Aspects of axiomatic thinking in Schlick’s philoyophy of science

Aspects of axiomatic thinking in Schlick’s philoyophy of science

Julia Franke-Reddig

The young Moritz Schlick’s understanding of logic was limited to traditional syllogistics. He adopted David Hilbert’s conception of the ‘implicite definition’ in the “General Theory of Knowledge” but rejected this idea already in the 1920s after a criticism by Rudolph Carnap.

This is one aspect of the story of Schlick’s philosophical conversion in Vienna that is often told. But, is it really that simple?

In my presentation I present my thesis, that the young Moritz Schlick’s studies of Hilbert’s work lead him to an idea that I call ‘axiomatic thinking’. In this way ‘implicite defined concepts’ became a central aspect for the early Schlick’s conception of knowledge and influenced his understanding of the constitution of scientific theories essencially. In this way the concept of ‘implicite definition’ didn’t only have relevance for the early Schlick’s work: it also had a deep influence on the so called “Thesis of Structure”, that plays a central role in the theory of science in Schlick’s late philosophy.

In front of this backround I deny that it makes sense to see Schlick as a discontinuous thinker.