Research

Publications

Narcissism and the Agency Cost of Debt - with Ronald Anderson, Forthcoming at Journal of Empirical Finance 

Measuring CSR, ESG, and Sustainability - with Sebeom Oh, Forthcoming at International Finance Review

Working Papers

Narcissism and Insider Trading - with Jason Jiang, Jingyu Zhang, Kose John (Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Corporate Finance)

Narcissism constitutes a complex and comprehensive personality trait that affects individuals’ thinking, feeling, and behavior. In this study, we examine whether narcissistic CEOs engage more in opportunistic insider trading relative to other types of CEOs. By using a numeric measure of CEO narcissism based on textual analysis, we find that CEOs with a higher level of narcissism engage in opportunistic insider trading more intensely, which is consistent with exploitative personal benefit hypothesis. We employ numerous approaches to alleviate endogeneity concerns, including the coarsen exact matching, instrumental variable, falsification test, and Heckman’s two-step sample selection model. The cross-sectional analysis shows that the effects of CEO narcissism on opportunistic insider trading are more pronounced for CEOs with less legal knowledge and weaker monitoring pressure. Taken together, our findings highlight narcissism as an important personality trait that drives a CEO’s opportunistic insider trading behavior.   

Effect of Board Gender Diversity Policies: Evidence from Director Appointments

I examine the effect of board gender diversity policies on firm value. First, I confirm the previously documented negative investor reaction to 2018 CA gender quota requirement (SB 826). Additionally, I find significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following the passage of the 2020 CA board diversity mandate (AB 979), and the 2020 Nasdaq board diversity disclosure rules, and significantly positive CARs when AB 979 and SB 826 were legally overturned in April and May of 2022. Second, I examine CARs to director appointments over the period 2003-2021. While CARs to female director appointments are always economically smaller, the difference in CARs between male and female appointments is not statistically significant. Moreover, the difference in CARs remains insignificant even after #MeToo, when arguably, firms faced greater pressure to appoint female directors. Finally, I examine the qualifications of appointed directors. I find that male directors have more work experience and more CEO experience relative to female directors, but this differential in qualifications across male and female directors does not change significantly in the post #MeToo period. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that while investors react less positively to female director appointments and negatively to laws that increase or encourage board diversity, the negative reaction does not appear to be driven by a lower supply of qualified female directors.

Work in Progress

Female Leaders and Mergers and Acquisition Targets - with Kamyar Goudarzi, Xiaohu Guo, and Luqi Xu