Table of Content

1. ASEAN and Australia are facing up to need for green cooperation

Prof. Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG 

April 05, 2024

Last month's ASEAN-Australia Special Summit in Melbourne has set the stage for a new, greener chapter in the bilateral relationship through a collaborative push into sustainable, technologically advanced economic practices.

Two-way trade between ASEAN and Australia reached 178 billion Australian dollars ($116 billion) in 2022, up 42% from a year earlier and exceeding Australia's trade volume with Japan, the U.S. or the European Union.

This rapid growth has been propelled by upgrades to the 2010 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area agreement as well as the 2022 launch of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership to which both sides belong. Australia and four of ASEAN's 10 members are also members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which could further propel trade exchanges.

ASEAN's exports to Australia have considerable room for growth. In 2022, Hong Kong alone took in more than twice as much of ASEAN's goods exports as Australia did, according to government figures. Oil, both refined and crude, accounted for almost a third of ASEAN's goods and services exports to Australia.

The burgeoning middle class and youthful population of ASEAN has created a lucrative market for Australian goods and services, although the country's exports to the region are still dominated by commodities like natural gas, coal and wheat.

With both Australia and ASEAN states seeking a greener path, oil and gas can be expected to decline in importance in bilateral trade in the future. Yet Australia's proficiency in renewable energy could then take on new significance as a pivotal asset for ASEAN's climate transition.

Collaborative initiatives could include the transfer of clean technologies and the building of sustainable infrastructure. Australia could play a key role in retraining ASEAN's workforce to equip workers for the demands of future-ready, low-carbon industries.

Collaboration on sustainable mining practices and environmental management in relation to critical minerals and metals could strengthen supply chains for low-carbon technologies and leverage the rich geological reserves of both Australia and ASEAN states. 

At last month's summit, Singapore and Australia formalized a memorandum of understanding to create a Green and Digital Shipping Corridor between them. The pact commits the two to working together to explore opportunities to develop zero- or near-zero-emission fuel supply chains for the shipping industry, and to look at digital information exchanges to speed up port clearance.

Last year, Australia launched an AU$200 million Climate and Infrastructure Partnership program with Indonesia under which Canberra is helping to finance its neighbor's energy transition. Over a five-year period, the funding will go toward supporting climate- and clean-energy-focused small business in Indonesia, building green infrastructure, technical assistance and other programs.

Australia also agreed last year to provide AU$105 million for clean-energy infrastructure investment and sustainable infrastructure planning in Vietnam, and launched a bilateral Green Economy Program to foster collaboration and development involving the private sector, too. These kinds of groundbreaking initiatives could be replicated with other ASEAN members in future years.

On a bigger scale, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese took the opportunity provided by the summit to announce the AU$2 billion Southeast Asia Investment Financing Facility to support infrastructure and green-economy transition projects.

The facility will provide loans, guarantees, equity and insurance for projects seen as boosting Australian trade and investment in Southeast Asia. Albanese said the government would also add AU$140 million into the Partnerships for Infrastructure Program, which assists ASEAN governments in areas like planning and procurement.

The socio-cultural relationship between Australia and ASEAN could be deepened, too.

People-to-people connections, especially among youth, could be strengthened through diversified education and exchange programs like the New Colombo Plan, which provides aid to Australian students studying in and interning in Indo-Pacific nations, and the Australia Awards Scholarships, which supports Indo-Pacific students studying in Australia.

Political and security cooperation is also growing in significance. At last month's summit, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong announced her government would invest AU$64 million over four years in enhancing maritime cooperation with ASEAN states.

"What happens in the South China Sea, in the Taiwan Strait, in the Mekong subregion, across the Indo-Pacific, affects us all," Wong said then. The summiteers also pledged to work together to tackle transnational crime, particularly cyberscam gangs.

The 50th anniversary of bilateral relations symbolizes an opportunity for ASEAN and Australia to work closely for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region and beyond. Continued engagement of Australians and ASEAN citizens will be crucial to sustaining cooperation, facilitating exchanges and realizing mutual benefit. 

Link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/ASEAN-and-Australia-are-facing-up-to-need-for-green-cooperation 

2. U.K. summit shows why the U.N. should take lead on AI issues

Prof. Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG 

November 16, 2023

The AI Safety Summit convened two weeks ago by British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak was supposed to align interested international parties on questions of setting ground rules around the development of artificial intelligence.

But while Sunak hailed the summit in Milton Keynes and its resulting declaration as "world first" breakthroughs and the summit included participants from 28 nations, it did not really deliver concrete outcomes and was a clear failure in terms of diverse representation.

A major shortcoming of the summit declaration was a lack of specificity. The summit also produced no binding standards, regulations, policy changes, ethical guidelines or specific targets for reducing AI bias or any action plan to implement the principles discussed.

Despite the hype, the U.K. summit was not even really a first. The 2023 World Artificial Intelligence Conference held in Shanghai in July actually had more tangible outcomes. But given the challenges involved, an ad hoc event cannot be expected to show the way on AI governance; this is really an area where the U.N. should be moving matters forward.

While the EU has proposed requiring high-risk AI systems to meet transparency obligations, no such concrete commitments emerged from the U.K. summit. With advanced AI already deployed in high-impact sectors, the lack of concrete guardrails is worrying. Rhetoric needs to shift to action, with clear mechanisms for ongoing governance and accountability.

The unregulated proliferation of deepfakes, disinformation, autonomous cyber weapons, and other risks demands the establishment of global standards and policies. Otherwise, ethical AI will remain an aspiration rather than a reality.

Because AI is having a profound global impact, it is concerning to have an event like the U.K. summit limited to a narrow range of technology companies and governments. Civil society groups, marginalized communities and developing countries were all underrepresented at the summit.

This is a serious problem. Such perspectives are indispensable for inclusive governance as those at risk of harm can help expose biased data and algorithms that could amplify injustice if deployed uncritically.

The U.K. event was dominated by speakers from Western economies including the U.S., EU, Canada, Japan and Australia, and the summit declaration was signed by 28 countries and the EU, with Western nations predominant although China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, the Philippines and South Korea were among those joining in.

AI is a global challenge and requires global input. A Western-centric approach to AI governance could lead to the development of AI standards not relevant to other parts of the world, due in part to differences in values.

AI presents a universal challenge, but diverse nations have differing regulatory approaches. Progress necessitates incorporating non-Western viewpoints into cooperative initiatives, not ignoring them. Proposals from academia and civil society at Milton Keynes went largely unheard, undermining holistic governance.

Geopolitical tensions, particularly those between the U.S. and China, are a major obstacle to global cooperation on AI governance. This is increasing the risk of incompatible AI standards taking root in different countries.

Disappointingly, the U.K. summit avoided addressing many contentious issues key to achieving global collaboration on AI governance and failed to build trust between competing nations that could enhance global cooperation on AI governance.

Ignorance was amplified by the lack of coherent plans produced for AI governance. Strategies to curb AI misuse for oppression, mass surveillance and autonomous weapons were sorely lacking.

Control of dual-use AI technologies is already challenging because of the difficulty in distinguishing between legitimate and malicious uses. These dangers require urgent multilateral attention before humanitarian crises emerge.

Tangible outcomes from the Shanghai AI conference included agreement on the development of open-source AI platforms, common data sets and joint laboratories. Participants demonstrated a practical, results-oriented approach and the conference boasted diverse, global representation, including Nobel laureates and international academics.

The event also showcased AI models and their industrial impact, presenting a practical, solutions-focused agenda. Interactive sessions, livestreamed globally, made the Shanghai conference accessible and engaging, and its forward-looking approach toward emerging AI technologies marked a significant advancement in achieving concrete AI development and global cooperation objectives.

AI governance will inevitably be complex, multifaceted and evolving. Collective global ambitions for responsible AI development require transparency, inclusion, cooperation and grappling with AI's dark dual-use potential.

While the U.K. summit represents a starting point of sorts, much work remains to build an effective framework for AI governance that delivers concrete outcomes through diverse cooperation and sustained coordination between nations.

This is why establishing a U.N. body for AI governance, akin to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, would be appropriate. Such a body would help ensure an equitable and globally diverse perspective and the incorporation of views from developing nations, emerging economies and non-Western cultures.

A U.N.-led approach would also offer a more neutral and balanced platform, mitigating geopolitical biases and facilitating the development and enforcement of globally applicable AI guidelines and standards. Such an initiative would promote equitable resource and knowledge sharing and could maintain long-term sustainability and oversight.

This kind of structure should result in higher public trust and legitimacy and facilitate capacity building. It could also significantly increase public awareness and engagement in AI issues, ensuring a comprehensive, structured approach to global coordination and policymaking.

Link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/U.K.-summit-shows-why-the-U.N.-should-take-lead-on-AI-issues#

3. 2023 climate talks can deliver better results with more preparation

Prof. Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG 

May 09, 2023

Six months out from the 2023 U.N. Climate Change Conference, concerns are rising about the gap between the measures that governments are taking and the actions that scientists say are necessary to stop catastrophic climate change.

The stakes will be high when the United Arab Emirates, a top oil producer, convenes the summit, formally the 28th Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, or COP28, in late November in Dubai, with participants due to complete an assessment on progress toward achieving the goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement.

The COP27 summit last November in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, billed as a chance for Africa to seek justice as the continent most impacted by climate change yet least responsible for it, demonstrated how fragile the world's climate approach is.

The sole significant accomplishment of that meeting was a decision to create a worldwide "loss and damage" fund to compensate poorer countries for climate impacts.

The result of tense, last-minute negotiations, the fund gave all the indications of being ill-planned. Even though it has been described as providing at least $500 billion of support for needy nations, the fund currently has no paying subscribers.

Notably, some of the world's largest emitters -- in particular, China and India -- have made clear that they will not contribute to the fund. As yet, it remains unclear who will capitalize it and under what conditions distributions will be made.

Egypt hardly did any effective climate diplomacy ahead of COP27, and even countries with which it enjoys friendly relations did not send their leaders to Sharm el-Sheikh, in part due to the unfortunate timing of the event.

The conference began as the world's media was focused on the delicately balanced results of the U.S. midterm elections. The Group of 20 conference in Bali overlapped with the second week of the conference, deflecting attention and tying up many international leaders. Talks continued through the following weekend as the world's focus shifted to the opening of the soccer World Cup in Qatar.

 Those who missed the Egyptian event included the leaders of China, India, Australia and Canada. At the same time, fossil-fuel industry lobbyists were present in force, giving the event an overly business-friendly tone to the detriment of other important perspectives and voices. Meanwhile, Russia's continuing conflict with Ukraine undermined COP27 by keeping worries about fossil fuel supplies at the forefront of concerns of many governments.

COP28 is now where decisions ought to be made regarding who will pay for the loss and damage fund and how this support will be distributed. One of the challenges for the Emiratis will be how to operationalize the fund in a just manner.

The U.N. also unveiled an ambitious plan at COP27 to establish a global early warning system. The Emiratis now are supposed to nail down $3.1 billion in financing to support this system for the next five years while giving investment priority to nations at the highest risk but with governments capable and motivated to ensure effective implementation.

The Dubai conferees are also due to conduct what the Paris Agreement established as a "global stocktake" to determine whether the 200 signatory nations' pledges to reduce global emissions will be adequate to keep the increase in world temperatures below 1.5 C. Countries that have made relatively modest pledges will have to be encouraged to enhance their obligations to keep the target within the realm of possibility.

COP28 could alter the course of U.N. climate talks and provide the impetus to shift the focus from negotiation to action.

To lay the groundwork for a successful event, the Emiratis are already engaging with participating governments at the ministerial, head of delegation and technical levels. They have also committed to work closely with chairs of subsidiary bodies and the COP secretariat to prepare for the conference in a coordinated, open, transparent and inclusive manner.

The conference will be a crucial opportunity to outline how to implement a drastic course correction in global climate action. For both the summit hosts and the climate community at large, there is a definite tone of urgency, purpose and reality. Mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, and finance are all areas that will require collaboration and support at the highest levels.

As current G-20 president, India has invited the UAE to attend that body's leaders' summit, which is important as G-20 members together account for around 81% of global emissions. The UAE and India can work together to help deliver a political framework for a more effective COP28.

Similarly, the UAE should work with Japan as the current Group of Seven president. The two nations have a comprehensive economic partnership and have agreed to jointly explore hydrogen power.

In terms of what has been promised and what is still required from the U.N. climate process, there is a vacuum that must be bridged. The UAE will need effective climate diplomacy to deal with the unresolved problems and failures of the past.

Despite the absence of negotiating deadlines, COP28 must produce significant advances toward climate justice. One of the first steps will be to secure the participation of the political leaders who will matter most in resolving the climate puzzle, especially those of high-emitting nations and potential sponsors of the loss and damage fund and other programs.

The Emiratis are starting with a timing advantage, as the marathon of events that sidelined leaders last year with the G-20, the East Asia Summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders' summit will have played out this year well before COP28 convenes.

International diplomacy on issues of climate mitigation is challenging and requires a lot of time, effort and expertise. If fossil fuels continue to be exploited, then billions of people will suffer and many will perish.

Scientists have been raising the alarm for years, and if COP28 does not result in meaningful action, politicians will have lost a crucial opportunity to prevent global temperatures from rising beyond the point of no return.

Link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/2023-climate-talks-can-deliver-better-results-with-more-preparation 

4. Japan should bridge gap between G-7 and G-20

Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG & Dean & Chief Executive, ADB 

October 18, 2022 

Global cooperation should be getting stronger given the numerous interconnected crises facing the world, including the Ukraine war, rampant inflation, and high energy and food prices. Yet compromise appears increasingly out of reach. The Group of 20's gathering of finance ministers and central bank governors in Bali in July notably ended without even a joint communique due to disagreements related to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. There is growing apprehension that next month's G-20 leaders' summit in Bali may fare no better.

Meanwhile, Japan is due to take over the presidency of the Group of Seven in the new year. Given its commitment to multilateralism, this is a great opportunity for Japan to assume the leadership of the leading grouping of advanced economies. However, in a world of rising uncertainty due to protectionism and nationalism, promoting multilateralism will be easier said than done.

Japan can lead from the front by strengthening collaboration with partners, including the G-20 and the U.N. The goal should be to realize coordinated action based on universal human rights, shared democratic principles and rule-based multilateralism. The priorities of Japan's G-7 presidency should include tackling food insecurity, including both its short- and long-term causes. Energy security should be a focus as well, given the effects of the Ukraine conflict.

The U.N.'s Global Stocktake, which will assess progress on national commitments under the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, will take place concurrently with Japan's G-7 presidency. As the world's' fifth-largest carbon emitter, Japan will be one of the nations in the spotlight. A coordinated effort by the G-7 can highlight paths for rapidly decarbonizing the power sector and moving away from coal and gas while accelerating the development of renewable energy sources.

As with climate change, it is important for liberal democracies to cooperate on pressing issues affecting the prosperity of millions that require technological solutions. The G-7 should make a commitment to collaborate on safeguarding space sustainability by starting work on a treaty for the development of orbital space. The present uncontrolled course risks turning these far heavens into a junkyard of unmanageable debris.

Having served as president of the G-20 three years ago, Japan can help build bridges across the divide between the two groupings. The two clubs have overlapping global governance agendas, though the G-7 focuses more on political and security-related concerns while the G-20 leans toward global economic and financial governance. The primary goal of the G-20 has always been to support inclusive cooperation and collective action among the world's largest developed and emerging economies, although the agendas of this varied group of nations frequently diverge. G-20 countries believe that as the COVID pandemic continues to have an impact on all spheres of society, the future of shared prosperity will depend on a collective ability to generate inclusive and sustainable growth.

The G-7 must find ways to help important G-20 nations deal with domestic political pressures without resorting to protectionism and nationalism, which risk disrupting global supply chains and pushing up commodity prices. To stabilize price surges amid the market turmoil caused the Ukraine war, some countries have unfortunately restricted or banned exports to prioritize domestic supply, as with chickens in Malaysia, palm oil in Indonesia, and wheat and vaccines in India.

The G-7 should also respond to the needs of developing nations by initiating a systematic dialogue to ensure that the group's development priorities remain relevant, visible and responsive. Doing so should help developing nations to avoid taking on unsustainable debt burdens as occurred in Sri Lanka with the massive infrastructure projects launched under the umbrella of China's Belt and Road Initiative. The G-7 nations' shared agenda for global action demonstrates commitment to multilateralism as the group seeks to revitalize economies, safeguard the planet by committing to net-zero carbon emissions, ensure future prosperity and strengthen partnerships.

The Japanese presidency has a pivotal role to play in promoting resource efficiency as the next step-change for achieving a sustainable future. Equally important is ensuring that the concerns and interests of smaller countries are not neglected in the collective quest to promote sustainable and inclusive growth. G-7 members have a responsibility to develop a promising future in the spirit of sustainable economic recovery for a healthy planet and to seek progress toward a more equal world.

During Japan's G-20 presidency, members committed to work together to address global financial crises, promote economic growth, and exploit the potential of technological innovation, particularly digitalization, for the benefit of all. The late Shinzo Abe, then prime minister, emphasized multilateral leadership as part of his effort to recast Japan's position in the developing international order. The G-7 presidency provides Japan an opportunity to strengthen global governance and follow through on the commitments made in 2019 and, in the process, bring the two important global platforms closer in pursuit of their common agendas.

Growing worries about the possible use of nuclear weapons in the Russia-Ukraine conflict led Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to strategically designate Hiroshima as the destination for the G-7 leaders' summit next May. At last June's summit in Germany, he said, "We will make sure to deepen discussions on realistic measures toward the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons." By working with the international community to address diverse global concerns, Japan can contribute to developing a prosperous and peaceful international society.

Link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Japan-should-bridge-gap-between-G-7-and-G-20#

5. Singapore has lessons to offer the world on digitizing government

August 30, 2022 

Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced authorities around the world to recognize the importance of bringing public services and other government functions into the digital age.

The Group of 20 has sought to provide support to assist this transition, particularly for low-income countries, but as digital economy ministers from member countries convene this Thursday in Bali, it is evident that much work remains to be done.

In this respect, Singapore can be an inspirational model of e-governance for other nations around Asia and beyond. In recognition of its achievements, it has been invited to join this week's discussions by Indonesia, the G-20's host country for 2022, even though Singapore is not a member of the group.

Indeed, Singapore happens to be the founder and chair of the Global Governance Group, an informal bloc of 30 small and mid-size nations that seeks to boost engagement between the G-20 and the rest of the world to support multilateral cooperation and cooperation.

The G-20 community has been promoting e-governance under the "industry, innovation and infrastructure" plank of the U.N.'s sustainable development goals. Bloc leaders committed in 2017 to reduce the divide in digital infrastructure development between countries better endowed with technology resource and low-income nations by 2025, and to promote international standards for digitization under the principles of openness, transparency and consensus.

"A fully digital government should provide digital services that are proactive, human-centric and user-driven, safe and secure, easy-to-use and accessible to all," G-20 digital economy ministers agreed in a declaration concluding their summit a year ago in Trieste, Italy. "It should support protecting personal data and privacy of citizens and businesses, in order to foster confidence."

The challenges of establishing e-governance existed before the pandemic. But as many economies were forced into rapid digital transformations under the pressure of COVID-19, many of those with less access to technology had to cope with increased inefficiency and weakened resiliency. Formulating new legislation to adopt digitization within governance structures has been time consuming, while some governments have also faced resistance from civil servants when trying to integrate technology.

In developing nations, only 47% of households were connected to the internet as of 2019, according to International Telecommunication Union data. This compared with 87% of households in the developed world. With least-developed nations, only 19% of families had an internet connection.

In the case of Singapore, the government began pushing civil service computerization during the early 1980s. The drive focused on developing an innovation-accepting mindset among government employees and raising public awareness of e-government and its benefits.

Since then, Singapore's stellar e-governance systems have reduced service delivery times and provided secure, virtual access through times of crisis such as the COVID pandemic. When countries around the globe rushed to digitize public services during lockdowns, Singapore had the advantage of enjoying a ready system.

 Telehealth systems under development by the country's Ministry of Health will allow patients at home to measure vital signs such as their blood pressure or heart rate through Bluetooth-equipped watches and other such devices. The agency has deployed robots to patrol public hospital wards to help cope with patient surges during the pandemic.

Singapore is working with Malaysia and the Philippines to further digitize their immigration services to ease entry and exit for its own citizens as well as others. With the use of phone apps, facial-recognition services and other digital tools taking the place of lengthy documentation, travelers will be able to move through airports and border crossings more smoothly and quickly.

Singapore's e-government services enable its citizens to interact with official agencies online, a concept still alien to many developing nations. Its current e-government action plan would make public services even more accessible, convenient and efficient by focusing on digitized interactions between agencies on the one hand, and citizens, business and public employees on the other.

Singapore's expertise, experience and continuous innovation can help the wider G-20 community with the transition to digital governance. The Singapore-based Chandler Institute of Governance ranks the country third in the world now for effective governance. Except for New Zealand at No. 9, the rest of the top 10 is composed of Western European nations, highlighting Singapore's unique opportunity to broaden G-20 discourse to support developing countries in adopting effective e-governance policies.

The slow adoption of technology into governance has proved costly for many countries amid pandemic restrictions on movement. Standardization of e-governance across the G-20 would boost global adoption that could reduce the digital divide and increase international digital collaboration.

Such a digital transformation would provide positive reinforcement for accelerated economic growth and help make the cyber world safe and global governance more accountable and transparent.

Link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Rohingya-refugees-should-press-Myanmar-for-their-own-state

6. Rohingya refugees should press Myanmar for their own state

September 4, 2019 

Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG

Background

As the Rohingya crisis faces an impasse with refugees refusing to return in absence of safe & dignified repatriation, it is time to look for viable solutions in the face of four decades old cat & mouse game of Myanmar with the Rohingya refugees.

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"Rohingyas should either be treated as nationals or they should be given their territory to form their own state," said Mahathir Mohamad, the Malaysian prime minister, during his four-day visit to Turkey in late July.

Mahathir's provocative comment came as the international community has made a renewed effort to oppose the atrocities committed for two years now against the Rohingya, a Muslim minority in Myanmar. His words were controversial but necessary, and they set the terms of debate anew.

One of the world's most persecuted religious minorities, the Rohingya were rendered stateless in their own country in 1982 through the revocation of citizenship. They were labeled "illegal immigrants from Bangladesh" despite having a lineage of centuries in Myanmar.

Brutal eviction drives in 1978 and 1991-92 sent thousands of Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar's Rakhine state to neighboring Bangladesh. Although Myanmar took back some of the refugees each time under pressure, repatriation efforts slowed almost to a standstill from 2005.

In 2017, following the deaths of 12 Myanmar security personnel at the hands of Rohingya rebels, the Rohingya were subjected to new waves of brutal persecution, which included murder, torture, rape and arson, by both the military and local mobs. An estimated 10,000 Rohingyas were killed in this military crackdown.

 Consequently, more than 700,000 members of the ethnic Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, living in sordid makeshift refugee camps. The U.N. has already termed the atrocities "genocide," adding that Myanmar's military leaders should face trial in international courts for bringing about this inhumane situation.

There has been some international action. In July, the U.S. imposed travel sanctions against the top four commanders of the Myanmar army, known as Tatmadaw. Meanwhile, International Criminal Court prosecutors have been granted permission by judges to open a preliminary probe into the atrocities committed against the Rohingya.

But there has been no constructive action from Myanmar yet, and the plight of the Rohingya continues in ominous limbo, pressing Bangladesh's good will. This is why the world must now consider a state for the Rohingya.

It is not that the Rohingya want to stay. During his visit in last July to the refugee camp in Cox's Bazar, Taro Kono, Japan's foreign minister, learned firsthand from Rohingya refugees that they are unwilling to stay in Bangladesh for a long time and want to go back to their homeland as soon as the conditions are conducive for safe return.

Although Bangladesh, having the ninth-highest population density in the world, has shown exemplary generosity in accepting the Rohingya refugees, this small South Asian country is facing formidable challenges in providing shelter and sustenance for the huge number of refugees.

In January 2018, Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a "Physical Arrangement" document with a view to facilitating the repatriation of the Rohingyas within two years. Although the first group of the refugees was supposed to move in November 2018, the process came to a standstill because the Rohingya feared a dangerous and unwelcoming reception in Rakhine.

"Not a single Rohingya has volunteered to return to Rakhine due to the absence of conducive environment there," said Bangladesh's foreign secretary in March 2019.

Now Bangladeshis are growing dissatisfied -- a new concern for the Rohingya. The local population has seized on sporadic drug offenses and criminal activities by some Rohingya, as reported in the media, to fuel their annoyance.

As Bangladesh's patience wears thin, Myanmar's response has been feeble and inadequate. Bangladesh has already handed over names of 55,000 Rohingya refugees to the Myanmar authority for repatriation, but Myanmar has been playing a cat-and-mouse game with Rohingya repatriation for more than four decades.

Recent promises by Myanmar seem more like delaying tactics devoid of real commitment designed to reduce international pressure. It is in this context that Mahathir's suggestion to Myanmar of either giving citizenship to the Rohingya or separating a state for them makes sense for the safe and dignified repatriation of the Rohingya.

While the proposal by U.S. Congressman Bradley Sherman to bring Rakhine state under Bangladeshi control seems blunt, the idea of an autonomous state within Myanmar seems more practicable.

If Myanmar, particularly the military, feels that integrating the Rohingya with citizenship is an impossibility given sectarian hatred, it should take the option of granting autonomy by demarcating a reasonable area in northern Rakhine for a state for the 1 million Rohingya who were there before the latest atrocities.

The autonomous state can still be part of Myanmar, with central government keeping foreign affairs, defense and central taxation under its control. The autonomous region can retain the right to self-administration in local governance, health, education, taxes and other civilian aspects.

To address any lack of resources and administrative capabilities, the process can be overseen by the U.N. in similar ways to initiatives such as the transitional administrations in East Timor and in Cambodia, until the autonomous province attains stability and sustainability.

In the absence of safe and dignified repatriation, the Rohingya have the moral justification to press for their rights for an autonomous state in their homeland Rakhine.

Link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Rohingya-refugees-should-press-Myanmar-for-their-own-state

7. Huawei's Asian partners right to defy Trump–for now

May 21, 2019

Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG

Background

The US government’s decision to restrict the selling of Huawei products in American markets due to threats to data security, has been reciprocated by several developed countries. However in developing countries where advancement in infrastructure takes precedence over security issues, Huawei has remained largely unscathed. The article analyzes why it is important for China to adhere to international best practices so that its economic success can lead to effective global leadership. 

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As President Donald Trump increases the pressure on Huawei, U.S. warnings over security concerns have convinced Japan and a handful of other high-income countries to follow suit in banning the Chinese telecommunications equipment maker from the sector's next big challenge -- 5G.

But Washington seems to have had little impact on Huawei's interactions elsewhere in the world -- notably among the developing countries of Asia, including long-standing American defense partners such as Thailand.

These nations appear to be putting cost before U.S. complaints about Huawei's alleged ties with the Chinese state and its intelligence-gathering services. With close geographical, economic and political links to China, they are also balancing their relations with Washington against those with Beijing.

They are right to do so, given the overwhelming priority to lift their people out of poverty. But, as with the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing should not take their cooperation for granted.

The largest telecommunications manufacturer in the world, Huawei operates in 170 countries, earning $105 billion in 2018, almost as much as Microsoft. The company has already secured 30 5G contracts all over the world as the race for fastest new mobile technology intensifies.

Huawei's astronomic rise in recent decades is a source of national pride for China. The recent arrest in Canada of Meng Wanzhou, Huawei's CFO and daughter of the founder, Ren Zhengfei, on an American extradition request has hit a sensitive spot. For Huawei's partners, including in developing Asia, there is no way of ignoring the political implications of dealing with the company.

Moreover, Huawei is no stranger to security-linked allegations. Since 2010, U.S. intelligence officials have repeatedly alleged that the Chinese government uses Huawei and ZTE, another key telecoms equipment group, as mediums for espionage. These complaints have less to do with Huawei's internal operations than with its interactions with the Chinese government. Despite many denials, Huawei has failed to clear the air, as Trump's latest onslaught over 5G shows, including yesterday's decision by Google to take off few vital apps from Huawei's operating system.

In 2018 Huawei issued a statement saying it was never asked to share intelligence with the government. It added: "Chinese law does not grant government the authority to compel telecommunications companies to install backdoors or listening devices, or engage in any behavior that might compromise the telecommunications equipment of other nations"

However, China's 2017 National Intelligence Law takes a decidedly different line, saying "Any organization and citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work" while the 2014 counter-espionage law states "when the state security organ investigates... and collects relevant evidence, the relevant organizations and individuals shall provide it truthfully and may not refuse."

Countries in the West and Japan have limited Huawei's participation in 5G contracts to various degrees. U.S., Japan, Australia, and New Zealand have banned Huawei and other Chinese groups from bidding for 5G equipment contracts. Elsewhere, Canada, Germany, Poland, and UK are imposing restrictions on Huawei while mulling stricter measures if security protocols are not met.

However, in developing Asia, U.S. warnings have largely been ignored.

In Southeast Asia, Thailand, one of U.S.'s oldest allies in Asia, is moving ahead with its 5G Huawei test bed. Globe Telecom, the Philippines' biggest network operator, stated that concerns over Huawei were overblown and it would continue with a planned 5G rollout.  

Malaysia, which has deep ties with Huawei and hosts the company's regional headquarters, has said it would perform security checks, but the initiatives would barely affect Huawei's interactions in the country. In Middle East, Bahrain plans to move ahead with its 5G rollout in 2019 partly using Huawei technology.

In South Asia, while India mulls Huawei's involvement in its 5G, the outlook for the Chinese group seems positive, as Huawei has been invited to take part in 5G trials along with rivals, Nokia from Finland, South Korea's Samsung Electronics and Ericsson, the Swedish group. Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have all reiterated their support for Huawei, as Chinese investments continue to flow into these countries.

For countries in developing Asia, security is secondary to the cost savings that Huawei offers.

Most countries already have extensive Huawei telecommunications infrastructure in place and it makes economic sense to put in stringent new checks and not outright bans.

Huawei claims to be 12-18 months ahead of competitors in technology, including speed. While competitors dispute this, few argue that the Chinese group's equipment is second-rate. It clearly offers value for money.

In a region with a huge infrastructure funding gap, it is imperative for poorer countries to source low-cost finance in feasible ways. Chinese companies offer a cost-effective option. It is wiser for developing states not to turn down Chinese proposals but to go ahead with stricter monitoring and control measures.

For Asia's developing states, security stands secondary to the drive to build infrastructure and raise living standards, as China itself has done.

Also, the concerns raised by U.S. are perhaps more of a worry for U.S. itself as it fights for global hegemony with China, than for Asia's developing states who have mostly had cordial, reciprocal relations with Beijing. Certainly, few, except possibly India, can realistically consider themselves rivals to the Middle Kingdom.

But Beijing can do much more to help itself in enhancing ties with developing states. Even poor countries resent unfair treatment and do not want to be taken advantage of. The claims that Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure program has forced recipient states to assume excessive debt highlights the point. It would add insult to injury, if such countries now caught Huawei cooperating in spying for Beijing on their territory. China would be the loser, as much as the target country.

While a rigid, authoritarian socio-political structure may have served China well in achieving the economic heights, to be a global leader, including in the developing world, Beijing should respect the sovereign rights of others. Its focus should shift toward building reputation based on good governance and ethical business practices and not on economic or political dominance.

While developing countries in Asia are unlikely to respond to Western security concerns over Huawei, neither the company nor the Chinese government should take Asian cooperation for granted.

The BRI experience shows that even scandals in poor nations can embarrass Beijing. In the long run, for China to develop real global leadership, it needs to complement its economic success with acceptable legal and commercial practices. That should include ensuring the separation of Huawei from the country's intelligence services.

Link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Huawei-s-Asian-partners-right-to-defy-Trump-for-now

8. G-20 offers Japan a chance to raise its global game

January 04, 2019 

Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG

Background

Japan's Presidency of the G20 Group, is an opportunity for the country to rise the occasion to effectively lead on Global Platform. Given Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's international stature as a pragmatic statesman willing to redefine the role of Japan in the changing leadership of Asia Pacific & beyond, G20 is a test case of leadership for both him and Japan. The article looks into the leadership opportunities provided for Japan & how the country can do justice to the same. 

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Japan's diplomats face a busy few months as Tokyo prepares to host the Group of 20 summit for the first time, just when international economic cooperation has rarely been under so much pressure.

With a world undergoing tectonic shifts in geopolitics and multilateralism under attack, simply maintaining the global status quo and delivering an inconsequential G-20 summit in Osaka in June 2019 might itself turn out to be an achievement. Heading the group's presidency, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will earn his place as host if he can improve the climate for economic cooperation even by a degree or two.

Given the low expectations running before the November 2018 Buenos Aires summit, the outcome was as a success. Not only did U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping declare a temporary truce in the trade war that has cast a long shadow over the global economy, but the gathering of the world's top 20 economies managed to produce a final communique, unlike the 2018 meeting of the Group of Seven in Canada or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation gathering in Papua New Guinea. The curtain fell with leaders reaffirming their commitment to adhere to "rules-based international order" in the joint communique. That is a lot better than nothing.

Japan needs all the support it can get. The multilateral trade order that lifted billions out of poverty is under threat. Globalization has created a sizable population of have-nots who in many countries have elected populist leaders to solve their problems. Those leaders, most notably Trump, are mostly inward-looking and pursuing agendas inconsistent with the core tenets of free trade.

To his credit, Abe has demonstrated willingness to stand up to protectionist initiatives, including the recent U.N. General Assembly speech whereby he strongly defended the mantle of free trade. He was the first foreign leader to meet Trump to try to keep the U.S. in the Trans-Pacific Partnership economic pact. Even though he failed, Japan led the way in persuading remaining TPP parties to complete the accord, even without the U.S.

At home, Abe's initiatives to bring momentum to deflationary economy popularly known as Abenomics has also seen some success, with the benefit spilling over to trading partners.

However, even though it is second only to China among Asian economies ranked by size, Japan has yet to play an effective role as a stabilizer in the Asia-Pacific region and mitigate U.S.-China tensions.

With Beijing and Washington playing belligerent tunes, there is space for Tokyo to take bold steps, and the G-20 presidency should give it a better platform on which to act. With G-20 as a platform, Japan can facilitate dialogue between U.S. and China, and ease its own differences with Beijing.

Meanwhile, environmental questions have never been more urgent, as witnessed at the December 2018 conference in Poland, when three G-20 economies -- the U.S., Russia, and Saudi Arabia -- were among those who broke ranks with the majority and successfully demanded a watering down approval of a key scientific report -- from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Only six months left before the G-20, Japan can play a constructive role in trying to bring these three G-20 economies on board in the global fight against climate change. Japan, itself a signatory of the Paris Agreement, could use its influence with the three nations, particularly the U.S., to achieve greater agreement among the G-20 leaders on climate change.

Also, to safeguard its clout and investments in the Asia-Pacific, Japan can be more than an obedient U.S. ally in the region. The country should undertake independent policies and lead multilateral cooperation, even without the U.S., as it did in forging the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership -- the successor to the TPP abandoned by Trump. To counterbalance an assertive China, Japan should promote regional security, cooperating closely with other democratic countries in the East Asia, back international investment projects to counter the influence of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative and increase its engagement with groups like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Japan would also enhance its leadership credentials if it played a bigger role in international social and humanitarian issues, such as refugee crises, including in Asia, where the plight of the Rohingya refugees from Myanmar makes headlines. According to United Nations data, 66 million people have escaped their homeland to avoid conflict. By 2030 the world could have 180 million-320 million displaced people. Many countries have played important roles in responding to the crisis -- Uganda, in Africa, for example, Germany and Turkey in Europe, and, in Asia, Bangladesh, which hosts the bulk of the Rohingya refugees.

Japan is a signatory to the U.N. Refugee Conventions promising refugees shelter but it still accepts appallingly few people. According to Japan's Immigration Bureau, 4,882 asylum-seekers have applied for refugee status in Japan since 1982 and only 410 have been granted asylum. Germany accepted more than a million in 2015-2016 alone. Japan should find a way to relax its stringent asylum policy. Granting asylum to around 20 refugees per year is incredibly insignificant. Abe has, to his credit, tried to liberalize immigration against the backdrop of an unwilling nation. Tokyo is preparing a new visa status for nonprofessional foreign laborers, alongside existing rights for high-skilled workers. By 2025, Japan is reportedly considering letting around 500,000 relatively low-skilled laborers enter the country to ease labor shortages. This is a breath of fresh air. It shows Abe's willingness to undertake unpopular initiatives for the long-term benefit of his country. But admitting more economic migrants is not the same as welcoming refugees. There is much more work to do.

Japan's government pledges that during its presidency, it "is determined to carry out strong leadership in advancing discussions toward resolving the myriad issues now facing the international community."

To effectively lead the international community, Japan should start leading from the front as opposed to being pulled from the sides. For people to see a "revitalized" and "transforming Japan" as the official government website says it seeks, Tokyo needs demonstrate that it is not preoccupied with its own agenda but tackles issues of importance to the world at large.

Link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/G-20-offers-Japan-a-chance-to-raise-its-global-game

9. Migration - the forgotten part of ASEAN integration

November 20, 2018 

Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG

Background:

Inspite of being one of the most successful regional organizations out of Asia, ASEAN has not progressed much in addressing issues relating to refugee crises and illegal economic migration. This piece discusses how ASEAN can now graduate from an economic block to an all-encompassing organization that can address issues outside trade and investment. Inhumane treatment of illegal labor migrants and inability to address refugee crises within the community are issues which require collective response from ASEAN as a unified body. In that vein, the article argues how ASEAN can do a better job in addressing issues of migration.

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While leaders of ASEAN spoke eloquently about mutual trade and investment at their summit in Singapore this month, they had little to say about another key flow in the region -- migration.

Admittedly, they did express collective concern about the Rohingya people who become international refugees in fleeing Myanmar for Bangladesh and other countries. But for the most part they ignored the much bigger movements of other groups of people who daily cross their states' borders, mostly in search of a better life.

While members of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations have made big efforts to have advance mutual trade and investment flows to the benefit of their 640 million inhabitants, they have not been entirely inclusive in its march forward. Migrants, numbering around 6.5 million people, have largely been left out of the ASEAN integration process.

This must change. It is time for ASEAN to respond more urgently to migrants' needs with coordinated policies both for refugees, fleeing for their safety, and the much larger numbers of economic migrants. While each country will rightly have its own laws and practices, common rules should be developed to give migrants more protection and dignity.

Migrations is a major political factor in the region, with a sharp division between those countries which largely supply migrants -- Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Vietnam -- and those which receive them -- Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Together these three countries host 6.5 million migrants, 96% of them coming from other ASEAN states.

These include 284,949 documented refugees seeking asylum in neighboring states, plus unknown numbers of others who have fled for safety without registering anywhere. Almost all the rest are economic migrants looking for jobs.

As intra-ASEAN migration has increased in recent years, member states have taken acknowledged the problem and taken some steps to reduce the barriers to mobility and promote greater regional integration.

An ASEAN declaration aiming to protect migrant workers was signed early as 2007. But migration has become a significant issue in official terms with the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, agreed in 2015, which envisages reducing paperwork for work visas.

However, the troubling fact remains that the focus of these deliberations falls more on facilitating the migration of high-skilled migrants such as engineers and nurses and much less on the much larger numbers of low-skill workers, who end up as laborers and cleaners.

Undocumented economic migrant in ASEAN experience myriad mistreatments including high charges paid to people smugglers, fraud by recruitment agencies, nonpayment of salaries, low wages, long working hours, and poor workplaces safety standards. Worse, they sometimes suffer physical violence and illegal detention, trafficking, and sexual abuse. Female migrants, for example from Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines, are sometimes treated like modern-day slaves.

The abundance of human rights violation cases involving domestic workers in ASEAN seem to highlight a lack of legal protection for the thousands of women. There are not enough regulatory officials and police to assess and prevent exploitation.

Meanwhile, the Rohingya crisis has not only put pressure on neighboring Bangladesh, where most refugees have gone, but given ASEAN members a challenge that not only members have handled well. In 2015 when 25,000 Rohingya refugees were abandoned in the seas in a boat by human traffickers, the Philippine government opened its doors, offering the stranded refugees emergency assistance for five months before they were relocated to permanent settlements in the Philippines. But Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia all repeatedly rejected these latter-day boat people and towed their vessels back out to sea.

Some ASEAN members have expressed concerns that refugees bring security threats and crime, including terrorism, human trafficking and smuggling arms and drugs. Even skilled economic migrants can be seen as a danger. Students in Cambodia and Myanmar have often demonstrated hostility to foreign professionals coming from other ASEAN countries, fearing the newcomers were stealing locals' jobs.

For an institution like ASEAN, based on the mantra of noninterference, making common policies on a tricky issue like migration is challenging. But for the organization to mature and become more like the European Union, it must tackle hard topics, including migration. ASEAN should develop a single set of asylum policy principles. While each individual state may have different approaches to processing refugees, they require a standardized principle on upholding refugees' human rights. Common standards in refugee centers and in resettling refugees are also important. However, countries should retain the right to decide how many refugees they can realistically shelter.

Similarly, when it comes to economic migration, countries may differ on the technicalities such as job contracts and decide on accepting different numbers of immigrant workers. But there should be ASEAN-wide agreements on humanitarian aspects of labor migration including workplace safety, and ethical practices for recruiting, employing, paying and treating migrants. Illegal labor migration thrives in the absence of clear and transparent rules and migration channels.

Policies should be benchmarking policies against international standards such as those of the EU, which are particularly robust. I am not suggesting EU-style freedom of movement but a common EU-based framework for the human rights of refugees and migrants.

Country-specific policies for low-skilled migrants and refugees should, over time, be harmonized. Where there is political resistance to granting naturalization to immigrants, then migrants' rights as resident noncitizens can be made more dignified. Wealthier host countries, such as Singapore, should lead the way.

While ASEAN has primarily been an economic organization, it has already acknowledged the need for action on human rights with the creating of bodies such as the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC). However, unlike, for example, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, there seems to be no specific mentions of the terms "refugee," "asylum-seeker" or "forced migrant" in any of these key ASEAN documents. This needs to be addressed, and soon.

Treating migrants ultimately benefits both the migrants and the host country. The free movement of workers boosts economic growth, trade and the spread of innovation. Regions which fail to facilitate the well-managed movement of labor do not only jeopardize the dignity and even the lives of migrants, they also harm their own economic interests.

Link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Migration-the-forgotten-part-of-ASEAN-integration

10. Southeast Asian fund can complement Chinese investment by boosting self-reliance

July 3, 2018

Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG

Background

Amidst a growing Chinese economic presence, in a welcome move Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam - half of ASEAN's 10 members - have announced a common infrastructure and development fund. The Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) Fund comes at a pivotal moment, with Chinese power growing in the region while the U.S., the long-standing dominant force, seems to be in retreat. This article analyzes how ASEAN nations are waking up to an increasingly influential China and how the proposed regional fund will help in fostering a financially, self-reliant ASEAN amidst changing military and strategic alliances in the greater Asia-Pacific region.

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The countries of Southeast Asia have rarely found it easy to cooperate, despite founding one of the world's best-known regional clubs -- the Association of Southeast Asian Nations -- over 50 years ago.

With the members in very varied political and economic positions, they have found it tough to launch concrete joint projects. So in a welcome move Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam -- half of ASEAN's 10 members -- have announced a common infrastructure and development fund.

The Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) Fund comes at a pivotal moment, with Chinese power growing in the region while the U.S., the long-standing dominant force, seemingly in retreat. Beijing has found it all too easy to buy influence in ASEAN states with loan-funded infrastructure schemes and investment pledges, whilst at the same time spreading unease over its military expansion, especially in the South China Sea. The region's changing geostrategic situation tops the agenda at the ASEAN foreign ministers' annual meeting in Singapore on July 30-Aug. 4.

While details of the new Thai-led fund, including the amount of money involved, are scarce, the project shows ASEAN countries demonstrating a much-needed willingness to take the initiative and assume some joint responsibility for the region's future development.

The fund, to be jointly managed by the five founding states, aims to help Southeast Asia to become more financially self-reliant and reduce its dependence on external economic and political giants, particularly China. It is expected to raise money by issuing debt for specific infrastructure projects, according to a senior Thai official.

However, in a reflection of economic reality in a region still reliant on external capital, the fund is open to financial contributions from countries and institutions beyond Southeast Asia.

While ASEAN ministers are reluctant to criticize Beijing, it is clear they are worried about China's role in the region. China is the biggest trading partner for ASEAN members, ahead of both the U.S. and Japan, with China-ASEAN trade reaching a record high of $514.8 billion in 2017 -- a 13.8% increase from the previous year. Even Vietnam, despite its traditional enmity with China and its recent development of close ties with the U.S., exports more to China than to the U.S.

Substantial Chinese-backed infrastructure schemes abound, for example, a showpiece railway from China to Thailand via landlocked Laos, which could, one day, extend to Singapore.

Beijing has also boosted military aid, for example, to Cambodia, where it pledged $130 million in additional defense funding during the Chinese defense minister's recent visit to the country.

Chinese economic largesse has made it capable of exerting growing political influence. In the South China Sea (SCS), the biggest bone of contention in the Asia-Pacific, an international tribunal ruling against China in 2016 on territorial issues has not deterred Beijing from building artificial islands and increasing military activities.

The Philippines, which is one of the primary claimants in the international arbitration against China, has had come into understanding with Beijing under which it seems to have accepted China's growing maritime presence, despite concerns among some Philippines foreign policy officials.

Manila's ambivalent position highlights the difficulty of developing ASEAN-level regional security, since it is hard to make common cause against China when some member states -- notably Cambodia -- are becoming ever more deeply entangled with Beijing politically as well as economically. Such misplaced loyalty to China comes at the expense of fellow ASEAN members.

The U.S. and its allies have mounted a challenge to China in the region with the Quad arrangement -- a loose U.S.-led security grouping that includes Japan, Australia and India and covers the Indo-Pacific. These four countries want to work with ASEAN, as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi argued at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue conference in Singapore where he called for ASEAN to have an integral in maintaining a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.

Putting some military flesh on these bones, India and Singapore last November agreed on enhancing cooperation in maritime security to ensure "freedom of navigation" in important shipping routes such as the Malacca Lombok and Sunda Straits.

But the difficulties in challenging China have been highlighted by India's failure to join the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP), a security arrangement between Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. New Delhi's proposal has been shot down by Indonesia as it is concerned that the sovereignty of the littoral states on the straits would be compromised by including India in the patrol. Jakarta's major underlying reason is very likely the worry that China might follow suit if India were granted access. Once again, a promising initiative has fallen foul of the region's complex politics and divergent views within ASEAN.

In such a scenario, the proposed regional fund to foster a financially self-reliant ASEAN faces a tricky future. The five countries backing the fund are all major beneficiaries of Chinese investments and military aid. They will struggle to avoid conflicts of interest. They may fail to agree on key issues.

But the idea is worth trying. Stronger and deeper cooperation within ASEAN is vital. The group was originally founded in 1967 as a U.S.-backed alliance for economic development to stop the spread of communism. It now needs redefining in a world where the global communist threat is history but where Communist China has emerged as a powerful counter to the U.S.

ASEAN needs projects like the fund to promote regional unity at a time when its political cohesion is challenged by disparate alliances forged by some of its members with China.

Whether the trade ties and economic relations that bind ASEAN together will be strong enough to survive in the face competing strategic choices remains to be seen. But the fund's five partners are right to make the effort to stand together.

Link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Southeast-Asian-fund-can-complement-Chinese-investment-by-boosting-self-reliance

11. India must get smarter about handling China

May 29, 2018 

Syed Munir Khasru, Chairman, IPAG

Background

At the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue, leaders and analysts will be looking towards the speech by the opening speaker, Prime Minister Narendra Modi to understand how he plans go about with the US envisioned and India-led Indo-Pacific Strategy amidst a rising China. It has become crucial for India to consolidate influence in its immediate neighborhood, the ASEAN nations and westwards in Iran and Afghanistan to counter a growing China which is spending billions in South Asian and East Asian economies. It is also important for India to maintain a respectable relationship with China to have a peaceful and prospering neighborhood. This article looks into how India will juggle through all these geo strategies and take lead in the grand Indo-Pacific Strategy without ruffling feathers with China.

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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi may be largely focused on domestic challenges and above all on winning the next parliamentary election, due to be held by May next year.

But with both the U.S. and China paying increasing attention to the subcontinent and the vast seas that surround it, Modi cannot afford to ignore his growing foreign policy problems -- especially juggling the multiple strategic conundrums in the critical Indo-Pacific region.

After recent summits with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian leader Vladimir Putin, Modi's next opportunity to present his ideas on a global stage comes with a speech on June 1 at this year's Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore -- the premier annual Asia Pacific security forum.

India is viewed by the U.S. as helping to lead President Donald Trump's Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, which replaces the Pivot to Asia strategy undertaken by former President Barack Obama. This strategy is meant to keep the Indo-Pacific region open to trade and transit links under the aegis of Washington.

Modi's visit to the U.S. a year ago, followed by Trump's tour in Asia last November and continued high-level visit by U.S. diplomats and defense officials to Asia are all part of containing the growing influence of China in the region. The U.S. last year helped revive the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which is meant to bolster the strategic alliance between the U.S. and India, Japan and Australia.

Although India is being given a central role in this process, it must first sort out issues in its immediate neighborhood. While India continues to confront Pakistan, it cannot easily assume a leadership role in countering Chinese moves in the rest of South Asia.

In Sri Lanka, China has invested billions of dollars in developing port facilities, which is forcing India to respond by proposing to increase investments in the island nation.

Until recently, India had strained relations with Nepal after it imposed an unofficial road blockade in 2016 on the landlocked country over Kathmandu's treatment of ethnic minorities under a new constitution. The blockade was partly relieved by fuel supplies from China. Nepal has since become a supporter of China's flagship Belt and Road Initiative.

Although Bangladesh has uprooted all anti-Indian insurgency activities staged from its territory, India has yet to agree with Dhaka to a more equitable distribution of water supplies from their shared river systems. Meanwhile, China continues to maintain strong military and economic ties with Bangladesh.

India also needs to work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in asserting its influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Rivalry between the U.S. and China has split ASEAN, with more countries recently growing closer to Beijing to gain investment and maintain peaceful relations.

China appears to be pursuing a more coherent strategy than the U.S toward Asia. Beijing's BRI policy has helped ease some of ASEAN's displeasure over Chinese military moves in the South China Sea.

Within ASEAN, Cambodia and Laos have become allied with China after receiving billions of dollars in investment. Even erstwhile U.S. regional allies such as the Philippines and Thailand are tilting toward China. Under its current military junta government, Thailand has boosted defense ties with China. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has voiced support for China despite Manila's dispute with Beijing over the South China Sea. In Myanmar, China's investment far exceeds that of India.

Unsure of American commitments to the region, ASEAN nations embroiled in the South China Sea conflict have chosen to negotiate a Code of Conduct on the Seas with China. Bilateral trade between China and ASEAN reached a record $514.8 billion in 2017, while India's bilateral trade with ASEAN amounted to only $71.6 billion. In an effort to woo ASEAN leaders, Modi unprecedentedly invited all 10 to India's Republic Day Parade this year.

But India recognizes the need for a functional relationship with China and has been conducting a strategic rapprochement with Beijing. When Modi met Xi in early May in the Chinese city of Wuhan, they agreed there should be better communication and coordination between their militaries to avoid another border confrontation similar to the recent stand-off at Doklam in the Himalayas, where China, India and the mountain kingdom of Bhutan all have strategic interests.

India has long complained privately that China is waging a proxy war through Pakistan, which has close ties with Beijing. India has not joined the BRI program due to reservations over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which runs through Kashmiri territory that is disputed between India and Pakistan. But if India improves relations with China, it may place Beijing in a position to help reduce Indo-Pakistan tensions.

India is developing Chabahar Port in Iran to counter China's Gwadar Port in Pakistan, which is just 100 miles to the east. Development of the port will open a strategic transit route between India and Iran and Afghanistan and give India access to markets along the northern edge of the Indian Ocean as well as Central Asia. India is Iran's second-biggest oil customer after China.

Meanwhile, India's relations with Russia, its traditional ally, are cooling as India tilts toward the U.S. Russia and Pakistan are implicitly backing the Taliban in Afghanistan, while India and the U.S. are supporting the civilian government in Kabul. Although India remains a major military customer for Russia, Russian weaponry accounted for 62% of India's total arms imports between 2013 and 2017, down from 79% between 2008-2012. In contrast, India has bought $15 billion worth of military equipment from the U.S. in the last five years, an increase of more than 500% from the previous five-year period.

If India is to manage its complex strategic situation and increase its influence in the Indo-Pacific region, it must pursue delicate bilateral relationships with its immediate neighbors to build trust, strengthen relations with ASEAN, and tactfully contain an assertive China. This strategy will call for both smart diplomacy and pragmatic strategic positioning. Asian geopolitics is too complex to be influenced only by wishful thinking in Washington. New Delhi must play a bigger role. 

Link: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/India-must-get-smarter-about-handling-China2

12. China needs diplomatic skills to sell Belt and Road Initiative

May 18, 2017 

Syed Munir Khasru

Background

The Belt Road Summit held by China from May 14-15, 2017 was attended by heads of governments from South East and Central Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. However, weak participation from the Western nations and G7 countries speaks of China’s inability to convince the western world and other important regional players like India of the benefits of their intended mega project.

President Xi’s flagship project, promises to bring unprecedented economic benefits to almost 65 nations in Asia, Europe and East Africa, through massive infrastructural investment but fails to delineate how geopolitical complexities around stakeholder countries will be addressed. The Belt Road Initiative (BRI) requires considerable buy in from prominent European and North American leaders. The article looks into some of the diplomatic challenges that China has to address effectively if the BRI is to be a success.

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When Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered his keynote speech on May 14 to 28 heads of states, leaders of international organizations and delegations from 130 nations at the opening ceremony of the China's Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, he urged his audience to achieve results through greater openness and cooperation. Xi cautioned that countries should respect each other's interests and argued that the Belt and Road Initiative would promote fruitful exchanges and coexistence.The Belt and Road Initiative, announced by Xi in 2013, aims to connect nearly 70 economies through a network of roads, railways, bridges, pipelines and ports. Also known as the "One Belt, One Road" and "New Silk Road" project, the initiative is 12 times bigger in scale than

America's postwar Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe and it will require the significant participation of all stakeholder countries. The main objective of the summit in Beijing was to solicit the endorsement of global leaders for the China-led infrastructure projects under the BRI vision. Most leaders of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations attended thesummit, but they remain divided on how to respond to Chinese expansion in the South China Sea. Now that the U.S. has abandoned the ambitious Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement and U.S. President Donald Trump has distanced himself from former President Barack Obama's "pivot to Asia," ASEAN nations are looking toward Chinese leadership in regional investment to expand free trade despite some reservations.

The countries targeted for BRI projects cover a range of economies, demographics and governing systems. For the project to reach maturity, China needs to convince stakeholders how BRI projects will produce net economic benefits without accompanying political risks. It is in this area, where Chinese leadership seems to be struggling.

The proposed land and sea linkages crisscrossing most of South, Southeast and Central Asia have already revealed geopolitical sensitivities. India, despite lacking infrastructure investment, has voiced concern about joining the BRI because the China Pakistan Economic Corridor touches on border and sovereignty issues, a point recently made by Indian Finance Minister Arun Jaitley.

Similar concerns are likely in many of the countries that China has targeted for BRI projects. China must display the diplomatic skills needed to effectively address potential complex geopolitical issues. India, one of the fastest growing economies, represents an important conduit for Maritime Silk Road in the Indian Ocean region and the absence of an Indian delegation at the summit revealed deep-seated Indian suspicions about the project and China's geopolitical ambitions.

The roads, bridges and ports envisioned by BRI would connect Central Asia to Europe and East Africa and cover 65% of the world's population, one-third of global gross domestic product and about a quarter of global trade in goods and services. The project will hugely benefit China and help reduce its dependence on its port cities and overburdened sea routes. Developing Asian economies hungry for infrastructure view the BRI as a means to boost their international trade. At the summit, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres compared the BRI to the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals since both initiatives share a vision for global development.

Financial needs

China has lined up a consortium of banks and institutional funds, including the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road Fund and the New Development Bank, to provide $240 billion in financing. But it is estimated that $6 trillion will be needed to construct all the planned projects over the next 15 years and China alone cannot fund them. To undertake this monumental task, robust support from leading economies and private investors in the West is required. For governments and investors to invest in risky projects in volatile regions over the long term will require stronger guarantees and confidence building measures on the part of China.

Some countries targeted for BRI projects have border issues with China, while others are U.S. allies that do not want to be seen as "joining the Chinese camp." Many European economies will have security issues when it comes to BRI projects and may fear their markets being flooded with Chinese products.

Regional suspicions remain about Beijing's intentions in fostering infrastructure network

The success of the BRI depends on China creating a more inclusive and interactive mechanism to allay these concerns. China cannot ignore the voices of participatory democracies and expect them to follow the Chinese model of economic development. Observers remain uncertain whether China has the means to develop robust institutions to manage such challenges. China needs to address concerns about critical issues like sovereignty, governance and transparency to ensure the progress of the BRI.

Chinese megaprojects overseas have had a mixed record. For example, the China-financed rail project running from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to the port of Djibouti has cut transportation time from three days to 12 hours and has opened up landlocked Ethiopia to the sea. It will also soon link Ethiopia to neighboring Kenya and Sudan.

On the other hand, Chinese investments in Latin America, amounting to almost $30 billion, have only focused on been short-term resource exploration in mining and agriculture. An analysis by the Inter-American Dialogue shows that in 2016, 92% of China's loans to Latin America went to Ecuador, Venezuela and Brazil, nations that are facing serious economic problems. As a result, Chinese investment has fared differently in different regions, a concern BRI advocates will need to address.

By building infrastructure for 65% of the world's population, China can provide a much-needed global public good whose beneficiaries will mainly be in Asia, Europe and East Africa. If successfully undertaken, BRI will stand as the world's greatest platform for regional collaboration. As Napoleon said, "China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world." The question is whether and how China may move the world -- and, equally importantly, whether the world is ready to dance to the tune of Chinese music.

Link:  https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-needs-diplomatic-skills-to-sell-Belt-and-Road-Initiative