Lara Bartels
I am a Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics in Bonn, Germany.
I am a Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics in Bonn, Germany.
My research interests lie at the intersection of environmental, behavioral and experimental economics, as well as development economics.
You can contact me at bartels@econ.mpg.de.
PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS
Lara Bartels and Martin Kesternich (2026). Motivate the Crowd or Crowd them out? The Impact of Local Government Spending on the Provision of a Green Public Good. Journal of Economic Psycology, 114.
Cities are increasingly being held accountable for their climate action. By demonstrating their pro-environmentality through their own climate-related activities, they aspire to encourage individual climate protection efforts. However, economic theory posits that this strategy may not be as promising as it appears. Since cities fund these initiatives using taxpayers’ money, their contributions may be perceived as substitutes, potentially crowding out private contributions to the same public good. Inspired by research on the crowding-in effects of social norms, leadership, and the expressive influence of laws, we challenge this argument. We conducted a framed field experiment to analyze whether providing information on the previous contributions made by the city itself has an impact on individual private contributions to the same public good. Results show no statistically significant evidence that city contributions reduce resident contributions. Instead, referencing fellow citizens increases contributors, attracting especially those less pro-environmentally oriented.
An earlier version is available here as ZEW Discussion Paper Nr.22-040 // 2022
Ivo Steimanis, Thomas Falk, Lara Bartels, Vishwambhar Duch, and Björn Vollan (2025). The Role of Women in Learning Games and Water Management Outcomes. PNAS Nexus, 4(8).
Economic games have emerged as promising tools for fostering sustainable resource management, yet their gender dynamics remain underexplored. We examine how women’s participation relates to the effectiveness of game-based learning in 56 Indian communities facing water management challenges. These structured experiential learning environments allow participants to develop system understanding, problem-solving capacities, and collective action through active engagement. Our results suggest that greater female involvement is associated with improved water management outcomes 2 years after the intervention. Notably, the presence of female leaders correlated with broader participation among women, which in turn was linked to the development of more effective management rules. These findings indicate that gender-balanced participation may enhance the success of such interventions. Incorporating women in game-based learning has the potential to support long-term improvements in resource management, highlighting the importance of inclusive approaches.
Lara Bartels and Madeline Werthschulte (2025). 'More Bang for the Buck'? Experimental Evidence on the Mechanisms of an Energy Efficiency Subsidy. Environmental and Resource Economics, 88, pages 631-654.
Environmental subsidies are a popular public finance instrument used to reduce carbon emissions. However, there is little evidence on the mechanisms underlying the demand response to the introduction of a subsidy. We use a framed field experiment to disentangle the relative importance of the price and non-price effects implicit in a subsidy encouraging an energy-efficiency investment. In the experiment, participants decide whether or not to purchase a low-flow showerhead and are either confronted with the introduction of a subsidy or a same-sized price decrease. We find a demand increase of about 3 percentage points when the price decreases and a significantly larger demand increase of about 9 percentage points when the subsidy is introduced. An analysis of the underlying channels rules out changes in beliefs and social norm perceptions. Positive spill-over effects of the subsidy on other pro-environmental behaviors rather suggest that the non-price effect is explained by a crowding in of intrinsic motivation.
Lara Bartels, Martin Kesternich, and Andreas Löschel (2024). The Demand for Voluntary Carbon Dioxide Removal. Land Economics, 100(4).
This study explores the individual willingness to pay (WTP) for carbon removal through afforestation as a complementary climate change mitigation strategy. Using a framed-field experiment, we assess the impact of local co-benefits and geographic location on WTP. We find that participants strongly favor voluntary climate change mitigation through forestry-based removal. Emphasizing co-benefits doesn’t significantly alter WTP in our municipal tree-planting project. A follow-up survey indicates a high awareness of co-benefits, suggesting that unobserved priors may influence WTP results. Trust levels are higher for forestry-based removal than for established market-based carbon avoidance, suggesting preferences for understandable mitigation measures with tangible co-benefits.
Thomas Falk, Wei Zhang, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Lara Bartels, Richu Sanil, Pratiti Priyadarshini, and Ilkhom Soliev (2023). Games for Experiential Learning: Triggering Collective Changes in Commons Management. Ecology & Society, 28
As resource users interact and impose externalities onto each other, institutions are needed to coordinate resource use and provide incentives for sustainable management. However, when such collective action is absent, the question arises - how can it be fostered? This paper deepens our understanding of experiential learning's role in behavioural change, thereby offering a pathway towards sustainable commons management. We present a conceptual framework elaborating on the essential processes involved in experiential learning games. Applying the framework to three intervention cases from India - focusing on groundwater, surface water, and forests - we scrutinize the role of design features in shaping behavioural drivers associated with commons management. Our findings suggest that selecting appropriate tools systematically for specific purposes, including participants who can correlate the game with their real-life scenarios, is critical. We conclude by shedding light on areas requiring future research from both game design and conceptual behavioural change perspectives.
Lara Bartels, Thomas Falk, Vishwambhar Duch, and Björn Vollan (2022). Experimental Games in Transdisciplinary Research: The potential Importance of Individual Payments. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 113.
Laboratory experiments in social sciences are a powerful tool with which to study causal mechanisms in human interactions. Over the past several years, experimental games have been applied increasingly in transdisciplinary research in natural resource management with a strong purpose to develop capacity to promote learning and behavioral change. Yet, few studies have evaluated the potential of different experimental game designs to promote collective action outside of experiments. In a framed field experiment on water management in rural India, we compared within-game behavior and collective action outside the game between individuals who received individual payments and those who did not. Our results show little evidence for different behavior in the game. However, we find some evidence that our experimental game induced real-world changes compared to a control group without game intervention and that this change is slightly more likely to occur when individual payments are used.
ONGOING WORKS
Lara Bartels. Barking Up the Wrong Tree? Beliefs and Valuations in Voluntary Carbon Offsetting.
Forest-based offsets dominate voluntary carbon markets. They offer salient co-benefits, but their long-term climate impact is uncertain. Alternatives such as retiring EU ETS allowances ensure lasting emissions reductions yet attract little demand. This raises the question of whether offset demand reflects the objective of effectively compensating for climate damages or instead other offset attributes. Using a large-scale framed field experiment with incentivized choices, I show that participants value long-term climate impact but substantially misperceive offset effectiveness. Correcting these misperceptions reallocates demand toward more effective climate instruments without crowding out participation, thereby improving market efficiency.
Status: Draft available upon request.
Lara Bartels, Carlo Gallier and Achim Hagen. Cooperation, Inequality, and Equity in the Endogenous Choice of Institutions to Provide Public Goods.
Mitigating climate change is a global cooperation problem that requires collective action by sovereign and heterogeneous agents. In this paper, we combine a theoretical model with a laboratory experiment to investigate the willingness of agents to form a coalition and provide collective action. We test how agents' willingness to form a coalition depends on both how the corresponding burden is shared within the coalition and on how the decision to share the burden is made. burden-sharing rules can range from equal contributions from all members to fully proportional contributions based on members’ endowments. The rules are either chosen democratically by the group members themselves or imposed exogenously. Our findings show that participants behave strategically when deciding whether to form a coalition. Richer participants try to avoid high obligations and are more likely to join a coalition when the burden-sharing rule prescribes that the costs are equally distributed. Participants’ behavior within the coalition depends on whether the burden-sharing rule is chosen democratically or externally imposed. When burden-sharing rules are externally imposed, richer participants – who benefit from an equal cost distribution – contribute more to the public good than what is optimal. This reduces inequalities but comes at the expense of efficiency. When the burden-sharing rules are democratically chosen, they are less willing to reduce inequalities.
Status: First draft in preparation.
Lara Bartels and Bettina Chlond. Moral Credits and Debits: Estimating a Moral Exchange Rate Between Good and Bad Behavior
Status: Experimental Design in Preparation