May 9, 2025
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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In recent elections across the world, many right-wing politicians echoed US President Donald Trump’s political style, policies and even rhetoric, reflecting a rise in populism. But the tide is turning and in several instances, Trumpism has backfired.
In Canada and Australia, an “anti-Trump bump” was in effect as voters rejected chaos and Trump-style protectionism in favour of stability and centrism. Thanks to the Trump effect, political parties previously expected to lose reversed their electoral fate.
In Canada, just months ago, the Conservatives had been ahead of the Liberal Party in the polls by some 20 percentage points. By the time the federal election was held last month, Mark Carney and his Liberal Party had turned the race around, winning on a platform of reducing Canada’s reliance on the United States in preparation for a changing global order.
In contrast, Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre’s campaign echoed Trump’s approach, attacking institutions and focusing on inflation. Carney’s message, however, increasingly resonated amid a public backlash against Trump’s suggestion that Canada should become the 51st US state. In response to Trump’s aggressive trade policies and provocative rhetoric, Canadians chose to show unwavering support for national sovereignty. In his victory speech, Prime Minister Carney declared that the old Canada-US relationship was “over”.
In Australia, where no prime minister had been consecutively re-elected in over two decades, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese gained momentum as Trump’s tariffs began to hurt Australian exports. Opposition leader Peter Dutton, who had been ahead in the polls, essentially imported Trump’s outlook and heavily leaned towards immigration crackdowns and stricter law and order.
In contrast, Albanese ran on a centrist, stability-focused platform centred on economic reform and national unity. This ended up striking a chord with the public, helping the Labor Party to a landslide victory while Dutton lost his seat.
In Germany, voters gave the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) a major boost in the snap election in February, with over 20 per cent of the vote, making it the second largest party. Endorsed by US Vice-President J.D. Vance and Trump adviser Elon Musk, the AfD campaigned on anti-immigration and anti-elite propaganda. But despite Afd’s political gains, no mainstream party would form a ruling coalition with it.
Instead, the Christian Democratic Union led by Chancellor Friedrich Merz and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, have formed a majority government with the centre-left Social Democratic Party.
This comes amid a diplomatic feud with the US over the designation of the AfD as a right-wing extremist organisation by the German intelligence service after a three-year investigation.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called it “tyranny in disguise” while Vance accused the Germans of rebuilding the Berlin Wall. Mere months ago, the US vice-president had been firmly rebuked by then German chancellor Olaf Scholz, who warned against “outsiders intervening in our democracy”.
Unsurprisingly, post-election Germany has swiftly re-examined its reliance on the US, considering Trump’s dismissive stance towards Europe and Nato, the transatlantic security alliance, as well as his protectionist tariffs. Merz pushed through a policy shift which includes an increase in defence spending and a €500 billion (US$565 billion) infrastructure fund aimed at improving Germany’s autonomy and resilience.
These measures are suggestive of a Germany quietly preparing for a future when the US may no longer be considered a dependable ally, even if it remains formally committed to Nato and transatlantic ties.
In Britain, however, contrary to the resistance shown in Canada, Australia and Germany, Reform UK, the party led by long-time Trump admirer Nigel Farage, achieved a surprising breakthrough in the local elections. Reform won most of the council seats, two mayoralties and even a parliamentary by-election.
That the main Labour and Conservative parties lost ground to the right-wing upstart reflects a deep and gnawing public frustration with the political establishment. Trumpism worked in Farage’s favour as he borrowed heavily from the playbook. His rallies took on the style and energy of Trump’s campaign events, focusing on immigration control, national identity and anti-elite sentiment.
Reform’s success has revealed a deeper shift in British politics where Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s diplomatic approach to Trump has done little to counter the rise of populist rhetoric among the people.
Similarly in Romania, far-right, pro-Trump candidate George Simion has won the first round of the presidential election this week with about 40 per cent of the vote, well ahead of his rivals. He faces centrist Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan in a run-off on May 18.
Evidently, Trumpism is developing into more than an American political trend – it has become a guide for leaders abroad who want to position themselves as defenders of the people against the political elite.
True, recent elections and domestic political shifts across three continents suggest that in many instances, Trump’s tactics and policies are becoming liabilities for right-leaning parties. But the challenge remains for democracies to understand why Trumpism resonates in the first place.
Simply put, it feeds on the common man’s frustrations over inequality, political gridlock and cultural alienation, and creates the public image of a charismatic leader who cares for local people.
Ignoring these drivers of populism could risk putting the rights of minorities and immigrants in jeopardy. Populist politics can only be countered when traditional politicians go back to the roots – and the first definition – of democracy and start finding ways to better connect with people and implement policies that are of the people, by the people and for the people.
March 19, 2025
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Artificial intelligence (AI) has made quite the splash this year. Despite the many benefits its advancement can bring, a world where AI remains in the hands of a few elite corporations and nations will pose significant risks.
Without democratisation, only a limited number of players will be able to afford AI-driven solutions. This could lead to increased economic inequality, with wealthy organisations gaining disproportionate advantages in productivity and efficiency while smaller businesses and underprivileged communities fall further behind.
In such a world, AI’s potential to address global challenges, such as climate change, healthcare and education, would also be severely constrained, with solutions driven primarily by profit rather than societal good.
A centralised AI landscape could also exacerbate ethical concerns, with unchecked monopolies controlling vast amounts of data and decision-making power.
Ensuring AI’s accessibility is not just an economic necessity but a safeguard against deepening technological divides and global inequalities. Thus, that AI development is increasingly affordable and accessible represents a pivotal shift. With significantly reduced costs, AI is no longer an exclusive tool of major corporations but potentially a catalyst for global innovation, economic growth and problem-solving.
One of the most striking recent developments in AI democratisation is DeepSeek’s open-source R1 large-language model. While companies like OpenAI reportedly spent between US$80 million and US$100 million training their advanced GPT-4 model, DeepSeek managed to achieve impressive results with just US$6 million and 2,000 Nvidia graphics processing units (GPUs).
This dramatic reduction in cost signifies a transformative shift, proving powerful AI models are no longer confined to organisations with deep pockets.
The implications are profound: start-ups, researchers and educational institutions can now develop and train sophisticated AI models without requiring exorbitant resources. This shift not only diversifies the players in AI development but also fosters a more inclusive technological landscape where innovative solutions can emerge from different corners of the world, rather than being concentrated in Silicon Valley or Beijing.
A recent study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) observed the work of more than 1,000 materials scientists and found that those who used AI-powered tools saw a productivity increase. These researchers discovered 44 per cent more materials, which led to a 39 per cent rise in patent filings and a 17 per cent boost in downstream product innovation. The statistics illustrate AI’s ability to amplify creativity and efficiency, helping researchers and engineers solve complex problems at an unprecedented pace.
Industries ranging from healthcare and finance to agriculture and education stand to benefit from such AI-driven efficiencies. AI-assisted drug discovery, for instance, can accelerate the development of life-saving medicines, while AI-powered financial analysis tools can enhance investment strategies for individuals and small businesses.
Democratised AI is breaking down these barriers. One of the most promising examples is California’s partnership with Nvidia to train more than 100,000 students, faculty, developers and data scientists. By integrating AI education into community colleges and state universities, this initiative ensures AI literacy is not confined to elite institutions like MIT or Stanford but reaches students from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds.
As automation reshapes the job market, equipping people with AI skills ensures workers remain relevant, adaptable and capable of leveraging AI to enhance their careers rather than being displaced by it. Governments and educational institutions worldwide should take note and implement similar programmes to make AI education widely available.
Traditional AI development required vast capital investments, but with affordable open-source models, small businesses and start-ups in regions like South Asia, Africa and Latin America can now integrate AI into their operations.
For example, AI-driven agricultural analytics can help small farmers optimise crop yields with predictive weather modelling, while AI-powered translation services can enable businesses to expand into global markets. In the finance sector, AI-driven microfinance solutions can help underbanked populations gain access to credit, fostering economic growth from the ground up.
The key takeaway is that by providing open access to AI, we enable a broader spectrum of innovators to contribute solutions to pressing global challenges like climate change, poverty and healthcare disparities.
The advancements in AI affordability, accessibility and education point to a future where AI is not just a privilege but a tool that enhances global productivity and innovation. If nurtured properly, democratised AI can empower start-ups and small businesses with AI-driven insights and automation. It can accelerate scientific discovery by enabling researchers to solve complex problems faster. Additionally, AI can expand educational opportunities, ensuring AI skills are not limited to a select few.
Democratised AI can support economic development by making AI-driven solutions accessible to emerging markets and enhance global competitiveness, allowing diverse players to contribute to AI advancements. By recognising AI’s potential beyond its risks, policymakers, educators and business leaders can ensure AI remains an engine of inclusive progress rather than an instrument of control by a select few.
The democratisation of AI is not just a technological revolution – it is an economic and societal imperative. From increasing productivity in research to training the workforce of the future, AI’s impact will be felt across society.
To harness AI’s full potential, we must advocate for governance that supports open innovation rather than restricts it. Thoughtful policies, widespread AI education and continued investment in accessible AI technologies will ensure the benefits of AI reach everyone. If we succeed, AI will not be a tool of inequality but one of empowerment, driving a future where innovation knows no boundaries and progress is truly shared across the world.
February 21, 2025
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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https://www.scmp.com/opinion/world-opinion/article/3299049/aukus-quad-will-have-step-under-trumps-indo-pacific-stance
US President Donald Trump is expected to take a far more aggressive approach in the Indo-Pacific than the Biden administration as America strengthens ties with Australia and Japan.
Australia is deepening its security ties with the United States through the Aukus alliance (which includes Britain) and critical minerals agreements, while balancing its economic reliance on China. The US remains Australia’s largest investor and demand for Australian rare earths is growing parallel to China’s market dominance.
But Trump’s return brings economic protectionism, with potential tariffs that could strain trade. Despite these challenges, long-standing intelligence-sharing and military cooperation, including the joint defence facility at Pine Gap, keep the alliance strong.
Likewise, for years, Japan has been America’s top investor and plans to boost investment to US$1 trillion. It is also increasing liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from the US while maintaining a careful approach to trade disputes. India, meanwhile, is set to receive billions in US weapons, including potential F-35 stealth jets, as part of a growing defence partnership.
These developments reflect America’s focus on strengthening alliances in the Indo-Pacific while countering China’s influence, as security alliances such as Aukus and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue gain more momentum under Trump than under Biden.
Though the Quad was revived by Trump in November 2017, its fading momentum reflected Biden’s failure to turn diplomacy into strategic influence. Biden’s decision to skip the 2023 Sydney summit exposed the alliance’s weaknesses. During Biden’s tenure, despite being outlined as a counterweight to China, the Quad struggled to unify.
India prioritised strategic autonomy, maintaining strong ties with Russia and avoiding firm stances on issues like the Ukraine war and the Myanmar junta’s brutal suppression of its people as well as persecution of the Rohingya. And while the US, Australia and Japan strengthened their military cooperation in November last year, India, also a Quad member, was not included in the agreement.
Moreover, the Quad failed to deliver on important initiatives, like its vaccine partnership. Overall, Biden’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy, often called a “lattice” of alliances, fell short.
Given that Trump perceives China as America’s rival, he is expected to use his second term to go the extra mile and push back China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. His secretary of state, Marco Rubio, focused on Quad as his first major task by including it as a key aspect of US strategy.
A recent Quad meeting in Washington, held just a day after Trump’s inauguration, indicated commitment from the US, India, Japan and Australia to security and economic cooperation. Trump also plans to visit India for the next Quad summit, a sign of US interest and growing concern with China’s regional and territorial ambitions.
Though founded under the Biden administration, Aukus remains an integral part of the US defence strategy under Trump. While Biden saw Aukus as part of a bigger regional plan, Trump’s team views it as a model for strong military alliances. US officials have confirmed their support, with Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth stressing its importance.
Under Aukus, the US will provide Australia with advanced Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines. This will give Australia top-tier naval capabilities. Additionally, Australia recently sent US$500 million to boost US submarine production, showing a shared commitment to defence. Though building these submarines on time is a challenge, Trump’s team may push for faster production. His history of increasing defence spending and cutting red tape suggests he will prioritise this deal.
Aukus is also about more than submarines. It involves collaboration in technologies like artificial intelligence, cyberdefence and quantum computing. Trump values military strength and innovation, which fits Aukus’ goal of integrating advanced defence technology.
Besides, the Trump administration may explore ways to expand the pact, strengthening US security leadership in the region. Amid changing political dynamics, Aukus projects the power of US-led alliances, offering a model for military cooperation.
Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy is clear. He sees the Quad and Aukus not as diplomatic forums, but as security coalitions meant to challenge China’s regional ambitions. His administration will push for faster military integration, greater burden-sharing among allies and a more forceful stance in the region.
This shift will test how far India, Japan and Australia are willing to go in challenging China’s influence. While Biden preferred a cautious and calculated approach, Trump will pressure allies to take bolder steps, whether they are ready or not.
For the Quad, this means moving beyond symbolic gestures and becoming an active deterrent force in the Indo-Pacific. For Aukus, it means pushing Australia to develop military capabilities at a pace not seen before.
There is a real possibility that Trump’s approach could provoke increasing tensions in the South China Sea, across the Taiwan Strait and even along the Himalayan border. But the other side of the coin suggests an aggressive US presence could deter Beijing from pushing its territorial ambitions further.
The Indo-Pacific is entering a period of strategic uncertainty, and how the Quad and Aukus evolve under Trump will shape regional security. Unlike Biden’s balanced and careful strategy, Trump will demand results and expect his allies to deliver. Hence, one may anticipate stronger military ties, expanded joint drills and deeper intelligence-sharing between the four countries under Trump 2.0. Similarly, given his track record, Trump’s approach will also be more direct when it comes to China.
Unlike Biden, who kept Quad statements vague and diplomatic, Trump will not hesitate to call a spade a spade and be openly critical of, even confrontational about, Beijing’s actions.
January 08, 2025
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to be a transformative force, reshaping industries, economies and societies while acting as a harbinger of revolutionary change. However, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres cautioned the UN Security Council in a recent address that this technological revolution carries a double-edged promise: while it has the potential to drive progress, it also risks deepening existing inequality.
His urgent call that “we must never allow AI to stand for advancing inequality” is not just valid, it demands immediate global action. The critical question is how the international community can harness AI’s potential responsibly while safeguarding against its pitfalls.
AI advocates emphasise its potential to solve global challenges, from addressing food insecurity to predicting climate change-induced displacements. However, this optimism is tempered by the rapid speed of AI’s development, which can outpace the frameworks necessary for its governance.
As Guterres highlighted, AI’s deployment in autonomous weapons, border surveillance and predictive policing raises profound ethical and legal questions. Beyond these immediate concerns, AI’s integration into economic systems is reshaping labour markets and deepening existing divides between the global North and South.
In developed economies, AI promises economic growth and productivity gains. McKinsey’s assessments suggest AI could contribute US$4.4 trillion annually to the global economy, yet these benefits are not equitably distributed.
Developed regions and countries are in position to capture the lion’s share of gains, leaving the Global South scrambling to catch up. This is a worrying indicator of what could happen if AI remains unchecked. Likewise, PwC predicts that Africa, Oceania and less-developed parts of Asia – regions already facing significant development challenges – will see only minimal economic returns from AI.
The rapid development in AI-enabled automation is expected to affect 40 per cent of jobs worldwide, having a particularly negative impact on those in low-skilled or repetitive roles. Developing nations, where economies often rely on manual labour, are particularly vulnerable.
Moreover, while AI technology can transform productivity in hi-tech sectors, it often excludes under-represented populations because of design biases. AI tools trained predominantly on English-language data can fail to address the needs of non-Western users, rendering such tools ineffective or even harmful in local contexts. As a result, these challenges exacerbate existing inequalities for countries with limited digital infrastructure and internet access, further sidelining the Global South.
Besides economic disparities, AI poses significant environmental and security risks that could place much of the world population at a disadvantage. Most data centres powering AI models heavily rely on fossil fuels and contribute to a growing carbon footprint. Data centres and transmission networks are responsible for 1 per cent of energy-related global greenhouse gas emissions.
In terms of security, AI’s employment in autonomous weapons and cyberattacks represents a rather apocalyptic erosion of human control over the use of force. Given that, Guterres’ plea to ban lethal autonomous weapons by 2026 is understandable. There must be real urgency to establish international safeguards for the preservation of peace and human rights.
About 32 per cent of the global population, or 2.6 billion people, lack internet access, with most of them concentrated in the Global South. In this context, developing countries often grapple with acquiring equitable access to digital tools and infrastructure as they lack adequate capacity or the infrastructure needed to use AI for development.
To address these challenges, it is vital to advocate for the Global Digital Compact, emphasising inclusive AI governance. The compact’s focus on capacity-building and technical assistance for developing countries is particularly crucial as it aspires to avert the emergence of a new AI divide. If employed fairly and holistically, this initiative will succeed in creating a universal framework that ensures AI serves humanity.
AI bias disproportionately harms non-native speakers, black people and women, perpetuating harmful stereotypes and inequalities. For example, in the United States, an investigation by a non-profit news organisation found that AI-driven algorithms were 80 per cent more likely to reject mortgage applications from black families, perpetuating historical discrimination.
Similarly, during the Covid-19 pandemic, an AI system downgraded 39 per cent of assessments of A-level grades by teachers in England, disproportionately affecting students in disadvantaged schools. After a public outcry, the AI system’s grading was disregarded.
AI algorithms also often misidentify the written work of non-native English speakers as AI-generated, leading to false accusations of cheating and discouraging their academic contributions.
Similarly, there are instances where AI systems reflect societal gender biases, associating roles such as “secretary” or “flight attendant” with women while linking professions such as “judge” or “lawyer” to men, reinforcing outdated stereotypes. Such biases marginalise these groups and perpetuate systemic discrimination in education and beyond.
There is a dire need to establish inclusive and secure governance mechanisms to ensure AI technologies are developed and deployed responsibly. Multilateral organisations and governments must work in unison with the help of experts. Critical steps include banning lethal autonomous weapons to maintain international peace and security and bridging the digital divide in the Global South by investing in digital infrastructure and education.
Promoting ethical AI design is equally essential; developers must prioritise inclusivity, fairness and transparency to address biases. Additionally, strengthening international collaboration is vital to tackling AI’s cross-border implications.
All in all, Guterres’ concerns about AI’s potential to exacerbate inequality are well-founded. However, with proactive governance and global cooperation, AI can become a force for good. By aligning its development with principles of equity, sustainability and human rights, we can create a future where AI lifts up all of humanity, not just a privileged few.
November 27, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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The proliferation of social media platforms and digital tools has provided children with vast opportunities for learning, creativity and connection. However, alongside these benefits comes a growing set of challenges.
The online space, particularly social media, seems to be increasingly fraught with dangers for children, ranging from cyberbullying to sexual exploitation. Striking a balance between the benefits of digital tools and protecting children from online risks is one of the most pressing challenges of our time.
Online educational platforms provide tools that foster learning, while social media helps children engage with a global audience and break geographical barriers. Platforms such as YouTube, TikTok and Instagram serve as creative outlets, enabling young people to share their talents and build communities around common interests.
For marginalised children, including those in rural areas or with disabilities, the internet can be a lifeline which offers access to resources, education and networks previously unavailable. Social media can provide a sense of belonging, especially for teenagers, and help them to engage in conversations on topics they care about, from climate activism to mental health awareness.
According to the Disrupting Harm project, children are extremely vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse on social media platforms. Perpetrators exploit the anonymity and reach of these platforms to target children, using tactics such as grooming, blackmail and non-consensual sharing of explicit material. Vulnerable groups face even greater risks as they can lack access to safe disclosure environments, exacerbating the psychological toll of exploitation and abuse.
The issue is further compounded by socioeconomic and cultural factors. Children from low-income families can lack digital literacy, leaving them ill-equipped to recognise or respond to online threats. Victims of online exploitation can experience feelings of shame, anxiety and depression.
Research suggests that children who face one form of harm online are more likely to encounter others, creating a cycle of vulnerability. This highlights the importance of early intervention and inclusive approaches to online safety.
Governments worldwide have introduced policies aimed at safeguarding children online. Australia recently proposed a ban on social media use for children under 16 which has garnered both support and criticism. Singapore’s new social media code, introduced by the Infocomm Media Development Authority, requires platforms such as TikTok and Facebook to remove harmful content and provide child-specific safety measures.
South Korea’s gaming restrictions offer a cautionary tale. Despite implementing strict limits in 2011 to curb children’s gaming time, the measures were largely ineffective and ultimately removed as children found ways to bypass the restrictions. Similarly, the European Union’s parental consent requirements for underage social media users are not always adequately enforced, raising questions about their efficacy.
However, restrictive policies risk driving harmful behaviours underground, making it harder for parents and educators to identify and address issues. Such measures risk alienating young people, who could view them as intrusive and dismissive of their autonomy.
One of the most compelling arguments against outright bans is the role of digital literacy in mitigating online risks. Children with higher digital skills are better equipped to navigate the complexities of the online world by identifying harmful content, blocking abusive users and reporting exploitation.
In contrast, children with limited digital literacy risk being overwhelmed by online risks and less able to seek help. Digital literacy programmes can empower children to become proactive participants in their online experiences. Such programmes could include lessons on recognising grooming behaviours, understanding privacy settings and fostering healthy online interactions.
For many young people, social media is both a source of entertainment and a platform for learning, activism and even employment. Content creation has emerged as a viable career path for tech-savvy youth, with platforms such as YouTube and TikTok offering monetisation opportunities.
Social media also provides space for advocacy, enabling young people to amplify their voices on issues ranging from climate change to mental health. Given its multilayered role, social media cannot be dismissed as merely a source of risk. Instead, policies should aim to maximise its benefits while minimising harm.
Initiatives such as the UN Global Digital Compact provide valuable guidance on addressing online safety by emphasising collaboration from all stakeholders. Recommendations include implementing child rights impact assessments, developing strong reporting mechanisms and promoting restorative approaches for children affected by online harm.
The Disrupting Harm project highlights the importance of evidence-based policies. By collecting comprehensive data on online exploitation, the project provides insights into effective interventions such as context-specific solutions that account for cultural, socioeconomic and technological differences across regions.
Platforms such as Meta and TikTok have introduced measures such as content moderation and AI-driven detection tools to identify and remove harmful material. These efforts often fall short, as evidenced by the persistence of exploitation and abuse on their platforms. Greater accountability is needed, including stricter enforcement of community guidelines and transparency in addressing user complaints. Innovative solutions such as age-appropriate design features and parental control tools also hold promise.
While safeguarding children from harm is paramount, it is equally important to respect their right to access information, express themselves and participate in digital culture. Excessively restrictive measures risk stifling creativity and innovation, depriving children of opportunities the digital age offers. Children need to be equipped with tools and knowledge to safely navigate the internet.
This requires a collective effort which brings together policymakers, educators, parents and tech companies to create a digital world where children can thrive. While the benefits of technology should be accessible, effectively managing risks is the only way to strike the delicate balance between risk and reward in a child’s digital world.
December 16, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3290635/trump-20-forcing-asian-economies-make-hard-choices-fast
As US president-elect Donald Trump returns to the White House for his second term next month, global markets and US trading partners are bracing for what could be one of the most dramatic reshapings of international commerce since World War II.
His campaign promises suggest an even more aggressive stance on tariffs than his first term, with proposals for a universal baseline tariff of up to 20 per cent on most imports and potential tariffs as high as 60 per cent on Chinese-made goods. These signals alone are prompting Asian countries to re-evaluate their supply chains and investment strategies before he takes charge.
The Trump administration’s aggressive stance towards China during his first term, marked by the trade war which began in 2018, fundamentally altered the economic relationship between the world’s two largest economies.
Trump’s approach to import tariffs aligns with his “America First” economic vision, emphasising the protection of US industries to address trade imbalances. His first-term policies targeted what he described as unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft and the erosion of US manufacturing jobs, particularly in relation to China.
When Trump became president in 2017, the federal government collected US$34.6 billion in customs, duties and fees. This doubled under his watch to US$70.8 billion in 2019. US tariffs on Chinese goods also escalated to cover about US$370 billion worth of imports.
These measures had significant collateral effects on Asian economies integrated into Chinese supply chains. GDP growth in developing Asia fell from 5.9 per cent in 2017 to 5.2 per cent in 2019, partly attributable to rising trade tensions.
Vietnam, though, emerged as a notable beneficiary, with exports to the US increasing 28.8 per cent year on year in the first quarter of 2019 as manufacturers sought alternatives to China. This trend of supply chain diversification has continued to reshape regional trade patterns.
The post-pandemic economic recovery has been uneven across Asia. China’s gross domestic product growth, while rebounding to 5.2 per cent in 2023, has faced structural challenges including a property-sector crisis and demographic headwinds. Asian economies have shown varying degrees of resilience, with India maintaining robust growth, averaging 7.2 per cent in 2022-23, while Southeast Asian economies have demonstrated remarkable adaptability.
Indonesia, for instance, maintained steady growth at more than 5 per cent in 2023, while Japan has seen modest growth as it grapples with inflation and currency depreciation. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, implemented in 2022, has created the world’s largest trading bloc, potentially offsetting some negative effects of US-China tensions. However, the exclusion of the United States from this agreement highlights the competing spheres of economic influence in the region.
The security landscape in Asia has grown increasingly complex too. China’s military expenditure has risen consistently, reaching an estimated US$292 billion in 2022, second only to the US. This military modernisation, coupled with assertive actions in the South China Sea and around Taiwan, has prompted regional concerns about Beijing’s intentions.
The evolving security dynamics can be seen in the increased frequency of US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, strengthening of the Quad grouping between the US, Japan, Australia and India, and enhanced military cooperation between traditional US allies such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.
China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia through infrastructure investment and diplomatic engagement has added further layers of complexity to regional relationships.
Trump’s strategy has focused on economic nationalism, aiming to reduce reliance on foreign supply chains and use the size of the US market to secure advantageous trade agreements. He has employed tariffs, tax incentives and public pressure to encourage domestic production, claiming that previous trade policies disadvantaged American workers.
His broader agenda has included deregulation, lower corporate taxes and bolstering traditional manufacturing sectors. While some industries saw benefits from these protections, tariffs raised costs for consumers and businesses reliant on global supply chains. Retaliatory tariffs have also hurt US exporters, especially farmers.
Looking ahead to potential scenarios involving Trump’s policies in 2025 intended to “Make America Great Again”, Asian nations face several critical economic challenges. The potential for renewed trade tensions between the US and China could force them to make difficult choices about economic alignment.
Countries heavily dependent on both markets might need to accelerate economic diversification efforts, strengthen regional integration, develop more robust domestic markets and invest in technological self-sufficiency. The regional security architecture could face increased strain if US-China competition intensifies, requiring countries to balance their security relationships with the US, economic ties with China, regional solidarity, Asean centrality and domestic security priorities.
For Asian nations navigating these challenges, several strategic approaches merit consideration. Enhanced regional cooperation through strengthening intraregional trade and investment could help reduce dependency on both the US and Chinese markets.
Furthermore, focusing on the digital economy through investments in digital infrastructure such as high-speed telecoms services, data centres and instant digital payments will be essential for maintaining competitiveness in the evolving global economy. Infrastructure development can also be advanced by leveraging multiple sources of investment, including the Belt and Road Initiative.
The Asia-Pacific region faces a period of significant uncertainty as Trump prepares to take the oath of office for the second time. While the challenges are substantial, they also present alternative opportunities for regional powers. Success will require careful diplomacy, strategic foresight and enhanced regional cooperation.
The future stability and prosperity of Asia depends largely on how regional economic powerhouses such as Japan, India and Singapore navigate complex political-economic dynamics while maintaining their strategic autonomy by factoring in the Trump effect on US-China relations.
November 4, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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As Azerbaijan’s capital Baku prepares to host the Cop29 climate conference from November 11, Asia stands at a crossroads in the global fight against climate change. The region, home to 60 per cent of the world’s population and 53 per cent of global emissions, is emerging as an unlikely champion in the race to net zero. While challenges remain formidable and estimates suggest meeting its goals by 2050 will cost about US$70 trillion, Asia’s commitment to climate action is reshaping the global environmental landscape in unprecedented ways.
Asia’s climate journey embodies a striking paradox. The region remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels, with China alone consuming 53.8 per cent of the world’s coal in 2022. However, it is precisely this enormous carbon footprint that has sparked some of the most ambitious climate commitments anywhere. Southeast Asian nations are showing remarkable leadership in climate action. The Philippines’ bold commitment to reduce emissions by 75 per cent by 2030 sets a new standard for developing nations. Singapore, despite its size, has established a precise emissions cap of 60 million tonnes by 2030, backing this commitment with comprehensive carbon pricing mechanisms and investments in renewable energy infrastructure.
The region’s approach to carbon pricing is particularly noteworthy. Singapore’s carbon tax framework, implemented in 2019, has become a model for other economies. Indonesia’s carbon trading scheme, launched in 2021, shows how emerging economies can integrate market-based mechanisms into their climate strategies while maintaining economic growth. Vietnam’s renewable energy transformation deserves special mention. It has become a leader in solar power deployment, increasing its capacity to 16.5 gigawatts in just a few years. This shows how rapidly developing nations can pivot towards clean energy when supported by appropriate policies and international cooperation.
While remaining the world’s largest carbon emitter and coal consumer, China has simultaneously emerged as the global leader in renewable energy installation. Beijing’s commitment to peak emissions before 2030 and to achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 has inspired massive investments in clean energy infrastructure. The numbers tell a compelling story. China’s non-fossil-fuel capacity is expected to reach 1,200GW by 2030, and its share of global emissions is projected to decrease from 33 per cent to 22 per cent by 2050. This transformation, while maintaining economic growth, offers valuable lessons for other developing nations. China’s leadership in electric vehicle (EV) adoption and manufacturing is particularly impressive. It accounts for more than half of global EV sales and has built a comprehensive supply chain for battery production. This transition both reduces emissions and creates new economic opportunities and jobs in the green economy.
India’s climate journey exemplifies Asia’s potential for transformation. It is currently the world’s third-largest source of global emissions but has emerged as a leader in renewable energy deployment, ranking fourth globally in installed renewable capacity. The country’s commitment to producing 5 million tonnes of green hydrogen by 2030 and achieving net zero by 2070 has opened up huge investment opportunities in the clean energy transition. New Delhi’s ambitious National Green Hydrogen Mission and solar energy expansion plans demonstrate how developing economies can align climate action with economic development. India’s success in driving down renewable energy costs is remarkable. Solar power tariffs have plummeted to a record low of less than 2 rupees (US$0.02) per kilowatt hour in recent auctions, making it cheaper than coal-based power in many instances. The country’s massive renewable energy parks, including the world’s largest solar park in Bhadla, Rajasthan, showcase the scale of India’s ambitions. This dramatic reduction in solar costs has accelerated India’s energy transition and created a replicable model for others grappling with the challenge of balancing economic growth with climate action.
The scale of Asia’s climate ambitions requires unprecedented financial mobilisation. The region’s need for US$70 trillion of investment has sparked innovative financing mechanisms. Green bonds, sustainability-linked loans and climate-focused venture capital have experienced rapid growth. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s commitment to cease funding coal-related projects and increase green financing signals a fundamental shift in regional investment patterns. Japan and South Korea have emerged as major financiers of green projects in Asia. Their expertise in technology and finance has been crucial in supporting renewable energy projects and energy-efficiency initiatives. Japan’s Green Innovation Fund and South Korea’s Green New Deal exemplify how developed Asian economies are facilitating the region’s transition to clean energy. As Asia leads the way in climate action, several challenges remain. Balancing rapid economic growth with emissions reductions requires careful policy calibration. The region’s heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants cannot be eliminated overnight, and the transition must be managed to ensure social equity and economic stability.
The challenge of grid integration and energy storage becomes increasingly critical as renewable energy penetration grows. Countries must invest heavily in grid modernisation and storage solutions to manage the intermittent nature of renewable power. Cross-border power trading and regional grid integration initiatives, such as the Asean Power Grid, offer potential solutions. Asia’s leadership in renewable energy deployment, carbon market development and green financing provides a blueprint for global climate action. The region’s approach shows that economic development and environmental protection can be mutually reinforcing goals. As Cop29 approaches, Asia’s journey offers valuable lessons. Its success in combining ambitious climate targets with pragmatic implementation strategies shows that the path to net zero, while challenging, is achievable. With continued international support and regional cooperation, Asia is not just participating in the global climate fight – it is leading it.
Research suggests that children who face one form of harm online are more likely to encounter others, creating a cycle of vulnerability. This highlights the importance of early intervention and inclusive approaches to online safety. Governments worldwide have introduced policies aimed at safeguarding children online. Australia recently proposed a ban on social media use for children under 16 which has garnered both support and criticism. Singapore’s new social media code, introduced by the Infocomm Media Development Authority, requires platforms such as TikTok and Facebook to remove harmful content and provide child-specific safety measures. South Korea’s gaming restrictions offer a cautionary tale. Despite implementing strict limits in 2011 to curb children’s gaming time, the measures were largely ineffective and ultimately removed as children found ways to bypass the restrictions. Similarly, the European Union’s parental consent requirements for underage social media users are not always adequately enforced, raising questions about their efficacy.
However, restrictive policies risk driving harmful behaviours underground, making it harder for parents and educators to identify and address issues. Such measures risk alienating young people, who could view them as intrusive and dismissive of their autonomy.
One of the most compelling arguments against outright bans is the role of digital literacy in mitigating online risks. Children with higher digital skills are better equipped to navigate the complexities of the online world by identifying harmful content, blocking abusive users and reporting exploitation.
In contrast, children with limited digital literacy risk being overwhelmed by online risks and less able to seek help. Digital literacy programmes can empower children to become proactive participants in their online experiences. Such programmes could include lessons on recognising grooming behaviours, understanding privacy settings and fostering healthy online interactions.
For many young people, social media is both a source of entertainment and a platform for learning, activism and even employment. Content creation has emerged as a viable career path for tech-savvy youth, with platforms such as YouTube and TikTok offering monetisation opportunities.
Social media also provides space for advocacy, enabling young people to amplify their voices on issues ranging from climate change to mental health. Given its multilayered role, social media cannot be dismissed as merely a source of risk. Instead, policies should aim to maximise its benefits while minimising harm.
Initiatives such as the UN Global Digital Compact provide valuable guidance on addressing online safety by emphasising collaboration from all stakeholders. Recommendations include implementing child rights impact assessments, developing strong reporting mechanisms and promoting restorative approaches for children affected by online harm. The Disrupting Harm project highlights the importance of evidence-based policies. By collecting comprehensive data on online exploitation, the project provides insights into effective interventions such as context-specific solutions that account for cultural, socioeconomic and technological differences across regions.
Platforms such as Meta and TikTok have introduced measures such as content moderation and AI-driven detection tools to identify and remove harmful material. These efforts often fall short, as evidenced by the persistence of exploitation and abuse on their platforms. Greater accountability is needed, including stricter enforcement of community guidelines and transparency in addressing user complaints. Innovative solutions such as age-appropriate design features and parental control tools also hold promise.
While safeguarding children from harm is paramount, it is equally important to respect their right to access information, express themselves and participate in digital culture. Excessively restrictive measures risk stifling creativity and innovation, depriving children of opportunities the digital age offers. Children need to be equipped with tools and knowledge to safely navigate the internet.
This requires a collective effort which brings together policymakers, educators, parents and tech companies to create a digital world where children can thrive. While the benefits of technology should be accessible, effectively managing risks is the only way to strike the delicate balance between risk and reward in a child’s digital world.
October 16, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3282348/ai-takes-world-storm-asia-stands-benefit
Driven by industries ranging from finance to healthcare and manufacturing, worldwide demand for artificial intelligence infrastructure is rapidly increasing. Global AI spending is projected to reach US$632 billion by 2028. This rise is particularly evident in Southeast Asia, where governments and the private sector are embracing AI and cybersecurity to secure digital assets, improve automation and boost economic resilience.
Cybersecurity is becoming a critical focus in the region. Global cybercrime costs are estimated to be as high as US$10.5 trillion next year, creating a pressing need for enhanced security frameworks.
Southeast Asia is becoming a key player in the global digital infrastructure landscape, driven by a booming demand for AI and cybersecurity. Major technological firms are increasingly choosing to host their data centres in the region, fuelling the growth of digital services, cloud computing and AI capabilities.
This trend is contributing to economic growth, particularly through job creation and the development of skilled labour in fields such as data centre engineering, AI development and cybersecurity.
Southeast Asia has quickly emerged as an ideal destination for data centres, thanks to the lower operational costs, access to renewable energy and political neutrality. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam are leading the way with digital infrastructure enhancements. Demand for data centres is expected to grow by 20 per cent annually in Southeast Asia over the next few years, largely driven by the need to support AI innovations and cloud computing services.
Singapore remains the top destination for data centres, offering superior infrastructure and a stable regulatory regime. Despite a moratorium between 2019 and 2022 due to environmental concerns, Singapore now houses around 1.4 gigawatts (GW) of data centre capacity and expects to add 300 megawatts in the coming years. Recent projects include those by Microsoft, Equinix and ByteDance.
Malaysia is emerging as a regional competitor, attracting investments from tech giants such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft. With plans to reach around 1.6GW of data centre capacity, Malaysia’s market is set to grow rapidly. AWS alone has pledged US$6 billion towards establishing cloud regions and data centres across the country.
Thailand and Indonesia are also receiving significant attention. AWS has announced a US$5 billion investment in Thailand to set up a new cloud region, while Indonesia is becoming a major player with its push for digitalisation across industries.
The rest of Asia is also seeing significant advances, albeit at a slower pace. Countries such as India, China, Japan and South Korea are expanding their digital infrastructure to tap into the global demand for AI and cybersecurity.
China, Asia’s largest economy, has a massive data centre footprint, primarily driven by its tech giants, which include Alibaba Group Holding (owner of the Post), Tencent and Huawei Technologies. The country is investing heavily in AI development and cybersecurity capabilities, with the government pushing for digital sovereignty and localised data storage.
Japan and South Korea are also leaders in AI and cybersecurity research, driven by strong government policies and established tech ecosystems. Japan’s focus on AI and robotics has made it a global leader in AI applications, while South Korea’s cybersecurity market is expected to grow significantly, with the value of the digital forensics market alone reaching US$3.52 billion by 2031.
India is at the forefront of South Asia’s digital revolution. Power demand for its data centres is estimated to reach as high as 15GW by 2030, and the value of its data centre market is expected to grow to US$21.87 billion by 2032. Investments from companies such as Google, which has pledged US$10 billion to India’s Digitisation Fund, and AWS, which plans to invest US$12.7 billion in data centres in the country, are positioning India as a key player in the AI and cybersecurity space.
Growing demand from Western countries, led by the United States, is a key driver of investments in Southeast Asia and the rest of the region. Google, Microsoft and AWS have been instrumental in expanding Asia’s digital infrastructure. Cybersecurity demand from the US and Europe is also driving investments in South Asian countries. India, in particular, is becoming a cybersecurity hub, with companies such as Palo Alto Networks and IBM investing in local research and development.
As global cyber threats increase, Western companies are seeking to outsource cybersecurity services to South Asian nations where operational costs are lower and talent is abundant.
Despite Southeast Asia’s rapid progress, challenges remain for individual countries. Singapore’s high operational costs, especially in data centre construction (US$11.40 per watt compared to US$8.40 per watt in Malaysia), may push companies to look at alternatives such as Johor in Malaysia. As sustainability becomes a key consideration for data centre operators, the energy dependency of some Southeast Asian countries is another issue, especially with growing emphasis on the use of green energy.
China, on the other hand, embroiled in a tech stand-off with Western powers, is concentrating on self-sufficiency in AI innovation instead of attending to global demand. Meanwhile in India, challenges such as unreliable power supply, internet connectivity issues and a shortage of skilled talent are more pronounced.
Southeast Asia’s data centre boom is positioning the region as a digital powerhouse, attracting significant investments from global technology firms. The region’s ability to offer lower costs and its geopolitical neutrality makes it an attractive destination for AI and cybersecurity infrastructure. As Western demand for digital services continues to grow, Asian economies stand to benefit, though the pace and scale of development will vary based on each country’s unique challenges and opportunities.
September 14, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3278106/bangladeshs-uprising-offers-lessons-pakistans-democracy
Inspired by the success of the student-led popular movement in Bangladesh resulting in the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, some Pakistanis were seen carrying Bangladeshi flags in rallies in solidarity.
As Bangladesh’s South Asian neighbours gain inspiration, the role of the Bangladeshi army has unsurprisingly come under scrutiny. Their measured response and refusal to use force against civilians stands in stark contrast to the historical and contemporary actions of the Pakistan army.
Pakistan’s 77-year history has been marked by frequent military interventions in civilian affairs and democratic evolution has been rather paradoxical. While military interventions often facilitated transitions to civilian rule, they simultaneously constrained democratic governance.
This resulted in a political landscape where civilian governments operated under the shadow of military influence, unable to consolidate democratic norms and institutions. This pattern of military involvement has led to a revolving door of civilian leaders, unable to complete their terms amid behind-the-scenes machinations by the army. Notable examples include the 1993 ousting of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto and, more recently, Imran Khan.
In contrast, Bangladesh has charted a different course since its return to parliamentary democracy in 1991. The country’s military has largely refrained from direct political involvement. A pivotal moment came in 2007 when the then ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party attempted to manipulate elections.
The military supported an interim caretaker government, ostensibly influenced in part by international pressure, particularly the UN reportedly threatening to exclude Bangladesh from peacekeeping missions if they engaged in election tampering.
Since Sheikh Hasina’s return to power in 2009, the army has largely remained in the barracks, refraining from interventions even as Hasina’s government was criticised for holding largely non participative and questionable elections thrice – 2014, 2018 and in 2024 – before her downfall.
As protests against Hasina’s government intensified, the army refused her requests for quelling the unrest. Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman’s decision not to deploy troops against civilians marked the turning point for Hasina’s iron fist rule of 15 years as she ran out of options. Even as the police faltered under the pressure of civilian attacks, the army maintained its stance of non-intervention.
This restraint was crucial in allowing for a peaceful transition to an interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. Scenes of jubilant students in camaraderie with young army officers captured the nation’s mood as the country was coming out of the clutches of a prolonged autocratic rule that saw human rights and civil liberties trampled.
Another crucial area where Pakistan and Bangladesh diverge is in the role of their intelligence agencies. In Pakistan, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is widely perceived as an extended arm of the military exerting influence over foreign, defence and domestic matters, often operating beyond civilian oversight. This has allowed the military to maintain significant control over the country’s political and strategic direction, even during periods of civilian rule.
In contrast, Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Forces Intelligence has been primarily controlled by the prime minister’s office rather than the military. This arrangement, while not without its problems, is significantly different from the Pakistani model.
The infamous Aynaghar prison or “house of mirrors” where Bangladeshi intelligence forces allegedly detained individuals without due process during the rule of Hasina has become a symbol of the agency’s controversial practices. However, it’s important to note that these actions are typically carried out at the behest of the political civilian government, not the military.
On August 29, in a significant move, the country signed the instrument of accession to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, making Bangladesh the 76th party to the convention worldwide.
This not only signals Bangladesh’s evolving stance on human rights but also puts pressure on the intelligence and security apparatus to align with international norms. The situation in Bangladesh is an opportunity for Pakistan to reflect on its own intelligence practices and the relationship between its military, intelligence agencies and the civilian government.
The contrasting approaches offer several valuable lessons for Pakistan’s military. The Bangladeshi army’s respect for civilian authority and willingness to step back has emboldened the country’s democratic institutions. The choice to support national stability over power grabs shows institutional maturity on the part of Bangladesh’s army, prioritising the national interest over institutional power.
The army’s role in easing a peaceful transition to an interim government without dictating its composition offers a good model from which the Pakistan army could learn, paving the way for greater political stability and stronger democratic institutions. This would require a fundamental shift in the Pakistan military’s self-perception, from guardians of the state to servants of democratically elected governments.
Such a transformation would be neither easy nor quick, requiring a concerted effort from civilian and military leadership, as well as support from civil society. As recent events in Bangladesh show, a delicate balance between civilian authority and military power is essential for a functional democracy.
In a rare acknowledgement, Pakistan’s then-army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa conceded during his farewell speech in November 2022 that Pakistan’s military had interfered in politics for decades and promised that the army would refrain from intervening in democratic processes.
Yet the path his successor, General Asim Munir, might have chosen contradicts this pledge. Munir is accused of orchestrating the incarceration of the popular former prime minister Imran Khan and conspiring with rival political parties to keep Khan out of power and behind bars. Old habits indeed die hard.
August 14, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/opinion/world-opinion/article/3273249/steel-industry-forging-new-identity-champion-sustainability
Amid the clanging of hammers and the glow of molten metal, an unexpected environmental revolution is taking shape. The steel industry, long perceived as a climate villain, is forging a new identity as a champion in the fight against global warming.
This transformation isn’t just reshaping an age-old industry, it’s redefining our understanding of how even the most carbon-intensive sectors can pivot towards a sustainable future.
Steel is fundamental to modern civilisation, used in everything from skyscrapers to smartphones. But traditional production is carbon-intensive. As the world grapples with the urgent need to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, as outlined in the Paris Agreement, the transformation of the steel sector, which accounts for about 7-9 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions from the use of fossil fuels, is crucial.
Among the technologies driving this change in the steel industry, one of the most promising is hydrogen-based production. Several leading steel companies are pioneering hydrogen as a reducing agent, in place of coal.
Sweden’s SSAB, LKAB and Vattenfall have developed HYBRIT (hydrogen breakthrough ironmaking technology) and aim to produce steel free of fossil fuel by 2026. This process replaces coking coal with hydrogen produced from renewable electricity, potentially reducing Sweden’s carbon emissions by 10 per cent.
Austrian steel giant Voestalpine, another pioneer of hydrogen use, operates one the world’s largest pilot plants to produce hydrogen from renewable electricity. Through using more green hydrogen, it aims to cut its CO2 emissions from steel production by over 80 per cent by 2050.
ArcelorMittal, the world’s largest steel producer, is investing heavily in carbon capture and storage technologies. Its project in Ghent, Belgium, aims to capture carbon emissions from the blast furnace and convert them into ethanol.
Many producers, such as Nucor Corporation, North America’s largest steel producer, are also shifting to electric arc furnaces (EAFs), which can use up to 100 per cent scrap metal, unlike traditional blast furnaces.
By embracing EAFs and having recycled feed make up 77 per cent of its steel products, Nucor slashed its carbon footprint to just one-third of the global steel industry average, a new standard for eco-friendly steel production.
Tata Steel, one of India’s largest producers, has embarked on plans to make green steel and carbon-neutral steel across Europe by 2050, and has set ambitious targets for carbon reduction. In India, it aims to reduce its CO2 emissions to less than 2 tonnes per tonne of crude steel by 2025, well below the global average.
While global steel demand is projected to grow by 30 per cent by 2050, decarbonising production requires substantial investment – an estimated US$4.4 trillion over three decades. This could increase production costs by 30 per cent by mid-century, highlighting the need for innovative solutions and supportive policies for steelmakers to stay competitive in a low-carbon future.
Governments worldwide are recognising the importance of supporting the steel industry’s green transition. The European Union’s Green Deal Industrial Plan includes significant funding for decarbonisation projects in heavy industries, including steel. In the United States, the Inflation Reduction Act provides tax credits for clean hydrogen production, which could accelerate the adoption of hydrogen-based steelmaking.
Industry collaboration is crucial, and initiatives like ResponsibleSteel, a global multi-stakeholder standard and certification programme, are promoting sustainability across the steel supply chain. ResponsibleSteel members, including ArcelorMittal, BlueScope, Tata Steel and Posco, are working to address environmental and social issues in steel production.
A successful green transition for the steel industry could be a tipping point in the global fight against climate change. If one of the world’s most carbon-intensive industries can dramatically reduce its emissions, it sends a powerful message that no sector is beyond transformation. It would be a testament to the power of innovation and commitment to sustainability. This is not just about reducing emissions; it’s about reimagining entire industries for a sustainable future.
The progress made by companies like ArcelorMittal, Tata Steel and SSAB shows a greener future for steel production is not just possible, it’s under way. Their efforts are paving the way for other carbon-intensive industries to follow suit, showing that even the most traditional sectors can adapt and thrive in a low-carbon economy. It demonstrates the importance of long-term vision, the power of cross-sector collaboration and the potential for technological innovation to solve seemingly intractable problems.
The journey towards truly sustainable steel production is far from over. The industry must continue to innovate, invest in new technologies and collaborate across borders and sectors. Investors must recognise the long-term value of green steel and direct capital towards companies leading in sustainability. Consumers can also play a crucial role by demanding low-carbon steel products.
As the world stands at the crossroads of industrial legacy and environmental imperative, choices made now will shape the future of not just the steel industry, but the planet. The steel sector is proving that it’s possible to forge a future where industrial prowess and environmental stewardship are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually reinforcing.
The steel industry, once a symbol of industrial pollution, is blazing a trail towards a cleaner, greener future. It’s time for other industries to follow suit. Our future depends on this crucial transformation.
July 6, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/opinion/world-opinion/article/3269032/why-india-still-places-high-priority-good-ties-moscow
As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to make a state visit to Russia on July 8, following his recent re-election, the world watches with keen interest. The coming summit will mark Modi’s first bilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin since the invasion of Ukraine and his first to Russia since 2019, highlighting the enduring strength of India-Russia relations.
India’s relationship with Russia dates back to the Cold War era, with the Soviet Union being a reliable partner during India’s formative years. The 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation solidified strong bilateral ties. The treaty provided India with crucial diplomatic and military support during the 1971 war that led to the independence of Bangladesh. The treaty also outlined a robust framework for cooperation across multiple domains, including defence, technology and economic development.
Starting in 1957, the Soviet Union vetoed five UN Security resolutions on tensions between India and Pakistan, shielding New Delhi from international pressure. This came at a time when India faced significant opposition from other global powers, such as the US, which sent its Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal in a show of support for Pakistan. Moscow’s support resulted in a deep-seated trust that continues to influence India’s foreign policy decisions to this day.
India’s reluctance to align completely with the West, despite growing partnerships like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, stems from its commitment to strategic autonomy. This principle, rooted in India’s history of non-alignment, allows New Delhi to maintain an independent foreign policy that balances relationships with various global powers.
By maintaining strong ties with both Russia and the West, India aims to maximise its strategic options and avoid becoming too dependent on any single power. India’s strategic autonomy is particularly evident in its approach to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
While India has strengthened its ties with the US, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, India has consistently abstained from UN votes condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine despite pressure from Western allies. Instead, India has called for a peaceful resolution. This approach has become increasingly crucial in a world marked by growing great power competition and shifting alliances.
This diplomatic tightrope walk reflects India’s desire to maintain its strategic autonomy while also highlighting the trust deficit that still exists between New Delhi and Washington. Despite growing cooperation, memories of past US support for Pakistan and concerns about America’s reliability as a partner continue to influence Indian thinking.
Energy security is a critical factor in India’s engagement with Russia. As the world’s third largest oil importer, India has significantly increased its purchases of Russian oil since the Ukraine conflict began. Russia, facing Western sanctions and a shrinking customer base, has offered its oil at discounted rates. For India, this represents an opportunity to secure its energy needs at lower costs, a crucial consideration for its developing economy.
By increasing imports from Russia, India is also diversifying its energy sources, reducing over-reliance on traditional suppliers in the Middle East and hedging against supply disruptions. The savings from discounted Russian oil translate into reduced inflationary pressures and lower costs for Indian consumers and industries. India’s pragmatic approach, despite Western pressure, underscores the importance it places on its relationship with Moscow.
Russia has been India’s largest arms supplier for decades. From 2016 to 2020, India accounted for 23 per cent of Russia’s total arms exports, while Russia provided 49 per cent of India’s arms imports. This long-standing defence partnership has resulted in deep technological cooperation and interoperability between Indian and Russian military systems.
While India has diversified its defence purchases in recent years, including increased procurement from the US, the legacy of Russian equipment and ongoing cooperation in projects such as BrahMos Aerospace continue to bind the two nations.
While defence and energy dominate headlines, India-Russia economic cooperation extends to other sectors as well. Bilateral trade has shown resilience despite Western sanctions on Russia, amounting to US$49.36 billion between 2022 and 2023, with both countries working on alternative payment mechanisms to bypass the Swift system.
Furthermore, India sees potential in Russia’s resource-rich Far East, with Modi’s government encouraging Indian companies to invest in sectors such as agriculture and mining.
After the Sino-Soviet split, Russia and China grew further apart, owing to ideological differences and border conflicts. In recent years, the two countries have drawn closer, forming what some analysts call a “partnership of convenience” driven by shared opposition to Western dominance. This shift has complicated India’s position.
While India maintains its strong ties with Russia, it faces an increasingly assertive China which India considers as a security threat. This evolving dynamic necessitates a delicate balancing act for India, as it seeks to maintain its historically close relationship with Russia while managing the security risk posed by China and strengthening ties with Western powers as a counterbalance.
As Modi and Putin prepare to meet in Moscow, next week’s meeting symbolises more than just bilateral talks. It represents the culmination of decades of trust, strategic cooperation and shared interests. While India has continued to strengthen ties with the West, its relationship with Russia remains rooted in the pursuit of strategic autonomy, energy security and defence capabilities. India’s balancing act between Russia and the West is likely to remain a defining feature of its foreign policy, guided by pragmatism and its national interests.
June 16, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3266045/can-modis-third-term-bring-india-and-asean-closer-together
India’s recent general elections were spread out over the course of six weeks but still managed to provide a thrill. The results suggest the Indian voter decided to humble the mighty and restore balance.
The victory for Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the Bharatiya Janata Party and its alliance partners has secured a mandate for political and economic reform, although they will have to engage in negotiations and are likely to face stronger opposition. Modi’s victory was widely expected, but needing a coalition to form a government was not.
As Modi begins his third term, India’s “Act East” policy is poised for a recalibration. New Delhi’s economic and strategic engagement with Southeast Asia saw an upswing during his first two terms, albeit with some shortcomings that require a course correction. Modi may now inject new vigour into this key foreign policy as India seeks to establish a stronger Indo-Pacific presence.
On the economic front, trade and investment links with Southeast Asian nations have received a major boost, with annual bilateral trade surging from around US$80 billion in 2014 to more than US$110 billion by 2021-22. However, the existing trade accord with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – the Asean-India Free Trade Area – is seen as heavily favouring the Asean side, frustrating India.
India’s exports to Southeast Asia saw a moderate increase in the 2023 financial year, rising to US$44 billion from US$42.3 billion the previous year. Meanwhile, imports from Asean nations rose at a sharper pace, from US$68 billion to US$87.6 billion, resulting in a substantial trade deficit of US$43.6 billion for India. The need to address the trade imbalance is all the more pressing given that the trade deficit was just US$5 billion in 2011.
On the other hand, the economic outreach to Asean nations under Modi’s government has been hampered by a reluctance to undertake market reforms and liberalise tariffs. This has led to frustration among several Southeast Asian states, leaving the economic dimension of Act East lagging behind the policy objectives.
On the strategic front, India’s efforts as part of the Act East policy have helped bring seven Asean members into the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, an initiative aimed at strengthening economic cooperation across the two critical regions. India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and Asean’s outlook on the Indo-Pacific present opportunities for extensive maritime collaboration.
Participation in these complementary Indo-Pacific strategies allows for greater coordination of respective interests in this strategically vital region. Initiatives dealing with connectivity, such as the US$484 million Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project connecting India to Myanmar and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, are examples of what Asean-India collaboration can achieve in this area.
However, India’s level of participation remains constrained by resource limitations and risk aversion, preventing it from playing a larger role in countering China’s expanding strategic footprint across the Indo-Pacific. There is a mismatch between India’s rhetorical commitment to upholding a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and its limited role as a security provider in underwriting the regional rules-based order.
Modi’s re-election is likely to give the economic imperative greater importance as India attempts to position itself as an attractive alternative to China for investment and manufacturing under the government’s production-linked incentive schemes.
Fresh momentum could also be injected into expanding economic cooperation agreements with Asean to include commitments by India to greater service-sector liberalisation.
The security dimension is also likely to be scaled up. Maritime engagement, joint operations such as naval exercises between India and Asean states, capacity building and exports to Asean navies are just some areas that could see increased collaboration. As India expands its military footprint in the region to protect its strategic interests, expect a greater focus on defence diplomacy and the sharing of logistics and intelligence with friendly Asean partners.
New Delhi could also consider establishing strategic maritime hubs or logistics facilities across Southeast Asia. Negotiations for acquiring bases in Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay and Indonesia’s Sabang Island could bear fruit during Modi’s third term.
At the same time, expect India to continue to develop its soft power across Southeast Asia, through expanded cultural exchanges, education links and development assistance programmes, to bolster its image as an attractive counterweight to China’s hard power.
For smaller Asean states walking a tightrope between the Indian and Chinese spheres of influence, Modi’s third term holds both opportunities and challenges. An economically integrated, strategically engaged India provides a counterweight to Chinese dominance. Productive engagement with India can help Asean states hedge against overreliance on Beijing while enhancing their leverage.
However, they will have to deftly manage potential flashpoints arising from New Delhi’s geopolitical rivalry with Beijing. And Asean centrality could face new strains if US-China tensions cast a larger shadow over the region. Taking advantage of enhanced Indian engagement while fencing off destabilising spillover effects will require skilful statesmanship from Asean nations.
Ultimately, a revamped Act East policy will aim to protect India’s core strategic and economic interests across Southeast Asia while promoting its vision of an open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific regional architecture.
As India tries to convert its heft into greater strategic alliances, Asean’s neutrality will come under considerable pressure in the years ahead, given the overlapping spheres of influence. For the time being, though, developments in India will continue to bolster ties with Asean, one of the world’s most successful regional economic alliances.
May 15, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3262275/india-china-thaw-may-be-horizon-if-modi-re-elected
India is in the midst of a pivotal general election. The potential continuity of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership could spark a renewed debate on the trajectory of India’s relations with China.
Over the past decade, ties between the two Asian giants have been characterised by a complex interplay of cooperation and competition, marked by diplomatic engagements at the highest levels and border stand-offs underscoring enduring tensions.
There have been several incidents that have tested the limits of both nations’ strategic patience. The 73-day military stand-off in Doklam in 2017, triggered by China extending a road into the disputed territory, brought the two nuclear-armed neighbours perilously close to an armed conflict. Violent clashes in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh in 2020, which resulted in casualties on both sides, exacerbated bilateral tensions.
When Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the 2016 G20 summit in Hangzhou, he voiced India’s objections to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through the Pakistanadministered portion of Kashmir, which India also claims.
Despite these flare-ups, there have been concerted efforts to foster dialogue and diplomacy. When Modi met Xi at an informal summit in Wuhan in 2018, against the backdrop of the Doklam conflict, the leaders resolved to provide strategic guidance to their armed forces, to enhance communication and foster trust.
The following year, Xi visited Mamallapuram in Tamil Nadu for a second informal summit focused on enhancing bilateral relations and increasing cooperation. However, these engagements have yet to yield tangible results, and the issues fuelling mistrust remain unresolved.
At the heart of the India-China rift lies the thorny issue of territorial disputes, particularly over the unresolved border in the Himalayas. The two countries have vastly divergent perceptions of the Line of Actual Control, a loosely defined ceasefire line, and this has led to periodic incursions and accusations of transgression.
India’s concerns about China’s increasing influence in the Indian Ocean region and its strategic partnerships with India’s neighbours, notably Pakistan, have fuelled apprehensions about a potential encirclement. China’s close relations with Pakistan, underpinned by economic and military cooperation, is a thorn in India’s side. New Delhi views Beijing’s support for Islamabad as a hindrance to regional stability and a potential threat to its national security.
India’s joining of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue has added a new layer of complexity to the IndiaChina equation. The Quad, seen as a counterweight to China’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, has raised concerns in Beijing about potential encirclement as well.
On the other hand, China’s actions in the South China Sea, coupled with its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, have fuelled fears of a debt trap and an erosion of sovereignty among smaller nations in the region. India’s opposition to China’s infrastructure initiative and its espousing of a free and open IndoPacific have positioned it as a strategic bulwark against China’s regional ambitions, further straining bilateral ties.
If Modi secures a historic third term, his approach towards China may be influenced by a desire to leave a lasting legacy of regional stability and economic cooperation. A pragmatic and statesmanlike approach, driven by the pursuit of long-term bilateral and regional interests, could motivate him to seek a thaw in relations with Beijing.
Such a shift would necessitate significant concessions from both sides, and a willingness to address longstanding grievances and find common ground on contentious issues. India’s concerns about China’s support for Pakistan and Beijing’s growing footprint in the Indian Ocean region need to be allayed.
Similarly, India will need to reassure China that it does not consider the Quad an anti-China grouping and that its involvement is focused on addressing shared regional concerns. While the challenges are formidable, the potential rewards of a pragmatic rapprochement could extend far beyond the bilateral realm, ushering in a new era of cooperation and prosperity for the entire Indo-Pacific.
For Modi, the decision to pursue a diplomatic thaw with China may ultimately rest on his ability to navigate the complex web of domestic political pressures, regional alliances and global power dynamics. Only time will tell if Modi’s continued leadership can catalyse a diplomatic breakthrough that has long eluded the two Asian giants, or whether the status quo of strategic distrust and periodic tensions will persist, casting a long shadow over the region’s geopolitical landscape.
April 12, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3258476/how-reskilling-asias-workforce-can-secure-more-sustainable-future
As the world increasingly embraces renewable energy sources and sustainable practices, a new and dynamic sector has emerged: green jobs. These positions span a diverse array of industries from solar power to sustainable forestry. They are not only vital for addressing the pressing challenges of climate change but are also a driving force in the transformation of the global labour pool.
According to the International Renewable Energy Agency and International Labour Organization, Asia dominated the global renewable energy employment landscape in 2021, accounting for two-thirds of the jobs while the United States represented 21 per cent and Europe 12 per cent. China in particular had 42 per cent of the global total of renewable energy jobs, underscoring the region’s leadership in this rapidly growing sector.
This impressive figure is expected to grow exponentially in the coming years, with employment in renewable energy projected to exceed 38 million by 2030. The solar photovoltaic industry employs about 4.9 million people, while wind power accounts for 1.4 million jobs. Other key green job sectors in the region include hydropower, biofuels and the emerging decentralised renewable energy market.
The sheer scale of this workforce transformation underscores the critical importance of developing a skilled labour force capable of supporting Asia’s energy transition. As the demand for renewable energy, energy efficiency and sustainable practices continues to rise, employers are seeking workers with specialised technical skills and a deep understanding of environmental stewardship and sustainability.
China, a global leader in renewable energy, invested a staggering US$546 billion in clean energy in 2022, far surpassing the US. This commitment has not only created vast job opportunities across the sector but has also driven the upskilling of individuals, empowering them with the necessary expertise for the transition towards sustainable energy solutions.
In India, the government signed a memorandum of understanding with Germany to establish nationwide vocational training programmes on renewable energy, e-mobility, energy efficiency and more.
To meet this rise in demand, educational institutions, training providers and policymakers across Asia must work in tandem with the rest of world to develop comprehensive workforce development programmes. These initiatives should span a wide range of disciplines, from technical vocational training for renewable energy technicians and installers to higher education programmes in engineering, environmental science and sustainable business practices.
At the higher education level, universities across Asia are expanding their course offerings and degree programmes to align with the skills needed in the sustainable energy transition. In Japan, for example, the Tokyo Institute of Technology has launched innovative engineering programmes focused on renewable energy systems and smart grid technologies, preparing the next generation of green-collar professionals to drive the country’s decarbonisation efforts.
Beyond technical training, reskilling and upskilling opportunities will be equally important, especially for workers transitioning from traditional fossil fuel industries. As Asian economies accelerate their shift away from coal and other carbon-intensive sectors, governments and employers are implementing comprehensive retraining initiatives to help displaced workers adapt their skills for the growing green economy.
Governments across Asia have a crucial role to play in driving the growth of green jobs and supporting the development of a skilled workforce for the sustainable energy transition. Through targeted incentives, funding and policy initiatives, policymakers in the region are creating the necessary conditions for businesses, educational institutions and workers to thrive in the sustainable economy.
For example, South Korea’s Green New Deal programme under the Korean New Deal has provided substantial tax credits and subsidies for companies investing in renewable energy job training. Meanwhile, the transition to renewable energy is opening up opportunities for women in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, the Department of Energy has provided energy companies with a gender mainstreaming toolkit to increase women’s participation in renewable energy systems.
By investing in the development of a green workforce, Asian nations can not only address the pressing issues of climate change but also unlock a wealth of economic benefits. These positions offer competitive salaries, opportunities for advancement and the chance to be at the forefront of the clean energy revolution.
Moreover, the growth of green jobs is not limited to specialised technical roles. Rather, it spans a wide range of industries and occupations, from marketing and human resources to urban planning and waste management.
The green economy holds the potential to create many well-paying, highly skilled jobs that can support families, strengthen communities and drive sustainable economic development across Asia. However, realising this potential will require a concerted effort from policymakers, employers, educators and workers to build a workforce that is technically proficient and deeply committed to environmental stewardship and social responsibility.
As the global economy shifts towards renewable energy and more sustainable practices, green jobs will be essential for powering a just and equitable energy transition in Asia. By equipping workers with the necessary skills, the region can unlock immense opportunities to create a cleaner, greener world. Through strategic investments in workforce development programmes, Asian nations can build a highly skilled, environmentally conscious labour force to drive sustainable transformation across industries.
Moreover, by fostering diversity and inclusion in green job opportunities, policymakers and employers can ensure the benefits of the clean energy revolution are distributed equitably, empowering marginalised communities. As Asia looks to the future, the continued growth of green jobs will be a cornerstone for building a more prosperous, resilient and sustainable regional economy which outpaces the progress seen in developed countries.
February 29, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/world/article/3253645/amid-israels-siege-hamas-scores-victories-beyond-battlefield
As ceasefire talks take place between Israel and Hamas, the possibility of an Israeli ground invasion of Rafah is causing global concern as it could lead to untold human tragedy. Israeli war cabinet member Benny Gantz stated that Israel may launch a ground offensive unless hostages are released before the month of Ramadan, which is expected to begin on March 10.
Israel’s bombardment of Gaza has killed more than 30,000 Palestinians while Hamas-led attacks on October 7, 2023 resulted in about 1,200 Israeli deaths and up to 250 people being taken hostage. While Hamas is no match for Israel’s overwhelming military prowess, the Gaza war has resulted in significant strides on other fronts due to fallout from the October 7 attack.
Diplomatically, the war has revived discussions on the two-state solution. Traditional allies of Israel – the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom – are advocating for a long-term peace within the framework of a two-state solution.
The UK has expressed a readiness to recognise a Palestinian state and United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres said Israel’s rejection of the two-state solution was unacceptable. US President Joe Biden characterised Israel’s military response as “over the top”, underscoring diplomatic challenges for Israel.
Israel normalised diplomatic ties with several Arab states resulting from the Abraham Accords, brokered by the Trump administration. In the process, the Palestinian cause was pushed to the margins until Hamas’ actions halted further developments for the time being, such as Israel’s pursuit of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.
Strategically, Hamas has successfully expanded the conflict, fuelling broader hostilities in the region. The Houthi attacks on commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea and the killing of American soldiers in Jordan, along with retaliatory responses from the US, have elevated the stakes. This has pushed the region into proxy wars, regional disputes, and a multifaceted theatre of hostilities.
Israel’s missile strike on Damascus exemplifies the transformation of the conflict into a regional crisis as various actors could seek to exploit the chaos. Militia groups in Syria and Iraq are intensifying attacks on US bases, drawing the US into a wider Middle East conflict and complicating its efforts to militarily disengage from the region.
Houthis have increased their attacks as hundreds of ships are avoiding the Suez Canal, taking an additional 4,000-mile route around Africa. This diversion not only incurs higher fuel costs but also inflates expenses and adds at least 10 days of travel time in each direction. Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi stated that revenue from the Suez Canal has declined by 40-50 per cent.
Israel’s image on the world stage has taken a heavy toll. South Africa initiated legal action against Israel, resulting in a ruling by the International Court of Justice for Israel to prevent acts of genocide. Malaysia, Turkey, Jordan, Bolivia, Maldives, Namibia, Pakistan, the Arab League, Colombia and Brazil have endorsed the case.
Brazil’s president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who currently chairs the Group of 20, drew comparison between Israel’s assault on Gaza and the Holocaust. His remarks prompted Israel’s foreign minister Israel Katz to declare Lula “persona non grata.”
Rising civilian deaths and a worsening humanitarian crisis have been eroding traditional sympathy for Israel, notably in the West, igniting widespread international protests and calls for an immediate end to the hostilities. Tens of thousands have joined large pro-Palestine demonstrations in Dublin, Jakarta, London, Sydney, Istanbul, and other cities around the world.
Militarily, the conflict remains highly unbalanced. The Israeli Defense Forces possess advanced military technology whereas groups like Hamas and Hezbollah focus on employing asymmetric warfare tactics. At the outset of the conflict, Israel had about 169,500 active-duty personnel. Hamas has close to 40,000 fighters though exact details of their strength is unclear. The year before the war, Israel spent about US$23.4 billion on its military. Hamas gets foreign funding but the exact amount is uncertain.
The Gaza conflict has seen a transformative shift with Hamas making gains beyond the battlefield where they never had the advantage to begin with. Their influence has spread through multifaceted means, resulting in diplomatic manoeuvres, international support, and asymmetric strategies to achieve Palestinian statehood. The conflict has evolved much beyond conventional warfare, showcasing the complex nature of struggle between two enemies, now resonating in the global corridors of power, policy and diplomacy.
February 14, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/asia/article/3251943/pakistans-election-results-wake- call-its-power-hungry-military
For decades, Pakistan’s military establishment has interfered with the democratic process of the country, influencing election outcomes to maintain its grip on power. While the public votes, the military ensures that only its preferred parties or leaders emerge victorious through various mechanisms.
This managed political system has largely kept the transitions of power stable – but at the cost of establishing genuine representative governance. However, the recent ousting of former prime minister Imran Khan, once backed by the military, has disrupted this established process and created upheaval.
Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the army has carried out three direct coups, in 1958, 1977 and 1999, when civilian governments lost the military’s favour. These overt seizures of power laid bare the reality of who truly rules the country. Even when not formally in power, the generals have exerted control over weak civilian governments through indirect means.
“In almost pendulum-like fashion, it appears the military has gone from governorship back to guardianship,” wrote expert Aqil Shah in his book The Army and Democracy. The military has justified its interventions by claiming to be saviours against corrupt civilians.
However, the real motive has been to protect the military’s privileged position and massive business interests, estimated to be worth over US$100 billion, or more than a quarter of Pakistan’s gross domestic product.
In 2018, the military supported the rise of Khan as prime minister to displace Nawaz Sharif. Khan’s ascent to power bore all the hallmarks of behind-the-scenes string-pulling. The generals assisted Khan by weakening Sharif through court cases leading to his disqualification. Meanwhile, the military gave nods and winks to all institutions under its influence to tip the scales towards Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party.
Khan’s relationship with the generals turned adversarial after he became prime minister and disagreed with them on key domestic and foreign policies. He later claimed he was pressured by then army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa to realign policies as desired by the military brass.
Khan resisted the military’s assertive control and blamed it for conspiring with the US to orchestrate his removal. The incensed military-intelligence complex responded by cutting off his support and building bridges with political opponents instead.
It is widely believed to have coerced Khan’s coalition partners and allies to defect, enabled a no-confidence motion in parliament in April 2022 and ensured its success through back-door manipulations. These moves culminated in Khan’s dramatic midnight ousting.
Unlike past ousted leaders who acquiesced to their fate, Khan tapped into his widespread popularity to put up an agitated resistance rather than go gently into the night. He took to holding large public rallies where he demanded early elections.
When Khan threatened to escalate matters by dissolving provincial assemblies using his power, the military establishment struck back with full force. He was arrested and jailed on flimsy pretexts and trumped-up charges.
The move to force him into submission backfired badly. Outraged PTI supporters attacked security forces and government buildings after their leader’s arrest.
During the elections this month held in this charged atmosphere, the military establishment apparently resorted to vote rigging and voter suppression to boost Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party.
However, PTI-backed independent candidates still emerged as the biggest winners, with 101 seats out of 264. Khan’s bold defiance to the military establishment’s political engineering has disrupted its managed transition of power.
With no clear winner emerging, Pakistan’s major political parties have formed a coalition government to gain a majority. Despite being long-time rivals, the PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari have agreed to join hands.
Shehbaz Sharif of the PML-N party is expected to be the nominee for Pakistan’s next prime minister, and backchannel talks are surely under way about cabinet portfolios. This political marriage between unlikely partners is driven by the necessity of keeping Khan out of power. While both parties failed to garner enough seats on their own, together they have the minimum threshold to form a government.
An alliance out of necessity rather than common ideology remains fragile. It will require a careful balancing of competing interests and personalities. The next prime minister will have to accommodate the demands of coalition partners while confronting economic crises. With a razor-thin majority, strains could develop over unpopular decisions, leading to a collapse. Its success largely depends on keeping the military establishment placated while buying time for public support.
Installing an unreliable unity government cooked up through back-door deals would only temporarily paper over the deep schisms of Pakistan’s political landscape. Such a government is unlikely to last long or bring genuine stability. With Khan’s popularity still intact, only free and fair elections conducted under neutral oversight can bring stability in Pakistan’s chaotic environment.
The country today stands at the cusp of a democratic breakthrough – but this will require the all-powerful military taking the historic decision to yield space to civilian supremacy. Whether the military establishment accepts a scaling back of its overreach remains the pivotal question for the country’s future direction.
Allowing civilian supremacy risks diminishing the military’s corporate interests and agenda, while continuing with a controlled democracy is also unsustainable, as evidenced by the mass support that populists like Khan can marshal. The generals have a choice – either recalibrate and let representative politics flourish or risk rebelling against an idea whose time has come.
January 11, 2024
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3247836/2023-was-hottest-125000-years-it-wont-be-last
Last year was humanity’s hottest in at least 125,000 years. However, with warming trends predicted, it may turn out to be merely an average year rather than an anomaly.
Last November, with the Cop28 UN climate summit commencing, the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) affirmed what already seemed inevitable – that 2023 would be the hottest year in human history. It is noteworthy that similar declarations – whether for the hottest year, years or decade – are made just about every year around the time of the conference of parties.
Last May, the WMO also warned that it expected global temperatures to reach record levels in the next five years. This surge is attributed to heat-trapping greenhouse gases and a naturally occurring El Niño weather pattern.
For scientists at Nasa, the summer of 2023 marked Earth’s highest temperatures since global records began in 1880. The combined temperatures for June, July and August were 0.23 degrees Celsius higher than for any other summer recorded by the US space agency.
Last year, intense heatwaves affected many parts of the world, from the United States across South America, to countries in Europe and Asia, with devastating wildfires in Canada and Hawaii. Extreme weather was also seen in Italy, Greece and across central Europe, where severe rainfall caused floods.
The speed of global warming over the past 50 years has exceeded anything observed over the past 2,000 years, according to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Such concerning patterns suggest we are unlikely to look back on 2023 as the year that rising temperatures peaked. And conditions are projected to deteriorate.
In its most recent comprehensive assessment, the IPCC projects that greenhouse gas emissions have contributed 1-2 degrees to global warming since the pre-industrial era. In contrast, natural factors such as solar radiation and volcanic activity had a minimal impact, accounting for a change of only around 0.1 degrees.
The combined effect of human activity, such as the extensive use of fossil fuels, deforestation and industrial processes, along with natural climate phenomena, indicates that 2023 will not be the culmination of the Earth’s path towards rising temperatures. This underscores the urgent need to enhance global cooperation to combat climate change.
The repercussions of climate change are evident. July was the world’s hottest month by a wide margin, and extreme weather is bringing death, disease and displacement through heatwaves, severe floods and droughts, and wildfires.
Climate Central reported that some 1.9 billion people experienced a minimum of a five-day heatwave that was strongly influenced by carbon pollution, at some point in the 12-month period to October 31, 2023. The far-reaching consequences of human-induced warming have been palpable for hundreds of millions worldwide.
From unprecedented early-season wildfires in British Columbia in Canada forcing tens of thousands to evacuate, to widespread flooding across East Africa displacing millions, the effects of climate change were deeply felt.
People in regions of China, Japan, the southwestern US and South America endured prolonged periods of record-breaking heat and faced dire consequences such as loss of life, agriculture and property, as well as food insecurity and increased health risks.
The escalation in global temperatures shows no signs of abating. With a robust El Niño – which releases heat from the Pacific Ocean into the atmosphere – reaching its zenith, climate scientists warn that the pace of global warming could increase.
The prominence of climate change making headlines throughout 2023 is noteworthy, especially given the armed conflict happening around the world, including in Ukraine and Gaza. This underscores the growing recognition of the immediacy and significance of addressing climate change, even as the issue competes for attention and importance alongside other pressing global issues.
It is critical for humanity to work to preserve our glaciers and mitigate the effects of rising sea levels. While a return to temperatures of the 20th century is not feasible, immediate action is essential to minimise the threats posed by an increasingly inhospitable climate.
Hence, it is highly unlikely that 2023 will be the beginning of the end of global warming. Rather, the question is: when will humankind begin to reverse the self-defeating and destructive climate change path we have recklessly submitted ourselves to?
December 14, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3244957/why-indias-modi-looks-set-third-term-despite-economic-concerns
As India braces for next year’s national elections, all eyes are on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who seems to be heading for a third term as leader of the world’s largest democracy of about 1.4 billion people and more than 900 million eligible voters. Following his Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) recent victories in crucial state elections in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh, Modi has cemented his position as the clear front runner.
In the face of a slowing economy and unemployment rising to around 10 per cent, the BJP relies on Modi’s nationalist populism for electoral victory. According to a recent survey, 52 per cent of respondents wanted Modi to continue to lead India. However, securing a third term requires Modi to expand his voter appeal, addressing anti-incumbency sentiment.
In the past, ruling parties have typically fallen prey to overconfidence. In 2004, the then-incumbent BJP launched an “ India Shining” campaign to trumpet the country’s economic growth. As party members gleefully counted down the days to polls opening, confident of securing re-election, angry undercurrents were already percolating, especially across rural areas. When results came in, the BJP was defeated by a rural-backed coalition which tapped into pervasive feelings of deprivation and neglect beneath surface-level economic advances.
Learning lessons from history, Modi has avoided a repeat of this strategy, instead promoting inclusive development. Flagship schemes such as distributing 80 million free gas connections to poor households, rural electrification and more than 21 million houses completed in rural areas resonate more than previous elite-centric campaigns.
He champions a vision of “sabka saath, sabka vikas, sabka vishwas” (“with everyone, for everyone’s progress, with everyone’s trust”), welcoming marginalised groups into the national project instead of catering mostly to urban elites. Will this be enough to overcome the hurdles in his path?
Under Modi, “Hindutva 2.0” signifies a contemporary evolution of Hindu nationalism, emphasising cultural pride and India’s distinct Hindu identity. In the political arena, Modi strategically employs issues such as Kashmir and citizenship to mobilise supporters, navigating religious complexities.
This philosophy integrates subnational identities, uniting them behind shared tenets. The political consolidation of a Hindu bloc transcends caste divisions, reshaping voter identities and emphasising religious affiliations over local ties.
Amid this transformation, there have been concerns about potential repercussions – including instances of anti-Muslim bullying and challenges in the disputed region of Kashmir – adding complexity to the political landscape and raising questions about the delicate balance between religious identity and national unity.
Modi’s campaign strategy is to emphasise the scale of development achieved over two terms, showcasing successes such as household gas connections and roadway expansion. The “ Make in India” initiative, despite mixed results, serves as potent nationalist messaging. He has been credited with improved governance, transparency and efficiency backed by technology adoption.
This approach has yielded electoral successes, but underlying tensions persist. Fissures among groups feeling left behind, such as the dominant Patels in Gujarat or Marathas in Maharashtra, pose challenges. How the BJP addresses these outbreaks of restlessness is a crucial factor, requiring adept management of potential social fissures within the coalition.
In the lead up to next year’s national elections, opposition hopes hinge on highlighting economic management failures, such as youth unemployment of above 23 per cent in 2022. High food inflation disproportionately hits the rural poor and could cut into Modi’s base. While successes in sanitation access, housing and healthcare offer hope for the BJP, expect opponents to play up lingering inequality.
The opposition will point to persistent structural issues in rural areas under Modi’s tenure, which fuelled farmer protests and rural distress. Critics allege inflated claims of progress, pointing to weak employment generation and limited private investment. Incidents of cow vigilantism and religious tensions have raised social stability concerns.
Despite this, Modi remains highly popular. His adept use of populist pledges, cultural narratives and decisive leadership imagery strengthens his agenda-setting power, making it challenging for opponents to undermine his powerful public image. With the absence of a national leader to rally the opposition, early advantages favour Modi.
Meanwhile, the BJP’s opposition is fragmented. The main opposition Congress party, lacking vision and grappling with internal divisions, is struggling to unify regional parties around a cohesive national narrative. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi’s evolving leadership, evident in initiatives such as the Bharat Jodo Yatra (unite India march), hints at a changing dynamic.
While the scion of the Gandhi dynasty lags Modi in popularity, a more engaged approach could unify the opposition. However, it must bridge ideological gaps and forge alliances to offer a compelling alternative to Modi, which is currently missing.
On the global stage, Modi has leveraged foreign policy to feed national pride by adeptly navigating complex geopolitics, such as joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue while still maintaining close ties with Russia to buy both fuel and arms. Domestically, revoking Kashmir’s special status by scrapping Article 370 of the constitution and the resulting tensions with Pakistan were well received by Modi’s base, and India’s Group of 20 presidency has showcased Modi and India as the leader of the Global South.
As the 2024 elections draw closer, Modi appears poised for a third consecutive victory. His status as a prominent leader from the developing Global South plays well with both domestic and international audiences. A survey by US-based consultancy Morning Consult in September found that Modi was the world’s most popular leader.
As an economic downturn and anti-incumbency pose potential challenges to Modi’s government, addressing job creation and reinvigorating rural economies are crucial for sustaining expectations. For the time being, it seems India is destined for “ab ki baar, Modi sarkar” (this time, Modi’s government).
November 23, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3242192/climate-change-water-scarcity-fuelling-new-crises-across-asia
As climate change depletes freshwater resources critical for human and ecological survival,the world faces an escalating water crisis. Droughts, heatwaves, and glacial melt are exacerbating water scarcity globally. According to Unicef, more than 2 billion people already lack access to safe drinking water and 4 billion face severe water scarcity for at least one month per year. If this continues, half of the world’s population could live in areas experiencing water scarcity by 2025.
COP27, last year’s UN climate change conference, missed its chance to prioritize the urgent climate adaptation and mitigation policies needed to prevent worsening water security worldwide. This negligence leaves vulnerable regions at risk of humanitarian disaster. With COP28 on the horizon, the interlinked challenges of climate change and global water scarcity must be made a priority before the crisis becomes irreversible. The future habitability of the planet hangs in the balance.
China faces an acute water crisis that could jeopardise the country’s economic and social stability. Major rivers such as the Yellow River are drying up, exposing riverbeds and disrupting agriculture. Melting glaciers, falling aquifers, pollution and rising demand are depleting China’s water resources. By 2050, China’s water deficit could reach 400 billion cubic metres.
While the government has taken steps such as water transfers, recycling and extraction reforms, they fall short of meeting China’s growing needs. Water scarcity is already diminishing crop yields, hampering hydropower generation and spurring migration. This threatens China’s food security, green energy transition and urban sustainability.
China’s water crisis is a complex issue that demands urgent action across all sectors. Current policies are inadequate for the scale of the problem. Comprehensive transformational strategies and investments in sustainable water infrastructure are needed to avert catastrophic effects in the country.
Southeast Asian countries also face a growing water crisis driven by climate change effects such as El Nino droughts,saline intrusion and pollution straining water supplies. Major agricultural producers Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia are particularly vulnerable to water scarcity.
Thailand has suffered severe drought, with global supplies of sugar and rice taking a hit. This has led to reliance on water tankers and trucks in rural communities. Vietnam is another Southeast Asian country dealing with water scarcity because of saltwater intrusion from the rising sea levels hampering irrigation and access to drinking water. Indonesia’s water pollution is exacerbated by deforestation and agricultural run-off, leading to soil erosion and contaminated water supplies.
Lack of cooperation on managing transboundary rivers such as the Mekong poses another major challenge. Hydropower dams and irrigation projects are compromising the Mekong’s fragile ecosystem across its six-country basin while also creating geopolitical tensions and conflicts between countries. For example, a decade ago, Vietnam and Cambodia expressed their strong opposition to Laos building a dam on the Mekong River.
Climate effects, land use changes and uncoordinated development are conspiring to create a severe water crisis across Southeast Asia. Urgent cooperation is needed to improve water governance, curb pollution, protect watersheds and build climate resilience. Regional countries need to work together to confront the existential threat posed by water scarcity and prevent catastrophic effects on agriculture, economies and human welfare as regional stability also depends on protecting water.
South Asia is home to almost 2 billion people and several water-stressed countries. The region is highly dependent on water for agriculture, domestic use and industrial activities, but it faces a dire water crisis driven by the effects of climate change, including Himalayan glacial melt,, extreme weather and aquifer depletion. The Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers, which provide water for millions of people in the region, are all at risk of drying up.
Reduced snow cover and rising temperatures are causing Himalayan glaciers to lose tons of ice each year. The Hindu Kush Himalayas could lose up to 75 percent of their volume by century’s end because of global warming, causing both dangerous flooding and water shortages for the 240 million people living in the mountainous region. Meanwhile, excessive groundwater pumping is also draining the South Asian aquifers on which up to 80 percent of India’s population relies.
This multifaceted crisis threatens the region’s food production, economic growth and political stability. Tensions between communities and countries could also escalate as they compete over limited water supplies, such as theIndus River dispute between India and Pakistan leading to the Indus Waters Treaty, the disagreements between India and Bangladesh over the Farakka Barrage, and theIndia-China Brahmaputra issue.
The climate change-exacerbated global water crisis is no longer a distant threat but a present reality demanding immediate action. Acute water stress in major Asian economies jeopardises the water security of billions of people. Climate effects such as droughts and floods have already diminished agricultural yields, disrupted electricity generation and strained drinking water access for millions of people living in these regions.
The COP28 summit is a chance to call for galvanised action. Water security must be an urgent priority emphasized through climate adaptation plans and funding mechanisms. Developed countries need to support vulnerable nations in building climate-resilient water infrastructure and institutions. This includes investments in watershed protection, desalination, irrigation efficiency, transboundary cooperation and sustainable technologies for water conservation, treatment and reuse. Failure to act decisively will have massive humanitarian, political and economic consequences.As the latest UN climate change conference nears, it is time for the world to confront the interlinked challenges of climate change and water scarcity before it is too late and, as some pundits expect, World War III breaks out over water.
October 15, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3237481/our-ai-driven-healthcare-future-needs-one-vital-ingredient-human-touch
Artificial intelligence in healthcare is increasingly an important topic, and one that will be discussed at the World Health Summit next week in Berlin. AI has the potential to improve patient outcomes but it also poses risks – from data collection and use to biases that can skew patient outcomes.
By 2025, more than US$30 billion is expected to be invested into AI for healthcare, a reflection of the growing trust in AI-driven healthcare solutions.
A major driver of this investment is the imperative to make better use of the vast amount of healthcare data available. Through data analysis and tools such as virtual health assistants, AI can help to significantly cut healthcare costs.
Also becoming popular are wearable health devices and AI-backed treatment plans that focus more on individual needs and early healthcare measures. In China for instance, such devices from companies including Huawei Technologies monitor vital health statistics, while platforms like Ping An Good Doctor offer AI-driven preliminary diagnoses. China’s AI healthcare evolution also includes innovations such as Infervision’s AI algorithms for early disease detection through medical imaging, and Tianji Robot’s precision in robot-assisted orthopaedic surgery.
And it’s not just China. The integration of AI into healthcare has also seen significant advances in Europe and the United States. Countries including Britain, France and Germany are spearheading public-private initiatives, such as digital innovation hubs in healthcare.
The US, home to pioneers like DeepMind, which trained its AI algorithms to detect more than 50 eye diseases from medical scans, emphasises cutting-edge research with regulatory vigilance. The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) guidelines for AI-based medical devices and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s (HIPAA’s) data privacy mandates demonstrate this commitment.
A study in the journal Nature found that AI might be as good as, or better than, doctors at detecting breast cancer from mammograms. AI is also game-changing in predicting the spread of disease. During the Covid-19 outbreak, for instance, a Canadian company, BlueDot, used AI to quickly track the spread of the virus, using news and flight data.
Surgery also has seen big changes with AI and robot-aided procedures. For example, the Da Vinci system from California-based Intuitive Surgical, used in more than 10 million surgeries, gives better results and quicker patient recoveries.
Meanwhile, Japan is addressing the needs of its ageing population by integrating AI in elderly care with innovations like the Robear robot.
The integration of AI into healthcare offers both transformative potential and challenges that demand robust regulatory oversight. Ensuring patient safety, data security and addressing ethical dilemmas remain paramount. Misinterpretations by AI, for instance, can lead to misdiagnoses with grave implications.
A classic example is IBM’s now-defunct company Watson Health, which promised to transform medical care through AI, particularly in cancer treatment. By diving into massive amounts of health data, Watson would suggest the most suitable treatments to doctors, acting as a super-smart assistant.
But as time went on, Watson’s advice was found to have failed to hit the mark, even incorrect, which risked faulty medical decisions. The Watson experience served as a lesson: while technology can be a powerful ally in healthcare, blind trust without human oversight can be hazardous.
Most countries are grappling with crafting regulations that balance innovation with safety. America’s FDA and HIPAA are the guardians of medical AI regulation; the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) sets tight controls over data processing, with rigorous provisions for health data.
While nations such as Canada and Japan are incorporating AI guidelines into existing medical device regulatory structures, others are at the nascent stage and still evaluating the best approaches. The rapid evolution of AI technology means it often outpaces regulation. Transparency in AI algorithms, essential for building trust, also remains elusive, making regulation even more challenging.
One significant struggle is in addressing AI’s potential bias, which can lead to skewed healthcare outcomes. Back in 2019, a Science journal article found that a widely used algorithm was showing racial bias – it recommended more white patients than black ones for further health treatments.
Such instances show that AI is susceptible to inheriting biases in its training data. By identifying such biases or inaccuracies in AI predictions, humans can improve the system’s accuracy, fairness and reliability.
Moreover, healthcare is not just about diagnosing and treating diseases; it also encompasses vital human elements such as trust, understanding and the ability to address the cultural, socio-economic and psychological nuances of individual patients. In mental health services, for example, while AI can play a role in the initial diagnosis or monitoring, a robot cannot replicate the deep understanding, empathy and trust established in a therapist-patient relationship.
The challenges that AI presents do not negate its potential. Instead, they underscore the necessity of a synergistic approach. AI’s strengths lie in its data-processing capabilities, pattern recognition and efficiency. Humans bring experiential wisdom, ethical discernment and empathetic understanding. Combining AI with human skills is vital, not only for accuracy, but to maintain the essence of personal care in healthcare.
The future of healthcare requires the integration of AI tools without losing sight of the human-centric essence. This delicate balance, while challenging, is vital. It is the path to a healthcare future where technology and humanity coalesce, redefining the contours of quality healthcare in the 21st century.
September 2, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3232981/can-india-be-net-zero-champion-global-south-needs
As extreme climatic events such as the wildfires that ravaged the Hawaiian island of Maui and the bitter winter in Afghanistan dominate headlines, while being referred to by many as the new normal, it is a clear signal that climate change has taken hold.
The current trajectory of carbon emissions puts the world on track for catastrophic events that impact both people and the planet. The latest report by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warns that only a limited window of time remains before temperatures rise more than 1.5 degrees Celsius, and once this threshold is passed, the impact of climatic events will be even more severe.
Against the backdrop of this looming crisis and the inability of the Global North and South to come together in addressing the challenge, the concept of a “just transition” is becoming increasingly popular in climate policy discussions.
Reaching the global net-zero goal of the Paris Agreement require mass-scale transformation of industries and economies, inevitably bringing job losses as economies scale down carbon-emitting industries. Measures to achieve global carbon neutrality will have varying effects on different social groups and regions, which legitimises the need for a just green transition.
In a 2018 report, the International Labour Organization projected that the scaling down of resource-intensive industries would lead to about 6 million job losses. However, the growth of energy-efficient sectors, such as those involved in the production of greener buildings and electric vehicles, could create 24 million jobs, with implementation of sustainable practices and just transition policies.
Transitioning to a net-zero economy involves significant investments in new infrastructure and technologies. Thus, the real challenge of the transition will be in emerging and developing nations, where the financing needs for net-zero and climate action are the greatest while access to and the cost of capital can be a bottleneck.
During a two-day forum on financing an equitable transition, organised in Bangkok in July by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, representatives from governments, financial institutions, academia, think tanks and the private sector discussed the need to inject the concept of a just transition into sectors such as agriculture and transport, in addition to the energy sector.
Some countries are already changing their industrial policies. China, for instance – considered the manufacturing hub of the world – is heavily invested in energy efficiency and has launched policies encouraging Chinese manufacturers to shift to green technologies.
In Southeast Asia, Malaysia, for example, rolled out its National Green Technology Policy as early as 2009. This week, it further announced an ambitious plan to set up a multimillion-dollar seed fund to turn the country’s energy transition into a growth driver.
In the Middle East, the Moroccan government encourages foreign investment for solar-powered projects and has been supporting industries shifting to renewable energy sources.
As holder of the G20 presidency this year, India has an opportunity to shape future climate diplomacy, by steering G20 nations towards more aggressive climate targets, sustainable practices and the promotion of renewable energy.
In fact, India has already started taking the leader in climate action. In July, it hosted the meeting of G20 energy ministers in Goa, which stressed the need for accountable consumption and production to ensure an equitable transition.
India has also been advocating for Africa’s inclusion in the G20, as part of the country’s commitment to bridging the global North-South divide by amplifying voices of developing nations on global platforms.
India’s membership in major groupings such as the Quad and Brics, as well as its role in the founding of the International Solar Alliance and Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, strengthens the country’s aspiration to be a climate policy leader.
Having projected itself as one of the leading voices of the Global South, India now has to rise to the occasion to demonstrate it can indeed bridge the climate divide by making the G20, whose economies account for about 80 per cent of global carbon emissions, subscribe to an energy transition that is just, fair and equitable, and does not make the marginalised even more vulnerable because of the impacts of climate change.
India this year surpassed China as the world’s most populous country. But, even though it is one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, it is also one of the most climate-vulnerable nations – based on the Global Climate Risk Index, India was the 7th most affected country in 2019. According to other studies, up to 4.5 per cent of India’s GDP is at risk by 2030 due to climate change, and the country could see a loss of US$35 trillion over the next 50 years.
There will be domestic challenges to tackling climate change, including resistance from industries to transition to a low-carbon economy due to cost concerns, a lack of political will and uneven access to financial and technical resources. But, to win the battle, global climate commitments need to be met by major economies like India, the US and China.
India must use its G20 presidency to build a consensus between the North and South on climate change initiatives based on the principles of a just energy transition. As the experience of previous COP climate summits show, this is easier said than done when the very definition of “just” has different connotations in the East and the West, with funds coming up short and commitment talk not matched by action.
August 11, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3230527/imran-khans-jailing-leaves-little-hope-pakistans-democracy-can-escape-ruling-elite- and-meddling
Last Saturday, police in Pakistan arrested former prime minister Imran Khan after a court sentenced him to three years in prison. He was accused of buying and selling state gifts worth around US$500,000 during his premiership from 2018-22.
Khan, a former Pakistan cricket captain turned politician, was taken into custody in May by paramilitary troops who stormed into at the Islamabad High Court to jail him on several corruption charges. Protests erupted around the country as word of Khan’s detention spread.
Armed with batons, the former prime minister’s followers targeted security institutions, including army headquarters. After he was granted bail on May 12, Khan blamed the army chief, General Syed Asim Munir, for the situation, saying, “It’s not the security institution; it is just one man, the army chief.”
Khan’s arrest is the latest development in months of political turmoil since his removal from office last year and his Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf (PTI) party facing a crackdown, with many senior leaders arrested and forced to quit the party. Thousands of his supporters, alleged to be involved in the protests, have been arrested with the prospect of being tried in military courts.
Pakistan’s military has ruled the country for more than half its existence since gaining independence in 1947. Only three of Pakistan’s 23 prime ministers have held office for more than four years, and the country continues to operate as a partial democracy owing to the military’s control over domestic and external affairs.
Pakistan’s democratic identity is fuelled by complex tussles between two political dynasties: the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by the Bhutto family, and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), led by the Sharif family. For the first time, the Khan-led PTI posed a challenge to the status quo with his anti-corruption campaign and governance reform promises.
Khan’s rise to power in 2018 was the second democratic power change following Nawaz Sharif’s election in 2013.
Pakistan’s swings between military coups and quasi-democratic political regimes are reflected in the military managing border affairs as well as defence and foreign policies. For its neighbour and rival India, it has been a tricky affair engaging with leadership between these shifts, be it during Sharif’s or Khan’s rule.
Although Pakistan has maintained close ties with China, its changing terms have created a puzzling foreign policy stance for many. This is also true of its tacit support for the Afghan Taliban while being part of the international coalition opposing the same.
Khan’s party came into power in 2018, winning the support of the urban middle class who resonated with his promises of uprooting corruption and governance reforms. The military’s support for Khan is also worth mentioning, and its influence continued from the media to foreign policy.
Khan’s efforts to live up to his promises led him to challenge the status quo of political dynasties and the military. Although he was removed through a constitutional procedure, the military withdrawing its support was the turning point in his exit.
While Khan changed Pakistan’s political narrative, his anti-corruption drive mostly targeted opposition leaders. As his government became increasingly authoritarian, he tended to bypass the parliament, reflecting his distrust in the state machinery. With political turmoil resulting from weak governance and high inflation, allies jumping ship and the military withdrawing support, Khan failed to survive a no-confidence vote and left office after serving four years.
His allegations of foreign interference and deep-rooted corruption in the Pakistani establishment drew many followers and generated political momentum that made even the army nervous. There was talk that this could be a turning point in the country’s history that led to changes in Pakistan’s democratic outlook.
Khan being shot during a protest march on November 3 brought to mind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, who at the time was bidding for a third term as prime minister. He accused Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah and a US-led foreign conspiracy colluding with the military of plotting his assassination.
Khan’s open challenge of the establishment galvanised his rivals to unite, with Pakistan’s current ruling coalition, including formerly bitter foes the PPP and PML-N. Given the fate of those whose views do not align with the establishment, the situation was increasingly disconcerting for both Khan and Pakistan’s fragile democracy.
With the current parliament’s term ending this month, Pakistan is expected to hold elections for its national assembly no later than November. Going by history, there is little expectation that the upcoming vote will be free and fair. The ruling coalition is likely to retain power, thanks to the support of the military and keeping Khan out of the election by jailing him, thus making him ineligible to run for political office for five years.
Even if Khan’s movement helped usher in needed changes and provided the people with hope that a functional democracy could emerge, the influence of the golden triangle of Pakistani democracy – the parliament, judiciary and military – still looms large.
The question is whether a different political system will evolve in Pakistan and give its people a fair shot at achieving a viable, credible democracy that is free from the clutches of dynastic politics, established elites and, last but not least, a military that has an overarching reach in national politics.
August 2, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link:https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3229544/world-cannot-afford-ai-cooperation-falling-prey-us-china-geopolitical-strife?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=3229544
At a time when the Biden administration has secured voluntary commitments from seven top companies – Google, OpenAI, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, Anthropic and Inflection – to address the risks posed by AI, the artificial intelligence industry is expected to reach US$1.8 trillion by 2030, growing at an annual pace of 37.3 per cent between 2023 and 2030.
The companies have committed to testing their AI systems’ capability and safety, sharing their results as well as information on managing AI risks before releasing them to the public. As governments across the world invest heavily in AI research and development, the ethical constraints of AI – which includes issues such as bias, privacy and data protection – are of great concern.
Cybercrime is an issue affecting businesses around the world, and academic integrity is under threat as students turning in AI-generated papers has become a worry.
Biases within AI systems pose additional ethical challenges as unconscious biases can be introduced through human involvement. Examples include biased outcomes of facial recognition AI for people of colour and the discriminatory consequences of automated systems, such as Amazon’s recruiting tool, which reflected bias against women.
Meanwhile, the geopolitical battle for AI domination is on, with the United States and China investing massively in research and development to fight for technological dominance.
While many countries are taking policy action on AI, there are differences in the scope of rules, with some nations focusing on certain AI systems while others are adopting more comprehensive measures. The emphasis on security, justice, openness and human scrutiny is crucial to avoid bias and govern these AI systems.
The UN’s International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) AI for Good Global Summit in Geneva and the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai have produced recommendations underscoring the need for responsible AI development and use. Doreen Bogdan-Martin, secretary general of the ITU, has called for swift collaboration, warning that unrestrained AI runs the risk of “spiralling out of control”, risking “social unrest, geopolitical instability and economic disparity” not experienced before.
The geopolitical divisions were evident in the two events, with the Geneva event mostly having speakers from the West while the Shanghai conference had mostly speakers from China and its allies. The UK is planning to host a global AI summit this fall.
Geopolitics is a threat to international cooperation and standardisation on AI legislation, resulting in patchwork strategies, competing goals and disjointed international standards. The ongoing chip war between the US and China could make things worse, leading to problems with interoperability, uneven enforcement and unequal protection.
Inadequate protections could deepen inequality and cause moral dilemmas. ITU deputy secretary general Tomas Lamanauskas said, “It is up to us to make sure the good prevails over the risky, and that we leverage AI to help rescue the sustainable development agenda and save our planet.”
Establishing an environment for exchanging best practices and discussing ethical issues by cultivating trust is essential for the world to start converging in framing global rules of engagement and ensuring AI that upholds justice, respects human rights and minimises risks.
Stronger support is needed to bring nations together to make unified legislation to regulate AI, promote cooperation, share information and exchange resource via multilateral agreements, treaties and global standards. Developing ethical and responsible management of AI requires initiation of a global AI governance structure with the participation of stakeholders from across the world.
There are successful international collaborations in other fields, such as the Montreal Protocol, a worldwide accord that illustrates strong international leadership and government collaboration for phasing out ozone-depleting compounds. The European Union-led General Data Protection Regulation has been an exemplar for regulations on the digital spectrum.
The world faces two stark choices. Either we can let tech giants control our fate, or the global community comes together to harness the power of AI to improve everyone’s lives. Responsible navigation of AI’s rapid growth requires addressing ethical concerns, ensuring accountability and promoting collaboration and cooperation.
Getting the most out of AI that benefits everyone is not exclusive to retaining the core principles of developing unified international legislation, multilateral agreements and global governance standards. As Bogdan-Martin warned, “We’re running out of time”. The stakes could not be higher for the global community to act quickly, collectively and decisively on AI.
July 3, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3226081/modis-much-hyped-us-visit-has-shifted-no-sand-indo-pacific-alliance
Many see Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the United States as significant amid global economic and geopolitical headwinds. Once denied a US visa over human rights concerns, Modi is now viewed by Washington as a critical partner, and India as a counterforce against China’s rising assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific.
Over the visit, India and the United States concluded discussions on a wide range of issues from defence and emerging technology to collaboration on space exploration. The accords recognise India’s role as an important US partner and support the strengthening of India’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. But while Washington has long seen India as a strategic partner to offset China’s regional aspirations, New Delhi has never been totally at ease with the label. Yet, without India’s full engagement, the US’ Indo-Pacific policy, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or any other grouping of nations hoping to check China would be nothing more than a talking point.
Given the impossibility of coercing China into demilitarising the South China Sea, the US has intensified its safeguarding of the freedom of navigation in two crucial maritime areas: the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. This elucidates the US characterisation of India as a genuine strategic partner. The US has long urged India to assume its responsibilities as the Indian Ocean’s maritime and naval centre. But in addition to the US and China, Russia has emerged as a noteworthy if discreet contributor to the Indo-Pacific.
In aspiring towards a military presence in the Pacific, Russia has positioned itself as a provider of weapons and energy to smaller nations in the Indo-Pacific, including Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. These countries, concerned about being entangled in the US-China rivalry, seek alternatives. Russia is also India’s primary arms supplier, which means the Indian armed forces are dependent on Moscow for military equipment spare parts.
For India, Russia is an established strategic partner. No wonder India, which has the G20 presidency this year, while acknowledging the geopolitical tensions around Ukraine, has implored nations to avoid letting divisive topics hinder agreement on less controversial issues.
India is the world’s largest buyer of Russian weaponry, accounting for around 20 per cent of Russia’s order book. From 2018-2022, Russia was India’s biggest source of weapons, contributing 45 per cent of India’s arms imports. France was the second-largest supplier with 29 per cent, the US was third with just 11 per cent. Hence, even if the Pentagon seeks to reduce India’s reliance on Russian arms, this is not happening any time soon and thus affects India’s stance on issues like the Ukraine war.
The same asymmetry exists on the economic front. Last year, India-China trade reached an all-time high of US$135.98 billion, according to Chinese customs data. According to India’s commerce ministry, however, which marks the financial year as starting from April 1, the US was India’s largest trading partner in 2022-2023 with US$128.55 billion worth of trade, and China was in second place. But whichever the figure, it is dwarfed by the value of US-China trade, which grew 2.5 per cent last year to reach a record US$690.6 billion.
In other words, geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific is being eclipsed by the underlying geoeconomics, with no shift in sight despite US sanctions, trade wars and the strategy of de-risking from China. During Modi’s visit, several House Democrats decided to stage a boycott of his speech to Congress to show their opposition to the Indian government’s poor track record on human rights, especially regarding India’s Muslim minority.
Four lawmakers issued a statement, calling Modi addressing a joint session of Congress a “shameful” display and arguing that in allowing it, “Congress undermines its ability to be a credible advocate for the rights of religious minorities and journalists around the world”. Imagine the reaction from China if the same treatment were meted out to President Xi Jinping.
India has long maintained its strategic autonomy, making judgments that best serve its national interests, and is likely to hew to that blueprint even as it enters yet another “quasi-alliance” with the US – both sides hailed the US-India Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership at the conclusion of Modi’s trip. Maintaining autonomy will allow India to show its credentials as an alternative power to China in Asia, avoid being characterised as deputy sheriff to the US, and pursue its aspiration of becoming an independent Asian power.
India remains in a security quandary, given China’s development, Russia’s strategic convergence with China and the US’ conceptually ambiguous Indo-Pacific geopolitical stance. In addressing this predicament, India has moved from non-alignment to strategic autonomy, but this also raises questions about its strategic trajectory. These revolve around whether India will establish a formal alliance with the US, sustain its engagement with China, uphold long-standing ties with Russia, or intensify the implementation of its “Act East” policy.
From suspicion to antagonism, past complaints to future prospects, it has taken the US and India three-quarters of a century just to establish an economic-strategic relationship. Modi’s trip to the US was little more than an engagement aimed at devising strategies to counter an assertive China and expanding the US-India partnership’s role in promoting stability in the region.
The meeting, held with the professed intention of cooperation, connectivity and a strategic partnership, appeared to offer little more than Washington’s desire to protect its Indo-Pacific interests by building deeper connections with New Delhi. For all the hype and hope over Modi’s visit, no sand has shifted for the much-touted Indo-Pacific alliance, nor will it any time soon.
June 4, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3222434/global-climate-change-policy-still-failing-women- despite-50-years-meetings?module=live&pgtype=homepage
June 5 marks the 50th anniversary of World Environment Day, which the United Nations started in June 1972 at the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. Even after 50 years of efforts to preserve the environment, the effects of climate change are disproportionately felt by women. Female mortality rates from heat exposure have increased significantly since the 1970s. And inequalities in gender mortality rates from natural disasters have risen continuously from the 1970s to the 2000s. For example, 14 times as many women than men were killed when Cyclone Gorky hit Bangladesh in 1991. In the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, women accounted for 70 per cent of all deaths, with that number rising to 80 per cent in the worst-hit areas.
There are many reasons women disproportionately face the negative consequences of climate change. They are particularly vulnerable, for example, because they often have to provide resources such as food, water and fuel for their households. The UN has estimated that about 383 million women and girls lived in extreme poverty at the end of last year. Despite 63 per cent of women aged 25 to 54 being in the global workforce, they still face an estimated 23 per cent wage gap compared to men. Meanwhile, a lack of economic and social empowerment restricts women’s involvement in climate change decision-making on adaptation and mitigation. Women and children under five bear an estimated 88 per cent of the burden of disease caused by climate change.
To address climate change, it is vital to acknowledge the gender component and include it in policy frameworks. Women must be at the forefront of developing sustainable technologies to be able to adapt to the changing climate. Developing infrastructure requires more investment that takes gender equality into account. Taking a gender-specific approach towards climate change will help elevate women’s rights issues and advance gender equality. It can also help increase production at a time when agriculture is threatened by climate change. Giving women the same access as men to agricultural resources can raise yields from women’s farms in developing countries by 20 to 30 per cent, according to a UN report, boosting overall farm output by up to 4 per cent.
Rwanda is one nation that stands out for its dedication to advancing gender equality, including efforts on climate change adaptation and mitigation. Its National Environment and Climate Change Policy underscores the significance of incorporating a gender perspective into action, and multiple networks serve as avenues for women to exchange knowledge, share experiences and advocate for climate policies that address gender considerations.
While women are recognised as being vulnerable to the effects of climate change, they are also champions of adaptation and mitigation measures. In Chile, women are bringing their skills in engineering, research and project management to participate in renewable energy projects, including the development of solar and wind energy. They play a vital role in advocating for energy efficiency and conservation practices within households and communities.
When member states adopted a gender action plan at the 2017 UN climate change conference in Bonn, Germany, they sought to improve the climate policy response to gender-related concerns. The need to ensure national adaptation plans are responsive to women’s needs has been underlined by UN climate bodies, which have also reinforced initiatives that elevate the equal involvement of women in climate advocacy and action.
On Gender Day during the 2021 UN climate change meeting in Glasgow, Scotland, women took to the global stage to demand greater representation. Even though a day was dedicated to gender issues, and multiple countries made financial pledges, the conference did not feature many women at the decision-making level, particularly indigenous women and those from vulnerable countries. This underrepresentation is concerning as women comprised less than a third of country negotiating teams attending the UN summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, last year.
Another striking example of the gender disparity was evident in the group photo of world leaders at last year’s summit, where only seven of the 110 leaders present were women. This was one of the lowest concentrations of women at recent UN climate meetings, according to the Women’s Environment and Development Organisation, with the gender imbalance extending beyond leaders as some countries’ delegations consisted of over 90 per cent men.
One possible measure for the next UN climate change conference, which takes place from November 30 to December 12 in Dubai, is to give greater precedence to the gender action plan. This will involve encouraging states to create climate policies that consider gender equality and increase the representation of women in decision-making roles at all levels. It is critical to prioritise research on how climate change affects women, to aid in the development of more appropriate policy responses.
If the world’s largest climate conference were to focus on the effects of climate change on women and commit to ensuring their meaningful participation, it would have a significant impact on global decision-making while contributing to a just and sustainable future for all. Fifty years should be enough time for the world to implement a gender-sensitive climate agenda.
May 27, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3221517/can-eus-infrastructure-initiative-be-better-greener-version-chinas-belt-and-road
At the EU Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum in Stockholm on May 13, the European Union reiterated its commitment to strengthening ties and cooperation with the Indo-Pacific region through its Global Gateway initiative. Europe plans to make strategic investments in infrastructure development in the region, with more than 20 flagship projects set to be launched in 2023 and beyond.
Just six days later, President Xi Jinping hosted the first China-Central Asia summit with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, trade between China and the five Central Asian countries has grown rapidly, reaching US$70.2 billion last year, up 40 per cent year on year.
As the East-West contest to grab a share of global infrastructure investment heats up, some see the Global Gateway as the EU’s response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The latter was introduced in 2013 to connect China with Asia, Africa and Europe via sea and land. It is considered a central component of China’s foreign policy to create trade and investment opportunities to foster economic growth with partner nations.
While China’s initiative has been criticised for its lack of transparency, environmental impact and debt-trap diplomacy, the Global Gateway seeks to provide an alternative by emphasising investments in future-focused, environmentally responsible infrastructure. The initiative is based on the tenets of sustainability, openness and observance of human rights. With much of the Western world rethinking its economic reliance on China, the EU is attempting to strengthen its footprint in the Indo-Pacific region. Under European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s leadership, the EU is undertaking initiatives to counter China’s growing political and economic clout.
The initiative is raising €300 billion (US$324.2 billion) between 2021 and 2027 for investment in digital, climate and energy, transport, health, education and research connectivity initiatives towards consolidating Europe’s development finance, with a concentration on infrastructure development and connectivity. It is positioning itself with a distinct European flavour based on democratic values, equal partnerships, environmental sustainability, safe and secure infrastructure and integration of the private sector.
Given the relatively late start of the Global Gateway, it is unclear how it will compete with the belt and road, what resources it will have and how it will collaborate with other emerging initiatives. The EU is struggling to convince critics that the scheme can compete with China over the long term. There is a reputational cost for failing to deliver on enormous promises. The EU does not have a good track record of leveraging private finance for initiatives outside Europe, and it is unclear whether member states will back the Global Gateway with public cash. Private-sector engagement is also questionable and will be based on risk-reward calculations that could be difficult to reconcile with existing development cooperation norms.
Furthermore, the potentially divergent objectives of the Global Gateway and development policy goals highlight an obvious contradiction. For example, the obvious inconsistencies between helping authoritarian governments with big infrastructure projects while promoting the value-based nature of the EU’s development policy and democracy-assistance schemes. One major criticism of the belt and road has been the tendency for participating countries to incur substantial debts to finance infrastructure projects that might not be economically viable. It also has been attacked for its lack of transparency and accountability. Numerous projects have been shrouded in secrecy and caused severe ecological damage.
Large-scale infrastructure initiatives require careful planning, transparency and accountability to be economically viable. In addition to exercising caution with large-scale debt financing, it is also important to carefully consider the environmental impact of projects. The Global Gateway aims to address these shortcomings by offering opportunities for inclusive and sustainable development through targeted investments in a variety of sectors. While promising to adhere to European social and environmental standards, it faces challenges in terms of project details and financing. To gain the support of participating countries, it is essential to address these challenges and ensure transparency, clarity and robust implementation. It will be crucial to navigate the current geopolitical complexities to establish partnerships to realise the vision.
Some 40 investment programmes have been given the green light in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Asia-Pacific as part of the initiative. In Africa, the Global Gateway envisions infrastructure initiatives that can improve connectivity, stimulate trade and raise living standards throughout the continent. It can help strengthen partnerships and cooperation, and lead to tangible benefits, including increased investment, technology transfer, capacity development and enhanced regional integration.
For some, the Global Gateway is a competitor to the belt and road, with an emphasis on investment in environmentally responsible, future-oriented infrastructure. The EU wants the initiative to be unique and independent of China’s efforts, surpassing them through transparency, good governance, democratic values, “links, not dependencies” and sustainable infrastructure. If the EU wishes to achieve strategic sovereignty, it must align its actions with its goals. Nearshoring processes are difficult and costly, necessitating significant funding as well as strong political commitment. If the EU acts swiftly, the Global Gateway offers an ideal opportunity to do so.
As the Group of 7 leaders met in Hiroshima to put up a united front against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and to counter China’s “economic weaponisation” through debt financing, it seems that the “clash of civilisations” is happening on all fronts.
April 19, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3217324/south-asian-association-regional-cooperation-still-relevant
For nearly a quarter of its existence, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has not held a summit. When the term of its last secretary general ended last February, confusion reigned over his replacement.
It was Afghanistan’s turn to put forth a candidate but none of the other SAARC members recognise the Taliban. In the end, it was decided that Bangladesh (the turns are carried out in alphabetical order) would put forth a candidate.
Formed in 1985, the regional trade association – whose other members are Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – has become moribund even though it started out with so many advantages. SAARC covers a larger land area than the European Union and Asean combined, and has a bigger population.
With 25 per cent of the global population and a gross domestic product of more than US$2.9 trillion, SAARC has been around for almost 40 years. But it has neither the clout nor economic leverage of other regional organisations such as the EU, African Union or Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Although created to boost regional integration through trade, just 5 per cent of SAARC trade happens within the region.
Political divides across South Asia have frustrated efforts to strengthen collaboration in non-political areas. Obstacles include the enmity between the two regional giants of India and Pakistan, and the asymmetry in the Indocentric region that forms a threat perception among the smaller countries.
Earlier this year, Pakistan expressed its willingness to host a SAARC summit – an event that has not taken place since 2014. Pakistan was originally due to host the 19th summit in 2016 but this was cancelled after India refused to participate, calling Pakistan “a terrorist state” after militants attacked an army base in Indian-administered Kashmir. In a sign of unresolved tensions, an Indian official spokesman responded to Pakistan’s latest invitation by saying there has been “no material change in the situation” and therefore, “no consensus” on the holding of the next summit.
The situation in Afghanistan after the Taliban seized power is another factor keeping things in limbo. It would be challenging to organise a SAARC summit where, with the exception of Pakistan, none of the members may feel comfortable sitting at the same table with the Taliban. India’s diplomatic stance also suggests a realignment in its attitude towards regional integration – and the declining relevance of SAARC as an institution. Under its “neighbourhood first” policy, India has increased its bilateral interactions with its South Asian neighbours. It has also grown its bilateral and multilateral interactions outside South Asia, such as with the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), in BRICS and most recently in the G20, where India currently holds the presidency.
With the India-Central Asia Dialogue and “Act East” policy, India has signalled its intent to increase its influence in Central and Southeast Asia respectively. But a strategic dilemma for India is China’s advances into South Asia, which have been eased by the absence of a robust regional institutional system. China’s expanding economic and strategic involvement throughout South Asia is making regional integration a futile exercise, given the historical Sino-India hostility and Sino-Pakistan proximity. Meanwhile, the region’s actors are seeking alternatives due to SAARC’s failure to foster collaboration in South Asia. Members of BIMSTEC, for example, have expanded to include five of the eight SAARC members – India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan – as well as Thailand and Myanmar. The BIMSTEC framework allows smaller states to take advantage of the markets in Thailand and India, and work together to create a shared space for peace and development.
Like Asean, SAARC operates on the basis of unanimity. But while the guiding principles and goals are similar, SAARC’s failure to meet its objectives means it has stagnated while Asean grows from strength to strength. Through increased intraregional commerce and connectivity, Asean members have become more integrated, whereas SAARC countries have fallen further apart from each other. By amicably resolving disagreements and finding peaceful methods to moderate conflicting claims, Asean has steered towards vitality and sustainability. The formation of SAARC was supposed to be a turning point in South Asia, an impoverished region despite being rich in natural and human resources. But with no arrangement for settling disagreements or mediating conflicts, SAARC’s progress has been hampered by the never-ending conflict between India and Pakistan.
Acts of collaboration and engagement are still viewed by many with suspicion. For SAARC to find peace and achieve economic integration would require South Asian leaders to find the political will and proactive approach that have been largely absent from its nearly four decades of existence. AARC holds the economic potential of a large market of 1.8 billion people – four times as much as the EU’s and nearly three times that of Asean. But the failure of the region’s political leadership has made this organisation infructuous.
When no summit has been held for nearly a decade and with no light apparent at the end of the tunnel, the inevitable question is whether to continue funding the SAARC secretariat and its affiliated bodies when the organisation’s ability to deliver is crippled in the fractured South Asian political landscape – or to dissolve it.
March13, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG and Tetsushi Sonobe, Dean and Chief Executive, ADB
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Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3213121/g7-and-g20-japan-and-india-helm-must-ensure-global-south-has-voice-table
Traditionally, the Global South and middle powers have been under-represented in multilateral deliberations. But this year, Asian countries are at the helm of two powerful global platforms, with the Group of Seven led by the Japan and the G20 led by India.
Under India’s presidency, three prioritised G20 agendas are terrorism, pandemics and climate change. Similarly, Japan’s G7 presidency emphasises economic recovery, climate change mitigation, public health and nuclear non-proliferation. Their presidencies provide an opportunity to foster North-South cooperation led by Asia. Japan and India have a strong relationship. The late Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe personally led in strengthening ties by persuading India, traditionally a cautious operator, to embrace his Indo-Pacific vision. The relationship continues to deepen after current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida chose India for his first bilateral visit. Across the world, despite development gains lifting millions out of abject poverty, inequality is growing between the world’s richest and poorest nations. The G7 elite – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain and the United States – accounted for 27 per cent of global gross domestic product and 14 per cent of growth in the past decade. In contrast, for least-developed countries, a 7 per cent growth target was unreachable for most, even before the pandemic. The economic and social advantages of artificial intelligence, technological infrastructure, a clean energy transition and food security are still largely restricted to the Global North. For most resource-constrained nations, implementing cutting-edge technology, ensuring food security and achieving a just energy transition are a prohibitive expense, never mind long-term operation and maintenance. The developing Global South has also been disproportionately affected by the pandemic and war in Ukraine.
Since G7 leaders have expressed support for India’s G20 chairmanship and pledged to work together for a better future, Japan and India should be able to push for greater collaboration in an environment of increasing financial vulnerabilities and geopolitical tensions.
The G7 has committed to work to increase funding for infrastructure and investment, and conclude more agreements like the energy transition partnership with Indonesia. Given India’s close relations with G7 nations, it can bring a fresh perspective to the narrative of climate change, carbon pricing and pandemic prevention, as well as secure investment, new technologies and climate financing. India, however, has responded differently to the war in Ukraine. While Japan joined other G7 nations in denouncing Russia and imposing sanctions, New Delhi’s response has mostly been restricted to statements of concern. When Kishida met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in March last year, their joint statement gauged the invasion’s broader implications, notably for the Indo-Pacific, and advocated an immediate cessation of violence, but did not name Russia.
With rhetoric in Europe and beyond ratcheting up amid the spectre of nuclear war, Kishida, as part of his commitment to nuclear disarmament, is hosting the G7 summit in May in Hiroshima, the city devastated by the first atomic bomb detonated during the second world war.
Tensions are also rising on the Korean peninsula with Pyongyang thought to be planning a nuclear test, in response to which South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has warned of an “unprecedented joint response”. Japan, as the only country to have suffered a nuclear attack, is in a unique position to advocate a peaceful resolution.
Despite having sometimes divergent strategic goals, Japan and India have managed to worked closely to improve ties, especially in defence and security, economic cooperation and technology. A joint Kishida-Modi diplomatic effort could see both leaders brokering peace in Moscow and Kyiv when the US and Europe have never been so diplomatically distant from Russia – and the UN has neither the consensus nor mandate to stop the war.
India has its work cut out in trying to unify a divided G20 but it complements its long-standing pursuit of strategic autonomy and in serving as a link between the East and West. The South Asian giant will continue to press for greater Global South representation in multilateral organisations as the second of four consecutive G20 presidencies from the Global South – Indonesia, India, Brazil and South Africa.
Meaningful coordination between the G20 and G7 presidencies can open windows for developing nations to participate in discussions on international policy and influence the global agenda. Japan will need to emphasise the significance of the interdependence of all countries in the global economy, and increase efforts to resolve outstanding issues of North-South cooperation through dialogue, rather than diatribe.
The North-South collaboration under the leadership of Japan and India should vie to achieve a unified stance on critical issues such as poverty alleviation, food security, healthcare support, digital transformation, energy transition and climate change. The goal should be to create a strong global financial safety net to help identify, prevent and mitigate financial crises.
Japan and India should also catalyse discussions at the G7 and G20 to mobilise new funding mechanisms in the wake of the pandemic and Ukraine war. The much-needed physical and digital infrastructure in the Global South can only be financed by strengthening international financial cooperation on direct investment and official development aid.
G7 and G20 leaders make pledges that have a huge impact on global governance and people’s lives. As the world struggles to reboot post-pandemic, and to spur socioeconomic advances while averting ecological catastrophes, adherence to those promises has never been more important.
The question is whether the Asian giants of Japan and India can rise to the occasion, to synergise their diplomatic acumen and statesmanship to make the world better and safer.
February 15, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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After a trade break of more than two years, Australian coal ships have arrived at Chinese ports, indicating hope for goods such as barley, lobster, wine and others on which the Chinese government had imposed hefty sanctions.
Last week’s virtual talks between Commerce Minister Wang Wentao and Australian Trade Minister Don Farrell, the first meeting between the country’s trade ministers since 2019, discussed resuming bilateral and commercial exchanges and improving relations. Ties have been strained in recent years over political, trade and security issues.
Relations deteriorated amid a string of events starting with Australia banning Huawei from its 5G networks. They soured further as Australia’s foreign minister called for an inquiry into China’s response to the Covid-19 outbreak in April 2020, marking the lowest point in bilateral relations.
Australia also faced the brunt of China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, wherein diplomatic and ministry officials respond to any criticism or opposition to China with arguments and accusations on social media.
It resulted in a slew of aggressive comments towards Australia. Hu Xijin, then the editor of the Global Times, described Australia on Weibo as “a bit like chewing gum stuck on the sole of China’s shoes”.
Later, China imposed an 80.5 per cent tariff on Australian barley, barred imports from Australia such as beef and enacted anti-dumping and anti-subsidy reviews on Australian wines. Coal ships were left stranded off the Chinese coast amid China-imposed restrictions. Although China constitutes more than 30 per cent of Australia’s exports, Australia said it would not bend under economic pressure.
China also warned its international students about studying in Australia. In July 2020, Australia cautioned its citizens against travelling to China, citing the chance of arbitrary detention. A year later, Australia joined the United States, Britain and other countries in accusing China of engaging in malicious cyber activities, a charge Chinese representatives denied.
Sino-Australian bilateral trade has shown significant growth from its beginnings in the 1970s, and the two economies enjoy a “complementary relationship” with a two-way merchandise trade. Australia-China trade has increased annually from US$2.51 billion in 1995 to US$57.2 billion in 2020. Iron ore, petroleum gas and coal are among the major exports from Australia to China, whereas computers and broadcasting equipment are China’s major exports to Australia.
China is Australia’s largest goods export market including agricultural goods, as well as for service exports including education and recreational travel. China is also Australia’s largest source of overseas students, apart from being its largest import source for clothing, communications equipment and so on.
The overall impact of China’s regime of sanctions and restrictions on Australia has remained low as it has found alternative markets for products such as beef, coal and copper ore. Yet, other products such as lobster and timber have suffered compared to their 2019 levels. Disregarding disruptions stemming from the pandemic, Australian exports have overall increased because of high commodity prices.
Australia joining the Quad security grouping has predictably drawn China’s derision. The grouping, which comprises Australia, Japan, India and the US, is seen by some as an alliance against China’s growing military might and economic clout in the region, some of whose members have ongoing disputes with China. Recently, Quad members also formed a cybersecurity partnership to counter the risk of Chinese cyber warfare in the region.
On the other hand, the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is expected to reduce trade barriers and boost economic collaboration in the region. However, RCEP cannot aid in resolving trade wars as it does not possess a strong dispute mechanism to resolve tariff impositions or promote new trade. In that respect, RCEP might not have a significant impact on improving Sino-Australian trade.
Sino-Australian relations have begun to see improvement under the leadership of new Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, as opposed to the previous government of Scott Morrison. Australia’s intent to improve relations is evident in the talks Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong held in December 2022, when she discussed trade blockages faced by Australian exports along with the issue of Australian citizens detained in China.
There is hope for an annual strategic dialogue to get reinstated. However, talks and dialogue might not be sufficient given that bilateral relations and trade have suffered despite the presence of a comprehensive strategic partnership and a free-trade agreement.
Australia and China must be forthcoming in communicating their expectations as their earlier deals disintegrated with political disagreement. With a political chasm leading to a mismatch in trade requirements, both countries need to be more prudent in devising a strategy that is mutually beneficial. With regional disputes and rivalries growing increasingly tense, future Sino-Australian rapprochement must be based on maintaining stable economic relations despite geopolitics driving a wedge between them.
With the US building strategic alliances around Southeast Asia and the Ukraine war affecting global economy, the challenge is to have a long-term vision that envisages optimum use of market access, demarcation from political alliances and minimises conflicts of interest.
Then foreign minister Wang Yi said during his meeting with Wong last December that China was ready to start again on the journey to improve bilateral relations and move forward in a sustainable manner. However, as his Australian counterpart aptly noted during a visit with her country’s ambassador to China, “The ice thaws, but slowly.”
January 25, 2023
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Following the end of World War II, with the world split into a Western bloc led by the US and an Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union, nations torn between the two established a new alliance known as the non-aligned movement. At the height of the Cold War and amid the rise of global independence movements, the first official summit of the non-aligned movement was held on September 1, 1961 as representatives from 25 countries and three observer states gathered in Belgrade, in part of what is now Serbia.
President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia launched the movement with his counterparts Sukarno of Indonesia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India. The primary objectives of non-alignment were to make sure that countries did not centre their national interests around international politics in terms of ideological aims or goals established elsewhere, and to ensure that countries maintained strategic autonomy to pursue their national development goals, as the cornerstone for establishing a just and equitable global order.
The non-aligned movement supported the security and sovereignty of its members, who were primarily from the Global South and opposed colonialism, imperialism, and foreign intervention. In a bipolar world, the non-aligned movement gave newly independent nations ways to exercise their political and economic autonomy. When the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, one of the founding premises of movement became infructuous. As the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviets dismantled, the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) became the only remaining functional military alliance.
Three decades later, the world appears again split. This time, a binary has developed with China and Russia on one side and the West, led by the US, on the other. At the same time, however, most African, Asian, and Latin American nations are profoundly concerned by the prospect of having to pick a side, as evidenced by their responses to Russia’s war on Ukraine. China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are among the nations that have resisted giving up their own interests to punish Russia. Most significantly, many of these countries think that their negotiating positions in the new cold war could entice trade, technology, and arms agreements from the West. By 2030, the populations and economies of these eight nations will make up three-fourths of the world.
The international context in which the non-aligned movement was created has undergone a significant transformation. The movement must recognise and respond to this new reality, its focus shifting from balancing rival powers to maintaining global links in an era of economic interdependence.The non-aligned movement has been marginalised by international leadership organisations such as the G7 and G20 and their dominant roles in matters like global governance, peacekeeping, and international finance. Hence, in light of the political uncertainty that has emerged as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and sanctions by the West, non-aligned countries are attempting to negotiate within this new economic regime and find ways to benefit from it.
Three of the largest democracies in the emerging Global South – India, Brazil and South Africa – abstained from voting to condemn the invasion at a special session of the UN General Assembly last March, as did numerous countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. In addition, 58 countries abstained from the vote to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. Many have also chosen not to ratify Western sanctions in order to continue conducting business with Russia. China is similarly viewed as a crucial economic partner.
The international system is undergoing alterations in power, and by all accounts, a new cold war is around the corner. China and Russia have both been designated as threats by the US. Potential allies are hedging, and there is no effective coalition defending the interests of the vulnerable and poor. To reboot the non-aligned movement is to give it a new purpose. The current order does not address the needs of the Global South regarding security, existential concerns about food and other commodities, or global threats like climate change. Nations that view global polarisation as an impairment to their interests are drawn to non-alignment – or, to use its more contemporary phrase, strategic autonomy – in these unsettling times. The non-aligned movement’s mandate could be expanded to address current global concerns such as greenhouse gas emissions, cyberthreats, health vulnerabilities, rising debt and poverty rates, the food crisis, and unemployment.
In their fresh efforts to forge an autonomous path, postcolonial powers shouldn’t be undervalued by either the West or China and Russia. This new de facto non-aligned movement may prove more effective than the previous one, not least because of the fact that a large portion of the developing world has made significant progress since the Cold War and is now less vulnerable to external shocks.
These countries’ increased resilience is a result of advancements in their political, security, and economic architecture. Hence, a newly revamped non-aligned movement would need a well-defined geopolitical structure and strategic approach to position itself as a viable coalition of countries driven together by their common socio-economic interests as well as political aspirations.
December 23, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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The United States and the Soviet Union started developing fusion weapons after US atomic bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Nuclear stockpiles peaked in 1986 with more than 64,000 warheads. Today, the US and Russia own around 90 per cent of all nuclear warheads.
The US, Russia, China, France, Britain, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea combined hold close to 13,000 nuclear weapons. An additional 27 countries “endorse” nuclear armament by allowing the potential use of nuclear weapons on their behalf as part of defence alliances.
The B83 gravity bomb – the world’s most potent weapon currently in service – is about 80 times more powerful than the “Little Boy” bomb which killed tens of thousands of people in Hiroshima.
Nuclear disarmament has taken wavering directions since 1945. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created in 1957 to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The United Nations established the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which the US, Soviet Union and Britain signed in 1968.
Non-proliferation improved with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine giving up their nuclear weapons by 1992. Other important developments include North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and Iran’s uranium enrichment programme. India’s race to the Nuclear Suppliers Group also raised questions as, unlike other members, it is not an NPT signatory.
Nuclear weapons are humanity’s most dangerous weapon. They can destroy lives and ecosystems, creating a nuclear winter and food shortages as the spread and duration of radioactivity is uncontrollable. There are no mechanisms or agencies equipped to deal with the catastrophic effects of a nuclear war.
The Ukraine war been escalating with Russian missile and drone attacks, along with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s occasional nuclear threat. The nuclear deterrence doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) – the condition that a nuclear attack might be reciprocated – has helped prevent World War III. To quote Winston Churchill, “safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation”.
Since it has been paused after the end of the Cold War, MAD lacks teeth in the context of modern, differently waged wars. The Ukraine war questions the efficacy of MAD as Russian expansionism in its neighbourhood dwarfs the possibility of any potential nuclear retaliation from Nato.
On the other hand, countries such as North Korea and Iran have felt emboldened by the possibility of nuclear arms acquisition as an effective deterrence against any possible attack, as they could not be brought under any formal or informal regulatory framework.
Japan adopted the Western model of industrialisation to restart its economy after World War II. The US-Japan relationship has since remained mutually beneficial, wherein Japan would focus on redevelopment and the US provided security. For more than 70 years, Japan has remained pacifist.
However, former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe supported abandoning those pacifist values, something that has gained relevance with nuclear-armed North Korea firing ballistic missiles over Japan. While Japan relies on the US nuclear deterrent, some worry that Tokyo’s pacifism makes it vulnerable to external threats. With the world’s third-largest economy and great international political capital, the question is how long Japan can afford to uphold the pacifist values enshrined in Article 9 of its constitution.
Such a policy could have unforeseen consequences in the cyber era as the rules of engagement are changing rapidly. In cyber warfare, neither the status quo nor complacency will serve the interests of any country well in an ecosystem where activism is the key weapon for any aggressor.
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has introduced a five-step “Hiroshima Action Plan” to create a world without nuclear weapons. It involves shared recognition of the cause, increased transparency by nuclear states, continuing to decrease the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, securing non-proliferation while promoting peaceful use of nuclear energy and encouraging better understanding of the realities of nuclear weapons.
He expressed an intention to use the 2023 Group of 7 summit for the same, choosing Hiroshima as the venue.
Japan is the third-largest financial contributor to the UN, and its support is aimed at securing peace, security and disarmament. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has expressed optimism about Japan’s leadership on global issues, including peacekeeping on the occasion of its G7 presidency and UN Security Council membership.
Apart from calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons, Japan has stayed the course in its efforts for non-proliferation and peacekeeping. In line with this vision, Kishida also attended the first leaders’ meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty group.
As the only country to be the victim of a nuclear attack and then have constitutionally underpinned pacifist values, Japan is in a unique position to lead the global discourse on the dangers of nuclear rhetoric, as well as the dire consequences of any potential nuclear attack.
Given its previous G20 presidency in 2019 and current G7 leadership, the country has both the global clout and the moral high ground to pursue dialogue towards denuclearisation with the world’s eminent nuclear powers, which includes the US, Russia, China and others. Will Japan rise to the occasion to lead from the front or continue to shy away from the bold leadership that the current reality demands?
December 10, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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On December 1, India took over the G20 leadership from Indonesia. A member of the group since its founding in 1999, India will now preside over the G20 into 2023.
With its entrepreneurial spirit, abundance of talent, and ambitious foray into the global economy, India has solidified its position as a leader among developing economies in guiding international development cooperation and bolstering multilateralism. To be sure, the political and economic difficulties now facing the international community are numerous. The Ukraine war has strained relations between Russia and Western countries, most of which are G20 members. Meanwhile, the sanctions imposed on Russia have negatively affected food, oil and gas prices, holding back post-pandemic global recovery.
Amid such geopolitical divides, getting the leaders at this year’s G20 summit in Bali to sign a single document was an extraordinary feat in itself for host Indonesia. Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s focus on the global economic impact of both the Russian-Ukraine conflict and the pandemic, coupled with the absence of Russian President Vladimir Putin, helped attendees reach a joint declaration.
India similarly aims to develop pragmatic solutions for the well-being of populations worldwide, in the spirit of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (the world is one family). The transformation of India’s economy, especially the rise of its green and digital sectors, has shaped India’s vision for global development, while the effects of the pandemic have highlighted the necessity of robust healthcare infrastructure and international cooperation.
G20 is a window for the world’s fifth largest economy to streamline critical global issues, keep the focus on long-term strategic goals, and strengthen North-South and South-South cooperation. It is noteworthy that for four consecutive years, developing economies will be in the driving seat of the G20: Indonesia in 2022, India in 2023, Brazil in 2024 and South Africa in 2025. This provides the space needed to begin work on issues that are key for developing nations, from framing principles for digital payment systems to reforming multilateral development banks.
The thrust of the Indonesian G20 presidency, “recover together, recover stronger”, aimed to push the world towards robust and systemic participation, concentrating on global healthcare architecture, the sustainable energy transition and digital transformation. India can build on this by offering an inclusive vision of prosperity, providing a strong gender lens to the development agenda, and fostering climate action – which appeared to have lost momentum at the recently concluded COP27.
Equally important is the task of connecting the dotted lines between cross-cutting issues like propelling growth while safeguarding environment, promoting the transition from fossil fuels to renewables while strengthening access to electricity for all, and bridging the digital divide while developing a governance ecosystem for the cyber world.
India has the social fabric and intellectual capital to lead and deliver on these vital global issues; the question is whether Indian diplomacy can rise to the occasion to effectively support G20 engagement throughout the year with an inclusive and action-oriented global agenda framework.
In other words, the current G20 troika of Indonesia-India-Brazil have their work cut out in a period marked by the need for post-pandemic recovery and by the fallouts from the Ukraine war.
Given its close relations with both the US and Russia, one of the biggest challenges for India will be to persuade Russia and Ukraine’s Western supporters to retreat from the battleground. If successful, the second obstacle – rising costs, primarily for food, and the subsequent cascade into wider global inflation – is expected to taper down as well.
Meanwhile, the presence of US President Joe Biden and Chinese president Xi Jinping within the G20 gives India a window to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific by persuading the two rivals to agree to some fundamental rules of engagement in the region. From ensuring maritime security in the Indian and Pacific oceans to freer and fairer trade at a time of weakened multilateralism and global recession, there is much for the two giants to discuss in the coming year.
As a host nation located in the heart of the Indo-Pacific, India has a unique opportunity to facilitate one of the most important political discourses within the G20. This will require India to go beyond simply setting an agenda and facilitating meetings; it must pursue effective and backchannel diplomacy away from the fanfare of the media.
India’s commitment to international collaboration, inclusive development, financial stability, and sustainable growth is consistent with its own national objectives and the broader G20 goals. The G20’s recent struggles to agree on basic communiqués, which have negatively affected its ability to operate and maintain the integrity of its core agenda, have led to its credibility being called into question.
India’s diplomatic acumen will be put to the test given the need to hear all perspectives in a severely divided multipolar world, while steering a course for compromise to reach a unified stance on the critical global issues that brought the 20 countries together in the first place.
As the world’s largest democracy in a period of severe geopolitical and economic uncertainty, India has the chance to demonstrate global leadership and statesmanship. Whether India can rise to the occasion remains to be seen.
Novermber 17, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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The latest UN climate change conference, COP27, is taking place with record-breaking drought in the Horn of Africa, famine warnings in Somalia and one-third of Pakistan devastated by deadly floods.
One of the central issues being debated is challenges that many developing countries face on the front lines of the climate disaster, despite accounting for a relatively smaller percentage of global emissions.
These countries are advocating for a “loss and damage” fund for offsetting damage previously incurred. Growing threats of conflict, global warming and economic crises are taking a toll on every continent, striking the Earth’s most vulnerable the hardest. The bone of contention in this year’s negotiations is the issue of what wealthy, industrialised nations, which produce most of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, owe to those suffering the most from climate threats.
As host, Egypt aspired to project itself as a leader in renewable energy, a popular tourist destination and a credible player on the global stage. It has made an effort to position itself as the developing world’s climate champion. However, those initiatives appeared at odds with the nation’s alarming human rights and environmental records.
Additionally, the protests which were a common occurrence at previous climate summits, have been conspicuously absent in Egypt, in part because of tight security measures and the conference site’s distance from major cities.
As it becomes difficult for many people to live healthily on a warming planet, there are increasing calls for wealthy countries to pay climate-vulnerable nations. Rich countries have long opposed the establishment of a fund to address loss and damage, despite producing most of the historical greenhouse gas emissions.
Although underlings are negotiating, the leaders of China and India – two of the top three greenhouse gas-emitting countries – did not attend the conference in Egypt.
US President Joe Biden, the head of the second-largest polluting nation, arrived in Sharm el-Sheikh days after most other leaders. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau also passed on a chance to demonstrate leadership in the struggle against climate change.
Even Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who has spent the last six months portraying Australia as a climate leader, upheld his decision to not attend COP27. British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak had first planned not to go, but he changed his mind after pressure from the public and the decision to attend by Boris Johnson.
Even Greta Thunberg, the Swedish climate campaigner who has previously attended conferences, decided not to go this time. She characterised the occasion as “more greenwashing, lying and cheating” by those in positions of authority.
Last year, given the strained relationship of COP26 host Britain with both Russia and China, it might not have been a surprise that neither President Xi Jinping nor Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the conference. In contrast, Russia and China both enjoy friendly relations with Egypt with increasing economic cooperation, leaving others wondering where Egyptian climate diplomacy went wrong.
Perhaps they wanted to avoid getting embroiled in climate change talks when neither has much appetite to give up either selling or consuming fossil fuels, being caught up in economic recession or having to finance a war.
Although previous climate change meetings did not often culminate in implementation of climate policies, even critics still saw value in participating.
There have been more than 600 fossil fuel lobbyists, 25 per cent more than the previous year and outnumbering any single frontline community affected by climate change. COP27 saw a dramatic increase in attendees from some of the world’s biggest, most polluting oil and gas companies, signifying growing influence of the fossil fuel industry on the debate.
At a time when scientists think it is necessary to prevent catastrophic climate change by keeping global temperature increases under 1.5 degrees Celsius, civil society organisations are concerned by the growing influence of fossil fuel lobbyists which could stall negotiations at a crucial time.
The ability of affluent nations to deliver on reparations – a contentious subject that is viewed as a key issue of climate justice – will largely determine the success or failure of the UN’s flagship climate summit. Little has changed over the years, but rich nations have indicated they will now walk the talk about new loss and damage finance methods.
The question is how these nations will send a credible signal that they will adapt and assist others when their absence damages the significance that COP27 deserves.
There have been numerous decisions and agreements made over time. Most of these agreements have finance at their core, and lack of funding is the main reason most agreements fail.
The purpose of these conferences is for nations to address climate change, and the yearly series of conferences continues to be the only arena for doing so. However, they work by consensus among nearly 200 nations which have diverse viewpoints.
Within this decade, radical transformation is required for both mitigation and adaptation, and the necessity for this action is emphasised when nations come together at COP27. Rising absenteeism by those whose meaningful presence can have a positive influence on the deliberations, discussions and debate and the growing presence of those from the opposite side of the aisle does not help either the case or credibility of climate action and COP27.
October 29, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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For the first time, Indonesia holds the G20 presidency. Its motto, “Recover Together, Recover Stronger,” selected in light of the pandemic, calls for collaborative and inclusive efforts for global recovery.
Strengthening cooperation between the world’s major established economies and emerging economies is the G20’s main goal this year. Specialised task forces are working to identify gaps in recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, and promote inclusive and sustainable growth in G20 countries and beyond.
Indonesia is focusing on collaboration in three areas essential for recovery: fostering a robust global health system; maximising digital technology to assist societal transformation; and, supporting an equitable and affordable transition to renewable energy and a circular economy. Indonesian President Joko Widodo has emphasised on various occasions the importance of “leaving no one behind”.
Intent on diversifying the image of the G20, Widodo wants Indonesia’s turn at the helm to benefit vulnerable populations, small island nations and developing economies, in addition to G20 members. A high priority is being given to aiding underdeveloped nations in Asia, Africa and South America, as well as the small island states in the Pacific and Caribbean.
But this year’s summit, scheduled for November in Bali, is taking place amid rising tensions between key G20 member states. With the conflict between Russia and Ukraine still unresolved, Indonesia is in a difficult position.
Political divisions within the G20 are at an all-time high, with growing concern over Russia’s participation in the summit and the possibility that Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden may meet in person for the first time since Russia invaded Ukraine.
China has so far refused to condemn the Russian invasion, abstaining from voting on the Ukraine issue on a number of occasions at the United Nations, and maintaining a “no limits” friendship with Moscow.
There have been demands from some quarters for the summit to exclude Putin and other Russian representatives from its sessions. As a result of Widodo’s shuttle diplomacy efforts, there is also the possibility that Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky may be present at the summit alongside Putin. If so, it would be the first occasion for the leaders to share a platform since the beginning of the war in February.
In the face of numerous globally interconnected crises, one would expect international cooperation to be stronger than ever. Instead, widening geopolitical divides will make it difficult for Indonesia to steer leaders towards a consensus in addressing pressing global issues.
Compromise is becoming increasingly difficult, particularly at the G20 level. The G20 meeting of finance ministers and governors of central banks in July was overshadowed by disagreements about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and ended without a joint communique. There is growing apprehension over whether the leaders convening in Bali in November will do any better.
The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has already had an effect on the global economy, complicating G20 agenda items like energy security and prices, food security and global supply chains, financial markets and inflationary pressures. Progress on these issues and others is now being held hostage by the G20’s lack of cohesion.
Climate action is also being put on hold, despite massive worldwide public pressure. G20 nations are divided on how to prepare for the transition to sustainable energy. Indonesia has the opportunity to show them the way.
As the G20 leadership summit is preceded by the COP27 climate conference in Egypt, Indonesia needs to demonstrate smart climate diplomacy to address disparities in G20 states’ economies, levels of expertise, and societal expectations with relation to a green energy transition.
Locally, Indonesia has launched a number of initiatives to develop renewable energy sources like solar, wind and hydropower. However, the Southeast Asian nation’s reliance on coal for its economy makes it difficult to strike a balance between the need for economic growth and renewable energy aspirations.
Indonesia is the world’s eighth-largest carbon emitter. In comparison to other G20 countries, its renewable energy sector is small, making it difficult to lead by example on this issue.
No less than the future of humanity is at risk because of crises like the Ukraine war, energy insecurity, inflation, climate change, biodiversity loss, and the multipronged challenges facing developing nations.
Entering the post-pandemic era, G20 nations must work together to build a more responsive global health architecture, transition to renewable energy sources, create inclusive financial systems and bridge the global digital divide.
In a world marred by war and still reeling from the longest pandemic in living memory, setting common agendas and attainable action plans will be a challenge for Indonesia.
At the same time, however, November’s summit gives the Southeast Asian country a unique opportunity to demonstrate global leadership and advocate for unity at a time when division and disconnect are becoming the norm rather than the exception.
September 18, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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The Commonwealth of Nations, a group of 56 member states comprising mostly former territories of the British Empire, is home to 2.5 billion people – a third of the global population – and represents US$13.1 trillion in gross domestic product. The group also hosts 32 of the world’s smallest 42 states.
There are still 15 Commonwealth realms where the British monarch remains the head of state, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and multiple island nations of the Pacific and the Caribbean. Yet the death of Queen Elizabeth raises uncertainty over what the future holds for the group, and in particular over the role of the British royal family.
The Commonwealth dates back to a meeting in 1926 between Britain’s King George V – grandfather of Elizabeth – and the leaders of the United Kingdom and six Dominions (semi-independent territories that had the British monarch as head of state), where it was agreed that each country should be regarded as autonomous and equal. The declaration was made official in 1931.
In 1949, the Commonwealth was updated to allow nations that wanted to become republics, like India, to keep their membership, leading to its current configuration. Although the Commonwealth was formed to create unity among former and current British territories, it remains a symbol of Britain’s colonial history. For many, it is a reminder of the economic inequality that exists among former British colonies. As former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad said in 2015, “the ‘wealth’ is not ‘common’ at all, it belongs to only four members and the rest are poor”.
The group is facing mounting challenges. For one, there are ideological differences between member nations that date back to the period of colonial rule. Second, in more recent decades, nations have prioritised other international groupings – both economic and regional – that promised greater diplomatic and economic value, reducing the Commonwealth’s importance. Third, movement within the Commonwealth has become more restricted since Britain introduced visas, discouraging the notion of a “common wealth”.
Lastly, the British monarchy has failed to make amends for its colonial past, having provided no reparations to Caribbean nations for the injustices of slavery, and offered no formal apology either for the Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919 in India ordered by then Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, or for the Bengal famine of 1943. These unhealed wounds have divided the Commonwealth further.
Objections to the British monarchy have been growing stronger among citizens of the Commonwealth; many are unwilling to recognise a monarch as the head of democratic nations. Prince William and his wife Kate’s recent Caribbean tour was not received positively, with protests breaking out in host nations.
Public sentiment is lukewarm in larger, wealthier nations, too. In Canada, 51 per cent of the population opposes having the British monarch as the country’s head of state. Australia has been pushing for a referendum on becoming a republic since 1999, while New Zealand’s prime minister Jacinda Ardern has said she expects the country to become a republic in the next few decades. Last week, anti-royal protesters gathered in Scotland and England following the death of Queen Elizabeth, reflecting the waning national popularity of the British royal family.
Given that Barbados has already removed the British monarch as its head of state and Jamaica plans to do the same by 2025, the death of Queen Elizabeth could serve as a catalyst for more Commonwealth realms to follow suit.
Indeed, the queen – the longest-reigning monarch in British history – was a powerful symbol of Commonwealth unity among its leaders. King Charles faces a challenging task in keeping the Commonwealth together.
At 73, Charles is the oldest person to take the British throne. Along with the sovereign title, he inherits the position of head of the Commonwealth, and 14 of its nations (the Commonwealth realms) will automatically regard him as their new head of state. This transition, although only ceremonial, is not voted on by the citizens of these realms, raising issues of legitimacy in democratic countries that include a G7 member (Canada) and a G20 nation (Australia).
While the Commonwealth realms retained the British monarch as their head of state during Queen Elizabeth’s reign, they might not choose to do the same for King Charles. The new king has had his fair share of episodes that could make Commonwealth realm leaders uncomfortable. For instance, receiving 3 million euros (US$3.2 million) in bags of cash from the former prime minister of Qatar as a donation to his charitable fund and £1 million (US$1.1 million) from the family of Osama bin Laden did little to boost Charles’ public image. Further dampening public perception is the king’s strained relations with the immensely popular late Princess Diana.
Should the Commonwealth realms renounce the British monarchy, there is a high possibility that other member nations will gradually lose interest in the group. As the new head of the Commonwealth, King Charles must work hard to restore the faith of member nations of the Commonwealth, address the long-held grievances of former British colonies, and make his role in the Commonwealth meaningful, not just ceremonial.
The British crown can expect more scrutiny as it moves beyond the Elizabethan era. The new king must be prepared for an uphill struggle.
August 22, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Australia is one of the most susceptible places on Earth to the effects of climate change. Record-high monthly and seasonal temperatures across the continent have led to severe droughts, forest fires, floods and other extreme weather events. Rising sea levels threaten livelihoods, infrastructure and housing. In the future, we can expect more of the same.
Australia’s surface temperature has increased by 1.4 degrees Celsius and open ocean regions have warmed by 1 degree, resulting in unbearable heatwaves. These heatwaves, stronger and more frequent than in the past, have claimed more lives lately than all other natural catastrophes in the country combined.
Australia was hit hard by bushfires during the summer of 2019-20 – the worst in the nation’s recorded history. Thirty-three people died, 3,094 dwellings were damaged, and up to 19 million hectares of land were burnt, of which some 12.6 million hectares were native forest and bushland. Australia is now suffering from severe droughts that last 5-20 per cent longer than usual. In Tasmania alone, rainfall is expected to decrease by up to 69 per cent.
More than 80 per cent of Australia’s mammals are unique to the continent, which is known for its diverse flora and fauna. In just the past five years, 175 plant and animal species have been listed as environmentally threatened. If prompt action is not taken to stop the continent’s drastically declining environmental health, this richness could be lost forever.
It’s no wonder, then, that climate change has become one of the most difficult and divisive topics in Australian politics. The country is sensitive both to the effects of climate change and to policies which attempt to mitigate them.
In 2019, following prolonged droughts, destructive floods and bushfires, Australian voters were expected to give the country’s Labor party a mandate to pursue its ambitious goals for renewable energy and carbon emissions reduction. Instead, Labor’s bold environmental plans were successfully demonised by the opposing Liberal-National Coalition.
Liberal leader Scott Morrison called restrictions on the country’s massive coal industry “reckless” and “job-destroying”. Representatives of the lucrative industry, which accounts for a third of global coal exports and provides employment in crucial swing electoral regions, supported Morrison’s government and voters backed his faith in fossil fuels.
This time around, Australians’ strong desire for progressive climate policies won out, bringing an end to the Liberal-National Coalition’s nine years in power. The result of the federal election in May highlights the rise in public concern about climate change and, since taking power, the Labor government, led by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, has made tackling the issue a priority.
Still, the party has presented voters with reform, rather than revolution, on climate, learning from its bitter experience in the 2019 elections. Despite being eye-catching, Labor’s proposal of a government-owned entity called “Rewiring the Nation Corporation”, which comes with an investment of AU$20 billion (US$13.8 billion) to modernise the power grid and unlock renewable energy supplies, is unlikely to bring about the changes needed without also expanding divisive policies like carbon pricing.
The government’s first piece of climate change legislation was approved by the Australian House of Representatives on August 4. It sets two national targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions: a 43 per cent cut from 2005 levels by 2030, and a reduction to “net zero” by 2050.
The bill stresses that the 2030 objective is just the beginning, and more steps will be taken. It also mandates that several government bodies take the targets into account when making investment decisions. After years of inaction, the world’s third-largest exporter of fossil fuels has finally decided to confront global warming.
The bill also gives power back to the Climate Change Authority (CCA), an organisation responsible for providing independent policy advice, after it was sidelined by the previous coalition government. The authority will now provide advice on the status of Australia’s climate targets and set new targets for 2035 further down the line. If the government fails to follow the advice, it will be required to publicly explain why.
The ousted coalition party has, unsurprisingly, rejected the new climate bill and declared that it will instead come up with its own proposals, which could include advocating the use of nuclear power.
Of course, Labor’s climate policies are not without their flaws, and some specifics still need to be fleshed out. For one, the aim to cut emissions by 43 per cent by 2030 remains below the 50-75 per cent range which experts recommend. Albanese has also made clear that his government will not support a total ban on fossil fuel projects.
Indeed, fossil fuels will continue to drive the country’s economy, at least until a shift to renewables takes place. The new government will take over 114 new coal and gas projects from the previous leadership, which are likely to cause a sharp rise in Australia’s emissions. But devising strategies which allow communities that currently depend economically on fossil fuels to also profit from renewable energy initiatives won’t be easy.
Australia’s changing climate poses a substantial challenge to the government, businesses, industries, communities and individuals. Despite Labor riding to power on the growing environmental concerns of voters, Australia’s climate change battle must still be fought on two fronts – political and economic. Unless good policies can be combined with good economics, the country will struggle to address the environmental perils it faces.
Moreover, in a country where elected governments only serve a three-year term, making concrete progress is a tall order when dealing with something as complex, far-reaching and long-term as climate change.
Weblink: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3189346/australias-climate-change-challenge-safeguard-jobs-while-moving
July 31, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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A year and a half after Myanmar’s military takeover, the country has carried out its first executions in decades. It announced on Monday that four men had been executed. Among them were a former National League for Democracy lawmaker and a pro-democracy activist, accused of aiding “terror acts” in a closed-door trial.
Myanmar’s governing military defended the executions as “justice for the people”, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) has denounced them. A statement issued by Cambodia, the current Asean chair, described the use of the death penalty “just a week before the 55th Asean ministerial meeting” as “highly reprehensible” and damaging to regional efforts to establish peace in Myanmar.
Such a rebuke from Asean is rare. Although Myanmar’s military junta was at first prohibited from attending high-level Asean meetings, more recently this stance appears to have shifted. Indeed, the presence of junta representatives at the Asean Defence Ministers’ meeting in June has called into question Asean’s commitment to upholding the democratic rights of Myanmar’s population.
Asean has been criticised before for sidelining human rights in the pursuit of economic integration. In 2017, the 50th anniversary of the bloc’s founding, Teddy Baguilat, a board member of Asean Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), called on the group to strengthen its rights framework: “We must push back against moves of autocrats and populist leaders to demonise human rights advocates and trivialise human rights issues”.
A year and a half after Myanmar’s military takeover, the country has carried out its first executions in decades. It announced on Monday that four men had been executed. Among them were a former National League for Democracy lawmaker and a pro-democracy activist, accused of aiding “terror acts” in a closed-door trial.
Myanmar’s governing military defended the executions as “justice for the people”, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) has denounced them. A statement issued by Cambodia, the current Asean chair, described the use of the death penalty “just a week before the 55th Asean ministerial meeting” as “highly reprehensible” and damaging to regional efforts to establish peace in Myanmar.
Such a rebuke from Asean is rare. Although Myanmar’s military junta was at first prohibited from attending high-level Asean meetings, more recently this stance appears to have shifted. Indeed, the presence of junta representatives at the Asean Defence Ministers’ meeting in June has called into question Asean’s commitment to upholding the democratic rights of Myanmar’s population.
Asean has been criticised before for sidelining human rights in the pursuit of economic integration. In 2017, the 50th anniversary of the bloc’s founding, Teddy Baguilat, a board member of Asean Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), called on the group to strengthen its rights framework: “We must push back against moves of autocrats and populist leaders to demonise human rights advocates and trivialise human rights issues”.
Among Asean member states, bilateral approaches to Myanmar have varied. Thailand, for example, has been more upfront in recognising the junta’s power; the outgoing Thai ambassador to Myanmar met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in March.
As for achieving the Five-Point Consensus, a set of aims agreed upon last April by Asean members and Myanmar’s new junta leader to pull the country out of its post-coup crisis, Asean has little to show for itself. The bloc has not yet had a formal meeting with any members of the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), which represents the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar. It has also come under scrutiny for being too tolerant of the junta, which has made minimal tangible progress itself in realising the five aims.
The junta refused to entertain Malaysia’s suggestion that Asean could engage with the NUG, calling the proposal “irresponsible and reckless”. Furthermore, the military leaders of Myanmar have made it clear that attempts at diplomatic isolation and international sanctions have little impact on them.
Meanwhile, thousands of Rohingya Muslims, members of an ethnic group from Myanmar’s northwestern Rakhine state, have been seeking refuge in neighbouring Bangladesh ever since a brutal military crackdown in 2017 sparked a mass exodus. Objections by Myanmar to a case accusing it of having committed genocide against the Rohingya were dismissed by the International Court of Justice on July 22.
Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister Abdul Momen has expressed concern over the delayed repatriation of the Rohingya. “The only possible solution in this regard is the repatriation of the displaced people to their homeland, the Rakhine state of Myanmar,” he said earlier this month in a plea to Asean for help in beginning the process.
Amid this crisis, analysts have condemned Asean’s principle of non-interference and adherence to nonviolent tactics to settle conflicts. Rohingya asylum seekers have been facing government pushback and forced return, violating international rules that no one should return to a place where their life or freedom is at risk.
Certainly, Asean could have played a more meaningful role in resolving the Myanmar crisis. In the words of APHR chairman Charles Santiago in 2017, “Asean needs to adapt or risk becoming irrelevant in a rapidly evolving global environment. The non-interference principle is a barrier to the realisation of human rights, as well as to Asean’s ability to act decisively to address a host of other issues. It must change if the bloc is to have any hope of becoming a pivotal actor in the international arena.”
Many agree with an APHR report’s assessment that Asean’s institutional framework has allowed member states like Myanmar the freedom to “set the parameters of Asean’s engagement”. More than five decades after its founding, Asean needs to decide whether it is merely a well-functioning trade body or a respectable regional organisation with common binding values.
The situation in Myanmar highlights the shortcomings of building an association based on economic interests alone. Such an association may well fail to serve the needs of the people for whose well-being it was first created.
In a statement on the situation in Myanmar in February, Asean chair Cambodia said that “durable peace and national reconciliation can be achieved only through an inclusive political solution that is Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led and involving all parties concerned”.
Perhaps then Asean diplomats may wish to speak to the ordinary citizens of Myanmar about democracy, human rights and civil liberty, rather than its leaders who could not care less about these values.
Weblink: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/asia/article/3187019/executions-myanmar-plight-rohingya-bangladesh-reflect-poorly
July 12, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe was shot dead last week at an election rally. Despite his sudden and shocking death, Abe leaves a legacy for Japan and the world at large. He was Japan’s longest-serving leader in the post-war era – as prime minister from 2006-2007 and 2012-2020 – and was also president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
Abe was exceptional among Japanese politicians. He was committed to national policy reforms, particularly regarding the Japanese budget. Abe appointed the tax policy expert Koji Omi, who led delicate budget-balancing acts through spending cuts, as his first finance minister.
Born after World War II, Abe was the country’s youngest post-war prime minister. He regularly took stances that were on a different side of history, including denying the Japanese government’s responsibility for women and girls’ coercion into sexual slavery during World War II and supporting revisions to Japanese history textbooks that reflected a more positive view of the country’s modern history.
He and other conservative politicians promoted bills to encourage patriotism and nationalism in Japanese schools.
Abe and his party also led reform through many economic policies, the most famous of which was known as “Abenomics”. This approach had three key points, or “arrows” – aggressive monetary policy, fiscal consolidation and structural reforms.
This unique policy reform was a mix of reflating government spending and a growth strategy for the Japanese economy. Japan’s nominal GDP growth was steady during Abe’s tenure amid Abenomics, and the government’s relative debt as a percentage of national GDP stabilised for the first time in decades. Japan’s unemployment rate dropped to the lowest among Group of 7 countries in 2019.
Abe made a public show of pushing for gender equality and women’s rights. He publicly advocated for women’s empowerment, raising the issue in 2015 at the UN General Assembly by vowing policy reform to achieve gender equality in Japan. He set a goal of having 30 per cent of leadership positions held by women by 2020, with Japan pledging about 42 billion yen (US$450 million) towards that goal.
Abe attempted to promote his idea of a society where women “shine” by taking multiple actions to boost women’s education and empowerment. At the 2016 G7 summit, which Japan hosted in Shima, Abe pushed for the leaders’ endorsement of the G7 Guiding Principles for Building the Capacity of Women and Girls, and the Women’s Initiative in Developing STEM Careers.
In 2016, Abe presented Japan’s plan to offer technical training to 5,000 women and assist in the education of 50,000 female students. In addition to Abe promoting the capacity-building bill among G7 countries, Japan has hosted every edition of the World Assembly for Women since 2014.
Abe established a strong presence in shaping Japan’s foreign policy. His hardline stance against the North Korean regime was a message of not putting up with bullying in the region by the pariah state. He promoted good diplomatic relations in Southeast Asia. Abe also attempted to improve relations with China, trying to move beyond lingering sentiments from World War II.
He gained respect in Taiwan among local politicians seeking greater distance from Beijing. His popularity in Taiwan came in part from his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi’s friendliness towards the island as well as his great-uncle Eisaku Sato’s visit in 1967, making him the last Japanese prime minister to go to Taiwan during his time in office.
While Abe made moves to renew diplomatic relationships with Japan’s former enemies, at the same time he pushed to strengthen the country’s geopolitical positioning and military capabilities. He sought to revise Japan’s pacifist constitution that he and other conservatives felt was imposed on the country by the United States and its allies in 1946.
Perceiving a threat from a rising China, Abe’s administration reinterpreted the constitution to permit a greater role for the Self-Defence Forces in addition to seeking to change Article 9, which renounces war and bans Japan from maintaining the potential for war.
Japan also joined the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – which Abe initially proposed in 2007 – creating an informal alliance with the US, India and Australia to protect their common interests in the Pacific amid China’s growing influence and military presence. Abe also pushed to improve Japan’s relationship with India in addition to Quad participation.
Abe played an important role in driving reform within Japan as well as building international alliances and collaboration. From pushing for economic growth to taking centre stage at international forums such as the G7, he broke with previous Japanese prime ministers and led from the front.
He was a transformative force within Japan and beyond. From walking a fine line in managing relations with China to playing a key role in the founding of the Quad, Abe showed diplomatic dexterity in navigating the complex geopolitical landscape of the Asia-Pacific.
For the Japanese people, Abe will be remembered as the leader who showed the way for Japan to have the strength to say “no” when pressured and the courage to say “yes” when that was the right thing to do, regardless of what others would have chosen.
This is the legacy Abe leaves behind for Japan, for whom this reboot was long overdue, given the country’s rapid rise to the global stage after the destruction of World War II and the challenges that arose in its aftermath.
June 29, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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As host of the Group of 7 leaders’ meeting in the Bavarian Alps, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz underscored the importance of having a “climate club” for countries to come together in tackling climate change.
Protesters have been demonstrating in Munich and calling on the G7 economies to take greater action against climate change. According to the World Meteorological Organization, the past seven years have been the warmest on record. Global sea levels have continued to rise amid constant ocean heating and acidification.
Southern China has experienced record-breaking floods this month, and hundreds of thousands of people have been evacuated. In contrast, provinces in northern and central China are dealing with an extreme heatwave.
Exceptional temperatures have been observed across the globe, with brutal heatwaves in Europe. Similarly, Australia has witnessed extreme weather events, including storms, droughts, catastrophic bush fires, heatwaves and floods. Populations across parts of India and Bangladesh are facing intense floods and landslides, leaving more than 100 dead and multiple communities devastated.
Climate experts have warned that South Asia’s most exposed populations might have to live with more volatile and longer spells of destruction as patterns of monsoon and severe weather change become more the norm than an exception.
The Paris Agreement unified nearly all nations in agreeing to cut greenhouse gas emissions which are leading to global warming. At last year’s UN climate change conference, one crucial debate was about whether nations are actually fulfilling their commitments made in Paris.
The Glasgow Climate Pact was a product of discussions among nearly 200 nations. Important steps were discussed, but the collective political will was not enough to tackle profound contradictions.
Reductions in overall greenhouse-gas emissions are still far from where they need to be to ensure a habitable climate and look after the most vulnerable nations, such as Bangladesh and the Maldives, which are greatly affected by climate change.
The idea to “phase down” coal was pushed by India and China, ultimately watering down one aspect of the final pact. Furthermore, Australia’s decision to back coal was an early blow to discussions at the conference along with its refusal to strengthen its 2030 emissions targets.
However, the term “coal” was used in a UN climate change conference text for the first time. There was dissatisfaction that the phrase “phase out” was altered to “phase down”, but there was a pledge to phase out wasteful fossil fuel subsidies.
The conference did yield novel building blocks to develop and execute the Paris Agreement through more sustainable action and advancing along the path to a low-carbon world.
China ranks first in total greenhouse-gas emissions, and India is on its way to joining it at the top. Both nations are also very vulnerable to air pollution. For China and India, coal signifies energy security and sovereignty, making it more than an engine of economic development.
In comparison, Bangladesh produces a mere 0.56 per cent of global emissions yet is seventh on the list of countries most vulnerable to climate devastation. By 2050, one in seven people in Bangladesh is forecast to have been displaced because of climate change.
The country is expected to lose about 11 per cent of its land by then, amid a 50cm rise in sea levels, with up to 18 million people forced to relocate. Progress in poverty alleviation and health in Bangladesh and elsewhere risk being wiped out by climate change.
The Paris Agreement reaffirmed a promise that was made in 2009 that the richest nations should provide US$100 billion by 2020 to help developing countries deal with the effects of climate change and grow sustainably. A UN report said the objective cannot be achieved until 2023.
To reduce global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, carbon dioxide emissions have to hit net zero by 2050. This can only happen when every country joins these collaborative efforts.
With the current energy crisis and rising global greenhouse-gas emissions, stakes are high for the next UN climate change conference, to be held in Egypt in November. The need of the hour is to scale up efforts to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees, pledge more action and seek to do better than what we have in the past.
Even with the commitments made at the Glasgow conference, and before it, people everywhere will continue to feel the impact of a changing planet. Instead of protecting jobs in carbon-emitting industries, the world needs to move towards economic diversification and the creation of green jobs for a just and sustainable transition.
The goal is to cultivate a climate-neutral planet by mid-century. To help billions of people, instead of letting temperatures rise by up to 2 degrees, the goal should be to keep the increase to no more than 1.5 degrees.
Some 130 countries have also pledged to conserve natural habitats and end deforestation by 2030. This will require robust implementation of environmental safeguards.
However, with economic development and domestic politics still taking priority for many, existing plans have been slow to move forward; many are still “under consideration”. And, according to independent estimates, the current array of climate policies is nowhere near enough to meet the Paris Agreement goals.
As we hesitate and delay, time is running out for the global community to turn its rhetoric into action. In the meantime, the ice keeps melting, sea levels rise – threatening nations’ survival – and temperatures go on rising, with heatwaves devastating life and property. There is nowhere to hide from water and fire.
Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3183254/amid-heatwaves-and-floods-time-running-out-rich-nations-fulfil
May 30, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Since 2009, Bangladesh has maintained macroeconomic stability through prudent fiscal and debt management, along with expansion of its social security net and investment in infrastructure projects. Economic growth has been consistent over the past 40 years and gross domestic product growth has been outstripping South Asia’s – with the region contracting by 6.58 per cent as a whole and Bangladesh growing by 3.5 per cent in 2020.
Agriculture used to contribute a third of Bangladesh’s GDP but fell to less than 15 per cent between 2010 and 2018, while industry’s contribution rose from less than a fifth to more than a third.
Manufacturing’s contribution to GDP has doubled since 1980, and exports have grown 20-fold since the 1990s to more than US$40 billion. High remittances – US$16.4 billion in 2019 – from low-wage labour has also supported the economy.
Bangladesh is expected to maintain its per capita GDP lead over India until 2026, owing to strong remittances, exports and agricultural growth. In 2020, India’s per capita GDP fell to US$1,929 from US$2,098, and economic output dropped to US$2.66 trillion from US$2.87 trillion. That same year, Bangladesh, a US$355 billion economy, overtook India with a per capita GDP of US$1,961 after attaining 6 per cent growth over the past 15 years.
Since 2004, Bangladesh’s GDP growth has been picking up but it was only in 2017, when India’s growth started falling, that it managed to outpace its bigger neighbour. Bangladesh’s per capita GDP stood at half of India’s before the 2008 debt crisis, but by 2014 that figure had grown to 70 per cent. Covid-19 caused India’s economy to contract by 7.3 per cent in 2020, while Bangladesh’s grew 3.5 per cent.
Today, Bangladesh outperforms India in fiscal deficit, merchandise trade balance, employment, public debt and investment-to-GDP ratios. Its human development programmes, particularly in girls’ education, have brought fertility rates and early marriages down.
Bangladesh has done better than India on various human development indicators such as life expectancy, fertility and child nutrition. The benefits of its economic rise reach a wider base, compared with India’s skewed distribution. This inclusive growth has raised living standards, which in turn has led to better education and healthcare.
India, on the other hand, has performed poorly on human development indicators, especially in economically backward states. For instance, its female work participation rate was 19 per cent last year, according to the World Bank. In Bangladesh, the figure is 35 per cent.
India’s Hindi heartland continues to struggle with teenage marriages and early pregnancies – in Bihar state, the infant mortality rate is 47 per 1,000 live births – dragging down the well-being of a large majority. Bangladesh’s success lies in having addressed the fertility issue through investments in education and women’s empowerment.
Meanwhile, India’s 2016 demonetisation, meant to weed out “black money” or unaccounted wealth, sent economic growth sliding for several years and served to boost digital transactions. The sudden withdrawal of 500 and 1,000 rupee banknotes hurt the economy as, at the time, up to 94 per cent of the workforce was unorganised, cash-dependent and without access to banking.
The cash ban hindered daily food and fuel purchases and its ill-effects were extended to trade and manufacturing. With 86 per cent of the cash in circulation abruptly withdrawn overnight, as opposed to gradually, the economy crashed.
Thanks to its macroeconomic stability, Bangladesh’s economy has grown around 270-fold in the past 50 years in local currency terms, and its budget deficit has remained at 5 per cent of GDP or less. It has become the world’s second-largest garment exporter, owing to its development strategy of export-oriented industrialisation.
Indeed, textiles, garments and footwear industries, which are labour-intensive and employ unskilled and semi-skilled labour, account for most of Bangladesh’s exports. With its beneficial position in free trade agreements, its innovation and lower salaries, many Indian buyers have relocated there to remain competitive in the global market.
Bangladesh is India’s sixth-largest trading partner with bilateral trade worth US$10.8 billion in 2020-21, up from US$9.5 billion in 2019-20. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between India and Bangladesh will boost trade but its full potential will only be realised with better transport connectivity.
Recent initiatives to strengthen bilateral cooperation include boosting trade in commodities, services and energy, infrastructure development, and encouraging cross-border investment. Even as the smaller neighbour continues to surge ahead, untapped economic gains remain to be explored. For now, Bangladesh is enjoying the ride to economic stardom in South Asia.
Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/asia/article/3179480/how-bangladesh-has-surged-past-india-road-south-asian-economic?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=3179480
March 25, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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As Russian forces advance from the north, east and south and try to encircle Kyiv, Ukrainian residents caught in the war are fleeing their homes. As they try to escape, they face a devastating situation, battling hunger, and walking long distances while exposed to sudden shelling by Russian forces.
At least 2,400 civilians have died in the southeastern city of Mariupol, for example. Hundreds of thousands are trapped, with utilities cut off and supplies running out. Some of the 30,000 civilians who managed to flee had to melt snow for drinking water and have eaten only food scraps.Ukraine has declared martial law, prohibiting men aged 18 to 60 from leaving the country. As a result, they have been separated from their families as women and children tried to flee. Ukrainian men and women from across Europe have even returned, to join the defence forces.
The refugees, almost all women and children, face difficulties they could never have imagined. While some have been taken in by European families and some children have found safety with relatives, most are living in temporary shelters in the extreme cold and are short of food.Ukrainian women and children seeking to cross into Poland face long delays. And millions of Ukrainians have been internally displaced, with the western city of Lviv reaching its capacity to accommodate extra people.
Europe is doing its best to accommodate those fleeing the war. Poland has taken in the most refugees, more than 2 million, followed by Romania, Moldova, Hungary, Slovakia and others. Moldova, among others, has called for international assistance.More than 100,000 people in Britain signed up on the launch day of a new scheme to host individuals or families rent-free in their homes or another property for six months. The scheme will be open for three years, and hosts will receive £350 (US$460) per month, with no upper limit. More than 6,100 visas were also issued through the Ukraine Family Scheme. Ireland, meanwhile, has lifted visa requirements for Ukrainians.
The European Union estimates the refugee count could reach around 7 million. The UN refugee agency estimates that more than 2.5 million people, including 1 million children, have fled so far in the largest European refugee crisis since World War II.Eastern European countries are already struggling to cope with the influx. Moving some refugees to other countries to relieve the pressure would be a huge logistical challenge, both for the people and the host countries.Within Ukraine, amid plummeting temperatures, millions of children have been displaced, trekking through harsh weather, with poor supplies of food, clothes and heat. Children are particularly vulnerable to hypothermia, and mental trauma. A lack of transport is exacerbating their plight, as are the continuous explosions and artillery attacks.There are growing concerns that human traffickers are targeting refugees under the pretence of offering help. Women face the additional burden of caring for children and the elderly.Ukrainian refugees, especially those from Middle Eastern and African countries, also face racist and xenophobic responses. Additionally, some countries have been unwilling to take in people even when they qualify for refugee status.While providing emergency aid, the United States has indicated that Europe should be the refugees’ primary destination. Around 140 countries allow in Ukrainians without a visa or provide visas on arrival. The New Zealand government has announced that Ukrainian-born New Zealand citizens and residents can bring in family members, giving them the right to study and work.
The United Nations is scaling up its delivery of life-saving support and humanitarian relief, especially for vulnerable groups. It has launched two emergency appeals, seeking US$1.7 billion – one for the escalating humanitarian needs of 6 million internally displaced people for three months and another for the refugees who have fled Ukraine.The Regional Refugee Response Plan outlines a comprehensive response to support the efforts of host countries, including the financial requirements of 12 national and transnational partners. However, these plans only look a few months ahead and a long-term vision is still lacking.The exodus is expected to continue for the foreseeable future, but the response remains underfunded. Host countries, in issuing visas or allowances, are only offering short-term solutions.Hosting and integrating Ukrainian refugees could cost these nations US$30 billion in the first year alone, according to new analysis by the Center for Global Development. Meanwhile, permanent integration could reshape Europe’s economic landscape.Europe is already coping with the challenges of high inflation, supply chain disruptions and the Covid-19 pandemic. Providing long-term assistance to refugees will strain European economies.
However, migration experts and economists say it is too early to tell whether most Ukrainians will stay, as returning home could still be an option. This is in contrast to the 2015 movement of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, who cannot return home as they fear persecution.It may be necessary for host nations to comprehensively integrate refugees as full citizens, to protect both the people and their economies. Government schemes and programmes are needed to support children, women who lack financial support, people with disabilities, and the elderly.
For the time being, a humanitarian crisis is unfolding, and getting worse each day, under the watch of the world as Ukrainian men, women and children head into an uncertain future
Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3171522/ukrainian-refugees-suffer-world-slowly-wakes-growing-humanitarian
February 28, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked diplomatic and economic chaos around the world. Amid intensified sanctions and concerns about Russia’s gas supply to Europe, the world seems to be scrambling to respond to a crisis quickly spiralling out of control.
Across the Asia-Pacific, stock markets fell with the news, with market benchmarks down 2 per cent in Tokyo and Seoul, and more than 3 per cent in Hong Kong and Sydney on Thursday alone.
Russia, stung by the 2014 sanctions after its annexation of Crimea, has spent the intervening years moving away from the US dollar – and strengthening its ties with China and the renminbi. As tensions with Ukraine started to build again last July, Russia’s US$186 billion sovereign wealth fund said it had dumped all of its dollars to hold 30.4 per cent of its value in yuan and 20.2 per cent in gold.
Three weeks before the invasion, Russia announced oil and gas deals worth US$117.5 billion with China, an old ally and economic partner. Bilateral trade, which had jumped from US$4.87 billion in 1995 to US$105 billion in 2019, is expected to reach US$200 billion by 2024. But trade with the rest of the world will be hurt.
Sanctions are set to hit Russia’s trade with the European Union, its biggest partner, worth about US$219 billion in 2020. The United States, Britain and the EU have frozen the assets of Russian financial institutions and oligarchs. Allies from Australia and Japan to South Korea and Taiwan are joining the sanctions – potentially costing Russia more than US$11 billion a year in export revenue – including banning Russian bonds.
Russia’s invasion also threatens to leave Ukraine’s trade in tatters, potentially affecting China. Ukraine is China’s largest corn supplier, selling more than a third of its harvest to China, which is Ukraine’s biggest overall export market at US$8 billion last year. In turn, China, which relies on Ukraine for 30 per cent of its corn needs, has invested heavily in Ukraine as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.
Interestingly, China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was refurbished from an incomplete carrier bought from Ukraine in 1998.
And it is not just China. Russian’s invasion will also affect Ukraine’s free-trade deals with countries such as Singapore. Since 2014, Ukraine has gradually stepped back from participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States, which include Russia.
Meanwhile, news of the invasion has sent energy prices skywards, with oil prices rising to levels not seen since 2014. Natural gas prices in Europe, already four times the levels last year, have risen even further. Inflation on the continent, already uncomfortably high at 5.1 per cent last month, can expect to push higher.
Even more uncomfortably, as much as 40 per cent of the EU’s gas imports come from Russia. Germany has already halted the Nord Stream 2, Russia’s contentious gas pipeline project, after Russia moved to recognise separatist-held regions in eastern Ukraine last week, sending its troops in. The Ukraine invasion and Europe’s worsening relationship with Russia will only worsen the EU energy crisis.
At the gas summit held in Qatar last week with the 11-nation Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), which includes Russia, members explored whether Asia could fill the gap in the European energy crisis. After careful analysis, the forum concluded that most of the gas-producing nations have very little spare capacity to meet the huge gap.
With oil prices boiling at around US$100 a barrel, countries in Asia highly dependent on oil imports are also starting to get very worried. They include South Korea, which imports as much as 92 per cent of its energy needs, and India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, which is only just recovering from the Covid-19 pandemic.
With an emerging new global power polarisation, with the West led by the US against an emerging China-Russia alliance, many countries in Asia may find themselves in the increasingly uncomfortable position of having to choose a side or be squeezed in the middle.
There may be more pressure from the US to join sanctions or scale back economic ties with Russia even as regional geopolitics makes it difficult to be seen as part of either an anti-Russia faction or a China-Russia axis – an axis that is increasingly becoming a reality as Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to court fellow Chinese strongman leader Xi Jinping.
India, for example, has strong economic ties with Russia, with an annual bilateral trade worth around US$10 billion that is expected to grow to US$30 billion by 2025. Yet India is also part of the US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which is seen by many as an alliance against China’s growing presence in Asia.
It is no wonder that Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan – India’s nemesis and China’s close ally – has rushed to Moscow to meet Putin to advance talks with Russia to build a 1,100km gas pipeline.
The ripple effects of the invasion will be felt far beyond the borders of Europe, with significant economic and geopolitical implications for Asia that will only become increasingly complex in nature.
As one could see in last Friday’s UN Security Council resolution denouncing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the two members who joined China in abstaining from the vote are India and the United Arab Emirates.
Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3168519/ukraine-war-asia-caught-rip-tide-power-polarisation-and-sanctions
January 13, 2022
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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China succeeded in deepening ties with Singapore last month, signing 14 new deals at an annual bilateral cooperation meeting held on December 29.
Beijing has been active in Southeast Asia since the 1990s, becoming a dialogue partner of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) in 1996. In November 2020, 10 Asean members signed the Chinese-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest free trade agreement involving several major powers, but with the notable absence of the US.
Certainly, the US remains a central geopolitical power, with allies in the Middle East, Asia, Europe and the Pacific. The absence of large military powers in Southeast Asia has also helped the US gain a geopolitical footing in the region.
On the other hand, China has unswervingly bolstered production, trade and investments both in Southeast Asia and globally, evolving into a geoeconomic power by strengthening relations through economic partnerships and trade relations.
Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia”, rather than adopting an economic focus, relied more on a robust military approach aimed at containing China. Then came Donald Trump’s “America first” policy which saw the US exit the Trans-Pacific Partnership, damaging its political and economic relations with Southeast Asia.
US President Joe Biden now faces an uphill struggle to correct course. Although high-level engagement has been initiated, a lot more must be done to regain the confidence of the region in the consistency and reliability of US policies. America’s firm stance against autocracies in Southeast Asia has also indirectly benefited China, which remains unbothered by humanitarian issues.
The disputed waters of the South China Sea are another issue at play. China remains a security concern for many Asean member nations, but given the huge direct investment and development assistance flowing in from China, they are unlikely to position themselves against Beijing.
Rather, analysts have hinted at a potential comprehensive strategic partnership between Asean and China – including countries contesting Beijing’s aggressive claims in the South China Sea – that could further boost investment, trade and even military ties, while weakening US influence in the region.
Understanding that economic security created through trade lasts longer than when done through military superiority, China has deftly managed the relationship with Asean by strengthening economic ties with many traditional US allies.
Despite tensions with Vietnam, the country’s new metro system in Hanoi is Chinese made. Indonesia, considered an important ally by Washington, has also embraced China of late, propelled by the latter’s pandemic diplomacy. Last year, the two signed an agreement to promote the use of their respective currencies in trade deals, curbing dependence on the US dollar.
Australia, a historically close US ally with security partnerships like Aukus, has also ratified the RCEP. Even though Australia has banned Chinese telecommunication firms from supplying 5G technology, and Australian exports to China are facing entry-related obstructions, Chinese investment has increased over the years to make China Australia’s largest trading partner, with US$261 billion flowing annually between the two.
China has made huge strides to become a major player in the international market. Free trade agreements such as the RCEP have helped it build inroads in the Indo-Pacific region. While the US is engaged in diplomacy, China is playing its cards with infrastructure investment deals.
Asean became China’s top trading partner in 2020, beating the European Union. Asean attracts Chinese foreign direct investment in many sectors, from agriculture and manufacturing to the digital and green economies. Investment between Asean and China now exceeds US$310 billion. Total trade in 2020 rose to US$685.28 billion whereas, for US-Asean trade, the figure stood at US$362.2 billion.
Even when it comes to the Quad, which comprises the US, Japan, Australia, and India, China has a strong trade relationship with all members bar the US. Japan’s exports to China stood at US$141.4 billion in 2020, roughly one-fifth of its total exports, surpassing the US.
China also briefly overtook the US in 2020 to become India’s biggest trading partner, supplying it with heavy machinery, telecoms equipment and home appliances – although the US managed to regain its top position last year amid a slowdown in China-India bilateral trade growth.
US-China trade relations, meanwhile, are increasingly under strain. Washington continues to impose tariffs on Chinese imports, thus dismantling China’s position as the US’ top trading partner.
Beijing’s diplomatic strategy cannot be viewed in isolation from its economic policy. China has attracted countries in the Indo-Pacific through large infrastructure investments deals, especially under its Belt and Road Initiative, development aid and foreign investment.
Economic blocs such as the RCEP will bring more partners to China, giving the US tough competition. China has not engaged in traditional soft/hard diplomacy but has instead adopted a strategy to boost geoeconomic relations, while following a policy of domestic non-interference.
The US is still playing catch-up as it works on a comprehensive Indo-Pacific framework to strengthen cooperation around trade and the digital economy, resilient supply chains, decarbonisation, infrastructure, and other areas of shared interest.
With continued domestic divisions in the US, which have frequently spilled over into trade and foreign policy, it will take more than diplomatic engagement and words of assurances for the US to match an adversary which has neither any vested-interest group to cater to at home nor any uncertainty over the continuity of its political leadership or policy consistency.
December 24, 2021
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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In 2022, the world enters the third year since Covid-19 appeared in late 2019, with different variants emerging. Pfizer estimates that the pandemic could extend to 2024, even when large swathes of the global population have been vaccinated.
To understand why the pandemic is stretching out, three things need to be examined: the importance of herd immunity; vaccine efficacy; and, the emerging Covid-19 variants.
Social distancing, wearing a mask, personal hygiene routines and government-imposed national lockdowns have all been put forward as ways to reduce the spread of Covid-19. After the World Health Organization announced that the coronavirus outbreak had become a pandemic in early 2020, it was clear there was no quick cure for the highly infectious virus.
The one long-term solution is to prevent its spread by achieving herd immunity through a global mass vaccination programme. After a year of research, the world produced vaccines with comparatively high rates of efficacy.
However, herd immunity continues to be crucial to prevent the pandemic from continuing. This needs to be achieved before vaccine efficacy falls as new variants emerge across the globe.
The pandemic took a drastic turn in South Asia, particularly India, where lockdowns were lifted too early, leading to a rapid spread of Covid-19 and the subsequent mutation to the Delta variant. This variant brought down vaccine efficacy, but they were still effective.
India responded by banning vaccine exports and initiating a rapid inoculation programme across the country. One year after the emergence of the Delta variant, yet another variant – Omicron – has emerged from South Africa, and we have no one but ourselves to blame for this.
Vaccines distribution has been uneven from the very beginning. While developed and rich nations overstocked vaccines, there was rarely enough available for poorer countries.
Group of 7 countries have bought about a third of the global Covid-19 vaccine stock despite representing barely 13 per cent of world’s population. This has caused poorer countries, particularly in Africa, to fall behind in achieving herd immunity.
Only about 6 per cent of Africa’s population – 77 million people across 54 countries – are fully vaccinated. It is not surprising, then, that the Omicron variant emerged from a largely unvaccinated and exposed continent.
To tackle the new variants, vaccine producers have started production of a third booster dose. British researchers say these boosters could be more than 80 per cent effective against the Omicron variant. Boosters have gained popularity in rich countries, with much of the population seeking a third vaccine dose.
However, the WHO has strongly opposed the roll-out of booster doses, asking rich nations to instead donate two doses of the vaccine to countries that do not have enough to meet the minimum vaccination rates. So far, the world has only managed to delay the Covid-19 pandemic and has yet to achieve a long-term solution, that is, herd immunity.
While booster shots are necessary for vulnerable populations and front-line workers, it should not be the primary means of achieving herd immunity. As nations continue to put their resources into these boosters, the world risks a situation where more Covid-19 variants emerge, with many people still unvaccinated and exposed to the virus.
Lower-income countries have struggled to get vaccines since they first came to market at the end of 2020. Some producers have seemingly not been thinking of the greater good when pricing their vaccines, either.
If we compare the first few vaccines that received WHO clearance, Pfizer BioNTech and Moderna cost US$20 and US$33 per dose respectively. Considering that two doses are required, the per capita cost of a vaccine is therefore at least US$40, more than the typical monthly salary in many developing countries.
The fact that some vaccines also need to be stored at minus 70 degrees Celsius also creates logistical problems for poorer countries.
By contrast, the Oxford AstraZeneca vaccine is priced at a more friendly US$4, and can be stored at regular fridge temperatures. The company even pledged 64 per cent of its supply to developing countries.
However, the British population received priority even with this vaccine. And, although supplies were pledged to developing countries, higher-income developing nations were at the front of the queue for supplies.
As we enter 2022, the world needs to come together to beat the virus, and this can only be done by achieving herd immunity as quickly as possible. Developed countries are moving towards donating vaccine doses to poorer countries – once they have achieved good vaccination rates for their own populations.
The largest effort to ensure poorer countries receive fair and equitable access to Covid-19 vaccines is the Covax Facility, an initiative led by the WHO. It aims to collect donations, whether vaccines or money, from developed countries. Covax has already shipped more than 792 million doses to 144 countries.
Rich countries with spare vaccines are donating them to their allies, including China’s pledge of 1 billion vaccine doses for Africa. Other large-scale donations could greatly boost global herd immunity and we could hopefully see an end to the pandemic.
With just 48 per cent of the global population fully vaccinated, this is a job half done. Achieving herd immunity will get more difficult unless there is significant, rapid progress on global vaccination soon.
September 26, 2021
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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With accusations made against Pakistan with regard to the Taliban’s resurgence, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan asked the Taliban government to be inclusive and respect human rights during an interview with the BBC this week.
Pakistan’s historical and paradoxical relationship with the Taliban dates back to the 1990s, when it helped the Islamist militia rise from the ashes of a bloody civil war following the Soviet Union’s departure. In a marriage of convenience, Pakistan provided sanctuary to Afghan Taliban leaders as the group served Pakistan’s regional security interests.
After the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001, Pakistan appeared to face an American ultimatum to join the global “war on terror” or, in the words of then-president Pervez Musharraf, “be bombed back to the Stone Age”. In exchange for military and financial aid worth billions, Pakistan switched to Washington’s side.
More than 80,000 Pakistani civilians have been killed in the “war on terror” while Pakistan’s economy has lost around US$126 billion, making Washington’s US$6 billion in aid a pittance compared to what the country has gone through. Between 1995 and 2020, Pakistan experienced hundreds of terrorist attacks.
Hence, the Taliban’s resurgence is being taken with a pinch of salt by Pakistan, whose armed forces led operations to curtail the menace of the Pakistani Taliban, or Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Now, amid the chaos and confusion, a rare chance for redemption has emerged for Pakistan, which could either continue its dubious role in Afghanistan or leverage its influence with the Taliban to secure lasting peace in the region and support Afghanistan’s integration into the international community.
Weblink: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3149767/moment-truth-pakistans-marriage-convenience-afghan-taliban
July 21, 2021
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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The decision by Japan and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to hold the summer Olympics, which starts on July 23, continues to be controversial due to the health risks posed by Covid-19 to all the participants.
The world’s best athletes are being left at the mercy of a government and an international organisation that are supposed to be looking after their well-being. Already, at least 55 people linked to the Olympics have reported positive Covid-19 tests since July 1.
Last Saturday, just a week before the opening of the Games, the Tokyo metropolitan region recorded 1,410 new Covid-19 cases, the highest single-day count since January 21. Infection numbers have been rising since late June across the country, with the health ministry reporting 3,093 new cases last Sunday.
The surge in cases has already led to the torch relay being taken off Tokyo’s streets, while Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga declared yet another state of emergency in Tokyo, three weeks after it had been lifted.
One of Japan’s strategies to tackle Covid-19 during the Olympics was to vaccinate its population. The country has 100 million doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech jabs ready to be administered, but logistical bottlenecks and misallocations have disrupted the roll-out.
As a result, only 33.7 per cent of the population had received at least one dose as of July 18, according to Our World in Data. With such a low rate, the government is falling back on its promise to keep everyone safe.
According to some estimates, Japan has already spent US$35 billion to host the Games. The organisers have created a whole playbook of guidelines for the event. But, despite the rules and a pledge that 85 per cent of all athletes and officials would be vaccinated, ensuring herd immunity, there are already cracks in the system.
Some athletes have questioned the Covid-19 prevention measures at hotels, where tourists were not separated from the athletes, introducing fear of the virus spreading.
Around 11,000 athletes and 7,000 officials are expected to take part in the Games. The best-case scenario would be a safe and smooth Olympics, implying safety measures by the Japanese government and IOC have worked. Yet a simple human error could easily cause things to go south. Is the world prepared to take that chance when so much is at stake?
The challenges facing the organisers are real. The fear is that the Games could trigger an outbreak within the athletic community or even the city.
An Olympic Covid-19 outbreak would not only test the limits of Japan’s health care system but could also possibly incubate a new Olympic variant. As the tens of thousands of athletes and others attempt to head home, any new variant could pose a global threat.
When the world is still struggling to overcome a pandemic that has already led to 4.1 million deaths and more than 191 million infections, and with the bulk of the world population yet to be vaccinated, is this the time for celebration and showcasing?
The top medal-winning nation of the last Olympics in Rio de Janeiro in 2016 was the US, which today is the most severely affected country by the coronavirus, with more than 608,000 reported deaths, according to Our World in Data.
As stated in the Olympic Charter, one of the roles of the IOC is “to encourage and support measures relating to the medical care and health of athletes”. By going ahead with the Tokyo Games, is the IOC not violating its own charter?
The World Health Organization cannot avoid responsibility either, should an outbreak occur, for it told the IOC that there was “no case” for cancelling or relocating the Tokyo Olympics over the coronavirus outbreak.
How can Japan and IOC be so oblivious to the potential hazards facing some of the world’s most talented athletes?
Weblink: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3141806/amid-pandemic-tokyo-olympics-disaster-waiting-happen
June 04, 2021
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
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The pandemic has accelerated Southeast Asia’s adoption of e-commerce, which holds great economic potential
But, for the region to become a major digital economy, gaps in infrastructure, access, inclusion, skills and policy must be addressed
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The coronavirus pandemic has accelerated ASEAN’s digital transformation at an unprecedented scale and speed. With bricks-and-mortar businesses in Southeast Asia disrupted by lockdowns, e-commerce surged to US$62 billion in 2020, 63 per cent up from 2019. Online shopping is expected to grow by another US$100 billion by 2025, research shows.
In Thailand alone, downloads of shopping apps increased by 60 per cent early in the pandemic. In Indonesia, where almost all businesses are micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), the government has been compelled to help entrepreneurs adopt digital tools and skills. Across the region, the shift to online work and schooling has seen the number of internet users hit 400 million.
Southeast Asia’s adoption of digital solutions has played an important role in addressing a wide range of socio-economic challenges. Singapore was the first country in the world to introduce a Bluetooth-based mobile app, TraceTogether, for contract tracing, with others in the region following suit.
The use of technology to compliment conventional health care has benefited members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Deployment of information apps providing transparent and accessible data on the pandemic has kept the “infodemic” under control, for example.
Technology has also been used to roll out social programmes: the adoption of digital identity systems has been accelerated to ensure cash transfers reach the poor. Additionally, the plethora of online marketplaces that have sprung up during the pandemic has helped small businesses survive and, in many cases, thrive.
Digital integration has enabled Asean to harness its power as a collective, enabling member states to compete effectively in the global economy and also allowing them to foster domestic growth.
However, a divergence in technological readiness, governance and the like has led to differing levels of adoption. Internet penetration varies widely: only 22 per cent of Laos’ population has internet access versus 81 per cent in Singapore, for instance.
While Singapore, Thailand, Brunei and Malaysia were quick to support health and other sectors with digital tools, the Philippines and Indonesia were held back by a lack of government coordination. For less-developed countries like Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, low digital penetration and lack of digital literacy has left them reliant on traditional approaches.
For Asean to become a key regional digital economy, gaps in infrastructure, access, inclusion, skills and policy have to be addressed. Up to US$1 trillion could be added to the region’s GDP by 2025 with greater digital integration, according to Bain and Company research.
With the pandemic-induced shift in consumer behaviour, e-commerce integration for MSMEs could help Asean revive struggling economies. This would open up opportunities for enterprises of all sizes, increasing local businesses’ participation in the global value chain and enhancing their international competitiveness.
MSMEs are the backbone of ASEAN’s growing economy, employing 80 per cent of the workforce. Despite this, less than 20 per cent of such enterprises are equipped to benefit from digital integration. To foster their growth, they need support to navigate the e-business ecosystem, whether it is starting an online enterprise or understanding digital norms.
Southeast Asia can generate major investment opportunities via cross-border integration and economic digitalisation. This has to be accompanied by the provision of seamless, secure and low-cost digital financial services.
Such services could provide support to the “unbanked” and “underbanked” populations, and foster entrepreneurship by providing financial assistance to small businesses. It is estimated that digital financial services could generate US$60 billion in revenue by 2025.
Digital technology can also help garner exponential gains in manufacturing. The region could become the next factory of the world by seizing the potential of Industry 4.0 technologies like robotics, 3D printing and predictive algorithms. For Asean, this could translate into productivity gains of up to US$627 billion by 2025, according to a McKinsey report.
Asean’s path to a successful digital transformation depends on coordinated policy responses – that is, whether the region’s leaders have a common vision for digital integration.
First, providing inclusive and affordable access to quality digital infrastructure across the region would involve lowering prices, increasing internet speeds and introducing stable broadband services in neglected areas. Second, no one in the workforce should be left behind. The yawning gap in digital skills makes it imperative to prioritise investment in human capital.
Third, growth driven by cross-border data flows will have to be balanced by stringent cybersecurity standards and regulations as customer trust is key to the long-term success of online trade. Vulnerability to cyberattacks could cost top Asean companies up to US$750 billion, and the region would need to spend up to US$171 billion on cybersecurity by 2025, according to research by consulting firm Kearney.
Finally, around US$18 billion in investments is needed to roll out 5G networks to 200 million people by 2025 and deliver internet that is 50 times faster than 4G. Given the enormity of the task, public-private partnerships will be vital to Asean’s digital transformation.
December 23, 2020
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background:
As the severity of the pandemic increased, Asia had a united front in tackling the disease technologically and economically. However, now as the world prepares for the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccines would it overcome the geopolitical tensions and challenges in poverty, health care and climate change on its path to recovery?
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As the world prepares for the distribution of Covid-19 vaccines, Asia is on target for a fast economic recovery. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development projects that China, Asia’s largest economy, will return to 8 percent growth in 2021, compared to 3.2 percent for the United States. The Asian Development Bank expects the Asian economy to rebound by 6.8 percent next year.
While East Asia has been the driver of advanced technology during this pandemic, South Asia has been able to draw on its lessons in epidemic and disaster management. Asia has become the new frontier not just for global trade and capital, but also knowledge creation, culture and digitalisation.
As key technology, capital and market providers, Asia’s economies and populations have proved resilient and diligent, ready to play a leading role in shaping the next phase of globalisation.
Many Asian nations, particularly in East Asia, practice a culture of discipline and adherence to instructions, which has empowered governments to tackle the pandemic effectively. The region’s experience with epidemics has also helped authorities craft their strategies.
Asians’ response has largely been in contrast to the West’s anti-mask and anti-lockdown rallies. Vietnam has been exemplary with its aggressive containment and cost-effective control measures, showing Asian countries’ ability to act swiftly.
Asia also regularly deals with infectious diseases, including 70 percent of the world’s dengue cases. Though many countries in the region lack the infrastructure to support a surveillance and emergency response system, they are continually working towards it.
Natural disasters, particularly in South Asia, add to the development of these emergency systems, leading to fast and dynamic changes in infrastructure. This makes possible the development of flexible strategies and a “build back better” approach, rather than “business as usual”.
Bangladesh is a prominent example in its response to deadly cyclones, having constructed early warning systems, cyclone shelters, coastal embankments and evacuation plans, while raising community awareness.
Singapore is another example, dovetailing its technological capabilities with people’s adherence to rules and discipline. It has, for example, developed a rapid Covid-19 response through a national WhatsApp channel and Gowhere website to educate and update as well as tell citizens where to collect masks and special subsidies.
Singapore, with its low number of Covid-19 cases, is a prime example of a disciplined, mature and informed population respecting government advice.
A key factor in Asia’s resilience is its rapid technological development, particularly in East Asia and India, where investment in intraregional tech start-ups has increased.
With 50 per cent of the world’s largest technology companies based in Asia and four fast-rising innovation hubs spread across the region in Wuhan, Jakarta, Yangon and Hyderabad, Asia is becoming the key driver of technological advancement.
This advancement has been led by a dynamic economy and a young population rapidly transitioning from lower to middle class, with vast resources for innovation, and access to quality intellect at competitive prices. The sharp rise in literacy across Asia has also led to productive employment.
The OECD estimates that China and India will account for over 60 per cent of STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) graduates by 2030 in comparison to 4 per cent in the US and 8 per cent in Europe.
As an innovative and entrepreneurial middle class grows in leading Asian economies such as China, India and Indonesia, the consumer market is also changing rapidly, with a preference developing for domestic goods over Western imports as tighter regulations drive out poorer-quality products.
This has nurtured the success of the likes of Alibaba, Samsung, WeChat, Toyota and Huawei, and increased Asia’s global presence. E-commerce revenue in Asia is projected to reach US$1.4 trillion this year, compared to US$425 billion for Europe.
Epidemics are not the only motivation for the coming together of Asia, where the building of a resilient economy has been at the forefront of partnerships.
The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) last month by 15 Asia-Pacific nations is a milestone – the trade pact covers a market that accounts for 30 per cent of the world economy. In addition, Asean has long been a force for regional development and growth. These networks bind both Asian economies and populations.
However, there are caveats to regional progress. India-China rivalry and the India-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir are flash points. Bringing western Asia into the fold is a difficult task that needs to be explored. China’s contentious Belt and Road Initiative may not be the only trajectory for a more connected Asia.
Asia’s united response and technological transformation have had a positive impact. This Asian boom should inspire the region to deepen its ties with lower-income countries so they, too, can catch up.
As culture, technology and unity propel Asia to the global forefront, greater attention to the education and health care of marginalised populations can reinforce this transformation. With economic growth and population pliancy, a shift to sustainable practices is essential.
Vulnerabilities in areas such as poverty, health care and climate change impact are major obstacles to progress. These complications call for regional cooperation to become global. Like the rest of the world, Asia is preparing for the affordable and accessible distribution of vaccines to its population, much of it deep in poverty.
Asia’s bigger goal is to bounce back from the economic shock of the pandemic. Its resilience places it in an advantageous position to jump ahead of its Western counterparts on its way to recovery.
November 11, 2020
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
As the new US President Joe Biden vies to re-establish US leadership in Asia. The article looks into challenges for the new US administration in regaining US’s leadership in the region.
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The pivot to Asia, initiated by then US president Barack Obama, was expected to be a harbinger of a new era of cooperation between the United States and Asia. But, with Donald Trump in the Oval office, that strategy was pushed aside to make room for an Indo-Pacific alliance.
This “Quad”, made up of the US plus three regional allies – Australia, Japan and India – was seen by many as more of a bulwark against an increasingly assertive China than a way of bringing a greater number of Asian nations into the fold of a US-led economic and strategic alliance.
As Asia continues its upwards trajectory, seeking to surpass Europe not only in economic terms, but also in strategic importance, a key challenge for Joe Biden’s administration will be to recover lost ground, which will require both sides to reconnect and reboot relations.
The pivot to Asia was intended to promote a number of collaborations, from tackling the impact of climate change to propping up US-led regional security, with a key focus being economic growth through open markets that create greater opportunities for trade and investment.
The signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership charted a path to reducing the signatories’ dependence on Chinese trade and to forge stronger ties with the US as a geopolitical counterweight to China’s regional aspirations.
Trump’s withdrawal from the TPP in 2017, driven by his “America first” policy, created a leadership void in the region that led to the creation in 2018 of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), involving Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.
As China continued on its path to regional dominance, the Trump administration strengthened the Indo-Pacific strategy. This year saw all four members of the Quad taking part in the Malabar naval exercises.
In the same vein, as a result of India and China’s conflict over the Ladakh-Aksai Chin border in the Himalayan region, the US secretaries of state and defence visited New Delhi to sign a military agreement and send a message to Beijing that America is committed to its allies who are on the front line of China’s aggressive posturing under President Xi Jinping. However, when it comes to trade, the balance continues to be tilted towards China.
The Chinese-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – which is being negotiated with traditional US allies like Australia, Japan and Singapore – is expected to finally be signed at the upcoming Asean summit. This would signal an important victory for China in its quest for global economic supremacy.
Once signed, the pact will forge the largest free trade bloc in the world, covering about a third of global gross domestic product. Currently, even the Philippines, a long-standing US ally, trades more with China: 18.8 per cent of its trade in the first half of 2019 was with China, while the US accounted for 10.9 per cent.
Yet, Biden is becoming president at a time when China’s authoritarian muscle-flexing in Hong Kong, incarceration of up to 1 million Muslims, and early coronavirus missteps in Wuhan have hurt the Asian giant’s global image. In addition, the Belt and Road Initiative – with deals worth US$64 billion signed during the Belt and Road Forum last year alone – has not quite shaken off concerns about “debt trap diplomacy”.
Partner countries like Pakistan, Mongolia, the Maldives, Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan and Laos are at high risk of debt distress. Even Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad, who attended last year’s Belt and Road Forum, has cautioned China against becoming a new colonial power.
All this gives Biden an opportunity to reconnect with old allies and rekindle relationships that may have become dormant. For example, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore came together in 2004 and launched the Malacca Straits Patrol, combining their naval and air patrols in the Malacca Strait.
Here, the US could play a lead role in ensuring rules-based navigation and engagement in the Malacca Strait, one of the world’s most important shipping channels through which one-quarter of global trade passes. This would be quite relevant, especially when there is growing concern about China’s expansionist policy and its territorial disputes in the South China Sea with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia.
Meanwhile, the region’s privacy concerns about Chinese apps including TikTok and WeChat present an opportunity for US tech giants like Amazon, Google and Facebook to strengthen their presence in the Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for over two-thirds, or US$2.3 trillion, of global e-commerce.
The US and its allies in Asia could set up an e-commerce framework, opening up a new horizon for the trade of goods and services between the world’s largest economy and its biggest e-commerce market. The CPTPP already contains important liberalising measures to facilitate digital trade and establish a regulatory framework for all things digital in the region.
During his term in office, Obama attended nine out of 12 Apec and US-Asean summits; Trump has attended two of five. Trump’s foreign policy approach towards the Asia-Pacific has been transactional, and he has shown less interest in building long-term economic partnerships and strategic alliances. Biden’s challenge will be to rebuild trust and re-establish the US’ leadership role in the region.
Over his career, which includes terms as US vice-president and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Biden has met some 150 leaders from 60 countries. He has the experience and acumen to reboot the relationship with the Asia-Pacific that has never been more important, when the US is facing a serious challenge for dominance from a rising Asian power that is intent on claiming its rightful place on the global stage.
Link: https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3109186/after-four-years-trumps-america-first-biden-must-pivot-back-asia
Jan 25, 2018
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
In the last few decades, significant progress has been made in women’s empowerment around the world. However, much still needs to be done in achieving gender parity and equal pay, and removing power play and sexual harassment of women in work. In light of some of the recent high-profile revelations of gender discrimination and power abuse of women by men, the article sheds light into this ongoing social debate.
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Sex abuse scandals have hit the headlines because of star power, both in the film and sports industry. However, ordinary women who have been subject to similar abuse relive the same moments every day, without it being reported or prosecuted. In many Asian countries, the culture of male sexual entitlement and the social norms empower men to harass women.
ActionAid research concluded that 44 per cent of women surveyed in India had been groped in public. As women say #MeToo and share stories of sexual harassment on social media to show how widespread it is, the campaign has not had an impact everywhere. In Thailand, a women’s rights advocate argues that this is because “the cultural structures are different. Thai people see sexual harassment as a personal issue between two people.”
Sexual harassment, along with unequal pay, remains at the forefront of global gender-based discrimination. In 2015, 586 million women were self employed or contributing family workers. However, many earn half or less than the wages men are paid for the same work and face gender discrimination, intimidation and sexual abuse. Recently, Carrie Gracie, BBC’s China editor, resigned citing pay inequality. Heidi Lamar, a former Google employee, filed a complaint against the tech giant for its alleged pattern of unequal pay for women.
In many Asian countries, the culture of male sexual entitlement and the social norms empower men to harass women
The average full-time female worker earns 15 per cent less than her male counterpart in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. Even in the developed world, women are still viewed as objects and less valuable than men. In the US, there is one rape reported every 6.2 minutes.
The political arena is no exception. Alabama Senate candidate Roy Moore recently lost in the Republican stronghold after being accused of sexually assaulting teenagers. UK defence minister Michael Fallon admitted to appropriately touching a journalist and was accused of trying to kiss another reporter.
In spite of the progress in the economic empowerment and social status of women over the past 50 years, both powerful and ordinary men continue to cast a shadow over women. As women become more vocal about their place and rights in society, economic provisions and social norms need to be on a par with the changing times. It will be a while before #Time’sUp becomes a reality as substantial barriers remain to achieving full equality for women around the world. Until then, the movement continues.
Link: http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2130347/metoo-momentum-shows-theres-much-more-do-gender-equality
January 6, 2018
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
As investigation by the special prosecutor Robert Mueller closes in the Trump Presidency, the prospect of impeachment against the US President looms large and may prompt a US led attack on the North Korea for diversion from the political ordeal that may emanate. The article looks into the recent developments, analyzes odds against the President, and makes rationale inferences based on careful look at the options he may have on such eventuality.
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While North Korean leader Kim Jong-un struck a conciliatory note in his new year’s message, speaking of “peaceful resolution” with South Korea, he was steadfast in his belligerent rhetoric toward the US: “The entire United States is within range of our nuclear weapons, a nuclear button is always on my desk.” US President Donald Trump did not lose time responding, tweeting that he also has a nuclear button, “but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than [Kim’s], and my Button works!”
Even as South Korea responds to the North’s gesture by proposing a meeting on January 9 in Panmunjom, a village in the demilitarised zone that serves as a location for inter-Korean negotiations, one should recall the claims by Republican US Senator Lindsey Graham, that there’s a 30 per cent chance that Trump will attack North Korea, rising to 70 per cent if the North conducts another nuclear test. “If nothing changes, Trump’s gonna have to use the military option, because time is running out,” Graham said in December.
As the new year starts with a note of both cautious optimism and provocative exchanges, there are a number of independent but interrelated events which may affect how the Korean crisis plays out in the months to come.
As special prosecutor Robert Mueller, appointed by the US Department of Justice to oversee the investigation into “links and/or coordination” between the Russian government and Trump’s campaign, closes in on Trump’s inner circle, the spectre of impeachment continues to cloud the Trump presidency. Trump could potentially face multiple charges, including collusion with a foreign country, obstruction of justice, abuse of power and charges specific to Trump aides.
While the investigation remains largely secretive, it is apparent that Trump campaign aides have shared campaign-related information and strategy with Russian operatives through phone, email and secretive meetings. This includes Trump’s former national security adviser Michael Flynn, who has pleaded guilty to making false statements to the FBI about meeting a senior Russian diplomat and politician. Mueller has deployed the Inland Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigations Division, one of the government’s specialised investigative entities focused on financial crime including tax evasion and money laundering. Deutsche Bank has already sent Trump’s financial details to the Mueller investigation.
Trump’s approval rating has hovered below 40 per cent, with a Fox News poll this week placing it at 38 per cent and showing a decline among his core white voting base. As Mueller puts together the pieces of the puzzle and the investigation gets too close for the president’s comfort, Trump may be tempted to use external issues to fend off domestic political crisis. Another round of missile tests by Pyongyang at a precarious time for the Trump presidency risks provoking a US response by a potentially beleaguered presidency in Washington.
Last month, Trump’s current national security adviser H. R. McMaster stated that the North Korean threats were increasing by the day. Launching a war would risk bringing major players like China into the conundrum, upsetting the precarious balance between the US and China, and risk thrusting parts of Asia into nuclear winter, spelling disaster for millions, especially in East Asia.
If the Mueller investigation results in incriminating charges against Trump, the president might well take on “Little Rocket Man”, rather than face the political ordeal emanating from potential impeachment proceedings.
November 27, 2017
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
The controversial 1982 citizenship law by Myanmar denies the Rohingya Muslims from legitimate and basic rights as citizens of the country. With end of the British rule in 1948, Myanmar embarked into a new form of ultra nationalism that promotes discrimination against the Rohingya. The recent atrocities committed by the Burmese army against the world’s most persecuted minority can not absolve Myanmar from its responsibility to accept the Rohingya as its own and grant them safe return and refuge in their ancestral homeland of hundred years where they have been living since the Arakan kingdom of 12th century.
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An unprecedented 400,000 Rohingya have crossed into Bangladesh since August 25 to flee persecution and death in Myanmar. Bangladesh, itself densely populated and mired in rural poverty, is struggling to manage the massive influx. Most of the refugees are encamped in Cox’s Bazar, a resource-strapped district in southern Bangladesh.
With the country already hosting tens of thousands of Rohingya who have fled Myanmar over the years, this latest wave poses significant risks not only to Bangladesh, but to the region as a whole.
So far, Bangladesh has responded to the humanitarian crisis with compassion. Some 810 hectares of land have been provided to house the arrivals in makeshift camps, though the ultimate goal is repatriation.
By contrast, the regional powers in South and Southeast Asia are either acting like an idle bystander or waiting for things to play out.
In Europe, the EU committed billions of dollars to help Turkey accommodate the flow of Syrian refugees. Bangladesh has not received anything close to that from its neighbours.
The silence from India, considered Bangladesh’s biggest regional ally, is especially deafening. It has not spoken out against the atrocities being committed against the Rohingya, and even disassociated itself from the “Bali declaration” adopted by the recent World Parliamentary Forum on Sustainable Development held in Bali, in which the Rohingya plight was mentioned.
Yet, the issue must be addressed, or the refugee crisis will become a security concern for both Bangladesh and India. The refugee camps can easily become a breeding ground for terrorism. Moreover, the growing refugee population will also exacerbate poverty, raising already high illiteracy and unemployment rates.
Myanmar must accept the Rohingya as its own. Its controversial 1982 citizenship law denies the Rohingya Muslims any recognition from the state. While they have been permitted to live in Myanmar, they are considered by the authorities to be “resident foreigners” – that is, illegal immigrants from Bangladesh with no ancestral ties to Myanmar.
The end of British rule in Myanmar in 1948 ushered in a new nationalism, which unfortunately included discrimination against the Rohingya. It is foolhardy to think that the Rohingya can ever be sent back to their “place of origin”, when they and their forefathers have been living in Myanmar since the 12th century.
July 13, 2017
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
Relations between China and Singapore have historically been friendly beginning with visits by Lee Kuan Yew and Deng Xiaoping in the mid-seventies. In recent times, relations have been challenged by a number of issues which has dented the goodwill. In view of the upcoming visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Singapore, the article looks into the past, present and future of relations between Singapore and China, the factors affecting it and what is at stake for both the countries.
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When Singapore announced last month that Chinese Premier Li
Keqiang (李克強) will pay a visit to the island nation, the news was widely seen as a sign that tensions between the two countries were easing. Their relations took a dive last year over Singapore’s stance on the South China Sea disputes involving China and some of the other Asean countries.
In November, Beijing protested against Singapore’s military exercises with Taiwan, after Hong Kong customs impounded nine Singapore armoured personnel carriers in transit from Taiwan after military exercises.
With the dent in relations, China has started looking more towards countries like Malaysia and the Philippines. And with China building its own training capabilities, dependence on Singapore for capacity building in governance is also waning.
But the ties between the two run deep. As recently as 2015, China and Singapore celebrated the 25th anniversary of their diplomatic ties. And Singapore has played a key role in relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
China was Singapore’s top trading partner in 2015, while Singapore was China’s largest foreign investor. In November 2015, Singapore also hosted the dialogue between President Xi Jinping ( 習近平 ) and then Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou.
Although Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s absence from
the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May raised questions, the city state’s deputy prime minister, Teo Chee Hean, emphasised that Singapore will continue to support “China’s peaceful development and constructive engagement in the region”.
In fact, Singapore was one of the first counties to support the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and 60 per cent of the earlier belt and road projects implemented in Asean countries were financed by Singapore.
In a meeting last week in Hamburg between Xi and Lee, prior to the G20 Summit, the two leaders discussed Singapore’s role in the Belt and Road Initiative, and closer economic ties through an improved free trade agreement.
Singapore is now confronting a reality that has seen the Trans-Pacific Partnership shelved, the US “pivot to Asia” policy revoked, and uncertainty over the impact of the Donald Trump presidency on Asia. With rising Chinese influence, much is at stake for Singapore considering the love lost in recent times.
For both Singapore and China, there is still much value in having a strategic partnership that, in the past, has served them both well.
May 24, 2017
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
As Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi completes three years of his five year term i.e. little more than half of his term on May 26, 2017, the article looks into how much he has delivered on his promises on the diplomatic front, particularly with regard to the relationship of India in the Asian neighborhood and beyond, including the US and China.
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Upon assuming office in May 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi went on the diplomatic offensive. His “neighbourhood first” policy and high-profile visits to major capitals of power – from Washington to Beijing, and Moscow to Tokyo – underlined his commitment to secure India’s ascension to its rightful place in the League of Nations. More than half way through Modi’s five-year term, the question is whether his foreign policy is delivering.
Modi strengthened India’s ties with the US under President Barack Obama, visiting the US three times and meeting Obama six times in his first two years in office. Now President Donald Trump has renewed an invitation for him to visit the US.
However, India’s economic relations with the US are a different matter, especially when compared with US-China relations. Despite the hype, Modi’s “Make in India” initiative is falling short, with employment generation reaching a seven-year low in 2015, when just 135,000 new jobs were created, compared with 12 million new entrants to the workforce every year.
Historically, India has maintained close ties with Russia. However, Moscow’s deepening military cooperation with Pakistan, and Pakistan’s offer to let Russia use their Chinese-built port in Gwadar, is a sign that – amid warming US-India ties – Russia does not consider India the sole focal point in South Asia. Differing views on engaging the Taliban in Afghanistan could also potentially strain New Delhi’s relationship with Moscow, particularly with Russia emphasizing that Pakistan must be a part of the solution.
India’s offensive to isolate Pakistan, diplomatically and politically, had mixed results during the BRICS and Bay of Bengal Initiative (BIMSTEC) nations meeting in October. While the BIMSTEC joint statement said, “We condemn in the strongest terms the recent barbaric terror attacks in the region”, India failed to achieve the same with BRICS. In 2014, Modi had announced the building of a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) satellite to benefit all members of the bloc. But before its May 5 launch, it was renamed as the South Asia Satellite, after Pakistan opted out. Along with the dysfunctional Saarc, India has been trying to lead region initiatives like BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal) and BIMSTEC. But the strategy of isolating Pakistan has not yielded much dividend.
India has its share of problems with other South Asian neighbors as well. Despite traditional close ties with India, Bhutan refused to ratify the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement for cross- border movement, while India’s displeasure with Nepal’s new constitution has caused a widening rift with Kathmandu, and its fisheries dispute with Sri Lanka has yet to be resolved.
With Afghanistan, India has played a positive role in reconstruction in the post-Taliban era, providing development aid worth US$2 billion. Landlocked Afghanistan has also gained access to Iran’s Chabahar port through partnership with India. Meanwhile, though relations with Bangladesh have made significant progress, unresolved water-sharing rights, cross-border killings and terrorism have dogged talks.
India’s opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Beijing’s blocking of India’s coveted entry to the Nuclear Suppliers Group have seen multilateral initiatives like the “Belt and Road” and BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar forum) suffer. The failure of the two Asian giants to forge a strategic alliance is depriving regional nations of a chance to reap the benefits of greater connectivity and trade.
Japan is keen on boosting connectivity with Bay of Bengal states in the Indian Ocean region and investing in the Big-B (Bay of Bengal industrial growth belt) initiative. This is expected to play an important role in India’s “Act East policy” – by helping to connect the country with Southeast and East Asia.
Modi’s skilled oratory and charisma may have helped India to gain the attention of the world. However, in terms of tangible results like the resolution of neighborhood disputes and propelling regional initiatives, he has fallen short. Modi’s diplomacy needs to deliver better if it is to make a positive difference during the remainder of his term.
May 04, 2017
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background:
As ADB celebrates 50 years of operation in 2017, the article acknowledges the critical development projects and initiatives brought forth by the bank in emerging Asia. From embracing a very Asian approach in its projects and lending criteria to supporting the graduation of low-income countries to middle-income nations through disbursement of loans worth US$300bn, ADB has played a remarkable role in fostering the region’s rise. This article aims to highlight the spectacular successes of ADB, delves into criticisms received by ADB and identify the escalating challenges ahead of the bank in enhancing sustainable and responsible prosperity in Asia.
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Asia today is the fastest growing region in the world, housing three of the 10 largest economies – China, Japan and India. The once poverty-stricken states of Asia, with their intermittent political violence and weak governance, have become today’s star performers.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB), which celebrates 50 years of operation this week, was created to cater to Asian development needs and played a significant role in the rise of the region. Over the past 50 years, the bank has contributed US$300 billion worth of development financing to its member countries and is expected to increase its annual loan commitments to US$20 billion by 2020, with almost half of its lending portfolio allocated to energy and transport infrastructure. Through the ADB, the US and Japan and later China have funnelled funds worth billions to infrastructure-hungry Asian economies.
Unlike the World Bank, where decisions were undertaken in Washington, based on the West’s experience of development financing in Europe, the ADB took a very Asian approach to its projects and lending criteria.
China, which now has the world’s second-largest economy, was once the ADB’s second-largest sovereign borrower. It has since graduated to being a significant contributor.
The ADB, however, has had its fair share of criticism as well. Changing geopolitical landscapes and global economics demand that more voting rights go to emerging China and India. As of now, the non-Asian member, the US, holds the second-largest voting power (12.71 per cent) after Japan (12.8 per cent), while China, the largest Asian economy, holds a paltry 5.46 per cent of the voting power.
And while the bank’s primary focus has been on infrastructure and connectivity, it needs to move towards projects that enhance good governance and promote democratic principles in the emerging Asian economies. Governance, human rights and women’s empowerment have not moved in tandem with economic growth in Asia.
To meet its infrastructure requirements, Asia requires US$26 trillion in investment by 2030. The urban population in Asia is expected to nearly double in the next four decades, putting tremendous pressure on cities. And despite all its successes, Asia is still a region where 1.2 billion people live on less than US$3.10 per day. As the ADB celebrates its 50 years, it has a challenging task ahead to widen its network and portfolio and establish a poverty-free and self-sustaining Asia.
Link: http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2092671/50-years-asian-development-bank-must-move-times
November 13, 2016
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background:
As US President elect Donald Trump makes key appointments and gets into putting his policies in place, particularly relations with Asia, the attached article in the South China Morning Post, Hong Kong makes a poignant case as to how a policy of isolationism makes US a bigger loser than Asia, both economically and strategically. The policy implications are backed by facts and realities that the Trump administration will have to deal with once the dust settles and populist rhetoric face the real life challenges.
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In 1990, Asia’s share of world GDP in real terms was 23 per cent. This rose to 38.8 per cent in 2015 and is expected to go up to 45 per cent by 2025 if current economic trends continue.
Today, the East Asia and Pacific region is a major driver of global economic growth, accounting for two fifths in 2015. The United States maintains robust trade relations with many countries from this region. Five Asian nations were among the top 10 US trading partners in 2015. China is currently the largest goods trading partner of the US and was also the third-largest goods export market in 2015. As of last year, US goods and services trade with China, India and Japan stood at a staggering US$1.42 trillion, and US-Asean bilateral trade has increased 71 per cent since 2001.
President-elect Donald Trump, throughout his campaign, kept repeating how China had cheated the US out of millions of manufacturing jobs through currency manipulation and how these jobs needed to be brought back to the US. While it is true that, between 2001 and 2015, the US lost 3.2 million jobs to China, three-quarters of those in manufacturing, what is also true is that manufacturing bases in China and other emerging Asian economies have provided American consumers with access to quality goods at affordable prices and kept the wheels of the American economy turning through continued consumer spending.
The US Consumer Sentiment Index, which fell to 68.2 in September 2010, stood at 91.2 in September this year. More American families can afford more clothing, smart TVs and phones, and other products because of Asia’s ability to churn out quality goods at lower costs. A “made in Bangladesh” T-shirt that costs an American US$2 would have cost US$10 if made in the US. In fact, during Trump’s campaign, several media outlets highlighted how the Donald J Trump men’s clothing and accessories line had their products made by factories in Asian countries like Bangladesh, India and China where production costs are lower.
In a globalised world, it is simply not feasible to undo the global value chain mechanism already in place. Bringing certain manufacturing jobs back to America risks increasing production costs, making goods more expensive for the average US consumer. Trump’s stated Asia policy in terms of trade is isolationist, myopic and economically flawed. Instead of going for more mutually beneficial trade deals with emerging and established Asian economies, he plans policies like imposing a 45 per cent tariff on all Chinese products and declaring the country a currency manipulator.
Now that he has won the election, populist theories, which may have served him well during the campaign, need to be in sync with realities on the ground. The world that Trump faces is much more complex than the electoral constituencies he energised with populist campaign messages. Isolationist policies will harm the American economy no less, perhaps more, than the emerging economies he is targeting in Asia.
On geopolitics, Trump’s tirades against traditional Asian allies like Japan and South Korea will only help regional players like China and Russia solidify their influence in the region. Long- established US allies in Asia want the US to retain its support and influence in the region to counterbalance an increasingly assertive China. During the first presidential debate, which focused on foreign policy, Trump commented on how support of Japan and South Korea through sending troops is unnecessary and costly for the US. He even suggested that Japan and South Korea pay the US for defending them. However, South Korea reportedly paid US$848 million in 2015 for the 28,500 US troops stationed there, while Japan increased its financial support for US troops to US$1.9 billion the same year.
By 2050, China will account for one-third of global GDP, with the rest of Asia taking the region’s total contribution to more than half. If the Trump administration chooses to be oblivious to the economic realities and geopolitical complexities of Asia and can’t get over his election rhetoric, the bigger loser will be the US, not Asia.
August 17, 2016
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
On August 13, 2016 the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Indian Prime Minister Modi and his Indian counterpart Sushma Swaraj. This is highest level contact between the two countries after fallout from the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) row between them in last June during which China blocked India's entry into the NSG. Since then, things have been getting sour between the two and the standoff is reflective of the strategic discomfort between the two Asian giants.
The attached article looks into the Sino-India relationship and underscores the importance of a better Sino-India strategic relationship, if not partnership, to realize the growth potential of Asian integration in the 21st century. Geopolitical complexity is compounded by increased reassertion of traditional China-Pakistan partnership and the growing US-India-Japan strategic alliance.
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Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s (王毅) meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj in New Delhi on August 13 was the first high-level bilateral contact since China’s move to block India’s membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
From Wang’s perspective, the purpose of his visit was to secure India’s cooperation at upcoming multilateral meetings like the G20, BRICS, and East Asia summits, while also discussing trade and investment, visas and tourism, and cultural and academic exchanges. Contentious issues did come up and Swaraj reiterated India’s opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a US$46 billion project to transport goods from China’s western regions through the Pakistani port of Gwadar.
Since China blocked India’s entry to the NSG, the fallout has continued. Last month, India deployed 100 tanks to its border with China and then refused to extend the visas of three Chinese journalists who reportedly made unauthorised visits to Tibetan refugee camps. New Delhi has also stated its willingness to help other Asian countries with rights claims in the South China Sea, and Indian navy ships took part in joint military exercises with the Malaysian navy.
New Delhi also sanctioned the deployment of additional supersonic missiles in the Eastern sector, to ramp up capabilities along the Chinese border. During Modi’s upcoming visit to Vietnam, he is expected to offer a range of military equipment and on August 10, Hanoi affirmed that India can drill for oil in the South China Sea, despite Beijing’s threats.
On the economic front, India’s exports to China dropped 16.7 per cent in the first seven months of the year, and New Delhi’s anti- dumping duty on Chinese hot-rolled steel products reflects the continued downward trend in Sino-Indian trade ties.
Since fighting a war in 1962 over a border conflict, China and India have clashed on many issues. Although over time, the rising powers have healed the wounds to grow into major trading partners, the agenda of strengthening connectivity and strategic cooperation remains largely shelved and the NSG affair has certainly not helped. If India’s membership were granted, it would irk Pakistan, considering its demand for access to the group through China.
China’s stance on India also relates to security concerns, centred on the evolving dynamics of New Delhi’s relations with the US and Japan. Informal alliances such as that between Japan and India are meant to balance the growing Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific.
In parallel, India-Japan-US trilateral dialogue has emerged from Japan’s fear of a rising China, particularly a concern over the battle for trade advantage in East Asia, and South China Sea disputes.
On the Chinese front, concern lies in possible Indian support for Japan and littoral Asean members’ cause, backed by the US military scouting in the region. If these were the only pieces of the continental puzzle, a solution could be found in re-evaluating the parameters of the new regional order by sorting out territorial conflicts.
However, the repercussions of Indo-China relations inflict collateral damage far beyond the two countries as, collectively, they have significant influence on the economic, diplomatic, strategic and military spheres of the Asia-Pacific. All areas would benefit greatly from better Sino-Indian relations. For example, as new members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, India and Pakistan could gain from cooperation with Central Asian countries. For India, it opens a new gateway to the massive energy fields.
However, the intricacies of relations between China, India and Pakistan may prevent uninhibited cooperation within the organisation.
Very often, potential gains from a Sino-Indian strategic partnership are either overlooked or get buried in the vestiges of past animosity and distrust.
The European Union is a pertinent example of former enemies (Germany and France) overcoming historical hostilities and playing a leading role in the formation of a union which is now benefiting the whole region.
With potential trade partnerships among Asian countries, the Chinese-led “One Belt, One Road” initiative could enable greater regional integration, boosting collective gross domestic product. The Maritime Silk Road could be funded by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with India potentially the second-biggest contributor. India also has a 20 per cent capital share in the new BRICS bank. The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor initiative, meanwhile, awaits Sino-Indian cooperation to move ahead.
Liu Zongyi, of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, is among analysts who believe that geoeconomics rather than geopolitics should
rule India-China ties. The reality is both issues are so intertwined that to derive economic and strategic benefits from bilateral and mega-regional cooperation, China and India need to rise to the occasion.
They must find ways to come together to lead Asia towards greater connectivity, increased trade and economic development. The need of the hour is pragmatism and cooperation, not negativism and obstruction.
Big neighbours should be great neighbours before expecting others to follow suit.
October 19, 2015
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background:
Procrastinating reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions has long deprived the emerging economies from voice proportionate to their rising economic clout. Yet, all is not lost, and this article argues that much can be gained by all sides through pushing the reforms of Bretton Woods sooner than later. The successful Obama-Xi Jinping Summit in Washington last month could be a starting point to promote convergence in international economic diplomacy.
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The annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund held in Lima, Peru earlier this month failed to come up with meaningful takeaways on the agenda of reform. Meanwhile, two new multilateral development banks, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank of the BRICS countries, mostly driven by China, have been rolled out. US Undersecretary of Treasury for International Affairs Nathan Sheets has acknowledged that the rise of both banks is a result of the failure of reform by the World Bank
and IMF. While the developed countries continue to preach for institutional reforms in China and India, the World Bank and IMF themselves need substantial overhaul.
The Obama administration made a bid in 2010 for quota reform in the IMF with more voting share for developing nations, but it was foiled by the US Congress. At the Lima meeting, US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew called upon the US Congress to approve the quota reforms. The Bretton Woods’s institutions were devised when countries like China or India were ravaged by years of war and colonialism. The rise of these emerging economies has changed the state of play. The virtuous cycle of reform of the existing and cooperation with the new is the only way forward India, too, is also strongly supportive of reforms. In Lima, its finance minister Arun Jaitley pledged to press for reforms in the Bretton Woods.
Instead of driving a wedge between the older international order and the emerging economies, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank have opened up an opportunity for creating convergence. While the US has now wised up to accept the former's presence, China has pledged to increase its contribution to the Bretton Woods institutions.
The formation of new banks does not obviate but reinforces the need for reform. The Bretton Woods institutions can benefit from a larger role of emerging economies. The proposed quota reform in the IMF will result, for example, in more financial contribution by emerging economies, boosting the fund's ability to play a more effective role in the global economy. As the crisis-riddled advanced economies are not inclined to boost the size of capital of multilateral development banks, higher contribution from emerging economies can be a welcome addition.
Besides jumpstarting the reform process, the two sets of banks - old ones and newcomers - have opportunities to harness cooperation for mutual advantage. One of the key planks of the organizational reform strategy of World Bank president Jim Yong Kim has been to cut the operational expenses, including retrenching staff.
The staff and overhead set-up of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank would be leaner than its older peers, and instead of one-off reform campaigns, Jin Liqun, the bank's president designate, promises that it will "go to the gym everyday". The bank plans to extend loans without conditionalities like deregulation or privatization, while promising to uphold environmental and governance standards.
Against the poverty-reduction focus of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will deploy its energy in developing infrastructure. The new multilateral development banks do not have any wild card or magic bullet and have to prove efficiency and impact in meeting the needs of developing countries.
Exclusion is a double-edged sword in the new world order, and mutual exclusion can feed into a race to the bottom for all sides. The existing global governance architecture could be sustained only through the inclusion of emerging economies, as advanced economies need to engage with the new institutions set up by their emerging counterparts.
The virtuous cycle of reform of the existing and cooperation with the new is the only way forward. Otherwise, there will be more multilateral development banks to emerge in the coming decades.
June 19, 2015
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is applauded as a success story of regional economic cooperation. However, the sacrosanct principle of noninterference has exposed the cracks in the association as the summit on South Asian Boat People Crisis held by Thailand on May 20, 2015 failed to adopt conclusive and sustainable solutions. While similar challenges are being confronted by the European Union, the latter has succeeded in bringing together members to adopt coherent strategies for tackling the Mediterranean migration. The contrast between the two regional bodies point at the underlying forces of convergence and divergence that have shaped these two powerful institutes and impact their responses to regional and global issues.
The attached article adds a new dimension to the debate by contrasting ASEAN’s ineptitude with the more effective response by EU to the Mediterranean crisis. It provides insights into the inherent structural weaknesses of ASEAN which limits its ability to effectively respond to such man-made crisis.
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For the boat people of Southeast Asia, each day begins with a thickening sense of uncertainty, despair and a fading glimmer of hope. Thousands have been rescued in the past month by authorities and fishermen in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia after being stranded in the Andaman Sea. While some are Bangladeshis migrating for better jobs abroad, the majority are Rohingya Muslims escaping persecution in Myanmar.
After last month's regional summit in Thailand in which 17 countries participated, along with the UN refugee agency and the International Organisation for Migration, the host said major progress had been made. However, the meeting failed to address the root cause of the problem; delegates refrained from uttering the word "Rohingya" to ensure Myanmar's participation, even though the Rohingya are the principal victims of the crisis.
The summit's failure to effectively address a humanitarian crisis shows the inherent weakness of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in grappling with regional issues. Some argue that the boat people crisis is not particularly an "Asean problem", saying we shouldn't hold all of Southeast Asia accountable for Myanmar's ethnocentric policies. However, the reality is that Asean's existing structure limits its ability to put into force the collective political will to mitigate this human tragedy.
The association is universally applauded for its economic success, but its sacrosanct principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a member country has exposed the cracks in cooperation.
Before Myanmar's reforms, Western democracies used to criticise this policy due to its acquiescence to Myanmar's military rulers. However, the censures were overshadowed by the spectacular economic gains of regional free trade arrangements. Now criticism has resurfaced alongside the migrant crisis.
When a similar migrant crisis emerged in the Mediterranean, the European Union was quick to mobilise a coherent response. Comparisons are inevitable as both are multinational bodies in important regions seeking to overcome past conflicts by promoting integration. Within a month of Italy's call for help, the European Commission had announced plans to distribute asylum seekers among member countries to ease the surge along the coasts of Italy, Greece and Malta. Even as discussions continue, so does action on the ground, in contrast with Asean.
While Asean is a grouping with a predominantly economic mandate, the EU has a customs union and a supranational structure of governance with an elected parliament. The European Commission could come up with an involuntary quota of migrant sharing because it has a mandate, clearly lacking in Asean's case.
The EU migrants are mainly refugees fleeing embattled North African countries and the EU is in no position to cooperate with the source countries to stop the influx. In Southeast Asia's case, the migrant source and destination countries have come together in talks but, still, the meeting fell short of an effective response.
Asean today finds itself faced with a stark choice hinging on its very self-definition: should it expand its mandate to adequately equip itself to tackle a humanitarian crisis, or stick to a purely economic agenda? As the "Asian Century" spawns unforeseen geopolitical, economic and humanitarian challenges, the time has come for Asean to build on its economic success to create a framework of governance that can respond to the changing geopolitical realities.
June 01, 2015
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
After much discussion and debate, the Chinese led newly formed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has created an opportunity for the country to demonstrate its leadership in the world of development finance, traditionally dominated by the likes of the World Bank, IMF, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). As China advances its economic and geopolitical ambitions both within and beyond the Asia-Pacific, it has a dual identity of being both the world’s second largest economy and at the same time is a developing country with tens of millions of people still living in poverty. AIIB is the first major test for China in projecting its global economic leadership as it rallies the world to a new economic order profoundly influenced by the Asian giant.
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China's success at rallying both developed and developing nations to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank gives it an opportunity for global economic leadership. This role hinges on its dual identity. On the one hand, China is the world's second- largest economy; on the other, it is a developing country which still receives aid from the likes of the World Bank. Hence, China is in a position to understand the priorities of the developing world, while being responsive to concerns of the developed world.
The US emerged as the underwriter of the global economic system with the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 and the Marshall Plan, when it led not only in terms of the size of its economy and military capabilities, but also in per capita gross domestic product. China, on the other hand, is taking up the mantle of leadership when a significant portion of its population still lives in poverty. Its growth is slowing to a "new normal", necessitating internal reforms for sustaining a modest 6-7 per cent growth.
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is the first test for China's emergence as the new leader of a changing world economic order, setting the stage for the internationalization of its currency and the emergence of Beijing as a major capital in global development finance. China is also undertaking initiatives like the Shanghai-based New Development Bank (BRICS bank) and the US$40 billion Silk Road Fund.
With the infrastructure bank, China has created a bridge to most of the traditional US allies that did not pay heed to US concerns about the new bank. The much vaunted "One Road, One Belt" connects China to Europe via a slew of routes. While the US and Japan ponder joining the infrastructure bank, major multilateral institutions, including the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, have expressed their willingness to work with the newcomer.
The developed world is beset with concerns over governance issues that China needs to allay with a robust framework of accountability. China's campaign against corruption at home needs to be matched by the right institutional safeguards against corruption at the infrastructure bank. The emerging economies of Asia need the bank's resources to meet the infrastructure gap of US$700 billion.
The infrastructure bank empowers China to bolster South-South linkages, and trade and investment relations with Central Asia, South and Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe. The developing countries, often disgruntled by the strings attached to the aid packages of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, would have a bigger say in the infrastructure bank.
Knowledge resources from time-tested incumbents such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank will be crucial to helping the infrastructure bank address its governance issues. The bank's interim secretariat is already recruiting people with experience in multilateral institutions. China also may tap its vast pool of citizens graduating from top universities, especially in the US.
An ascending China and the US "pivot" to Asia have given rise to zero-sum thinking, such as seeing the Trans-Pacific Partnership as a competing economic bloc to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Yet, in the larger scheme of things, there is scope for complementarity. Hillary Clinton, the then US secretary of state, noted in 2012 that "the Pacific is big enough for all of us". In his July 2013 tête-à-tête with US President Barack Obama, President Xi Jinping echoed the same: "The vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for two large countries like the US and China."
For the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to have the greatest impact, China and the US must cooperate, the way they did to ink the breakthrough bilateral climate deal last year. The world's development potential is big enough for the two leading nations to engage and cooperate, rather than doubt and frustrate each other.
January 07, 2015
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
In the wake of election victory of Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe last December, the reform-oriented statesman sets about translating his vision into action. As the Abe government moves forward with its agenda to reboot the domestic economy and international strategic stance of Japan, repercussions would be felt across the region and beyond. Japan has an important role in working with its neighbors towards a multilateral regional diplomacy and a forward-looking approach for a peaceful Asia-Pacific.
The article sheds light on the major challenges faced by Abe in its second term: the economic challenge, the international reorientation, and the social-demographic tailspin. Successful tackling of these three challenges would determine to a significant extent whether Prime Minister Abe leaves a lasting legacy for his country and the world. Here is the link to my latest article in the South China Morning Post (SCMP), one of the oldest, prestigious, and well respected Asian English newspaper published from Hong Kong.
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As Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe starts his new term in office, his priority was captured in his new year message. "This year, we will once again make the economy the foremost priority, delivering the warm winds of economic recovery to every corner of the nation," he said.
He has smartly captured his putatively irreplaceable game plan in the slogan, "This is the only way". However, he faces key challenges to translate his vision into reality.
Like his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi, the prime minister from 1957 to 1960, Abe is no stranger to pushing through unpopular policies that may ultimately bring positive results. Kishi set the tone of Japan's strategic alliance with the US that initially stirred wide protests but in theend had momentous consequences. Abe now has the opportunity to revive the floundering economy by pushing reforms which include not only the popular monetary and fiscal stimulus, but also the tough acts of overhauling the economy with a consumption tax hike, corporate tax cuts, labour market restructuring and deregulation in sectors like agriculture.
On December 27, the government announced a fresh stimulus package to spur dynamism in the economy. By revamping the economy through a delicate calibration of the three levers of "Abenomics" - fiscal stimulus, monetary easing and structural reforms - Abe expects to pull his country towards a new growth path.
On the international front, Abe pledged in his New Year statement to expand the role of the Self- Defence Forces. His programme of a "proactive contribution to peace" aims to reconstruct Japan's stature as a peaceful global power with an important strategic role. In the Asia-Pacific, Japan needs to work out a modus vivendi with China, which is playing a leading role in economic diplomacy in the region.
China is one of Japan's largest trading partners and people-to-people relations show signs of warming. Last year saw the highest number of Chinese tourists visiting Japan. Regarding the island disputes that have edged close to flashpoints in recent years, newly released British government files indicate China and Japan have earlier precedents of mutual accommodation on the territories.
Rather than rubbing salt into old wounds by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, Abe's recent statement referring to Japan's remorse over the Second World War and post-war contributions to peace signals a forward-looking approach. Chinese President Xi Jinping reinforced the approach when he said in a speech that "the Chinese and Japanese people shall learn from the past, look to the future, and work together to contribute to peace in the world".
In November, Abe struck the right balance by shaking hands with Xi while firming up the country's long-standing partnership with the US. Talks on a free trade agreement between Japan, China and South Korea, the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum could provide windows for further economic cooperation between the two nations.
On the social front, an important priority of Abenomics is to buoy wages to raise household spending. The national budget must accommodate welfare costs of the elderly, who constitute a quarter of the population and are a key bastion of support for Abe's Liberal Democratic Party. Abe's goal of increasing the workforce participation of women highlights social inclusion and women's empowerment. This is a welcome course correction for Japan.
Abe has demonstrated boldness and vision but whether his promises will deliver remains to be seen. Careful but reform-oriented economic management, complemented by an enlightened foreign policy and social progression, are crucial to sustain the momentum.
Link: http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1675984/abe-sets-stage-can-abenomics-really-work