Episode 4

To listen to this episode, click on one of the following links.

Texts Discussed in This Episode

• The Ramayana: A Modern Retelling of the Great Indian Epic by Ramesh Menon (ISBN 978-0-86547-695-0)

• “How people choose between criminal opportunities” by Andrew T. Krajewski et al., in Criminology, https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9125.70006

Transcript

An important announcement for listeners

This episode was made to be suitable for a general audience. However, please be advised that the Ramayana, and the actions of its characters, will be discussed in depth.

Hello, and welcome to “If Socrates Had a Podcast”! I am your host, Vinay Kalva. I apologize for the hiatus in new episodes over the past 2 months. I am happy to announce that I am back, and am slowly building a catalog of episodes to ensure that I have sufficient buffer. This is the first episode of 2026 and my fourth overall, and I am excited to bring it to you.

In this episode, we will turn to a subject that blends religion and science, the epic and the local, the predestined and the choosing. It is why people choose to commit certain crimes. Why does an offender decide to commit one type of crime over another? For example, why would a murderer murder rather than rob a person? No case is the same, and, as with most social sciences, one must tread carefully. Thus, in this podcast, we will attempt to answer this question, focusing on a very specific case: that of the Ramayana, one of the two great epics in Hinduism. Using the insights in a recent paper published in the journal Criminology – “How people choose between criminal opportunities” by Andrew T. Krajewski and colleagues – we will attempt to answer this question, however best we can.

I therefore bring to you, my listeners, a dialogue between Socrates and Chanakya. Socrates is the namesake of this podcast, as always. Chanakya, meanwhile, is one of the most famous strategists in Indian history. It is their meeting that I chronicle here, in which they consider this most important subject. I will play the parts of both characters, inflecting my voice as follows when I am Socrates (inflect “I am Socrates”) and as follows when I am Chanakya: (inflect “I am Chanakya”). With that, let us begin our exploration of what crimes people choose to commit and why.

CHANAKYA: Well, I see King Chandragupta does not suspect you today.

SOCRATES: Of course he does not suspect me, Chanakya. Why would he when you have defended me so eloquently in front of him?

CHANAKYA: Well, as with any emissary of any nation, it is my duty to defend them, as eloquently as possible. I read your Apology; it is most unfortunate that your fellow citizens had neither the foresight nor the virtue that was needed to make such a momentous decision as to execute the great scholar that was you.

SOCRATES: The past, Chanakya, is the past. There is not much either I or you can do about it. Thankfully, I managed to survive long enough to make it here, so you have my time. Let us proceed, if you will.

CHANAKYA: Certainly we may proceed. What, Socrates, do you wish to discuss?

SOCRATES: I read one of the great works of literature and, of course, key religious texts of Hinduism, the Ramayana, very recently. To be more precise, I read a narrative retelling of it, which is accurate enough for my purposes. I also happened to read this paper called “How people choose between criminal opportunities” by a group of authors led by Andrew T. Krajewski.

CHANAKYA: I see that you bring me interesting material to work with today. Would you mind discussing what the two works have to say, so that we may discuss them as deeply as possible?

SOCRATES: Certainly. To start, there is the Ramayana.

CHANAKYA: Now, I have heard it many times in my life. I see that you have, somehow, read it.

SOCRATES: Indeed I have. It was a narrative version, because we Greeks did not have access to your bards, only our own.

CHANAKYA: Well, I suppose that’s the best you can do. I won’t fault you. Proceed if you will, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Most certainly, Chanakya. There are seven books, and I suppose it will work best if I go by each one.

CHANAKYA: I am ready to hear it. I have read, seen, and heard the Ramayana far too many times to count, so it is my obligation and duty to check if you get the details incorrect.

SOCRATES: I am a simple man and know very little, so I will assume all of the liability for inaccuracy. Now, starting with Book 1, we learn about how Rama’s dynasty emerged, as well as the story of King Janaka, whose daughter was Sita; she was born from the earth, adopted by King Janaka, and married to Rama on her and King Janaka’s wishes after Rama broke Shiva’s bow. In Book 2, Rama is exiled by Kaikeyi, his stepmother, against the wishes of nearly everyone else; Kaikeyi makes this decision after being persuaded by her maid, Manthara. Sita and Rama’s brother Lakshmana insist on joining Rama. In Book 3, the Ramayana narrates the period of exile of Rama, Sita, and Lakshmana, including the capture of Sita by Ravana, the king of Lanka. Rama and Lakshmana search desperately for Sita in Book 4, and as part of that effort they go to the land of the vanaras. The king there is Sugriva, and he kills his brother Vali with Rama’s help (specifically, Rama violates the rules of duelling). In exchange for Rama’s deed, Sugriva agrees to send his subjects to search all over for Sita. Book 5 chronicles the efforts of Hanuman, Sugriva’s best minister, in finding Sita; Hanuman flies over the ocean and locates her in Lanka. He then destroys the garden Sita is in, is captured, and gets his tail burned by Ravana; Hanuman uses it to destroy Lanka. Up to this point, Ravana has refused all requests for him to let Sita go, even from his own brother. Book 6 describes the war, in which Ravana’s most talented warriors – and eventually Ravana himself – all are killed. Many vanaras die too, but Rama wins in the end. Sita enters a purificatory fire on the orders of Rama and survives, after which Sita and Rama, as well as Lakshmana, return to Ayodhya. Book 7 discusses Ravana’s origin story; the killing of Lavana, Ravana’s brother, by Shatrughna, Rama’s brother; and the exile of Sita due to public demand in Ayodhya. Sita raises Rama’s two sons, Lava and Kusha, and ultimately returns to the Earth; Lakshmana is also exiled and returns to the world of the gods, after which Rama follows.

CHANAKYA: From what I can tell, you have understood the details correctly. What about that paper you mentioned?

SOCRATES: I will certainly be pleased to discuss that. The paper evaluated several different factors to determine which were significant in motivating choices to commit a specific crime in 10,000 situations. In essence, why do people choose to commit crime X over crime Y? The crime, in this case, was a scam that did not involve violence. The relevant factors assessed were the economic status of the victim; the number of accomplices; the length of time required for the goals of crime to be achieved; how much money could be made from the crime, and when it would be made; how likely the criminal was to be arrested; and the punishment that would be administered if the criminal was caught. I must note here that rational choice theory, which is the widely accepted theory in the field, attempts to account for all of these variables, except for the number of accomplices and details relating to the victim. The researchers also assessed prior offenses and self-control. To determine the effect of these factors, the researchers recruited a diverse sample of 1023 adults in the United States to complete a survey, of which 1000 completed it.  They also examined each factor both in terms of selecting what crime to commit and determining the role of self-control and prior offending. The results suggest that rational choice theory models accurately reflect what crimes people choose to commit; crimes targeting those with more money were more likely to be selected; and accomplices decreased the probability that a crime would be pursued. Further, the authors found that individual factors were largely irrelevant. Overall, the authors concluded that rational choice theory accurately explains what crimes a person chooses to commit.

CHANAKYA: Well, I could not be more intrigued personally. I see a connection between the Ramayana and this paper that you have mentioned.

SOCRATES: What is it? And how?

CHANAKYA: Well, before I start, I must establish my assumptions. One cannot be a strategist without knowing the basis of their thinking and re-evaluating it.

SOCRATES: With respect, Chanakya, what are your assumptions?

CHANAKYA: My assumptions are these. First, I am treating the Ramayana here as a work of literature, and separating it from the significance it holds in Hinduism. This is a separate matter – one that is personal to me and that I wish to avoid discussing.

SOCRATES: I suppose you mean what you are saying in the sense that the Iliad and the Odyssey are religious, but they are also art.

CHANAKYA: Precisely. I must also say that it makes little sense to apply our current understanding of a “crime” to the Ramayana, given that Valmiki did not imagine what sorts of crimes we have today. The definition that should be used should be that of the time period.

SOCRATES: I think that is a reasonable assumption to make. Our analysis will be flawed should we choose to do otherwise.

CHANAKYA: Do you have anything else with you?

SOCRATES: Unfortunately, I do not. I only have that which is in my hands, which is nothing.

CHANAKYA: In that case, we will have to work with what the various characters define as a crime in the Ramayana.

SOCRATES: I suppose so.

CHANAKYA: Well, let’s begin, then. Perhaps we could start by chronicling all of the actions which could be considered criminal.

SOCRATES: I cannot object to this. What, in your view, constitutes crime in the epic?

CHANAKYA: Well, there are lots of crimes committed, and it would not be good to discuss them all in detail. However, the two most notable crimes committed are these, if you will: Ravana kidnapping Sita, and Rama killing Vali against the rules of the duel.

SOCRATES: I am more doubtful about the latter. The duel seems perfectly legal, of course, and Sugriva and Vali both agreed to the rules of the duel. Further, Rama, who is the embodiment of dharma, which seems to be best defined as “duty”, justifies his actions to the dying Vali as being in line with his duty to protect the Earth from the forces of evil.

CHANAKYA: Are you arguing that Rama, then, was acting legally?

SOCRATES: It appears I am. However, I am not quite sure whether this justification suffices in terms of Rama committing a crime rather than an immoral act. Those are distinct, after all.

CHANAKYA: In that case, we will need to define what a crime is more carefully. We must read the Ramayana carefully to understand what is the law rather than a moral rule, and vice versa.

SOCRATES: In that case, we must carefully consider what constitutes a crime, and then proceed with the cases we want to examine. 

CHANAKYA: I suppose we could discuss this case, then. However, to incorporate the notion of choosing a certain crime over another, we need to see where any character had a choice about what crime they wanted to commit, and what choice they made.

SOCRATES: Indeed, we must. To limit our discussion, I think the case of Rama killing Vali during the duel, and the case of Kaikeyi exiling Rama through a boon, are the best cases to examine. Rama had the choice to incapacitate Vali by another means, and Kaikeyi also had alternative options in achieving her goal. Further, both actions were illegal; Vali could not have, legally, been killed given the rules of the duel, and Kaikeyi…
CHANAKYA: I must stop you there, Socrates. It was a tradition, or norm, for the eldest son to succeed their father as king. Kaikeyi’s desire to have her son, rather than her stepson, take the throne is, therefore, not a crime in as much as it was a violation of societal norms.

SOCRATES: Cannot societal norms be reflected in the law?

CHANAKYA: They can, but they are not always. Suppose we have a norm that every day, I must go into the forest, apply paste on my head, and prostrate myself in front of a tree. Should I fail to do this, I will face the disapproval of everyone, even the king, but I will not be fined, taxed extra, or thrown in the dungeon. Has a crime been committed here?

SOCRATES: Absolutely not. You are breaking a norm, but not the law.

CHANAKYA: In any case, this norm is still important to regard. I think it is reasonable to assume that Kaikeyi’s right to use her boons is granted by law.

SOCRATES: Please reason through this for my benefit, for I am a simple man and do not know all that much.

CHANAKYA: Well, who grants rights?

SOCRATES: I am not quite sure. I would say God, but that’s ahead of my time.

CHANAKYA: I will take that answer for now, although I would add that the state bestows rights too. 

SOCRATES: What is the basis of the state, then?
CHANAKYA: God. It could only be God, and perhaps a good showing of physical force.

SOCRATES: But I am sure even that is justified by God, is it not?

CHANAKYA: Indeed. Further, given that this is the Ramayana; Rama is Vishnu on Earth; and Vishnu is an avatar of God; it would be reasonable to assume that, in the Ramayana, Rama is the representative of God.

SOCRATES: And Rama, as the king, makes the laws.

CHANAKYA: Precisely. As Rama makes the laws for Ayodhya during his rule, and Rama is a representative of God, God is the source of all laws during Rama’s rule.

SOCRATES: Could not Rama act independently of God, as an individual person?

CHANAKYA: You are not wrong here. However, within the context of the Ramayana, Rama’s actions are generally within the bounds of the rules made by God. 

SOCRATES: What of his predecessors?

CHANAKYA: In the Ramayana, we know that Dasaratha, and the royal house of Ayodhya, is also descended from God. Every member of the royal house is a representative of God, then, and God is the source of all their laws.

SOCRATES: I cannot object to this claim. If, therefore, we take it as true that Ayodhya’s laws are defined by God, what is it precisely that we are evaluating here?

CHANAKYA: From my point of view, we are asking why Kaikeyi chose to violate God’s laws in the way she did, rather than in any other way.

SOCRATES: Now that is a very interesting matter. However, we have been debating whether this is a merited topic for discussion for quite a while, and I imagine that we do not get to use the court all day. Would you mind walking in the royal garden with me for some time, to refresh our minds?

CHANAKYA: I certainly would not mind. Let us go.

This regularly scheduled program is interrupted for a short break.

Dear listeners,

I am quite sure that you are wondering how exactly Socrates met Chanakya. Well, while I did not get the chance to meet them, the court reporter was granted permission to narrate this story to me after Chanakya told the ministers about this most bizarre event. Here it is, for your enjoyment:

Chanakya was sitting near the river, thinking carefully. He had heard from his informants that the great empire of Alexander was collapsing, and his many generals were all fighting for pieces of it. King Chandragupta was indecisive, so as always, he had asked Chanakya to “think it over, and come back with a plan”. Chanakya had managed to obtain quite a number of the Greek and Roman classics, and was reading Livy’s excellent history of Rome. Unfortunately, King Chandragupta did not explain how he got a hold of them for Chanakya. At this moment, he started to think of something very mysterious.

CHORUS

What happened to that mysterious book?

Did it lay closed,

Binding and pages intact?

Did it lay open,

Uncorrected after the fact?

Did someone read it,

Or was Chanakya first –

Checking it bit by bit?

He didn’t know, for

It wasn’t important.

Or was his vision tint?

HOST: My apologies, dear listeners. I don’t know why the chorus decided to interject with Langston Hughes right now. That was supposed to happen in a few minutes. 

HOST TO CHORUS: I told you to wait for five minutes! Why couldn’t you wait for five minutes? Just five minutes! 

CHORUS: We wanted to do it now. Sorry. 

HOST TO CHORUS: Well, it’s too late now. Just come in when I tell you to. 

HOST TO AUDIENCE: All right. Now, I present to you what you have all been waiting for: the one, the only, the magnificent Zeus – I mean, Socrates. For this, we must turn the clock back several more years.

Socrates, the eternal teacher, had decided to evaluate how Aristotle was doing several years prior. Teacher audits were quite standard even then, so Socrates sat in, at random, when Aristotle was teaching Alexander the Great. Due to the excellence of his feedback, and saddened by the actions of the Athenians, Alexander the Great permitted Socrates to live in Macedonia as long as he and his kin ruled the land. Socrates, ever grateful, lived happily, but yearned for an adventure and more interlocutors to talk to. Thus, when he heard about the military campaign, he volunteered to be a messenger. Despite the generals’ reluctance, they ultimately agreed to let Socrates work as a messenger due to his fame. Thus, when Socrates happened to be assigned to issue an ultimatum to King Chandragupta, he readily accepted the task. He knew that messengers were protected by strongly observed norms, and he had some freedom to talk to others. Accordingly, Socrates went on his way.

Socrates, tired, reached the river where Chanakya sat. However, he saw not a boat in sight, nor did he have the knowledge to cross. Chanakya saw him and inferred that he needed to cross the river. Certain that he could gain the man’s favor, he walked a short distance to an abandoned boat, rowed across the river, and met Socrates.

“Who might you be?” asked Chanakya.

“Me? I am a messenger for Macedonia,” replied Socrates, who for his own good could not bend the truth.

“Well, my king tells me I cannot harm a messenger. Come. I will take you to King Chandragupta.”

“Thank you. I must return urgently.”

Thus Chanakya rowed Socrates across the river, and took him to King Chandragupta. Chanakya, of course, was quite suspicious, but he did not wish to do anything until he had, in line with King Chandragupta’s orders, “thought it over and came with a plan”. He decided to let Socrates speak, for nothing could be more useful in planning than knowing what one’s adversary wished to do. 

The rest, I must say, is history. Socrates spoke in court, and a large war ensued, of which I have no knowledge. Socrates, as a messenger, was not asked to fight, and managed to survive the war. Chanakya, sensing that there was more to Socrates and himself asked by King Chandragupta not to fight, spoke with him after the war ended. They realized that they had too much in common, and hence I bring you this dialogue. Now, as for how it ended up here. Chorus!

CHORUS

How did that story come here?

Was it an egg,

Laid and waiting to hatch?

Was it a fire,

The result of the lit match?

When was it posted,

Or was a spy –

Fearful of being roasted?

He was too competent,

For his own good.

Or had he wood?

We now return to our regularly scheduled program.

SOCRATES: King Chandragupta has a wonderful garden. Chanakya, you are a fortunate man in being able to work for him.

CHANAKYA: Indeed I am, Socrates. Now, what were we discussing before?

SOCRATES: We were discussing the applicability of the paper to the two cases in the Ramayana: Kaikeyi exiling Rama, and Rama killing Vali during the duel with Sugriva.

CHANAKYA: Yes, that is correct. To start, I think it will be useful to consider the alternative options available in the first case.

SOCRATES: Are there not an infinite number of counterfactual situations?

CHANAKYA: There seem to be at first glance. However, I think that there are only a limited number.

SOCRATES: Why would you say so?

CHANAKYA: To answer your question, we must look at the objective of the crime, determine the means required to reach that objective, and eliminate the impossible.

SOCRATES: I agree with this approach. What is the objective to be reached?

CHANAKYA: Well, Kaikeyi’s objective – after she was convinced by Manthara, of course – was to prevent Rama from acceding to the throne.

SOCRATES: And what are the means?

CHANAKYA: In the Ramayana, Kaikeyi uses her boons to achieve this objective.

SOCRATES: Actually, I must stop you here. I think the debate we should be having is not over the objective, or its means, but the result of the means and how that relates to the objective.

CHANAKYA: Color me confused. Socrates, would you please explain what you are trying to say?

SOCRATES: I suppose it will be useful to borrow a concept from psychological research: operationalization. Many variables are not measurable directly, so a related variable that is measurable is examined instead, and the effects on the unmeasurable variable can be inferred.

CHANAKYA: Is the objective that Kaikeyi has not measurable? Either Rama is on the throne or he is not.

SOCRATES: But the latter option is filled with possibilities. Bharata took the throne in the epic, but Lakshmana or Shatrughna could have taken it too. 

CHANAKYA: I think you are missing a detail here. Kaikeyi was persuaded to push for Bharata to take the throne, against the laws stating otherwise.

SOCRATES: The issue here, however, is that success is measured by two criteria, the latter following the former:

1. Rama is not on the throne.

2. Bharata is on the throne.

CHANAKYA: Kaikeyi, then, must act in such a way as to ensure both objectives are reached. Further, both objectives are easily measurable. Thus, Socrates, I think we will be fine.

SOCRATES: I suppose it will be useful if we trace the full sequence of actions.

1. Rama is slated to be the king of Ayodhya by law.

2. Kaikeyi wants Bharata on the throne instead.

3. To fulfill this wish, she must break the law.

4. Kaikeyi uses the boons granted to her to coerce her husband, King Dasaratha, into breaking the law.

5. Dasaratha obeys, and Bharata becomes king.

CHANAKYA: I suppose, then, that we are working with step 4.

SOCRATES: Precisely. Now, let us draw up the alternatives.

CHANAKYA: The primary alternative, in my view, would have been earlier in Rama’s life. She could have used her boons earlier, but did not do so. The reason seems evident to me: she did not intend to commit the crime until Manthara pressured her to do so.

SOCRATES: Perhaps we could also characterize Rama, who is in this case the victim.

CHANAKYA: Some of the criteria perhaps do not apply, although we could adjust them to fit the context. For instance, Rama was wealthy, though I am not sure if he is necessarily more wealthy than Kaikeyi was. 

SOCRATES: What about power? Rama would likely have more power than Kaikeyi did.

CHANAKYA: That seems to be a better fit in this case than either the wealth of the victim or the type of enterprise, which the researchers tested for. However, perceived power precedes both variables and may explain both. As for the remaining variables, it seems quite obvious that Kaikeyi had one accomplice, Manthara; this is not in line with rational choice theory. The crime also had a high payoff: her son being in charge would protect her from irrelevance and exile, as Manthara said. This return was long-lasting and immediate as well. Now, I wonder about the punishment: would transgressing this law not cause stigma?

SOCRATES: Well, Manthara was physically assaulted for persuading Kaikeyi to act in the manner which she did. This, I assume, would be a punishment, and aligns with the results of the study. There, more stringent punishments for certain scams reduced the odds of those scams being selected.

CHANAKYA: Now, I wonder if Kaikeyi was acting in accordance with rational choice theory.

 SOCRATES: It seems as if she did. Manthara’s statement that Kaikeyi was ignoring her self-interest out of innocence, or not knowing the true ways of humans, seems accurate here. Further, most of the relevant factors in rational choice theory, and the two additional ones mentioned by the researchers, were relevant in this case. The question I still have, however, is why Manthara being a part of the plan did not reduce the chances that Kaikeyi would act in the way she did. 

CHANAKYA: The answer is that Kaikeyi respected Manthara immensely. Trust in the accomplices perhaps increases the chance that one will commit a crime.

SOCRATES: I suppose we have arrived at our answer. Kaikeyi acted as rational choice theory would predict. Now, what of the case of Rama shooting Vali during the duel? Is this also in line with the theory?

CHANAKYA: I will try this time. To reconstruct the events:

1. Sugriva and Vali entered a second duel, because Vali, due to an old grudge, despised Sugriva.

2. Rama was not a party to the duel, but secretly aided Sugriva.

3. This aid was provided by shooting Vali with an arrow.

4. Vali died from the wound.

SOCRATES: What are the alternatives?

CHANAKYA: The alternative that seems most plausible is Rama injuring, but not killing, Vali.

SOCRATES: Why, then, did Rama choose to kill Vali?

CHANAKYA: Rama tells the dying Vali that he had violated dharma before and thus merited punishment. This punishment was death.

SOCRATES: Who is the criminal in this case, then? It is less clear to me now.

CHANAKYA: I think Vali is the criminal. As we discussed before, Rama, being God on Earth, enforces the law of God. Even his action in this case is a form of enforcement.

SOCRATES: Then I suppose we should be examining the violation of the law committed by Vali.

CHANAKYA: There are several, but it seems one of the main ones was that Vali was trying to kill Sugriva for taking the throne out of selfish desire, when Sugriva only acted as a regent until Vali’s return.

SOCRATES: Then the criminal is Vali. What, then, is the alternative crime that he could have committed?

CHANAKYA: He could have chosen to exile Sugriva rather than kill him. It is still a crime, but it could be done.

SOCRATES: Thus we must consider the relevant factors. In either case, Vali had no accomplices. I agree with you that Vali’s grievance over power imbalance – he did not have the power he viewed himself to merit – explains the increased likelihood of crime when there is a wealthy victim and for the monetary return, so I will take power imbalance to be the cause. The crime took little time for Vali to accomplish, as it appears to be motivated by impulsive anger, and Vali surely did not imagine that he would be punished.

CHANAKYA: I cannot disagree with this analysis. It seems evident that rational choice theory largely explains the actions of Vali as well.

SOCRATES: There is a relevant factor that we have neglected to consider, however. Perhaps it increases the validity of our conclusions that power imbalances affect expected monetary return and the level of change that occurs if a victim is wealthy versus if they are poor.

CHANAKYA: What factor might you be referring to?

SOCRATES: I refer to the fact that the study was conducted on nonviolent crime. Perhaps for violent crime, which applies to the second case, a larger power imbalance must be present, and thus the expected monetary return and the aggravation of a wealthy victim increases.

CHANAKYA: Socrates, are you arguing that the violence of a crime is directly correlated to the change in the relevant factors?

SOCRATES: Yes, Chanakya, I am. However, this is as far as we can go for today. I must be going, for it has been a long day. I would like to eat dinner and rest at home.

CHANAKYA: I must too. King Chandragupta has provided me with a very urgent assignment to complete.

SOCRATES: I wish you the best on your assignment, Chanakya.

CHANAKYA: And I wish you a safe journey home, Socrates.

This concludes the fourth episode of “If Socrates Had a Podcast”. As noted in the beginning, you can find the specific editions of the texts in the podcast description. If you have any questions or would like to suggest books or notable people that I should feature on this podcast, reach out by sending me an email at ishap.podcast@gmail.com. That’s i-s-h-a-p.podcast@gmail.com.

I hope that you learned something new and exciting today, and enjoyed the brief intermission. If you like what you heard, stay tuned for my next episode, coming up in two weeks. Thank you very much for your time, and have a wonderful day.