UNDERSTANDING HAMAS: PART 1
The Islamic Resistance Movement, abbreviated Hamas, is a Palestinian nationalist political organisation with a military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades. It has governed the Gaza Strip since 2007 and was responsible for the October 7 attack.
In his book Whose Promised Land? Colin Chapman provides this assessment of how Hamas is perceived by its critics all over the world:
It is a terrorist organisation which has repeatedly committed war crimes.
Its attack on 7 October 2023 involved unparalleled cruelty and barbarity.
Its leaders are prepared to use Gazans as human shields and to see thousands killed.
It wants to destroy Israel and drive Jews into the sea.
It wants to turn Palestine into an Islamic state.
Its 1988 Charter is full of anti-Semitic tropes.
It has become an authoritarian, brutal dictatorship in Gaza.
It is financed and supplied with weapons by Iran.
It has used aid coming from outside to build its network of tunnels.
Many of its leaders live in luxury and security in Qatar.
It will never give up violence, and has said it would repeat what it did on 7 October 2023.
Because of its Islamism and brutal methods it’s no different from ISIS.
He then asks:
'With powerful accusations of this kind being made, can anything be said in defence of Hamas?'1
These two chapters are not written either to defend Hamas or to justify its actions, but rather to help us understand in a more objective way what the movement stands for and how it operates. In this chapter we will use extracts from books by Colin Chapman and Munther Isaac to provide their analyses of the origins and ideology of Hamas. We will then use a quote from Norman Finkelstein and two more extracts from Colin Chapman's book to provide further insights into the movement.
What Is Hamas and How Does It Differ From Fatah?
NB: This is an edited version of a section from Whose Promised Land? by Colin Chapman.
Hamas is a more radical Palestinian resistance group that developed out of the Muslim Brotherhood in December 1987 as a response to the First Intifada, calling itself ‘the Islamic Resistance Movement’ or Hamas (meaning ‘zeal’ in Arabic). It was critical of Fatah and the PLO for being too secular and for having made too many concessions to Israel. It therefore emphasised its Islamist ideology and adopted a more confrontational approach towards Israel. In 2006 it won the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council which ran the West Bank and Gaza but its victory was not recognised by the USA or the EU. During armed clashes with Fatah in Gaza in 2007, it ousted Fatah and seized power, and has been in control there since then.
Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide, by Khaled Hroub, a Palestinian academic born in Bethlehem, is a sympathetic but not uncritical account of the movement. In the Preface he explains his starting point:
'I see Hamas as an outcome of unnatural, brutal occupational conditions. The radicalisation of Hamas should be seen as a completely predictable result of the ongoing Israeli colonial project in Palestine. Palestinians support whichever movement holds the banner of resistance against that occupation and promises to defend the Palestinian rights of freedom and self-determination. At this juncture of history, they see in Hamas the defender of those rights.'2
He describes Hamas a ‘a blend of a nationalist liberation movement and Islamist religious group’, and explains how it differs from Fatah and the PLO:
'Founded in the late 1980s, Hamas emerged as a doubly driven religious-nationalist liberation movement which peacefully preaches the Islamic religious call while harmoniously embracing the strategy of armed struggle against an occupying Israel. Its critics thought it seemed as if Hamas started where the PLO had left off. Its supporters felt that it came at just the right time to salvage the Palestinian national struggle from complete capitulation to Israel. On the ground, Hamas hacked its own path in almost the opposite direction to the peaceful route then being taken by the PLO and other Arab countries. It refused to come under the PLO as the wider umbrella of the Palestinian nationalistic struggle, and adopted the ‘old’ call for the ‘liberation of Palestine’ as originally enshrined by the PLO founders back in the mid-1960s. Hamas rejected the idea of concluding peace treaties with Israel that were conditional on full Palestinian recognition of the right of Israel to exist.2
'Another major factor that helped Hamas in winning those elections was the failure of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in almost all aspects. It failed not only externally, on the front of the peace talks with Israel, but also internally, with its management of day-to-day services to the Palestinian people. Mismanagement, corruption and theft were the ‘attributes’ that came to mark Fatah’s top leadership, ministers and high-ranking staff. As unemployment and poverty reached unprecedented levels, the extravagant lifestyle of senior Palestinian officials infuriated the public. The elections gave the people the chance to punish those officials.'2
Its holistic strategy has contributed to its popularity:
'By using myriad and interconnected strategies spanning military attacks, educational, social and charitable work in addition to religious propagation, it has succeed in popularising itself across the Palestinian constituencies inside and outside Palestine. With the gradual erosion of both the legitimacy and popularity of the PLO, Hamas’s power has manifested itself in landslide victories in municipal elections, student union elections, syndicational and other elections held in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.'2
Hroub explains Hamas’s anger over the refusal of the EU and the USA to recognize its electoral victory in 2006 and to cooperate with it:
'It has strongly condemned the European decision, which it considers to be a collective punishment against the Palestinian people. The entire reaction against the Palestinian elections has been viewed by Hamas, and many others, as a scandalous exemplification of hypocritical western politics. An outcome of free and fair democratic elections has been shamefully rejected because the winners are not pro-West, or willing to accept or implement what has been imposed on them by their enemy, Israel.'2
Hroub makes the following observations about the way Hamas’s policies have developed over the years:
Its attacks on Israeli citizens have generally been in direct retaliation for the killing of Palestinians by Israel – as, for example, the killing of the twenty-nine Palestinians by a Jewish settler at the Hebron mosque in 1994.
In recent years Hamas has moved away from the uncompromising Islamist language used at the beginning and has adopted more pragmatic policies: ‘The political discourse...is now based mostly on the language of international law, and on political, not religious, assumptions.’2 It has also moved away from its earlier insistence that any Palestinian state would be an Islamic state.
He explains Hamas’s position on the question of the recognition of Israel:
'Hamas’s ‘starting position’ on this question was purely religious. Palestine was declared to be a waqf or an endowment for Muslim generations with which no one has the right to compromise. The justification that today’s Hamas would offer on the same position, however, is political and not a religious one. Hamas argues that Israel is a ‘borderless’ state and that it has never identified clear borders... Hamas leaders point to the Arab Summit Peace Initiative adopted in Beirut in 2002, which offered Israel full and collective Arab recognition and normalisation of relations in return for accepting the two-state solution according to UN resolutions. Their point is that when Israel refuses such a collective Arab recognition, how and why would Hamas’s recognition of Israel change Israel’s attitude and position?2
'It is not inconceivable that Hamas would recognise Israel. Hamas’s pragmatism and its realistic approach to issues leave ample room for such a development. Yet most of the conditions that could create a conducive climate for such a step lie in the hands of the Israelis. As long as Israel refuses to acknowledge the basic rights of the Palestinian people in any end result based on the principle of a two-state solution, Hamas will find it impossible to recognise Israel.'2
In spite of many attempts at reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, the two movements remain divided over the importance of Islamic ideology, the use of violence and responses to Israel’s occupation. The bitterness between them has increased since Hamas won the elections in Gaza and the West Bank and proceeded to take over power in Gaza to forestall an attempt by Fatah to take control. Fatah has controlled the Palestinian Authority running the West Bank, but has inevitably felt threatened by the increasing support for Hamas after 7 October 2023. The Palestinian movement has been seriously weakened by the conflict between Fatah and Hamas and by the geographical separation between the West Bank and Gaza.'
Hamas Comes to Power
NB: This is an edited version of a section from the book Christ In The Rubble by Munther Isaac.
Hamas is an Islamic political and militant group that was founded in 1987 by Ahmed Yasin, and his aide Abdul Aziz al-Rantissi, shortly after the start of the first intifada. Hamas was viewed as an alternative to the more secular approach of the Palestinian political movement at the time, especially that of the Fatah party... The founding charter, written in 1988, clearly laid the foundation for a religious (rather than national) movement while trying to maintain an inclusive position: '(Hamas) strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety.' The charter declared the land of Palestine as an Islamic trust from God, a waqf.
The charter saw no place for negotiations or for any peaceful talks with Israel: 'Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement.' In fact, the introduction to the charter gave a clear indication of the vision of Hamas with regards to Israel: 'Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.' The charter evoked very dangerous religious rhetoric: 'Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious. It needs all sincere efforts. It is a step that inevitably should be followed by other steps...until the enemy is vanquished and Allah’s victory is realised.'
However, in 2017, Hamas revisited and modified the charter, in what can be described as a pragmatic move. The main principles of the first charter remain the same, yet there are significant revisions, most notably the acceptance of the two-state solution, and a distinction between Zionism and Judaism. With regards to the two-state solution, the new charter says:
'There shall be no recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist entity... Hamas rejects any alternative to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea. However, without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity and without relinquishing any Palestinian rights, Hamas considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus.'3
This is a confusing statement, but it presents a compromise, even if understated, toward accepting the two-state principle... And in a notable shift, the new charter of Hamas states:
'Hamas affirms that its conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion. Hamas does not wage a struggle against the Jews because they are Jewish but wages a struggle against the Zionists who occupy Palestine. Yet, it is the Zionists who constantly identify Judaism and the Jews with their own colonial project and illegal entity.'3
Since its foundation, Hamas has been involved in armed resistance through its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, with the aim of liberating historic Palestine... They rejected the Oslo Accords, yet later agreed to adopt and join the political system established by the Oslo Accords, namely, the Palestinian Authority, during the campaign for the parliamentary elections in 2006.
Today, the United States and the West in general look at Hamas as a terrorist organization, whereas in Palestine it is mainly viewed as a resistance movement. It is important to note that Hamas drew its popularity from the network of charities, clinics, mosques, and schools that it set up in the West Bank and Gaza. Due to the perceived religious devotion of its leaders, it was at times viewed as the counter to the corruption and ineffectiveness of the elite Palestinian Authority. The fact that Israel has over the years assassinated many Hamas leaders, including its founders, has only served to elevate the movement’s popularity among Palestinians. Many view the positions of the Palestinian Authority as weak compromises. By contrast, Hamas dared to stand up against and challenge Israel and the West.
Hamas represents a sector in the Palestinian society. It is distinct in its Islamic and religious ideology. Today, it stands in opposition to its main rival, Fatah, not in its desire to end the occupation but in method: Hamas believes in armed resistance, while the leadership of the PLO has adopted the path of diplomacy, international pressure, and building the institutions of a future Palestinian state. Hamas does not represent all Palestinians, and many religious and secular Muslim leaders openly disagree with Hamas and sometimes criticise its actions. The rivalry between Fatah and Hamas has developed into enmity at times, and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank is known to make life difficult for Hamas leaders there.
The years in which Hamas have been in charge of Gaza have not been easy for Christians, though Hamas did not target them directly. Palestinian Christians do not support Hamas’s religious ideology or its characterisation of the Palestinian struggle as a religious one. They also are opposed to Hamas’s vision of a religious state. The state, according to the Kairos Palestine document, a widely accepted Palestinian Christian document, must be for all its citizens:
'Trying to make the state a religious state, Jewish or Islamic, suffocates the state, confines it within narrow limits, and transforms it into a state that practices discrimination and exclusion, preferring one citizen over another. We appeal to both religious Jews and Muslims: let the state be a state for all its citizens, with a vision constructed on respect for religion but also equality, justice, liberty and respect for pluralism and not on domination by a religion or a numerical majority.'4
Palestinian theologians, unlike Hamas and other factions that believe in armed resistance, support creative nonviolence and condemn the killing of civilians.
Hamas must be viewed in the context of the Israeli occupation. Just as the Muslim Brotherhood was, in part, a response to Western colonialism in the Middle East, so Hamas is a response to Israeli colonialism. If people are genuine in their desire to destroy Hamas, I suggest we begin by getting rid of the occupation and apartheid.
In the 2006 Palestinian elections, Hamas won a majority of legislative seats with 44 percent of the vote. The vote was as much a vote against the ruling secular Fatah party as it was a vote for Hamas and its agenda. Many voted for Hamas because they were frustrated with the failed peace process led by Fatah leaders, which led to more settlements and an intensified occupation. Many votes were also in protest of the corruption of the Palestinian Authority at the time, which had become controlled by a rich elite minority. Widely respected Palestinian independent politician Mustafa Barghouti told CNN that 'mostly, they were voting for opposition and voting against Fatah—against corruption, against nepotism, against the failure of the peace process and against the lack of leadership.'5
Throughout the recent war, Gazans have been blamed for electing Hamas to power, as though a majority of the people living in Gaza on October 6, 2006, voted for Hamas. This logic has been used as a justification for the mass killing of civilians, contributing to an image of most, if not all, Gazans as Islamic militant terrorists. This is a gross distortion of the facts. A Washington Post article cited Lara Friedman, president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace, who observed that in 2006 Hamas did not win a majority of the votes in even one district in Gaza. The Washington Post also reported that in 2023, children made up roughly half of Gaza’s population, meaning that only a fraction of them ever cast a ballot for Hamas.5
When Hamas militants took over Gaza by force in 2007, toppling the security forces of the Palestinian Authority, Israel announced a total blockade on Gaza by ground, air and sea starting in June 2007. This is collective punishment, a tactic prohibited under international law. The blockade has enabled Israel to control all access points and allow only humanitarian supplies into the strip. Their intent is to 'keep Gaza’s economy on the brink of collapse' and thus dependent on external actors.6
Meanwhile, Hamas ruled Gaza with force, and with limited freedom of expression, especially for opponents. It was authoritarian rule of a distinctly Islamic nature. The early months of the takeover were characterised by chaos and the appearance of many factions that were more extreme than Hamas in their Islamic ideology. The small Christian community of Gaza was the target of attacks by these groups in 2007, and one member of that community was killed. Some Christians decided to flee Gaza then and over time many Christians, due to the hardships of the blockade and the nature of Hamas’s rule, took advantage of the special permits Israel gave them during holidays to visit Bethlehem and Jerusalem and never returned. Others emigrated when it was possible to leave through Egypt so that by 2023 the number of Christians in Gaza had declined from three thousand to one thousand.
In time, Hamas gained full control over the strip, almost without any remaining opposition. The highly religious nature of Hamas’s reign and the freedoms Hamas restricted were rightly a matter of concern, not merely for the small Christian community that remained in Gaza but also for many Muslim Gazans. The leadership of Hamas invested much in its military arsenal and its underground tunnels. For years, the tunnels were mainly between Egypt and Gaza and were used to bring in goods, which turned into a profitable business for Hamas. There were other indications of corruption as well.7 One survey showed that Hamas was losing its popularity before October 7: 67 percent of the four hundred Palestinians surveyed in Gaza 'had little or no trust in Hamas in that period right before the attacks.'8
Hamas Tries Cooperation With International Legal Bodies
NB: This is an extract from the talk given by Norman Finkelstein at New Millennium Church, Arkansas in August 2025 (see previous chapter).
Hamas tried to cooperate with international legal bodies, for example, after each of Israel's killing sprees in Gaza... To take the case of Operation Protective Edge in 2014 Israel killed about 550 children and destroyed about 18,000 homes. When the head of the international committee of the Red Cross toured Gaza he said he's never in his entire career seen so much destruction as what Israel inflicted on Gaza. And these high-tech killing sprees occurred with a steady recurrence over time. So Hamas thought 'Let's let in these international commissions of inquiry because after every killing spree in Gaza, the UN Human Rights Council commissioned what was called a commission of inquiry to look into what was done and whether it violated certain principles of international law.
Now, these commissions of inquiry were not very kind to Hamas. They were pretty brutal in their judgments on Hamas. They were much more brutal in their judgments on Israel because the vast amount of death and destruction was committed by Israel. But they were not generous to Hamas. They accused them of war crimes, crimes against humanity and so forth. I mention this because Israel each time refused to meet with the UN Commission of Inquiry. They said, 'We won't help you. We won't participate. We won't join you.' Hamas said, 'We will.' They were willing to accept a harsh verdict on them in order to get some kind of action by the international community. Well, each time these commissions of inquiry produced voluminous reports and each time the reports were very harsh in their judgment on what Israel had unleashed and each time the reports were buried. No action taken.
Can Hamas ever justify terrorism?
NB: This is an edited version of the answer given to this question by Colin Chapman in his book Whose Promised Land?
If we start with the US State Department’s definition of terrorism as ‘premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents’, Hamas would argue that they have turned to violence for three reasons: firstly, because of the violence that has been done to them; secondly, because Palestinian non-violence has achieved nothing and often been met with violence; and thirdly, because they believe that international law permits violent resistance to occupation. ‘They are engaged in a justified war,’ says Baconi, ‘against a violent and illegal occupation that terrorizes them and their family members.’ He speaks of:
'...key Palestinian political demands that remain unmet and unanswered and that form the basis of the Palestinian struggle: achieving self-determination; dealing with the festering injustice of the refugee problem created by Israel’s establishment in 1948; and affirming the right to use armed struggle to resist an illegal occupation. In this light, Hamas is the contemporary manifestation of demands that began a century ago.’9
'Instead of addressing this reality or engaging with Hamas’s political drivers, Israel has adopted a military approach that defines Hamas as a terrorist organization. This depoliticizes and decontextualizes the movement, giving credence to the persistent ‘politicide’ of Palestinian nationalism, Israel’s process of erasing the political ideology animating the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. This approach has allowed successive Israeli governments to avoid taking a position on the demands that have been upheld by Palestinians since before the creation of the State of Israel.'9
Baconi suggests that labeling Hamas a terrorist organisation
'...fails to account for the terror caused by Israel’s relentless military regime over the Palestinians. It is exceedingly difficult to engage in a discussion on terrorism, which is precisely why it is a powerful device to undermine any legitimacy that organisations such as Hamas may have... Why is terrorism limited to sub-national groups or clandestine agents if states are the biggest perpetrators of organized violence against civilians? How does one differentiate between indiscriminate violence aimed solely at terrorising civilians and legitimate armed resistance aimed at securing internationally sanctioned rights that invariably ends up killing civilians? ...Classifying Hamas as a terrorist organisation has justified sweeping military action against Palestinians, depoliticising and dehumanising their struggle. It has also prevented the possibility of viewing Palestinian armed resistance as a form of self-defense within the context of war.'9
Hamas would argue that it is a body elected by Palestinians, not a ‘sub-national group’ or a ‘clandestine agent’. It has every right to point out that Jews engaged in terrorism over many years in their conflict with Palestinian Arabs and in their struggle to drive the British out of Palestine. They had their own terrorist groups – the Haganah, the Irgun, the Palmah, and the Stern Gang (the Lehi) – some of whom operated in cooperation with official Jewish institutions. The massacre at Deir Yassin and the blowing up of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem can reasonably be described as terrorist acts. Israel has had four prime ministers who had previously been involved in terrorist activity – Ben-Gurion, Shamir, Rabin and Sharon. Israel can hardly claim that it has never engaged in terrorism.
Could Hamas ever renounce violence and be prepared to recognise Israel?
NB: This is an edited version of the answer given to this question by Colin Chapman in his book Whose Promised Land?
Tareq Baconi gives this explanation of how, for Hamas, renouncing violence and recognising Israel are linked to achieving at least some of its goals:
'In many ways, this is the backbone of Hamas’s ideology. It is both the final trump card before reaching a settlement and the last line that must be defended to safeguard the imagined purity of Palestinian nationalism. For decades, Hamas has explicitly and repeatedly indicated its willingness to accept a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, most recently by issuing a revised political manifesto in 2017. Even prior to its election victory in 2006, Hamas consistently explained that its use of armed struggle was limited to forcing Israel to end its occupation rather than the destruction of the state as a whole. Hamas’s leaders believe that this would offer a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Palestinians and end the bloodshed.'9
He addresses the response that ‘this would be a temporary solution before Hamas rearms and attacks from a strengthened position’:
'While Hamas may indeed continue to harbour ideological aspirations for the liberation of the entirety of Palestine after such a peaceful settlement, it is unlikely that the movement would have popular backing for such a step if a just settlement is offered. Khaled Meshal has even offered written guarantees to international mediators underscoring this, noting that Hamas would abide by the outcome of any referendum to a peace deal delivered to the Palestinian people, including deals that entail mutual recognition, while stressing that Hamas would not accept these outcomes until the deal is implemented.'9
This interpretation is supported by Shlaim's claim that ‘Hamas’ leaders have a solid reputation for observing agreements.’10
Notes
Whose Promised Land? by Colin Chapman
Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide by Khaled Hroub, 2nd edition
https://kairospalestine.ps/index.php/about-kairos/kairos-palestine-document
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/24/gaza-election-ham
Hamas Contained by Tareq Baconi
The Iron Wall by Avi Shlaim