with an Eiruv even if the inner one didn't make an Eiruv.

123) If the two courtyards made an Eiruv together, and one person forgot to contribute to it; if the Eiruv is in the outer courtyard, it's always forbidden no matter who forgot to contribute. However if the Eiruv is in the inner courtyard, if one of the inner people forgot to contribute, it's forbidden. However if one of the outer courtyard people forgot, then the inner one can close their doors and permit carrying with themselves (since everyone their contribute to the Eiruv). Although there are people from the outer courtyard that contributed and is part of the Eiruv, the inner ones could push their contribution off by saying, we only partnered with you to give us a better fix, but not to mess us up. R' Akiva says that they're forbidden until the outer courtyard is Mevatel their Reshus to them.

124) Although Shmuel regularly holds that there is no Bitul from one courtyard to another, he can hold like R' Akiva here. After all, he only holds it when one courtyard doesn't forbid the other (but they're both permitted by themselves), but here the outer ones forbid the inner ones until they Mevatel, so they can do the Bitul. [Tosfos points out: according to Rava in the beginning of the Perek, we'll only allow this Bitul from courtyard to courtyard if the problem didn't arise from the negligence of the inner ones.]

125) Although R' Yochanan holds that you can be Mevatel from one courtyard to another, he can hold like the Rabanan here who say to close the door and don't say that it's permitted anyhow through Bitul. That's because the inner courtyard can say that they don't want to wait until the outer ones Mevatel it to them and be forbidden in the meanwhile. Therefore, they can close their doors and carry right away.

126) If the two courtyards belong to individuals, they're permitted without any Eiruv (like the Rabanan of R' Akiva, since they're both permitted in their own courtyard).

127) R' Ada b. Ahava says: if there are many people in the outer courtyard, and an individual in the inner courtyard, the outer ones are forbidden, although they should be allowed since the inner one can carry in his courtyard, since we decree this that you might come to permit it even if there are two people in the inner one, and they would be prohibited to carry in the inner one (and that would forbid the outer one). [Tosfos explains: they only forbid by an individual in the inner one since he didn't make an Eiruv, but if there are two people that made an Eiruv, you don't need to worry that you'll permit even if they don't make an Eiruv.]

128) Shmuel holds that they're permitted, since there is no reason to be concerned. After all, those who are in the know, know that there is only an individual in the inner courtyard. The ones that aren't in the know, even if they would think there are multiple people in the inner courtyard, they'll assume that they made an Eiruv. However, if there is an individual non-Jew in the inner courtyard, everyone holds that he's forbidden. Granted, there is no problem for someone who is in the know, since he knows that there is only one non-Jew in the inner courtyard. [Tosfos says: although he has the right to pass into the courtyard with two Jews, we don't say that he forbids them. After all, since a Jew wouldn't forbid in that case, they don't want to be more stringent by a non-Jew than by a Jew.] However, those who are not in the know will assume there are Jews with the non-Jew in the inner courtyard and would be forbidden to carry there (which would, in turn, forbid the outer courtyard, and they won't assume that they rented from him, since there are always rumors when someone rents from a non-Jew and there are no rumors of renting in our case, since no one rented).

129) Shmuel holds that foyers of an individual's house are considered as a foyer. therefore, if you have ten houses, one leads into the other, only the inner one needs an Eiruv since the outer ones are structures of foyers for the inner one.

130) However, R' Yochanan says that you don't have foyers for an individual house [Tosfos: if they're made for people to live in], but only for multiple ones. Therefore the inner two need to contribute to the Eiruv, and the outer ones can be foyers for the inner two.

131) If you have three houses, each one leading into the other, between two courtyards. Both courtyards make combine their Eiruv by placing it into the middle of these three houses, and then, all three houses don't need to contribute to the Eiruv. After all, the middle one doesn't need to contribute since the house that the Eiruv is placed in never needs to contribute to the Eiruv, and the two outer ones are foyers for the middle one. [Tosfos points out: even if the Eiruv is placed in one of the outer ones, the other two don't need to contribute since they're foyers for the outer one. Also, even if the Eiruv was put in a different house from the two courtyards, since the people bringing the Eiruv to the other courtyard needs to pass these houses to get there, they're all considered as just foyer-like rooms.]

Daf 76

132) However, if there are two houses between two courtyards, you can't have one courtyard to place their Eiruv in the house that's further from them by carrying it through the closer one, and the other places their Eiruv in the one that's further from them by carrying it through the closer one, since there will be a contradiction in the Heterim. After all, we can't count each house as a true house for one courtyard, and then consider it as a foyer to the second courtyard.

133) This is not similar to a case where the same person made an Eiruv for one person before Shabbos, and it was eaten Bein Hashmashes, and then made an Eiruv for another person after that, later in the Bein Hashmashes, that both Eiruvs take effect. [Rashi: this refers to Eiruv T'chumim. Tosfos says it refers to Eiruv Chatzeiros.] Although there, both of them couldn't take effect (since they both couldn't be around when the second that Shabbos started), still, we can be lenient in both cases since it's only rabbinic; there is different since it's not an obvious to everyone the contradiction, so the rabbinic decrees won't look like a joke by being lenient by both cases. However, here, where both Eiruvs are before us at the same time, the contradiction will be apparent to all and it will look like the rabbis' enactments are a joke.