The Rooked-No-More Rooker-Feldman Court Fix-it Act:  An act to make improvements in the operation and administration of the Federal courts, and to correct the abominations of the lazy Bozo's (Draft 1)

Roughly modeled after the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996.  

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that Congress, the Big Magilla, acting on behalf of Mr. Peebles formerly known as We the People, states its intent to correct the failures and excesses of the federal courts in applying what is known by the courts as the "Rooker-Feldman doctrine."  Congress finds that the lower federal courts have ignored the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and have gone to excess in applying Rooker-Feldman, to the detriment of Mr. Peebles.  Federal courts have thus shirked or abandoned their duty to enforce the requirement that state courts honor and give effect to federal guarantees to individuals and to Mr. Peebles collectively.  Mr. Peebles is super dee duper upset and not going to take it anymore and expresses outrage through the Big Magilla.  The federal courts' shirking or abandonment of their duty has continued even after the Supreme Court, 22 years after the 1983-Feldman case, set forth in the case Exxon v. Saudi-2005 that:  “In the case before us, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit misperceived the NARROW ground occupied by Rooker-Feldman, and consequently erred in ordering the federal action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,” and that “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is CONFINED to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court JUDGMENTS rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”  "Judgments" are confined to final judgments of a state's highest court, as the facts of Feldman pertain only to a state's highest court, including DC's.  This is confirmed not only by the facts of Feldman and Rooker, but also because the phrase, "state-court judgments," is repeatedly followed by the "1257" US Code section.  This section references only "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court."  Section 1257 does not reference any other decision or any lower court.  Therefore, federal district courts that have been using Feldman to bar consideration of any state-court decision other than the final judgment of the highest court in a state, should stick that "doctrine" up their ass.   An individual may challenge, in a federal district court, the Constitutionality of any decision of any lower state court, because the "Fourteenth Amendment [put] restrictions [on] State power. It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action, however put forth, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial."  (ex parte Virginia 1880.)

(a) Definitions:  a "judgment" is the same as a final judgment.

(b) A judgment decides the validity, through a reasoned analysis of the facts and the law, any one or some or all of the causes of action including injunctive relief or any request for declaratory relief to a state court.   

(c) A "reasoned analysis" requires a reason that includes the word, "because."

(d) A reasoned analysis cannot encompass the phrase, "because I say so."

(e) A federal judge forfeits his or her independence by failing to provide a reasoned analysis.  Congress hereby adopts the principle: "An independent judiciary is held to account through its open proceedings and its reasoned judgments." (Lujan case 1992, Kennedy J.)

(f)  If a federal court invokes Rooker-Feldman as a bar to federal court jurisdiction before there is a final judgment from the highest state-court whose ruling is challenged in federal court as violating a Constitutional or other federal guarantee or otherwise creating a federal question under 28 USC §1331, the judge or judges of that federal court are immediately referred to the House and Senate committees on impeachment. 

(g) continued .......

"Rooker-Feldman" Commentary

Rooker-Feldman, which I have referred to in my blogs as Feldman, refers mainly to the 1983 Feldman case where the Sup. Ct.  set up the failure of the federal courts, such that they became mere lemon-production factories (as in defective products) by letting lazy judges toss cases in the dumper to clear their caseloads -- cases that would hold state courts accountable for Constitutional violations.  So the state courts began to really get out of control and do whateverTF they wanted to the Constitution and its application to you .  (BTW, I capitalize the adjective "Constitutional" when referring to our Constitution, for obvious reasons, while standard style-like manuals give it the lower case and should go esch(r)ew themselves, again for obvious reasons.)   Federal courts especially like "doctrines" because the word makes them sound as if they have truly valuable knowledge and skills the way real doctors do -- the ones who know how to reconstruct a "double-crushed" spine over 8 hours of surgery, even though you have the Herman-Munster flexibility afterwards, with a lot of pain, but that was my fault not theirs.

I should also mention that a great many (perhaps nearly all but in fairness I don't know, of course) judges will punish a person (a party) who has a case in front of them for whatever "reason" they want.  Maybe because the person has criticized the court system publicly like this, to pick a random example.  I fully expect that I will be punished -- maybe in the very near future -- for my 1st Amendment exercise,  here.  It is hardly ever easy to prove, obviously, what a judge's actual motivations are.  And they can get away with whatever they want easily by the nature of the Dues Process where judges bail out other judges and their lawyer pals.  However, regardless of what a judge's actual motivation is, you can apply a very simple test in many cases to see whether a judge is punishing you.  A judge "abuses" his or her "discretion" by definition if s/he does not give a reason for the decision.  It takes actual work to be a judge, according to the law, you know; but the law is hardly ever applied to judges.  The "abuse of discretion standard," with which appeals courts give trial judges a free pass, requires that the trial judge state some reason for why he is ruling the way he is.  Also, the appeals court must actually state why the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion.  Gosh, gee, you say:  you mean there really are duties that a judge owes to parties to a case and to the public?  You betcha, but courts ignore this because they can do whatever they want, principally because Congress and legislatures are full of lawyers.  But lawyers or not, essentially no one will call out the glaring defects in the courts for what they are.  I will and vituperatively so; give them what-for.  The time for "niceness" to the courts is long gone.  They have gotten away with their crimes for far too long.  George Floyd and others have had lives lost and ruined by this corrupt monstrosity.   Ok, back to the main topic.  

Federal courts also especially like hyphenated names for their doctrines because they make judges sound as if they're really analyzing how something works -- such as Maxwell-Boltzmann, which helps you analyze how fast molecules zip around as they heat-up in, for example, a fuel-air mixture that would be prone to detonation in your cylinders at higher temps (or when running your aircraft engine too far lean of peak, so you still get detonation even as the temp drops), rather than having a smooth flame front traveling through the mixture across the cylinder and giving you a highly-complete, stoichiometric burn with maximum power.   When I was in Akron in the early 80s for my roommate's wedding, the day after the wedding we went to Summit Racing where I got their water injection system for my '69 SS-396 Chevelle when 93 Amoco was on its way out.  I'll tell you more about that later, and yeah, I'm making a heavy-handed point about people who explore and deal with the real world, unlike lawyers.  

So, Maxwell-Boltzmann and Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein are standard fare for freshman and sophomore hardsci types -- depending on what kind of experiment you're doing -- along with Lorentz-Fitzgerald and Euler-Lagrange in another context.  And there are plenty more.  In other words, we're not impressed with -- let alone blown away by -- hyphenated "doctrines" and stuff.  We know how to read and apply logic, Dr. McCoy.  And we like to push down on the button, man, you can hear her sing.  

So, as I've written, the federal courts could not scale-up from 1789.  They are obsolete and not up to the job.  It was a good try by the 1789 designers, but engineering any system bumps up against realities of scale.  State court systems are out of control and were set on this path in 1983 by Feldman.  It is a big advantage to know something about how the real world works, with its constraints, when you write laws for real-world people who go to real-world jobs and take kids to real-world after-school activities.  Hardsci, engineer, fixit types are used to sitting at the lab bench or sliding under a big-block chevy and diagnosing problems by throwing out all assumptions.  Assumptions with getcha eventually, if not every time.  This is the kind of actual analysis a hardsci (not pollysci - wanna cracker) types bring to legislation.

The Judge Puty. Computational Due Process & Access to Justice, Enabling Act

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,  that Congress states its intent to correct, by preemption, the failures and excesses of the federal courts, with the Judge Puty Computational Due Process Project.  Judge Puty's initial embodiment is with fillable forms on Congress' website, free of charge to the user.  

(1)(a) Long-arm jurisdiction tort case:   the Congress webform ("Longarm") first asks the question of whether the complaint an individual (party) seeks to file alleges a contract or a tort.  Longarm asks whether there is a "deal" between the parties, either a written or oral deal.  If there is no "deal" between the prospective parties to the case, Longarm then asks whether the complaining party is alleging harm within the state in which that party is filing in federal court.  If the plaintiff is alleging harm within the state, Longarm then asks whether the defendant intentionally directed harmful acts towards the plaintiff's activities within the state.  If the answer is yes, then the individual is prompted to enter the specific facts and dates on which the intentionally-directed harm occurred.  

(b)  Longarm then asks the appropriate questions for satisfying federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 USC §1332.  

(c)  Longarm then asks the appropriate questions for satisfying federal question jurisdiction under 28 USC §1331.

(d)   Longarm then displays that facts and dates and asks for confirmation of correctness, not under any oath, from the user.  Upon confirmation, Longarm assigns a provisional federal case number to the filing, which is logged in the Judge Puty system. 

(e)  The party may submit the provisional federal complaint electronically for a jurisdictional confirmation ruling, for a fee of 5¢ which is Lucy's Doctor is In fee.  

(f)  A federal court reviews the facts alleging harm in the state and an intentional interjection of harm into the state.  If an error is found, the court must notate why the alleged facts do not show that harm occurred in the state and/or that the harm was not intentionally interjected. 

(g)  Subsequent amended Judge Puty jurisdictional tort filings require increasing fees not to exceed a total of $30 for the first three amended filings, which excluded the first filing for a nickel.

(g) Congress finds that some courts have imposed an extraneous and unconstitutional requirement on a plaintiff to articulate some "benefit" that a defendant 's allegedly tortious acts provided for the defendant.  Congress finds that, consistent with the 1984-Calder-Jones case (what a honey that Shirley, eh?), long-arm jurisdiction in an intentional tort case does not require a plaintiff to articulate any benefit to an out-of-state tortfeasor.  Congress finds that it is not the duty of a plaintiff to be a defendant's psychologist and speculate on what pathology motivated a defendant to intentionally interject harm into a state from outside that state.  If an out-of-state defendant intentionally causes harm to a plaintiff's activities in a state, long-arm jurisdiction is satisfied. 

(2)(a)  Long-arm contract jurisdiction case: ..........

About John: Engineer - electronic hardware design and test; MSEE Stanford/Ginzton Lab-applied physics; B.A. Oberlin College, physics, math. email: john4midwest@gmail.com .  John will not immediately reply to requests for comment, where "immediately" may be >1 year, especially in the case of the Chant Now Network.