Projects
Projects
The project’s main aim is to examine Gottlob Frege’s philosophical methodology in the context of his philosophy of language. It will investigate the types of evidence that Frege believed should inform philosophical arguments, as well as his underlying model of, and method for, philosophical enquiry. Specifically, I will explore whether intuition and folk beliefs regarding everyday concepts can serve as a source of justification for Frege’s arguments, and whether his conception of analysis is fundamentally prescriptive and revisionary. I will argue that my interpretation of Frege provides a robust defence of analysis, countering the critique that it is purely descriptive and incompatible with the objectives of conceptual engineering.
In 2022, I was awarded a three-year research grant Sonatina 6 for project How to Understand Nonsense? The Role of Imagination in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by National Science Centre, Poland (NCN). Project Number: 2022/44/C/HS1/00054.
The project’s main goal is to propose a novel theory that would explain how do we ‘understand’ the nonsensical Tractarian sentences, what is the mechanism behind the ‘understanding’ of these sentences and how their ‘understanding’ differs from the understanding of meaningful sentences of other philosophical and scientific works. The secondary aim of the project is to provide a logical cartography of concepts that are crucial for an assessment of the current state of a debate concerning the correctness of the austere conception of nonsense.
The project describes the relation of the context principle to various conceptions of nonsense and the compositionality of language in Ludwig Wittgenstein's early philosophy and works of Gottlob Frege.