PROGRAM

ABSTRACTS

• Victoria LYSENKO, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia, Dignāga's criticism of the Sāṃkhya's doctrine of perception ("Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti" k.25-33)

For the majority of Sāṁkhya authors epistemology has never been a subject of special interest. In a kind of “division of labor” between Indian philosophical schools (darśanas), the subject of Sāṁkhya is primarily associated with “cosmogenesis”, “psychogenesis”, “evolution”, “ontology”, “dualism”, if we use Western philosophical categories. How, then, did Sāṁkhya become involved in epistemological discussions? Was it due to an external influence? I hold a positive answer to this question. It is the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (c. 480–540 CE), who is believed to trigger an “epistemological turn” (E.Frauwallner) in Indian philosophy, may have influenced some Sāṁkhya authors . He advanced the idea that the knowledge of reality is determined by our cognitive tools, therefore the main task of intellect and intellectual disciplines connected with it – logic and epistemology (hetuvidyā, pramāṇavāda) is to criticize flawed cognitive instruments (pramāṇa) and, accordingly, to develop correct, efficient ones. Among the Brahmanical schools criticized in his magnum opus Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti for their definitions of perception, there were also some Sāṁkhyas (he mentioned by name only a certain Mādhava).

In this paper, I propose to dwell on the following issues. What are the Sāṁkhya sources which Dignāga had in mind in his critical analysis of Sāṁkhya definition of perception: the Ṣaṣṭitantra and or the comments thereon (I refer to reconstructions of E. Frauwallner, Maasaki Hattori and E. Steinkellner)? What criticism strategy did Dignāga develop ? Did his criticism influence the Sāṁkhya approach to perception in the Sāṁkhyakārikā by Iśvarakṛṣṇa (between 350 and 450 CE)? What results of this criticism can we find in the Yuktidīpīka (c. 6^th century CE) of an anonymous author?

• Asha MUKHERJEE, Visva-Bharati University, India, Cognition of value, freedom and predictability

Questions of value such as what ought I to do or what I ought to be presuppose that we have freedom to do or we have choice to do. But to choose also presupposes that we choose one alternative based on some knowledge and have some reasons. The question is ‘are these reasons based on some knowledge of the facts (or perception) or based on some knowledge of the values’. Do we have knowledge of values in some significant sense? Often knowledge is defined as ‘justified true belief’ and Gattier has shown this account of descriptive knowledge is extremely problematic and it has also made sufficiently clear that we cannot rely satisfactorily on such a definition. Even if we work on the fourth condition we do not know what it would be to define “knowledge” as necessary and sufficient conditions. In this paper, I raise a similar question in the context of knowledge of values. Is this definition applicable to value judgments such as ‘lying is bad’ or ‘one ought not to lie’? The knowledge of natural phenomena or descriptive knowledge and the knowledge of values may have a significant difference in the sense that knowledge of value places a demand for the agent, some kind of intervention on the part of an agent and at human level it is unpredictable in principal. But again the interesting point is that knowledge of natural phenomena is also human knowledge and therefore unpredictable in principal whether empirical or formal. Therefore, knowledge in both the realms either fails the criterion of ‘a justified true belief’ or both are knowledge as justified true belief that cannot be predicted.

• Rocco CESTOLA, University of Roma "La Sapienza", Italy, Śabda as a cittavṛtti or mental event: Language and sphoṭa in the Yogaśāstra of Patañajali

While describing the inhibitory praxis of how to void the mind-body complex of its functions, the Yogaśāstra of Patañjali let emerge the contents and structures of those functions themselves. Rather than emphasize the cessative practice of Yoga, it will be the focus of the present talk to mark the field of the language and linguistic cognition amounting to a specific set of the overall paradigm of mental events (cittavṛtti) occurring in a subject. A mental event linguistically structured can be, according to the Yogadarśana, one of the specific mental episodes where the language-function is dominant, as in the instance of mental representation (vikalpavṛtti), or as in the case of cognitive mental episodes such as pramāṇavṛtti or, its opposite, viparyayavṛtti, In the case of a cognitive mental event, āgama amounts to an instance of valid and linguistically-structured cognition, while viparyaya to a case of misconception whose domain ranges from perceptive to linguistic cognition. That a mental representation (vikalpa) is linguistically structured is clear from its own definition deeming it as depending on word-knowledge (śabdajñānānupatī), and void of objective referent (vastuśūnya). In this regard, a vikalpa can be considered as a generic speech-act taking place in the mind, and determining the fundamental ground of sender-receiver communication whose output can be either a case of truth-value or untruth-value cognition. The term āgama can be rendered as “authoritative and inherited valid belief linguistically transmitted in the form of verbal testimony”, and regarded as a specific instance of a speech-act bearing an epistemic content. Considering both vikalpavṛtti and āgamavṛtti, the topic of linguistic cognition (śābdabodha) is therefore central. Taking an instance of a mental event linguistically structured, the following points do emerge: a), the sentence (vākya) is the basic, indivisible semantic unit (sphoṭavāda) where the verbal meaning is grasped as a unitary-value; b) the instrumental function of phonemes/speech-sounds (vāgvarṇa) conveying verbal understanding; c) applicability of the context principle, namely the theory claiming that words do not have meaning in isolation but only when used in sentences.

• Douglas L. BERGER, Leiden University, the Netherelands, Vācaspatimiśra on the contributions of imagination to perception

From the fourth to the seventh centuries, Yogǎcāra Buddhists like Vasabandhi and Dińńāga framed the notion of "imagination" (kalpanǎ) in cognition in terms which divested it of genuinely perceptual meaning by distinguishing its tendency to produce cognitive commonality from supposedly utterly unique perceptual experiences. Vasabandhu's discourse regarding our presumably perceptual experience gave to inner cognitive process the powers to provide almost all the qualitative content to perceptual cognitions, thus placing the latter on a cognitive par with dreaming. Dińńāga argued that imagination, and not direct perceptual cognition, provided us with all the commonalities we normally attribute to objects and therefore made kalpanā the engine of inference. This presentation will argue that a crucially important role was mapped out for the contributions imagination makes to the genuinely perceptual process by the tenth century polymath Vācaspatimiśra, who detailed instance in which an as-yet indeterminate perception can be partially filled out by memory, expectation and imagination that can lead to entirely true perceptions. The paper will argue that this contribution of Vācaspatimiśra renders realist perceptual theory in classical India for more robust and plausible then other attempts to bifurcate perception and imagination as sharply distinguishable cognitive operations.

• Monika KIRLOSKAR-STEINBACH, University of Konstanz, Germany, Relational knowing and the study of world philosophies

Recent scholarship in cross-cultural philosophy draws attention to the limits of conventional, comparative philosophical approaches. Urging us to be more attentive to the power politics played out in philosophy, they suggest that our conventional understanding of a knower may have to be revamped, even in this sub-discipline. Against the backdrop of this scholarship, the presentation will sketch salient characteristics of a relational knower and then illustrate its potential in intercultural encounters.

• Prakriti MUKHERJEE, India, Confucius' concept of human: through cognition and perception

Confucius, “The Great teacher” of Chinese civilisation, was dealing with ‘the forgetful of duty’ and reminding of high truths. His teachings consist of developing the concept of human based on cognition of duty and perception of life at every stage. The paper deals with his concept of human analysing Analects and looking for role of cognition and perception. On the one hand, he talks about all our happiness and all our troubles coming from within ourselves and saying ‘archery is like a life of a good man. When the archer misses the centre of the target, he turns around and seeks the cause of his failure within himself.’ The interrelation between knowledge and practice, is the essence of the teachings, while answering what is knowledge The Master says “when you know a thing, to hold that you know it; and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it - this is knowledge.” and he also says “Learning without thought is labour lost; thought without learning is perilous.” On the other, he emphasises on practice of the duties saying “He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it.”

According to Confucius, human beings become moral by integrating themselves into the natural order that is ‘tian 天’. Like Kant, he upholds the dignity of human beings that dependents upon our interconnection with each other, demanding ongoing self-extension. No doubt there are differences, but for Confucius our efforts at humanisation are unceasing and that we may never fully live up to our human potential. But to live a human life we need to realise our potential through knowledge and perception.