Work presented at the I <3 TECHNE exhibition: Books to be judged by the cover, 2026, installation; bookshelf 200 × 170 × 30 cm, wood, aluminium; 40 cloth-bound book objects, UV print.


[PL] Poniżej krótkiego eseju (w wersji angielskiej) o okładce w sztuce i okładce jako sztuce znajdują się mniej lub bardziej zwięzłe objaśnienia poszczególnych książek prezentowanych na wystawie, w językach polskim i angielskim.

[ENG] Below the short essay (English version) on the cover in and as art, you will find a more or less brief explanation of each book presented in the exhibition, in Polish and English.



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Weronika Wronecka

BOOKS TO BE JUDGED BY THE COVER


Written language matters to me. I learned to read and write faster than I learned to speak properly. Speaking aloud, especially in front of a larger group (more than one listener), was a particular struggle. I spent an unusually long time learning it, considering that I am now a university teacher, a lecturer, someone who makes a living by talking. Truth be told, I became a teacher precisely to force myself to find a voice. I assumed that once I stood in front of a group as a specialist, it would be too embarrassing to stay silent. I was right. It turns out that once I open my mouth, what comes out is an unstoppable stream of words, as if I were afraid that during a few seconds of pause I might forget absolutely everything I had ever learned. That's why I feel for my students. And despite everything, before every lecture I feel a fear of suddenly losing my voice and my memory.

I think in words. The existence of things that are not named, and preferably written down, is at best doubtful to me. That's why I write a great deal and keep unwittingly getting myself into large literary projects, which causes no end of trouble for my artistic career. A visual artist is supposed to produce visual works of art, and here I am, straddling the gap between the visual and visualizing the world to myself through articulation, through telling. It's supposed to go hand in hand, but it's not at all simple. I should add that I am a trained philosopher and a diagnosed autistic person (a few times during my studies, professors would slip up when talking about me and say "autistic" instead of "artistic", which I still find pretty funny). And philosophers and autists want to know why. For them, things are less real than the inquiry into what processes lie behind those things and what their causes are.


Why is it hard to combine writing with the visual arts? First, the question of causes doesn't make my life any easier. I completed two bachelor's degrees, two master's degrees, and nearly two doctorates (though I finished and defended only one), and I devoted all of these works to questions about the basic conditions of possibility of contemporary art. To how art works, how it exists, what we need it for. The result was that at my doctoral defense I was accused of being too smart for art. And being too smart is, in effect, being stupid, maladjusted. The professor I work with keeps insisting that I think too much and that this will be the ruin of me as an artist. It's obviously terribly unfair and stupid, although it's true that between editorial and academic obligations I sometimes lack the time for art. But I have no choice, because in order to make art, I first have to narrate the world to myself in such a way that art becomes possible within it at all.

Second, a large role is played by judging a book by its cover. In my circle I've already been branded a know-it-all, and even when I stay silent because I have nothing to say, others often think I'm being meaningfully silent, that my silence conceals some unspoken wisdom. This is the death knell of the fact that people cling too tightly to the idea expressed in the saying "don't judge a book by its cover." A radical belief in this idea leads to its opposite: assuming that silence might conceal some wisdom (rather than that I'm simply uninformed), people go ahead and judge the book (me) by its cover anyway – only now they overvalue it (instead of, as more often happens, undervaluing it). Our Poznań-based artist Piotr Bosacki once wrote something along the lines of: a person has as much depth as another person will attribute to them based on their surface. It was phrased differently, but Lacan had already tried to push through something similar long before.

I don't believe in any depth other than exactly that – a surface effect seen from a particular perspective. That, too, may be the autism in it, and the very core of being too smart for art, an art whose idea carries within it a certain mystery, an excess, some IT or something that goes beyond the level of physics, materiality, or visuality. No one, after all, would say that in a painting, art comes down to the materiality of the paint. Nor would I say that. But I will say that a painting is a book overvalued on the basis of its cover. Or better: a cover behind which, technically speaking, there is nothing, but symbolic culture gives us license to fill that emptiness with all the things we can't do anything else with: hopes, longings, desires, fears, and so on.

I believe that sometimes it's worth openly judging a book by its cover.

I spend my life surrounded by books. As a perfectly average academic, I've bought up quite a few beautiful publications I don't have time to read. The piles accumulating on my shelves form a charming, if somewhat pathetic, monument to my ignorance, and they make moving house difficult. A large part of my collection I inherited from my late friend, along with his unfinished novel, which I feel obligated to publish – something that rather resembles a pact with the devil. 

Humanism is the ultimate perversion, and books, nicely exposed and displayed, are the ultimate fetish. What could be more perverse than a love entirely dematerialized, an attachment to that which is intangible, ungraspable, unprovable, relative, and absolutely liable to be refuted or forgotten. Humanism is the ultimate perversion, and the book on the shelf is the ultimate fetish. We no longer live in the age of writing, and perhaps it is precisely for this reason that the fetish has become all the more fetishistic.


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Books to be judged by their cover
On the cover as a work in itself and on the epistemological status of the art object 

The title inverts the familiar advice not to judge a book by its cover, in the manner of a serious methodological proposal: the relation between surface and depth is, after all, never innocent, it organizes how we know things, and how we pretend to know them. This essay examines that relation across two adjacent fields – art and philosophy – where the question of what lies beneath the visible is particularly fraught. The question, in this sense, concerns a technique of knowing that is also a technē of making – two operations that the resulting series of objects, born out of an experimental exercise in the plein-air (TECHNE, Sokołowsko, june 2026) that gave rise to this project, takes to be inseparable.


Debt in philosophy + mystery as the "it" of art

Contemporary art, following its long entanglement with conceptualism, has come to rely on a kind of philosophical scaffolding. Discourse is no longer external to the work; it is part of its material. Yet this proximity to philosophy is uneven. Theoretical references often function as labels – markers of legitimacy attached to objects whose connection to the cited thought remains decorative. At the same time, the art object preserves what might be called a promising secret: the assumption that a silent material thing, placed within the institution of art, harbours a meaning, a depth, a value registered at the threshold of the mystical. Consider the freudian metaphor of the iceberg, often misread. Unconscious in this model is not – as many understand – a hidden secret tucked away beneath the surface, but a structure so visible, so directly exposed, that we simply fail to notice it. The viewer is invited to pour content into the surface and to call the result the work.

What makes this condition peculiar is that it operates as a form of mysticism dressed in the vocabulary of rationality. The promise is articulated through theoretical citation, methodological description, and the diction of critical analysis – yet what is being promised is, in the end, an unverifiable depth, a hidden interior whose existence is a matter of trust rather than evidence. This project takes this paradox seriously rather than ironically. In this sense, every work of art operates as a cover. We judge the book – the assumed content – on the basis of what we see, and what we see is often what we are willing to project. Rule and Levine's account of International Art English names one dialect of this promise: a jargon whose function is precisely to artify the mere object.


Knowledge in art and philosophy

How do the two disciplines – art and philosophy – understand evidence, surface, and demonstration, and where do their respective certainties dissolve?

The divergence begins with a misrecognition that flatters both sides. Artists tend to feel close to philosophy, but the proximity is largely an effect of surface: the steady presence of a presumed depth. The work looks like it is thinking; whether it is, and by what criteria one would check, remains conveniently unasked.

Philosophy returns the misrecognition in its own register. Its aesthetics still tends to address the art of the twentieth century and a set of categories quietly past their expiry date (it's a tendency, not a rule; the twenty-first century has its own approaches to art and the visible, not necessarily part of the basic aesthetics curriculum); it has rather little purchase on what is happening now, and it routinely skips the empirical – the studio, the install, the market, the milieu – as though these were marginal extras rather than the actual conditions under which art is made and judged. Philosophy theorises a discipline it does not necessarily frequent.

And what it misses is that in art rationality is not the final court. A great deal of the field is tacit, learned by doing, legible only from inside a very specific environment with capricious standards. Here techne undergoes a strange transformation: it withdraws from technical mastery and reattaches itself to a different set of competencies – a feel for citational lineage, for what has already been done; the correct calibration of irony and sincerity; institutional positioning; a finely tuned detector for cringe; the ability to make a thing read as interesting before it reads as anything else; fluency in current fashions and many more. These are not rational criteria, but they are criteria – and mastering them is a real, if peculiar, form of knowledge, often registered almost unconsciously, developed as a kind of intuition, a feel.

All of this is, at times, funny, hermetic, and capable of genuine absurdity – Ruben Östlund's The Square is essentially a feature-length documentation of the failure mode. But the absurdity should not obscure the fact that these are competencies, a habitus, an acquired sense rather than an arbitrary one.

The philosophy book cover is the inverted mirror of this. It is often the manifestation of a refusal of aesthetics – the spectacularly ugly cover that says, by its very indifference, that the content is too serious to be packaged. (The whole genre of "I would have bought this book, if not for the cover.") Aesthetic abstention is itself a code; ugliness, here, signifies depth, or rather a certain insouciance, a nonchalance directed at the surface.

Which brings us to the wager of these covers. Art is, in a certain sense, a book to be judged by its cover – the content of the book is not written, the only content we have direct access to is its form. Strictly speaking, there is no content. That is the point. The assumption that something is inside – an argument, a meaning, a knowledge – is a social convention, a part of the habitus, sustained collectively and rarely tested. The covers made here are made for exactly that book: the one judged on its surface, whose interior is a shared and necessary fiction.


Untitled work, untitled book

A particular case worth examining is the difference between the untitled artwork and the untitled book. In contemporary art, Untitled has become a respectable gesture – it signals refusal, openness, or a deliberate withholding of the interpretive key. In publishing, by contrast, a book without a title is closer to scandal than to subtlety: it cannot be catalogued, sold, or shelved. The asymmetry between these two refusals reveals how each field treats the relation between an object and its name or epistemic status, and what each is willing to surrender in order to remain itself. The series works with this asymmetry directly – proposing covers for books that have no title, and titles for books that will never exist.

The core premise of the project is to approach the book and the cover as a metaphor for art, or for representation in a broader sense. It treats the surface seriously – as an autonomous, fully-fledged field that organises experience; as a sphere that is not an in-between, not a barrier or cognitive obstacle, nor something that conceals some substantial more. The cover is treated as something that exhausts the work. Along the way, the project allows itself the use of brilliant titles that will never receive a work or a narrative – trailers that are themselves the thing they announce, and so on.