India's quest for nuclear weapons is associated in the common mind with Indira Gandhi and, laterally, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The real story is more complex. It was pursued along many paths and many other people were involved.
Lal Bahadur Shastri paved the way for the 1974 test. Rajiv Gandhi issued "orders for India to have minimum number of bombs ready within a time frame". V. P. Singh upgraded the crude command and control system. Indira Gandhi and Vajpayee get all the laurels because they allowed tests, but almost every prime minister played a role. Jawaharlal Nehru set the tone by insisting on maintaining a nuclear option, even warning Bhabha to ignore public postures about outlawing nuclear weapons.
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There was also the approaching September 1999 review of the test ban treaty. The last straw was Pakistan's testing of the Ghauri missile. In the end, Vajpayee said, "There was no need for much thought. We just have to do it."
This book is disproportionately a scientists' narrative. The diplomatic side is barely mentioned. Indian thinking, or the lack thereof, on overall strategy regarding use of nuclear weapons gets barely a word.
The documents show that as early as 1958 the CIA was exploring the possibility that India might choose to develop nuclear weapons. The reports focus on a wide range of nuclear related matters - nuclear policy (including policy concerning weapons development), reactor construction and operations, foreign assistance, the tests themselves, and the domestic and international impact of the tests.
As was the case with France, Israel, and a number of other countries, India's path to a nuclear weapons capability was an incremental and prolonged one. Homi Bhabha, the father of the Indian bomb, moved in the same circles as Frdric Joliot-Curie and other atomic physicists of the pre-World War II era. Bhabha left India in 1927 to study engineering at Cambridge, but the doctorate he received in 1935 was in physics. After he returned to India in 1939 the Second World War began, and Bhabha found himself stranded. He accepted the position of "reader" in theoretical physics at the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore. In 1941 he was promoted to professor of cosmic ray research. (Note 1)
From the beginning of the nuclear age, U.S. leaders were well aware that civilian nuclear research could advance a nation's progress toward a nuclear weapons capability. Over the last five decades the United States has gathered intelligence on Indian nuclear activities, civilian and military, through all the means at its disposal - human intelligence, open source collection, communications intelligence, and overhead reconnaissance. Those activities, as demonstrated by the documents below, allowed U.S. intelligence analysts to provide decision-makers with far more detailed assessments of Indian nuclear activities than would be available from public sources. At the same time, other documents show that the collective efforts of the organizations gathering intelligence on Indian nuclear activities -- including the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, Defense Intelligence Agency, and State Department -- did not result in U.S. intelligence analysts warning U.S. officials of India's nuclear tests, carried out in May 1974 and May 1998.
The first 16 documents in this briefing book deal with one or both of two questions: does India have the capability to build a nuclear device? and what is likelihood that it will do so? Answering the first question required analysts to examine and evaluate the data concerning Indian organizations involved in atomic energy activities; the availability of resources (uranium, heavy water); the reactors in operation, under construction, or on the drawing board; the ability to produce plutonium or highly enriched uranium; and possible delivery systems.
Addressing the second question required analysts to examine the histories of key political and scientific personnel (for information as to their views on nuclear weapons) as well as the domestic political pressures facing the nation's leaders. In addition, there was a need to assess the external pressures faced by Indian leadership - including security threats from China and Pakistan, and pressures to conform to international norms concerning nuclear proliferation.
By the 1980s, the 1974 test was well in the past and there had not been another. The documents from this period (Documents 26-35) thus continued to explore Indian capabilities for building a bomb - particularly the July 1988 CIA assessment, India's Potential to Build A Nuclear Weapon (Document 34), and the factors - both technical and political (domestic and foreign) - that helped shape India's nuclear policies.
By the beginning of 1998 India had come close to conducting its second test on several occasions but had pulled back - in 1995 due to American pressure that followed the discovery of test preparations by U.S. spy satellites. That may have helped convince U.S. analysts that despite the pledge by the newly-elected Hindu nationalist BJP-led administration to "induct" nuclear weapons into the Indian arsenal, no nuclear test would actually take place. Thus, an early assessment of BJP policy (Document 36) suggests that a change in Indian nuclear policy was not imminent.
This cable constituted a cover instruction to a requirements statement prepared by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), an interagency committee that reported to the U.S. Intelligence Board. The distribution indicates that the search for information on India's capability to produce nuclear weapons, and its likelihood of doing so, covered both the South Asia and Europe. It also specifies that the recipients should feel free to report on political and economic factors as well as the technical items that were the focus of the JAEIC requirement.
This OSI report concerns negotiations for Swedish sale of a heavy water reactor to India. It also reviews the history of September 1961 Swedish-Indian agreement for collaboration in developing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It also summarizes the state of the Indian nuclear power station program.
This study reports on India's reactors, uranium reserves, nuclear power stations, and capability to produce plutonium. It notes that, "Construction of a plant for plutonium metal production, which is necessary for weapons manufacture, is now under way and planned for operations in 1966; should the Indians so decide, it could be in operation in the fall of 1965."
This paper by a senior member of the Defense Department's International Security Affairs bureau, begins with the observation that "India may be near the point of deciding on starting a nuclear weapons program" and goes on to examine the current situation in India. It goes on to explore possible Indian nuclear programs and their costs, the consequences of an Indian program, and a number of other issues - including the impact of an Indian program on proliferation, and U.S. aid leverage.
This memo was produced by (or for) OSI chief Chamberlain in response to a request from Johnson on the current status of India's nuclear energy program. It examines the decision whether or not to develop nuclear weapons, the Canadian-Indian Research Reactor, the Chemical Reprocessing Plant at Trombay, plutonium research, resources (including uranium and heavy water), and nuclear power development.
This special national intelligence estimate assesses India's nuclear weapons policy for the remainder of the decade. In doing so, it examines India's technical capabilities, the pressures for a weapons program, and the opposition to a weapons program. A final section, "The Indian Decision," tries to assess India's decision calculus and notes that India might try to represent any underground test as being for peaceful purposes.
This article states that India's nuclear energy facilities "would enable India to proceed into a nuclear weapon development program at any time" but that "it is believed the Indian government has not yet decided to develop nuclear weapons." The body of the article reports on Indian nuclear energy research (including its plutonium production capability), Indian Air Force weapons delivery systems and which ones could be used to deliver nuclear weapons, and the chances that Indian could develop a long-range ballistic missile.
Document 11: Department of State to Amembassy, New Delhi, Subject: Possible Indian Nulcear Weapons Development, March 29, 1966. Secret
Source: Subject-Numeric File 1964-1966, Central File of the Department of State, Record Group 59, NARA
This article notes that despite India's stated policy was to refrain from embarking on a nuclear weapons program "the Indians are reportedly conducting a limited amount of research devoted to reducing the time it would take to develop a weapon once a decision was made." It goes on to provide details on the Canada-India Reactor at Trombay, the plans for a second nuclear power reactor at Rajasthan, India's attitude toward international safeguards, and the amount of weapons- usable plutonium that could be produced at Trombay.
Document 13: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. "Views of the New Head of the Indian Nuclear Program on Atomic Weapons," Weekly Surveyor, June 20, 1966. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
This item reports on the views of Dr. Vikram A. Sarabhai, the newly appointed Secretary of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission on possible development of nuclear weapons by India as well as providing commentary on Sarabhai's professional and personal background.
On May 18, to the surprise of the U.S. Intelligence Community, India conducted an underground nuclear test at a site in the desert at Pokhran - making it the world's seventh nuclear power and the sixth to test (Israel having achieved nuclear status in 1966 without testing). India claimed as CIA analysts had previously suggested (Document 9) it might that the test was for peaceful purposes. This Top Secret Codeword item in the CIB relays press reporting and public statements by officials of other governments, including Pakistan, and contains analysts assessments of the implications for China. be457b7860
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