Mini-Workshop on Computational Social Choice
In Celebration of Julian Chingoma's PhD Defense
January 23rd 2025
In Celebration of Julian Chingoma's PhD Defense
January 23rd 2025
On January 23rd 2025, to celebrate the PhD defense of Julian Chingoma, there will be a mini-workshop on Computational Social Choice. It will be held in Room C0.23 of the Oudemanhuispoort building and it begins at 09:00. All are welcome to attend.
Note that Julian's defense of his thesis (titled On Proportionality in Complex Domains) is scheduled for 14:00 on the same day in the Aula der Universiteit.
09:00 - 09:15: Welcome
Abstract: We study the independent approval model (IAM) for approval elections, where each candidate has its own approval probability and is approved independently of the other ones. This model generalizes, e.g., the impartial culture, the Hamming noise model, and the resampling model. We propose algorithms for learning IAMs and their mixtures from data, using either maximum likelihood estimation or Bayesian learning. We then apply these algorithms to a large set of elections from the Pabulib database. In particular, we find that single-component models are rarely sufficient to capture the complexity of real-life data, whereas their mixtures perform well.
This is joint work with Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Marcin Kurdziel, Grzegorz Pierczyński, and Stanisław Szufa
10:15 - 10:30: Coffee Break
Abstract: Apportionment is the act of distributing the seats of a legislature among political parties (or states) in proportion to their vote shares (or populations). A famous impossibility by Balinski and Young (2001) shows that no apportionment method can be proportional up to one seat (quota) while also responding monotonically to changes in the votes (population monotonicity). Grimmett (2004) proposed to overcome this impossibility by randomizing the apportionment, which can achieve quota as well as perfect proportionality and monotonicity — at least in terms of the expected number of seats awarded to each party. Still, the correlations between the seats awarded to different parties may exhibit bizarre non-monotonicities. When parties or voters care about joint events, such as whether a coalition of parties reaches a majority, these non-monotonicities can cause paradoxes, including incentives for strategic voting. We propose monotonicity axioms ruling out these paradoxes, and study which of them can be satisfied jointly with Grimmett’s axioms. Essentially, we require that, if a set of parties all receive more votes, the probability of those parties jointly receiving more seats should increase. Our work draws on a rich literature on unequal probability sampling in statistics (studied as dependent randomized rounding in computer science). Our main result shows that a sampling scheme due to Sampford (1967) satisfies Grimmett’s axioms and a notion of higher-order correlation monotonicity.
Room C0.23, Oudemanhuispoort
Oudemanhuispoort 4-6, 1012 CN, Amsterdam
For more information, send an email to: j.z.chingoma@uva.nl.