Project Syndicate
Table of Content
1. The Global South’s Pandemic Path to Self-Reliance
November 17, 2020
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
The post-1945 paradigm of external development finance has been primarily driven by the developed countries of the Global North and shaped by their geopolitical agenda. But the COVID-19 pandemic offers developing countries the chance to reinvent and reboot their economies, and shake off the disabling legacy of foreign aid dependency.
MELBOURNE – COVID-19 continues to have a devastating impact on public health and to rattle the global economy with structural shocks. The pandemic has now killed more than one million people, while the International Monetary Fund estimates that global GDP will shrink by 4.4% in 2020. But, strange as it may seem, the current crisis could offer developing countries a path toward greater economic self-reliance.
This is partly because developed countries have in general borne the brunt of the pandemic’s health effects so far. Many advanced Western economies have experienced more COVID-19 cases and deaths relative to their populations than have developing countries of the Global South, despite their superior health-care systems and stronger social safety nets. For example, India’s health system ranks 112th globally, while that of the United States ranks 37th. But whereas India has so far reported about 6,400 COVID-19 cases per million population, America’s tally is more than four times higher.
Some developing countries like Vietnam combated the coronavirus effectively by introducing strict testing, tracing, and quarantine measures at a very early stage – something most developed countries failed to do. Even after allowing for possible underreporting and data inaccuracies in poorer countries, the relative performance of developed economies remains a paradox.
Moreover, development financing has already started to plummet as richer countries focus on engineering domestic post-pandemic recoveries. The OECD estimates that external private finance inflows to developing economies could decrease by $700 billion year on year in 2020, exceeding the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis by 60%. Non-resident portfolio outflows from emerging markets totaled $83.3 billion in March 2020 alone, according to the Institute of International Finance. And the OECD thinks global foreign direct investment (FDI) will drop by at least 30% this year, with flows to developing economies likely to fall even more. Such trends imply a grim outlook for Global South countries that historically have largely relied on development aid from the Global North.
But studies have shown that development aid and humanitarian assistance do not necessarily foster economic empowerment. A recent OECD survey found that between 48% and 94% of respondents in developing countries do not believe that humanitarian assistance helps them to become economically self-reliant. People want financial autonomy, not prolonged assistance.
The debate over the effectiveness of development aid is an old one, with critics claiming that rich countries use aid as a tool to exploit developing economies’ resources, and often attach conditions to ensure that donors reap the bulk of the export receipts. But many developed countries have lost much of their soft power because of their shambolic pandemic responses.
Even before COVID-19 struck, many developing economies had been looking for ways to make a sustainable shift from aid dependency to self-reliance. In 2018, Rwanda banned second-hand clothes imports with the aim of encouraging its domestic textile industry to produce higher value-added garments; the US responded by ending the country’s duty-free export privileges. And last year, the United Kingdom’s government allocated part of its £14 billion ($18.5 billion) aid budget to capacity-building projects intended to help developing countries increase their international trade and attract FDI.
Today, developing countries have more opportunities to become self-reliant. For starters, trade in developing East Asia has declined less sharply than in the West during the pandemic, according to the World Trade Organization. A key reason for this is that industries producing high value-added goods usually suffer more during downturns. Developing countries’ greater resilience, stemming from their reliance on low value-added manufacturing, is evident in Vietnam’s textile and garments sector, which has remained operational throughout the pandemic and is expected to have a swifter recovery in 2021 compared to their regional competitors.
Second, digitization will play a crucial role in the post-pandemic recovery by significantly boosting e-commerce, which implies a fairer competitive playing field for producers around the world. Bangladesh’s e-commerce sector grew by 26% year on year by August, and other South Asian countries show a similar trend.
Third, the health-care and pharmaceuticals sectors are expected to thrive in the post-pandemic economy as people become more aware of the importance of health and fitness. Least developed countries can take advantage of World Trade Organization provisions by producing more generic drugs, which face no patent-related obstacles.
Finally, governments in the Global South can mobilize domestic resources to offset the decline in external development finance – in particular by transforming their tax policies to generate revenue from fast-growing digital economic activities. Currently, developing countries’ low levels of tax revenue as a share of GDP – typically between 10-20%, compared to 40% in high-income countries – hinder development by constraining governments’ ability to invest in public goods like health, infrastructure, and education.
Developing countries face several hurdles on the path to self-reliance, not least poor governance, unfavorable business climates, and civil conflicts. But they also must break with the post-1945 paradigm of external development finance, which has been primarily driven by the Global North and shaped by its geopolitical agenda. For far too long, developing countries have had to listen to lectures from those who think they know better. Today, developing-country governments must chart a development agenda that is free from donor conditionality.
Every crisis contains great opportunities, and the COVID-19 pandemic is no different. It offers developing countries nothing less than the chance to reinvent and reboot their economies – and to shake off the disabling legacy of external aid dependency.
2. The Lady and the Exodus
September 15, 2017
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
DHAKA – Myanmar is in crisis. The Rohingya – a Muslim ethnic minority group in a predominantly Buddhist country – are under attack by the military, with many fleeing for their lives. This escalating conflict is threatening to undermine Myanmar’s ongoing democratic transition – and to tarnish irrevocably the reputation of the country’s de facto leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
For decades, Myanmar’s government has refused to recognize the Rohingya – who comprise around 2% of the country’s population of over 50 million – as a legitimate ethnic minority, denying them citizenship and even the most basic rights as inhabitants. But it was just last month that systematic discrimination escalated into ethnic cleansing, with security forces responding to attacks on police posts and an army camp by Rohingya militants by launching an assault on all Rohingya people.
So far, Myanmar has confirmed 400 deaths, though United Nations officials put the toll closer to 1,000. Moreover, upwards of 300,000 Rohingya have fled to neighboring Bangladesh. Several thousand more Rohingya are waiting at the border, awaiting permission to enter the country.
For a Bangladesh already reeling from seasonal flooding, managing the inflow of refugees has proved a momentous challenge. Makeshift camps are overcrowded, lacking in basic resources, and vulnerable to natural disasters; already, a cyclone has destroyed some camps. Other surrounding countries, including India, Thailand, and Malaysia, are also feeling the effects of the Rohingya’s plight.
Far from moving to stop this humanitarian crisis, Suu Kyi’s government has exacerbated it. While Suu Kyi does not control the military, which is leading the murderous crackdown, her government has blocked UN agencies from delivering vital emergency supplies. The UN Population Fund (UNFPA), Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and Children’s Fund (UNICEF) have all been forced to halt work in the affected areas.
This represents a tragic departure for Suu Kyi, who previously won international acclaim – and a Nobel Peace Prize – for her role in the fight for democracy in Myanmar. The rise to power of her National League for Democracy in 2015 marked the end of 50 years of military rule in the country formerly known as Burma, and seemed to herald a new era, in which the human rights of all inhabitants would be respected and protected.
Amid the violence against the Rohingya, faith in Myanmar’s transition from military dictatorship to democracy is rapidly deteriorating. The military, which holds 25% of the seats in parliament, has already blocked Suu Kyi from becoming president, and, along with Myanmar’s nationalists, it continues to constrain her authority. Now, the military is actively persecuting and even murdering members of one of the country’s largest ethnic and religious minority groups, in what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, has rightly called “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” – all for political reasons.
Buddhist nationalism has lately been gaining traction among many Burmese, fueling hatred and violence toward the Muslim Rohingya. By attacking the Rohingya, the military secures the support of Buddhist monks, who remain influential in Myanmar and could thus challenge the military’s authority.
As for Suu Kyi, she is now between a rock and a hard place. If she sides with the Rohingya, she will face a powerful backlash from the military and a large share of voters. But, by remaining silent, she is severely damaging the moral authority that allowed her to wear down Myanmar’s generals and place the country on the path to democracy.
Suu Kyi did appoint a commission, led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to figure out how to address the divisions between the Rohingya and Buddhists in Rakhine State, where most Rohingya live. But her goal appeared to be simply to buy time, though she probably also hoped that Annan would find a way to resolve her dilemma.
Of course, that was impossible. Instead, the commission called for the immediate establishment by Suu Kyi’s government of a clear, transparent, and efficient strategy and timeline for the citizenship verification process. The commission also emphasized the need to “allow full and unimpeded humanitarian access to all areas affected by recent violence.”
Myanmar’s military made clear its stance on these proposals right after the report was released: it opened fire on Rohingya civilians in northern Rakhine, leaving at least 100 people dead. The massacre was ostensibly a response to an attack by Rohingya militants that killed 12 members of the security forces, though, as al-Hussein put it, the military’s actions were “clearly disproportionate.”
What Myanmar needs today is a genuine peace process that recognizes the ethnic and religious components of the Rohingya crisis. Suu Kyi, who was praised by the Nobel Committee in 1991 as “an outstanding example of the power of the powerless,” should be the person to lead such a process. Yes, her power is severely limited, as she has no authority whatsoever over the military. Yet her moral authority, which once proved powerful enough to bend the military to her will, is not entirely depleted.
To wield that authority effectively, Suu Kyi must be willing to take a political risk. To be sure, as delicate as the political order is in Myanmar, there is no gridlock that obviates an agenda for progress in achieving peace. But a peace process will require Suu Kyi to stand up to Myanmar’s generals, as she has done in the past, reminding them of the enormous benefits they have reaped from the political transition and convincing them that it is not in their interest to jeopardize the democratization process.
Suu Kyi said in her Nobel Peace Prize lecture in 2012, “to be forgotten, is to die a little.” She must not allow the Rohingya to be driven out and forgotten. Her task is to give power to the powerless and bring peace to Myanmar.
3. A G20 Refugee Agenda
July 05, 2017
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
The article was published on July 5, 2017 immediately prior to the Leadership Summit of G20 countries held in Hamburg, Germany from July 7-8, 2017. It closely looks into the challenges and inadequacies of the current international agencies of migration and how to revitalize these global bodies. This has become more imperative in light of the forced migration taking places in masses from the Middle East across the borders of Europe and even affecting resource constrained developing countries like Bangladesh who is having to shelter the persecuted Rohingya refugees fleeing from the neighboring Myanmar.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
DHAKA – Every day, an average of some 34,000 people are forced to flee natural or man-made disasters. In the last six months alone, more than 2,000 lives have been lost in the Mediterranean; over the last weekend in June, 12,600 migrants arrived in Italy by sea. Financial and political pressures are overwhelming the countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe that are on the receiving end of this human wave. Unfortunately, in many cases, help is not on the way.
The scale of forced migration today has revealed troubling flaws in the organizations intended to serve as the last line of defense. Weak mandates, insufficient funding, disorganized structures, and the absence of a global governance system have weakened intergovernmental agencies’ ability to act with authority in the name of the most vulnerable.
As I argue in Germany this week, G20 leaders meeting in Hamburg on July 7-8 have an opportunity to reshape the migration governance system with proactive protection policies that would enhance people’s trust in international leadership. Although past summits have produced little more than talking points, the prospect for action is better this time, given that the talks will be held in Europe, where the impact of the migration crisis has been deeply felt.
At the moment, an alphabet soup of nonprofit and multilateral agencies tackles elements of the challenge. These include independent groups like Refugees International (IR) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). Even the World Trade Organization (WTO) plays a role in managing economic migration. But at the intergovernmental level, the two most important players – the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) – are also under the greatest strain.
For the UNHCR, the challenges are systemic. For starters, it lacks broad enforcement powers, and must rely on government cooperation, which is not always guaranteed in conflict zones – or forthcoming from neighboring states. Countries that ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention have never fully adhered to it in practice, which limits the UNHCR’s ability to act. UNHCR interventions fail when countries are uncooperative, as we saw with Haitian and Cuban migrations to the United States in recent decades.
But the UNHCR also suffers from internal shortcomings. Its communication with refugees on the ground is inconsistent. While an increase in UNHCR protection officers would help, it is equally important that the agency get its facts straight. For example, when host countries move to repatriate refugee populations forcibly, without informing the UNHCR, the agency itself looks unreliable, if not incompetent.
The UNHCR, as currently conceived is not the independent, nonpartisan agency it claims to be. Heavily dependent on donors and host governments to launch relief operations, it is beholden to their interests and does not always have the political support it needs to get the job done.
The other major multilateral migration agency, the IOM, assists in the return of migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and the internally displaced to their place of origin, or to other countries or regions that have agreed to accept them. But, like the UNHCR, governance issues plague the IOM.
In particular, the IOM lacks a mechanism to evaluate whether national governments are using coercion – banned under international law – to repatriate or relocate refugees. Nor does the IOM have the capacity to assess the safety of areas to which refugees are returning.
Millions of people benefit from IOM-sponsored programs and projects, but prior to joining the UN structure as a “related organization” in September 2016, the IOM had no formal mandate to protect the rights of migrants. And even as a UN-related entity, the IOM suffers a mismatch between its broad mission and its meager budget and staff. It has been held to a “zero growth” standard in recent years, even as demand for its programs has increased. And, because its work is largely project-based, with member states funding specific activities, its role in mitigating refugee crises is largely reliant on individual members’ preferences and priorities.
As key guardians of the world’s refugees, these two organizations must adapt to today’s challenges. Proactive policies on interagency coordination and financial burden sharing are essential. Elements of the Refugee Convention, like language on asylum policies, also should be updated to reflect current realities, and both agencies need to develop holistic and consistent policies on refugee advocacy and protection. To this end, the member states of both organizations should support their continued integration within the UN structure, which would give them more tools to influence the causes, not just the effects, of forced displacement.
These are just a few of the governance upgrades that I have recommended for the G20. Both the UNHCR and the IOM could benefit from stronger multilateral support, and the G20 is uniquely poised to offer it. If we cannot end war, famine, corruption, or poverty, then the next best solution is to improve the organizations helping those who flee them.
4. ASEAN and the Rohingya Crisis
February 02, 2017
Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG
Background
New tension in South East Asia resurfaced after the military involvement over Myanmar’s North Rakhine State’s Rohingya community resulted into the death of 130 people. The incident has not only national but also considerable regional implication given how refugee crisis destabilizes regions and strains established multilateral dynamics. In this regard, Asean committed to ensuring stability in East Asian region can provide direction, platform and leadership to put an effective and reasonable end to the conflict. The attached article makes the argument for Asean to recalibrate its non-interference policy and take on necessary steps to put a lasting, peaceful end to the crisis before it blows out of proportion and starts to destabilize the region.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
The worsening plight of Muslim Rohingya communities in Myanmar’s Rakhine state could soon imperil the country’s government, as well as the reputation of its leader, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The crisis has been escalating since last October, when Myanmar’s military launched an offensive in which 130 Rohingya were killed, and dozens of their buildings were torched. At the time, the military’s leaders claimed that the attack was part of an effort to locate unidentified insurgents who were thought to be responsible for the slayings on October 9 of nine policemen at three border posts in the district of Maungdaw.
According to a Human Rights Watch analysis of satellite images, still more Rohingya villages were destroyed over the course of nine days in November, bringing the number of buildings razed to 1,250; meanwhile, 30,000 people have reportedly been displaced. The United Nations considers the stateless Rohingya to be among the world’s most persecuted minorities.
Now, other countries in an otherwise stable region are becoming embroiled in the crisis; indeed, countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand, and Indonesia are increasingly feeling the spillover effects, as Rohingya seek asylum within their borders. The persecution of the Rohingya can no longer be described as merely a domestic problem for Myanmar.
ASEAN has been criticized for approaching the Rohingya issue too cautiously, and for failing to recognize that the ongoing conflict could divide the bloc along ethno-religious lines. The region’s population is 60% Muslim, 18% Buddhist, and 17% Christian; continued discrimination against the Rohingya already has become a rallying cry for sympathetic Islamic extremist groups in countries that provide asylum. This is an especially grave risk for Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia.
The fleeing Rohingya live in deplorable conditions when they reach host countries, and they have been involved in chronic skirmishes with security forces. Facing constant struggle and ongoing food shortages, the Rohingya are prime targets for terrorist recruiting. Not surprisingly, Islamic extremist groups have already posted online videos calling for jihad against Myanmar; and Indonesian authorities recently arrested two militants who were allegedly plotting an attack on Myanmar’s embassy in Jakarta.
As the Rohingya crisis deepens, more regional and international extremist groups will undoubtedly use it as a convenient tool to gain sympathy, recruit new members, and raise funds. ASEAN leaders must formulate an effective diplomatic solution to the crisis to prevent it from fueling more extremism in the region and disrupting trade and people’s livelihoods. The much-heralded “ASEAN Way,” whereby member states adhere to quiet diplomacy and principled non-intervention, served the bloc well on the economic front in its first decades of existence. But as international criticism mounts, the ineffectiveness of a “see no evil, hear no evil” strategy for addressing internal issues should now be obvious.
Malaysia seems to recognize this. At the recent ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Yangon, it called for the coordination of humanitarian aid and an investigation into alleged atrocities committed against Rohingya.
Following the meeting, Myanmar showed willingness to grant humanitarian access and to keep the ASEAN members informed.
It is time for ASEAN to heed this call, shifting its mode of operation, so that mature democracies such as Singapore and Malaysia – which rank high in human-development indices – can become responsible global leaders, and expand their humanitarian problem-solving capacities. ASEAN needs to grow into a strong, politically accountable, European Union-style community. To do that, it must find peaceful yet effective ways to mitigate what is now a regional humanitarian crisis.
According to unofficial estimates, there could now be as many as 500,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh alone. Since the latest military intervention, another 20,000 Rohingya have arrived. This puts Bangladesh, which already struggles to provide basic services to its own 170 million citizens, in an extremely difficult position.
Already, Myanmar’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs has visited Dhaka for talks. And a three-member team of Myanmar’s Advisory Commission on Rakhine State visited the Rohingya slums in Bangladesh’s coastal area bordering Rakhine state.
ASEAN could help here. Member states such as Singapore enjoy friendly relations with both Myanmar and Bangladesh, and thus could provide a platform for the two countries to come together and arrive at permanent solutions to a decades-old problem.
But first ASEAN must decide to pull its political weight, and to expend some of its political capital, to bring about a just, long-term settlement. If it does, it can serve as an honest broker between Myanmar, Bangladesh, and, most importantly, representatives of the Rohingya community, who have suffered persecution for long enough.